

ENGINEER
AND
ARTILLERY OPERATIONS
AGAINST THE
DEFENCES OF CHARLESTON HARBOR
IN 1863;

COMPRISING THE DESCENT UPON MORRIS ISLAND, THE
DEMOLITION OF FORT SUMTER, THE REDUCTION OF
FORTS WAGNER AND GREGG.

WITH
OBSERVATIONS ON HEAVY ORDNANCE, FORTIFICATIONS, ETC.

By Q. A. GILLMORE,
MAJOR OF ENGINEERS, MAJOR-GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS, AND COMMANDING GENERAL
OF THE LAND FORCES ENGAGED.

WITH THE
OFFICIAL REPORTS OF CHIEF OF ARTILLERY, ASSISTANT ENGINEERS, etc,

ILLUSTRATED BY SEVENTY-SIX PLATES AND ENGRAVED VIEWS.

(PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY.)

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TO THE HONORABLE

EDWIN M. STANTON,

FOR HIS TRUTH AND CANDOR AS A MAN.

HIS PURITY AS A PATRIOT,

AND HIS WISDOM, ENERGY, AND JUSTICE

AS A PUBLIC OFFICER.

N O T E .

It is proper to state that the general Report of the Campaign of 1863, before Charleston, submitted to the General-in-Chief, has been somewhat enlarged, more particularly the observations and suggestions on the subjects of heavy ordnance and fortifications, in preparing it for publication.

It was the original intention to publish the reports of all the subordinate commanders, but some of them were not received until about a month since, too late to take their proper place in the work, or to be used in making up the general Report, while others have not been received at all. The work, however, has been made sufficiently full and complete without them.

Q. A. GILLMORE.

NEW YORK, *Nov.* 16, 1864.

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GEN. GILLMORE'S REPORT.

CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA.

1. THE city of Charleston, South Carolina, is situated at the head of Charleston Harbor, on the point of a narrow peninsula formed by Ashley and Cooper Rivers. It is distant seven miles from the outer edge of the bar which stretches across the entrance to the harbor. This entrance is formed by Sullivan's Island on the north, and Morris Island on the south side; each about three and a half miles in length, low, narrow, and sandy, and each separated from the mainland adjacent to it by soft, deep, and impracticable marshes, varying in width from one and a half to three miles. These marshes are slightly above the level of ordinary high water, but are submerged by spring tides. They are traversed by numerous small streams or bayous, that are generally very narrow, deep, and tortuous. The inner ends of these islands reach to within three and a half to four miles from Charleston city. The harbor, inside of Morris and Sullivan's Islands, is bounded by the mainland on the north and by James Island on the south side. The

shortest distance across the channel between Sullivan and Morris Island is 2,700 yards.

FORTIFICATIONS IN CHARLESTON HARBOR BEFORE THE WAR.

2. The defences provided for the city of Charleston by the United States comprised the following works, viz. :

3. First, Fort Sumter, a strong casemated brick work of five faces, designed to mount two tiers of guns in embrasure and one *en barbette*. It is built on a shoal, its foundations being formed by stones *a perdue*. It is located on the south side of the channel, nearly equidistant from Sullivan and Morris Islands, and three and one-third miles distant from the nearest part of the city.

4. Its full armament, which it never received, would comprise about one hundred and thirty-five guns. None of the embrasures of the second tier had been finished at the commencement of the present war, and the openings left for them were walled up with brick during the occupancy of the work by Major Anderson's command in the spring of 1861, in which condition the enemy allowed them to remain. Its armament at that time comprised six 24-pounders, forty-one 32-pounders, ten 8-inch Rodman guns, ten 42-pounders, three 10-inch columbiads, and eight 8-inch sea-coast howitzers.

5. Second, Fort Moultrie, located on Sullivan's Island

at 1,700 yards' distance from Fort Sumter. It is a brick work mounting one tier of guns *en barbette*. Its armament in the autumn of 1860 consisted of sixteen 24-pounders, fourteen 32-pounders, ten 8-inch columbiads, five 8-inch sea-coast howitzers, and seven field-pieces.

6. Third, Castle Pinckney, an old-fashioned brick work on Shute's Folly Island, one mile east of the lower end of the city. Its armament at the opening of the war comprised fourteen 24-pounders, four 42-pounders, four 8-inch sea-coast howitzers, one 10-inch and one 8-inch mortar, and four light pieces for flank defence.

7. To the works above named, intended solely to resist a naval attack, the enemy commenced adding rapidly and largely when the war broke out.

8. Strong earthworks were erected on the upper and the lower ends, as well as at intermediate points, of both Morris and Sullivan's Islands.

9. The gorge wall of Fort Sumter was reinforced adjacent to the magazines, and its armament increased.*

10. Additional guns were mounted on Fort Moultrie, and it was otherwise very materially strengthened.

11. Old Fort Johnson, on James Island, was rebuilt and armed with a few heavy guns and mortars.

* See foot-note to paragraph 136.

12. Several batteries were also established on the shell beach running in a southeasterly direction from Fort Johnson.

13. Heavy guns were mounted upon the wharves of the city, and a number of iron-clad rams were constructed.

14. A work called Fort Ripley, mounting a heavy armament, was also improvised in the middle ground north of Fort Johnson.

15. Against a land attack formidable preparations were likewise made. On James Island a line of detached works, armed with heavy artillery, was constructed, fronting the Stono River, with its left resting on the village of Secessionville, and its right on James Island Creek, while Fort Pemberton, a strong and heavily armed earthwork, located at the junction of Wapoo Cut and Stono River, controlled the approach in that direction. Stono Inlet and Harbor were protected by an enclosed work on Coles Island, within short and effective range of the anchorage and all the landing-place inside the Stono bar.

16. Between Secessionville and Fort Johnson a long line of earthworks, armed with artillery, and looking toward Morris and Folly Islands, swept all the water approaches from that quarter.

17. In rear of the city of Charleston, formidable defences were also erected, covering the approach down the peninsula; but no very reliable information as to

their extent and strength had been obtained by us prior to the siege of Fort Sumter, which commenced early in July, 1863.

18. A line of heavily-armed entrenchments was also constructed, northeast of the city, on the mainland, extending from Wandoo River to Copahee Sound, to guard the approach from Bull's Bay.

19. The strength of the James Island works was tested by a bold but unsuccessful assault upon them by our forces under Brigadier-General Benham, on the 16th day of June, 1862.

20. A gallant attack upon Fort Sumter by our iron-clad fleet under Rear-Admiral Dupont, on the 7th day of April, 1863, was likewise unsuccessful. One of the iron-clads, the thin-armored Keokuk, was so much injured on that occasion that she subsequently sank abreast of Morris Island, and her armament fell into the hands of the enemy, while the others withdrew after an engagement of forty minutes, most of them being considerably disabled.

PLAN OF OPERATIONS.

The operations executed against the defences of Charleston comprised principally,

21. First, The descent upon the south end of Morris Island, and the capture of the enemy's fortified positions there, July 10th, 1863, including two co-operative feigned attacks elsewhere.

22. Second, Two unsuccessful assaults upon Fort Wagner on July 11th and 18th.

23. Third, The demolition of Fort Sumter by two bombardments, viz., from the 17th to the 23d of August, and from the 27th of October to the 9th of November.

24. Fourth, The siege and reduction of Forts Wagner and Gregg, ending September 7th.

25. Toward the close of May, 1863, I received orders to repair to the city of Washington. I there learned that it was the wish of the navy department to make another trial of the turret iron-clad gunboats against the defences of Charleston Harbor. My views, in regard to the part which could be efficiently taken in such an operation by the small land force then available for the purpose in that quarter, were requested. It was distinctly understood that no more troops could be sent to the department of the South.

26. I had entertained the opinion, which I freely expressed in my interviews with the secretary of war, the assistant secretary of the navy, and the general-in-chief, during which the subject was fully discussed, that Fort Sumter could be reached and reduced, or its offensive power entirely destroyed, without material, and perhaps without any, augmentation of the land and naval forces then serving in the department of the South; that a cordial and energetic co-operation between the two branches of service was essential to in-

sure the success of any plan of joint operations having in view the capture of Charleston city; and that the naval commander should be an officer who had confidence in the efficiency of the turret iron-clads, (*monitors*,) and their fitness to such work, and who was willing to risk his reputation in the development of their presumed, but comparatively unknown, though not unquestioned, powers. The operation was regarded as one requiring not only audacity but perseverance in its execution.

27. I also expressed the opinion that, beyond the capture of Morris Island and the demolition of Fort Sumter, the land forces, numbering scarcely eleven thousand men of all arms available for offensive operations, could not, unless largely reinforced, take the lead in any operations against the interior or land defences of Charleston, that would involve their leaving their hold upon the narrow sea islands, where, on the one hand, they had the co-operation of the navy against the iron-clad rams and gunboats of the enemy, and, on the other, practically impassable marshes, against which the well-known superior numbers of the enemy, and their facilities for concentrating troops by railroad, could be of little avail and confer no special advantage.

28. A land attack upon Charleston was not even discussed at any of the interviews to which I was invited, and was certainly never contemplated by me.*

* Major-General Halleck, general-in-chief, in his annual report

29. The principal question was, to what extent the fall of Sumter, or the destruction of its offensive power, would exert an influence on the capture of Charleston; that, of course, being the ultimate object in view.

says: "The withdrawal last year of most of our troops in South Carolina to reinforce General McClellan on the Peninsula compelled the commanding general of the department to confine himself mainly to the defence of the point which he then occupied. An attack upon Fort Sumter and Charleston had long been in contemplation by the navy department, and in March last it was represented that the operations of the iron-clads and monitors would be greatly facilitated by a land force prepared to assist the attack, and to occupy any work reduced by the navy.

"Accordingly General Foster, with a considerable force, and a large siege equipage which had been prepared for another purpose, was sent to assist in the naval attack. It was thought that his talents and experience as an engineer officer, and his personal knowledge of the localities and defensive works of Charleston Harbor, rendered him peculiarly suited for this duty; but not proving acceptable to the commanding general of the department, he was permitted to return to his command in North Carolina, leaving his troops and siege preparations in the department of the South. The naval attack on Fort Sumter took place on the 7th of April, but being unsuccessful, nothing apparently remained to be done by the land forces. A siege of Charleston and its defences by land had never been contemplated, and, therefore, was no part of the plan. It was now represented by the navy department that a second attack upon Fort Sumter and Charleston was preparing, and that its success required the military occupation of Morris Island and the establishment of land batteries on that island to assist in the reduction of Fort Sumter. The establishment of these batteries and the reduction of the enemy's works—Fort Wagner and Battery Gregg—being a matter of engineering skill, Brigadier-General, now Major-General Q. A. Gillmore, was selected to command the land forces engaged in these operations. In addition to being an educated and skilful military engineer, he had considerable experience

30. A consideration which possessed much weight in the deliberations, was, the great practical advantage to be derived from a blockade of Charleston Harbor in all respects thorough and complete. The capture of Morris Island, by allowing a portion or all of the blockading fleet to lie inside the bar, even should they fail to finally occupy the waters of the inner harbor, would secure this end.

in the special duties required in these operations. General Gillmore, despite the enemy's defensive works, landed his force on Morris Island on the 10th of July, and immediately commenced the slow and difficult operations of conducting the siege of Fort Wagner, and establishing batteries against Fort Sumter. Without, however, waiting for the reduction of the former, he opened, on the 17th of August, his fire on the latter, and on the 23d, after seven days' bombardment, Fort Sumter was reported a shapeless and harmless mass of ruins.

“Being under the fire of other forts of the enemy, inaccessible by land, our troops could not occupy it, and a few guns have since been temporarily remounted, but they have been as often silenced. General Gillmore now vigorously pushed forward his saps against Fort Wagner, and, on the morning of September 7th, took possession of that place, and also of Battery Gregg, most of the garrison having made their escape in boats during the night. He captured in all thirty-six pieces of artillery and a large amount of ammunition.

“General Gillmore's operations have been characterized by great professional skill and boldness. He has overcome difficulties almost unknown in modern sieges. Indeed, his operations on Morris Island constitute a new era in the science of engineering and gunnery. Since the capture of Forts Wagner and Gregg he has enlarged these works, and established powerful batteries which effectually command Fort Sumter, and can render efficient aid to any naval attack upon Charleston. They also control the entrance to the harbor.”—*See General Halleck's Report, dated November 15th, 1863.*

31. The naval authorities at the seat of government regarded Fort Sumter as the key of the position. That stronghold once demolished, or its offensive power practically destroyed, the monitors and other iron-clads, they affirmed, could remove the channel obstructions, secure control of the entire harbor, and reach the city.

32. The barbette batteries of "Sumter" were specially dreaded, on account of their height above the water, and the comparative vulnerability of the monitors' decks to a plunging fire.

33. It was therefore determined to attempt the destruction of Fort Sumter, unless it should become necessary before the commencement of active operations, to detach troops from the department of the South to reinforce General Grant or General Banks, then operating on the Mississippi.

34. The following is a brief synopsis of the plan of attack agreed upon. Of the four distinct operations which it comprises, the army was to take the lead in executing the first, second, and third.

35. First, To make a descent upon and obtain possession of the south end of Morris Island, known to be occupied by the enemy, and then being strongly fortified by him offensively and defensively.

36. Second, To lay siege to and reduce Fort Wagner, a heavily armed earthwork of strong plan and relief, situated near the north end of Morris Island, and distant about 2,600 yards from Fort Sumter. With

Fort Wagner the work on Cummings Point would also fall.

37. Third, From the position thus secured to demolish Fort Sumter, and, afterwards, co-operate with the fleet, when it was ready to move in, by a heavy artillery fire.

38. Fourth, The monitors and iron-clads to enter, remove the channel obstructions, run by the batteries on James and Sullivan's Islands, and reach the city.

39. I received no written instructions whatever from the war department, everything connected with the operations of the land forces, in general and in detail, being left to my judgment and discretion. It was presumed that as soon as the fleet should reach the city, the outer line of defences thus broken through would be abandoned by the enemy; for, the control of Cooper and Wandoo Rivers by our gunboats, and the operations of the land forces which they could then aid and cover, would compel the evacuation of Sullivan's Island, after which the possession of James Island would be of but little value to the enemy.

40. Other plans of joint operations, to be executed after the navy should enter the inner harbor and reach the city, were subsequently from time to time discussed by Rear-Admiral Dahlgren and myself, which it is unnecessary to mention here.

41. Rear-Admiral Foote, an officer of tried bravery and long and successful experience, had, for the special

purposes of this contemplated attack, been assigned to the command of the South Atlantic blockading squadron, which included the naval force available for operations against Charleston. By his sudden death, the command devolved upon Rear-Admiral Dahlgren. He assumed command on the 6th of July, relieving Rear-Admiral Dupont.

42. I assumed command of the department of the South on June 12th. Our forces at that time had control of the coast from Lighthouse Inlet to St. Augustine, Florida, a distance of nearly two hundred and fifty miles. The positions actually occupied by our troops were, Folly Island, Seabrook Island, on the North Edisto, St. Helena Island, Port Royal Island, Hilton Head Island, Tybee Islands, Fort Pulaski, Ossabaw Island, Fort Clinch and Amelia Island, and the city of St. Augustine. An efficient blockading squadron lay off, or inside, the principal inlets.

43. Folly Island, the most northerly portion of the coast in our possession, was occupied by a brigade under Brigadier-General I. Vogdes, who had entrenched the position strongly, and had mounted several heavy guns on the south end of the island, to control the waters of Stono Harbor and Inlet, and the water approaches from James Island. A road had also been opened, practicable for infantry and artillery, by means of which a concealed communication with all parts of the island was secured.

44. A naval force under Commander Balch, comprising two gunboats and a mortar schooner, was stationed in the Stono and Folly Rivers, to co-operate against any possible attempt to dislodge us from Folly Island, and particularly to hold Stono River against the enemy's light-draft gunboats, that might approach by way of Wappo Cut, and Fort Pemberton.

45. The greater portion of Folly Island was very thickly wooded, the undergrowth being dense and almost impassable. Near the north end of the island, for a distance of nearly two thousand yards, it was extremely narrow, perfectly barren, and so low that the spring tides frequently sweep entirely over it. At the extreme north end, however, the sand ridges formed by the gradual action of the wind and tides, were, when our operations commenced, covered with a thick undergrowth, favorable for concealment and the masking of batteries. In this undergrowth General Vogdes had his pickets, those of the enemy being on the opposite side of Lighthouse Inlet, within musket range.

46. Cole's Island, and all the hommocks and patches of firm ground between Folly and James Islands, were kept under our surveillance by means of constant reconnoissances.

47. It was determined to withdraw the forces from Ossabaw Sound and the North Edisto, as positions of no importance to us, and of no advantage to the enemy, in consequence of the efficient blockade of those inlets by the navy.

48. By the changes above indicated, it was found that the aggregate means for carrying on offensive operations within the department, leaving the valuable depots at Hilton Head perfectly secure, and the other most important points reasonably so, comprised the forces enumerated below, viz. :

- 10,000 Effective Volunteer Infantry ;
- 350 Volunteer Artillerists for serving heavy guns and guns of position ;
- 600 Volunteer Engineer troops ;
- 28 Pieces Field Artillery completely equipped and mounted ;
- 8 Pieces Field Artillery without horses, and but partially manned ;
- 5 Parrott Rifle Guns of eight inches diameter of bore, known as 200-pounders ;
- 9 Parrott Rifle Guns of six and four-tenth inches diameter of bore, known as 100-pounders ;
- 12 Thirty-pounder Parrott Siege Guns of four and two-tenth inches diameter of bore
- 4 Twenty-pounder Parrott Siege Guns of three and sixty-seven hundredth inches diameter of bore ;
- 12 Thirteen-inch Sea-coast Mortars ;*
- 10 Ten-inch Siege Mortars ;
- 5 Eight-inch Siege Mortars ;
- 3 Coehorn Mortars.

49. There were on hand a liberal supply of ammunition and engineering tools and materials. The entire

* The thirteen-inch sea-coast mortars were not used by us at all in our siege operations. Lighter mortars were used in the siege of Fort Wagner. Very little mortar fire was employed in the demolition of Fort Sumter, the siege of Fort Pulaski having satisfactorily demonstrated that for the reduction of casemated works of that character, at long ranges, mortars are not efficient, on account of the inaccuracy of their fire.

effective force in the department, including men on extra and daily duty, was 17,463 officers and men inclusive. No portion of the artillery was organized into a siege train.

50. As the endurance of the Parrott guns of heavy calibre was at that time a matter of some distrust and uncertainty, requisitions were sent forward for several more of them, which were promptly filled by the ordnance department.

PLAN OF PRELIMINARY ATTACK.

51. The project for obtaining a lodgment on Morris Island comprised three distinct operations :

First, The real attack from Folly Island, to partake of the nature of a surprise, more or less complete ;

Second, A demonstration in force on James Island by way of the Stono River, designed to prevent reinforcements to the enemy on Morris Island from that quarter, and, if possible, draw a portion of the Morris Island garrison in that direction ;

Third, The cutting of the Charleston and Savannah railroad at Jacksboro', by ascending the South Edisto River, in order to delay reinforcements from Savannah, should the real attack be temporarily checked or prematurely divulged.

52. The demonstration up the Stono was commanded by Brigadier-General A. H. Terry, and was eminently

successful. A part of the Morris Island garrison was drawn to James Island by it.

53. The attempt to cut the railroad between Charleston and Savannah was entrusted to Colonel Higginson, First South Carolina Volunteers, (colored,) who was sent from Brigadier-General R. Saxton's command at Beaufort for that purpose. It signally failed, with a loss to us of two pieces of field artillery, and a small steamer, which was burned to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy.

DESCENT UPON MORRIS ISLAND, JULY 10, 1863.*

54. The storming of a fortified position, except when

* The question has been asked why the route across James Island from Stono River, the same that Brigadier-General Benham attempted, was not selected to operate upon.

The answer is simple. The enemy had more troops available for the defence of Charleston than we had for the attack. The general-in-chief, in the preliminary discussions of the project, had mentioned ten thousand men as the approximate number that could be collected in the department of the South for this operation. The force actually got together there did not vary much from eleven thousand five hundred men, including engineers and artillerists. Upon Morris Island, on account of its narrowness, this force was ample, and it was not until the command had been reduced one-third by sickness and casualties that reinforcements were asked for. But James Island presents a different case. There our progress would soon have been arrested by the concentration of a superior force in our front. Upon Morris Island both parties had all the force that could be employed with advantage. Our superiority in artillery, ashore and afloat—particularly in the use of mortars in the trenches—the

preceded by the slow operations of a regular siege, which, besides partially or entirely silencing the fire of the enemy's works, will also enable the attacking column to get very near the enemy under cover before the final assault is made, is always an operation attended with imminent peril in its execution, and great uncertainty in its results. The best troops can seldom be made to advance under the fire of even a few well-served pieces of artillery. The hazard of such an undertaking, great as it is under ordinary circumstances, when both parties operate on firm ground, becomes immeasurably augmented when the assaulting column has to approach in small boats from a distant point, exposed to full view and constant artillery fire, disembark and form upon an open beach in the presence of the enemy, and finally advance to the attack under the combined fire of artillery and small-arms.

55. Yet these were the difficult conditions of the problem so successfully solved in the descent upon Morris Island on the 10th day of July.

56. It was known from deserters and fugitives that the enemy had there in position from ten to twelve guns

successful application of new devices, the energy and skill of our engineers, and a steadily maintained initiative, gave us the controlling elements of success. Moreover, according to the programme of joint operations, the demolition of Fort Sumter was what the land forces had to accomplish, and that could be done with more ease and certainty from Morris Island than from any other position. James Island was too wide to operate upon, with a fair promise of success, with our small force.—Q. A. G.

of various calibres, and that these were so arranged in batteries of single pieces, that they each covered with their fire, not only the north end of Folly Island held by our advanced pickets, and the main ship-channel abreast of Morris Island, but could be so traversed as to sweep the entire length of Lighthouse Inlet, which separates the two islands.

57. Three methods of conducting the assault suggested themselves:

First, To place the men in small boats in Stono River, tow them out to sea, and land them in the surf at day-break on the sea front of Morris Island;

Second, To accumulate on the north end of Folly Island the boats required for the assaulting column, keep them concealed there until the moment of attack, and then launch them under fire, embark the men, and cross over;

Third, To embark the men in Folly River, and pass in the night-time, during high tide, through the shallow creeks into Lighthouse Inlet and make the assault from that direction. This last-named method of attack was adopted.

58. In the mean time, between the middle of June and the 6th of July, ordnance and ordnance stores were quietly accumulated at Folly Island.

59. The following armament was secretly placed in position on the north end of Folly Island, completely

masked from the enemy's view by sand ridges and undergrowth. The object to be secured by this powerful array of guns was threefold, viz., First, To operate against and, if possible, dismount the enemy's guns nearest the place where the landing would have to be made; Second, To cover the debarkation of the troops; and, Third, To protect their retreat to the boats in case of repulse. This last-named condition was considered by far the most important of the three.

Battery.	No. of Guns.	Kind of Guns.
A . . .	2 . . .	3-inch Field Rifle.
B . . .	4 . . .	20-pounder Siege Parrott.
C . . .	4 . . .	30-pounder Parrott.
D . . .	6 . . .	10-inch Siege Mortar.
E . . .	2 . . .	3-inch Field Rifle.
F . . .	6 . . .	10-pounder Field Parrott.
G . . .	8 . . .	30-pounder Parrott.
H . . .	4 . . .	10-inch Siege Mortar.
I . . .	6 . . .	3-inch Wiard Field Rifle.
K . . .	5 . . .	8-inch Siege Mortar.

(See Plate II.)

60. The duty of constructing these batteries was assigned to Brigadier-General I. Vogdes. The task was by no means easy, and to its successful execution our subsequent triumphs were due in no small degree.

61. It was necessary that the attack on Morris Island should be a surprise in order to insure success. Secrecy was therefore an essential element in the preparations. Most of the work on the batteries, and all the transportation to them, was accomplished at night, and in silence.

Moreover, all signs of work had to be carefully concealed by day. One fortunate circumstance favored these operations. A blockade-runner had been chased ashore just south of the entrance to Lighthouse Inlet, within point-blank range of our batteries, and while the enemy on Morris Island were industriously engaged in wrecking this vessel night and day, (an operation which we could easily have prevented,) our batteries were quietly and rapidly pushed forward to completion. They were ready to open fire on the 6th July.

62. The fact that forty-seven pieces of artillery, with two hundred rounds of ammunition for each gun, and provided with suitable parapets, splinter-proof shelters, and magazines, were secretly placed in battery in a position within speaking distance of the enemy's pickets, exposed to a flank and reverse view from their tall observatories on James Island, and to a flank view at pistol range from the wreck, furnishes by no means the least interesting and instructive incident of this campaign.

63. Meanwhile, during the week ending July 8th, additional troops, comprising Brigadier-General Terry's division, about four thousand strong, and Brigadier-General Strong's brigade, about two thousand five hundred strong, were quietly accumulated on Folly Island under cover of darkness.

64. The buoys at the entrance to Stono River, where the channel was narrow and crooked, with but five feet

of water at low tide, were lighted up at night, and all transports carrying troops were ordered to enter after dark, land their men, and depart before daylight in the morning. Sutlers' schooners were ordered away, and all appearance of preparations for offensive operations was carefully suppressed. Upon General Vogdes' defensive works on Folly Island a semblance of great activity was conspicuously displayed. Everything being in readiness, the following order was issued:

65. CONFIDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH,
FOLLY ISLAND, July 8th, 1863.

I. An attack upon Morris Island will be made at the rising of the moon to-night, by Brigadier-General Strong's brigade of Brigadier-General Seymour's division. This force will be embarked in small boats immediately after sunset, and will pass through Folly Island Creek to and across Lighthouse Inlet.

A small detachment from this force will enter the creek to the west of Morris Island, and will land just north of the old lighthouse, seize the batteries there, and, if possible, turn them upon the enemy's encampment north of them. The main column will land from Lighthouse Inlet, carry the batteries on the south end of Morris Island, and advance to the support of the detachment above mentioned. Two regiments and some field artillery will be held in readiness on the extreme north end of Folly Island to be pushed over as reinforce-

ments. To this end General Strong will send his boats back as soon as he has disembarked his command.

II. At the same time General Terry, with all his division, except the One Hundredth New York Volunteers, will ascend the Stono River under convoy of the navy, and make a strong demonstration on James Island, but will not unnecessarily hazard any portion of his command. Perhaps one or two regiments only need be disembarked. These should be pushed forward as skirmishers under cover of the navy.

III. A naval force is expected to enter the main channel abreast of Morris Island, by or before sunrise to-morrow morning, to co-operate with the land forces.

IV. Should the night attack fail from any cause, the assaulting column will withdraw to Folly Island, sending their boats into Folly Island Creek. In that event the batteries on the north end of Folly Island will open at daybreak, or as soon thereafter as practicable.

Brigadier-General Seymour will arrange the details.

By order of

Brigadier-General Q. A. GILLMORE.

W. L. M. BURGER,

Assistant-Adjutant-General.

66. Colonel Serrell of the New York Volunteer Engineers had received orders to remove, before daybreak on the 9th, enough of the piles, which the enemy had previously placed across the creek which connects Light-

house Inlet with Folly Island Creek, to allow the column in the small boats to pass through.

67. The batteries on the north end of Folly Island were also ordered to be unmasked, by opening out the embrasures and cutting away the brushwood in front of them. (See Plate II.)

68. About midnight on the 8th it was determined, for various reasons, the principal one of which was the unseaworthy condition of our boats, to defer the attack until the next night. A sufficient number of piles had been removed to afford a passage for the boats, but the work of unmasking the batteries had not progressed far enough to expose them to the view, or attract the attention of the enemy.

69. In the mean time Brigadier-General Terry's command, of about three thousand eight hundred men, had proceeded up the Stono River on the afternoon of the 8th, and was confronting the enemy on the lower end of James Island. The immediate effect of this demonstration, as subsequently ascertained, was to draw off a portion of the enemy's force on Morris Island.

The following order was then issued on the afternoon of the 9th, and full detailed instructions for the assault given verbally to Generals Seymour and Strong.

65. CONFIDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH,
FOLLY ISLAND, S. C., July 9th, 1863.

I. The attack on Morris Island, ordered for this

morning but postponed in consequence of the inclemency of the weather and other unfavorable circumstances, will take place to-morrow morning at break of day, by opening our batteries at the north end of Folly Island.

General Strong's brigade, or so much of it as the small boats can accommodate, will embark to-night and hold itself in Folly Island Creek, ready to move forward and at the proper time occupy the south end of Morris Island.

II. Lieutenant - Commanding Francis W. Bunce, United States Navy, with four navy howitzer launches, will approach Lighthouse Inlet at daybreak, by way of Folly Island Creek, and engage the enemy's rifle-pits and batteries on Morris Island in flank and reverse, choosing his own position. He will cover General Strong's landing.

III. Two' regiments of infantry, a battery of light artillery, and five Requa's rifle batteries,* will be held in readiness to reinforce General Strong promptly.

Brigadier-General Seymour will arrange and order all details.

By order of

Brigadier-General Q. A. GILLMORE,

ED. W. SMITH,

Assistant-Adjutant-General.

* For a description of the Requa batteries see Report of Major T. B. Brooks, A. D. C. and Assistant Engineer.

71. In pursuance of the above order, nearly two thousand men of General Strong's brigade were embarked in small boats in Folly River on the evening of the 9th, and at daybreak on the following morning the head of the column had reached Lighthouse Inlet, where it was halted. The boats kept close to the east shore of the creek, and were screened by the marsh grass from the view of the enemy on Morris Island.

72. Our batteries on Folly Island opened shortly after daybreak, and were served rapidly for about two hours, when I ordered General Strong to land and make the assault by putting two regiments ashore at Oyster Point, and the balance of his command on the firm land lower down. The landing was promptly effected, under a hot fire of artillery and musketry, under which our troops did not falter for a moment. All the enemy's batteries on the south end of Morris Island were gallantly and successively carried.

73. By 9 o'clock A.M. we occupied three-fourths of the island, and our skirmishers were within musket range of Fort Wagner. The heat being intense, and the troops exhausted, offensive operations were suspended for the day.

74. Brigadier-General Seymour was ordered to carry Fort Wagner by assault at daybreak on the following morning. The attempt failed. The following report of these operations was made to the general-in-chief:

75.

DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH,
HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,
MORRIS ISLAND, July 12th, 1863.

Major-General H. W. HALLECK,

General-in-Chief U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.:

SIR,—I have the honor to report that at five o'clock on the morning of the 10th instant I made an attack upon the enemy's fortified positions on the south end of Morris Island, and, after an engagement lasting three hours and a quarter, captured all his strongholds on that part of the island, and pushed forward my infantry to within six hundred yards of Fort Wagner. We now hold all the island except about one mile on the north end, which includes Fort Wagner and a battery on Cummings Point, mounting, at the present time, fourteen or fifteen heavy guns in the aggregate. The assaulting column was gallantly led by Brigadier-General Strong. It landed from small boats, under cover of our batteries on Folly Island and four monitors led by Rear-Admiral Dahlgren, which entered the main channel abreast of Morris Island soon after our batteries opened.

The monitors continued their fire through the day, mostly against Fort Wagner.

On the morning of the 11th, at daybreak, an attempt was made to carry Fort Wagner by assault. The parapet was gained, but the supports recoiled under the fire to which they were exposed, and could not be got up. Our loss in both actions will not vary much from

one hundred and fifty men in killed, wounded, and missing.

We have taken eleven pieces of heavy ordnance, and a large quantity of camp equipage. The enemy's loss in killed, wounded, and missing, will not fall short of two hundred.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Q. A. GILLMORE,

Brigadier-General-Commanding.

76. It was subsequently ascertained from deserters and prisoners that the enemy's loss was very considerably under-estimated in the above report. General Beauregard, in his official dispatch, admits a loss of three hundred, including sixteen commissioned officers, killed, wounded, and missing.

77. The kind and calibres of the guns captured in this assault are given in the following table, and their several positions are indicated on Plate II, by the capital letters as follows:

A	1	Eight-inch Navy Shell Gun. Pintle in centre transom.
B	1	Eight-inch Sea-coast Howitzer. Pintle in rear transom.
C	1	Three-inch Whitworth, Siege Carriage.
D	3	Ten-inch Sea-coast Mortar.
E	1	Thirty-pounder Parrott (Navy), Siege Carriage.
F	1	Brooks Rifle (Siege).
G	1	Eight-inch Navy Gun.
H	1	Eight-inch Navy Gun.
I	1	Eight-inch Sea-coast Howitzer.

78. Brigadier-General Terry was attacked on James