MEMOIRS

OF

HENRY VILLARD

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOLUME II
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## Volume II

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MEMOIRS OF HENRY VILLARD

BOOK FIVE

IN CIVIL-WAR TIME: CHARLESTON
CHAPTER XXIV

AT HILTON HEAD.—1863

For a few days I was quite a lion in Washington as the first arrival from the front. The Tribune office was crowded day and night with army officers, members of Congress and others who wished to talk with me about the battle. Wherever I went—in the departments, at the hotels, in private houses, and on the sidewalks—I was beset by eager inquirers. I did not mince words, and can flatter myself that my earnest denunciations had something to do with the early inquiry into the Fredericksburg campaign instituted by the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, which fully brought out the facts of the case. Owing to the contradictory evidence given by the commanders involved, the public mind, however, remained much befogged as to where the real responsibility for the disaster belonged.

It is a matter of record that Burnside, notwithstanding his thorough defeat, clung for some time to the plan of trying another offensive movement without delay, and that his obstinacy and illusions in this respect were brought to an end only by his famous so-called “mud march” on January 21. But I was convinced that the unfavorable season and the condition of the army rendered further collisions between the armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia before spring very improbable. I advised our managing editor that I thought it not worth while on that account to return to the front, and suggested that I be sent to the coast of South Carolina in order to witness the impending combined land and naval attack on Charleston. My recommendation was approved, and, accordingly, I left Washing-
ton in the first week of January, 1863, for New York, and sailed thence on the 14th on the steamship Arago for Port Royal harbor.

The Arago had been running regularly before the war as a passenger and freight steamer in the Havre trade, and was a large and commodious, but not very fast, ship. She had been chartered by the Government for some time, and was making three trips a month to the port mentioned, carrying Government supplies, but only such passengers as were in the public service or had permits from the War Department. Captain Gadsden was very obliging and jolly. There were only seven passengers in all in the first cabin, besides myself, including my old acquaintance, Major-General David B. Hunter, and his assistant adjutant-general, Major Halpine, two other staff officers, and some very nice ladies from Pennsylvania, who, like so many other patriotic and self-sacrificing Northern women, had volunteered for educational work among the negroes of the Sea Islands. Major-General Hunter had been in command of the Department of the South since the preceding summer, but, having become involved in misunderstandings with the Washington authorities, had asked and obtained leave in August to visit the capital for explanations. It was then decided to replace him by General O. M. Mitchel, who died late in October, 1862, after holding the command for a few weeks. Hunter was now returning to resume his position. He was over seventy years old, but tried to assume a younger appearance by wearing a full, dark-brown wig and giving his short moustache the same artificial color. He was a man of moderate ability, but an ardent patriot, a true gentleman, and very pleasing in his intercourse with others. I knew Major Halpine as an Irish poet and wit, under the sobriquet of "Miles O'Reilly," and a writer for the New York Times before the war, and found him again a very entertaining and amusing companion.

With the luxurious comforts of the Arago, the voyage
ought to have been a pleasure trip, but we had stormy weather from Sandy Hook to beyond Cape Hatteras; all the passengers except myself were very sick. We arrived on the afternoon of the 18th of January. As we entered the harbor, the forts taken from the rebels, on the right and left of its mouth, fired salutes in honor of the department commander. After we were made fast to the long dock, built out since the Federal occupation, from Hilton Head Island, which formed the south side of the harbor, many army and navy officers at once boarded the Arago, including Brigadier-General Ferry and Fleet-Captain Rodgers, to welcome General Hunter. Captain Gadsden kindly permitted me to remain on the Arago while she stayed in port, thus giving me several days in which to consider and decide upon my future course.

A brief review of the operations of the Union army and navy along the coast of South Carolina and Georgia before my arrival will be in place here. A direct and special punishment of the former State, as the hotbed of secession, had been insisted upon by public opinion in the loyal North ever since the first outbreak of the Rebellion. The Federal Government was quite disposed to yield to the popular demand. The occupation of the South Atlantic ports was the subject of special study by a board of officers which sat in Washington in June and July, 1861. In the first days of August, orders were issued to General Thomas W. Sherman to form an expeditionary corps of 12,000 men in the New England States, and to Captain Dupont of the navy to collect a fleet of vessels in Hampton Roads, for a combined aggressive movement down the coast. According to Nicolay and Hay, President Lincoln explained personally at a Cabinet meeting the purposes of the Government in this direction to General Sherman, and expressed to him the desire that the expedition should start early in September. The starting was, however, postponed till October, and did not actually take place before the end of that month. On October 29, between fifty and sixty
steam-vessels, of which fourteen were men-of-war and the remainder loaded with troops and quartermasters' and commissary stores, stood out from the Roads. The fleet encountered a storm the very next day, which resulted in the loss and disabling of some of the transports. The remainder reached Port Royal harbor in safety. On November 7 the men-of-war attacked the two rebel forts on the north and south sides of the entrance, mounting, respectively, twenty and twenty-three heavy guns, while the Federal ships carried one hundred and thirty. Nine of the ships, led by the frigate Wabash, moved up the harbor, following each other in a single line at short intervals, and delivering their broadsides against the two forts as they passed them. When beyond the range of the rebel guns, the death-dealing procession steered around and steamed back to the entrance, again firing broadsides while passing the rebel works. This movement was repeated three times, when the rebels abandoned, first, the strongest fort on the south side, and, later, that on the north side. The fire of the vessels had been so sweeping and destructive that the enemy became panic-stricken and sought safety in precipitate flight. Our victory cost only eight killed and twenty-three wounded. The fugitives spread the panic from the forts to the whole coast, from North Edisto to Warsaw Sound, with the result that the Sea Islands and the harbors of Port Royal, St. Helena, North and South Edisto, Tybee Roads, Warsaw Sound, and Ossabaw Sound fell under Federal control without the shedding of another drop of blood.

The troops were landed on the south shore of Port Royal harbor and established themselves in regular camps. From this base of operations the land and naval forces, during 1862, gradually reëstablished the Federal authority, not only along the Georgia and South Carolina coasts, but also at points on the Florida coast, including Fernandina, Jacksonville, and St. Augustine. The most noteworthy achievement was the reduction, in April, 1862, of Fort Pulaski, on
Cockspur Island, at the mouth of the Cockspur River, commanding the approach to the city of Savannah, under the direction of General Quincy A. Gillmore of the regular Corps of Engineers. He accomplished an extraordinary feat by planting, during many weeks of night labor, eleven batteries of thirty-six heavy guns, weighing from eight to eight and a half tons each, in a bottomless morass, without discovery and interference by the enemy. The siege was remarkable also as the first practical demonstration of the worthlessness of walls of masonry as a defence against modern rifled artillery. The fire of our guns, at ranges from 1650 to 3400 yards, made the fort untenable in thirty hours, and surrender unconditional.

In the early spring of 1862, Major-General Hunter was assigned to the chief command of the Department of the South, while General T. W. Sherman remained in charge of that of South Carolina. Hunter soon attracted general attention by the famous order he issued on May 9, 1862, announcing that "slavery and martial law in a free country are altogether incompatible. The persons in the three States of Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina, heretofore held as slaves, are therefore declared forever free." This act was nothing less than the abolition of slavery by military authority, five months in advance of the preliminary, and eight months before the definitive, Emancipation Proclamation of President Lincoln. General Hunter had no special authority from the War Department to issue the order, but promulgated it by virtue of his absolute powers as military ruler over territory under martial law. As one of the truest loyalists in the regular and volunteer armies, he was also moved by his sense of duty to the Government, and was among the first to perceive that one of the most effective blows that could be struck at the Rebellion would be to deprive it of the benefit of unpaid slave labor in civil pursuits and for military purposes. His strong anti-slavery convictions doubtless likewise prompted him to adopt this radical measure. The order made quite a sensa-
tion in the North, and led to attacks upon its author and
the Administration by the Conservatives and Anti-War-
Democrats, which moved President Lincoln to issue his
well-known proclamation of May 19, 1862, in which, after
affirming that the Government had no knowledge of, or
part in, Hunter's act, he declared it null and void, and as-
serted his exclusive right to determine whether it was
competent for him as Commander-in-chief of the Army
and Navy to declare slaves in any State or States free, and
whether, at any time and in any case, it had become a neces-
sity indispensable to the maintenance of the Government
to exercise such a supposed power.

General Hunter, though repudiated, remained in com-
mand, and soon found occasion to try another military
method of dealing with the slavery problem, which, while
not at once practically successful, was not disowned by the
Government, and was even subsequently adopted by the
War Department, and contributed much to the ultimate
triumph of the North. In other words, he was the first
to attempt to form military organizations out of fugitive
and abandoned slaves. The desertion of their plantations
on the Sea Islands by the great slave-owners had left
thousands of their human chattels without control or
restraint of any sort, and, as was natural, their sudden,
absolute freedom exposed them to the dangers of idleness,
vagabondism, and general lawlessness. Even before Gen-
eral Hunter's advent, efforts had been inaugurated, under
the leadership of Northern philanthropists, to take the
blacks of the islands in hand, to systematize their labor, and
to teach them frugal and industrious ways. There were then
some fifty devoted men and women from the North en-
gaged as teachers and overseers in that benevolent calling.
They had come South under the leadership of Edward L.
Pierce of Massachusetts, who had been put in charge, first,
of the organization of the colored refugees flocking to
Fortress Monroe into working parties, and now of the same
task in South Carolina, at the instance of Secretary Chase,
whose friend and supporter he was. (Mr. Pierce subsequently became widely known as a politician of the better class, law writer, and biographer of Charles Sumner.) On a number of the larger plantations, the regular work was thus being carried on again.

The undertaking proved so great that the War Department lent a helping hand by detailing Brigadier-General Saxton to take supreme charge of the "Freedmen's Aid" movement in April, 1862. Still, the islands swarmed with great numbers of idlers that could not, or would not, be employed, and had to be fed and clothed at the expense of the Government. General Hunter, on seeing this state of things soon after his arrival, and upon the recommendation of General Saxton, made up his mind that the best solution would be to enroll as soldiers the negroes physically qualified, and use them for whatever military purposes they might be fit. He lost no time in applying to the Secretary of War for 50,000 muskets, and "authority to arm such loyal men as I can find in the country." He coupled his requisition for arms with another which caused much wonder and some merriment at the time, asking for 50,000 pairs of scarlet pantaloons. "This is all the clothing," he wrote, "I shall require for these people." The Major-General soon tried the effect of scarlet cloth on the blacks in an attempt to organize a black regiment. It was actually formed, but did not hold together more than a few weeks, mainly owing to the unwillingness of the blacks to serve. The attempt was renewed, in pursuance of an order of the Secretary of War, dated August 25, 1862, authorizing Brigadier-General Saxton to arm, uniform, equip, and drill not more than 5000 volunteers of African descent, to guard and protect the plantations and settlements of Port Royal and elsewhere. Only one regiment of a thousand men was, however, got together after three months, of which T. W. Higginson, the well-known Massachusetts liberal clergyman and littérateur, became the colonel. This regiment donned red trousers.
Such was the situation in South Carolina when I stepped for the first time upon the sacred soil of the Palmetto State on Hilton Head Island, bordering the harbor on the south side and washed by the ocean on the east, on which the Union troops had made their first landing, and on which the department headquarters were situated. "The Head," as the natives called it for short, presented a very uninviting, dreary aspect. It was, indeed, but a dead waste of deep sand, "as flat as a pancake," varied only by a line of low sand-hills or dunes. Not a tree, not a shrub, not a green plant of any kind, was in sight; the only green spots being a few small grassplots produced by irrigation. Before the landing of the Federal forces, no buildings existed, and but a few scattering ones had been erected since. The principal were two long one-story frame structures of the plainest outer and interior finish, erected as quickly and cheaply as possible for use as headquarters. They extended along the shore, with a fine beach between them and the water. A few hundred feet from their rear stood a small but more substantial-looking two-story building, in which the United States Custom-house was established. There was also a group of board shanties and wall-tents, some with and some without wooden floors, which served as mess-houses and sleeping quarters for the customs officials and the officers and employees of the quartermaster's and commissary department. The habitations stood directly on the virgin sand, without artificial walks or streets. The truth was, indeed, that I had dropped into a very desolate place, of which the only redeeming feature was the bay and the ocean. I was comforted by the expectation that my stay would be a short one—in which hope I was, however, to be greatly disappointed.

Major Halpine promptly redeemed his voluntary promise to provide me with quarters by assigning to me an empty front room in one of the headquarters buildings, to which I moved from the Arago. It was small, but with a good-sized window overlooking the beach and bay. It being en-
tirely unfurnished, the Major showed me further favor by sending me a small table, roughly made on the spot, and a camp-stool. The next thing was to find something to sleep on (as I had brought with me only a small pillow and blankets) and washing utensils. As there was nothing of that kind to be got at "The Head" for love or money, I concluded to row back to the Arago and appeal to the generosity of Captain Gadsden. He at once authorized the steward to sell me a mattress, and advised me to apply to the quartermaster on shore for a tin basin and cup, in which quest I was successful. I slept on the mattress on the floor for several days, when I persuaded the post-carperenter to make me a bedstead and washstand out of unplaned lumber. With these appointments I managed to get along during my sojourn at "The Head."

I found board as easily as lodging. I had brought a letter of introduction from Secretary Chase to Mr. T. C. Severance, the Collector of the Port, who at once invited me to join his mess. We had an excellent table, indeed as good meals as at a first-class hotel in the North, and at a very reasonable price. The mess consisted of the Collector, two of his office assistants, a New England clergyman acting as Freedmen's agent, some commissary and quartermaster's clerks, Henry J. Winser, correspondent of the New York Times, and myself. Mr. Severance had been a banker at Cleveland, but had failed at the beginning of the Civil War. His good nature and willingness to oblige were without limit. His official responsibilities were not great, the arrivals of vessels subject to entry not averaging more than one a month, and what little work there was, his chief clerk did. Winser had a room next to mine and proved a very genial, gentlemanly companion, with whom I kept up close relations till his death in 1896. Mr. Howard, the Freedmen's agent, was a Harvard graduate and a well-informed, entertaining, liberal-minded man. The other members of the mess were like the good children who are seen but not heard.
I made it my first business to become acquainted with the officers of the fleet, not one of whom I knew. Assistant-Secretary Fox had kindly given me a letter to Rear-Admiral Dupont, in chief command of the South Atlantic blockading squadron, which I presented, two days after my landing, on board the flagship Wabash. The Admiral received me most courteously, and introduced me at once to Captain C. R. P. Rodgers, his chief of staff, and the other members of his official household, as well as the officers of the frigate. The Admiral was one of the stateliest, handsomest, and most polished gentlemen I ever met. He looked the ideal naval commander. Captain Rodgers also had a fine presence, and was most courteous and obliging. It will always be a source of pride to me that I won the lasting friendship of these two distinguished officers. Besides the flagship, there was, riding at anchor near it, the New Ironsides, an iron-plated frigate under command of Commodore Thomas Turner, with thirty-two Dahlgren guns in broadside. The very next morning we had a stirring surprise in the appearance of the Montauk, a reproduction of the original Ericsson monitor, in tow of the war-steamer Rhode Island, and commanded by John L. Worden, the hero of the ever-memorable fight between the Monitor and the rebel ram Merrimac. The Montauk was the forerunner of the fleet of eight ironclads of the monitor and other types that were expected from the North.

The presence of but one of these showed that I had left the North under a wrong impression in supposing that the preparations for the naval attack on Charleston were nearly completed and that it would certainly come off shortly after my arrival. This was confirmed by the Admiral himself. As I had been commended by Assistant-Secretary Fox to his confidence, I did not hesitate to ask him during my first visit whether he felt at liberty to say to me, under seal of secrecy, whether Charleston would be attacked soon or not. He replied that he had no objection to telling me that the fleet was not quite ready for it. I interpreted
this to mean that there would be considerable delay yet, and my surmise proved correct. I learned by degrees that, from the chief commander down to the lieutenants, the officers of the fleet had not much faith in either the offensive capacity or the speed of the new forms of ironclads, which were to be the principal instruments of attack, and that they were to be given practical trials in both respects before being actually used in the proposed grand effort to subdue Charleston.

I readily perceived that the key to the confidence of the Admiral and his chief of staff was the strict observance of their injunction not to say anything regarding the condition and purposes of the fleet in my correspondence, except what they should authorize to be published. I advised the managing editor of my intention to submit to this restriction, and confined myself at first to gathering material for purely descriptive letters. The supply proved rather meagre. One letter exhausted all that could possibly be said about Hilton Head, the army headquarters, and the fleet. The only other available sources of useful matter were excursions on the ordinary steamboats that kept up communication between the headquarters and the different points of occupation on the Sea Islands, and some reconnaissances by armed boats in the direction of the mainland, and especially of the Savannah River, through the network of tide-water inlets connecting the islands with one another. The steamboats made regular runs, but the reconnoitring trips, of course, took place only at the will of those in command.

My first excursion was to the famous town of Beaufort on St. Helena, the principal one of the islands. Our boat was the small side-wheeler Planter, that had been run out of Charleston harbor with a load of heavy siege-guns and delivered to the blockading fleet by her colored pilot, Robert Small, who had been its captain since, and whom I found a good-looking, intelligent, and well-informed mulatto. Beaufort was not more than eighteen miles from
"The Head"—four across the bay, and the rest of the
distance through the inlets connecting Port Royal harbor
with St. Helena Sound. Extensive plantations with large
mansions and scattered live-oaks and palmetto trees were
visible on both sides of our course. Beaufort did not belie
its renown as the favorite pleasure-resort of the South Caro-
lina slaveholding aristocracy. The town consisted of one
grand, broad avenue, two hundred and fifty feet wide,
lined with great evergreen oaks, behind which the stately
homes of the cotton lords stood, separated from each other
by gardens filled with a variety of brilliant flowers, in-
dicative of the mildness of the winter climate. The houses,
while built of wood in a plain style, were nearly all three
stories high and of generous proportions, and impressed
one as both spacious and comfortable. Their owners, al-
most without exception, had abandoned them to the care
of their slave servants. Several were made use of for
various purposes by the Northern invaders. One was oc-
cupied by General Rufus Saxton, the Military Governor of
the islands; another by the General Agency of the Freed-
men’s Bureau. Some served as boarding- and lodging-
houses for the volunteer teachers of the freedmen from the
North, and some for the schools in which colored adults
and children received free instruction in reading, writing,
and arithmetic, as well as in sewing, cutting, cooking, and
other domestic arts.

I paid my respects to General Saxton, whose marked per-
sonality proved very true to the descriptions I had heard
given of him. He was a regular artillery officer, and one
of the few outright abolitionists in the army. He had a slen-
der, wiry figure of middle height, a small head with fiery
black eyes, short-cropped black hair, and full beard. His
intense zeal in the Union cause and the sincerity of his deep
hatred of the Rebellion and what he considered its main
support—slavery—made him seem at first a glowing zealot,
like the martyred preachers of the Faith. But, while ardent
and unflinching in his duty, he was at heart as gentle
as a lamb. He was certainly the man for the task intrusted to him of making soldiers out of the "contrabands" of South Carolina and Georgia. He expressed himself as very much pleased with his success so far in that direction, and spoke very highly of the aptitude of the negroes for military service. I also made the acquaintance of his assistant adjutant-general, Edward W. Hooper, son of the well-known Massachusetts Congressman, Samuel Hooper, and one of many Harvard graduates who, from the loftiest motives, had left college to enter the service. In the same spirit, this exemplary character devoted his life after the war to the public weal in various capacities, ending with the treasurership of Harvard College. I likewise met there, for the first time, Mrs. Frances D. Gage, a lovable woman of middle age, an able writer for the press (she wrote the best letters on the "contrabands" to the Tribune), and an enthusiastic anti-slavery advocate and champion of other reforms. She was one of the Freedmen's Bureau agents, and discharged her duties with untiring zeal, true benevolence and great ability.

Immediately after my Beaufort trip I had an opportunity to witness the novel and interesting spectacle described in the following reproduction of my letter to the Tribune on the subject:

**PORT ROYAL, January 22, 1863.**

General Hunter and staff yesterday afternoon improved the return of clear weather to visit and review the 1st Regiment of South Carolina Volunteers. I was glad of the early opportunity to see what appeared to me the most interesting feature of South Carolina, and satisfy myself, by personal observation, as to the relative success of the experiment of transforming the black freedmen into Union soldiers.

The party steamed up Beaufort River on the Beaufort packet *Flora* to Smith's plantation, some eight miles distant, where the black volunteers had their encampment. We were transferred from the steamer to the right bank in small boats, and, after passing through a magnificent grove of live-oak trees and a "street" of the regimental camp, reached an unplanted cotton field, where a line of
black faces, blue trousers, red trousers, and muskets told us that the object of our visit was before us.

The General and suite having taken position in front of the line, the regiment was first made to go through the manual of arms. It next marched past the General by companies both in ordinary and quick step, and then went through several battalion manoeuvres.

Judged by the absolute standard of perfection in drill, the performances of the black soldiers appeared liable to criticism. But, taking into consideration all the facts bearing upon the case—the low intellectual status of the rank and file, the short training, the inexperience of most of the white officers themselves—no honest-minded, unprejudiced observer could come to any other conclusion than that the regiment had attained a remarkable relative proficiency. I have no hesitation, with my extensive observations of the capacities and acquirements of white volunteers in both the Western and Eastern armies, to say that no body of men in the service has done better in seven weeks, the period during which the dark-skinned South Carolinians have served upon the drilling-ground.

It is said by those unwilling to give the blacks credit for any human capabilities that, although they may master the mere mechanism of the service, through their great natural gift of imitation, they will yet never become efficient soldiers, owing to the want of "spirit"—of "heart" in the profession, and of proper appreciation of the cause for which they bear arms. In refutation, the fact that every one of the eight hundred and sixty men volunteered might be sufficient. But the best possible evidence to the contrary is furnished by what happened at the close of the review. Having formed the regiment in square, Colonel Higginson requested General Hunter to say a few words to the men.

The General stepped inside the square amid three spontaneous cheers from the ranks. He said in few but forcible and moving words that he rejoiced to find the native soldiers so proficient; that, judging from the progress they had already made, he could see no reason why they should not become as good soldiers as any in the world; that he expected them to fight as well as drill, as only men willing to fight for their liberty are worthy of it, and that he hoped before long to see fifty thousand of their friends striking for freedom from bondage.

There was unmistakable intelligence, true warmth of emotion and firmness of resolution speaking out of the enthusiastic response
of the black audience to these remarks. The most venomous pro-slavery agitator in the North could not have denied that the General was fully understood. But the wildest shouts of joy broke out when General Saxton announced, after General Hunter had concluded, that fifty thousand muskets were arriving from the North to arm the freedmen of South Carolina. Cheers for liberty and the Union were never given more heartily by white volunteers than those elicited by the announcement.

The monitor Montauk departed a few days after my arrival for the Ogeechee River for a trial of her offensive and defensive strength against the rebel Fort McAllister, which protected the approaches to the city of Savannah. Colonel Burton, of the Forty-eighth Regiment of New York Volunteers, who was in command of the captured Fort Pulaski at the mouth of the Savannah, had come to Hilton Head on official business, and invited me to accompany him on his return trip in order to witness the exploits of the monitor. We left on January 28, reaching Pulaski in the evening. The fort had been entirely restored and made stronger than before. It mounted eighty guns and had a garrison of two regiments. The next morning we started early for the Ogeechee by the inland passage. We passed by the Tybee River and Warsaw Sound into the network of channels connecting the latter with Ossabaw Sound. Our pilot lost his way, and we found ourselves caught in the Romney Marsh in a passage so narrow and shallow that our boat grounded and touched the banks on both sides. It was extricated with great difficulty from its perilous position. As it was unarmed, we should have been an easy prey to the enemy, who happily did not discover our plight. It was a narrow escape for me from a taste of Southern prisons. We steamed back to Fort Pulaski, reaching there only late in the evening. Our mishap was the more provoking as we had been so near the scene of action that we not only heard the firing, but saw the puffs of powder-smoke ascend after each discharge. We learned the next morning from the attacking fleet that there had been a severe artillery fight,
lasting nearly all day, between the Montauk, four gunboats, and a mortar-boat on our side, and the rebel fort, mounting thirteen heavy guns. The Montauk approached within a mile of the fort, when she was stopped by a row of close piles driven into the channel. She was struck thirteen times by heavy shot, but not injured beyond slight dents in her armor. The attack led to the discovery that the rebel cruiser Nashville was still in the Ogeechee, seven miles from Fort McAllister. She had run in some months before, and was prevented from getting to sea again by the vigilance of our cruisers and the obstructions placed by us in the outlets from the Ogeechee.

It was the purpose of Captain Worden, in command of our flotilla, to get by the fort with the Montauk and attack the rebel vessel. Our fire was supposed to have disabled most of the armament of Fort McAllister. Captain Worden was bent upon overcoming the obstructions in the river, but, as this would take time, I returned to Hilton Head. I found that the military and civilian community was much stirred up by very exciting news, just arrived, of a partially successful attack made by rebel rams from Charleston harbor upon our blockading fleet, preceded by the disablement and surrender of one of our gunboats in Stono River. The veteran braggart, Beauregard, was in command of Charleston at the time. On receiving the report of the rebel rams, he launched forthwith a proclamation to the civilized world announcing that the Federal blockading fleet, having been either destroyed or dispersed, had disappeared, and that the blockade was therefore raised. The proclamation was accompanied by an official statement of a British naval officer and the resident British consul that they had been out to sea on a tug, but had seen no sign of the blockading fleet. The rebel Secretary of State followed this up by a circular to the Confederate agents in Europe, announcing the reopening of Charleston harbor to the ships of seafaring nations. This performance of Beauregard and the British officials ranks
high among the many extraordinary perversions of current events which occurred during the Rebellion. It was denounced as an absolute falsehood in a protest addressed to Admiral Dupont by all the commanders of the blockading men-of-war. At first the rebel story was believed even by the Washington Government, and credited by the Northern press, which indulged in severe criticism of the blockading fleet. The feelings of the Admiral and his subordinates on reading these rash effusions may be imagined. A partial compensation for the losses inflicted by the rebel rams was the capture at that time of several vessels with valuable cargoes trying to run the blockade. A great prize among them was the British steamer Princess Royal, which was brought to Port Royal harbor and which I visited. She carried machinery and guns for the rebel navy, besides a large miscellaneous cargo of merchandise.

Another noteworthy event was the return of the First South Carolina Volunteer Regiment from an expedition to the coasts of Georgia and Florida, and up various rivers into the interior of those States. It was intended to produce a moral effect on the slave population by the sight of the colored troops, who were to circulate the President's Emancipation Proclamation. Another object was to secure brick, lumber, and other material needed for military purposes. The expedition was successful in every respect. The black soldiers received their baptism of fire, having had several victorious encounters with rebel infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Colonel Higginson was overflowing with praise of the gallant conduct of his command, which had inspired him with the conviction, loudly proclaimed, that nothing would end the war quicker than the employment of negro troops on the largest possible scale.

The long-announced reinforcements consisted of the entire Federal force that had operated under command of Major-General Foster on the North Carolina coast. It arrived successively in a great fleet of one hundred and twenty-five
vessels. The transports had encountered severe gales, which had blown violently for a week along the South Carolina coast and made us very anxious for them. No disaster occurred, however, but the crowded troops suffered greatly from seasickness. Port Royal harbor was so much disturbed by the storm that the transports could not land the troops for several days; they were finally put ashore, mostly on St. Helena Island. Their advent was considered another sure indication that the opening of offensive operations by land and sea was not far off, but the general expectation in this regard was once more doomed to disappointment. Many weeks were yet to elapse before hope deferred became fulfilled. Moreover, the coming of General Foster led to lamentable dissensions between the commanders of the land forces, which threatened to have a paralyzing effect upon military operations. Although General Hunter was, by seniority, the ranking major-general, and, by general order of the War Department, the ranking general officer took command when troops passed from one military department into another, General Foster expected to remain in independent command of all the forces he brought to South Carolina, and was greatly taken aback when, during his temporary absence on a flying trip to North Carolina, General Hunter issued a general order assuming command over his troops. Foster would not accept the situation, but left for Washington on the first steamer to make a personal appeal to the Secretary of War and the President for the recognition of his claim. As he did not succeed in this, he asked to be and was relieved from duty in South Carolina. He left his staff behind, who had so little sense of propriety and subordination that they loudly boasted of the sure success of their chief's mission, which would, of course, have resulted in the retirement of General Hunter. Their indiscretion soon brought upon them an order of expulsion from the Department, when they followed their general to the North. Other subordinates of Foster were similarly infected. The chief
quartermaster actually refused to turn the control of the steam transports over, as in duty bound, to the chief quartermaster of the Department, and had to be placed under arrest. One of the brigadiers, General Stevenson, openly proclaimed that he and his command would not fight beside "niggers," for which General Hunter had him arrested and confined. General Naglee, another brigadier, was also removed from command later on and sent North for manifesting a similar spirit of insubordination. Some of Foster's troops were guilty of perpetrating great outrages upon the colored people on some of the Sea Islands, and had to undergo rigorous disciplinary treatment. Altogether, the morale of the accessions from the North was unsatisfactory, and it was fortunate that offensive movements did not commence until the bad spirit had been in a measure suppressed.

I had announced in the Tribune, about the middle of February, that the intention was to send another expedition of colored troops from Hilton Head on a regular recruiting mission among the negro population of a certain Southern State, and that thousands of muskets would be taken along to arm male slaves. The publication caused a great sensation in the North, some of the conservative Republican papers pronouncing the news an outright malicious canard, while the "Copperhead" press denounced in the most violent language the attempt to excite "servile insurrection." I was even personally attacked as the author of the bogus intelligence. But, a week later, the correctness of the information was proved by the actual departure of over a thousand black troops, under Colonel Higginson, on the very errand I had foretold. Forays were made up a number of streams on the Georgia and South Carolina coasts, but the expedition was far less successful than expected, as many slave-owners had run their human chattels off into the interior. It brought back, however, a few hundred black recruits, many of them with their families.

Excepting the incidents mentioned, the month of Febru-
ary passed away in rather monotonous quietude. The land forces were ready for active work, but the navy was not yet fully prepared for it. I clearly understood the true cause of the past delay and of that still before us, but for public reasons said nothing about it in my correspondence. It was the procrastination in the North in getting ready the monitors which were to play the leading part in Admiral Dupont’s offensive, to the number of seven. They all had been expected to be with the fleet by the end of February at the latest, but only the Montauk, the Patapsco, and the Nahant had then turned up, much to the disappointment of the Admiral and his officers and men.

I devoted part of my abundant leisure to a careful study of the condition of the slave population on the Sea Islands within our lines. It numbered a little over 9000, including 3617 children. General Saxton’s department was divided into two divisions. That comprising the islands embraced no less than eighty-two plantations with 4015 adults and 2200 children, under the superintendence of Mr. Soule, a man especially well fitted for his task by his qualities of mind and heart. I visited the agencies in charge of subdivisions, either with him or with a Northern clergyman by the name of French, who acted as a sort of general Protestant missionary among the more than half-heathenish blacks. We could not understand the jargon spoken by them, and they did not comprehend our English, yet my clerical companion preached to them as though he were addressing a Northern congregation. His whole gospel work seemed, indeed, perfunctory and even farcical. The fact was, that savage superstitions still prevailed among the blacks, and that they practised fetish worship. On one occasion, my reverend companion, after he got through with his prayers and exhortation at a Sunday service in one of the rude structures used for places of worship for the slaves on the plantations, called on “Brother” Villard to address “our colored brethren.” I did so, but let the gospel alone, and explained to my hearers
as well as I could what rights and duties their liberation had vested them with. Although I used the simplest possible language, I felt sure that I was not understood. Such an audience I never looked upon before or since. Most of the jet-black faces, with their protruding, glaring eyes, thick noses, heavy outturned lips, glittering teeth, low receding foreheads, and coarse twisted, matted hair, spoke plainly of the Niger and the Congo. It seemed to me that the efforts of the volunteer male and female teachers from the North to instil even a little rudimentary knowledge into the skulls of the adults were bound to prove futile, and so they did. Nothing else could be expected, indeed, from creatures who had been purposely kept in the condition of brutes.

Upon the first appearance of the Northern liberators, either the terror-stricken masters had sought safety in flight and left their slaves to shift for themselves as best they could, or the latter had taken refuge with them in the Confederate lines. This inevitably produced a state of entire disorder on the plantations. Most of the blacks abandoned their customary work, and took advantage of the indiscriminate distribution of free rations that was at first practised by our commanders. But the demoralizing influence of this system was soon recognized, and it was abolished after our occupation had been extended over the larger islands and the plantations taken possession of by Government agents. The plan had been adopted, and generally carried out, of letting the freedmen (as they came to be called) become cultivators of the soil on the estates to which they belonged, either as employees of the Government or for their own account. In the former case they were required to perform regular daily tasks, and were allowed in payment regular rations and small wages. In the latter, they were allotted a certain acreage near their cabins on which they could grow such crops as they chose. The first-mentioned mode of employment, according to the testimony of the agents, promised better results than the
latter, but the trial had not been going on long enough to justify definite conclusions. The agents expressed very favorable opinions of their people as regarded docility, willingness to work, and aptitude to learn, among both young and old. They could not speak so well of them in the matter of tidiness, truthfulness, and morality. I found them, as a rule, well behaved, well fed—plenty of cornmeal, bacon and molasses, a stock of pigs and chickens, made up the sum of earthly bliss for them, and all these blessings were now within their easy reach—and contented, yes, happy, in their inborn lightheartedness. Slavery had confined them to the simplest requirements in regard to habitation and personal wear, and they had not yet risen above their compulsory indifference to appearances beyond a fondness for loud colors, so that they presented a tattered, dirty appearance as a rule. A noteworthy characteristic was their proneness to express their moods of joy and sorrow in original songs, which indicated the natural musical gift of the race.

The last days of February brought great cheer to the navy, so eager for revenge for the attack of the rams on the blockaders. The joyful news reached Hilton Head by a despatch-boat that the Nashville had been utterly destroyed by the Montauk. The rebel craft had lain quiet for a long time under the protecting guns of Fort McAllister, watching for an opportunity to slip out to sea unobserved by our vessels, but her attempts to do so were repeatedly baffled by their vigilance. On February 27, she tried to run out under cover of a thick fog. She got aground, and was discovered in that predicament by the Montauk when the fog lifted. Captain Worden lost no time in going for his prey. He ran his monitor as close as possible to the obstructions in the river, getting within 1200 yards of the Nashville. Disregarding the furious fire of the fort upon his vessel, he devoted himself exclusively to his victim. His first experimental shots missed the mark, but, the proper range being obtained, thirteen- and fifteen-inch
The fourth fifteen-inch shell burst in her and set her on fire. The flames spread rapidly, and speedily heated her guns so as to explode their charges. Soon another shell went crashing through her side, penetrating her powder-magazine and causing a fearful explosion that finished the work of destruction. The officers of the Montauk described the burning and blowing up of the Nashville as a sight grand beyond description. No damage whatever to ship or crew was suffered by the Montauk.

The monitors Patapsco and Nahant had been ordered to Ossabaw Sound by the Admiral, but arrived too late to share in the glory of the Montauk. They were followed by the monitor Passaic, just arrived from the North, and by several mortar-boats. The Admiral ordered all the newcomers to try their guns against Fort McAllister. The Passaic, Patapsco, and Nahant accordingly moved towards the fort on the morning of March 3, and took up positions at distances of 1200, 1600, and 1800 yards, with the mortar-schooners behind them. The fort promptly answered the fire of the monitors from all its guns, and the exchange of shots continued all day. The fire of the fort was rapid and ill aimed, while that of our vessels was slow and deliberate, the main object being to make thorough tests of the range and accuracy of fire of their guns. It was indeed, on our part, a leisurely bombardment rather than a spirited offensive action. The monitors stopped their work at nightfall and fell down the river beyond the range of the fort. They returned to Hilton Head during the following days. The trial attack apparently demonstrated that the three monitors engaged were as invulnerable as the Montauk. The Passaic, being nearest to the fort and hence most exposed to its fire, was struck thirty-three times upon deck and turret by the heaviest shot and shell, which left, however, only slight indentations on her armor. Most of the rebel missiles were broken into fragments against it. One ten-inch shell fell unexploded upon
the deck, after striking the pilot-house, and a thirteen-inch shell struck the deck directly without causing more than a crack. The Patapsco and Nahant were also hit but not injured. As was to be expected, all rebeldom burst out into a shout of triumph over the apparent repulse of our iron-clads.
CHAPTER XXV

NAVAL ATTACK ON Forts Sumter and Moultrie.—1863

ON March 5, General Hunter issued the following address to his command in the form of a general order (No. 16):

SOLDIERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH: After long and wearying delays, due to causes over which no one in this Department had control, we have at length the cheering prospect of active and very important service.

Soldiers of the 10th Army Corps, you are stimulated by every consideration of honor to vie with the gallant men from the Department of North Carolina who have been sent by the Government to take part with you in the dangers and the glory of operations now pending.

Officers and men of the command, you are adjured to the performance of every duty. All who earn distinction, no matter how humble their positions, have my pledge that their services shall be honorably acknowledged, and the acknowledgment pressed to their advantage.

Alas, the General’s manifesto proved but another deception. One more entire month of weary waiting was to elapse before the “pending operations” were actually commenced. Again the delay in the arrival of the rest of the monitors from the North was the cause of the postponement. The Weehawken and the Nantucket appeared during March, but the last ironclad, the Keokuk, reported only at the very end of the month. She was a departure from the monitor model, and a new experiment, as she was turtle-shaped, with sloping sides and two stationary turrets.

On March 31, I wrote from Hilton Head: “But for a violent gale that arose suddenly last night, and has been
blowing with unabated fury since, I should probably have been able to announce definitely the day on which the army and navy are to commence their long-delayed offensive operations. Still, I can assure your readers with the utmost positiveness, that the rough weather is now the only obstacle to the immediate consummation of the aggressive plans of General Hunter and Admiral Dupont." At last I was right in my predictions. As soon as the elements of high winds and heavy seas had quieted down, the combined campaign by land and water really opened. I was thoroughly tired of my long-enforced idleness, and heartily welcomed the prospect of active work. I naturally assumed that the extensive and protracted preparations for vigorous, telling strokes against the enemy would bring me steady and stirring occupation for some time to come. But the god of war ordained it otherwise. In little more than one week our offensive energy was to be exhausted, the carefully planned attack on arch-rebellious Charleston to prove an utter failure, even in the very first stage of its execution, and my task in South Carolina to be suddenly brought to an end. How all this came about is told in the following batch of reports to the Tribune, printed in its issue of April 14:

UNITED STATES SURVEYING STEAMER Bibb,
NORTH EDISTO HARBOR, April 4, 1863.

Preliminary movements and reconnaissances, embarkations and landings, have been making for some time, both by the navy and army; but it was only on Wednesday last that there was a general readiness for the commencement of the main operations. High wind and heavy sea caused another delay of twenty-four hours, but on the day before yesterday morning the four ironclads still remaining in Port Royal Harbor started at last for this general rendezvous; the Admiral's blue flag was transferred from the Wabash to the James Adger, which left soon after the monitors; and a large number of the army transports also followed in their wake. I availed myself of a kind invitation of General Ferry, commanding one of the divisions of the expedition, and made my way across the bay to St. Helena landing and aboard his flagship, the steamer New
England, as soon as I saw the wheels of the James Adger in motion. The New England formed the centre of a group of steamers and propellers, all heavily laden with human freight. The troops had been marched aboard the night before, in the expectation of an immediate departure; but the means of landing (scows and surf-boats) could not be secured until this morning, and the division got under way only a short time before sundown.

The destination of General Ferry's command was Stono Inlet. It was to make a landing on Cole's Island, already occupied for some days by a regiment. The fleet had hardly crossed the bar when a severe gale suddenly sprang up, and continued to blow all night. When the sun rose on Friday morning, the sorry discovery was made that the transports had been scattered, and lost in the storm most of the surf-boats they had been towing. In the course of the forenoon, however, the vessels all hove again in sight, but, low tide preventing their passage over the bar, they were ordered to lie off the entrance until high water. The New England having too deep a draught for a safe crossing, she proceeded to this port in order to transfer part of her load to another steamer.

North Edisto Harbor presented, when we entered it, an aspect at once pleasing and imposing. Its placid waters, with well-defined, graceful contours of shore lines, just contrasted and variegated enough to give tone to the picture, formed an idyllic ensemble strangely contrasting with the numerous novel and formidable engines of naval war riding at anchor within its sheltering limits. All the ironclads excepting the New-Ironsides, with the James Adger, Seneca, Sebago, and Bibb, had arrived. Around them floated a great flock of sailing craft—mortar, ordnance, buoy and supply schooners; the Adams Express steamer Mary Sanford, the Locust Point and other propellers, together with several ever-puffing, ever-rushing tugboats, imparting additional liveliness to the scene. Before leaving Port Royal, I had obtained Admiral Dupont's permission to witness the operations of the ironclads from the New-Ironsides. Soon after arriving, I boarded the James Adger in order to ascertain the best mode of reaching the former, and had a passage provided for off Charleston on the survey steamer Bibb, to which I transferred myself and baggage forthwith from the New England. My reception by Acting-Ensign Robert Platt, the commander of the Bibb in the absence of Captain C. O. Boutelle of the Coast Survey, was as courteous as I could possibly desire it to be.

Instead of dying out, as expected in the morning, the wind grew
more violent in the afternoon, so that our anchorage became ruffled. As the swell increased in volume and the vessels rocked and rolled more and more, it became evident that the morrow was not likely to bring the sound and fury of action. Still, the final preparations for it were continued with unabated vigor on all the ironclads. Their decks were stripped of what little in the way of spars and rigging they had. The sides, turrets, pilot-houses, and decks of all were covered with a thick and anything but elegant coat of grease. Several were still receiving additional plating upon their most exposed portions. Various contrivances for exploding and taking up torpedoes and obstructions were tried. The click and clank of tools and the commands of officers and the shouts of working parties resounded until long after sundown. Towards evening, the steamship Ben Deford, carrying Major-General Hunter and staff, came in and anchored close to the Admiral’s flagship. Several schooners and steamers also stood in, with a number of small boats lost by General Ferry’s transports, so that no hindrance of the movements of the land forces need be apprehended from that mishap.

This morning it was manifest that we should experience rough weather for another day. High winds, veering in the course of the forenoon from N. E. to N. W., blew until towards evening. But, shortly before sunset, the sky became clear of clouds, the wind settled gradually into a calm, the surface of the water smoothened, and after dark there was every indication of a change for the better. At daylight, a strange accident had happened to the Whitney Battery Keokuk. The strong tide made one of the monitors drag anchor, brush past the former, carry off her anchor-chains, and set her adrift. Not having steam up, she floated helplessly down the bay towards the bar. Fortunately, before she reached the latter, her propellers had been got to work and she was safely brought back. About sunrise the naval squadron was joined by the gunboats Augusta, Memphis, and South Carolina, ordered here from off Charleston to take the monitors in tow. One of the two ironclad rafts with which the Ericsson anchored for several days outside, was brought in early this morning and attached to the bow of the Weehawken for experimental purposes. The officers and crews of the ironclads seemed to be even more busy than yesterday with hastening their preparations to completion. The greasing, the strengthening of the armor, the rigging up of means of rendering submarine engines of destruction harmless, continued all day. Experiments with
throwing the grapnel from a coehorn were made on the Keokuk. One of the discharges unluckily resulted in slightly injuring Lieutenant Forrest.

In the evening several of the commanders of the ironclads came on the Bibb for consultation as to the hydrography of Charleston Harbor. Captain Charles O. Boutelle also arrived from the North. It became understood that, with anything like favorable weather, the Admiral would order the whole squadron to get under way at flood-tide in the morning.

April 5, 1863.

The presumptions of last evening were well founded. A clear sun, cloudless sky, and calm sea removed this morning the last impediment to the attack, and about 6 o'clock the general signal to get under way was made from the flagship.

The consummation of what has been preparing so long, so carefully, and on so extensive a scale, being now close at hand, certain statements, without which the character of the operations about to begin can not well be fully appreciated, may safely be made. An erroneous impression has undoubtedly prevailed all along in the North as to the offensive strength of the troops to be employed in the attack upon Charleston. I cannot, of course, at this moment state the real number of effectives at the disposal of General Hunter; but I can say, with a full knowledge of the actual figures, that it is far below the popular estimate. It is comparatively so small, indeed, that the land forces will be necessarily limited to a secondary part. They will have to act very much after the fashion of General Butler's command in the operations resulting in the capture of New Orleans. They will simply follow up the conquests of the navy; move in its wake and occupy the localities opened by it.

Of the navy, the armored vessels will do the main work. The facts ascertained in regard to the armament of the rebel defenses of Charleston Harbor would render the employment of the wooden ships under the command of Admiral Dupont (many of which are merchant vessels converted into men-of-war, and as weak as those that fell so easy a prey to the rebel ironclads in their late sortie) in any attempt at the reduction of the regular rebel forts exceedingly hazardous. The country may rest assured that all the pros and cons in connection with this question have been well weighed, and that wisdom required that the brunt of the contest should be borne by the ironclads. The aggressive qualities of these seem to be much misconceived by the general public. Popular fancy, nurtured
by journalistic ignorance and exaggeration, has enveloped them with a nimbus of irresistibility not at all warranted by their real merits. Their fighting capacities should consist of running, offensive and defensive powers. Were the impending combat over, I could disclose facts proving that they are far from being the models of perfection in the light of which they appear to unprofessional minds. As it is, I can only say that, although they are beyond gainsay in certain respects more powerful than anything else afloat, they have marked deficiencies which render success not by any means absolutely certain.

Two months ago the plan of attack was to make a landing of troops under the guns of the navy on Morris Island, clear it gradually of the enemy, and, after Cumming’s Point had been occupied, to support the attack of the forts by the ironclads with shore batteries. Since then the supposition that the defenses of the island had been so strengthened as to make this mode of operation impracticable, caused a modification of the original plan. It is now proposed to reduce the forts by the ironclads alone, and to bring and keep the land forces only as near as possible to the island, so as to secure its ready occupation after the fall of the forts shall have isolated it and necessitated the evacuation or surrender of its defenses. For this latter purpose the main body of the troops has now been landed on Cole’s Island, occupied, as already stated, for some time by a regiment, with a view to working their way across it to Folly Island, as close to Morris Island as practicable. A safe anchorage for the navy nearer than Port Royal being desirable, Edisto Island was taken possession of last week by the brigade of General Stevenson, and the control of the harbor it commands secured.

It would not be difficult to demonstrate that this whole movement against Charleston cannot stand the test of sound strategy; that it is not likely to be successful without a much larger land force than that at the command of General Hunter. But as it is positively determined upon, and about being made in accordance with the wishes of the Government and the people rather than with the judgment of those entrusted with its execution, comments of this kind had better be deferred until its prudence can be measured by its results. One condition of success is certainly fulfilled: the heads of the two branches are resolved upon the utmost efforts to accomplish the desired end, and to make the best possible use of the ships, men, and material under their control. It is true, one of the old
maxims of naval warfare is, that one gun on shore is equal to an entire ship's battery. Still, there is reason to suppose that the armament of the ironclads, although comparatively not very numerous, is so powerful in point of calibre as to be adequate to the task before it. The only fear of naval men is, that obstructions will prevent the vessels from reaching the proper position for an effective bombardment. If they can but bring the seven fifteen-inch and twenty-two eleven-inch guns and three rifled two-hundred-pounders, throwing combinedly nearly six tons of iron, to bear at close range, the result cannot be doubtful.

And now I will resume my narrative. At 7 o'clock the Bibb, which was to take the lead, was under way, and soon afterward the whole fleet was in motion. A magnificent spectacle spread out before us after we had crossed the bar and gained the open sea. The sun shone brightly, defining plainly every object upon the vast expanse of water. Slight undulations only disturbed the blue deep in its rest from the riot of yesterday. In our way rose the huge form of the Ericsson, and the horizon was lined with transports black with troops and headed in a northeasterly direction. The proud squadron steamed in grand and grim procession. What would old mariners from foreign waters think of the strange floating medley of swift, well-proportioned steamers and sails, and the slow, besmeared, ugly ironclad monsters? There came first the Bibb, next the Locust Point and Keokuk, then the Memphis and Nahant, the flagship and the Flambeau, the South Carolina and Patapsco, the tug Dandelion, and the Montauk, the Augusta and Catskill and Passaic.

When about two miles out, the gunboats Locust Point and Dandelion stopped and took the ironclads in tow. The Weehawken dropped her raft, which was again taken up by the Ericsson. The Memphis, in standing to the southward to wait for its charge, ran foul of the bow of the Keokuk, and, although it seemed but just to touch the latter, was so seriously injured that she had at once to be sent to Port Royal for repairs. Excepting this mishap, we made our destination in safety. After two hours' steaming, we came up with the blockaders and in full sight of Fort Sumter. The flagship had preceded us, and already assumed a station near the New-Ironsides, whose massive, graceless, barren hull, with its 'tier of huge guns, looked at a distance strikingly like a great swimming castle. As the different vessels approached, they took position in range with the flagship, and soon formed a line stretching far to the southward and northward about two miles from the bar. The last of the iron-
clads had just been brought up when rapidly succeeding reports of heavy guns from the harbor told us that the advent of the fleet had been noticed and the alarm sounded by the enemy.

The fleet being assembled, the next move was to buoy the channel to the bar. This duty was performed by the Bibb, the buoy schooner Admiral Dupont, and the Keokuk. The range to the bar was marked out by the former two by noon. Early in the afternoon Mr. Platt of the Bibb went on board the Keokuk, and under his guidance she gallantly steered for the bar. As she neared the shore the whole fleet watched eagerly her course. The battery supposed to cover Folly Inlet was every moment expected to open upon her. But the buoys were rolled off from the deck over her slanting sides at the proper points without molestation from the enemy. The buoys being placed, she steamed over to Swash Channel, after sounding which for several hours Captain Rhind brought her back to within a short distance from the Bibb.

The way over the bar was now opened, and the harbor accessible to all of the ironclads at the next flood tide. About 3 P.M. a stiff breeze rose suddenly, and speedily produced such a commotion of the sea as to drive the crews of the monitors from the decks, upon which they had been basking in the sun. The sky remained clear, but the wind gained in force. With the provoking, all but uninterupted, unpropitiousness of the weather during the last two weeks, we are almost inclined to believe that Providence frowns upon our cause. At sunset the Patapsco got in motion, made directly for the bar and crossed it, and took a picket station, as it were, inside, from which to prevent the removal of the buoys by the rebels during the night. Her bold movement drew out no more of an opposing demonstration from the enemy than that of the Keokuk. As soon as the Patapsco commenced moving, the Catskill and Passaic also got under way, standing for the bar, close to which they remained during the night. We presume that they are intended as a support to the Patapsco in case her isolated position should tempt the rebel rams into an attack.

Late in the afternoon the Ericsson joined the fleet with her two rafts. At sunset the Ben Deford also appeared among it. About dark the Dandelion visited the several ironclads and delivered the final instructions of the Admiral for the movement of to-morrow. The whole ironclad squadron will enter the harbor at high tide in the morning, but whether the attack is to be commenced will depend upon wind and weather. There is a general weariness through-
out the fleet of the delay of action, from day to day, by the freaks of the weather. The strain of nerves by the expected conflict itself can scarcely be more trying than the torture of suspense. May the next twenty-four hours bring us relief from the tantalization of expectation!

**ON BOARD U. S. STEAM FRIGATE New-Ironsides**

April 6, 9 A.M.

A quiet atmosphere and lulled sea greeted me at daybreak upon the quarter-deck of the *Bibb*. All signs augured for a commemoration of the anniversary of the battle of Shiloh by the opening of our guns upon Fort Sumter. About 7 A.M. I took leave of my kind hosts of the *Bibb*, and in a few minutes stood upon the spar-deck of the *New-Ironsides*. Admiral Dupont with his staff, comprising Fleet Captain C. R. P. Rodgers; Lieutenant A. S. Mackenzie, Ordnance Officer; Flag-Lieutenant S. W. Preston; Ens. M. L. Johnson, Aide-de-camp and Signal Officer; and Mr. A. McKenly, Secretary, had boarded the ship from the *James Adger* early in the morning. Duty did not absolutely require the presence of the Admiral on one of the ironclads, but a chivalric sympathy with his subordinates appeared to impel him to share the dangers of the fearful ordeal through which they were about passing.

One could not help beholding the *Ironsides* with a sensation of awe rather than admiration. The sense of the beautiful was not touched either by symmetry or elegance of form or neatness of general appointment. But she looked the fighting craft—the machine of destruction—all over. Outwardly and inwardly, her every visible inch revealed her devotion to war and to war alone. With her body stripped of the last vestige of spars and rigging, her sides discolored with slush and yawning with monstrous guns, she impressed one like a fit head and leader of the turreted nondescripts around her. Her deck, in addition to its iron plating, was protected with untanned hides aft, and a layer of sand-bags forward. To provide against penetration by shot or shell of her unarmored bow and stern, barricades of sand-bags from three to four feet thick, and rising from deck to deck, had been piled up on the gun and powder-decks. They filled the cabins and deprived the officers of their use. The furniture was stowed away below. To increase the resistance of the sand by moisture, a steady stream of water that flooded the cabins was poured from hose upon the bags. Upon the gun-deck the 11-inch Dahlgrens and 200-pound Parrotts shone
with a festive gloss. Muskets, cutlasses and pistols were stacked and heaped about. The powder-ways were open. The surgeons had their knives, pincers and saws displayed. Upon the whole, the flagship, though hardly replete with comfort, was attractive enough to one who could appreciate the stern pathos of preparation for battle.

I had been aboard about two hours when the signal to get under way was ordered to be made to all the ironclads outside of the bar. Simultaneously the drum and fife called all hands to quarters, and in a few minutes every man on board was at his post, and the ship ready to commence action at any moment. The general command of the ship was exercised by Commodore Thomas Turner and Lieutenant-Commander George E. Belknap. Lieutenant-Commander Barnes, commanding the gunboat Dawn, had also been detailed for special duty on this occasion... The crossing of the bar involved considerable risk from groundings, but all passed it safely, and were at anchor inside by ten o'clock. The Weehawken lagged somewhat behind, by having a raft from the Ericsson again fitted to her bow, but soon joined the rest. Charleston bar is a ridge-like elevation of the bottom of the sea, reaching from one end of the entrance of the harbor to the other. Large vessels can safely make the inside only through three openings in this, known as the Main Ship, Swash, and North Channels. The first runs to the south of the bar, almost parallel to Morris Island. The third to the north of the bar, along Sullivan's Island; and Swash Channel, between the two. The Main Ship Channel is commanded by the forts and batteries on Morris Island; the Swash and North Channels by those on Sullivan's. All three channels run into one directly in front of and at short range from Fort Sumter, whose guns, with those of the equidistant Fort Moultrie and Cumming's Point battery, thus defend the entrance to the harbor proper by a concentric fire. In addition to the mentioned works, there is said to be another heavy battery (Fort Bee) on Sullivan's Island, between the Moultrie House and the fort. It is presumed that the fire of nearly 150 guns converges at the described junction of the three channels.

The course of the ironclads was up the Main Ship Channel. It was expected that before coming under the fire of Sumter and Moultrie they would have to run, in a distance of three miles from the bar, the gauntlet of four works on the beach of Morris Island—one at Lighthouse Inlet, another near Lawford Beacon, a third
at Morris Lighthouse, and a fourth at Cumming’s Point. The
general belief was that the first-mentioned would interfere with the
passage of the bar, and hence all hands were ordered below. But
the eyes of the commanders and pilots were vainly strained in
trying to discover its outlines, and the opinion became general that
it had no existence. The walls and parapets of the forts further
up, however, could be distinctly made out. . . .

The ironclads had come to anchor to get the benefit of the ebb
tide, which it was deemed the part of prudence to await in order
to discover more readily, and avoid, take up or destroy more easily,
the various obstructions of the channels; but shortly after eleven
a haze arose, and in the course of an hour rendered the shore lines
indistinct. In the absence of any other means of guidance, Pilot
Godfrey deemed these requisite for safe steering, and declared a
postponement of the attack to the next day necessary. The Ad-
miral assented to it, and hence, after standing some distance further
in so as to bring us directly opposite Lighthouse Inlet, we again let
go our anchor. Our turreted consorts likewise came to anchor to
the southeastward and northwestward of us, in the line designated
in the order of battle.

From the spar-deck of the Ironsides a unique panoramic scene was
now in range of vision. The apprehensions of the closeness of
rebel batteries having been allayed, the hatches of all the ironclads
were opened, and their decks crowded with swarms of men from
stern to bow, that made the quaint forms of the monitors and
Whitney Battery appear like as many small islands with low mounds
and teeming population. Through the mist the walls of Fort
Sumter rose dimly to the northwest. Seaward the Pochatan,
Canandaigua, Huron, Housatonic, Wissahickon, Unadilla, Flambeau,
Ladona, Flag, Bibb, Ben Deford and others ranged in a long semi-
circle around the horizon. Upon Morris Island beach, crowds of
curious rebels watched the strange sights before them with evident
amazement. At intervals guns from the forts and batteries spoke
of the enemy’s readiness for the combat to which we were chal-
lenging them. Those around me manifestly first fretted from dis-
appointed expectation, but by degrees lost their ill humor and
indulged in pastimes little in keeping with their earnest duties.
The crew seemed unusually jolly, and amused themselves with such
sports as only sailors know how to practise.

In the latter part of the afternoon General Seymour and Major
Duane, Chief of Engineers, came aboard and had a brief consulta-
tion with the Admiral. A brigade of General Ferry's division, it is understood, is engaged in working its way up Folly Island, with some siege batteries. That the army will remain passive witnesses of the attack by the ironclads is now certain. A spirit of indifferent merriment continues to prevail among my shipmates. On the gun-deck and in the wardrooms, jovial groups while away the time with songs and jokes, as though they were not on the eve of a struggle to the fierceness of which human records will probably have no counterpart, but about joyously returning home from a long cruise.

The Admiral and staff had occupied the cabins of Captain Turner and his officers at the stern of the ship; but, the cabins having been filled with sand-bags, we all slept on mattresses spread on the gun-deck, where the hammocks of most of the crew were also swung. About four hundred officers and men occupied the common space, yet almost perfect stillness prevailed during most of the night.

Evening, April 7.

In a few brief hours this afternoon, history has been enlarged with volumes of memorable matter. The combat for which we have been so long accumulating strength, is over. It was short and decisive. We have experienced a bitter repulse. The ironclads have come short of the expectations even of the most diffident, and we are now mourning over the apparent certainty of an abandonment of the enterprise of which the country, with more faith than reason, hoped such great results.

At sunrise a veil of mist hung over the horizon, but toward the middle of the forenoon it cleared rapidly away, and at ten o'clock the pilot announced that, at last, our work would commence. Early in the morning, signals from the shore revealed to us the undisputed occupation of Folly Island by Colonel Howell's brigade. General Seymour is with it, and seems at a loss to know why we did not move to the attack with daybreak. The Admiral, Commodore Turner and all are anxious to get under way as soon as the mist has disappeared. But Pilot Godfrey again prevails with his argumentation in favor of going in upon low tide, and we must put up with continuing upon the rock of suspense until after noon. The opportune arrival of a mail on the supply-steamer Massachusetts assisted greatly in passing the dragging hours. Officers and men forgot for a while the approaching dangers in the eager perusal of letters from home.

As the morning hours advanced, the sphere of our operations became more and more defined. On the lower end of Morris
Island, rebels could be seen dragging heavy guns to the beach. The men and guns on the walls of Forts Sumter and Moultrie could be readily counted. The spires and even the houses of Charleston seemed not more than a mile or two off. Our friends outside evidently know that we are about striking blows. The gunboats and transports are all standing closer to the bar. The Flambeau, Bibb, Ben Deford, and Nantucket are seeking the best points of observation from the North Channel, but a shell or two from Fort Beaufort, the outer work on Sullivan's Island, compelled the latter to make a hasty retreat to a safer position. At noon, there is a call for a general muster on the gun-deck. From the Admiral down to the powder-boys, all humbly kneel and listen to, and seek strength for the coming trial from, a short, touching prayer read by Commodore Turner. The recollection of the sight of those four hundred determined, battle-eager men, bowing in picturesque groups before their Maker, around the grimmest implements of war, will never be effaced from my memory.

At 12:10 faithful Captain Barrymore of the tender Dandelion took leave of us, and, with the parting of his tug, the last link connecting us with the outside world was severed. At the same time the order to weigh anchor was given. At 12:30 the signal to get under way was hoisted on the flagship. The question how the ironclads were to communicate with each other during action had often puzzled me, but an ingenious arrangement contrived by the officers of the Ironsides and the Admiral's staff, and consisting of a narrow opening in the plate over the aft masthole, through which a long pole with small flags was raised above the spar-deck, gave assurance of a ready communication and comprehension of orders. There was some delay with the monitors ahead of us, but at ten minutes of two o'clock the whole line was in motion. General Seymour telegraphed a "God bless you" when our screw made its first revolutions.

Now comes the stirring general call to quarters. There was a great bustle for a few seconds, but the apparent chaos on the gun and powder-decks quickly changed into the most perfect order and quietude, and, in a few minutes after the order was given, every breathing body, Lieutenant Town of the Army Signal Corps, his two assistants, and myself alone excepted, was ready to do his part in the action. There was not that boisterous, evanescent enthusiasm I have often seen rise in the army to a high pitch and then suddenly fall to the depth of craven-heartedness; but the calm resolution and prompt obedience of orders that are the vital condition of success in
battle. There were four hundred men on the two decks, but a remarkable quietness was maintained.

The iron bulkheads fore and aft on the gun-deck, forming the casemates with the plated sides, were next closed. Streams of water were then again let upon the hides and sand-bags above and below. The pilot-house received another liberal dressing of slush. These last measures of protection being taken, Lieutenant-Commander Belknap's command, "Close port-holes!" rang through his trumpet over the gun-deck. In a second the ponderous shutters fell, and the hatchways were the only sources of daylight to those below. A "Look out for fore-and-aft shot!" from the trumpet next brought the gunners down behind their pieces. The grating over the hatchways was fastened by this time, with the exception of a small opening aft, through which the few permitted to remain upon the spar-deck were passing up and down. We were going at the rate of about four knots an hour. The little craft before and behind us were vigorously plowing the water with their blunt bows, keeping well in line. Nearer and nearer did we approach; clearer and clearer became the lines of the rebel defenses. Already we can count the guns on Fort Wagner (the work next to Morris Light-house) and Cumming's Point, and the windows of the houses of St. Vincent and Moultrieville. At 2:25 the first signs of the afterward fatal difficulty of steering the ship in a tideway became manifest. The bow swung to the port side, and it was necessary to stop her engines to steady her course. In a few minutes we were again in motion.

The first four monitors had already passed Fort Wagner, and we were now abreast of it. We can look into the very mouths of the guns, but they remain silent. We know not what to make of it. Ahead we steam, anxiously awaiting the report of the first gun. At last, about 3 o'clock, two flashes of fire burst from Fort Moultrie, and two shots flew across the bow of the Weehawken, the foremost monitor, that seemed to have approached within less than half a mile. This fairly opened the action. Everybody was now ordered below from the spar-deck and the last hatch closed. Pilot Godfrey, the Admiral, Captain Rodgers and Commodore Turner took their station in the pilot-house. The order, "Fifteen pounds up!" sounded over the gun-deck, and directly the whole ship's battery was shotted. Then followed a few minutes of intense anxiety. For me and a few others, the pilot-house and the ports that were kept open to heave the lead, afforded means enough of observing what was pass-
ing outside. But the mass of those aboard must have felt, for moments at least, natural diffidence at the thought of groping in darkness, as it were, into the deadly strife with the enemy.

The suspense did not last long. Six bells had just struck when a dull sound, like that of a sledge-hammer upon an anvil, was heard on the bow port side. It was the hostile greeting of Fort Sumter, now within 1200 yards of us. A second and a third, more violently than the first, shook the sides of the ship. Soon came the humming and whizzing of rifled and round shot and shell overhead. Still the successive discharges could be distinguished. The several reports had not yet been drowned, so to speak, in a continuous roar. But, hark! There is a reverberation as though of numerous, simultaneous thunder-claps; now a fierce, unceasing roar vibrating the air with a violence that causes even the solid mass of our ship to tremble. A look through the open port on the port side discloses the cause of the furious outburst. The first four monitors had reached the converging point of the fire of Cumming's Point battery, Forts Sumter and Moultrie, and Battery Bee. One after the other had steadily steamed, without firing a shot, to the verge of the concentrating ranges. The enemy evidently reserved their main fire for work at close quarters; but when the Weehawken had reached within six hundred yards of Fort Sumter, a long, broad, brilliant flame suddenly leaped from its side, with all but simultaneous intense glares from Cumming's Point and Moultrie, followed instantaneously by immense volumes of smoke and a rain of projectiles that fairly hid the turrets of our craft with countless spouts of water thrown up by striking shot and shell. Again and again this appalling scene was enacted in all its dire sublimity. As the forts and batteries, like so many vomiting craters of volcanoes, sent forth one torrent of destruction after another, my heart failed and panged with the fear of seeing the little monitors shivered into atoms. But when, in response to a signal from the flagship, they commenced replying to the enemy with the thunder of their huge batteries, and the combat was no longer one-sided, my confidence revived.

Meantime the Ironsides had vainly tried to keep up with the monitors ahead. At 3:37 we were startled by the command, "Stand by the starboard anchor!" followed soon by "Let go the starboard anchor!" The ship had again been disobeying the rudder and threatening to swing on the shoals on our port side. The enemy at once noticed our embarrassed position, and, improv-
ing the fixed mark afforded by the stoppage, diverted their long-range guns for a while from the monitors upon us. Bang, bang, their shot went against the sides almost faster than we could count. Happily the anchor straightened the course of the ship, and in a few minutes we were again under way. We had hardly gained a hundred or so yards upon Fort Sumter when the ship became once more unmanageable, and the anchor was again let go. The Admiral now had the monitors in our wake signalled to disregard the movements of the flagship, and run past it toward the forts. The two nearest, the Catskill and Nantucket, however, from their own heavy, unsteady steering and our own swinging, got foul of us and brushed on the port and starboard side, but got again clear, and headed on in disordered line with the Nahant and Keokuk.

The Ironsides continued almost helpless at the mercy of the tide—now gaining a little, now backing, now striking bottom, now swinging to right and left. Officers and crew grew restive. The enemy's guns were continually playing upon us. We had not yet returned a single shot. There was, indeed, something grand in this scornful disdain of the rebel fire; but our gunners nevertheless chafed under it. At last, at 4:30, while swinging on the starboard side, our port broadside came to bear fully on Fort Moultrie, and Commodore Turner would not let this opportunity slip. "Open port-holes, aim, fire!" followed by a severe concussion of the air, and the first and only offensive effort of the Ironsides in the action was made. Shortly after, the strong ebb tide rendered it utterly impossible to make headway with the ship, and the order was given to drop back. Never was a command more reluctantly given or obeyed. Deep chagrin settled upon all. Still, no other course was left, and we slowly steamed back, after signalling to the monitors to withdraw from the action and follow the flagship, and anchored under the guns of Fort Wagner.

While the Ironsides struggled, a passive mark, with the tide, the other eight ironclads had one after another become engaged in what will live in history as the most desperate—despite its brief duration—naval action known to mankind. I have already made an attempt to describe the raking, roaring intensity of the concentric fire of the rebel works. I might fill page after page with descriptive phrases without reflecting anything like the reality of its fury. The facts and figures respecting its effect upon the monitors which I give below will convey a better idea of its character than vain word-painting.
Under it the captains of the *Weehawken*, *Passaic*, *Montauk*, and *Patapsco* were working with might and main to come abreast, with their badly steering vessels, of the northwest face of the fort, as directed in the order of battle, firing all the while their guns, now at Sumter, then at Moultrie. But they were still under the fire of the northeast face when they discovered three lines of floating obstructions, with another consisting of a row of piles across the whole harbor a short distance beyond. They endeavored to gain the narrow passage left open through the first, but found themselves unable to exercise sufficient control over their vessels to do so. While making this attempt, the turret of the *Passaic* was so bent in by a single shot as to make the working of the 11-inch gun impracticable. A short while after, the turret refused altogether to turn, depriving her of all offensive power. The 200-pounder Parrott of the *Patapsco* also became early disabled. But, aside from these damages to two, the fact that not one of the four could make headway past the batteries, rendered their stay under the heaviest fire useless, and hence they turned about and steered back, after having been in concentric range nearly an hour. The motion of the *Weehawken* was very much impeded by the Ericsson raft chained to her bow. A torpedo exploded close to her port side, but did not inflict any damage. On the way up, the *Patapsco*’s screw caught in a kind of network of chains and cable, kept afloat by barrels and perpendicular by weights. For a while it seemed as though she could not be extricated from the mesh, but in the end she worked clear.

The *Catskill*, *Nantucket*, *Nahant*, and *Keokuk* had the same experience. When the *Catskill* and *Nantucket* got entangled with the *Iron-sides*, the last-mentioned steamed ahead of the three others, but all four got into action shortly after each other, and about the time those that had preceded them were turning back. The enemy had by no means spent the force of their fire upon the first four. The increased number of assailants seemed to spur them, on the contrary, into doubling their energies. For nearly half an hour the scene was wrapped in intensified sheets of flame, clouds of smoke and sprays of water. Then the impassability of the obstructions compelled the last four to fall back with the others. The *Catskill*, *Nantucket* and *Nahant* had kept their course half-way between Forts Sumter and Moultrie, received and replied to the hottest fire of both. The *Keokuk* had stood more to the left, and come within 300 yards of Fort Sumter, the fire of the whole northeast face of which
it seemed to sustain for some time alone, without being able to fire
more than three shots in return—from what cause I will show below.

About fifteen minutes before 5 o'clock a signal was made from
the flagship to cease firing and withdraw from the enemy's fire.
Shortly after 5 o'clock the monitors, followed by the Keokuk, were
within hail of the flagship, and the fire of the enemy stopped. In
dropping down, the Nantucket aimed a few shots at Fort Wagner,
which were the last fired on our side. When the vessels were near-
est the obstructions, the pilots made out the ironclad rams Palmetto
State and Chicora, with a wooden gunboat, standing toward them
from the city. After approaching within a mile of the obstructions,
they came, however, to a discreet halt, and did not venture to en-
gage the monitors.

Upon coming out of range, the hatchways of the Ironsides were
opened, and we could once more have a full view of things around
us. As I reached the spar-deck, the Keokuk was just passing our
starboard side, with Captain Rhind limping about the forward
turret. A sorry sight she presented. Her sides and turrets showed
innumerable holes. She was evidently used up. The Nahant,
Patapsco, and Nantucket also passed, and the commanders of each
reported more or less damage. The pilot-house of the first was
badly shattered. But the full extent of the injuries to the ironclads
was not known until their commanders personally reported them to
the Admiral in the course of the evening. The Keokuk had 90 shots
in all—19 on the water line (12 starboard, 7 port); 15 in the after
turret (5 of them through); 12 in the forward turret (3 of them
through); 25 on the sloping sides (15 starboard, 10 port); 8 through
sheeting on after turret; 10 through smoke-stack (7 through, 3
glanced); 4 through the boats, 2 glanced off the deck; 1 cut signal-
staff; 3 or 4 went through the flag.

The New-Ironsides was hit between sixty and seventy times, but
sustained no material damage. One of the shutters of port five,
port side, was knocked off; an 11-inch shell lodged in the bow
between the sides and the sand-bags. A shot passed through the
smoke-stack, and her bulwarks were much shattered. The Wee-
hawken was struck fifty-nine times. The turret was badly dented,
and worked with difficulty. Many bolts in the pilot-house had
been loosened and driven through. The Montauk was hit twenty
times; the Passaic, fifty-eight times (in addition to the damage
already stated, her pilot-house was much weakened by the loosening
and driving through of the bolts). The Nantucket was struck fifty-
one times, and had her turret stopped twice by shot. The Catskill received about the same number of shots. Both the latter had their decks almost torn open by rifled bolts. The Patapsco was hit between forty and fifty times, and, besides the disabling of her 200-pounder Parrott, had her turret much dented and pilot-house weakened. The Nahant was struck eighty times, and had her pilot-house almost broken into pieces. Four men were wounded, one mortally, in it, from flying bolts.

Of ammunition, the different vessels fired: Ironsides 8 rounds, Catskill 25, Keokuk 3, Montauk 26, Nantucket 15, Passaic 9, Nahant 24, Weehawken 26, Patapsco 18, a total of 154. Assuming that one out of every ten rebel shots struck—a very liberal allowance—it would appear that the enemy fired over four thousand rounds. Three-fourths of these, at least, were discharged while the monitors and Keokuk were within the converging ranges—that is, in less than three-quarters of an hour; so that it appears the forts and batteries averaged almost two hundred discharges per minute. Their fire was excellently directed. Their guns were all of heavy calibre, throwing 8, 9, 10, and 11-inch round shot and shell, and 5 and 6-inch rifled shot. The enemy had a few very effective Whitworth guns playing upon us. Several of the steel-pointed bolts thrown by them were found inside the Keokuk and upon the decks of several of the ironclads. The great force with which the rebel missiles struck and dented, bulged in and broke, the decks, sides, turrets, and pilot-houses, indicated high velocities from the heaviest practicable charges.

In spite of the comparative weakness of our fire, considerable damage was done to the forts. The northeast face of Fort Sumter was marked with eleven holes, plainly visible at our distance of three miles. Some gaps were three feet wide, and looked as though the shot had plowed right through the wall. Two embrasures seemed almost knocked into one. One of our first shots brought down the flag-staff of Fort Moultrie.

I conversed with all the captains of the ironclads during their meeting on board. Their opinions had but one drift: that it would be folly and sure destruction to renew the attack after to-day’s experience, resulting in the total disabling of two *(Keokuk and Passaic)* and partial of three more *(Nahant, Nantucket and Patapsco)*. The Admiral quietly received their reports, but did not ask for their opinions or make known his decision of the question of the renewal or abandonment of the attack.
April 8, 1863.

Late last evening the whole squadron dropped a mile further down the channel and anchored close to the bar. Almost my first look from the spar-deck this morning fell upon a sad sight. The Keokuk was sinking. She had anchored on the bar during the night. Her crew had been busy ever since last evening trying to keep her afloat by plugging the holes at her water line. But at daybreak a stiff breeze set the sea rolling, rendering their attempts futile. Captain Rhind hoisted a signal of distress at about 7, but it remained unnoticed until nearly 8, when the tug Dandelion came alongside the sinking craft. Through the strenuous efforts of her Captain, and Acting-Master Barrymore, every soul on board was saved, with a loss, however, of all they had. There was a mixture of the comic with the tragic in seeing officers and men lose their foothold in trying to get down the greasy slopes of the turtle-back deck and slide helter-skelter into the water, whence they were rescued by small boats. The crew were received with lusty cheers on board the Ironsides, and in the course of the morning sent to Port Royal on board the Wissahickon. The Keokuk went down precisely at 8:10, with her flag flying, in eighteen feet of water. In order to prevent the rebels from appropriating the machinery and guns, the wreck will be blown up.

The Weehawken lost her raft during the night. In the course of the morning it was washed ashore on Morris Island, and taken possession of by the enemy.

About noon the Admiral had the captains of the monitors called together, and declared his determination to them to withdraw their vessels from this harbor. As is the habit of his independent mind, he had arrived at this conclusion after cool reflection upon the facts officially reported to him, without consultation with any one else. But of course he was gratified with the coincidence of the opinion of his captains. To give the order to withdraw from the harbor was undoubtedly the most painful act of the Admiral's long and faithful career in the service of his country. He had to choose between the almost certain destruction of what was left fit for action of the ironclads, and the loss of personal prestige from accepting a repulse as the result of yesterday's attack. He chose the latter; and I say, with all the confidence personal observation can give, the country should thank him for it. When the fire of the rebel forts and batteries he was to attack and destroy, in the short time of three-quarters of an hour, disabled five and weakened all of the
ironclads, how could he feel justified in continuing a work requiring in all probability a trial of days of the powers of offense and defense that had failed in less than an hour?

It is evidence of true courage of the highest order on his part to listen to the dictates of reason rather than follow the impulses of rash daring. The honor of the North was fully upheld in the action, and the loyal people can be justly proud of the devotion and gallantry of all engaged in it . . .

When I left the flagship on Wednesday night, the Patapsco had already started for Port Royal, and the remainder of the monitors were expected to follow on the following day. The Ironsides was to return to her station among the blockaders. The Rear-Admiral and staff were to reëstablish themselves on the Wabash in Port Royal Harbor. The land forces, being numerically too small for independent aggressive conquests, will not be able to maintain themselves without the support of the ironclads on the islands between the Stono and Charleston, and probably will return, soon after the evacuation of the harbor, to their encampments at Hilton Head and St. Helena. Upon the whole, the loyal public had better accept the abandonment of all offensive demonstrations against Charleston as an accomplished fact.

The Admiral determined to send the Bibb at once to Washington with the reports of the action of himself and all the commanders under him. He promptly granted me permission to go North on her, which made me feel very jubilant, as it promised to enable me to outstrip by far all other press correspondents, not only as to knowledge of the details of the naval battle—of this I was sure anyway, as not one of my competitors had, like myself, shared its risks, but all of them had been far out of the range of fire on the transports—but also as to the time of publication. But this calculation came to naught. William Swinton, the very able correspondent of the New York Times, who, after the Rebellion, made quite a reputation as a historian of the war, managed to come aboard the Ironsides shortly after I had left her for the Bibb, to gather particulars of the fight from the officers and also to secure the
privilege of going North on the despatch-vessel. My annoyance on seeing him come aboard may be imagined.

The voyage on the Bibb was eventless. It took us three days and a half to reach Washington, giving me ample time to leisurely work up my notes and enjoy a welcome, soothing rest, after the intense excitement and nervous strain of the preceding days. My rival left the Bibb at Fortress Monroe, in the expectation, as I guessed at once, of getting the start of me by going on the regular boat to Baltimore and thence by train to New York, but we reached our common destination at the same time—that is, on the morning of the 13th. My report was at once issued by the Tribune as an extra and reprinted in the paper of the following day. It was referred to on the editorial page as follows:

Our special correspondent's account of the great naval contest at Charleston, which we printed in an Extra early yesterday morning, will be found in full in other columns. It is a complete and admirable description, and is especially valuable because it is the account of an eye-witness. Its author shared the perils of the conflict which he describes, on board the New-Ironsides, the flagship of Admiral Dupont, and is the only correspondent who was with the fleet during the engagement. The assertion in a morning paper of yesterday, previous to the reception of any account except by telegraph, makes it proper for us to add that our correspondent with difficulty obtained permission from Admiral Dupont to assume his perilous station. When, however, it had been granted him, the Admiral with considerate courtesy extended the offer to the other representatives of 'the press, but they unanimously declined it, and no one of them witnessed the contest, except at a safe distance from the scene of danger.

The allusion to my sole presence on the Ironsides was occasioned by the impudent fraud which the correspondent of the Times attempted to perpetrate by dating his account from the Ironsides, and making it read so as to create the impression that the writer had been on board the iron-clad during the action.
Mr. Greeley and the whole editorial staff of the Tribune complimented me highly upon my achievement, and I received also considerable praise from the press. A substantial recognition was also awarded to me in the form of an extra allowance of one hundred dollars and two weeks' leave of absence. I need not say that all this made me not a little proud.

The repulse in Charleston Harbor led to very savage attacks on Admiral Dupont in a number of Northern papers. George W. Smalley, who was then military and naval editor of the Tribune, defended him very vigorously in that paper. I wrote to Captain C. R. P. Rodgers with reference to this, and received in reply the following letter, which I have always prized very highly:

(Private.)

U. S. S. Wabash,
Port Royal, 25 April, 1863.

My dear Mr. Villard:

I am very much obliged to you for your kindness in writing to me. Your letter was deeply interesting to the Admiral as well as to myself. Your graphic and powerful account of the attack upon Charleston has done much to form public opinion, and I feel under great obligations to my old friend, Mr. Smalley, for the vigor and skill with which he has espoused our cause. Your own personal gallantry and unhesitating devotion in the exercise of your professional duty won for you the respect and confidence of us all, and I hope that it may be my good fortune soon to meet you again, and to find in a fairer field that success which we failed to win on the 7th.

Your letter to me was full of valuable information, and I can not sufficiently thank you for it.

I write briefly now, for I am sorely pressed by many unanswered letters, but I beg you to believe in the warm regard with which I am

Faithfully yours,

C. R. P. Rodgers.


On the same day Captain Rodgers thus wrote to Mr. Smalley:
My dear Mr. Smalley:

I beg you to receive my very cordial thanks for your kind letter, which I received by the Arago. It is a great satisfaction to me to find that one whom I had learned to regard as a tried comrade, has so effectively sustained our brave Admiral, under his first reverse, when an interested and powerful clique was so earnestly endeavoring to destroy a reputation so dear to those who have served under his orders. Mr. Villard's excellent letter and your skilful editorials have done much to frustrate the interested malignity which sought to win new contracts and large disbursements at the expense of the honor of men who have, at least, during this war served bravely and faithfully. The commanding officers who fought at Charleston are, as one man, emphatic and unanimous in coinciding with the Admiral in his views and decision. We were charged with the difficult task of taking Charleston by machinery. Twelve hundred men in ingenious machines were to take a strongly fortified city upon which the resources of the Rebellion had been lavished for two years. When these machines came to us, they were wholly untried, and we were to experiment with them under such a fire as the world has never before witnessed. Our attack was gallantly delivered, but the machines were found not equal to the task assigned them. After forty minutes' fighting, without endeavoring to force the obstructions, five out of the eight smaller vessels were found wholly, or one-half, disabled, and every commanding officer in the attacking force was convinced that a persistence in the attack would turn failure into utter disaster. We might have produced a more dramatic effect by lingering until a portion of the fleet had been sunk, and have thus gratified the sensationalists, but it was certain that the Admiral could not take Charleston with the naval force given him —could not even take Fort Sumter, which I had hoped we should destroy. The power of the new ordnance and the heavy projectiles was greater than the endurance of the monitors. The shattering process was rapidly going on, and another hour's engagement would have destroyed many of the vessels.

Our people are shocked that there was so little loss of life. They forget that, in these mailed vessels, when the loss of life begins, swift destruction follows. They are nearly safe until they are destroyed. Had Charleston been taken, scores of new monitors
would have been built, and now disappointed constructors are ready for denunciation. It remains to be seen whether the country will be influenced by the opinion of carefully selected Naval Commanders or by disappointed inventors and their interested partisans. If an issue is demanded, the Naval Commanders are ready for it—ready and defiant.

I am deeply impressed by your kindness in this matter. I have shown your letter to the Admiral, and he fully shares this feeling. I thank you most warmly, and I beg you to believe me, with true regard and respect,

Ever faithfully yours,

C. R. P. Rodgers.

G. W. Smalley, Esq., New York.

P. S. I had occasion to observe and admire the nerve and courage of Mr. Villard, and to witness the untiring fidelity with which he sought to perform his duties as an observer and recorder of all that was occurring.
CHAPTER XXVI

FIRST VISIT TO BOSTON.—1863

The main consequence of the Charleston affair to me personally remains to be told. My vacation accidentally led to an episode destined to direct the course of my whole life. When Sydney Howard Gay, the managing editor of the Tribune, announced to me that I could have two weeks' leave of absence, I remarked, "I am much obliged, but where shall I spend it?" "Have you ever been to Boston?" he asked; and when I answered, "No," he said, "Go to the 'Hub' by all means." Accordingly, after having "taken it easy" for a few days in New York, I followed his advice. I reached Boston on Thursday, April 21st, and spent the next day in walking about the city. On the 23d I called on Mrs. Severance, presenting a letter of introduction to her from her husband, the Collector at Port Royal. As she was not at home, her daughter Julia received me, and invited me to accompany her to the gymnasium of Dr. Diocletian Lewis, to witness the exercises of a class of young men and women. I accepted, went with her, and stayed through the performance. I was introduced to Dr. Lewis and others, among them the son of William Lloyd Garrison, the famous abolitionist. From the latter I received an invitation to go with him to hear the Rev. Samuel Johnson of Salem, a well-known liberal-minded, free-religious preacher, speak the next (Sunday) morning, and afterwards to dine with his family, in order to make their acquaintance. I gladly accepted.

I mentioned, in speaking of my deep interest in the Frémont campaign of 1856, that, like most Europeans, I looked upon the existence of slavery as an outrageous
shame and an abominable disgrace to the American Republic; that I was shocked and disgusted by the incomprehensible and most contemptible prejudice in the Northern States against the inspired patriots who demanded the abolition of the horrible institution, at the risk of constant, bitter persecution and personal danger. For them I had always felt the deepest sympathy and admiration; hence, I was delighted to receive from George W. Smalley a letter of introduction to Wendell Phillips, which I had not then delivered, and was, of course, rejoiced at the opportunity to become acquainted with his noble compeer.

Young William Lloyd and his younger brother Frank, a boy fifteen years of age, called for me, as agreed, and took me to hear Mr. Johnson, who preached in a public hall. Their sister was also present and joined us after the sermon, and we all walked together to their home. I was heartily welcomed by the parents, and at once felt entirely at home with them. Mrs. Garrison was a fine-looking woman, with a pleasant expression, but seemingly of a shy, retiring disposition. Mr. Garrison’s exterior was a complete surprise to me. His public character as the most determined, fearless antislavery champion had so impressed me, as it did most people, that I had supposed his outward appearance must be in keeping with it. In other words, I had expected to see a fighting figure of powerful build, with thick hair, full beard, and fiery, defiant eyes. It seemed almost ludicrous to behold a man of middle size, completely bald and clean shaven, with kindly eyes behind spectacles, and, instead of a fierce, an entirely benignant expression. He appeared, indeed, more like the typical New England minister of the Gospel than the relentless agitator that he was. The inner man corresponded fully to the outer one. He was forbearing, and mildness itself, in manner and speech. Being a journalist himself, he took a special interest in my war experiences as a correspondent, which I was made to relate during and after the dinner, with the whole family as eager listeners.
The next morning Mr. Garrison's youngest son, Frank, called for me early, and acted as my guide in an exploration of the older part of Boston. We climbed to the cupola of the State House and ascended Bunker Hill Monument. If I remember rightly, he also took me to the residence of Wendell Phillips, to whom I presented Mr. Smalley's letter of introduction. The latter had had close personal relations with the great orator ever since he had protected him from the violence of a Boston mob, and subsequently married his adopted daughter. Mr. Phillips lived in a very small house with hardly space for the enjoyment of even ordinary comfort. He received me very cordially, and I conversed for an hour with this famous man, and became deeply impressed by his fascinating personality. Throughout the rest of my stay in Boston, I was much in company with the Garrisons, visiting with them (among others places) Readville, some fifteen miles south of Boston, where the Fifty-fourth and Fifty-fifth Massachusetts colored regiments—the first ones organized in Massachusetts—were encamped. The oldest son of Mr. Garrison, George Thompson, had entered the army, much against the wishes of his father, who had always been an advocate of the doctrine of non-resistance. Mr. Garrison finally gave his sanction, however, and George ultimately became quartermaster in the Fifty-fifth Regiment. At Readville, Colonel Robert G. Shaw, of the Fifty-fourth Regiment, attracted especial attention, no one knowing how soon his fine young life was to be sacrificed in battle. He fell in the assault on Fort Wagner.

On reaching my hotel on my return from the camp, I found a letter from Mr. Gay, saying that he had received reliable information that Rosecrans's army was to enter upon aggressive movements, early in May, from Murfreesboro', and asking whether I was willing to shorten my leave of absence and start at once for Tennessee, to report the impending campaign. It was midnight when I reached a definite resolution, and, with deep regret that I should
have to give up the rest of my vacation, wrote in answer to Mr. Gay that I would report for duty the day after the morrow. It was to this chance visit to Boston that I owe the greatest happiness of my life—my marriage to Miss Fanny Garrison, the only daughter of the great abolitionist, to whose charms of mind and person I surrendered on first acquaintance.

I returned to New York by the night train.
MEMOIRS OF HENRY VILLARD

BOOK SIX

IN CIVIL-WAR TIME: CHICKAMAUGA
I

LEFT New York on May 3, and went directly to Cincinnati. Here I remained ten days, mainly for the purpose of watching the developments in the case of Vallandigham, the notorious leader of secession sympathizers. General Burnside, now in command of the Department of the Ohio, had arrested him on a charge of treason, and was about to bring him to trial before a court-martial. But as the General requested me not to publish anything in regard to the matter until the trial was over, at which no reporters were permitted to be present, it seemed useless to tarry longer, and I resumed my journey and reached Rosecrans’s headquarters at Murfreesboro’, Tennessee, five days later.

A short review of the experiences of the Army of the Ohio since I left it in eastern Kentucky, will be in place here. The campaign of Perryville had been brought to a close in October, 1862, by the successful retreat of Bragg’s army into Tennessee. General Buell halted the pursuing columns north of the Cumberland River, and, after a few days’ rest, turned his army again in a western direction towards Glasgow and Bowling Green. He had hardly issued orders to this effect when he was directed by the President to turn his command over to Major-General W. S. Rosecrans, who assumed charge on October 30. General McCook’s and General Gilbert’s corps were then concentrated at Bowling Green, and General Crittenden’s corps reached Glasgow a few days later.

The strong dissatisfaction with the disappointing per-
formances of General Buell that was generally felt in official circles at Washington, at the capitals of Western States, and by the loyal public, was the principal cause of his removal; but the immediate one was, that he again manifested his former disinclination to comply with the orders from Washington to move directly into East Tennessee. Subsequent events proved, however, that for once he was right in remonstrating against those orders, on the ground that Bragg was aiming at the capture of Nashville, and that the protection of the Tennessee capital and the control of middle Tennessee were more important than the occupation of the eastern part of the State. General Rosecrans, too, was compelled to decide at once against the movement so long desired by the Government, by positive information of the appearance of Bragg at Murfreesboro', only thirty-three miles from Nashville, and to order the whole army, within a few days after his assumption of the command, to make for that city by forced marches.

Nashville was occupied during the Perryville campaign by the divisions of Generals Negley and Palmer. The place had been well fortified, and was never really in danger from the inferior rebel forces under General Breckinridge that hovered about it during the fall, acting more as a corps of observation than as besiegers, although they made some offensive attempts, and even boldly demanded the surrender of the city. But the advent of the aggressive Bragg within one and a half days' march of it formed an imminent danger, and justified the southward rush of the army for its protection. General McCook's corps reached its destination on November 9, having marched seventy-two miles in three days, and was directly followed by the other corps.

One of the first acts of General Rosecrans was a reorganization of the army. Its name was changed to "Army of the Cumberland," and it was divided into the right wing, under Major-General Alexander McD. McCook, composed of the three divisions of Johnson, Davis (the slayer of Nelson),
and Sheridan; the centre, under General Thomas, with Rousseau, Negley, and Reynolds for division commanders; and the left wing, under General Crittenden, with the three divisions of Wood, Palmer, and Van Cleve. The new Commander-in-chief devoted himself assiduously to the improvement of the efficiency of his command, filling its thinned ranks with fresh troops, and weeding out incompetent officers. He also worked vigorously in other respects to get it ready for resuming the offensive as early as possible. Officers and men were greatly in need of clothing and foot-wear. The cavalry and artillery and the transportation department required extensive remounting, and an accumulation of quartermaster, commissary, and ordnance stores had also to precede a forward movement. Rosecrans's efforts to supply all these urgent needs were very much impeded by obstruction of communications with the North. The main line of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad had not been fully repaired since the destruction wrought upon it by the last formidable raid of the rebel cavalry leader Morgan, and hauling had to be done for many miles with army wagons. Nor was it found possible to ensure the regular operation of that sole available rail-line. More or less successful attempts to interrupt it were repeated again and again during November and December by the rebel chieftains Morgan, Wheeler, Wharton, Forrest, and others. Still, the wants of the army were gradually so far satisfied that, towards the end of the year, it could be considered ready to resume active operations.

Accordingly, General Rosecrans, on Christmas day, 1862, issued orders for a general advance the following morning upon Murfreesboro', where Bragg's army had remained stationary, receiving the benefits of rest, replenishment, and reinforcement. The army moved on December 26, in three columns: McCook on the right, Thomas with three of his five divisions in the centre, and Crittenden on the left. They came upon the rebel pickets and outposts within a few miles of Nashville, and, pushing them and
their supports steadily before them, on December 29 reached the west bank of Stone's River in the immediate vicinity of Murfreesboro', which lies on the east side of it. General Rosecrans had believed that his antagonist would retreat on his approach, but found him well concentrated, and evidently ready to accept battle, with the two corps of Generals Polk and Hardee, and a division under General Breckinridge. Unknown to each other, both commanders prepared on the 30th to attack the next morning. By an extraordinary coincidence, the plans of battle were exact counterparts. Rosecrans aimed to inflict a great defeat upon the enemy by turning his right, and Bragg was determined to try the Perryville tactics again by a flanking movement with the bulk of his army against our right, which he doubtless knew was commanded by the same general, McCook, upon whom he had tried the same game all but successfully. In this concurrence of the purposes of the two adversaries, he who struck first and heaviest would naturally have the best chance to win, and this advantage unfortunately fell to Bragg.

Thus the great battle of Stone's River, one of the bloodiest of the Civil War, came to be fought on the last day of the year 1862. Bragg, by a general wheel of his centre and left under Polk and Hardee, managed to work around our right, and to hurl upon this flank massive columns with such irresistible impetus that they swept before them, partly dispersed, and partly captured the first of our divisions encountered, and rolled back upon the centre the other two divisions. The centre, being thus exposed to determined attacks from the front, flank, and rear, was also compelled to give ground, and succeeded in staying the steady advance of the rebels from a new position only with the help of divisions from our left. For some time during the day there was the gravest peril of a general and crushing defeat of our whole army, and it may still be considered an open question whether the prevention of such a terrible catastrophe was due more to our resistance than to the
gradual tiring out of the assailants and their lack of reserves to follow up their success. As it was, the close of that awful day found us with a loss of nearly 10,000 killed and wounded, not far from 4000 prisoners (out of a total of 43,000 effectives), and 30 pieces of artillery, and forced back on a new line forming almost a right angle to the one first held. The enemy's casualties in killed and wounded were even heavier, out of an effective total of 8000 less than ours. The result of the exhaustion of both sides was that the opposing hosts lay confronting one another for the next two days. On the afternoon of the third day, the enemy attempted another assault, upon our left, ending in a severe repulse with heavy loss. Bragg retreated in the night of the fourth day—much to the relief of Rosecrans, who had even thought of a retreat to Nashville immediately after the misfortunes of the first day. What could at best be called a drawn battle by our side was now proclaimed, of course, a Union victory, coupled with the usual assertion that it was won over greatly superior numbers. Indeed, Rosecrans telegraphed to the War Department that he had encountered more than 62,000 rebels. Bragg, to be sure, likewise exaggerated our strength beyond 60,000. But the Official Records leave no doubt of the correctness of the respective strengths above given.

Rosecrans had set out from Nashville for an offensive winter campaign. Had the outcome of his main trial of strength with Bragg been satisfactory, as he confidently expected, he would doubtless have carried out that purpose, unless severe winter weather and, maybe, the course of events in other parts of the theatre of war had prevented it. The shock received by his command on Stone's River was so great, however, that he would have been obliged to lie still for a time at least for general recuperation, but he lapsed into inactivity for months. The severe handling he suffered from Bragg had apparently taken most of the aggressive "starch" out of him, and his confidence in the army was greatly diminished. Indeed, the
relative reverse he had undergone transformed him from a buoyant fighter into another cautious and irresolute "cunctator" of the McClellan and Buell type.

The first evidence of this change of spirit was the extensive fortifications he planned and had carried out around Murfreesboro'. They were on such an elaborate scale as to indicate a decided fear of the enemy. Next came the prominence he gave, in his communications to the Government, to the great need of more drill and discipline in his army, although this shortcoming had not been considered serious enough by him before to delay his advance against Bragg. Other strong symptoms of his loss of pluck were his continuous and clamorous demands for more troops, more equipment, and more supplies. His likeness to the prototypes mentioned grew very striking when the one sound excuse for his prolonged lethargy, the protracted very bad weather, could not be pleaded any longer upon the advent of spring, and the Government began to urge upon him the resumption of offensive operations. Like the others, he did not seem to be able to get ready to move. He had no end of excuses. Suggestions to him only led to long deprecatory arguments against them. Orders from Washington produced no other effect than to draw from him remonstrances and protests. He gradually developed even an obstinate obstreperousness and outright resistance to the wishes of his superiors, and resented their interference almost as an insult and outrage. His conduct naturally produced discouragement and distrust of him at the national capital. The dissatisfaction of the Government with his inertia became known to the public, and led to criticism of him in the Eastern papers, while he had many strong champions in the Western press.

This was the state of things when I reached Murfreesboro' in May. On presenting my credentials, General Rosecrans received me with literally profuse cordiality. Referring to my review of his predecessor, he assured me that he deemed it a privilege to have so able and well-known a
critic join him. Although I had only a slight acquaintance with him (I had seen him a few times during the siege of Corinth), he invited me at once to his mess, offered to provide sleeping-quarters for me next to his, and to furnish me horses and servants. This excessive hospitality confirmed the impression which prevailed among newspaper men, and which I had brought with me, that he tried to work the press systematically for his personal benefit. I felt that, if I placed myself under obligations to him by accepting the offered favors, he would expect services in return, and my independence as a writer could not be preserved. Accordingly, I declined his offers as politely as I could, and again joined my old friends, General McCook and his staff, who occupied a spacious brick mansion, the former home of the owner of a large plantation adjacent to the town, in which I was given a small but comfortable room. I also secured a serviceable horse and a negro servant.

My very first talk with Rosecrans satisfied me that I need not have made haste to retake the field, as he had no thought of an immediate advance. Fully six weeks were, indeed, to elapse before his army got again in motion, and during that time my work remained very light, as I was subject, of course, to the usual restrictions upon the publication of information regarding intended movements, the strength and condition of the army, and other matters that might have given "aid and comfort to the enemy." Murfreesboro' was an attractive, solidly built-up town, but offered no social diversions, as most of the ten thousand inhabitants had disappeared. But I found plenty of other means of pleasantly whiling away my abundant leisure. To return to this army was to me almost like returning to one's large family, owing to the great number of friends I had in it. There had been but few changes among the general officers, and in visits to them much of my time was agreeably spent. Then General McCook and his military family were a very jolly set, and provided a good deal of fun. The singing of songs in chorus was a constant amusement. A con-
tinuous flow of official and unofficial callers also added to the liveliness of our headquarters. Drills, parades, and reviews likewise afforded diversion. The weather was most propitious for outdoor life, and I took advantage of it by daily horseback exercise.

It was my duty as well as my pleasure to pay frequent visits to the general headquarters, where I always received a hearty welcome from both General Rosecrans and his chief of staff, General James A. Garfield, in whom nobody then foresaw a future President of the United States. I will describe them separately. General Rosecrans was of middle stature, with a broad upper body and rather short, bow legs (owing to which peculiarities he presented a far better appearance when mounted than on foot); a head not large, with short, thin, light-brown hair; a narrow, long face with kindly blue eyes, strong nose and mouth, and scanty full grayish beard. His general expression was very genial. He was a great talker, voluble, earnest, and persuasive—one of the elements of his strength. General Garfield, not much over thirty years old, presented a far more commanding and attractive appearance. Very nearly, if not fully, six feet high, well formed, of erect carriage, with a big head of sandy hair, a strong-featured, broad and frank countenance, set in a full beard and lighted up by large blue eyes and a most pleasing smile, he looked like a distinguished personage. His manners were very gentlemanly and cordial, and altogether he produced and sustained a most agreeable impression.

It was not difficult for me to get on a confidential footing with Rosecrans. In fact, he freely offered his confidence to me of his own accord, and thus enabled me promptly to take a correct measure of the man. He showed at once that his disagreements with the Washington authorities were the uppermost thoughts in his mind, and that it gratified him greatly to express his ill-humor towards them. Indeed, he criticised General Halleck and Secretary Stanton with such freedom—with such a total disregard of official pro-
priety—not once, but repeatedly, that it really embarrassed me to listen to him, although, fortunately, he was content to do the talking without expecting sympathetic echoes from me. He dwelt upon the disregard of some of his wishes by those superiors as a public wrong, and denounced as criminal their efforts to force him into the offensive before he was completely ready. Nor did he hesitate to expatiate upon his plans for future operations, and this with scarcely concealed self-appreciation. He evidently believed that he was destined to play the most prominent part and reach the greatest distinction among all the Union generals. He unfolded to me his conception of the grand strategy by which the triumph of the North could be assured, coupling it with a broad intimation that Halleck and Stanton would have to be got out of the way, leaving me to infer that, after this was done, the next necessary step was to put him in the former's place. Talk of this kind was so regularly repeated by him that I could not help concluding that he was anxious to impress me with his greatness and to have that impression reflected in the Tribune. There was a correspondent attached to his headquarters, W. D. Bickham, who did that sort of work for him very willingly in the columns of the Cincinnati Commercial. But the more "Old Rosey," as the puffer in question had nicknamed him, tried to make me help in pointing him out as the great and only hope of the country, the less I was inclined to gratify him, and the smaller grew my faith in his fitness to command a large army and lead it to victory. Notwithstanding his transparent vanity and love of approbation, he tried to make me—and, for that matter, everybody else, including his superiors—believe that he disliked publicity and shrank especially from newspaper notoriety.

His principal justification of the inaction of his command was that, as long as he stood still, he held Bragg fast in his front, and prevented the sending of reinforcements from him to General Johnston in his efforts to foil Grant in the capture of Vicksburg. He explained to me at length
the strategic theory on which he rested this plea. As appears from the Official Records, he used the same argument with General Halleck, who, however, tripped him up very effectively in replying to it. The simple truth regarding his real motives was, that the display of rebel valor and the lack of resisting stamina in his own troops on Stone's River still exercised a deterrent influence on his mind, and that under it he persisted in his belief in the superior strength of Bragg, and had not pluck enough to again undertake anything against him until he had at his command what in his judgment was a sufficient preponderance, numerically and otherwise.

General Garfield was also talkative, but more reserved and discreet than his chief. He professed to have great admiration for him and implicit faith in his military talents, but, unlike him, believed that the army was fully ready in the first half of May to enter upon a new campaign. He expressed himself freely upon the several ways of conducting operations against Bragg that suggested themselves from the relative positions of the opposed armies. He appeared to have a very clear and sound strategic judgment for one whose experience as commander had been limited to petty warfare, at the head of a small brigade, with raiders and guerrillas in eastern Kentucky. I recognized also his general capacity and great store of information. A distinguished career seemed certain for him, but I am sure that he himself did not dream that the chief magistracy of the nation was awaiting him.

There could be no doubt, however, that the long stay at Murfreesboro' had resulted in the much greater proficiency of the army. As more than one-third of it consisted of newly enlisted officers and men, there was great need of improvement in drill and discipline, and it must be said that the commanding general and the commanders under him had tried their best in that respect. Whenever the weather permitted, the exercises of the troops had been energetically pushed. But I could not learn that anything beyond drills
by companies and regiments had been attempted. The ex-
planation of this was that the Army of the Cumberland was
as deficient as the Army of the Potomac and that under
Grant in generals able to conduct brigade and division
drills. But the same deficiency prevailed on the rebel side.

While the main body of the Army of the Cumberland
enjoyed entire immunity from rebel disturbance, the enemy
resumed his daring coups against a number of our isolated
posts and his bold raids in our rear and upon our lines of
communication, not long after the battle of Stone’s River.
His exploits forced Rosecrans to resort to counter-strokes,
and from the latter part of January till June the newspa-
pers published almost daily accounts of the more or less
important undertakings of this kind on both sides, some of
which I will mention. Towards the end of January, the
united rebel cavalry under Forrest, Wheeler, and Wharton
turned up in middle Tennessee, north of the Cumberland,
and on February 3 appeared before Fort Donelson, but were
repulsed by the garrison. On March 4, Colonel Colburn
was sent from Franklin on a reconnoissance with a Union
force of 1900 men, fell into a trap set for him by the rebel
General Van Dorn, and was captured with 1400 of his
command. On March 20 the rebel raider Morgan suffered
a small defeat. A few days later, Forrest made a success-
ful descent upon the Nashville & Columbia Railroad. Early
in April our General Reynolds raided the Manchester &
McMinnville Railroad, and soon thereafter Colonel Streight
with 1600 men started from our side on his daring but
disastrous raid into northern Alabama and Georgia, where
he was captured with his whole force by Forrest. In May
and early June, further raids were undertaken by our Gen-
eral Stanley and the tireless rebel Forrest.

The irritating friction between the Government and Gen-
eral Rosecrans continued steadily after my arrival, and even
grew in severity through the month of May. But, early in
June, the General found himself driven into a corner by the
proof that he had failed to hold Bragg’s entire force, a large
part of it having actually reinforced Johnston in Mississippi. Ordered by the Government to take advantage of the weakening of his foe by a forward movement, and yet unwilling to comply, he bethought himself of an indirect mode of evading the command from Washington. He summoned his corps and division commanders to a council of war, and succeeded in obtaining from fifteen out of seventeen an endorsement of his opposition to an advance, which vote he triumphantly telegraphed to General Halleck, who answered him cuttingly that ‘‘councils of war never fight.’’ As the Government was loath to override the opinion of the council, General Rosecrans would probably have had his way but for the efforts of his chief of staff. In controversy of the views and verdict of the generals, General Garfield prepared and submitted an exhaustive memorandum. It set forth in detail the actual strength of our army and the estimated one of Bragg’s, according to which figures we had fully one-third more effectives. It clearly stated all the arguments for and against an immediate advance. One of the strong points which he made, and which mainly moved the Government in urging Rosecrans to activity, was the imperative political necessity of stopping the growth of the anti-war sentiment in the loyal States (as shown by the spread of ‘‘copperheadism’’) by Union victories in the field. Although the Commander-in-chief did not yield at once, the deliberate conclusion of his chief of staff that an advance should no longer be delayed, no doubt greatly influenced his early decision to move.

On June 11, General Halleck telegraphed from Washington to General Rosecrans: ‘‘I deem it my duty to repeat to you the great dissatisfaction that is felt here at your inactivity. There seems to be no doubt that a part of Bragg’s force has gone to Johnston.’’ It appears that no answer to this was deigned by Rosecrans, whereupon Halleck wired him again on June 16: ‘‘Is it your intention to make an immediate movement forward? A definite answer, ‘Yes’ or ‘No,’ is required.’’ This peremptory
demand elicited the following response: "In reply to your inquiry, if 'immediate' means to-night or to-morrow, No. If it means as soon as all things are ready, say five days, Yes.' This extraordinary telegraphic incident was closed by a despatch dated Murfreesboro', June 24, 2.10 A.M., saying laconically: "Major-General Halleck, General-in-chief: The army begins to move at three o'clock this morning. W. S. Rosecrans, Major-General.'"

In this connection I will also quote a telling rebuke from a letter of President Lincoln in reply to a long defence of his course which the General had sent to him:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, August 10, 1863.

MY DEAR GENERAL ROSECRANS:

Yours of the 1st was received two days ago. I think you must have inferred more than General Halleck has intended as to any dissatisfaction of mine with you. I am sure you, as a reasonable man, would not have been wounded could you have heard all my words and seen all my thoughts in regard to you. I have not abated in my kind feeling for and confidence in you. I have seen most of your dispatches to General Halleck—probably all of them. After Grant invested Vicksburg, I was very anxious lest Johnston should overwhelm him from the outside; and when it appeared certain that part of Bragg's force had gone and was going to Johnston, it did seem to me it was exactly the proper time for you to attack Bragg with what force he had left. In all kindness let me say, it so seems to me yet. Finding from your dispatches to General Halleck that your judgment was different, and being very anxious for Grant, I, on one occasion, told General Halleck I thought he should direct you to decide at once to immediately attack Bragg or to stand on the defensive and send part of your force to Grant. He replied he had already so directed in substance. Soon after, dispatches from Grant abated my anxiety for him, and in proportion abated my anxiety about any movement of yours. When afterwards, however, I saw a dispatch of yours arguing that the right time for you to attack Bragg was not before, but would be after, the fall of Vicksburg, it impressed me very strangely; and I think I so stated to the Secretary of War and General Halleck. It seemed no other than the proposition that you
could better fight Bragg when Johnston should be at liberty to return and assist him than you could before he could so return to his assistance.

According to the official returns, the aggregate of officers and men present for duty at the opening of the campaign was: Fourteenth Corps, 26,058; Twentieth Corps, 16,047; Twenty-first Corps, 17,023; reserve corps, 20,615; cavalry corps, 12,281—making a total of infantry, artillery, and cavalry of over 90,000. But, from this total, the staffs and escorts of the army, corps, and division headquarters, and the division of Van Cleve left to garrison the works at Murfreesboro', had to be deducted, so that the available number of actual combatants was under 70,000.

Bragg's army was known to occupy a strong position on the range of much-broken, rocky hills extending north of and parallel to Duck River, a tributary of the Cumberland. His lines extended from Shelbyville to Wartrace at an average distance of something over twenty miles south of ours. His front was about ten miles long, and covered the railroad from Nashville to Chattanooga and the principal ordinary highways in the same direction. The nature of the country gave the enemy great advantages for defence, and, moreover, a line of field-works had been constructed for the better protection of the approaches. A cavalry force covered each of his wings. His effective total was estimated at under 40,000 bayonets and sabres.

Rosecrans's plan of operations was that of an able strategist. A front attack being forbidden by the formidableness of the rebel position, he proposed to turn Bragg's right and assail him on that flank and his rear. To that end, the corps of General Granger was to make a show of an advance in force from Triune upon the enemy's left at Shelbyville, and, at the same time, a forward movement of infantry and cavalry columns in an easterly direction was to have the appearance of a feint to divert attention from Granger. The bulk of the three corps of Thomas, McCook, and Crittenden
was to execute the principal movement around the rebel right by hurried marches in a southeasterly direction, with the town of Manchester (on the south bank of the Duck) as the objective-point, on reaching which, the rebel flank, rear, and communications would have been exposed to us.

The corps commanders were summoned to the army headquarters on the evening of June 23, and this plan was fully explained to them by the General-in-chief. I had received a plain intimation of what was to come from General Garfield during the day, and made my preparations accordingly. As the army was to move with only twelve days' rations and as little baggage as possible, I arranged to leave my trunk with the headquarters train of McCook's corps, and to set out with no other impedimenta than toilet things and two changes of underclothing in my saddle-bags. General Garfield had offered to provide for me at the general headquarters during the campaign; but as, in his opinion, McCook's corps was most likely to be the first to collide with the enemy, I concluded to accompany it for a few days at least. Learning that the division of General Johnson was to be in the lead, I gladly accepted an invitation to spend the night at his headquarters and ride with him next day.

The actual orders to move were not issued till after midnight. The division was roused at four and ready to get under way at five, but was not put in motion till eight. I had grown very tired, towards the end, of the monotony of our routine life at Murfreesboro', and heartily welcomed the impending change to the stir and excitement of campaigning. I felt in perfect health and highest spirits, and looked and hoped for a long period of active work. But it was ordained that my new career should be brief—indeed, cut short at its very beginning. The greatest disappointment I experienced in the Civil War was in immediate store for me.

The second division first marched for six miles over the Shelbyville turnpike, and then turned to the left into an ordinary country road leading to the sadly dilapidated
town of Old Millersburg and beyond it to "Liberty Gap," one of the several narrow defiles through the rough hills north of the Duck River. The division was preceded by five companies of mounted infantry, immediately behind which General Johnson and staff and myself followed. Nothing was seen or heard of the enemy until we approached the Gap in the afternoon, which the mounted infantry found strongly guarded by rebels. A lively skirmish ensued, and, the ground being unfavorable for a cavalry attack, the General ordered the leading brigade under General Willich to clear the way. The latter had his command ready for an advance in a short time, and moved forward with a strong line of skirmishers and supporting companies in advance, and one regiment on the right and another on the left of the road, with two regiments and a battery in reserve. The rebel skirmishers fell back before us upon their supports on the high hills forming the entrance to the Gap. A direct attack being hardly practicable, Willich made his regiments feel their way around the flanks of the enemy, and, aided by part of another brigade, finally swept them from their position just before dark, by scaling the heights in a rush, with considerable loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Their camps were also captured. We lost a small number in killed and wounded. Our troops displayed a good deal of dash.

Up to that day, the weather had been all that could be wished for many weeks. But, soon after sunrise, the sky became covered, and by noon it commenced raining, and turned into a steady downpour in the course of the afternoon. It was the beginning of one of the worst rain storms that ever visited that part of the country, and actually continued with hardly any interruption for fully a fortnight. It quickly made the roads almost impassable, and the consequent obstruction of the movements of the army eventually prevented the full success of Rosecrans's strategy. I had no waterproof, but an ordinary army overcoat, which afforded little protection. By nightfall I was literally wet
to the skin. General Johnson invited me to share his tent, and had a big fire built under a large "fly" stretched over the entrance to it. Having no change of clothing, as even the extra underwear in my saddle-bags was wet, I had to spend the night in my soaked condition. In a few hours I became very feverish, and felt rheumatic pains all over my body. I suffered intensely, too, all night, from a fearful headache. In the morning, the fever was so high and the rheumatism so acute that I was entirely unable to move. The General sent for the chief surgeon of the division, who came promptly, and, after examining me thoroughly, expressed the opinion that I was suffering from a very severe attack of malarial fever and inflammatory rheumatism. He added that it was altogether out of the question for me to keep on with the army, and that the best thing I could do would be to return to Murfreesboro' or Nashville and go into a hospital. He offered to send me to the former place on an ambulance-train that was soon to start with our wounded of the day before. The thought of having to abandon the field within the first twenty-four hours was most irksome, but as I began to feel confused in my mind and could not stand on my legs, and had to choose between being taken back or left alone in a wild rebel region, I submitted to the inexorable.

An ambulance soon drove up, into which I was lifted on a stretcher. There were already two wounded officers in it, one of whom was able to sit up, so that there was room enough for me to be carried in a lying position. A surgeon accompanied us. The rain continued to come down heavily, and, what with its effect and that of the passage of artillery and trains, the roads had become so bad that our team had to be walked all the forenoon till we struck the turnpike. The ride was very rough, and would have discomforted me greatly had I not been partly out of my senses. It was late in the evening when we arrived at Murfreesboro', where I was transferred to a military hospital that had been established in a large brick building ordinarily used for mer-
cantile purposes. I had a severe attack of bilious nausea on the way, which recurred during the night and made me very weak and unable to take food of any kind. The doctor in charge interested himself specially in my case, and the next day offered to send me North in a hospital railroad car that was about to start with a load of sick and wounded officers and men for Louisville. He told me frankly that it would take me some time to get well, and advised me strongly to avail myself of the opportunity. Accordingly, I was put on the train which started from Murfreesboro' on the second morning and brought us to Louisville the next day. My fever and rheumatic aches increased during that long railroad journey, and I was a very sick man when we reached our destination. The Galt House people had been informed by telegraph, and were on hand at the station to receive and take me to the hotel.

Here I was confined to my bed till July 21, when I was sufficiently improved to take the risk of a transfer by boat to Cincinnati, where I put up at the Burnet House. The all-absorbing event of the day was the extraordinary raid which the rebel guerrilla leader Morgan was making through the southern parts of Indiana and Ohio. It was the most daring venture of the kind since the outbreak of the war. His force, consisting of several thousand mounted men, swam their horses across the Ohio not far from Louisville, and then started upon their plundering career, moving northward at first and then eastward through southeastern Indiana and across the whole State of Ohio, their route lying about half-way between Cincinnati and Columbus. This sudden invasion produced the greatest excitement and consternation in the two States, as well as throughout the Northwest. Great efforts were made to intercept the rebels with militia and troops from the enlistment camps at Cincinnati, Indianapolis, and Columbus; but the raiders moved so rapidly, and interrupted communication by rail and telegraph so much, that no concentration of forces was effected in time to stop them. Several bodies of militia and
troops had, however, encounters with detachments of the enemy, and killed, wounded, and captured more or less of them. It was only when the raiders were nearing the Ohio in the eastern part of the State that a considerable body of them, with Morgan himself, were finally cornered and captured, the remainder escaping across the river.

Having recovered strength enough to resume work, I devoted myself to supplying the Tribune with news about the raid by telegraph and mail; and, in pursuit of that object, I went to Columbus, the capital of the State, where I prepared a long account of the rebel incursion. From Columbus I went to Yellow Sulphur Springs, near Springfield, Ohio, to drink the waters for a fortnight; but, instead of thus completing my restoration to health, I was suddenly attacked again with bilious intermittent fever, and barely managed to get back to Cincinnati, where I was once more confined to my bed for nearly three weeks. The fever threatened at one time to assume a typhoid character, but, fortunately, did not actually develop into it. I was again convalescent when intelligence was received of the two days' fighting at Chickamauga between Rosecrans's and Bragg's armies and of the disastrous result to our side. As I had hoped all along to be able to take the field again before any serious collision between the two armies occurred, I felt great disappointment that I had not witnessed it, but did what I could to utilize for the benefit of the Tribune the information regarding the battle received by the local papers. I remained in Cincinnati till September 29, when at last I started again for the front.

I here break off the narrative of my personal experiences in order to make room for a history of the battle of Chickamauga.
CHAPTER XXVIII

BRAGG DISLODGED FROM CHATTANOOGA.—1863

WITHIN a little over a week after I left it, the Army of the Cumberland had compelled Bragg’s forces to abandon the fortified line described in the preceding chapter, by the literally "brief and brilliant" so-called Tullahoma campaign. Had the full execution of Rosecrans’s strategic programme not been prevented by the extraordinary inclemency of the unseasonable weather, he would probably have succeeded in working around the enemy’s right flank and upon his lines of communication, and inflicting a complete defeat upon him. As it was, he forced the enemy, with a loss of about two thousand in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and some guns, out of middle Tennessee, while his own loss hardly reached five hundred. Bragg, in his official reports to the rebel authorities, admitted that our flanking movements compelled him to fall back first from the Shelbyville-Wartrace line to Tullahoma, and thence to Elk River, and finally to retreat over the mountains to Chattanooga. He claimed that he did this to save his army from "destruction without a battle," which latter issue, much desired by himself and his command, he had offered to the enemy, but failed to bring him to it. His retreat was fully approved by the commanders under him, as is shown by a direct communication from Lieu-

tenant-General Polk to President Davis, but was nevertheless a great disappointment to the Confederate Government. It had a right to expect different results from an army whose condition, according to the reports of an aide-de-camp of Jefferson Davis who had made a thorough inspec-
tion of it but a short time before, was better as to equipment, drill, discipline, and health than that of any other in the rebel service. This condition was naturally changed for the worse by the inevitably demoralizing effect of a retrograde movement.

Our army thus found itself once more in almost the same position it had occupied twelve months before, until Bragg's flanking march into Kentucky had compelled its abandonment. Nor was there any compensation in the military situation for the grievous loss of a whole year's time, for the task before Rosecrans was now identical with that of Buell, viz., the advance upon Chattanooga; and its accomplishment was really rendered more difficult by the greater strength of the opposing forces, and by the diminished resources of the intervening country in consequence of its long occupation by the rebels.

Rosecrans endeavored to push after the enemy as soon as his retreat from Shelbyville and Tullahoma became known; but the continuous rainfall, the heavy roads, and mainly the high stage of the water-courses and the destruction of the bridges, rendered it impossible to interfere with the falling-back of the rebels over the Cumberland Mountains. The Commander-in-chief therefore determined to bring his main bodies to a halt, and carefully prepare for a further advance in the direction of Chattanooga by repairing the railroads to the Tennessee River and accumulating supplies. The army came to rest in a position extending from McMinnville to Winchester, with advanced posts at Pelham and Stevenson. Flying columns, however, were sent out over the enemy's lines of retreat, by which it was fully ascertained that Bragg had passed the Cumberland Mountains by the so-called Tantallon and University roads, and followed Battle Creek to the Tennessee. He crossed it at three points, and marched directly to Chattanooga, burning the railroad bridges and trestles behind him. The strategic importance of Chattanooga warranted the assumption that Bragg would strive to hold it, and imposed the correspond-
ingly difficult duty upon Rosecrans of wrestling it from the enemy.

The most creditable achievement of the Army of the Cumberland in manoeuvring Bragg into a retreat was not appreciated in the North as it should have been. The reason was that the news of it reached the loyal public while it was trembling over the issue of the mighty struggle between the armies of Meade and Lee at Gettysburg, and was in feverish expectation of the final outcome of the siege of Vicksburg. The authorities at Washington, in their elation over the defeat of Lee and the fall of the Mississippi stronghold, and in their angry remembrance of Rosecrans’s conduct, also failed to award the meed of praise the latter had expected. Secretary Stanton telegraphed on July 7 to him, in announcing the triumphs of Meade and Grant: “You and your noble army now have the chance to give the finishing blow to the Rebellion. Will you neglect the chance?” This deliberate prod provoked a caustic retort from Rosecrans, in which he said: “You do not appear to observe the fact that this noble army has driven the rebels from middle Tennessee, of which my despatches advised you. I beg on behalf of this army that the War Department may not overlook so great an event because it is not written in letters of blood.”

Rosecrans informed Halleck and the War Department in detail of the difficulties in the way of the movement on Chattanooga, but they were not considered by his superiors as great as by himself. Still, he was allowed some weeks to get ready, but when, towards the end of August, there were no signs of renewed activity on his part, the Government began afresh to spur him on. President Lincoln’s cherished plan of relieving the loyalists in East Tennessee was again pressed upon him. Halleck combined this with general urging in despatches and letters on July 24 and 25. But, while Rosecrans’s delay at Murfreesboro’, with the enemy within easy striking distance, was justly found fault with, he made out a much better case for himself in his explanation to
the Government. He was two hundred and sixty-four miles from his primary base at Louisville, and eighty-three miles from his secondary at Nashville. All his subsistence, equipments of every sort, ammunition, and most of his forage had to be hauled the total distance by rail. There was between him and the Tennessee fifty to sixty miles of barren, mountainous country, which would have to be passed by means of difficult roads unless the railroad to the river was repaired. There was also the formidable passage of and movement along the banks of the latter, which was from 2000 to 3000 feet wide and enclosed on both sides by precipitous elevations. But all this, in the judgment of his superiors, did not justify further delay. On August 3, Halleck wired him to report the position of all his forces. The reply having furnished proof that they had remained stationary, a peremptory order reached Rosecrans on the next day from the General-in-chief in these words: "Your forces must move forward without further delay. You will daily report the movement of each corps till you cross the Tennessee River." Rosecrans, in acknowledging receipt, answered: "As I have determined to cross the river as soon as practicable, and have been making all preparations and getting such information as may enable me to do so without being driven back like Hooker, I wish to know if your order is to take away my discretion as to time and manner of moving my troops." Halleck replied promptly on August 5: "The orders for the advance of your army and that its movements be reported daily are peremptory." Rosecrans wired another remonstrance, indicating his purpose to move in a few days, and adding, if literal obedience of the order of the General-in-chief was expected, he must insist upon its modification or upon being relieved from command. The upshot of it all was that the Army of the Cumberland was in motion again by the middle of the month.

The opening campaign was to be supported by the simultaneous movement of an army under Major-General Burn-
side from southeastern Kentucky into eastern Tennessee. Burnside had not long been kept in retirement after leaving the Army of the Potomac, but in March was put in command of the Department of the Ohio, comprising all the States between the Alleghenies, the Ohio, and the Mississippi, as well as Kentucky, with headquarters at Cincinnati. During the spring and until late in the summer, he was occupied with suppressing active manifestations of rebel sympathy in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, fighting the rebel leader J. H. Morgan’s new raid in July, and organizing an army for East Tennessee. He started from central Kentucky in the middle of August with about 15,000 men, organized as the Twenty-third Army Corps, and reached Knoxville on September 4 without having encountered the enemy. The Confederate troops in East Tennessee were under command of General Buckner and not much inferior to Burnside’s, but withdrew down the Tennessee, fearing a front movement from him and a simultaneous one to their rear by the force detached from the Army of the Cumberland for the feint against Chattanooga hereinafter mentioned.

The Cumberland Mountains divide the waters of the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, and extend from eastern Tennessee in a general southwesterly direction to near Athens, Alabama, rising to a height of 1000 to 2000 feet. The chain is eleft in two, for fifty miles from where it abuts on the Tennessee, by the parallel valley of the Sequatchie River, with an average breadth not exceeding four miles. The portion of the Cumberland Mountains between the Sequatchie and the Tennessee bears the specific name of Walden’s Ridge. Both the main range and the ridge are masses of rock, rising to a height of 1500 to 2000 feet, with steep sides furrowed by numerous ravines, and wide but broken and timbered crests. The average distance from the line occupied by the army to the Tennessee did not exceed from sixty-five to seventy miles, but the formidable natural barriers and the character of the means of communication
made the movement to the river an arduous undertaking. The Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad had been repaired to Bridgeport on the Tennessee, but to transport the army, with its artillery and baggage, ammunition, provision, and forage trains, over its single track with the limited motive-power and rolling-stock available would have required many weeks. The troops had, therefore, to use the ordinary roads over the mountains, which, as a rule, were narrow, extremely rough, and difficult in grade. Their precarious character rendered it further necessary to utilize as many of them as possible.

The configuration of the country and the lines of communication were such that General Rosecrans had the sole choice of approaching Chattanooga either by an eastward movement to the Tennessee and thence down the valley, or of making for the river to the west of the objective-point by way of the Sequatchie and the more direct routes to Bridgeport, Stevenson, and other points on the north bank. As the former course would have had to be made over fewer roads, and would have exposed our lines of communication and possibly invited another rebel invasion of middle Tennessee, the Commander-in-chief determined upon the latter movement. In order to mislead the enemy as to his real purpose, a direct advance was to be undertaken by part of his forces from the Sequatchie over Walden’s Ridge to points opposite and above Chattanooga. Accordingly, the three divisions of Crittenden’s Twenty-first Army Corps, forming the left, crossed the main ridge of the Cumberland Mountains in three columns, over as many roads, into the Sequatchie Valley. Thence the infantry brigades of Hazen and Wagner, together with Minty’s and Wilder’s mounted ones, were detached for the diversion against Chattanooga, while the remainder of the corps marched down the Sequatchie. General Thomas’s Fourteenth Army Corps, constituting the centre, took the so-called University and Tantallon roads leading to the mouth of Battle Creek and to near Stevenson. Of McCook’s Twentieth Army Corps,
which was the right, Sheridan's division was already in an advanced position on the river. The other two divisions under Johnson and Davis marched respectively to Bellefonte and Stevenson. The reserve corps under Major-General Granger followed the river as soon as the preceding columns were out of the way. All these movements were so promptly executed that by August 21 the whole army was in the valley of the Tennessee. But the crossing of the river was not commenced till August 29, when it was successfully accomplished over pontoon and trestle bridges, and by boats and rafts, at three different points, by all the troops and their impedimenta in less than a week.

According to the regular tri-monthly returns made to the army headquarters on August 10, the total strength of the Army of the Cumberland was 4735 officers and 75,183 men—cavalry, infantry, and artillery—of which the cavalry corps comprised 9973 officers and men, the Twenty-first Army Corps 14,367 men, the Fourteenth 22,389, the Twentieth 14,222, and the reserve corps 16,936; the remainder consisting of detached bodies serving as escorts, engineers, and in other duties. As the reserve corps took no part in the operations south of the river till some weeks after the other corps, its number should be deducted from the total, thus reducing the aggregate with which Rosecrans at first confronted Bragg to about 64,000. The artillery numbered 216 field guns.

A despatch sent by General Bragg to the Richmond Government on August 24 proves that he learned of Rosecrans's and Burnside's advances only on that day, when the former had already reached the Tennessee. He reported that Rosecrans had four corps with 70,000 men (a rebel estimate for once under the actual number), and Burnside 25,000 men (an overestimate by 10,000). According to his own statements, he himself had less than 30,000 effectives of the two army corps of Lieutenant-Generals L. Polk and D. H. Hill, and the reserve corps under Major-General Walker. Polk's army corps consisted of the divisions of Cheatham and
Hindman, Hill’s of Cleburne’s and Breckinridge’s divisions, and Walker’s of two small divisions under Brigadier-Generals Gist and Liddell, about Chattanooga, and 8000 under Buckner made up of Preston’s and Stewart’s divisions in East Tennessee. On these figures he based a strong appeal for reinforcements, which were sent to him at once to the extent of two small divisions from General J. E. Johnston’s command in Mississippi. He had the unpleasant duty of announcing, in the above-mentioned despatch, that a Federal force had appeared directly opposite Chattanooga on the day mentioned (this being the advance of the four brigades detached from the Twenty-first Army Corps) and shelled the town. Their sudden appearance was evidently a stunning surprise to him. He was deceived as to their strength, and spoke of them in his report as a “corps” when they hardly numbered 2000 men. Their nearness irritated him so much that, when he was sure that they were isolated from the rest of Rosecrans’s army, he formed a plan to capture or destroy them by a coup de main, to be executed by a sudden rush over the river by Hill’s corps. Some preparations were made to carry out this plan, but nothing came of it in the end.

Directly in the way of the Army of the Cumberland there rose on the south side of the Tennessee, running in a north-easterly direction to the vicinity of Chattanooga, two great mountain ranges, the one nearest to the river being known as Sand Mountain and the other as Lookout Mountain. They are separated by a narrow valley down which Lookout Creek flows into the Tennessee. The sides of Sand Mountain, with a maximum altitude of over 2000 feet, rise so abruptly that no road is practicable along its base except for a few miles; but a few very difficult roads lead over it and into Lookout Valley. Lookout Mountain, a great rocky mass, reaches a height of nearly 2500 feet above the level of the sea, and also declines very steeply on both sides. There were then but three wagon-roads over it—one around its precipitous abutment on the river two miles from Chattanooga, another at a distance of twenty-five miles from the
town, and the last forty-two miles from the first. Beyond Lookout Mountain several minor ridges follow the same general course a little east of north. The nearest to it is Missionary Ridge, and, next to this, Pigeon Mountain. Between Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge flows Chattanooga Creek, and between Missionary Ridge and Pigeon Mountain the West Branch of Chickamauga Creek. These are tributaries of the Tennessee, which they enter respectively below and above Chattanooga. The valley of the West Chickamauga bears the name of McLemore’s Cove. Pigeon Mountain is separated by Pea Vine Creek from Chickamauga Hills, the next minor ridge. Between this and Taylor’s Ridge runs Middle Chickamauga Creek, which, dividing, flows along the western base of the latter ridge as East Chickamauga Creek. This whole region of mountains and valleys was then covered with a dense growth of timber and underbrush, with the exception of clearings here and there for farming purposes. The roads leading over the minor ridges were as steep and rough as those over the higher ones.

The passage over the river being effected, and Bragg’s army apparently waiting to be attacked in its position about Chattanooga, Rosecrans had to decide between taking the direct offensive against the enemy and a repetition of his Tullahoma plan—that is, to compel Bragg’s withdrawal from Chattanooga by a flanking movement against his communications. The great natural obstacles in the way of the former stamped it as a very rash venture to seek the rebels on their chosen fortified ground, and hence the Commander-in-chief once more resolved upon turning operations. He set his troops in motion from the south bank without delay, with McCook again on the right, Thomas in the centre, Crittenden on the left, and Granger in reserve. The general object was to reach and hold or destroy the main rebel line of supply formed by the Atlanta & Chattanooga and East Tennessee & Georgia Railroads, both north and south of their junction at Dalton, Georgia, and thereby also cut all the enemy’s lines of retreat in a southward direction.
On our extreme right, a cavalry division, under command of my friend Colonel Edward M. McCook, led the advance, passed over Raccoon and Lookout Mountains into the valley of the Chattanooga River, and pushed on in a general south-westerly direction toward Rome as far as the towns of Alpine and Summerville. The whole Twentieth Army Corps followed in its wake as fast as possible. The Fourteenth Army Corps crossed Sand Mountain and had descended into Lookout Valley by September 6. Continuing up Lookout Mountain, it seized the passes at Johnson’s Brook and Cooper’s and Stevens’s Gaps without resistance, and by the 10th had made its way down Lookout Mountain and over the southern end of Missionary Ridge into McLemore’s Cove. It proved an exceedingly difficult march. General Thomas describes the roads as the worst imaginable. The ascents and descents were so long and difficult that teams had to be doubled in hauling over wagons and guns, thereby causing great delay. The Twenty-first Army Corps marched from Shellmound on the Tennessee to Hunting Water Creek, issuing from a narrow valley, up which extended the Nashville & Chattanooga railroad track to a long tunnel, with a wagon-road alongside leading over Raccoon Mountain, as the northern end of Sand Mountain is called. The whole corps followed this road into Lookout Valley, and, by the evening of September 6, General Wood’s division, forming the left, was at the junction of the Nashville & Chattanooga with the Trenton branch railroad up the valley, only seven miles from Chattanooga.

In the meantime, the two infantry and two cavalry brigades under Hazen, Wagner, Minty, and Wilder had thoroughly performed their part of a feint against Chattanooga by continuously and ostentatiously demonstrating with all three arms at different points opposite the town for a distance of fifteen miles up the river. On September 8, Colonel Wagner, who had taken position in the narrow bend of the river directly opposite Chattanooga, discovered indications that the enemy was withdrawing from the town, and sent word to that effect to the army headquarters.
Towards evening the evacuation had become a certainty, so that Wagner crossed over and took unopposed possession the next morning.

This exhilarating fact was quickly made known to all parts of the army. Rumors from various sources of the rebel purpose to abandon Chattanooga had reached Rosecrans for several days before the actual evacuation. In order to test them, several bold reconnoissances were made by General Thomas along the crest of Lookout Mountain, and by General Crittenden down the Lookout Valley and around the northern slope of the Mountain. But Wagner’s announcement of the occupation of the town was received by the General-in-chief before the reconnoissances confirmed the retirement of the rebels from it. General Bragg had acquired, by September 6, a sufficiently clear perception of the object of his adversary’s movements to come to a decision regarding his own. He recognized the advance of our right upon his southern communications as a most threatening move, and prudently, though reluctantly, accepted the inevitable consequence of it, namely, that he could not allow Rosecrans to get between him and Rome, and that therefore his withdrawal from Chattanooga was necessary. Anticipating this as a possible contingency, he had ordered Buckner to join him. On September 6, he issued a circular order directing that the troops of his army should move immediately toward Rome in four columns. This general indication was followed only by marching directions from Chattanooga to Lafayette, a small town twenty-five miles a little east of south of Chattanooga, and the point of junction of the main roads thence and from Ringgold to the Coosa Valley and Rome. The corps of Polk and Hill were to march via Rossville; the commands of Buckner and Walker, with the supply trains, over a more easterly route. The troops were to carry six days’ rations, and to include only “fighting men.”

The dramatic first words of the order ("In order to meet the enemy and strike him") may have been intended to
counteract the demoralizing effect of retreat upon his troops, or may have reflected the rebel commander's actual purpose. The naming of Rome as the army's destination and the six days' rations would seem to confirm the former theory, while his subsequent bold offensive corroborated the latter. In his report of the Chickamangua campaign, he asserts that he purposely accelerated the evacuation and the first marches in order to deceive Rosecrans into the belief that he was actually retreating as fast as he could, and thus induce his adversary to press his columns on in pursuit and "expose himself in detail," while he was really concentrating against Rosecrans's centre and determined to avail of the first chance to attack. As the assertion is fully borne out by his subsequent acts, he cannot well be denied proper credit for successfully shifting his command so as to protect his main line of supply, and, this being accomplished, to seek rather than avoid his enemy. That his purpose was to fight is also rendered more than probable by the assurance he had obtained from Richmond of further heavy reinforcement by Longstreet's division of Lee's army.

The withdrawal from Chattanooga was intended to begin on the day the order for it was issued, but was postponed till dark the next day. Hill's corps moved first over the direct road to Lafayette, and was followed by Polk. Walker preceded Buckner over the road to Ringgold. The columns marched so quickly that on the evening of the 8th they were in position in McLemore's Cove, between Lee and Gordon's Mills, twelve miles from Chattanooga, and Lafayette, facing the eastern slope of the Lookout Mountains, where they remained to await and take advantage of Rosecrans's movements. Bragg did not have to wait long for tempting developments.

It was but natural and even justifiable that Rosecrans should feel highly elated at the result of his strategy in forcing Bragg to yield Chattanooga to him without a struggle. It may be freely admitted, too, that, but for the sub-
sequent untoward turn of events, his flanking movement, well conceived as it was, and carried out with extraordinary energy in passing first over the mountainous country to the north of Tennessee, then crossing the river, and next overcoming the difficulties of two rugged ranges, all within three weeks, would have ranked as one of the greatest achievements of the Civil War. He claimed his success as a great triumph in exultant language in his telegraphic report to the Government. He believed at first, as shown by his own despatches and those of Assistant Secretary of War Dana (who was with him from September 11) to the Government, that Bragg was retreating south as fast as he could by way of Rome. He was so far carried away that he boldly boasted of having gained a position from which he could effectually advance on Rome and Atlanta and deliver there the finishing blows of the war. He even felt confident of being able to intercept the enemy's retreat before he reached Rome.

Acting upon these assumptions, he issued orders to all the corps commanders to make vigorous pursuit. General Crittenden had marched his corps around Lookout Mountain to Rossville, five miles from Chattanooga, and then pushed on to Chattanooga with Wood's division on the 9th. He was ordered to recall the remainder of his troops from the north side, leave one brigade in the town, and follow the enemy on the road to Ringgold. General Thomas was directed to push over Pigeon Mountain by way of Dug Gap, and make quickly for Lafayette. Neither he nor his superior was aware that this point was also the objective of Bragg's army. General McCook received, on the evening of the 9th, from general headquarters, the news of the occupation of Chattanooga, together with orders to move rapidly upon Alpine and Summerville, so as to get upon the enemy's line of retreat and strike him in the flank.

Strange as it may seem, for three whole days after the occupation of Chattanooga, neither our General-in-chief nor the commanders of the Fourteenth and Twentieth Army
Corps suspected that, instead of trying to elude their pursuit, the rebel army was lying like a crouched lion in their path, ready to spring with all its might upon the first hostile body coming within reach. The advance of Crittenden caught up with rebel cavalry on the way to Ringgold and had some lively skirmishes with them. But though his mounted troops followed the enemy some distance beyond the last-named town, they did not discover him in force. The corps commander accepted their reports to this effect, and informed General Garfield, as chief of staff of the army, on the night of the 11th, that "in his opinion the enemy had fled beyond his reach," and that "his only hope, or rather his great hope," was "that General Thomas or General McCook may be able to hit them a side lick." Yet, when he sent this utterly erroneous conclusion, the bulk of his corps was directly east and therefore in the rear of Bragg, at a distance of not more than eight miles in an air-line from him, or, in other words, with Bragg's army driven in like a huge live wedge between him and the rest of our troops. So absolute was Crittenden's delusion that, a few hours after he had sent his message to the chief of staff, he despatched another report in which he expressed the belief that, what with Thomas in the vicinity of Lafayette, and Wilder's cavalry on the Ringgold road, "all the enemy north of Lafayette would be effectually bagged."

General Thomas had been ordered to reach Lafayette and connect with McCook on his right by September 10. He tried his utmost to be there, but, most happily for the Union cause, was two days behind time, owing to the unexpected difficulties of the roads. Had he managed to debouch earlier from the passes of Pigeon Mountain in the order in which he marched, with one division after another, he would have fallen prey piecemeal to the enemy. Even as it was, he had a narrow escape from that fate. The division of General Negley was in the lead on the 10th, on the march toward Dug Gap. On nearing it, he discovered that the approach was obstructed by felled timber and de-
fended by rebel pickets. Reconnoissances and the statements of residents showing the rebel presence in strength before him, he decided to stop at the mouth of the gorge leading to the Gap till he was assured of support, in case of need, from the rest of the corps. Baird’s division came up with his early on the 11th. During the day it became evident that heavy rebel columns were moving from the north over Pigeon Mountain through Catlett’s Gap and from the south through Blue Bird Gap, obviously bent upon an early attack upon our forces from both directions.

This surmise was entirely correct. During the 9th, General Bragg had become aware that a Federal column, estimated by him as from 4000 to 8000 strong, had descended from Lookout Mountain into McLemore’s Cove. Seeing his first chance to strike an isolated body, he issued orders from Lee and Gordon’s Mills just before midnight on the same day to Hindman’s and Cleburne’s divisions to move at once against the Federals in the Cove through Dug and Catlett’s Gaps. Hill, Cleburne’s corps commander, on receiving the order, replied that it could not be carried out, as General Cleburne was sick, four regiments of the division were on detached duty, and the two gaps were so blocked that it would take twenty-four hours to clear them for the passage of troops. Hindman moved promptly at midnight, and reached the western foot of the mountain through Worthen’s Gap at daylight, having marched thirteen miles. In view of Hill’s reply, Bragg ordered Buckner early on the 10th to follow and report to Hindman with his two divisions, and, to make sure that the intended blow would be quickly and vigorously struck, moved his headquarters near the scene of action in the evening of that day. He also ordered General Polk to move Cheatham’s division to the support of Hindman from Lafayette, required Cleburne’s division to remove the obstructions at Dug and Catlett’s Gaps as speedily as possible and to join Hindman, and finally directed Walker’s reserve to move up at once.

Thus Bragg left nothing undone to avail of his oppor-
tunity to the utmost. His whole army was, in fact, converging upon Thomas's advance. There can be no doubt that Negley's division would have been doomed on the 10th, when it was advancing alone, with Baird's half a day's march in the rear, but for the obstructions in the Gap, for Hindman was making for the junction of roads known as Widow Davis's Cross-roads, near which Negley had halted on the 10th, and would have struck the latter's rear had he not felt in duty bound to await the approach of Cleburne's division. He stopped four miles from the crossroads. He had moved so promptly that he failed to learn Hill's reply, and was left to discover by his own scouting parties in the blockaded gaps the clue to Cleburne's non-appearance. A message from Hill reached him only late in the day, giving the reasons already mentioned for Cleburne's delay. Toward evening, General Buckner reported to him with his two divisions, thereby giving the rebels three divisions for an attack the next morning against our two. Of this superiority they failed, however, to avail themselves.

Hindman had received another communication from Hill during the afternoon, informing him that the Federals were advancing upon Dug Gap in force, and that he, Hill, thought that, if he was attacked, Hindman had a good chance to assault them from the rear. This Hindman read as directing him to attack after Hill had become engaged. Feeling puzzled as to the proper course to pursue, he assembled his general officers late in the evening for a council of war. During the meeting two communications from General Bragg were received, one urging him to finish his allotted work in the Cove as rapidly as possible in view of the advance of Crittenden's corps in their rear, and a later one impressing upon him that their forces were superior to the Federals and that it was of the highest importance to move vigorously and crush them. Notwithstanding this, the council voted to recommend the abandonment of the attack upon the Federals in front of Hindman, and the substitution for it of a concentrated move upon Crittenden.
A letter to this effect was sent to the army commander by a staff officer and reached him shortly before midnight. Bragg questioned the officer as to the character of the information that led Hindman and his generals to ask for a modification of his orders. Finding that it was not positive, he said that it amounted to nothing, and started the officer back at once with an oral message that his plans could not be changed and that his orders must be carried out. Half an hour later, a formal order was despatched, reaching Hindman at 4:20 A.M. on the 11th, containing these words: "General Bragg orders you to attack and force your way through the enemy to this point [Lafayette] at the earliest hour that you can see him in the morning. Cleburne will attack in front the moment your guns are heard."

Hindman inferred from the order that the general commanding looked upon his position as a perilous one, and expected him no longer to capture the enemy, but to avoid being captured himself. Being thus put on his guard, he moved his command at 7 A.M. slowly and with great caution. At about 11 A.M. he encountered the Federal skirmishers, when he formed his line for attack. He had just driven in the former when he received a despatch from headquarters directing him, if he found the enemy too strong for an attack, to fall back at once on Lafayette through Catlett's Gap, which had been cleared of obstructions, and requiring him to make his decision immediately. He answered that he was not sufficiently informed as to the enemy to decide upon his course, but would retire if necessary. An hour later, a staff officer from headquarters appeared to inquire whether he felt certain that he could make good his retreat through Catlett's Gap. He replied that he had no doubt that he could do so in case he decided to retire, but that he had ordered an advance. Soon afterward another despatch from headquarters arrived, advising him that a Federal force of from 12,000 to 15,000 was forming in front of Dug Gap, that the general commanding was
most anxious and wished to hear from him by couriers once an hour, and that despatch was necessary. How great Bragg's anxiety was is also shown by a private note to Hindman, dated 3 P.M., sent with this despatch and saying: "Dear General: Time is precious. The enemy presses from the north. We must unite or both must retire. The enemy is in small force in line of battle in our front, and we only wait for your attack." This record clearly demonstrates that, while Bragg was on the 9th and 10th and up to the morning of the 11th determined upon an attack, he then became uncertain as to his proper course, and vacillated between advance and retreat. This was doubtless due to the evidence that had reached him that the Federals before him now numbered many more than two days before, and also to the intelligence he had received of the appearance of McCook's advance seven miles from Lafayette, and of Crittenden's movements in the rear. But it was only natural that the commanding general's evident indecision made Hindman hesitate, and, after consultation with the generals under him, determine upon retreat. He had hardly issued his order to fall back upon Catlett's Gap when reports of returning scouts that the enemy was retiring reached him. He at once ordered his line to advance as rapidly as possible in order to intercept the retreating enemy. The pursuit was kept up till dark, when, at Davis's Crossroads, General Bragg, who had appeared upon the field in person, ordered it to cease.

The rebel movements against Negley, of which he became cognizant on the 10th and 11th, as mentioned, were those just described. He did not feel warranted in accepting battle when he was threatened with attack from two directions, and resolved to retrace his steps to a safer position near Stevens's Gap. Setting first his trains in motion, he commenced falling back with his troops in the middle of the afternoon. Skirmishing with Hindman's pursuing columns soon began, but the division was across the West
Branch of the Chickamauga when the enemy appeared in heavy force on the opposite bank. Negley tried to check him from the north bank with ten guns, to which he replied with two batteries. The rebel infantry deployed and advanced against Negley's left, and was soon heavily engaged. By skilful manoeuvring, the incipient attack was, however, foiled, and the retreat continued in good order, though at first it had to be made step by step and in constant conflict with the enemy; and the base of Lookout Mountain was reached in safety by the two divisions. It was altogether a lucky escape, for our strength did not exceed 9000, while the pursuing enemy numbered, according to the rebel records, over 15,000.

General McCook had made discoveries by his reconnaissances that left him no choice but to take the responsibility of not obeying his orders to advance rapidly to Summerville. The information brought in by his cavalry was so positive as to leave no doubt in his mind that the bulk of the rebel army was not retreating, but concentrating between him and the other corps. He wisely stopped his command for this and the additional reason that he failed to discover any signs of the approach of General Thomas's corps, which, as already stated, was to be at Lafayette and connect with his left on the 10th. McCook unquestionably did right in not running the risk of getting involved in an unequal contest with the enemy without being assured of support. He accordingly remained stationary, except that he cautiously moved his trains back to a safer position. He received an explanation of the delay of the Fourteenth Corps en route late in the evening of the 11th from General Thomas, indicating his purpose to continue his march to Lafayette, which he expected to reach on the 12th.

General Rosecrans clung to the illusion that Bragg was in full retreat and bent upon flight and not upon fight, until the reports of McCook's discoveries and Negley's experiences opened his eyes as to the real situation on the
11th. As late as the 10th, he chided Thomas for not having reached Lafayette more promptly, and later on expressed doubt as to the necessity of Negley’s retreat. The awakening was naturally a rude one. There was his army divided in three parts, more than a good day’s march even in an air-line from each other, and this distance was practically much increased by the difficult character of the intervening ground and of the means of communication. There were actually several chains of hills between Crittenden and Thomas, and Lookout Mountain between Thomas and McCook. The Commander-in-chief must have confessed to himself that, with the rebel army concentrated against him, as it appeared to be, he had himself created the opportunity for his adversary to overwhelm him in detail. It must have been clear to him, also, that the separation of his army rendered a rapid retrograde movement upon the only available common point—Chattanooga—out of the question. There was, indeed, no other course left to him than the quickest possible concentration of his command in a good position for offence or defence, which would secure him likewise a good line of retreat to Chattanooga. He resolved upon this at once when the truth had dawned upon him that Bragg was before him on both slopes of Pigeon Mountain, and immediately took energetic steps to bring the concentration about. He would hardly have succeeded but for misunderstandings and accidents on the rebel side, already partly related, which came to his rescue and enabled him to accomplish what he himself in his official report called a matter of “life and death.”

At midnight on September 12, General McCook received orders from army headquarters, through General Thomas, to move with the utmost expedition to his support, after taking proper measures for the safety of his trains. The corps was in motion at daylight on the 13th. McCook first intended to march by the direct road to Dougherty’s Gap and through it into McLemore’s Cove, and expected to be himself with Thomas on the night of the same day. But,
when he learned on the way that the road beyond the Gap was not practicable, and received information during the day from headquarters indicating the presence of the enemy in the Cove, he decided to change his route. He asked and received the advice of General Thomas regarding it, and adopted one that required crossing Lookout Mountain into Lookout Valley, a march down it to the road to Stevens's Gap, and then up the Mountain again and through the Gap to the other side. While an air-line from Alpine to Thomas's position would not exceed twenty-five miles, by his roundabout route McCook marched nearly sixty miles. Instead of joining Thomas within a day or two, it was actually five days before he came in touch with him. Having reported his change of route to army headquarters, he was peremptorily ordered to turn back, against which he angrily remonstrated, and was permitted to keep on; but neither General Rosecrans nor his chief of staff, Garfield, was ever fully satisfied that he had not wasted several days' time, and exposed the other two corps to the danger of being attacked singly on the east side of Lookout Mountain while he was following the west side. The point in dispute has never been fully cleared up, but my opinion has always been that McCook acted properly in the light of his information and instructions. It cannot be denied, however, that the loss of three days by him delayed the execution of the concentrating movement correspondingly, and might have proved fatal.

General Hindman states in his official report that, when he reported in person soon after dark on the 11th at Davis's Cross-roads to General Bragg, the latter said to him at once, "We can't stay here," and immediately ordered the whole force to make a night march to Lafayette, which was done, Buckner's division going by Dug Gap and the remainder of the army by Catlett's Gap. It seems to have puzzled the generals under him that he should have abandoned the advance when the several divisions were at last united for it. Bragg affirmed that, having become satisfied of the failure
of Hindman,\(^1\) the new movement was directed by him with a view to falling upon the separate Federal force moving via Ringgold. In pursuance of this new purpose, General Polk's and Walker's corps moved on the following day from Lafayette in the direction of Lee and Gordon's Mills. Bragg received a report during the day from his cavalry under Pegram that a Federal division was marching by itself up the Pea Vine Creek valley. He informed General Polk of this in a note dated 6 P.M., September 12, and added: "This presents you a fine opportunity for striking Crittenden in detail, and I hope you will avail yourself of it at daylight to-morrow. This division crushed, and the others are yours. We can then turn again on the force in the Cove. I shall be delighted to hear of your success."

Bragg followed this communication at 8 P.M. with a positive order worded thus by his adjutant-general: "I now give you the orders of the Commanding General, viz., to attack at day-dawn to-morrow. The infantry column to be attacked is reported at three-quarters of a mile beyond Pea Vine Church on the road to Graysville from Lafayette."

At 11 P.M. a disappointing reply came from Polk, stating that he had taken a strong position for defence, and requesting heavy reinforcements. Bragg answered that he must not defer the ordered attack, that he was already stronger than the enemy, that success depended on the rapidity of his movements, and that Buckner's command would be in supporting distance of him the next morning. Bragg reinforced this prod by another at 12:30 A.M. on the 13th, as follows: "The enemy is approaching from the south, and it is highly important that your attack in the morning should be quick and decided. Let no time be lost."

He relates further in his report that, when he reached the front in

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\(^1\) Bragg subsequently preferred charges against Hindman and relieved him from command for "disobedience of the lawful command of his superior officer." Hindman asked for a court of inquiry, but the difficulty was settled in the end by the intervention of the President of the Confederacy.
the morning of the 13th, he found that Polk had not advanced against the enemy, and that "the latter's forces had formed a junction and recrossed the Chickamauga." His language clearly conveys the impression that, but for Polk's remissness, the intended attack on part of Crittenden's corps would have been made. It appears, however, from Polk's report to army headquarters, dated September 12, 8 p.m., that Bragg did him injustice. Polk reached the ground in good season, but the information he collected after his arrival led him to believe that not one of Crittenden's divisions, but all three, were in front of him and advancing "with steady step upon my position, and will no doubt attack early in the morning"; hence he considered it his duty to ask "most respectfully and urgently" for reinforcements. Polk added: "My troops I cannot get into position in time to attack, myself, at so early an hour as day-dawn. If I find he is not going to attack me, I will attack him without delay."

The truth was, however, that while Bragg's information, on which he based his order to Polk to attack the one division of Crittenden's corps, was reliable, Polk's assumption that three divisions were before him was also well founded. General Harker's brigade of Wood's division, forming the rear of the corps, had been ordered by Crittenden early on the 11th to make a reconnoissance from Rossville to Lee and Gordon's Mills. Early in the afternoon Wood was ordered to move at once to the support of Harker with his other brigade (his third had been left at Chattanooga), which he did. It was the movement of these two brigades that was reported to Bragg. But when General Rosecrans perceived that his salvation lay in the immediate concentration of his army, he sent, simultaneously with his orders to McCook to join Thomas, directions to Crittenden to move also towards the latter by marching his whole corps "by the most available route," and as quickly as possible, to the road from Rossville to Lafayette that Wood had followed, and to close up with the latter. Crittenden marched
promptly early the next morning, and, on the evening of the 12th, his three divisions were in exactly the positions in which Polk reported them to be to Bragg. But Polk was mistaken in assuming that Crittenden was steadily advancing on him and would attack early in the morning. Crittenden of his own accord did what Polk had done before him, on the morning of the 13th, by taking up a good defensive position, and had no more thought of attacking than the bishop-general opposed to him had before receiving reinforcements. There was, however, this great difference between them, that the rebel commander acted cautiously because of his knowledge of the presence of the enemy in force before him, while the Federal general stood on the defensive from utter ignorance of the rebel whereabouts. Crittenden not only knew nothing of Polk’s advance upon him, but had not yet divested his mind of the belief that the enemy was continuing his retreat towards Rome, and persisted in expressing it to the army headquarters, even after reaching Lee and Gordon’s Mills. The chief of staff found himself obliged, indeed, to tell him, in a despatch dated September 12, 9:30 P.M.: “There is no longer any doubt that the enemy is in heavy force in the neighborhood of Lafayette, and there is far more probability of his attacking you than that he is running. Get your command well in hand, and be ready for defense or advance as may be necessary.’’ Yet, just before receiving this emphatic rebuke of his credulity, Crittenden had, in a report dated 9:45 P.M., reiterated his disbelief in these words: “I do not yet believe that there is a strong force of infantry in the vicinity of Lafayette.” This town is twelve miles from Lee and Gordon’s Mills, so that, while he would not be persuaded that the enemy was within that long distance, Polk was really no further than two or three miles from him.

According to the official rebel story, Bragg, on reaching Polk’s front on the morning of the 13th, accepted the latter’s conclusion that Crittenden’s whole corps was united before them, and decided to concentrate all his forces along
the West Chickamauga Creek for an offensive flanking movement. This was done between the 13th and the 17th, and on the latter day the rebel line was fully formed and extended up the eastern bank of the Creek from Reed's Bridge to some distance above Lee and Gordon's Mills. General Bushrod R. Johnson, with six brigades, of which five were reinforcements just arrived by rail, formed his right; next came Walker's corps, opposite Alexander's Bridge; then Buckner's, near Tedford's Fork, followed by Polk's opposite Lee and Gordon's Mills, with Hill's on the extreme left. General Wheeler, with two divisions of cavalry, protected the left; General Forrest, with two other mounted divisions, the right and front. Both of these leaders had achieved equal success and renown as cavalry commanders.

On September 16, Bragg issued a characteristic "General Order," in part to this effect: "The troops will be held ready for an immediate move against the enemy. His demonstration on our flank has been thwarted, and twice has he retired before us when offered battle. We must now force him to the issue. Soldiers, you are largely reinforced. You must now seek the contest. In so doing I know you will be content to suffer privations and encounter hardships." It cannot be said that Bragg overstated the case in claiming that Rosecrans's flanking movement had been thwarted, and that he had twice declined the offer of battle, for our efforts to concentrate meant, of course, an abandonment of the flanking operations, and the retreat of Negley could be taken as one declination to fight, while Bragg's boast of another was occasioned by Crittenden's next movement away from Polk's front, of which I will speak directly.

On the night of September 17, Bragg issued his "order of battle." His plan of attack was just the reverse of that in the battle of Stone's River. His line, beginning on the right and with the centre as a pivot, was to execute a "grand wheel" across the Chickamauga and thence up its west bank. Our line was to be rolled up from left to right,
forced from the roads to Chattanooga, and driven up McLemore’s Cove against Lookout Mountain, and thus destroyed or dispersed. As the order prescribed in detail: Johnson to cross at or near Reed’s Bridge and turn to the left up the stream toward Lee and Gordon’s Mills; Walker to cross at Alexander’s Bridge and join in this move; Buckner to cross at Tedford’s Fork and join Walker to the left and press the enemy up the stream from Polk’s front; Polk to push his troops to the front of Lee and Gordon’s Mills and unite in the attack wherever the enemy may be; Hill to cover the left flank, and, in case the enemy should be developing his main strength at the Mills, to attack him in the flank; Wheeler’s cavalry to hold the gaps of Pigeon Mountain and cover the rear. The order closed: “These movements will be executed with the utmost promptness, vigor, and persistence.”

Crittenden had hardly got his corps into a favorable position on the 13th when he received orders, dated 12:20 P.M., to post Wood’s division in a strong defensible position at Lee and Gordon’s Mills, in which it could resist stoutly any attempt of the enemy to seize the Chattanooga road; to move his other two divisions during the evening and night to a position on Missionary Ridge, so as to cover the roads in both the valley of Chattanooga Creek and Chickamauga Creek; and to send Wilder’s cavalry brigade up the former stream to join General Thomas as soon as possible. Another order, dated five minutes later and not very clearly expressed, was understood by Crittenden to require him merely to hold himself in readiness to execute the new movement, so that it was only begun early the next morning on receipt of another order to start promptly. His troops reached the new position on the Ridge in a few hours’ march, and he rode in advance of them to reconnoitre. At 12:30 P.M., he reported to the army headquarters as the result that he was confident no considerable force of the enemy was in his front for five miles. He added, that no water had been found on the Ridge, and that hence he
could not remain and would have to descend into the valley or return to his former position. He was directed consequently, late in the evening, to move his corps back to a good position for water along the Chickamauga from Owen’s Ford to Gower’s, which he did the next morning. In this position the corps remained quietly during the 15th and 16th. Crittenden certainly had not the remotest conception that a battle-cloud was gathering near him and about to burst until it was indicated to him by an order, received at 9:30 P.M. on the 16th, to issue to his command three days’ rations in haversacks, and twenty rounds for the pockets of each man, in addition to full cartridge-boxes.

At the time last named, McCook had not yet connected with Thomas, who remained stationary about Stevens Gap awaiting his approach, and Crittenden communicated with the Fourteenth Corps only by his cavalry. Even when the Twentieth Corps had finally come within supporting distance of the Fourteenth on September 17, the line of the Twenty-first Corps was not in contact with Thomas as the centre. Thus, if Bragg had been able to execute the attack ordered by him for early morning on the 18th, the Army of the Cumberland would have been struck while still divided, and would probably have suffered a much worse fate than actually befell it. Crittenden would doubtless have been overwhelmed, and the rear of Rosecrans and the roads from his position to Chattanooga gained. But, as the rebel commander relates: “The resistance of the enemy’s cavalry and the difficulties arising from the bad and narrow country roads caused unexpected delay in the execution of my orders.” In fact, a whole day was lost by him, and the onset upon the Federals, intended for the 18th, did not begin until the following day.

There is no evidence on record that General Rosecrans began to perceive Bragg’s real purpose against his left before the night of the 15th to 16th. He was aware on the 14th that the rebels had abandoned the valley between Lookout and Pigeon Mountains, and he had also learned
of strong indications of their withdrawal from Lafayette, but nothing was known at the army headquarters of the direction in which the bulk of their forces had subsequently moved. Their drift down the Chickamauga towards our left, however, was sufficiently recognized, by the time named, to produce an order dated September 16, 8:05 A.M., which showed that Rosecrans was then roused to the great gravity of the situation. This, summarily stated, was that the enemy with his whole army was practically half a day’s march nearer to Chattanooga than himself, and had to push only a few miles to the eastward to get between him and the town. The order required Thomas to concentrate his corps, provided with three days’ rations and extra ammunition, between Gower’s and Bird’s Mills, so as to command the Chattanooga Road, and “to do it to-day and as secretly as possible.” This meant a movement to the left down the Chickamauga so as to bring his corps close to Crittenden’s right. Thomas received the order at 3:30 P.M., but failed to comprehend its urgency—probably because he was not informed of the enemy’s designs—and considered it unwise to leave his position before the arrival of McCook; hence he answered: “General McCook’s troops have not yet arrived. I will send Baird’s and Negley’s divisions to take position to-morrow morning, and Reynolds’s and Brannan’s the day following.” To this came response from the chief of staff, dated 8:45 P.M.: “The General Commanding fears that the movement will be too late if delayed till the time you mention. The enemy seems to be massing on our left, and the General Commanding desires that our flank movement to the left may be accomplished as soon as possible.” With this exchange of despatches the day went by, and General Thomas did not get under way before the morning of the 17th, but was in the new position by evening, with his left connecting with the Twenty-first Corps at Owen’s Ford.

It has already been mentioned that the Twentieth Corps did not effect contact with Thomas until the 17th, when
the latter was already in motion down the Chickamauga. General McCook himself, however, was already at the foot of Stevens Gap on the evening of the 16th, when he reported the whereabouts of his divisions to the general headquarters. He was as ignorant as the other corps commanders of the doings of the enemy. Indeed, in a despatch to General Thomas dated September 16, 3:15 P.M., he expressed the opinion that the rebel forces were at Lafayette, "except Loring's division, which went to Charleston," and that he did not think they would fight there, "as they could find much better places further to their rear." It may be easily imagined, therefore, how surprised he must have been when he received, soon after, an order from General Rosecrans to issue three days' rations and extra ammunition to his men, and to mass his corps at once between Pond Spring and Gower—that is, to move also to the left, following Thomas, and connect with him at the last-mentioned point, and to send his trains down Chattanooga Creek. He sent corresponding orders to his three divisions, of which Sheridan's reached the foot of Stevens Gap in the evening, and Davis's at noon and Johnson's in the afternoon of the next day. Starting them as soon as possible to his new destination, he soon found himself obstructed by Thomas's troops moving in advance of him on the same road, and asked for a modification of his orders, which he received, with directions to take position to the right and left of Pond Spring. This he did early on the 18th, making connection with Thomas's right.

The Army of the Cumberland was now extricated from the peril involved in the isolation of the several corps which had hung over it for a week. But, although the three corps were at last in supporting distance of each other, the army was not yet secure against being cut off from Chattanooga by the flanking movement of the enemy. Evidence of the rebel preparations for an attack *en masse* against our left accumulated on the 18th, and made Rosecrans alive to the necessity of another rapid counter-concentration. The very
great urgency of the situation made him resolve upon a bold and almost desperate manœuvre in order to meet the apparent overreaching of our extreme left (Wood’s division) by the enemy, viz., the withdrawing of Thomas’s corps from the centre and moving it during the evening and night by the rear of Crittenden’s corps to its left, and simultaneously shifting McCook’s corps to the position vacated by Thomas. The great risk lay in breaking and entirely reversing our line in the face of the enemy, whose onslaught might be expected any moment. The shift was accomplished not entirely, but sufficiently, as events proved, to save the Army of the Cumberland from destruction. Thomas was under way by 4 p.m., and kept in motion all night. His columns had a most toilsome task in finding their way in the dark over narrow cross-roads and through the woods; and although the distance traversed was only between four and five miles, the head, Baird’s division, reached its destination at “Kelly’s Farm” on Crittenden’s left only at daylight on the 19th. This was the very position whose valiant defence by Thomas and his troops during the impending battle was destined to prevent the utter rout of all of Rosecrans’s forces.

McCook received his orders to move to the position vacated by Thomas shortly after midnight, and marched at early dawn, with Johnson’s division in the lead, followed by Davis’s and Sheridan’s. He himself reported in person between eight and nine to the Commander-in-chief at Crawfish Springs (about a mile southeast of Lee and Gordon’s Mills), and was ordered by him to mass his corps about that point and await further instructions, which was done. Crittenden’s corps lay still on the 17th, except that he moved Palmer’s division to the left in order to make room for one of Thomas’s then approaching.

Between 10 a.m. and noon on the 18th, General Wood sent in several reports that the enemy was advancing on both his left and right, and asked for reinforcement by a brigade. But no collision came from this move on the part
of the rebels, which was apparently intended simply to secure a new position, but led to a change of Crittenden's line by shifting Van Cleve's division from the right to the left of Wood's, and of Palmer's to replace Van Cleve's. This extension of our left, Crittenden made on his own responsibility. It anticipated to that extent Thomas's night move to the left. It seems almost incredible, but Crittenden says distinctly, in his official report, that he heard of Thomas's march by his rear accidentally the next morning, implying that he had not received any official advice of it.

Thus the hostile hosts became arrayed against each other for the terrible struggle into which they were about to plunge. Rosecrans tried his utmost to get ready for it, but was not, as his new line was still forming when the fighting began. He had been forced to exchange the confident part of victory and pursuit for that of an anxious defensive. He was not only anxious, but was actually apprehensive of failure, as is shown by his orders anticipatory of a possible defeat. And well he might be, in view of the positive information that had reached him, in the last few days, of the heavy reinforcements sent to Bragg from the West as well as from Lee's army. He knew, too, that, although orders had been sent from Washington in the light of those facts to Generals Grant, Hurlbut, and Burnside to send him all the troops they could possibly spare, help from any quarter could not arrive in time. Here these singular circumstances may be recorded: First, General-in-chief Halleck was under the delusion, almost to the middle of the month, that, instead of Bragg being reinforced from Lee, the reverse was the case. His belief was based upon misleading rebel newspaper reports, the surrender of Chattanooga without a fight, and upon Rosecrans's positive reports that Bragg was in full retreat southwardly. Secondly, Burnside, though repeatedly directed from Washington and requested by Rosecrans, after the occupation of Chattanooga, to close up with him, had made no serious efforts to that effect. He excused himself by Rosecrans's
advices that Bragg was in full retreat, which seemed to him to render haste unnecessary.

No proof exists that Bragg knew, before the battle, of the desperate effort made by Rosecrans to thwart him by massing his forces on the left, but it is not probable that such knowledge would have made him hesitate to offer battle; for, as is shown in the exhortation addressed to his army, he must have been inspired with faith in success by the reinforcements of his command already received and about to arrive. There is a riddle, however, in this connection which the rebel records fail to clear up. While, according to Bragg’s report of the battle, a considerable body had joined him some days before, Longstreet’s corps was still on the way to him when he decided to attack on the 18th, and could not reach the field in time to support him. How did it happen that he deliberately did not wait for the advent of the flower of Lee’s army, sent to him especially to ensure a victory over Rosecrans? Had he fought on the 18th, Longstreet would have been too late for any share in the action. As it was, he arrived only in time to contribute to the rebel success on the second day. No light has ever been thrown on Bragg’s motive.

The battle about to be fought forms no exception to the all but general rule that, in the great actions of the Civil War, the losing as well as the winning side claimed that it had to contend against far superior numbers. Yet, as will be seen from the following comparison, the contestants in this struggle were almost evenly matched, there being but a slight numerical superiority on the Union side. According to the tri-monthly return of the Army of the Cumberland of September 10, the Fourteenth Army Corps had then present for duty 22,781 officers and men, the Twentieth 13,156, and the Twenty-first 14,660, making a total of 50,597 infantry and artillery. This aggregate was reduced by about ten per cent. by the disabled and stragglers lost during the continuous and hard marching between the 10th and the 19th, thus leaving (say) about 45,000 effectives,
less about 2000 on escort and other detached duties. There was also the cavalry corps, with 9676 officers and men; but, owing to the broken and thickly wooded character of the scene of action, the mounted troops did only desultory fighting on a part of the front and on the wings, and may well be excluded, therefore, from the number of participants in the main action. The reserve corps under General Granger did not come into action until late on the second day, with the exception of one brigade under Colonel Daniel McCook, whose presence was, however, more than offset by the absence of Wagner's brigade of the Twenty-first Corps, garrisoning Chattanooga, and of one of Davis's brigades of the Twentieth Corps left to guard Stevens Gap. Hence it is right to say that there were about 43,000 combatants, exclusive of cavalry, on the Union side, with 196 pieces of artillery.

Bragg had 35,000 effectives, exclusive of cavalry, when he marched away from Chattanooga, from which five per cent. may be deducted for decrease from sickness and straggling (the rebels having been campaigning only half as long as the Unionists). He admits having been strengthened in time for the battle by two brigades of foot from Mississippi and five brigades of Longstreet's corps, which he, however, describes as weak and not exceeding five thousand effectives. But the seven brigades numbered certainly not less than 8000, bringing the effectives up to something under 42,000. This total is borne out by the aggregates of officers and men engaged given in the reports of the corps and division commanders, which foot up exactly 41,700 infantry and artillery. The rebel cavalry was stronger than the Federal, but its part also was confined to small and scattering fights, excepting the attack, hereafter mentioned, by Forrest's corps at the opening of the battle on the first day. The artillery numbered about the same as the Unionists'.

In another respect than numbers, about equal conditions prevailed on both sides. Neither the Unionists nor the Confederates were in fresh condition. The officers and men
in the two armies, from the generals in command down to the privates, were tired out by all but continuous marching by day and night. The former had been steadily on the move for nearly five weeks, the latter since the evacuation of Chattanooga. The last week, neither the one nor the other had had proper rest or regular nourishment. For days before the battle, the bulk of the troops on each side had not had cooked meals. There was much suffering, not only from hunger, but from thirst, owing to the scarcity of water on the ridges between the several streams. The animals, too, had fared very badly as to food and water. The long lack of rain in that region had caused such dryness that the movements of the masses of men and animals took place in suffocating clouds of dust, which greatly increased their hardships. By the dust rising from the roads, the signal services of the two armies divined their respective movements. The Union forces, having been longer under way by three weeks, were naturally more exhausted than their enemies. As nearly the whole of them were in motion during the entire night of the 18th to the 19th, they were really unfit for a general action. The Confederates were at least lying still during that night, and hence were better prepared for their bloody task.

It is difficult to give a description of the ground fought over on the memorable 19th and 20th of September that will convey a clear idea of it. It lay entirely on Georgia soil just south of the Tennessee boundary. It comprised the part of the valley of the West Chickamauga extending northerly from Lee and Gordon’s Mills for a distance of a little over four miles. The course of the stream is so meandering that the width of the valley varies greatly and its form is very irregular. The surface is undulating, and was then generally covered with heavy timber, and largely also with an undergrowth so dense that a clear view ahead could be had only for a hundred to two hundred feet. The timber entirely concealed the movements of the hostile forces from one another. There were, however,
a number of farms with clearings and cultivated fields of greater or less extent. General Thomas took position on the largest of these at Kelly’s, three and a half miles from Lee and Gordon’s Mills and about two miles from the Chickamauga. The road from Lafayette to Chattanooga, the possession of which was the object of the struggle, crossed the whole length of the battle-field due north and south from Kelly’s to Lee and Gordon’s Mills. The road ran along the eastern foot of Missionary Ridge, but between it and the slope there was first a narrow skirt of timber, stretching from “Widow Glenn’s Farm,” one and a half miles north of Lee and Gordon’s Mills, for nearly three miles to McDonald’s, about three-quarters of a mile north of Kelly’s. Beyond this strip, and parallel to it, there was a succession of cultivated clearings. The reason for taking the Unionist position between the State road and the Chickamauga instead of along the stream itself was the winding flow and numerous fords, which rendered it impossible to form any defensive line on the bank not exposed to flank and rear attacks.
CHAPTER XXIX

THE BATTLE OF THE FIRST DAY.—1863

GENERAL THOMAS had just succeeded in placing his leading divisions under Baird and Brannan in position early on the morning of September 19 when Colonel Daniel McCook, commanding the brigade of the reserve corps that had been serving on the front for some days, reported to him that he had discovered during the night an isolated rebel brigade on the west bank near Reed's Bridge, and that it could be cut off and captured, as he had destroyed that bridge behind it. Thereupon General Thomas ordered General Brannan to try and capture the rebel body. Brannan proceeded to carry out the order at once, and, by nine o'clock, his second brigade had taken one road to Reed's Bridge, and the third brigade another running a short distance to the north from McDonald's house in the same direction, so as to catch the rebels between them. The two brigades were followed by the first as support. The second brigade, after advancing three-quarters of a mile and driving the hostile skirmishers before them, was brought to bay and vigorously attacked at about 10 A.M. by a large body. It was part of Forrest's cavalry corps fighting as infantry under his own command. A severe conflict ensued, in which two regimental commanders fell, but, being reinforced by a regiment, the brigade managed to hold its ground for a time. The third brigade, after marching about a mile and a half towards the stream, also struck the dismounted rebels, who opened upon it a heavy fire of musketry and artillery at short range; but it pushed on and pressed them back to within a
short distance of the creek. These two collisions ushered in the two days' battle. General Thomas certainly had no intention of provoking the conflict, and would of course not have undertaken the venture with Brannan's division had he not been utterly ignorant of the forming of the rebel line for a general attack directly before him.

General Bragg, who was much disappointed that his army did not succeed in crossing the Chickamauga in time to attack on the 18th, insinuates in his report that General Bushrod Johnson, commanding on his right, might have moved quicker, and that he felt relieved when General Hood arrived on the field direct from Richmond with his division, and replaced Johnson as the ranking officer. The rebel right managed to cross the stream by 4 P.M. at Reed's Bridge, after a skirmish for its possession with Minty's cavalry brigade, and at a ford above, and advanced to Jay's Saw-mill, three-quarters of a mile to the west in line of battle, and thence turned southwardly for two and a half miles past Alexander's Bridge to within less than two miles of Lee and Gordon's Mills, where, after dark, the head of their column struck the Federal skirmishers. Hood formed a line facing southwest, and remained in this position all night with his troops resting on their arms. Hood had, unknown to himself and his adversaries, passed along most of the Federal front. Only Walker's Confederate reserve corps got across the Chickamauga on the 18th in addition to Hood. It found Alexander's Bridge defended by Wilder's mounted brigade, which yielded it only after a stubborn fight and dismantled the structure under fire. Walker's command crossed after dark at Byram's Ford below the bridge, and bivouacked for the night a mile to the west of it. There is no doubt that the rebel body seen by Colonel Daniel McCook was part of Hood's command, but it had passed from Thomas's front, and the force which Brannan's brigades encountered belonged to Walker's reserve corps. Hood having cleared the way for their unobstructed passage, Buckner's force and Cheatham's division
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passed the stream at daylight on the 19th. By nine o’clock, the rebel line was re-formed with Walker on the right, Hood in the centre, and Buckner on the left, about one mile below Lee and Gordon’s Mills, with Cheatham’s division in reserve. Polk, with another division of his corps, and Hill’s whole corps, were kept on the east bank until later in the day.

When Forrest found himself pushed back by Brannan’s brigades, he sent for infantry support, and Wilson’s brigade of Gist’s division of Walker’s reserve corps went first to his aid, followed soon by Ector’s of the same division. Thus strengthened, Forrest took the offensive against Brannan, and pressed his right so hard that he sent “repeated and earnest requests” to General Thomas for reinforcements. The corps commander at once ordered Baird’s division to his relief. Baird formed on Brannan’s right and moved vigorously upon the enemy, forcing him back three-quarters of a mile. The enemy having disappeared from his front, he stopped to readjust his line to Brannan’s. While so doing, he was suddenly set upon by a large body of rebels, which overwhelmed and drove back in utter confusion first Scribner’s brigade, and next the brigade of regular troops under General King, upon and through the centre of Brannan, thereby exposing both of the latter’s flanks. It was a complete rout, of which Baird said in his report that “entire destruction seemed inevitable,” “whole battalions were wiped out of existence,” and “the men could only be stopped after they had passed far to the rear.” The rebels captured 23 commissioned officers, more than 400 rank and file, and the two brigade batteries. Battery H of the Fifth U. S. Artillery had more than half of its officers and men killed and wounded, and forty horses killed and twenty wounded. This rout was inflicted by the two brigades of Liddell’s division of Walker’s reserve corps coming to the succor of Gist’s brigades, which had yielded to Baird’s onset. At this critical juncture, greater disaster was fortunately averted by the appearance of John-
son's division of McCook's corps, which had been prudently ordered to the support of General Thomas by General Rosecrans when the firing on the left indicated the development of a general engagement. The division formed at once on Thomas's left with Willich's brigade on the right, Baldwin's on the left, and Dodge's in reserve, advanced, and, striking the rebels in the flank, drove them in disorder for a mile towards the Chickamauga. Willich captured five guns in a bayonet charge. Meantime, Brannan had managed to stop and break the onset of Liddell's division by a counterattack with his first and third brigades, in which the German Ninth Ohio Regiment—the same that decided the battle of Mill Spring—recaptured at the point of the bayonet the battery taken from the regulars.

General Crittenden, being satisfied from the roar of battle that Thomas was getting heavily engaged, had of his own accord ordered Palmer's division to the assistance of the Fourteenth Corps between eleven o'clock and noon. It reached the front at about the same time as Johnson's, and, forming on the latter's right, advanced upon the enemy in echeloned columns of brigades. It became directly engaged, and, after a hot exchange of fire for an hour, the enemy yielded ground and was pursued for some distance. General Reynolds, with the second and third brigades of the fourth division of the Fourteenth Corps—the first being mounted and detached under command of Colonel Wilder—reached the field behind Johnson's division. His command did not join in the fight as a unit, but served to support and relieve, in parts of brigades, the left of Johnson and the right of Palmer, whose experiences they shared.

At half-past eleven, General Crittenden received a note from General Thomas, saying that, if he could spare another division, it should be sent to him without delay. A very heavy musketry fire then bursting out in the direction in which Palmer was moving, the corps commander sent two of his staff to the latter to ascertain the state of the fight. They soon returned, reporting that they had not been
able to reach Palmer, being stopped and fired at by the enemy. This led Crittenden to fear that his second division was being attacked from both front and rear, and to send hastily to the army headquarters for permission to order Van Cleve’s to its relief, which was readily granted. Anticipating the approval of the Commander-in-chief, orders to hurry forward were sent simultaneously to Van Cleve, who started at 1 P.M. with two brigades at the double-quick, leaving one to guard the crossing at Lee and Gordon’s Mills. He reached the scene of action before 2, formed on Palmer’s right, and became at once severely engaged. Before hearing of Van Cleve’s movement, General Rosecrans had ordered Davis’s division of McCook’s corps to the front, where it arrived about the same time as Van Cleve’s division. It took position alongside on the extreme right and came likewise at once under fire.

This narrative shows that the beginning of the action was as accidental as the subsequent course of the battle. Rosecrans, not being ready to fight, had not formed a plan for it. Bragg operated under a preconceived programme, which was upset by the incidents related. From the initial collision between small bodies, the conflict grew into a general action by one force after another being sent forward to the support of those already engaged. We have seen how on our side the fight of Brannan’s second brigade became that of the division, and how Baird’s, Johnson’s, Reynolds’s, Palmer’s, Van Cleve’s, and Davis’s brigades were successively drawn into it. Events took a corresponding course on the rebel side. At the opening, Forrest’s dismounted cavalry fought alone. His appeal for help brought first one and then another of Walthall’s brigades under fire. In response to Walthall’s call for support, Liddell’s division came to the rescue. When the whole of the rebel reserve corps had thus become involved and found itself hard pressed and forced to fall back, General Bragg at 11 A.M. ordered General Cheatham’s division of Polk’s corps to its assistance. Moving immediately, it was formed
in line of battle with three brigades in front and two in re-
serve by noon, and then advanced and collided within a 
few minutes with the Federal line, which was driving 
Liddell's brigades. Cheatham not only checked the Federal 
advance, but forced it back about three-quarters of a 
mile, when he encountered fresh hostile columns which 
made him yield in turn. Learning this, General Bragg 
ordered Stewart's division of Buckner's corps to make an 
attack for his relief. Stewart formed his line promptly, 
and reached the front in time for the rescue of Wright's bri-
gade, forming Cheatham's left, which was falling back 
in disorder with the loss of its battery. Stewart became 
at once hotly engaged. As he gained no ground for some 
time, while losing heavily, Bragg ordered Hood's corps into 
action on the left of Stewart. Its strongest division, under 
Bushrod Johnson, entered the fight shortly before 3 P.M. 
After it had been engaged for some time without decided 
result, Robertson's brigade of the division Hood had 
brought with him from Virginia, and Trigg's brigade of 
Preston's division of Buckner's corps, were sent to its 
assistance.

In this wise it happened that, in the latter part of the 
afternoon, no less than seven Federal divisions, less two 
detached brigades, and five divisions and two brigades of 
the enemy, had been drawn into the vortex of the battle. 
Hence there cannot have been much difference between the 
numbers of combatants on each side. The action shifted 
during the day from right to left. It was not continuous, 
but like the rise and fall of the tide. As the several bodies 
successively came into the fray, it rose to fierceness at the 
points of collision, surged and roared for a time as the 
assailing columns advanced, and subsided into more or less 
protracted lulls as they fell away from each other. It was 
offensive at first on our part, but became more and more 
defensive in the course of the day. Foiled in their early 
attempts to break the left of our line, the rebels directed 
their onsets from noon against our centre. Brannan, Baird,
and Johnson on the left were let alone after the events already described. But Palmer, Van Cleve, and Davis were kept at the bloody work during the afternoon by their adversaries, Cheatham, Stewart, and Bushrod Johnson and the two supporting brigades. Palmer’s division was forced back, after his first success, in considerable confusion and at one time outflanked, but he managed to stop and re-form his troops in a defensive position before dark. Van Cleve fared no better. Advancing on the right of Palmer with his two brigades, he drove the enemy rapidly and captured four guns, when he found himself flanked on the right by strong numbers, and compelled to fall back and leave the captured guns. He rallied his men and made another successful attack, taking four more guns, which were brought off. Assailed in turn, he had to yield again, but returned once more to the charge, when he encountered a fresh rebel mass which pressed his force back in such confusion that he could rally only a portion of them some distance to the rear. Van Cleve’s other brigade, which had been left at Lee and Gordon’s Mills, had been ordered to his relief, and came into action to his right when he was already discomfited, followed by Davis with Colonel Heg’s and General Carlin’s brigades.

Stewart and Bushrod Johnson were expected by General Bragg to make up for the repulse on our left by forcing our centre, gaining the Chattanooga road, and thereby cutting our army in two. His expectation was fulfilled, but, happily for us, only for a short time. Stewart, by his final repulse of Van Cleve, opened the way to the coveted highway, and not only reached it, but pushed nearly half a mile beyond it, and claimed to have captured twelve pieces of artillery. But this onset carried him singly so far from the Confederate line and all support that he directly found himself menaced on both flanks, and concluded to seek safety in retreat. As he mildly puts it in his official report: “In consequence of threatening movements on the right and left, my command fell leisurely back about sunset, re-form-
ing on the east side of the Chattanooga road.’’ Bushrod Johnson, between three and four o’clock, fell upon Barnes’s and Davis’s brigades, made them, after a stout resistance, give way in partial disorder, and followed them to and beyond the Chattanooga road. At this juncture, two brigades under General Wood, which General Crittenden had asked and obtained permission to send to the succor of Van Cleve in his precarious plight, became also involved. Wood had orders to go in on Van Cleve’s right, but, meeting Davis on the way and hearing from him of his distress, and seeing the evidence of it in a stream of fugitives from Heg’s brigade that came pouring out of the woods, he directed Colonel Harker’s brigade to form in line and push forward in an oblique direction and engage the advancing enemy. The brigade succeeded in checking him after a hot fight in which it lost very heavily. Wood’s other brigade, under Colonel Buell, got ready to support Carlin’s, holding Davis’s right, and was about to advance when the latter brigade was also driven back by the rebels. The fugitive crowd got mixed up with Buell’s men and swept them along with it some distance beyond the Chattanooga road, when the enemy was stopped by the fire of Wilder’s brigade, which was lying there dismounted, and the concentrated fire of twenty-six guns which General Crittenden had ordered to open. General Sheridan had been directed by Rosecrans to hurry from Lee and Gordon’s Mills with two brigades to the relief of our right, and arrived just in time to help check the pursuit of Davis’s and Wood’s men. Colonel Bradley’s brigade of his division formed hastily, and, after a short and severe fight, in which it recaptured a Federal battery, succeeded in driving the enemy back to the east side of the Chattanooga road. Davis’s and Wood’s commands then re-formed and regained their former position.

General Negley’s division had been left to guard the fords on our extreme right, while the other three divisions of the Fourteenth Corps made their night move to the left.
It was not molested until noon, when the enemy opened with two batteries upon it, and soon after advanced with an infantry force which was, however, easily repulsed. It was a feint on the rebel part to hold our forces in place. At 3:30 P.M., Negley received orders to move quickly to the support of General Thomas. He reached the front, where Van Cleve had been fighting, shortly before five, and discovered the enemy making a flank movement through a break in our line. He promptly sent two brigades against the rebels, which stopped them, and then, taking the offensive, pushed forward about half a mile in a brisk engagement lasting till after seven. The division did not resume its march to join Thomas, but remained on McCook's line.

Dusk and darkness had come during the last-mentioned incidents. The lull that had prevailed on our left during the afternoon was suddenly broken after dark by a tremendous outburst of musketry and artillery. Bragg was not satisfied with the compensation for the failures of Forrest, Waltham, Liddell, and Cheatham afforded by the partial successes of Stewart and Johnson—partial because they could not hold the Chattanooga road, and because our torn line was re-knitted. Moreover, the developments of the day had made him cognizant of the concentration of the main strength of the Federals on their left. He resolved to try again to break the latter. The new blow was to be struck by a night attack, so as to double its effect by a surprise. The best division of his army—Cleburne's veterans—was to deal it. It had not been engaged, and came therefore comparatively fresh to the task. It had been in position on the rebel left during the forenoon and part of the afternoon on the west bank of the Chickamauga, when it was ordered to cross at Tedford's Fork and march as rapidly as possible along the rear of the rebel lines to the right. It reached there after sunset, formed and moved forward by six o'clock with all three brigades in a front line and each followed by a battery. Cleburne says: "In
a few moments I was heavily engaged on my right and centre. The enemy, posted behind hastily constructed breastworks, opened a heavy fire of both small arms and artillery. For half an hour, the firing was the heaviest I ever heard. It was dark, however, and accurate shooting impossible. Each side was aiming at the flashes of the other, and few of the shot from either side took effect. Two of my batteries were run forward within sixty yards of the enemy’s line and opened a rapid fire.” Cleburne, according to his own story, drove the enemy for a mile and a half, when, his command having got confused by the advance in the darkness, and his artillery finding it impracticable to move further in the woods, he stopped, readjusted his lines and bivouacked. He claims that he captured three guns, two flags, and between two and three hundred prisoners, and that it was nine o’clock before firing on his front ceased.

Cleburne had struck Johnson’s division and the left of Baird’s. A terrible roar suddenly arose in front of them. The three brigades of the former and Scribner’s of the latter found themselves instantly exposed to a fearful shower of bullets and crashing shot and bursting shell, and immediately thereafter furiously assailed by yelling infantry in front and flank. Johnson’s left, formed by the brigade of Willich, had remained unprotected all the afternoon, although its commander repeatedly called attention to its exposure. The first rebel onset swept our first line back upon the reserves with heavy losses, but it then appears to have stood its ground till the enemy stopped fighting. The attack evidently threw our troops into great confusion, and many more of them were taken prisoners than Cleburne brought off, the greater number escaping in the darkness. Our line got so mixed up that Willich’s and Scribner’s commands fired into Baird’s second brigade and made it retreat in disorder.

This night fight—one of the most extraordinary incidents of the war—closed the day’s struggle. It had been mostly a
hap-hazard contest, from the first to the last, on both sides. Neither the generals-in-chief nor the heads of the corps exercised much command. They confined themselves to ordering one part of their troops after another into action, after which the character of the ground, the dense woods, and the difficulty of communication compelled them to let the immediate commanders do the best they could. As General Longstreet fitly expresses it in his recollections of the war: "The division commanders fought the battle." The Official War Records afford incontestable proof that the commanders not only of divisions, but of brigades and even regiments, had to shift for themselves. They warrant the assertion that, in no other of the great battles of the rebellion, are there to be found so many complaints from commanding officers, in both armies, of being unsupported in attacks and left exposed on the flanks and obliged to fall back by being actually taken on the sides and in the rear. A number of allegations appear that gaps from a few hundred feet to a mile and a quarter wide existed in the Federal and Confederate lines. For the same reason, but scanty laurels were gathered by commanders in this field for tactical achievements. Yet there are many instances of gallant conduct on record, and among them a remarkable feat of General Willich deserves to be mentioned. Major Williams, commanding the Eighty-ninth Illinois Infantry, in his report, after mentioning that at one time the heavy fire of the enemy made his command waver, says: "At this point General Willich came forward, and, standing in front of the regiment amid a shower of bullets, complimented it for its previous impetuous advance, calmed their excitement, instructed them how to advance, fire, and maintain their alignment, then dressed and drilled them for a short time; and his own inimitable coolness of manner restored order and confidence in the regiment so that, when he ordered them to advance, they did so promptly and in good order." A drill under the hottest fire—certainly an extraordinary example of the coolest courage.
The strife having been actually a series of "little battles," fought by particular units of the respective armies against each other with fluctuating results, it is not surprising that the division and brigade commanders engaged should, almost without exception on both sides, resort again in their reports to the plea of having encountered largely superior numbers, in extenuation of failure and in exaggeration of success. It is but natural that such fictions should be echoed first in the reports of corps commanders and then of the commanders-in-chief.

General Bragg had, to recapitulate, sought first to break our left and plant his army between us and Chattanooga, and next, when he had failed in this, to cut us in two by piercing our centre. General Rosecrans's chief object was to secure the concentration of his army and thereby his lines of communication with Chattanooga. As both of Bragg's attempts had miscarried, while Rosecrans had his forces fully in hand and commanded the two roads—the Rossville and the Dry Valley—to Chattanooga at the close of the day, the outcome may well be deemed to have been in our favor. It must be admitted at the same time that it was not our tactics but the Confederate to which the result was due, for the course which the action took through the aggressiveness of the enemy promoted, so to speak, and accelerated our concentrating movement. The hostile pressure contracted, as it were, our extended and loose lines, and forced us into a position astride the important roads. But it is also true that the line gained by the Confederates during the day was far better for a further offensive than that occupied by them on the morning of the 19th, since the Chickamanga was no longer between most of their troops and our own, they were within easy striking distance of us and, in front of both our flanks, much nearer to the Chattanooga roads, and, moreover, they were no longer hampered in their movements by ignorance of the ground.

Bragg was fully aware of all this, and had no other thought than to renew the struggle as early the next day as
possible, and felt sure of success. Rosecrans likewise knew but too well that another battle was still before him. The condition of the rebels was certainly better for another trial of strength and skill than ours. Their losses had been very severe, and no doubt greater than ours, except in prisoners. Their organizations were also much shaken and loosened by the varying fortunes of the day. Their general physical exhaustion was also great. But they had a reserve force of more than one-third of their army, consisting of the divisions of Hindman, Breckinridge, and Preston, from which only two brigades had been drawn into the action, as has been mentioned. They were reinforced, too, during the night by the arrival of two more brigades from Virginia. Another important accession was Lieutenant-General Longstreet in time to exercise command the next day.

On our side, the loss in killed was relatively small, but disproportionately large in wounded. The hauls of prisoners made by the enemy in his onsets comprised in not a few cases the larger parts of regiments, battalions, and batteries. But the worst we had suffered was the disruption and scattering and mixing up of so many organizations, which could not fully be reestablished in the dark. Moreover, our whole army had been engaged, barring Sheridan’s two brigades, which, with the reserve corps, constituted the only available fresh troops, and Granger’s command, which was at a distance. Our condition was, indeed, such that only the defensive could be thought of, and, accordingly, large details of our men were kept felling timber all night and erecting breastworks of logs for the protection of our lines. General Rosecrans certainly drew a fanciful picture when he said, in his telegraphic summary of the battle to the Government, ‘‘The army is in excellent condition and spirits.’’ That he really felt very anxious for the fate of his army appears plainly from the sentence with which he closed his official account of the events of the 19th, viz., ‘‘The battle of the next day must be for the safety of the army and the possession of Chattanooga.’’
CHAPTER XXX

THE BATTLE OF THE SECOND DAY.—1863

Both armies bivouacked, or rather lay on their arms, during the night. Excepting the pickets and their supports and the working parties, the rank and file enjoyed some hours of rest. But the commanding officers on either side were not allowed that boon. Rosecrans summoned his corps commanders to his headquarters at the Glenn House between nine and ten o'clock, where they remained till midnight to report the location and condition of their troops and to receive their instructions for the next day. Most of the remainder of the night the tired Union generals devoted to conforming their lines to their orders.

The position in which our army awaited the next attempts of the enemy was as follows: Thomas formed the left on substantially the line he held at nightfall, which was almost at a right angle to that from which he had opened the action in the morning, and extended from the road to Reed's Bridge to the direct road from Lee and Gordon's Mills to Rossville and thence to the so-called Dry Valley road, leading through Missionary Ridge from Crawfish Springs to Rossville. McCook formed the right—his left, Negley's division, filling the place of Johnson's, still on Thomas's line, connecting with Thomas's right; and his right, Sheridan's division, near the Glenn House in front of the gap through which the Dry Valley road runs. Davis's two brigades were the reserve of the corps. As the divisions of Generals Johnson and Palmer remained under Thomas's orders, McCook and Crittenden had only two divisions each to command on the 20th,
and the former was soon to be deprived even of Negley’s, which, as will appear, was also sent to reinforce the left. Crittenden’s corps extended as the general reserve along the eastern slope of Missionary Ridge, with Wood’s division on the right and Van Cleve’s on the left, and was so posted as to support both Thomas and McCook. In the line thus constituted, Baird’s division held the extreme left, Johnson’s came next, then Palmer’s, Reynolds’s, and Brannan’s on the slopes of Missionary Ridge, followed by McCook with Negley’s (till withdrawn) on the left, Sheridan’s on the right, and Davis’s in reserve. There is no record of any direction to the reserve corps under General Granger to move up closer to the front on either the first or the second day of the battle, but it was left in a position covering the junction of the roads from Ringgold and Cleveland to Chattanooga at a distance of nearly four miles from our extreme left, until its commander, of his own accord, as will be seen, led it into the action on Sunday afternoon.

A council of war likewise took place during the night at Bragg’s headquarters, which did not have the shelter of a building, but were located around a camp-fire. The rebel generals were informed by their commander that the army was to be fought the next day in two parts: the right wing to consist of Hill’s corps, Walker’s reserve corps and Cheatham’s and Breckinridge’s divisions, and to be commanded by Lieutenant-General Polk, and the left wing to be composed of Hindman’s and Bushrod Johnson’s divisions, Buckner’s corps and Longstreet’s corps (or so much of it as had arrived), with Major-General Hood in command, to be led by Lieutenant-General Longstreet. Bragg’s plan of battle, as communicated to his corps commanders, was to execute with his army a general movement by a wheel upon the extreme left as a pivot—an exact repetition of the Stone’s River plan. Polk was to attack at daylight, and the action was to be taken up successively from right to left. General Longstreet reached
Bragg's bivouac only at 11 P.M., when General Polk had already returned to his corps. He had arrived by train near Ringgold at 2 P.M., and left thence for the field with two staff officers as soon as horses could be procured. The party missed their way, rode into the Federal lines and were fired at, and came very near being taken prisoners. Thus General Longstreet had the responsibility thrust upon him of leading troops immediately into action of whom he had seen only those of his own corps. He was as unfamiliar with the ground as with the greater part of his command, and spent the night in learning all he could of the latter, and in studying maps.

General Bragg had personally given his verbal order to General Polk to attack with his extreme right at daylight. A curious chapter of incidents and accidents now occurred that will be related in full, as it had an important bearing upon the impending action. General Polk had started between 10 and 11 P.M. for his headquarters, east of Alexander's bridge, to prepare for executing his orders. On the way he met an aide-de-camp of General Hill, to whom he communicated his orders, with the further message that he desired to see General Hill at his headquarters, and that he would have fires started and orderlies stationed at the bridge to conduct the general to him. At 11:30 P.M., he issued written orders to Generals Hill and Cheatham to attack the enemy simultaneously at daylight, and to General Walker to remain in reserve, and sent them by couriers to the headquarters of these three commanders. The couriers to Cheatham and Walker promptly returned with receipts for the orders. The one sent to Hill searched for him in vain all night, and returned at daylight with the report that he had been unable to find him. Nor did General Hill put in an appearance in compliance with the order sent to him through his aide-de-camp. Thereupon General Polk sent direct orders to General Cleburne and Breckenridge, Hill's division commanders, to attack at once, and rode himself to the
front. Here he received at 7 A.M. a message from General Hill that he had gone to Alexander’s Bridge, but failed to meet there the orderlies that were to guide him to headquarters, and was, therefore, unable to find them and him, that his divisions were getting breakfast, and would not be ready to move for an hour or more. He also advised General Polk to examine their line and correct some irregularities in it before attacking, and expressed the opinion that, as the Yankees had been felling trees all night, their position had become too strong to be taken by direct assault.

General Polk no doubt had committed a very grave mistake in allowing six hours to elapse between the starting and the return of the courier to General Hill before taking any other action to insure the execution of his superior’s order to attack at dawn of day. General Hill’s preference of his own judgment as to the proper course for himself to pursue to the peremptory order of his immediate superior must be considered an act of insubordination. Two curious features of this incident, which proved very serious for the two generals, were, first, that Polk established the fact that he had stationed the promised guides for Hill at the bridge by the soldiers themselves detailed for that duty, while Hill and staff testified that they found none there; and that Polk claimed positively that he had sent the verbal order to attack at daylight to Hill through the latter’s aide-de-camp, while Hill absolutely denied having ever received it, and the staff officer in question denied having been given such a message. The effect of it all was that the rebel right, instead of attacking at daybreak, as ordered, did not commence the action till 10 A.M. This at least is the hour stated in General Bragg’s subsequent formal charges against General Polk for disobedience of orders. Rosecrans, however, asserts that the battle began at 8:30 A.M., and Thomas also mentions an earlier hour. Breckinridge, who opened on the rebel right, makes it 9:30 A.M. In his official report, General Bragg thus speaks of the delay:
Before the dawn of day, myself and staff were ready for the saddle, occupying a position immediately in rear of and accessible to all parts of the line. With increasing anxiety and disappointment I waited until after sunrise without hearing a gun, and at length despatched a staff officer to General Polk to ascertain the cause of the delay and urge him to a prompt and speedy movement. This officer, not finding the General with his troops, and learning where he had spent the night, proceeded across Alexander's Bridge to the east side of the Chickamauga, and there delivered my message. Proceeding in person to the right wing, I found the troops not even prepared for the movement. Messengers were immediately despatched for General Polk, and he shortly after joined me. My orders were renewed and the General urged to their prompt execution, the more important as the ear was saluted throughout the night with the sounds of the axe and falling timber, as the enemy had labored industriously to strengthen his position by hastily constructed barricades and breastworks. A reconnaissance made in the front of our extreme right during this delay crossed the main road to Chattanooga, and proved the important fact that this greatly desired position was open to our possession. The reasons assigned for this unfortunate delay by the wing commander appear in the reports of his subordinates. It is sufficient to say they are entirely unsatisfactory.

If Bragg's contention that the way to the main Chattanooga road from his right—that is, around the left flank of Thomas and to his rear—was open early in the morning, was well-founded, the salvation of the Union army from entire destruction was doubtless due to the delay of the rebel attack. But a search of all the reports of the general officers commanding on the rebel right failed to discover any evidence corroborating Bragg's allegation. General Polk, moreover, in a long letter addressed to President Davis after his suspension from command, combats most strenuously, but not altogether convincingly, the assumption that the outcome of the battle would have been different had the attack been made as early as ordered.

At all events, the gain of those hours enabled General Rosecrans to correct some faults in our lines, which he discovered, as he narrates, on inspecting them with his
ROSECRANS URGES NEGLEY

staff at daybreak. The time was also diligently utilized to further strengthen our line by additional breastworks. General Thomas having received a message at 2 A.M. from General Baird that his left could not be extended as ordered to the road to Reed’s Bridge without weakening it too much, immediately requested the army headquarters to send Negley’s division so that it could be placed on Baird’s left and rear, to which General Rosecrans responded that he would issue the order at once. Finding that Negley had not arrived, he sent an aide-de-camp to urge him forward as rapidly as possible. Negley says in his report that he received the order from the aide at 8 A.M., but makes no reference to any preceding one from army headquarters. It is of record, however, that General Rosecrans issued it at 6:30 A.M., as well as another to McCook to relieve Negley. The General Commanding was surprised to find, on his return to the right from his inspecting ride, that these orders had not been carried out. As it was hazardous so late in the morning to cause a wide gap in the line by the withdrawal of the whole division at once, Rosecrans ordered Negley to send only his reserve brigade under Beatty immediately to General Thomas, and to withdraw the two others only when actually relieved on the line. This new order prevented Negley’s compliance with that of Thomas’s brought by the aide. General Crittenden, as nearest to Negley, was directed by the Commander-in-chief to relieve him, and did so by directing Wood’s division and a brigade of Van Cleve’s to move into the vacated position. There is no evidence that the alleged order was issued from the army headquarters to Negley or received by him, but McCook’s report contains a copy of a despatch dated 6:35 A.M. from General Garfield, advising him that Negley’s division had been ordered to General Thomas, and directing him to fill the space left by his withdrawal, if practicable. The order reached General McCook so late that, although he rode immediately with General Sheridan to the position
vacated by Negley, he found it already occupied by Wood’s men. There must have been carelessness or confusion at Rosecrans’s headquarters in issuing orders, for General McCook, in returning, met Davis with his two brigades advancing, also by direct order of the General Commanding, to Wood’s position. Three divisions had therefore been actually ordered to take the place of one. McCook directed Davis to occupy part of Wood’s line with one brigade and hold the other in reserve.

The tardiness in meeting General Thomas’s call for help led to a bad beginning of the battle for us, for Beatty’s brigade was just moving into line on Baird’s left when the enemy opened the action by a furious assault at that point. The brigade had first formed perpendicularly to Baird for the better protection of our flank from a turning movement, but was directly ordered, against the remonstrance of its commander, to advance to a low ridge a quarter of a mile distant. This left a gap between the right of the brigade and Baird’s left. The left of the brigade reached the ridge unopposed, but its centre and right met the enemy half way, and were not only stopped, but pressed so heavily that they had to fall back until the rebels were checked and driven to shelter by a shower of grape from the brigade battery.

Such was the beginning of the second day’s struggle. The rebel attack extended quickly to nearly the whole of our left, involving the divisions of Baird, Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds. It was delivered by Breckenridge and Cleburne’s divisions of Hill’s corps. As explained, instead of attacking at daybreak as ordered by Generals Bragg and Polk, they had delayed in order to enable their men to fight on full stomachs. Breckenridge’s line was formed and began to advance on the left at 9:30 A.M. Cleburne on the right moved forward when Breckenridge had already been in motion for some time, with the result that there was no contact between the two divisions and that they fought independently of each other. Breckenridge advanced with
Helm's brigade on the left, Stovall's in the centre, and Adams's on the right. Pushing forward some seven hundred yards, Helm came under fire. His left found itself opposite the breastworks protecting Baird's line, and was brought to a halt by the withering fire from behind them, while the rest of the brigade came in conflict with Beatty's men. Helm was mortally wounded while urging on the regiments on his left, which upon his fall retreated in disorder. Meantime Stovall's and Adams's Confederate brigades had steadily moved forward, resisted at first only by lines of skirmishers, until Adams came up with Beatty in the position to which the latter had retired before Helm. Adams succeeded, by a vigorous onset, in pressing back Beatty and taking from him a section of his battery, after killing nearly all the men and animals belonging to it. The Federal brigade was cut in two, and its two right regiments became separated from it for the rest of the day. Adams continued on, and actually reached the Chattanooga road and passed some distance to the west of it. Stovall also reached the road, where he halted. In fact, these two brigades overreached our left, and virtually turned our flank by their movement. Their commander perceived and reported this to General Breckinridge, who rode up and ordered them to change front perpendicularly to their original line and renew the advance, with the left of Adams and the right of Stovall resting on the Chattanooga road. In this position they were directly in the rear of General Baird's division—a most threatening juncture at this early stage of the action.

When Helm recoiled, Baird made no counter-attacks, but, on the withdrawal of the enemy, sent out skirmishers who took many prisoners. He knew the weakness of his left since Beatty's withdrawal from it, and he was trying to strengthen it with regiments from other divisions when the overwhelming attack upon Beatty also forced back his left, and even reached the rear of Johnson, whose left brigade became severely engaged. When Adams and Stovall
resumed the offensive in their new formation, Baird had to order his line to face about and meet the attack fronting to the rear. Fortunately, the appearance of abundant succor insured the repulse of the rebels. General Thomas, when he was apprised of Beatty's discomfiture, at once ordered Van Derveer's brigade of Brannan's division, Barnes's brigade of Wood's, Grose's of Palmer's, and Stanley's of Negley's, to the support of the left, with the help of which reinforcements Breckinridge's brigades were beaten back. This phase of the struggle is described by Breckinridge as follows:

The brigades advanced in fine order over a field and entered the woods beyond. Stovall, after a severe and well-contested struggle, was checked and forced to retire. Adams, on the west of the Chattanooga road, met two lines of the enemy who had improved the short time to bring up reinforcements and re-form nearly at a right angle to his main works. The first line was routed, but it was impossible to break the second, aided as it was by artillery; and, after a sanguinary contest, we were forced back in some confusion. Here General Adams was severely wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy.

Breckinridge's division, thus badly defeated in detail (it lost over one-third of its number), fell back to a position a short distance in advance of that from which it had begun its attacks, and continued hors de combat till nearly the end of the day, leaving Baird's front correspondingly unmolested.

Had the imminent peril from Breckinridge's push to the rear of our left not been averted, complete defeat would doubtless have overtaken the Union army then and there. Our escape was plainly due alone to the fact that the rebel division attacked without proper support. Breckinridge complains of this in his report, and apparently with good reason (although his brigades found their way around our flank by chance and not by design), for he had informed his corps commander of his discovery, and
requested and obtained consent to the change of his line; but his superior evidently did not appreciate his opportunity, and continued the front attack with the rest of his command.

Cleburne's division was to fare no better than Breckinridge's. It moved forward with Deshler's brigade on the left, Wood's in the centre, and Polk on the right, when Breckinridge was already on the way, and its effort to catch up caused, as Cleburne admits, hurry and confusion. In this condition the division became exposed, its commander says, to the heaviest artillery fire he had ever experienced. A hurricane of shot and shell swept the woods from the unseen enemy in front. The Union guns checked the right of the rebel division within less than two hundred yards of the breastworks. Its centre and left found themselves impeded in their progress by Stewart's division. Wood's brigade got mixed up with Bates's of that division, and Deshler's was entirely stopped for a time. Wood's brigade disentangled itself, and, advancing again, attempted to cross an open field extending to the Chattanooga road. It received a heavy oblique fire from small arms and artillery which drove it back. It lost five hundred men in killed and wounded within a few minutes. Polk's line had also given way, and the two brigades retreated for a quarter of a mile. Cleburne had succeeded in bringing Deshler to the front by a move by the right flank, but he too failed to make headway against the Union fire, and fell back to the position of the other brigades. Deshler himself was killed by a shell that passed clear through his body.

Upon the repulse of Helm's brigade, General Hill sent to General Walker of the reserve corps for a brigade to fill the opening in his line made by the withdrawal of Helm. His request was misunderstood, and, instead of one brigade, the two divisions of the corps came up accompanied by Lieutenant-General Polk. They were ordered to resume the attack abandoned by Breckinridge, but, to quote from Hill's report, "met with a front and flank fire
which threw them in confusion and drove them back precipitately."

Four divisions of the rebel right were thus used up. The fifth, Cheatham's, was spared and kept in reserve. While Breckinridge and the three brigades of Walker were contending against Baird and his supports, Cleburne and Walker's other brigades made futile efforts in front of Johnson's, Palmer's, and Reynolds's divisions. These, like Baird, acted mainly on the defensive, checking the enemy by a very heavy infantry and artillery fire whenever he tried to rush forward. A rain of bullets, shot, and shell was poured forth incessantly from our breastworks, the front infantry ranks doing the firing and the rear ones the loading. All the rebel reports speak of our fire as more fearful than any they had ever before witnessed. Only General Willich, with his usual impetuosity, sallied forth at the head of one of his regiments, and followed the retreating enemy for a mile, inflicting considerable loss on him. General Thomas himself did not think of striking a counterblow after the rebels' offensive had been repelled and disappeared from his front, for Breckinridge's rear attack had much shaken and confused his command, and, moreover, his supply of ammunition had grown short. But the danger to our left had now fully passed, and the rebels did not disturb it again till near the close of the day.

The struggle there had not wholly ceased when an all but fatal turn took place on our right. General Longstreet relates that he arranged the line of the left wing so that Stewart's division formed his right, followed by Bushrod Johnson's, Hood's, Hindman's, and Preston's divisions as the centre and left. Only three brigades of Hood's having arrived, Kershaw's and Humphrey's brigades of McLaws's division were also placed under his command. The divisions were formed with two brigades in the front and the others behind them in supporting distance. When the action on the Confederate right had been raging for some time, without any apparent progress, Longstreet grew anx-
ious, and sent an aide to General Bragg with an inquiry whether he had not better attack. Before the aide returned, Longstreet learned that the Commander-in-chief had already sent orders direct to his division commanders to advance. Thus all of Longstreet’s divisions got in motion except Preston’s, which remained in reserve on the extreme left. The rebel left was to achieve the success that had been denied to the right, and the stranger lieutenant-general from Virginia, who had not even yet seen most of the general officers and the troops now placed under his orders, snatched the laurels which the old commanders under Bragg had failed to pluck.

What occurred on our right during the fighting along Thomas’s front and up to the time that Longstreet moved to the attack, was as follows: Negley’s two remaining brigades were relieved from the front line by Wood’s division only at 9:30 A.M. Stanley’s brigade was sent quickly to the support of the left, and took an active part in the repulse of Breckinridge. Negley’s, with Sirwell’s, was stopped on the way to the left by an order from General Thomas to mass artillery on the elevations to the left and rear of Baird’s position. Negley did not properly comply with the order, but placed the guns so that they protected the extreme right under Brannan instead of the left.

The rebel pressure on Thomas being apparently very great and steadily increasing, General Rosecrans decided to make dispositions to hold the left at all hazards, and to go even to the length of withdrawing his right wholly behind it. The resolve was a risky one, as it involved the abandonment to the enemy of one of the two lines of communication with Chattanooga, viz., the Crawfish Springs and Chattanooga road. But Rosecrans believed that the whole rebel army was being hurled against Thomas, and did not dream that a mightier force than had assailed his left was about to fall upon his right. By a message dated 10:10 A.M., he notified General McCook of his intention, directing him to prepare at once for a withdrawal of the
right, and to be ready to send reinforcements to Thomas at a moment's warning. Twenty minutes later, another order was despatched to McCook requiring him to send two brigades of Sheridan's division immediately, and with all despatch, to support Thomas, and to let the third brigade follow as soon as the lines could be drawn in sufficiently. McCook received the two orders within six minutes of each other, and lost no time in executing them. Lytle's and Walworth's brigades were taken from the extreme right and started for the left at the double quick. After General Wood had moved to occupy Negley's position, and when Davis's division was ordered to the front, Van Cleve's was also moved forward twice by the direction of the General Commanding, for the better support of Wood and Davis. Sheridan's third brigade, under Colonel Laiboldt, was held in reserve to Davis.

General Rosecrans states in his report that one of Thomas's aides, who brought him a request for further help, informed him at the same time that Brannan was out of line and Reynolds's right thereby exposed. The aide was mistaken, as Brannan was really in echelon slightly in the rear of Reynolds's right; but the Commander-in-chief acted without further inquiry on the wrong information, and at once sent an aide on the gallop to General Wood with the following order: "September 20, 10:45 A.M.: The General Commanding directs that you close up on Reynolds as fast as possible and support him." The order was received at about eleven o'clock by Wood, who was then a short distance in the rear of the centre of his command, and he immediately proceeded to carry it out. General McCook was with him at the time, and must have received his own order to move Sheridan's brigade about the same time, shortly before or after. He says in his report that, simultaneously with the movement of Sheridan and much to his surprise, Wood's division left its position in the line. This naturally suggests the question why McCook did not make an effort to prevent the execution of the General-in-
chief's order to Wood if he considered it unwise and dangerous. He did nothing, and that unlucky order, to which the disaster to our army was unquestionably due, was literally obeyed. Brannan's division being between Wood and Reynolds, Wood, in order to close up on and support the latter as ordered, had to pass his command in rear of Brannan. Wood's withdrawal left a wide gap in our line, to fill which General Rosecrans gave no order, supposing that Wood was occupying the vacant space created by the assumed change of Brannan's position. Wood had requested McCook to make Davis close up to the left, and an attempt to do so was made, according to McCook, but could not and did not prevent the impending catastrophe.

Wood was diverted from his intended destination. Riding in advance of his brigade to find General Reynolds, he met General Thomas, after searching vainly for the former, told him of his order, and requested instructions as to how to place his command. The corps commander told him that Reynolds was not in need of support, but that Baird was. Wood then asked whether Thomas would take the responsibility of changing his order, to which the latter replied he would. Wood consented accordingly to go to the support of Baird, and asked for a staff officer to conduct him. He rode back with the aide to meet his command, but, on reaching them, "found," as he says in his report, "the valley south of them swarming with the enemy."

Thus it happened that General Longstreet advanced to attack our right when almost the whole of it was in motion for changes of position. There is great divergence in the statements of the official reports on both sides as to the time at which his column struck our line, but it seems correct to say that Stewart's division on his right collided first with Brannan's between eleven and half-past, and the other divisions quickly became engaged successively as they swung from the right as on a pivot to the left, and that before noon all were under fire. Stewart's right brigade under Brown moved forward simultaneously with S. A. M.
Wood’s brigade of Cleburne’s division on its left, followed by Clayton’s and Bate’s brigades. They pushed on for several hundred yards under a destructive fire, when Wood’s brigade broke in confusion and exposed Brown’s to an enfilading fire. The latter brigade continued on for a short distance, when its right gave way, but its left and centre, followed by Clayton and Bate, pressed on some hundreds of yards beyond the Chattanooga road, driving the Federals before them. Brown’s right had recoiled from Reynolds’s front. The other parts of Stewart’s command came upon Brannan’s division, striking it obliquely, and turning first its left, formed by Council’s brigade. After a brief resistance this brigade, as its commander says, “broke in confusion and fled to the rear.” The right brigade under Croxton was taken in flank and rear in consequence, and also driven off. Reynolds, learning that the troops to his right were yielding, sent a regiment to their support, but it also was involved in the flight. Stewart, however, found himself confronted by another force. General T. J. Wood, on discovering the rebels, as related, in the large open field behind him, at once sought to meet the emergency as best he could with the available part of his command. Hastening forward, he found that Colonel Harker, a brigade commander, had already been warned by one of Brannan’s staff of what had happened, but felt in doubt whether the approaching troops were foes or friends, as it seemed almost incredible that the enemy should suddenly turn up at that point. Riding forward to determine their character and being fired on, Harker went back and formed an east and west line directly in the way of the advancing rebels. This movement appears to have led Stewart to stop and fall back. He explains: “New batteries being opened by the enemy on our front and flank, heavily supported by infantry, it became necessary to retire the command, re-forming on the ground occupied before the advance.” The division was so crippled that it did not take part in the action again until just before its close.
According to Longstreet’s account, Hood’s division, followed by Bushrod Johnson’s, attacked next to Stewart’s; but Johnson claims, and no doubt correctly, that he led, followed by Hood’s (under Brigadier-General Law, Hood exercising command over both it and Johnson’s). The two divisions formed a broad column three lines deep, thus bringing great weight of numbers to bear. The moving mass hit our most vulnerable point. The direction of its advance led it accidentally to the gap in our line made by the withdrawal of T. J. Wood’s division. Passing the unoccupied breastworks of rails and logs, they fell a short distance beyond them upon Wood’s rear brigade, under Colonel Buell, as it was moving to the left. Colonel Buell thus narrates what befell him:

We had scarcely moved one brigade front when the shock came like an avalanche. My little brigade seemed to be instantly swept off the field. The greater portion of it was cut off from me and driven to the rear. My staff, who were executing orders at the time, were also cut off. The orderly carrying the headquarters flag was captured. Captain Estes succeeded in getting away in hot haste with the brigade battery to a position four hundred yards to the rear, from which he opened on the enemy, but the latter worked around to it and captured it after killing thirty-five of the horses.

Another of T. J. Wood’s batteries was also forced back without a chance to fire, but escaped without being able to rejoin the division.

Having made short work of Buell’s men, the attacking column directly caused further havoc. The Federal General Van Cleve, after his two advances towards the front, was finally ordered to the line of battle. His two brigades had moved but a short distance when another order reached them to hurry also to the relief of General Thomas. They were hastening in that direction when Buell’s men suddenly rushed over them in their pell-mell flight. Some batteries were also driven at full speed through their ranks,
breaking them up and wounding several men seriously. This threw the brigades into great confusion, and before order could be restored the rebels were upon them. Bushrod Johnson's column again worked like a wedge, splitting the brigades in two and scattering one to the left and one to the right. The rebel general gives this graphic description of the scenes that followed:

Our lines now emerged from the forest into open ground on the border of long, open fields, over which the enemy was retreating, under cover of several batteries, which were arranged along the crest of a ridge on our right and front, running up to the corner of a stubble-field, and one battery on our left and front posted on an elevation in the edge of the woods, just at the corner of a field near a peach orchard and southwest of Dyer's house. The scene now presented was unspeakably grand. The resolute and impetuous charge, the rush of our heavy columns sweeping out from the shadow and gloom of the forest into the open fields flooded with sunlight, the glitter of arms, the onward dash of artillery and mounted men, the retreat of the foe, the shouts of the hosts of our army, the dust, the smoke, the noise of firearms—of whistling balls and grape-shot and of bursting shell—made up a battle-scene of unsurpassed grandeur. Here General Hood gave me the last order I received from him on the field—"Go ahead, and keep ahead of everything." How this order was obeyed will be best determined by those who investigate all the details of this battle.

The unusual depth of our columns of attack in this part of the field, and the force and power with which it was thrown upon the enemy's line, had now completely broken and routed their centre, and cast the shattered fragments to the right and left. Everett's battery was here ordered into action on the right of Johnson's brigade, and opened upon the retreating foe while my line continued to advance.

There was now an interval of about 800 yards between Hindman's division, on my left, and my command. Johnson's brigade, on the left, bore but slightly to the right, its left regiment stretching across the road from Dyer's house to Crawfish [Springs] road and passing on both sides of the house. Gregg's brigade, in the centre, moved a little to the right, so as to flank and capture nine pieces of artillery on its right, posted on the ascent to the eminence
in the corner of the field north of Dyer's house. McNair's brigade, now somewhat in rear of the two left brigades, moved obliquely to the right and directly upon this eminence. *My line was here uncovered by Hood's division, which must have changed its direction to the right.*

At the moment Van Cleve was being overborne, General Crittenden was placing the corps artillery in a commanding position on a hill to the rear with several hundred yards of clear fields in front. Turning from the batteries to the troops, he was astounded to see sudden and unaccountable disorder among them. He says: "There was but little firing at this moment near the troops, and I was unable to account for the confusion. In a moment, however, the enemy had driven all before them, and I was cut off from my command, though not one hundred yards in rear and in full view, and also cut off from our army. Returning to the batteries, I found them without the support of a single company of infantry." All the support that came a little later were from sixty to seventy men, the small remainder of Van Cleve's command brought up by that unfortunate commander himself. Troops were seen advancing over the open ground before the artillery. Our guns held their fire at first, as there was doubt whether they were foes or friends, but opened vigorously upon them when, on coming nearer, the rebel uniforms and flags were recognized. General Crittenden rode off to find additional help. He had hardly left when the batteries were obliged to fly precipitately. The enemy had come close up to them; his severe fire killed many of the horses, and only fifteen of the twenty-six guns got away. General Van Cleve did not succeed in getting more of his men together, but the greater portion of three of his regiments which had been driven to the right soon rallied, and did more or less fighting in the afternoon under other commanders.

All this mischief was done by the right of Hood's column. Its left and Hindman's division wrought still greater havoc. By the marching off of T. J. Wood's and Sheridan's
brigades, Davis's division had become an isolated outpost, as it were, in its position a few hundred yards to the west of the Chattanooga road behind rude breastworks—a weak outpost, too, for the losses of the previous day had reduced his force to a little over twelve hundred effectives. Ordered by his corps commander to fill the gap left by Wood, he was just moving his left brigade for that purpose when he found himself enveloped on the front and flanks by the enemy. His men fired a few rounds, but, after a short resistance, were utterly overcome. He called on his support, Laiboldt's brigade of Sheridan's division, for help, but it too was overwhelmed before it could be brought into line. Indeed, Davis's own men fleeing through its ranks made it helpless. In very little time the three brigades were swept away in complete rout. Repeated attempts were made to rally them, but they could not be brought to a stand before they were far out of harm's way.

Sheridan's brigades succumbed to the same assailants, but only after more resistance. The brigades were moving at the double-quick to the left when Davis received the shock, and orders reached Sheridan from McCook to halt and form his command for action. Directly the enemy was upon him, his men being shot down while forming. The odds against him were too great, and he was forced back some hundreds of yards, when his men rallied and drove the rebels back to Laiboldt's position before the attack. They even captured rebel colors and a number of prisoners. But they came upon the strong rebel reserves, and were forced back in turn beyond their starting-point. Sheridan's struggle was altogether with the division of Hindman, who claims to have captured in this attack eleven hundred prisoners (including three colonels), seventeen pieces of artillery, and six flags. General Lytle, one of Sheridan's brigade commanders, lost his life in the contest.

These rebel successes were achieved in less than an hour, by noon, and with relatively little loss in killed and
wounded. General Hood, however, had his hip shattered by a bullet, and was supposed to be mortally wounded, but recovered with the loss of a leg. Bushrod Johnson assumed command in his place. Our eight overwhelmed brigades—one of T. J. Wood’s, two of Van Cleve’s, two of Davis’s, and three of Sheridan’s, almost the equivalent of two divisions—were not only swept off the field, but carried in such a direction and to such a distance as to withdraw them entirely from the struggle. They were forced both off the Lafayette and Chattanooga road which formed the means of communication between them and our left, and out of the valley of the Chickamauga into the valley of the Chattanooga, so that Missionary Ridge became a barrier between them and the remainder of the army. Buell’s, Van Cleve’s, and Davis’s men got all mixed up, and made off in confused swarms. Sheridan, after being pushed back, re-formed his brigades on a ridge overlooking the scene of his fight; but, when he ascertained that all our troops to his left had disappeared, and that the enemy was between him and General Thomas, he determined to make an attempt to recover connection with the latter by marching his command on the arc of a circle over the hills of the so-called Dry Valley road, and by it to the Crawfish Springs road, and thence over Missionary Ridge to our lines. He was obliged to disencumber himself of twenty-four guns and forty-six caissons which he had found abandoned by other organizations and scattered promiscuously over the ground.

Colonel Wilder, with his brigade of mounted infantry, which had been guarding our right flank while moving to the left in the wake of Sheridan, struck the extreme left of the column assailing the latter, and succeeded in checking and driving it back, capturing two guns. He remained on the ground, and had another successful encounter with the enemy in the course of the afternoon. He took position on the outrunners of Missionary Ridge and held it till 4 P.M., although he was repeatedly advised by superior
officers to fall back to the passes of Lookout Mountain. He then retreated unmolested to the Chattanooga Valley, bringing off with him a large number of stragglers, many ammunition wagons, caissons, ambulances, and stray beef cattle. The record of the brigade is worth mentioning as that of almost the only unit of our army fighting by itself and coming off successfully.

The impetus of victory had carried the rebels in the wake of the fugitive Federals up and down and again up the group of hills intervening between the Lafayette and Chattanooga and the Crawfish Springs and Chattanooga roads. They gathered up many spoils on the way—guns, caissons, small arms, piles of knapsacks and tents. With Bushrod Johnson's division still in the lead, they reached the crest commanding the gap through which the last-mentioned road passes into the valley of Chattanooga Creek, and in which they discovered some of our retreating trains. They managed to send some shot and shell among the wagons, producing a panic among the drivers, who abandoned their charge to save themselves. Some more guns moving with the trains also fell into their hands. By thus pushing vigorously after our shattered troops, Johnson made it impossible to rally any of Davis's men before they reached McFarland's Gap and Farm on the Crawfish Springs road, between two and three miles from Rossville. He also prevented Sheridan from rejoining Thomas, as he had planned, and compelled him to march nearly five miles down to Rossville, whence he marched south for four miles over the Lafayette road, but did not reach the front again. Davis succeeded in collecting at McFarland's between twenty-five hundred and three thousand of his own command and of Wood's and Van Cleve's men, whom he led back late in the afternoon by the cross-road towards the battle-front. On arriving near it, he was ordered to fall back to Rossville.

The dispersal of our right had another momentous consequence. The Commander-in-chief found himself sud-
denly isolated from every part of the army. He describes his misfortune as follows:

At the moment of the repulse of Davis’s division, I was standing in rear of his right, waiting the completion of the closing of McCook’s corps to the left. Seeing confusion among Van Cleve’s troops, and the distance Davis’s men were falling back, and the tide of battle surging towards us, the urgency for Sheridan’s troops to intervene became imminent, and I hastened in person to the extreme right to direct Sheridan’s movement on the flank of the advancing enemy. It was too late. The crowd of returning troops rolled back and the enemy advanced. Giving the troops directions to rally behind the ridge west of the Dry Valley road, I passed down it, accompanied by General Garfield, Major McMichael, Major Bond and Captain Young of my staff and a few of my escort under a shower of grape, canister and musketry for two or three hundred yards, and attempted to rejoin General Thomas and the troops sent to his support by passing to the rear of the broken portion of our lines, but found the routed troops far towards the left, and, hearing the enemy’s advancing musketry and cheers, I became doubtful whether the left had held its ground, and started for Rossville.

In other words, the Commanding General, without an attempt to ascertain the real condition of the left, as in duty and in honor bound, himself magnified the doubt he felt regarding it into the assumption that total defeat had already overtaken the army, and, giving up all thought of further resistance, rode off with a squad of followers, leaving his command to its fate. He put, as we shall see, not only the four miles to Rossville, but the eight to Chattanooga, between himself and his soldiers. This act cost him the loss of his command and irretrievably blotted his record.

General Crittenden became a like victim of the disaster. He tried to find support for his corps batteries, and, when they had been driven off, remained with a small force of about one hundred men on an adjacent hill. After vainly waiting for some time for tidings, the fear seized him that Generals Rosecrans, McCook, Sheridan, and Davis had
all fallen into the hands of the enemy. No other course seemed to be open to him than to leave the field and to find his way if possible to Rossville. He does not claim to have been cut off from Thomas, but he no doubt was. Riding over the hills, he reached the Rossville road, which he found filled all the way with soldiers, cannon, caissons, and trains. Before reaching Rossville, he learned that General Rosecrans had not been captured, but had gone to Chattanooga, and he determined to follow him there. He should at least have tried, like Davis and Sheridan, to return to the front when he heard, as he did, that Thomas was still fighting. It is true that he was left entirely without command by the orders of Rosecrans transferring Palmer’s division on the first day, and Wood’s and Van Cleve’s on the second, to Thomas, and therefore he cannot be accused of deserting his command; still, he was riding away from instead of towards his divisions. For this he had to atone grievously.

General McCook was a third victim. He met Davis, while he was being driven back, and exerted himself to rally his troops, but without avail. He followed the division commander, and instructed him regarding his further retreat, and then set out to find General Rosecrans, but failed to discover him. He got the impression that our left was also beaten, and, learning from one of General Crittenden’s staff that the latter had gone to Chattanooga, he decided to go there also. Had he remained with Davis to the last, he would have had opportunity, in the course of the afternoon, to fall in again with Sheridan’s division and resume command over it. It was a strange fatality, indeed, that thus led the General-in-chief and two of the three corps commanders separately back to Chattanooga, as if fugitives from the battle-field, accompanied by mere squads of followers. All three were in ignorance of each other’s fate when they turned their backs upon the scene of the struggle. All three believed that the whole army was utterly beaten and shattered, and the bulk of it de-
stroyed or captured. It is easy to imagine the deep distress of mind which must have harassed them on that unlucky ride.

General Thomas was as ignorant of what had befallen his superior and his fellow corps commanders and their troops as they were of his condition at the time of and after the rout of the right. But he was made to feel the effect of it by the sudden threatening of his right rear before Breckinridge’s brigades had been fully beaten back from his left rear. He states in his report that, hearing heavy firing to his right and rear at about 2 p.m.—he must have been mistaken in the hour, or it is misprinted in the Official Records, as a score of witnesses testify that the crisis occurred much earlier—he rode in that direction to ascertain the cause. On the way he met one of his staff, whom he had sent to hurry up Sheridan’s brigades, who reported that, in attempting to reach them, he had met a large force moving with a line of skirmishers in front who fired on him and compelled him to return. The aide had also encountered Brigade-Commander Harker when the latter was yet uncertain whether the body in sight was a hostile or a friendly one. Thomas thereupon at once sought Harker to instruct him to fire on the approaching line if he was fired on, and was not long in verifying the portentous discovery that the enemy had gained his right rear, and was already behind Reynolds. The duty now devolved upon him to direct during the afternoon as determined a resistance to the rebel efforts to overcome his right as he had offered in the forenoon on the left. While his failure to hear anything from the Commander-in-chief and from the rest of the army made him apprehend that something serious had occurred beyond his right, hours elapsed before he clearly understood that he was fighting alone for the honor and safety of the army.

Bushrod Johnson’s leading column had moved forward all but due west so fast that the division behind it under Law lost sight of it and became diverted in a northwest-
erly direction. This led it obliquely towards Harker’s brigade and part of Buell’s, the remnant of the division of General T. J. Wood to which he had returned after discovering the enemy behind him. As the advancing rebels threatened his right flank, Wood retired his command to a narrow and short spur shooting out nearly due east and west at right angles from the main Missionary Ridge. The ridge fell off abruptly to the south, thus forming a strong and commanding position. When Brannan’s two brigades were driven off in confusion by Stewart’s division, he managed to rally a small number of his men about half a mile to the west on the hills from which the ridge occupied by Wood’s troops extended. He and his staff and other officers succeeded also, by strenuous efforts, in gathering up and getting into line some hundreds of stragglers from various organizations. Wood effected connection by his right with Brannan’s left, which was barely done when the Confederates delivered the first of the vehement onslaughts upon them which they attempted one after another in the course of the afternoon.

The heights constituting the southern outrunners of Missionary Ridge were the scene of the new conflict. They extend from a short distance west of the Lafayette road for about a mile to the Crawfish Springs road. They rise to a height of one hundred feet, and have a gentle, but irregular and spurring slope to the south and east, and were then covered with open woods. Their southeastern parts were within the boundaries of a farm belonging to one Snodgrass, and hence locally known as “Snodgrass Hill,” as which it appears in the records of both sides. The struggle now ensuing was for the possession of it, from which the enemy would have commanded the rear of Thomas’s line as well as the Lafayette road, the only line of retreat left to us. The lines of Wood and Brannan on these elevations formed a curve having almost the shape of a horseshoe, which gave our troops an enfilading and plunging fire upon the assailing enemy.
The chance-medley of troops hardly aggregated one thousand officers and men, an entirely inadequate number for the defence of the "horseshoe"; but they were gradually succored, after the beginning of the desperate wrestle, by the second brigade and one regiment of the third brigade of Negley's division, and also by Brannan's third brigade under Colonel Van Derveer, who, after taking a decisive part in repelling Breckinridge's division, had been led by the rising roar of battle on Snodgrass Hill to march of his own accord to the relief of his division commander. But even these reinforcements increased the defenders by only about fifteen hundred, and would have left their total less than one-fifth of the number Longstreet could bring against them. These overwhelming odds would doubtless have overpowered them in one of the early rebel onsets, had not, luckily, further aid come in time by the appearance upon the scene of General Granger, with the greater part of the reserve corps. Granger had been charged with guarding the lower crossings of the Chickamauga and the road from Ringgold to Chattanooga. He had heard the heavy firing in the direction of the army from 10:30 A.M., and, after listening to its swelling intensity for some time with growing anxiety, he determined to hurry to the front as quickly as possible without waiting for a call. In this, as General Rosecrans well says of him, he followed "the instinct of a true soldier." Leaving Colonel McCook's brigade to watch the Ringgold road, he started with General Whitaker's and Colonel Mitchell's brigades, and two additional regiments under the direct command of Major-General Steedman, soon after eleven o'clock. The force represented a total of thirty-seven hundred officers and men. After marching about two miles, he was suddenly fired upon by rebel skirmishers and a section of artillery. It was part of Forrest's cavalry which was guarding the rebel right. Granger stopped long enough to brush them aside, but moved on, after satisfying himself that they were only a small body and ordering up McCook's brigade
to keep the Lafayette road open between that point and the front. He reported to General Thomas for orders at 1:30 p.m. (according to Steedman), and naturally received a most grateful welcome. He was directed to go into position on the right of Brannan, which he did with alacrity. As we shall see, he was in the nick of time to prevent an attempt of the enemy to attack the "horseshoe" on the right flank and rear.

General Negley performed a different part at this stage of the battle, which subjected him to much and severe animadversion. He was charged with nothing less than marching off his command from the battle-field shortly after noon without orders. It appears that while he was moving in the forenoon to the relief of Baird's division, General Thomas had ordered him to concentrate all the artillery that could be spared from the line, with strong infantry supports, on a point of Missionary Ridge commanding the ground to the left and rear of Baird. Misunderstanding this order, he had occupied a hill some distance to the north of Snodgrass Hill, and nearly in the rear of Reynolds, with three batteries and Sirwell's brigade, which rendered effective service in checking Breckinridge's movement to our rear. Upon the rout of the right, swarms of runaways came up the ravines and over the ridge to his position, and several batteries from the broken divisions joined those already there. Negley and a number of other officers exerted themselves to rally the retreating troops for the protection of the artillery, but, as a staff officer describes it: "As soon as the detachments formed of them and brought to the front heard the sound of the enemy's muskets, they disappeared like smoke. All these scattered troops were soon gone." Finding it impossible to stop the fleeing troops, and unable to communicate with General Thomas, Negley deemed it his duty to secure the safety of the artillery, which was threatened with immediate capture by a large force of the enemy, and, accordingly, marched off with the guns and infantry to Me-
Farland's Gap within two miles of Rossville. His retreat led to direct imputations of misconduct on his part by Generals Brannan and Wood in their official reports.

Meanwhile, on the rebel left, after the brushing away of our right and before the assaults on the "horseshoe," Bushrod Johnson, who had occupied the elevation commanding the defile of the Crawfish Springs and Chattanooga roads and captured our trains, found himself separated from the other Confederate troops both on the right and left, and far in advance of them. He observed, too, the gathering of Federal batteries on Snodgrass Hill, which dominated his position, and therefore decided to halt until he was reinforced. He sent one of his staff to General Longstreet to report his situation, and to ask for infantry and artillery, and at the same time also despatched aides in other directions for help. None appearing for some time, he galloped off himself in search of assistance. After riding some distance to the right and rear, he came upon General Hindman, escorted by his staff officers. They first had to settle the question of rank between them, Johnson having learned only just before their meeting of the disablement of General Hood. Hindman was recognized as the superior in rank by virtue of his seniority, and ordered at once Anderson's and Deas's brigades to the support of Johnson, who then returned to his command.

Pending the arrival of the expected reinforcements, Johnson ordered one of his batteries to open fire upon the rear of the Federal position on the "horseshoe," which was about six hundred yards to his right. Having vainly waited for some time for the promised brigades, he grew restive and resolved to advance without them. He formed his line facing to the north and almost perpendicular to the Lafayette road, with Johnson's brigade on the left and Gregg's on the right. He was just getting in motion when Deas's and Anderson's brigades reported, followed by the third brigade of Hindman's division under Manigault. This and Deas's were brought into position on the left
and Anderson on the right of Johnson, under whose immediate orders all the five brigades fought, although Hindman exercised superior command over them and Kershaw’s and Humphrey’s brigades, which were brought into connection with the line of attack on the right of Anderson. McNair’s brigade, which had got astray, was also brought up in time in the rear of Johnson.

It being reported to Hindman that a force was trying to work around his left, he erroneously assumed that they were the same troops who were driven off by him and Johnson (indeed, neither he nor any other rebel general knew the extent of the havoc they had inflicted), but had been rallied and brought back to the field. Apprehensive of an attack in the rear, he sent to Generals Longstreet and Buckner for help, and, at the same time, ordered a vigorous general attack. The brigades of the centre and left were to wheel to the right until faced east, and then to advance against the enemy’s flank. Anderson and Kershaw, as the pivot, were to stand still till the firing commenced to their left, and then also to advance. Hindman felt confident that this movement would drive the remnants of the Federal army upon the rebel right, thereby insuring their capture or destruction. According to him, it did not commence till 3:30 P.M., but in other reports an earlier hour is mentioned. His appeal and Bushrod Johnson’s previous one for assistance failed to bring it. General Longstreet, who did not deem it safe to weaken any part of his line, nor prudent to draw so early on his reserve (Preston’s division) for that purpose, applied to General Bragg for troops from the right wing. He was answered that the latter had been beaten back so badly that they could be of no service to him, from which the commander of the left deduced that the discomfiture of the rebel right had been just as great as that of the Federal right, and that the fate of the day was depending on him and his command.

Bushrod Johnson’s wheeling movement commenced un-
der the protection of artillery fire upon the "horseshoe," and brought the rebel line within range of our musketry within a few minutes. It advanced determinedly up the slope, firing volley after volley, towards the crest for the defence of which Steedman's division had just hurriedly formed. Steedman boldly delivered a counter-attack upon the approaching enemy. Gallantly seizing a regimental flag, he led his men forward. With defiant shouts they rushed upon the foe, and, after a desperate conflict of twenty minutes, drove him back in confusion and gained a good advanced position. Johnson admits in his report that Deas's and Anderson's brigades and all but two regiments of Manigault's suffered so severely that they did not again participate in the action. He says further that the retreat of his whole line was precipitate, and that it required all the exertions he could make, joined to the "appeals, commands, and physical efforts" of the officers, to prevent the abandonment of the hill from which his troops had started, and of the artillery firing from it. He claims that these batteries checked our attack. The slaughter on both sides was terrible, especially among officers. The feat of Steedman's men was the more creditable as most of them had never been under fire before.

Kershaw's brigade, forming with Anderson's the pivot of the wheel, also came to the attack on the right simultaneously with Johnson's. They had been previously engaged and gained some ground, but found themselves compelled to fall back. Advancing again, they soon became exposed by the repulse of Anderson's brigade on their left. Kershaw claims that he not only stopped the Federals, but drove them with three of his regiments and the Anderson reserve regiments "pell-mell," and that he "followed them to the top of the hill, the Second South Carolina reaching even the crest." But he adds that the commander of the last-mentioned regiment, finding that the troops on his left had fallen back to their former position, was reluctantly obliged to retreat also. Longstreet refers to this part of
the action as follows: "Kershaw made a most handsome attack upon the heights at the Snodgrass house, simultaneously with Johnson and Hindman, but was not strong enough for the work."

The rebel attempts to capture the "horseshoe" were directed both against the left and the front of it, and were repelled from the latter only by the firm resistance of Wood's and Brannan's commands. These did not attack in return, but confined themselves strictly to the defensive. Anderson's brigade recoiled from them in a shattered condition, and they foiled Kershaw's onset, which the defenders describe as extremely determined. But our men fought from the shelter afforded by the rampart-like crest, overwhelming the advancing enemy by their continuous volleys.

General Thomas had established his headquarters at the Snodgrass house, from which he directed the course of the action during the remainder of the afternoon. He was made very anxious before the arrival of General Granger, on account of the short ammunition of his men, as, by somebody's unauthorized orders—the name of the guilty party is not mentioned in the reports—the ammunition-trains had been ordered back. There were not more than two or three rounds to the man left when a partial supply was obtained from the train following Steedman's division, giving an average of ten rounds per head. At half-past three Thomas received, for the first time, authentic intelligence of the full extent and consequences of the disaster to our right—four hours after it had happened!—by the arrival of General Garfield, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Thurston, General McCook's assistant adjutant-general, and two of his own staff.

The chief of staff and his companions had made their way back to the front, following roads part of the way, but cutting right through the woods over Missionary Ridge the greater part, urging their animals to the utmost speed, with the sounds of battle for their guidance. Once
they rode right upon a party of the enemy, who fired upon them, and they narrowly escaped death or capture. General Garfield had followed the Commander-in-chief as far as Rossville. During the ride to that point past the re-treating soldiery, artillery, and trains of every sort, grave and quickly growing doubts rose in his mind and pricked his conscience (I heard the story from his own lips in Chattanooga, within a fortnight after the battle) regarding the official and personal propriety of his chief's and his own conduct in turning their backs upon the battle-field, and going a long distance from it without any knowledge of the fate of the greater portion of the army, and without any earnest effort to ascertain it. He expressed this feeling to his superior, with the suggestion that they proceed no further than Rossville and try to learn something definite about Thomas, and he offered to go himself in search of reliable information. General Rosecrans at first objected to both recommendations, but finally yielded to the chief of staff's urgent plea for permission to set out in quest of Thomas. Garfield's success in reaching the front proved that communication with Thomas was possible. As General Wood expresses it pointedly in his report: "He showed thereby that the road was open to all who might choose to follow it where duty called." But still stronger proof lay in the fact that the two aides of Thomas, who came with Garfield, led back with them one of the missing ammunition-trains which they had overtaken far to the rear. Garfield's ride has been commemorated perhaps more than it deserved in both prose and poetry.

His tale of Rosecrans's escape and the sorry plight of the rest of the army was hardly apt to inspire General Thomas with greater confidence in his ability to save the fortunes of the day. But that stern character was not daunted by it, and resolved to hold his ground to the last. Shortly after Garfield's appearance, instructions from General Rosecrans, dated Chattanooga, 4:15 P.M., reached Thomas over the field telegraph (thus demonstrating how easy it really
was to communicate with the front), instructing him "to assume command of all the forces, and with Crittenden and McCook take a strong position and assume a threatening attitude at Rossville. Send all the unorganized force to this place for reorganization." This was virtually an order to leave the field to the enemy and retreat. Neither General Thomas nor the chief of staff thought such a course necessary. The latter, in his first report of Thomas's condition to Roseerans, dated 3:45 p.m., indicated this and even said: "I think we may in the main retrieve our morning disaster." But the order was not modified, and so Thomas had to obey it. He determined, however, to hold the position until nightfall. The fresh supply of ammunition was distributed as quickly as possible. Our line was strengthened by moving in Hazen's brigade, which was the only one left with full cartridge-boxes, from Palmer's front between Reynolds's right and Wood's left. The expectation that the enemy would renew his attacks was fulfilled directly.

General Longstreet had kept his reserve division under Preston inactive notwithstanding the repeated requests from his sub-commanders for assistance. But, upon the failure of the general assault upon the Federal position, he decided to respond to a further pressing demand from Hindman. Indeed, having satisfied himself by personal observation that to gain the Snodgrass heights would make him complete master of the field, he resolved upon a supreme effort to take them, and sent orders to General Buckner to move Preston to the attack. The latter first led Gracie's and Kelly's brigades forward, his third one under Trigg being kept back to meet an apprehended cavalry attack against the left and rear. In support of the advance, Buckner ordered the reserve artillery of his corps to a commanding position, from which the eleven pieces opened a heavy, continuous fire upon the hills. Preston's men passed through the discomfited lines of Anderson and Kershaw. The two brigades were to
form beyond them for a joint attack, but Gracie in the lead followed directions from Kershaw to push on, and directly received a withering musketry fire from the "horsehoe." Still, he moved on to the base of the hills and then made a rush up the nearest spur. The Second Alabama actually gained the height. There the brigade was checked by our infantry fire, suffering terrible losses. The Second Alabama went in with 239 officers and men and lost 169. Its flag was pierced eighty-three times. Gracie contended against Granger's command. Kelly's brigade followed in about ten minutes, and, bearing more to the right, attacked Brannan and Wood. He became at once as hotly engaged as Gracie, and also gained a lodgment on the outrunners of the hills. But both he and Gracie found themselves so severely pressed that they sent word to the division commander that they could not maintain themselves without reinforcements. Trigg's brigade was thereupon hurried up, one of its regiments going to the support of Gracie and the remainder making a fresh attack to the left of Kelly. At the same time, by order of General Longstreet, Stewart's division resumed action after hours of passivity, and advanced to the right of Kelly.

As Longstreet himself admits that Preston's attack was not a success, the claim of all the commanders of the defenders of the "horseshoe" that they maintained their position even against these last rebel onsets, deserves credit. The truth was, doubtless, that the enemy won some elevated ground held by our skirmishers in front and on the flanks, but did not actually penetrate our main line. But our leaders agree that the onslaughs upon them were made with extraordinary energy and bravery. General Wood states that the attack last referred to brought on the most terrific musketry duel, the fierce, continued roar of which inspired a sentiment of grandeur in which the awful and sublime were intermingled. Our front line advanced to the crest of the ridge, and delivered their fire by volleys at the command, and then retired a few paces to
reload, while the rear line took its turn in firing, thus keeping up a rain of missiles upon the enemy. Colonel Harker says that he never before witnessed so grand an example of effective musketry. General Granger speaks of our line being continually enveloped in smoke and fire. His men, in the end, got out of ammunition and had only their bayonets with which to repel the foe. Our troops were encouraged and cheered by the presence of Generals Thomas and Garfield under fire. The latter remained till the close of the action with Harker’s brigade, his own former command, sustaining the spirits of rank and file by animating words and acts.

Before five o’clock, General Thomas notified the division commanders through a staff officer to prepare to withdraw their commands from the field as soon as they received formal orders to that effect. These preparations meant the drawing in of the picket lines and their reserves, and could be carried out on our left only where the enemy had abstained from offensive movements since the forenoon. Not long before, General Bragg had concluded to second indirectly the final effort of Longstreet by a new general attack with his left, and sent orders to General Polk to press forward at once with his whole line. There was considerable delay in distributing corresponding orders to the corps and division commanders under Polk, and it was near dusk before they were carried out. The line of attack was formed with Liddell’s division on the right, and next Gist’s, Breckinridge’s, Cleburne’s, and Cheatham’s respectively. It so happened that, in the meantime, further orders to begin the withdrawal had been sent to the division commanders Reynolds, Palmer, Johnson and Baird, and their execution was just commencing when Polk’s columns advanced. Reynolds withdrew first, and General Thomas left Wood’s rear to direct Reynolds to a proper position to cover the retirement of the other troops from the left. On the way he received warning that a rebel column was advancing perpendicularly upon Reynolds, and
reached the latter in time to prevent his surprise and the loss of the line of retreat. Turchin’s brigade threw itself upon the approaching rebels, and routed and drove them beyond Baird’s left, with the loss of over two hundred prisoners. It was Liddell’s division that received this staggering blow. Reynolds’s division was then so posted to the east of the Chattanooga road as to form a curtain, as it were, behind which the retreat might be effected, it was hoped, without molestation; but it turned out otherwise.

Palmer was to move away first, Johnson next, and Baird last. The rebel attack struck them, however, before they could get out of reach. As in the morning, Baird was involved first and worst. He describes the onset as more violent than that of the morning. Three batteries opened upon him, while the rebel infantry pushed on towards him. He held fast to his position for a time, as it seemed to him safer to remain than to fall back with the enemy upon him; then, seeing the troops of Palmer and Johnson moving off, he attempted to follow suit. But he was pressed so closely that many of his men were struck down, while a large portion of the remainder became disordered, and saved themselves in separate squads, or, in the confusion, ran into the enemy’s lines. Johnson asserts that he was appealed to personally by Baird, and that he sent Willich to his support, and that the latter’s brigade charged the enemy “and drove them back with terrible slaughter.” Strange to say, Baird makes no mention whatever of this alleged incident. Johnson further relates that, as his front was already attacked when he received the order to withdraw, he sent a staff officer to tell General Thomas that he supposed the general was under the impression, when he gave the order, that all was quiet on his front, whereas he was so fearfully assailed that a retreat might prove disastrous. Before the staff officer’s return, however, the withdrawal of Palmer, followed by a hostile body, exposed Johnson’s flank so that he felt obliged to retire also, barely saving his command
from complete destruction. He gives credit to his reserve brigade under Willich for having saved the troops from annihilation and capture by being able to "engage the enemy in four different directions," but makes the disgraceful confession that he neglected to send an order to withdraw to the gallant brigadier, who, however, took good care of himself and others.

Palmer also suffered in his retreat. He supposed that he was to retire only some distance to another position in the rear of the centre and there to re-form for further resistance. His men had moved but a few hundred yards when the rebels rushed over the abandoned breastworks, and, in a few moments, opened upon them with artillery from right and left and small arms from the rear. It was almost impossible under such severe fire to preserve the formations. Grose's brigade became disordered, but the remainder got off in better shape, and the loss of the division was not great. Palmer halted and formed his command beyond range so as to constitute a rallying-point for the large crowds of stragglers which came up with him. His order did not direct him to what point to fall back, but, after waiting until night had set in, he started of his own accord for Rossville.

It was Stewart's division which, in advancing, had come upon and passed over the breastworks abandoned by Reynolds and then chased Palmer and made captures from him. His men joined the divisions of the Confederate right in making hill and dale ring with the frantic yells of joy over the apparent ease with which they had now carried the position against which they had vainly butted with heavy loss in the morning. The rebels did not discover, indeed, that Thomas was in retreat, but all thought that they had driven him off to another position. As dusk had set in, and the different parts of Polk's command had become much mixed up in pressing after our troops, and there was danger of their mistaking each other for enemies after dark, they were brought to a halt all along their line.
The rebel offensive in front of Brannan, Wood, and Granger by the command of Hindman and Buckner also ceased as the shades of evening descended upon the field. But the defenders of the "horseshoe" were made to hold their position until after the left had been withdrawn. Thomas sent orders to retire to the three generals simultaneously, but they do not agree as to the time at which they did so. Brannan says he withdrew "soon after sunset," while both Wood and Granger give seven o'clock as the hour when they received the order. Fortunately, moonlight facilitated the retreat towards Rossville. It was effected by Brannan and Wood without disturbance from the enemy, but Granger fared worse. By a most culpable negligence, three regiments of Whitaker's brigade did not receive notice to withdraw, and found themselves suddenly enveloped by the two rebel brigades of Trigg and Kelly, and were compelled to surrender almost bodily with all their field officers and flags.

Our several columns reached the vicinity of Rossville before ten o'clock, with the exception of Generals Reynolds and Willich, whom General Thomas had directed to protect the rear with their commands, and who remained in position in the field till the last of the other bodies had passed, and did not get into bivouacs before midnight. General Thomas, accompanied by Generals Garfield and Granger, had ridden in advance (in compliance with the Commander-in-chief's order to assume a "threatening attitude"), to select as good a position commanding the approaches to the town as could be found in the night and in the early morning. This the troops occupied as they arrived.

The enemy remained in entire ignorance of our retreat during the night. None of the rebel commanders was aware, indeed, of the extent of their success before the next day. General Bragg telegraphed cautiously in the evening to Richmond that, "after two days' hard fighting, we have driven the enemy, after a desperate resistance, from several positions and now hold the field, but he still confronts us. The losses are heavy on both sides, especially in our officers."
We have taken over twenty pieces of artillery and some 2500 prisoners." The secession Governor Isham G. Harris, one of the bitterest rebels (he died in 1897, a United States Senator), who was with Bragg, wired at the same time to a newspaper: "After two days' fighting, we succeeded in driving the enemy from his positions. The engagement not yet decisive." General Bragg was even led to believe, from alleged indications of movements in his front, that his foes were making dispositions for a renewal of the conflict in the morning. He was not at all anxious for this, "with his troops exhausted," to quote from his report, "by two days' battle, and with very limited supplies of provisions and almost destitute of water"; and the news of our disappearance must have been most welcome to him. He heard it first, while riding early in the morning towards Polk's headquarters, from General Liddell, whose pickets had discovered at dawn and reported that there were no signs of the Federals. He immediately gave orders to send out skirmishers along the whole line and move all the cavalry to the front. The rebel left still believed in the presence of our army when Bragg's aides reached it with these orders. The reconnoitring of the cavalry soon brought confirmation of the contrary. It was only then that Bragg dared to claim a "complete victory" in a second despatch to the rebel War Department. But he felt too weak for immediate pursuit. Having an aggregate loss of nearly fifty per cent. of his effective strength, including a very large percentage of officers, and considering the disorganization of the remainder, he felt that it would be reckless and disastrous to follow the enemy immediately and attack him in the entrenchments at Chattanooga, to which he supposed we had at once fallen back. His judgment was doubtless correct. His army certainly needed at least a short respite for rest and reorganization and replenishment of supplies. But his decision to remain quiet was, as will be seen, the beginning, so to speak, of his downfall.
General Rosecrans continued his mournful ride from Rossville to Chattanooga in gloomiest despondency, as I learned afterwards from his companions, for he was still under the impression that the whole army had been overwhelmed. He reached the town about 4 P.M., and established his headquarters in the building occupied by General Wagner, the post commander. Within half an hour of his arrival, both General McCook and General Crittenden rode into the place separately and reported to the Commander-in-chief for orders. McCook, accompanied by General Morton, Chief-Engineer, and three aides-de-camp, had been conducted by a guide over by-roads without meeting any of our troops until he struck the main road within less than two miles of Chattanooga. Here he met a force under command of General Spears on its way to Rossville by order of General Rosecrans to render what assistance it could to the army. The whereabouts of the Commanding General in town being thus ascertained, McCook galloped on. Crittenden had stopped a short time at Rossville to make inquiries regarding his command and General Rosecrans. He failed to get any reliable information regarding the former, but, learning from some staff officers of Rosecrans's presence in Chattanooga, he pushed on as fast as possible.

The two corps commanders had not been long with the General-in-chief when the first report from General Garfield was received. It was the first intelligence that had reached General Rosecrans that Thomas had not succumbed, but was still holding the enemy at bay. The chief of staff said in the same message: "Granger thinks we can defeat them badly to-morrow if all our forces come in. I think you had better come to Rossville to-night and bring ammunition." Notwithstanding this appeal, General Rosecrans not only did not himself act on this suggestion to return to the front, but remained in Chattanooga, and did not even send Generals McCook and Crittenden back. He told them to get some rest, which they both did.
Immediately after hearing from General Garfield, the Commanding General sent the first telegraphic report of the day’s events to Washington. He wired: “We have met with a serious disaster. Extent not yet ascertained. Enemy overwhelmed us, drove our right, pierced our centre and scattered troops there. Thomas, who had seven divisions, remained intact at last news.” This was a sorry sequel to his report of the first day’s battle, which had closed with these words: “By the blessing of Providence, the defeat of the enemy will be total to-morrow.” Far worse tidings had already reached the national authorities in the frantic, terror-stricken messages to the Secretary of War of Charles A. Dana, whom Mr. Stanton had chosen as one of his assistants, in reward really for the “vigorous editorial championship” of the Secretary after Dana had quarrelled with Horace Greeley and resigned as managing editor of the Tribune. Dana was sent on a roving mission to visit the different armies in the West, and report confidentially to the Secretary upon their condition, as well as his own opinions of their commanders and the leading generals under them. His part was something like that of the committees which the Convention in the first French Revolution kept at the headquarters of the armies in the field. He had joined Rosecrans on the 11th of September, and was with him in the battle, but became separated from him on the 20th, when the rebels broke our right. He fled back to Chattanooga, reaching there earlier than Rosecrans, and telegraphed at once under the impression of the rout of McCook’s and Crittenden’s troops, and without any knowledge of Thomas’s successful resistance in the afternoon, and on the assumption that the whole army was defeated when he left the field. His report commenced, “My report to-day is of deplorable importance. Chickamauga is as fatal a name as Bull Run,” and contained these passages: “Our troops turned and fled. It was wholesale panic. Vain were all attempts to rally them.” “Our wounded are all left behind, some 6000 in number.
We have lost heavily in killed to-day. The total of our killed, wounded, and prisoners can hardly be less than 20,000, and may be much more." "Enemy not yet arrived before Chattanooga." The official reporter of the War Department went to sleep directly after this performance and did not learn of Garfield's report until 8 p.m., when he was obliged, in a second despatch, to modify the alarming fictions born of his fright, as follows: "My report proves to have given too dark a picture. Having been myself swept bodily off the battle-field by the panic-stricken rabble of Davis's and Sheridan's divisions, my own impressions were naturally colored by the aspect of that of the field." What a confession! Then he gives a pretty correct account of the course of the action, but adds: "The latest report from Thomas is that he was driving back the enemy." He also overestimated the strength of the enemy at 70,000.

At 8:40 p.m., Garfield sent another summary of the events of the afternoon to General Rosecrans from Rossville, in which he expressed more favorable and hopeful views of the result than the facts warranted, using such language as this: "Longstreet's Virginians have got their bellies full." "I believe we can whip them to-morrow and crown the battle with victory." "Granger regards them as thoroughly whipped to-night." He added: "I hope you will not budge an inch from this position, but come up early in the morning, and, if the rebs try it on, accommodate them." Rosecrans answered that he liked his suggestions, but did not respond to his second appeal to come to Rossville any more than to the first. Nor was a third more successful which Garfield made five hours later in these words: "I hope you will get here as soon as possible to organize the army and victory before the storm sets in." The General Commanding thought more of saving the remnants of the army than of achieving a victory.

It appears from the records that Generals McCook and Crittenden were ready again for orders at General Rose-
crans's headquarters between 11 and 12 P.M. They were finally directed to proceed to Rossville and report to General Thomas. The two generals say in their reports that they started together at 12 P.M., but, according to Captain John J. McCook of Crittenden's staff, they did not get under way till 2 A.M. General Rousseau, who had just reached Chattanooga on his return from an official visit to the North, accompanied them. The two corps commanders found in line what had been gathered of their several divisions and resumed command over them.

The chief of staff's sanguine expectations for the next day were not fulfilled. In the morning, after studying the ground about Rossville by daylight, he and General Thomas became satisfied that it was not a good one for defence, being exposed on the right to an easy flanking movement, and they united in a recommendation to the General Commanding to concentrate the army at Chattanooga; he assented to it by an order received at 6 P.M. by General Thomas. The movement commenced at 9 P.M. and was successfully carried out, and by 7 A.M. the next day, September 22, the troops were all in the positions in front of Chattanooga staked off for them by engineer officers. McCook was once more on the right, Thomas in the centre, and Crittenden on the left. The retreat was not disturbed in the least by the enemy. Rifle-pits were at once dug and breastworks thrown up, and the entrenchments subsequently improved from day to day until they were sufficiently strong for all defensive purposes.

In the forenoon of the 22d, Rosecrans telegraphed to General Halleck: "Our position is a strong one. Think we can hold out for several days." In the afternoon of the same day, he answered President Lincoln, in reply to an anxious inquiry from him about the position and condition of his army: "We are now in Chattanooga in line of battle, the enemy threatening our whole front. Have pushed to our picket line. Whether they will attack us to-day uncertain. We are about 30,000 brave and determined men,
but our fate is in the hands of God, in whom I hope.'"

On the 23d, his confidence was so much restored that he wired to the White House: "We hold this point, and cannot be dislodged except by very superior numbers and after a great battle."

Bragg's troops only shifted their bivouacs slightly on the 21st, so as to be nearer to water in Chickamauga Creek, buried the dead, and gathered the wounded of both sides, and collected the spoils of the field in guns, small arms, accoutrements, tents, ambulances, ammunition, and quartermaster's and commissary supplies. On the 22d they were moved some miles further down the valley, but it was only on the morning of the next day that they appeared in force on the heights along our front, after some lively skirmishes with our outposts, so that Rosecrans was mistaken in reporting their presence the day before.

The rebel Commander-in-chief addressed a congratulatory order to his army on the 22d, opening thus:

It has pleased Almighty God to reward the valor and endurance of our troops by giving to our arms a complete victory over the enemy's superior numbers. . . . . . . Soldiers, after two days of severe battle you have stormed the barricades and breastworks of the enemy, and driven before you in confusion and disorder an army largely superior in numbers.

Our own Commanding General was, of course, in duty bound to let off a counterblast. He did this in a high-flown proclamation, dated October 2, in which he told his soldiers, among other boastful flatteries:

You have made a grand and successful campaign. You have driven the rebels from Middle Tennessee. . . . You fought the combined armies of Bragg, of Johnston and the tried veterans of Longstreet's corps, and for two days held them at bay, giving them blow for blow with heavy interest. When the day closed, you held the field, from which you withdrew in the face of overpowering numbers to occupy the point for which you set out—
Chattanooga. You have accomplished the great work of the campaign. You hold the key of East Tennessee and North Georgia. . . . You hold in your hands the substantial fruits of a victory, and deserve and will receive the honor and plaudits of a grateful nation.

As between the rival claims to victory of the two generals-in-chief, the balance of truth no doubt inclines in favor of Bragg. For even the one basis of Rosecrans's boasts, the possession of Chattanooga, became directly a doubtful advantage and threatened to prove a fatal trap for him. He could not prevent the immediate close investment of the town, and, before the end of the month, the enemy held him in so tight a grip that the confidence expressed in the despatch of the 23d to the President in his ability to successfully defend the place was very much shaken. He certainly would never have extricated himself from the rebel toils with his reduced force, and, but for the reinforcements which were hurried to his relief from the East, West, and South, would have been compelled to choose between starvation and surrender or retreat.

Historic justice must, indeed, award the palm to General Bragg, although his performance fell short of his chief object of interposing his army between ours and Chattanooga. At the close of the first day, it is true, the battle might be considered a drawn one, but the issue of the second warrants no other verdict than that the Army of the Cumberland suffered a complete defeat. The incontestable facts were that fully one-third of it was overwhelmed in one attack and driven off in great disorder, and that the remainder had to abandon the whole field, with its dead and severely wounded and numerous trophies, to the enemy. Nor can it be denied that the rebel triumph was due to superior generalship. Bragg had, indeed, failed to turn our left on the 19th, but he struck us so hard that he kept us on the defensive on both days. Rosecrans had no plan of battle beyond the protection of his lines to Chattanooga. Bragg adopted a bold one for the 20th, jus-
tified by the situation and the rules of the art of war, and substantially carried it out. He was favored by the accident of hitting our right just when most of it was out of position and in motion. But the strength of his assailning columns and vigor of their onset would doubtless have been too much for our wing if it had been in line. General Longstreet is, however, justly entitled to a share of the laurels. The début of Lee’s tried corps commander upon this new theatre was certainly a brilliant one. It will be difficult, indeed, to find another instance on record of a general assuming command at midnight over entirely strange troops and successfully fighting a great action with them the very next day. Most singular was the final outcome of the battle of Chickamauga in that it proved fatal in its consequence to both the victorious and the vanquished commanders-in-chief.

According to the official lists, our casualties on the two days were 140 officers, including one brigadier-general (Lytle) and 1517 enlisted men killed, 609 officers and 9147 enlisted men wounded, and 248 officers and 4503 enlisted men captured, making a total loss of 16,164. The proportion of nearly one officer to every sixteen enlisted men is very large. On the Confederate side, a number of organizations appear to have failed to make returns, so that complete lists were never available. The closest estimates show a total rebel loss of nearly 18,000. As 2000 prisoners fell into our hands, the aggregate of their killed and wounded must have been almost equal to our total loss, and fully one-third larger than ours in killed and wounded. This was the natural result of the constant offensive of the enemy on both days. Three Confederate generals were killed and four wounded. There is a great discrepancy between the returns of the respective chiefs of ordnance as to the loss of artillery on our side. Rosecrans’s chief admits the loss of only thirty-six pieces, while Bragg’s claims fifty-two.

The battle of Chickamauga will live in memory as one
of the bloodiest ever fought. The killed and wounded on the two days reached fully twenty-five per cent. in the Union and thirty-three per cent. in the Confederate army of the number engaged. But the percentage of the losses of particular organizations was much higher on both sides. In a number of regiments and brigades it ranged from forty to fifty per cent. and over, with even higher percentages of officers, so that regiments were commanded by captains and first lieutenants, and brigades by majors. By far the greatest relative losses were suffered during the closing struggle on the second day. Among the assailants as well as the defenders of Snodgrass Hill, almost all the casualties occurred in the two hours, and in some brigades in the last hour, before dark. Of the Confederates, Bushrod Johnson’s and Cleburne’s divisions, and of the Unionists Steedman’s, shed the most blood.

As I was not an eye-witness of the struggle described in the foregoing, it may be asked why I undertook to write its history. The answer is a simple one. In order properly to introduce the story of the events at and about Chattanooga, which will be related in the next chapter, it was necessary to review the Chickamauga campaign. For this purpose, I examined both the Official War Records and other works relating to it, and, in so doing, was struck by the imperfections of all the existing narratives of the memorable battle. I found them incomplete, incoherent, and contradictory in a greater degree than those of almost any other of the great actions of the Civil War. These very defects excited a desire on my part to draw from the available material a truer picture of the extraordinary contest. I was not long in finding out that, owing to the complicated movements of the two armies preceding the culminating collision, to the extension of the fighting over two days, and to the insufficiency of the sources of information, I had undertaken a most difficult task. But its very difficulties stimulated my determination to overcome them. It involved months of arduous labor. I am obliged to confess,
however, that their result is not as satisfactory as I could wish it to be as regards fulness and accuracy. Yet I can affirm that its shortcomings are not due to any want of conscientious endeavor on my part, but to the impossibility of making up a consecutive, complete and absolutely clear and true account from the material at my command. I have done the best I could with it, however, and I believe I can justly claim that my story is fuller and more correct than any of the existing publications upon the subject, and that it will be readily intelligible to the general reader.
MEMOIRS OF HENRY VILLARD

BOOK SEVEN

IN CIVIL-WAR TIME: CHATTANOOGA
CHAPTER XXXI

FEDERAL CONCENTRATION AND REORGANIZATION.—1863

WHEN the Government at Washington became convinced that part of Lee’s army had been detached to reinforce Bragg, the General-in-chief, Halleck, ordered General Grant, on September 15, four days before the battle of Chickamauga, to send all the troops he could spare, with all possible promptness, to the assistance of General Rosecrans. The order reached Grant at Vicksburg only on the 22d, but he at once complied with it, and soon fleets of steamboats were carrying tens of thousands of men up the Mississippi, bound for Memphis, whence they were to move by land. The deep effect of the news of the reverse at Chickamauga upon the Government is shown by the fact that, for the first time since the outbreak of the Rebellion, it was led to subordinate the theretofore always predominant considerations for the safety of the national capital to the requirements of a crisis elsewhere upon the theatre of war, and to overcome its reluctance to weaken the Army of the Potomac by reinforcing other armies from it. The decision was reached to send the 11th and 12th Army Corps, under Generals Howard and Slocum, as quickly as possible, by rail, to the Tennessee, under the command of General Hooker. The transfer of the nearly 20,000 men of the two corps, of guns, horses and teams and their belongings, was effected in a week—a very creditable achievement for those days. It took place as secretly as possible, and, in response to an appeal from the War Department to the Northern press, not a single reference was made to it in the newspapers.

I was just getting ready to start from Cincinnati for
Chattanooga when I was surprised on September 29 by the sudden arrival of General Hooker, accompanied by General Butterfield, whom he had appointed his chief of staff, at the Burnet House, where I was stopping. They welcomed me very heartily, and invited me to accompany them on their way to Chattanooga. As they travelled by special trains, their offer was eagerly accepted, and I set out with them in the course of the same day for Louisville, where we stopped half a day, and then continued our journey to Nashville and Bridgeport. Railroad travel at that time was, compared with its present perfection, of a primitive character. Sleeping or parlor cars were not yet known; hence long day and night journeys were very fatiguing. Although we had the right of way, we were delayed at every point by the crowding of the lines with trains carrying troops and supplies. It took us nearly two days and a half to reach Bridgeport on October 2, the regular running time being only fourteen hours. Directly in the wake of us, a dozen or more trains landed the two divisions of the 11th Corps under Generals Carl Schurz and Steinwehr on the banks of the Tennessee.

General Hooker's elation at being restored to active service was very great. Since I had last seen him, at Fredericksburg, he had passed through the ordeal of the battle of Chancellorsville, and had considered himself definitively shelved in consequence of his great failure there. He was in the highest spirits, and full of confident expectation of new distinction in the field. He talked in a lively and gay manner on the way, but was very indiscreet in discussing his past disappointments. He had hoped to have an immediate chance to do some fighting, and was very much taken aback when he received orders to remain himself at Bridgeport, and to employ his two corps in guarding the lines of communication between Nashville and Chattanooga. This meant scattering his troops in small bodies over about 200 miles of distance and did not suit him at all. But this duty was only temporary, and he was kept busy enough
while it lasted by rebel raids upon our communications, of which I shall speak hereafter.

I lost no time in pushing on from Bridgeport to Chattanooga, which I found to be an arduous undertaking of much hardship. The falling back of our army had been unfortunately accompanied by the abandonment of Lookout Mountain and Lookout Valley to the enemy. The Mountain rises, within a little over a mile from and to the west of the town limits, sheer up from the south bank of the Tennessee to the height of 2500 feet. Around its base ran the roads which formed the only direct western approaches from the Tennessee to Chattanooga, one down Lookout Valley, and the other over Raccoon Mountain. The occupation of Lookout by the rebels cut us completely off from the use of these roads, and limited us to the one longer and very difficult line of supply from Stevenson and Bridgeport up the Sequatchie Valley to Jasper, and thence over Walden’s Ridge to the north bank of the Tennessee River opposite Chattanooga, a distance of forty-eight miles. I had no choice but to take this. I left Bridgeport on the afternoon of October 3, in an ambulance with three officers, and our horses gave out when we reached Jasper, ten miles distant, after dark. Starting again at daylight, the roads proved so execrable that we decided to continue on foot, and had the hardest struggle in ascending and descending in the darkness. It took until after midnight to make the eight miles to the river. I bivouacked the rest of the night with some teamsters around a camp fire, and crossed over to the town on one of the two bridges at daybreak on the 5th. I went directly to the general headquarters, where I was very well received by Generals Rosecrans and Garfield. The chief of staff provided me with quarters in a small brick house of which some of the staff had taken possession. Having been obliged to leave my hand valise and roll of wraps behind in the ambulance, my whole equipment consisted of what I carried on my body. I continued in this uncom-
fortable predicament for nearly three days, when, to my
great relief, I recovered my retarded belongings, and could
discharge my duties in an easier state of mind.

Feeling very tired from my rough night’s experience, I
lay down for a good sleep at about 9 A.M., but was roused,
after resting hardly an hour, by the sound of heavy guns.
It was the beginning of the long bombardment of Chatta-
nooga from the rebel positions on Lookout Mountain and
the heights to the south of the town. The enemy had tried
some desultory firing upon us on previous days, apparently
in order to get the proper range, but on this, the 5th day
of October, 1863, our troops had their first experience of
continuous discharges. As the sounds did not cease, I got
up and set out to learn what the firing meant. I spent the
rest of the day in working my way on foot along our lines
and becoming acquainted with the situation.

Chattanooga occupies one of the peninsulas formed by
the crooked course of the Tennessee in that mountainous
region. The town had, before the Northern invasion, a
population of about 10,000, and, as the junction of impor-
tant railroads from all points of the compass, was a flour-
ishing commercial and industrial centre. It extended from
the left bank of the river southwardly for about a mile,
with an average width of half that distance. The ground
rose gradually, the lower part near the river forming the
business, and the upper the residence, portion. Most of
the buildings were of red brick, giving the place a solid
and well-to-do appearance. There were some flour- and
saw-mills, a foundry, rolling-mill, and other industries.
The common station of the railroads was at the southern
end. Of the population only a few hundred were left,
white and black. General Rosecrans was anxious to get
rid of the rest of the whites by sending them into the rebel
lines. Business was completely at a standstill. The con-
tents of the stores had been removed. Many of the build-
ings were being used for military purposes, and a number
of private houses as headquarters; but the bulk of the
troops camped under tents in the outskirts.
Our lines extended across the widest part of the peninsula. Our right, to the west of the town, under General Alexander McD. McCook, first rested near the mouth of Chattanooga Creek, but was subsequently drawn in further. Next came the centre, under Thomas, and the left, under Crittenden, thus repeating the formation that had been followed through the campaign. On reaching the assigned positions, our troops were at once put to work digging rifle-pits for immediate protection. Then day and night were employed in the construction of breastworks of solid earth in the rear of the pits. They arose like magic. The rebels had erected several forts within the town limits, which were put to use. The chief engineer, General Morton, had designed an interior chain of redoubts connected by breastworks, which were rapidly approaching completion. On Cameron Hill, an abrupt elevation on the west side of the peninsula, a regular casemated citadel was being constructed. Altogether the army could be said to be well sheltered within a strongly entrenched camp. Three days after the battle, Rosecrans reported to the War Department that he had 30,000 effectives left. This number had been increased in the meantime by returned stragglers and furloughed officers and men, and by various bodies on detached service, to about 35,000—an ample number to hold the place behind the entrenchments against any attack by the rebel army. Our security was, nevertheless, by no means absolutely assured; we were, on the contrary, exposed to the double danger of being either bombarded or starved out of the place.

Missionary Ridge divides the valleys of the Chattanooga and Chickamauga. It rises abruptly, like a mighty rampart, to a height of 1600 feet above the Tennessee River, and at an average distance of about two miles from Chattanooga. From the nearest part of its summit every quarter of the town is commanded. The rebel lines stretched from near the abutment of the Ridge on the Chickamauga along its brow to and beyond Chattanooga Creek, up the slopes of Lookout Mountain facing the town. The enemy's camps
were concealed by heavy timber, but their presence along this extended front had been well ascertained by reconnoisances, spies and deserters. The length of the line was nearly eight miles—too great—and became a source of weakness to which the final rebel defeat was due. The Confederate, like the Union army, retained its formation of Chickamauga during the first stages of the investment at Chattanooga—that is, the wing under Lieutenant-General Polk formed the right, and that under Lieutenant-General Longstreet the left. The strength of Bragg’s forces was, according to the returns telegraphed to the Richmond War Office on October 7: Present for duty, infantry, 4664 officers, 46,447 enlisted men; artillery, 157 officers, 3480 enlisted men, making a total of 54,748 officers and men. The enemy’s superiority in infantry and artillery thus appears to have been about thirty per cent. It was shown that the losses at Chickamauga had reduced Bragg’s strength of 42,000, exclusive of cavalry, to about 24,000, so that 30,000 men must have been added to his command during the intervening two weeks and a half. These heavy reinforcements appear to have been made up of the two brigades of McLaws’s division and two of Hood’s divisions of Longstreet’s corps, which joined the army just after the battle, a division from Mississippi under Major-General Stevenson, and many thousands of absentees on furlough and sick leave, whom the rebel authorities, by strenuous efforts, succeeded in gathering up and returning to the front.

The Confederate Commander-in-chief had made up his mind to confine his operations against Chattanooga to as close an investment as the local conditions allowed, and to compel the Unionists, both by interrupting their supplies and by shot and shell, either to surrender or retreat north of the Tennessee. This decision was contrary to the judgment of his leading generals, and, as will duly appear, led to what was nothing less than outright insubordination on their part. The interruption of our supplies had already been accomplished in a great measure by forcing us off the
river route, through the occupancy of Lookout Mountain and by cavalry raids upon our lines of communication between the Tennessee and Nashville. Haste had also been made in bringing up heavy guns for the bombardment of the town. It was their début that roused me from my slumber.

I made my way to the summit of Cameron Hill, where I had a fine panoramic view of the town, Missionary Ridge, and Lookout Mountain. The firing was carried on by ten guns stationed singly at considerable intervals along the winding road up the Mountain, and from one heavy piece and several light rifled pieces on Missionary Ridge. The highest gun on Lookout seemed to fire from an elevation of from 1200 to 1500 feet above the river. The heavy guns fired from a distance, measured by the sound, of about three miles. The firing continued all day till sunset, but varied greatly. Sometimes there were lively outbursts so that I could not count the number of shots, and again the discharges were single and in slow succession, as if for purposes of range-finding. Hundreds of shells were thrown in the course of the day, ranging from missiles six inches in diameter to those of three-inch fieldpieces. But the enemy inflicted hardly any damage. So far as I could learn, only one private was wounded in our camps, although crowds of our men freely exposed themselves by watching the fire from our parapets. Even the children pursued their games in the streets without concern. From our side only one field battery tried a little rifle practice from one of the redoubts. A couple of thirty-pounder rifle Parrots had arrived from Nashville, but were not yet in position.

Before my return to the army, the Northern papers had been full of all sorts of accounts of the course of the two days’ battles, the causes of our defeat, and the behavior of Generals Rosecrans, McCook, Crittenden, Negley, Davis, Sheridan, Wood, and Van Cleve. Charges that the first three had sought safety in flight from the battle-field had
been freely published all over the loyal States, and official
investigations called for in the press, by various State
authorities, and in Washington. There was so much con-
tradiction and partisanship in the printed versions that I
resolved to ascertain the truth on reaching Chattanooga
and to write a review of the battle. I began at once to
gather material for it. Generals Rosecrans and Garfield
expressed their readiness to place at my disposal all the
information they had, including the official reports of the
corps, division, and brigade commanders, as fast as they
came, together with the orders issued before, during, and
after the conflict. Both were also not only willing but
eager to give me the benefit of their opinions of men and
matters without the least reserve. Indeed, they had a
good deal on their minds, which they were very glad of an
opportunity to relieve by speaking out unrestrainedly.

General Rosecrans represented himself the victim of the
Washington authorities generally, and of the General-in-
chief and Secretary Stanton in particular. He was even
more bitter and vehement than at Murfreesboro' in his
denunciations of them for interfering with his plans and
for not complying with his recommendations and requisitions. He announced his firm intention to "show up"
these two principal offenders in his official report—a threat
which he was, however, wise enough not to carry out. He
affirmed emphatically that the direct and sole cause of the
disaster on the second day was the want of judgment and
discretion on the part of General Wood in executing the
momentous order "'to close up on Reynolds as fast as possi-
ble and support him,'" and opening a gap in the line al-
though aware that the enemy was about to attack that part
of it. He applied the strongest language to that division
commander, and even charged that he withdrew from the
line, notwithstanding that Wood; in doubt as to the pru-
dence of moving away, had sought advice of General
Thomas, who told him to stay where he was. General Rose-
crans was also unqualified in his censure of Generals Mc-
Cook and Crittenden for coming to Chattanooga "without orders," and at the same time thought it necessary to defend himself by a long argument on the duties and powers of a commander-in-chief for having preceded them. On my referring to the stories about Negley, he said promptly that this general had marched his troops away without orders, and ought to be tried by court-martial and dismissed from the service.

When I broached the subject of his own plans, he did not speak in as resolute a way about holding Chattanooga as I expected to hear. He was evidently in serious doubt whether sufficient supplies to maintain his men and animals could be secured. The destruction of several hundred wagons in the Sequatchie Valley by Wheeler's cavalry, to be followed probably by a new interruption of our only railroad connection with Nashville, made the outlook very grave. He confessed that there were rations for only a few days on hand, and so little forage that he was obliged to send away officers' and artillery horses. The lack of forage diminished greatly the quantities of supplies hauled by the wagon trains, since they had to carry food for their own animals for the round trip. The badness of the roads, destructive alike of wagons and of teams, so impeded their movements that it took them over a week to go and return. The reinforcements from the East, under Hooker, practically did Rosecrans no good, as they could not be brought up within supporting distance, owing to the difficulty of feeding them. He was clearly comforting himself in advance with excuses for a step which he did not like to take, but to which he feared he might be forced. Altogether, I found him very nervous, vindictive, irresolute, with little courage and self-reliance left, and showing generally the demoralizing effect of the lost battle.

General Garfield, knowing that he was safe with me, took me freely into his confidence. He told me how fully convinced he was that his chief was making a mortal mistake in going to Chattanooga, how he tried to dissuade him
from it, and how relieved he himself was to be permitted to rejoin Thomas. He asserted that a very strong feeling prevailed in the army over the conduct of the Commanding General and the two corps commanders, and intimated that he considered their removal from command probable. He had grave doubts also as to the possibility of keeping possession of Chattanooga. Having been nominated for Congress in an Ohio district sure to give him a strong majority at the impending election, his days of active service were numbered anyway. While he did not say so directly, it could be inferred from his remarks that his faith in Rosecrans's military qualifications was shaken, if not lost, and that he was not sorry to part official company with him. His changed opinion naturally made his position very embarrassing to him. In corroboration of this, I will anticipate events by quoting from a despatch of Secretary Stanton to Assistant Secretary Watson, dated Louisville, October 21, as follows: "Generals Garfield and Steedman are here on their way home. Their representations of the incidents of the battle of Chickamanga more than confirm the worst that has reached us from other sources as to the conduct of the Commanding General and the great credit that is due to General Thomas." (War Records, Series 1, Volume XXXI, Part I, page 684.)

I sought the headquarters of General McCook before dark on the day of my arrival and found General Crittenden with him. Both generals were in a state of great irritation and apprehension over the severe censures and demands for their removal and punishment with which the Northern papers were filled, and welcomed the chance of uttering their grievances to an old acquaintance through whom they hoped to get a hearing in the press for their side. The principal defence of both was that they had been virtually deprived of their commands by the successive orders of General Rosecrans to send one after another of their divisions to the support of General Thomas. In proof, they cited the original orders. McCook also showed
me the order dated September 20, 10:30 A.M., requiring him, after sending Sheridan's division to General Thomas, "to report in person at these headquarters as soon as your orders are given in regard to Sheridan's movement." He considered it a complete justification of his following the General Commanding to Chattanooga. But it may well be asked, Would he have been court-martialled if he had not obeyed the order, in view of the change in the situation? And would it not have been to his great credit, and would he not have kept his command, if he had stayed at the front? Crittenden claimed, that, having no longer any troops to command and being without orders, he was in duty bound to report to the head of the army, which could be done only by following him to the town.

I spent the whole evening with the generals and McCook's staff, all of whose members were in a bitter and depressed frame of mind. The corps commanders had not indicated any fears of personal consequences, but the staff officers were all apprehensive. Not being fully convinced by their arguments, I should have been embarrassed but that, in their excitement and wrath, they did most of the talking. As to the charge made and reiterated by the whole press that they had gone to sleep after reaching Chattanooga, they explained it as I have already done. They emphasized the fact that the Commander-in-chief had found no fault with their conduct—an assertion which astonished me not a little, as I had heard him express himself anything but approvingly regarding it only two hours before.

The blow they anticipated had already fallen even while I was discussing the subject with them. Nashville papers three days old were received late that night, with the news that the War Department had issued an order, dated September 28, consolidating the 20th and 21st Army Corps into a new one numbered 4th, appointing Major-General Gordon Granger to the command of it, relieving Generals McCook and Crittenden from duty in the Army of the Cumberland, and ordering them to hold themselves ready
to respond to a summons before a court of inquiry. I did not hear this until late the next morning, when I went at once to the general headquarters to ascertain whether the startling announcement was true. General Rosecrans admitted that he had received intimations from Washington that such orders would be issued, but he had not yet received them. Such was the fact, and the formal order was not promulgated by him until October 9. The intelligence created a great sensation throughout the camps, and consternation at the headquarters of the two affected corps. Generals McCook and Crittenden took it very hard, although they tried to seem indifferent. They felt that the indirect method of relieving them by the consolidation would deceive nobody, but would still leave upon them the stigma of punishment for their part in the battle by removal from command, and they made known their determination to demand courts of inquiry without delay. They manifested deep regret that ignominy should also be fastened upon their troops by the wiping out of the two corps organizations. I expected that the consolidation would not, on that account, be well received by their officers and men; but all, from commanders of division down, appeared to submit quietly to the change.

I tried to discover who was directly responsible for the act. Both Rosecrans and Garfield denied that they had recommended it or any other punitive measure at Washington, and subsequent developments confirmed this. Then I had a talk with Charles A. Dana, the Assistant Secretary of War, still at the army headquarters, but he was entirely non-committal. It is a matter of record, however—first through the publication of his reports to Secretary Stanton, and again lately through his own admission in the personal memoirs printed in McClure's Magazine—that his representations regarding the part played by the two generals at Chickamauga and its effect upon their subordinates had as much to do with the decision of the Washington authorities to remove them as any other influ-
ence. He is responsible for the assertion that Garfield, Wood, Palmer, Sheridan, Johnson, and Hazen demanded the removal. Justice calls for the statement that he was entirely wrong in some of his animadversions upon those corps commanders, and showed strong, bordering on malignant, bias against them. He received and conveyed impressions, like the professional journalist that he was, hastily, flippantly, and recklessly. He thus involved himself in glaring inconsistencies and contradictions and humiliating self-corrections. This criticism certainly holds good of his official correspondence relative to the Chickamauga and Chattanooga campaigns as reprinted in the War Records. It must be admitted, nevertheless, that his reports indicate great power of observation and expression, and that his characterizations of military leaders were sometimes very able and true. Nor can it be doubted that he was animated by sincere patriotic ardor, recognition of which led Secretary Stanton to overlook the shortcomings of the work of his special reporter. Wherever the latter was, his superior was kept better advised on all matters in that part of the theatre of war than from any other source. He was indefatigable, and shrank from no hardship and personal danger in discharging what he considered his duty. Yet his zeal often degenerated into officiousness, and he fell at times into the rôle of the informer, without perhaps being conscious of it. I saw a great deal of him during our joint stay—at least once and often several times a day—and never failed to find him very communicative. Being a man of great natural parts and wide and thorough acquirements, and affable withal, his society was a real boon.

Generals McCook and Crittenden left for the North, accompanied by their entire staff, on October 10. It was a bitter trial for them to take final farewell of their companions in arms, whom they had led for two years and in five different campaigns—Shiloh and Corinth, Middle Tennessee, Perryville, Stone River, Tullahoma and Chicka-
mauga. It must be said that they did not receive any too much sympathy from the officers and men of their commands. I felt sincerely for them, knowing them always to have tried to perform their duties to the best of their ability. I had been one of McCook's military family so often, and received so much kindness from all its members, that their departure moved me like a great personal loss. Their separation from the Army of the Cumberland was permanent, although they both underwent courts of inquiry into their conduct at Chickamauga, which found that General McCook committed a mistake in leaving the field to go to Chattanooga, but that this was only an error of judgment, and that in all respects his behavior was faultless, and which pronounced that "General Crittenden's conduct not only showed no cause for censure, but that it was most creditable, and that he was not even censurable for going to Chattanooga." I did not see General McCook again before the close of the war, but I found General Crittenden once more in active service six months later, at the head of a division in the Army of the Potomac. Both issued pathetic farewell orders to their corps.

On the same day, the reorganization of the army, necessitated by the formation of a new corps out of the 20th and 21st, was formally promulgated by general order. The 4th Corps was to consist of three divisions commanded respectively by Generals Palmer, Sheridan, and Wood. Each division comprised three brigades, commanded in the first by Colonel Cruft, General Whitaker, and Colonel Grose; in the second by Generals Steedman and Wagner and Colonel Harker; and in the third by Generals Willich, Hazen, and Beatty. The divisions averaged between 6000 and 7000 men, and the total strength of the corps was nearly 20,000. The 14th Corps also constituted three divisions, instead of the former four, under Generals Rousseau (who resumed command on return from leave, relieving General Brannan), Baird, and Davis, and each division consisted of three brigades—in the first under
Generals Carlin, King, and Starkweather; in the second under Colonel Morgan, General John Beatty, and Colonel Daniel McCook; and in the third under General Turchin, Colonel Van Derveer, and Colonel Croxton. Five division commanders and fourteen acting brigadiers were thereby rendered inactive. The changes in the sub-commands of the army were thus very sweeping.

General Negley was separately dealt with, and far more leniently than the two corps commanders. General Rosecrans, though considering him deserving of the severest punishment, allowed him to prepare a special defence against the statements severely reflecting upon his case in the reports of Generals Brannan and Wood. After receiving and examining the papers from him, the Commanding General came to the conclusion, as he wrote on October 14 to the War Department, that General Negley "acted according to his best judgment under the circumstances of the case." He further gave him a leave of absence for thirty days, but advised him to ask for a court of inquiry. General Negley proceeded to Washington, and, on October 30, formally requested the Secretary of War by letter to order a court of inquiry in his case. The Secretary not acceding to this and advising him to return to the front, the General telegraphed to Chattanooga for orders, and received a reply directing him to return to the army on expiration of his leave. The case now took a very curious turn, worth relating in detail as it shows our military management in a peculiar light.

Having reached Nashville, he wired on November 10 to Chattanooga for orders. He was told, in answer, to remain in Nashville until further orders, and: "It is proper that you ask for a court of inquiry. It would not be proper to assign you to a command until an investigation has been had." To this the General naturally replied that he had applied for a court, and renewed his request for one to the War Department, but heard nothing further from any quarter until he received an order, dated Chattanooga,
December 22, as follows: "Major-General J. S. Negley having failed to demand a court of inquiry for the purpose of freeing himself from charges affecting his usefulness in this command, is hereby directed to proceed to Cincinnati or to any point outside this military division and report by letter to the Adjutant-General of the army for orders." This he did promptly, only to be informed by the Adjutant-General that the General-in-chief had no orders for him, as he belonged to General Thomas's command. Finally, the President on June 9 ordered a court of inquiry for him (the same order directed courts for the corps commanders also). The court found not only that "General Negley exhibited throughout the second day of the battle and throughout the following night great activity and zeal in the discharge of his duties," and that there was no evidence affording any ground for censure, but that General Brannan's allegations were not sustained, and that General Wood deserved stern condemnation for indulging in severe reflections upon General Negley, and applying coarse and offensive epithets to him, in the presence of the army commander and some of his staff, while failing to substantiate his charges on the witness stand. Thus ended this curious "much ado about nothing."
CHAPTER XXXII

CRISIS IN THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.—1863

WHILE the removal of the generals and the reorganization absorbed the attention of headquarters and camps on our side, a similar crisis was occurring in the Confederate army. Indications of it had reached us through Southern newspapers. These came into our lines almost as quickly as into the enemy's, thanks to the truce arrived at between the respective pickets, without authority, but winked at by their superiors, and which led to friendly talk and exchange of courtesies. One contained a general order of Lieutenant-General Polk, in which he took leave of his corps, and the announcement of the removal of General Hindman from command. But no one was aware of the extent and violence of the conflict then raging among the rebel generals, nor was it suspected that these internal quarrels had led to a most important event, of which we learned from rebel papers and through the great commotion on Missionary Ridge. It was nothing less than a visit of Jefferson Davis himself to Bragg's troops. The President of the Confederacy arrived on the evening of October the 10th and remained till the 13th. His presence was signalized by artillery salutes and parades and reviews, which could be clearly seen from Cameron Hill. From our picket line the band music and cheers with which the rebel soldiery responded to the speeches he made to them were also distinctly heard. It is only by the publication of the Official War Records that the connection between his visit and the squabbles of the generals has been made apparent. I think it best to give at length this interesting chapter in the history of the Rebellion.
The opposition of Bragg's lieutenants to his decision simply to invest Chattanooga speedily found vent in active demonstrations against him. The first of these on record is a letter addressed by General Longstreet to the Secretary of War at Richmond, full of complaint and criticism, in which this passage occurs:

To express my convictions in a few words, our chief has done but one thing that he ought to have done since I joined his army. That was to order the attack upon the 20th. All other things that he has done he ought not to have done. I am convinced that nothing but the hand of God can save us or help us as long as we have our present commander. Now, to our wants. Can't you send us General Lee? . . . We need some such great mind. . . . You will be surprised to learn that this army has neither organization nor mobility, and I have doubts if its commander can give it them. . . . When I came here, I hoped to find our commander willing and anxious to do all things that would aid us in our great cause, and ready to receive what aid he could get from his subordinates. It seems that I was greatly mistaken. It seems that he cannot adopt and adhere to any plan or course, whether of his own or of some one else. . . . There is no exaggeration in these statements.

Nor was Longstreet content with this. He begged Colonel James Chestnut, Jr., aide-de-camp of President Davis, then on a visit to the army, to go to Richmond with all speed and urge action upon him. In an official letter dated October 4, to Lieutenant-General D. H. Hill, he entreated him and Buckner to see the colonel also for the same purpose.

Most of the other generals in command above the rank of brigadier followed Longstreet's example. They conspired to make a direct appeal to President Davis for Bragg's removal. Their action was hastened by the issue of an order on September 29 by the Commander-in-chief, who had learned of the cabal against him, relieving from their commands Major-General Hindman, for disobedience of orders in the affair in McLemore's Cove on September 11, and Lieutenant-General Polk, for the same offence, on the
morning of the second day at Chickamauga. A long letter to the Executive, dated October 4 and understood to have been prepared by Buckner and Breckinridge, was signed by them and Lieutenant-General Hill and Generals Hindman, Cheatham, Preston, Brown, and others. Its character may be judged from the following quotations:

Two weeks ago this army, elated by a great victory, which promised to be the most fruitful of the war, was in readiness to pursue its defeated enemy. That enemy, driven in confusion from the field, was fleeing in disorder and panic-stricken across the Tennessee River. To-day, after having been twelve days in line of battle in that enemy's front, within cannon range of his position, the Army of the Tennessee has seen a new Sebastopol rise steadily before its view. The beaten enemy, recovering behind its formidable works from the effect of its defeat, is understood to be already receiving reinforcements, while heavy additions to his strength are rapidly approaching him. Whatever may have been accomplished heretofore, it is certain that the fruits of the victory of Chickamauga have now escaped our grasp. The Army of the Tennessee, stricken with a complete paralysis, will in a few days' time be thrown strictly on the defensive, and may deem itself fortunate if it escapes from its present position without disaster.

After urging the necessity of strengthening the army, in view of the reinforcements of the enemy, the petitioners continue: "But... your petitioners would deem it a dereliction of the sacred duty they owe the country, if they did not further ask that Your Excellency assign to the command of this army an officer who will inspire the army and the country with undivided confidence." Moreover, independently of other reasons, "the condition of the health of the present commander totally unfits him for the command of an army in the field." In conclusion: "In making these representations to Your Excellency, your petitioners are aware that the proceeding is unusual among military men, but the extraordinary condition of affairs in this army, the magnitude of the interests at stake, and
a sense of the responsibilities under which they rest to
Your Excellency and to the Republic, render this proceed-
ing, in their judgment, a matter of solemn duty, from
which, as patriots, they cannot shrink." The petition
closed with a strong affirmation of their disbelief in the
possibility of success under the existing command.

The annals of modern warfare will probably be searched
in vain for a counterpart to this extraordinary perform-
ance in the face of the enemy. Lieutenant-General Polk
had anticipated it by a letter of his own to the same effect,
to President Davis, dated two days before he was relieved
from command, by one of the same date and of a like tenor
to General R. E. Lee, and by another to the President,
bearing the date of October 6, in which he goes so far as
to say:

General Bragg . . . allowed the whole of the fruits of this great
victory to pass from him by the most criminal negligence, or, rather,
incapacity, for there are positions in which weakness is wickedness.
If there be a man in the public service who should be held to a
more rigid accountability for failures, and upon the largest scale,
than another, that man is General Bragg, and I shall be happy to
go before a court of inquiry on charges preferred against me by
General Bragg, that I may have the opportunity not only of vindi-
cating my own conduct, but of establishing the truth and justice of
what I have written of his lack of capacity as a commanding
general.

Longstreet's letter to the Secretary of War had effect.
The latter wired to General Bragg that his apparent inac-
tion since Chickamauga was causing anxiety, and called
for an explanation. The General sent a full reply, setting
forth that to attack the entrenched enemy would be sui-
cidal, and that he was making every effort to accumulate
sufficient supplies for a turning movement across the Ten-
nessee River. But the demonstrations of the other gen-
erals decided the rebel President to make a personal at-
tempt to heal the dissensions on the ground. It may easily be imagined that his task was a delicate and un-
pleasant one. It does not appear whether he gave hear-
ings to both sides during his stay, but it is certain that he determined to sustain Bragg at all points. The latter offered to give up his command, but Davis would not listen to the suggestion. He not only approved of the removal of Generals Polk and Hindman, but, the day after his arrival, authorized also that of Lieutenant-General D. H. Hill. He consented the more readily to the latter as Hill had been detached from Lee’s army for the same reason, disobedience of orders.

Formal charges were made by General Bragg against Generals Polk and Hindman and sent to the War De-
partment. The two generals, of their own accord, also ap-
plied for courts of inquiry. General Polk addressed inter-
rogatories regarding his conduct to all the commanders under him, to which they all replied, mostly in his favor, and he further secured the statements of all his staff. But it never came to courts-martial or courts of inquiry in either case. President Davis settled that of Polk by de-
cining to authorize the appointment of a court, on the ground that his personal examination into the causes and circumstances of his removal had satisfied him that there was nothing in them to justify further investigation, and by appointing the Lieutenant-General to the command of another department, “as the best evidence,” to quote from his official notification, “of my appreciation of your past service and expectations of your future career.” General Hindman received even more striking exoneration. In his formal declination to order a court of inquiry, the Presi-
dent gave as his reasons for it that his personal investiga-
tion of the case had convinced him that, if the explanations since given had been made at the proper time, General Bragg’s order relieving him would never have been issued. This snub direct was administered to Bragg, notwithstanding-
ing the recantation which he addressed to the President, no doubt on his requirement, in this humiliating form, under date of November 15:

After your action in the case of Lieutenant-General Polk, which to me has been entirely satisfactory, I feel it a duty as it is a pleasure to request similar action on your part toward Major-General Hindman. This officer, as will appear from the official reports, was conspicuously distinguished at Chickamauga for gallantry and good conduct, and nothing but the necessity for uniform discipline prevented my overlooking the previous affair for which he was suspended. From what I have heard unofficially, the General may prefer not to serve under my command; but it is only just for me to add that he possesses my fullest confidence as a most gallant soldier and excellent disciplinarian.

The outcome was, that General Hindman returned to duty under Bragg.

The narrative of the machinations against the latter would not be complete without mention of the singular controversy provoked by General Buckner with General Bragg, within a week after the army had taken position before Chattanooga, over the question whether the Commander-in-chief had the right to transfer to another general's command part of the troops which Buckner had brought with him from East Tennessee. The correspondence between them, which fills many pages in the Records, culminated in violent personal abuse and a reference of the mooted point to the War Department, which overruled Buckner, who seems to have been a conceited, carping, and querulous egotist.
NEARLY all through September, dryness had prevailed and produced a veritable plague of deep dust, most trying to troops and supply trains. At last, on October 1, relief came in a good rainfall. At first it expedited transportation, but as rains gradually became frequent and heavier, the blessing was turned into another affliction. By the time of my trip from Bridgeport the roads were miry, and from day to day the reports regarding their condition grew worse. They soon spoke graphically of the animals sinking in the mud up to their bellies in the bottoms of the Sequatchie and along the Tennessee. The rains proved very trying in another respect. They filled the enclosed works and the ditches around them and the connecting trenches more or less deep with standing water, which it was found very difficult to drain off. The work on the fortifications was naturally very much obstructed. The steady rain made it almost impossible for the troops to keep dry, although they were provided with tents or had secured shelter in huts and dug-outs. There was a consecutive downpour for thirty-six hours during the first week of my stay. The pontoon bridge was broken on the night of October 15 by the force of the current, but fortunately the boats and timbers were saved and the bridge restored after a few days. The rebels, taking advantage of the elements, sent a number of rafts downstream to destroy it, but these happily passed while it was broken, and proper precautions subsequently taken neutralized all efforts in this direction.

I need not say that I too was made very uncomfortable
and hampered in my work by the inclemency of the weather. Owing to the increasing trouble in feeding horses, I had concluded to try to get on without one, but, under the circumstances, locomotion became steadily more and more restricted, as every sally meant getting wet through. Weather prognostications formed the main subject of talk at the various headquarters. The flood from above quickly swelled the rivers also, and their rise assumed such proportions as to involve dangerous consequences and render the condition of the army still more precarious. By the middle of the month, the Sequatchie was so high that it could no longer be forded at Jasper, and our supply trains were compelled to come and go by a circuitous route, lengthening the time of the round trip and entailing still greater destruction of wagons and animals. The high water in the Tennessee also did great mischief right under our eyes. Of the two bridges by which Chattanooga was connected with the north bank, the trestle had to be given up.

The protracted wet spell acted as a damper on the rebels as well as on our side. The hostile guns had not apparently increased in number, and they were fired so desultorily at long intervals that the enemy seemed to be under the restraint of a scarcity of ammunition. The damage they did to life and property was so insignificant, too, that we grew entirely indifferent to them. Those were indeed dull and gloomy days, not even enlivened by the regular arrival of the mails. While the bridge was broken, not a letter or newspaper reached the camps. Even the telegraphic connection was very irregular, and several times our only communication with the North was by couriers. Some slight ripples of excitement were produced, however, by the Ohio elections.

It must seem passing strange to foreign military men, and even our present generation will find it difficult to understand, that the discord and disintegration of party politics were deliberately introduced in the armies in the field. But party exigencies, in consequence of the really threat-
ening character of the internal political situation in 1863 in the loyal States generally, and especially in Ohio, where the bitter contest between Brough and Vallandigham for Governor was waged, made the Republican leaders feel justified in bringing about the passage of the State laws permitting their respective contingents in the national armies to cast their ballots for State tickets wherever they might be. No agitation by meetings and speeches among the troops in behalf of the candidates of either party was allowed before the election, yet so many politicians were serving in the rank and file that considerable quiet canvassing went on nevertheless. The voting took place on October 13, with very satisfactory results to the loyal cause. Out of nearly 10,000 votes, less than three per cent. were cast for Vallandigham. General Garfield, having actually won his seat in Congress, left for good on the 15th, under orders to proceed to Washington and to deliver in person to the War Department General Rosecrans’s report of the Chickamauga battles, and to make such verbal explanations regarding the campaign as might be called for. I could but lament his departure, for our relations had become so friendly and even intimate that he was always ready not only to give me all the army news, but to talk our situation over with me in the frankest manner. I was but too conscious that I should probably not again be able to form such a genial and professionally profitable connection in that army.

While the danger of being shelled out of Chattanooga was no longer looked upon as great, the problem of preventing our being driven from the place by starvation became more and more difficult of solution. The troops had been put on reduced rations before my arrival, but, notwithstanding this, the increasing difficulties of transportation had so limited the additions to the supplies on hand that, by the middle of October, there were not more than half-rations for a week left for officers and men. All, from the General-in-chief down to the privates, had nothing better
than the reduced regular ration without fresh meat. No sutlers' stores could be drawn on to eke out the allowances by extra eatables and drinkables. Money had lost its purchasing power. I wrote that it seemed to be impossible for us to remain in Chattanooga. Dana had the same opinion and wired it to Washington. On the 15th he telegraphed that the scarcity of food would soon make it necessary for all persons other than soldiers to leave, and that he desired instructions whether he should return to Washington or make his way to Burnside in Eastern Tennessee. The distress was still greater for beast than for man, as forage grew more scant than provisions. Yet more work had to be exacted from the poorly fed animals in hauling trains, in consequence of the steady increase of mortality among them. Hundreds fell daily en route, and the roads were literally lined with dead horses and mules. The weakness of the stock was such that teams had to double up to get empty wagons over Walden's Ridge, and it took as many as ten days for a trip only one way. Between the foot of this ridge and the banks of the Sequatchie, hundreds of teams were reported to be stopped owing to the exhaustion of animals. Artillery horses fell daily by scores. Around us in Chattanooga, the sight of famished and famishing beasts became a common one. Numbers of them could be seen tied to trees and left by their owners to starve. Many officers incurred losses in this way and had to attend to their duties on foot. Nor did there seem to be any prospect of an early alleviation of this discomfort and suffering.

The chief cause of our sorry plight was the abandonment, upon the retreat of our army into the town, of the northern slope of Lookout Mountain, which commanded the direct approaches to the town from the west, including the wagon road around the face of the mountain. This important position had been held by a brigade, but General Rosecrans ordered its withdrawal, against the protest of his chief of staff and General Granger, as I was repeatedly told by the
They argued with him that from 1500 to 2000 men would suffice to hold the ground against any force of the enemy, and distinctly warned him of the certain consequences of the other course; but he would not be convinced, and the hazardous step was taken. Military critics have justly said that this was as great a mistake on his part as the fatal order to General Wood in the second day's battle of Chickamauga. It not only absolutely prevented our utilization of the shorter and better land route from Shellmound on the south bank by way of Whiteside and Wauhatchie, but also the use on the river of the steamboats which had fallen into our hands below and at Chattanooga, and which, in the then favorable stage of water, would have alone sufficed to supply all the wants of the army. Moreover, it enabled the enemy to station sharpshooters on the south bank within easy range of the road on the opposite side over which our transportation had to pass for a distance. From the second week in October on, their fire proved a dangerous hindrance in the daytime to the movement of men and animals.

But the Confederates did not confine themselves to obstructing our transportation from the secondary base at Bridgeport; directly after Chickamauga they resumed their old game of breaking up our railroad connection with Nashville, so as to prevent the movement of supplies from the North to the Tennessee. Their efforts were at first alarmingly successful. The chief raider, General Wheeler, started from the rebel right on September 29, and on the following day succeeded in crossing the Tennessee near Washington, some forty miles northeast of Chattanooga, with his own two divisions and three brigades from Forrest's command, amounting in all only to between 4000 and 5000 officers and men. A cavalry division of our own, under General Crook, not over 2000 strong, had been charged with the duty of watching the fords above Chattanooga, but his force was scattered over a distance of fifty miles, and hence was unable to prevent the passage of the
enemy. Wheeler reached the Sequatchie Valley over Walden's Ridge on October 2. He divided his force, sending the greater portion under General Wharton over the Cumberland plateau, and proceeding himself down the Sequatchie towards Jasper. Unfortunately for us, the whole train of the 14th Corps, loaded with commissary, quartermaster, and ordinary stores, sutlers' and medical supplies, numbering some 400 vehicles, including a number of ambulances, was then strung out between the stream and Walden's Ridge, and fell an easy and most rich prey to the raiders. They loaded themselves up with all they could carry; stripped the teamsters and other persons accompanying the train (including a party of men and women from the United States Sanitary Commission) of their clothing and all their valuables; selected the best of the animals to remount themselves and to be driven along; shot the rest of the horses and mules, or cut their throats with their sabres, and finally set fire to the wagons and ambulances.

Wheeler then started with his booty to rejoin Wharton, but he was not to get away without some punishment. When General Rosecrans learned from General Crook, on October 1, of Wheeler's movement, he wired orders at once to my friend Colonel Edward McCook, who was watching with his cavalry division the crossings of the Tennessee above and below Bridgeport, to move up the Sequatchie at once in pursuit of the rebel cavalry. Although his three brigades were scattered and he had only three regiments and a section of artillery with him, he set out without delay from Bridgeport. At noon on the 2d, he struck the rebel rear guard near the scene of the destruction at Anderson's cross-roads and at once charged and drove it before him. He pressed closely after the enemy on the 2d and 3d, up to the summit of the Cumberland plateau. The rebels repeatedly tried to make a stand, but gave way each time under the attacks of our men. The result was a considerable rebel loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners,
the release of a number of our men belonging to the train escort, and the recapture of about 1000 mules.

General Crook, after collecting his command, followed rapidly in the rebel track. He was too late to prevent the capture of McMinnville (garrisoned by only one small regiment) and the appropriation and destruction of large stores of every kind; but he caught up with Wharton's rear and had a severe brush with it between McMinnville and Murfreesboro', and compelled the rebels to abandon their intended attack on the latter town. But they succeeded in destroying the railroad bridges and track southward to the Duck River. Near Murfreesboro' General R. B. Mitchell came to Crook's aid with McCook's division, which had made forced marches from the Sequatchie, and, as chief of cavalry, assumed command of all the mounted pursuers.

General Hooker had sent his chief of staff with an infantry force northward by rail from Bridgeport, to assist in the capture of the raiders. General Mitchell brought Wheeler to a stand near the village of Farmington, between Shelbyville and Columbia, a short distance south of the Duck River, and put him completely to flight after severe fighting. After this, it became a steady stern chase of the rebels to the Tennessee River, which they managed to ford between Huntsville and Florence, with about half of the force they had started with, but "loaded down to the guards," as General Stanley expressed it, "with their plunder of dry goods, watches, jewelry, and greenbacks, and hundreds of them dressed in our uniforms."

Another rebel cavalry force, under the notorious General Roddey, was to have started simultaneously with Wheeler from Northern Alabama to join him on the Duck River, but for some reason it crossed the Tennessee at Guntersville, Alabama, a whole week later than appointed—that is, on October 7 and 8—and so failed to prevent, as expected, the concentration of the Union troops against Wheeler. Roddey reached Salem, Tennessee, on the 10th,
but, learning there of Wheeler's defeat at Farmington, turned right around and retraced his steps as fast as possible to the Tennessee, and managed to reach Athens, Alabama, without having had more than a slight skirmish with the Federals.

Wheeler's raid was remarkable for the distance traversed, the hardships endured, and the work accomplished by his command. He was only eleven days under way, moved at the rate of from 40 to 50 miles a day, and certainly wrought as much damage as could be inflicted, on such a flying expedition. On our side, General Crook and his division showed equal tirelessness in the pursuit, for which they received well-deserved praise in a general order from General Rosecrans. There was naturally the greatest solicitude at the general headquarters regarding the extent of Wheeler's depredations and the duration of the interruption of our communications he would compass. The destruction of the wagon train had a most embarrassing immediate effect. Railroad connection was happily restored in four days—another of the many demonstrations during the Civil War that raids never succeeded in crippling railroads for any length of time.
CHAPTER XXXIV

ROSECRANS RELIEVED FROM COMMAND.—1863

Among the negative traits of General Rosecrans’s character, not the least was the obstinacy with which he clung to his own conclusions, in defiance of reason and facts. His justification of the abandonment of the river route to the enemy was, of course, the assumption that it would be practicable to supply the army fully by way of the Sequatchie and Walden’s Ridge. He stuck to it stubbornly against all the arguments to the contrary of General Garfield and others, until Wheeler’s newest exploits and the steady decrease instead of increase of the available stores of food compelled him to consider the problem how to undo his mistake by re-opening the river line. The conclusion was indeed forced upon him that without this it would be equally impracticable to hold Chattanooga or to reach a condition of readiness for the resumption of the offensive, inasmuch as the food difficulty would not permit him to draw the reinforcements under Hooker and Sherman near enough for the latter purpose. Symptoms of his change of mind were noticeable before General Garfield’s departure. He commenced talking to him on the subject, to General Smith, the new Chief of Engineers, to other generals, to Mr. Dana and myself. He began, too, to study the topography of the surroundings of Chattanooga and to send out engineer officers for the examination of particular points. This led to the evolution of an ingenious plan for neutralizing the obstructive effect of the hostile control of Lookout Mountain, viz., to seize and hold the south bank from a point beyond the range of the rebel artillery opposite the western front of the narrow peninsula formed by the first
great bend of the river below Chattanooga and known as Moccasin Point. While it was ten miles by water around the bend, it was not quite a mile across it in an air line from the north end of the main bridge of the town. The south bank being seized, supplies could be brought up the river from Bridgeport, landed at Moccasin Point, and thence hauled in wagons to the town. There were two steamboats and some barges available for the water transportation. The success of the plan would reduce the time from Bridgeport to one day each way, and thus solve the problem of sustaining the army. To carry it out, it was judged best that the initial attempt to effect a lodgment on the south bank should be made from Chattanooga, but that it should be supported by a simultaneous movement up the river by General Hooker's command.

It was ordained that General Rosecrans should not himself execute this clever plan. He had fully made up his mind to carry it out, and had already issued preliminary orders, including one to Hooker to concentrate his command, when his powers as commander-in-chief were suddenly cut off. A thunderbolt had been forging against him in Washington and descended upon him on October 18, in the form of a telegraphic Presidential order dated the 16th, relieving him from the command of the Department of the Cumberland, and directing him to proceed to Cincinnati and report by letter to the Adjutant-General of the army. By the same order, Major-General George H. Thomas was appointed his successor. This summary dismissal came as a stunning surprise to the doomed general. I can affirm from personal knowledge that while he had been apprehensive of removal after the battle, the tone of President Lincoln's subsequent despatches to him, and the fact that weeks had gone by without any indication of other intentions towards him, had led him to believe in his retention in command. He was wise enough not to give utterance to his feelings, and to leave at once for the North even before the change of command became known to the army. When
I bade him good-bye, he only remarked: "This was to be expected."

The truth was, that his fate had been decided at the national capital early in the month. On the 3d, a telegraphic order was sent to General Grant at Vicksburg, requiring him to proceed at once with his staff and headquarters to Cairo, and to report to the General-in-chief by wire for orders on his arrival there. It was several days in reaching him by boat, but, although he was lamed by an accident at New Orleans, he obeyed at once, and telegraphed from Cairo on October 16 for further instructions. The answer came in the evening of the same day, to the effect to proceed forthwith to the Galt House, Louisville, where he would be met by an officer of the War Department, with orders and instructions. He was also told to take his staff and headquarters with him, so as to be prepared to take the field immediately. This and the direction of his movements made pretty clear to the General and his military household what were the Government's intentions towards him. On reaching Louisville the next day, the officer of the War Department turned out to be Secretary Stanton himself, who delivered to Grant an order of the President constituting the military division of the Mississippi, with the three departments of the Ohio, of the Cumberland, and of the Tennessee, and placing him in command of the division, with headquarters in the field. The order also authorized him to relieve General Rosecrans by General Thomas, if he thought it best to make the change.

Before leaving Washington, the Secretary had wired to Dana on the 16th to meet him in Louisville, in pursuance of which the latter at once started for the North. As he relates in his memoirs, he reached Nashville on the night of October 20, and was intercepted at the station by a staff officer of General Grant, who told him his chief was on a train standing next to his and wished to see him. Dana had heard nothing of the great changes in the military commands, and his surprise when he learned what had hap-
pened may be imagined. General Grant informed him also that Secretary Stanton no longer desired him (Dana) to come to Louisville, but to return to the front with himself. Dana accepted the situation, and was directly on his way again to Chattanooga. They reached Bridgeport the next day, and set out for their destination the following morning. Grant's foot troubled him so that he took two days for the trip; but Dana rode through in one. An officer who passed Grant on the way told me that he presented a singular appearance with his white cotton gloves, low shoes, and white socks which were exposed for several inches. Dana reported to Stanton on the 23d that the General arrived "wet, dirty, and well." Grant himself, in a letter to Halleck, described the roads he had passed over as bad almost beyond conception.

Rosecrans's retirement from active command was the penalty for his loss of the battle of Chickamauga. Nor can it be doubted that his removal was demanded by the interests of the service and of the country. His desertion of the field alone afforded ample justification, and his conduct after the retreat to Chattanooga furnished other good reasons for it. There was the withdrawal from Lookout Mountain, already discussed. Next he was guilty of the presumption of despatching to the President on October 3 the senseless suggestion that he offer a general amnesty to all Confederate officers and soldiers, which gave great offence and raised suspicions of political aspirations on his part, although Mr. Lincoln replied kindly. But the greatest fault he showed was his indecision upon the question of staying in Chattanooga, notwithstanding the strong and repeated admonitions of the Government, and especially of the President, to hold the place. This state of the General's mind is revealed in Dana's despatches to the Secretary of War, but I must in duty point out that the extravagance of their language, in genuine reporter's style, unduly exaggerated the case. As Dana's denunciations were the only information which reached the Government from an au-
authoritative source—even Rosecrans’s own report did not reach the capital until after he was relieved—they proved the determining factor (just as they did in the cases of McCook and Crittenden) with Stanton and Halleck. Full credit for this riddance was claimed by Dana himself in a conversation with me some months later in Washington. The President was inclined to exercise that weak clemency towards the General which he manifested towards McClellan and other disappointing commanders, but finally yielded to the "categorical imperative" which Stanton on this as on other occasions was obliged to address to the Executive. I cannot help remarking, that, as my own eyes observed at the time, Dana had intimate intercourse, day and night, with General Rosecrans, and that he enjoyed his personal hospitality, sitting at the same table and sleeping in the same building. His reports also prove that he deliberately drew the General into confidential communications, the substance of which he used against him, and that he held talks with general officers regarding Rosecrans which were nothing less than insubordination on their part. It can hardly be admitted that patriotic motives were a sufficient excuse for such a course.

Just before starting for the North, in obedience to the summons of Secretary Stanton, the Assistant Secretary wired him that he feared Rosecrans would evacuate Chattanooga at once unless he was ordered to remain. It is due to General Rosecrans to state that there was no foundation for this last accusation, and I am at a loss to understand how Dana could utter it, for I can personally bear witness to the contrary. I saw the General daily, and knew that the reopening of the Tennessee and the proposed movement of General Hooker absorbed his attention. Moreover, I recollect clearly that Dana expressed regret to me, an hour before his departure, that he was not to be present when the attempt to seize Williams’s Island and the south bank should be made; so that he had no real ground for entertaining the fears he despatched to his chief. But his mes-
sage was effective, in that in consideration of it Stanton and Grant agreed to act at once by removing Rosecrans and appointing Thomas in his place.

I had never considered Rosecrans qualified to lead a large army. I can indeed claim that I took a correct measure of his mental and moral calibre directly after I made his acquaintance at Murfreesboro'. As early as June 14, I had written privately to the managing editor of the Tribune from that place, in reply to a suggestion from him that I should try to get into confidential relations with the General Commanding:

My intercourse with him could hardly be more intimate than it is. I always make it my object to secure the confidence and respect of others in my private character as well as in that of a representative of a leading journal, and am generally successful. As to the mode of securing the confidence of the General proposed by you, I must say that it could not be employed, in my opinion, without degrading me to a mere mouthpiece of him, as which my self-respect and conception of professional dignity will never allow me to serve. I refer to the recommended reading of my correspondence to him, with a view to its modification at his pleasure. Permit me to advise you, in connection with this, not to commit the Tribune too strongly to the advancement of his military fortunes. There are flaws in his moral as well as intellectual composition and professional capacity, which the future will surely develop into prominent shortcomings, and may make too much previous commendation a source of contradiction, inconsistency and humiliation.

Personally and professionally the exit of General Rosecrans from the scene was, in one respect, a disadvantage, in another a relief to me. On the one hand, while I knew his successor well enough, his natural reserve, if not stiffness of manner, his reticence and indifference to the press, precluded such facilities at headquarters as I had enjoyed under the previous régime. Thomas's staff followed his example, and was officious towards correspondents, whereas the military family of Rosecrans, in accordance with his own
seeking of favor with the press, observed the opposite course. On the other hand, Rosecrans constantly embarrassed me by trying his best to induce me by special favors to defend him in the *Tribune*. He went so far even as to let me not only read but copy for publication the principal official reports on the battle which came in before his departure, with the result that the *Tribune* printed them in advance of all other papers. In this connection I give a letter from Mr. Dana to General Thomas, which appears in the War Records and explains itself.

**WAR DEPARTMENT,**  
**WASHINGTON CITY, March 9, 1864.**

**MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS,**  
Chattanooga, Tenn.

**GENERAL:**

It is stated by a newspaper correspondent that, on the 19th of January, you were serenaded by the Ninth Ohio Regiment, and on that occasion declared to some of the officers of the regiment that you had praised them in your official report of the battle of Chickamauga, and then added: "I wanted to do justice to the regiment, and I cannot understand why—I feel sorry—that the War Department saw fit to curtail my report so as to leave this out." I presume that you are aware that the only copy of your report which has yet been published was the rough draft furnished by you to Major-General Rosecrans, that officer being in great haste to make out his own report. General Rosecrans gave this rough draft which you had sent him to Mr. Villard, the correspondent of the *Tribune*, and it was published in that paper. The final report which you sent to Washington was, so far as I am aware, never seen by Mr. Villard. I am confident that you have not imputed to the War Department the mutilation of any official documents; but it seems proper that you should be aware of a statement which pretends to be made on the authority of your own language.

I am, General, with great regard,

Yours faithfully,

C. A. Dana.

This chapter may fitly be closed with a brief sketch of the new commanding general. Thomas was a graduate
of West Point, and had had more than twenty years of active service, including the Seminole and Mexican wars, in the artillery and cavalry, before the outbreak of the Civil War. He had thus had longer military experience than any other general officer in the Army of the Cumberland. He held the rank of colonel of cavalry in the regular army. Though a native of Virginia, he had never faltered for a moment in his fealty to the flag. He had a commanding presence, being nearly six feet high, and a soldier-like, erect bearing, with an open countenance, but rather a stern expression, full light-brown hair and beard tinged with gray. On first acquaintance, he seemed of a stolid nature and stiff and distant in manner, but on closer intercourse would reveal himself as a sturdy, resolute character, with the strongest sense of duty, and, altogether, a thorough soldier. He was not a genius, but was very intelligent, and although he seemed at times not quick in perception and too deliberate in execution, he could always be relied on to do what was required of him to the best of his ability. His even temperament gave him that coolness in action and equipoise in success as in failure which he possessed in a higher degree than any of his fellow-generals. He differed creditably from most of them in another regard: he was entirely unselfish and unambitious. He never made the least effort for personal preferment, and rather shunned than sought higher commands, from modest doubts of his competency and consequent shrinking from great responsibilities. It will be remembered that he declined the command of the army when Buell was superseded. In the same spirit, he felt it his duty, when a report reached him that Secretary Stanton had inquired how his appointment, instead of Rosecrans's, would be taken in the army, to intimate to Dana his reluctance to be the successor. While he was not communicative or fluent and polished in speech, he was by no means discourteous, and, as his reports show, thought and expressed himself very clearly.

Feeling that I was no longer wanted at the general head-
quarters as a messmate, I looked about for another connection. I received several offers to join other messes, but finally decided to accept the invitation of Brigadier-General Willich to share his tent and table. Of his antecedents as a Prussian artillery officer I have spoken in describing the campaign under Buell. He was forty-eight years old, and was probably the most thoroughly trained officer in the army. He possessed great general intelligence and knowledge, and conversed well on almost any subject. He had, however, pronounced socialistic views, which had led to his participation in the revolutionary rising of 1849 in Germany and to his exile, and with these I did not at all sympathize. We had many disputes over them, but they left no irritation. He provided me with a camp bedstead, and I partook regularly of such fare as he had. His one servant, a private soldier, was a very smart man and of general utility in cooking, washing, waiting at the table, cleaning our clothes, blacking our boots, and taking care of the general's horse. In apologizing for the meagre meals he served, General Willich asserted that Fritz was a most successful purveyor and had nearly always managed to keep him in plenty, but that as there was now no chance to forage and his cooking was confined to the treatment of the reduced rations, he could not well do himself justice. Although the commissary department then distributed only hard bread, bacon, and coffee, Fritz showed real genius in evolving sufficient repasts out of this scant material and some canned vegetables and fruit he had managed to save from better days. I enjoyed Willich's hospitality as long as I remained in those parts, and I had nothing to complain of but the dampness. We could keep up a log fire only in front, not inside of, the tent, and when it rained, it was impossible to feel either dry or warm. To counteract this, our faithful attendant treated us at proper intervals to hot punch, for which he had kept some bottles of cognac in close reserve.

I became the guest of General Willich before I knew that
General Grant was coming to Chattanooga to assume supreme command; but as my chances of being allowed to join his headquarters were no better than with General Thomas, I concluded not to run the risk of a refusal, but to content myself where I was. It was fortunate for me that Mr. Dana returned, as he became my main reliance for correct information relative to the plans of the Commanding General, which he imparted and discussed with me freely, knowing that I would not make improper use of it. Next to him, General W. F. Smith, the engineer-in-chief, whose acquaintance I had made at Fredericksburg, General Meigs, the Quartermaster-General of the United States Army, whom the Secretary of War had sent to Chattanooga immediately after the battle, and the old division commanders of the Army of the Cumberland, were helpful to me. The scene of current events was also so confined that any occurrence of importance could hardly escape my notice.
CHAPTER XXXV

The Reopening of the Tennessee River.—1863

The very last order General Rosecrans gave to the engineer-in-chief was to make a thorough reconnoissance of the south bank opposite the west side of Moccasin Point. General Smith carried out his instructions on October 19. He found an opening low in the ridge bordering the river, through which a small creek discharged into it, with Brown's Ferry at its mouth. This opening, or gorge, offered a way for landing parties to gain by a rush the first heights rising from 250 to 300 feet to the right and left of it and commanding the narrow valley between them and Lookout Mountain, and the roads running through it towards the town from a lower ferry. From that position the communications of the enemy up the Lookout Valley and over Raccoon Mountain could also be threatened. It was discovered further that the ridge was occupied by only a thin chain of pickets, which it seemed quite practicable to surprise. General Smith was so well satisfied with the feasibility of the proposed lodge- ment that he immediately matured plans for effecting it without delay. He submitted it to General Thomas, as the new army commander, who laid it, with his approval, before General Grant upon his arrival. The very next morning, the two generals were conducted to the ground by General Smith, who explained the topography and his proposed coup de main. He convinced them of the sound- ness of his plan, and they authorized him on the spot to proceed with the necessary preparations.

General Smith was assigned to the command of the expedi- tion to be formed for his purposes. The brigades of
Generals Hazen and Turchin, numbering over 4000 men, and three batteries under Major Mendenhall, were ordered to report to him. The programme was to make the movement partly by water and partly by land. Fifty pontoons built for another bridge were prepared, each to carry twenty-five armed men and the rowers, together with two flat-boats holding forty and seventy-five men respectively. This flotilla would thus be manned by about 1600 men drawn from both brigades, with General Hazen in command, and was to pass down the river at night to the selected points for landing, a distance of nearly nine miles from Chattanooga. The remainder of the infantry and the artillery were to march under cover of night to the proper point on the east bank (the western front of Moccasin Point), whence the infantry was to be hurried in over the pontoons, directly after the landing of Hazen’s men, while the guns remained to cover by their fire, if necessary, the operations of the joint forces. Complete surprise was, of course, the main condition of success.

General Smith invited me to accompany him on the expedition, and I gladly accepted. The preparations were pushed day and night, and with as much secrecy as possible. Even the brigade commanders learned the real purpose only the day before the expedition took place. As a number of boats had yet to be built and nearly all the oars to be made and the men instructed in rowing, it was not until the evening of the 26th that everything was ready. I was notified to join General Smith at midnight, and was promptly on hand. He kindly furnished me with a mount for the occasion. I had enjoyed a long sleep before starting and felt fresh enough for the night’s adventures. We crossed over the bridge to the north side at about one o’clock, and had a good deal of difficulty in finding our way. Fortunately it did not rain, but it was very dark, and the very bad road was blocked by Turchin’s command and the artillery. But we reached the landing-place of the ferry (which in ordinary times ran to the mouth of the
gorge opposite) by two o'clock, dismounted and stretched on the ground, awaiting developments. Absolute silence was enjoined in order not to excite the attention of the enemy. No lights or fires were permitted. It was really remarkable how quiet the 3000 men and hundreds of animals, that bivouacked huddled together near the bank, were kept for the next few hours. Not a sound was heard by the rebel pickets, as was subsequently learned, though they were only about a quarter of a mile from us.

The flotilla was manned by one o'clock, but did not get under way until 3 A.M. The fifty-two boats moved noiselessly out in long procession. It was found directly that the current would carry them along without the use of oars. After floating down for three miles, the boats came in sight of the first rebel picket fires, but, by keeping well up the east bank, were not discovered by the enemy until the first boat touched the other bank, when a few shots, which were returned from the flotilla, were fired at them. This was the first sign to our party that the boats had reached their destination. It was then nearly five o'clock.

I had fallen asleep leaning against a tree, but was aroused by the stir about me. We saw nothing but the signal fires just lighted by our side to indicate the landing-points, but we heard the noises caused by the disembarkation, as well as the commands of officers. In about twenty minutes, sharp musketry was again heard and continued for some time. We inferred that the rebel grand guard was attempting to drive our men into the river. Our anxiety was relieved by the appearance of several boats which, having discharged their loads, came to carry over Turchin’s men. More and more boats followed them, and the passage over was affected with such regularity and rapidity that by daylight all the infantry and even a section of artillery were on the west bank. Towards dawn some rebel guns had been brought up and threw a number of shells at the boats, but without doing any damage or interrupting the transfer.
I crossed over with General Turchin on one of the last boats, and soon ascertained that General Smith's plan had been successfully carried out in every detail. We stepped on the bank, a short distance to the right of the mouth of the gorge at which the first landing was effected, and near which stood the small house of the ferryman, the only human habitation in sight. The gorge formed the bed of a small creek then running so full that it could be crossed only by a foot-bridge of a single log over which our men had to pass in single file. The gorge was just wide enough for the stream and an ordinary road hugging it closely and running up and over the ridge, and the slopes on each side were very abrupt and difficult of ascent. The summit was sharp and but a few feet wide. These hills fringed a valley over a mile wide, partially cultivated, and enclosed to the west by the high parallel range of the Raccoon Mountain.

Hazen and Turchin were to take the hills respectively to the left and right of the gorge. Fifty men of the Twenty-third Kentucky, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Foy of that regiment, having landed first, quickly moved up the road about a quarter of a mile to the crest, and commenced building breastworks, after throwing out some skirmishers. Shortly afterwards the latter reported the approach of a force of the enemy. They turned our detachment and compelled it to fall back until they came upon more of our troops under Colonel Langdon of the First Ohio. A stand was then made, the enemy were checked and finally driven off. It was ascertained that the rebel body charged with guarding the river consisted of three small regiments of Law's brigade of Longstreet's corps, with three pieces of artillery; but they were so scattered along the river that only 150 men attacked Foy's men. They left six dead and a number of wounded. We lost less than forty in all and captured the rebel camp, some cattle and a lot of forage. Our forces then occupied the ridge to the right and left, according to programme, and fortified themselves as
strongly as possible with breastworks and abattis. As soon as the last troops had crossed over, the construction of a pontoon bridge was commenced, and pushed so energetically that it was completed before dark. I was one of the first to recross on it and make my way back to Chattanooga, and reached my quarters very tired and hungry at seven.

The good news I brought was sent by General Willich to the regiments of his brigade and to the other brigade commanders, and was welcomed with much joy in the camps. The achievement at Brown’s Ferry was a great step towards the unlocking of the river route to Bridgeport, but it could not bear the full desired fruit without such further movements on our part as would prevent the enemy from rendering the position gained useless by again obstructing navigation from other points on the left bank, between the Ferry and Bridgeport. The only way to accomplish this effectively was to shut him out from the approaches to the river by the valley of Lookout Creek, or, in other words, by occupying it ourselves. This was to be Hooker’s task. It was intended that he should execute it simultaneously with the other move. He was ordered to concentrate his command for this purpose some days before General Smith’s expedition was authorized; but if Dana’s report of October 23 to Secretary Stanton can be believed, he was laggard about this on the ground that his wagon trains had not yet arrived. He did not commence the movement until the morning of the 27th, the very time the expedition was landing at the Ferry. Dana, who went to Bridgeport to accompany Hooker, wired thence on that day to his superior that the General was in an unfortunate state of mind towards the plan he was to execute, finding fault, criticising, dissatisfied, and truculent. Hooker’s force was to consist of Schurz’s and Steinwehr’s divisions of the Eleventh Corps, under General Howard, and Geary’s second division of the Twelfth Corps. He was strengthened, moreover, by two brigades of General Palmer’s di-
vision, which started on the night of October 24 from Chattanooga to join him by way of Rankin's Ferry.

Hooker's troops were ordered to move without wagons, with three days' rations and forage, and sixty rounds on their persons. They passed directly over and crossed the Tennessee from Bridgeport by a pontoon bridge, with Steinwehr's division in the lead, and followed the road along the base of Sand Mountain to Shellmound, where they entered the valley of Running Water Creek, up which they marched to Whiteside, where they went into camp late in the evening. The next morning, the column continued up Running Water Creek to the watershed, and descended through the gorge into the Lookout Valley. It pushed on as far as Wauhatchie without meeting any opposition; but, a short distance from that place, near the junction of the Brown's Ferry and Chattanooga road, the cavalry advance suddenly received fire from rebels concealed in the underbrush on a hill close to the road. The column halted and a brigade was deployed to the left and another to the right of the location of the rebels, in order to cut them off; but the enemy fled across Lookout Creek and set fire to the railroad bridge over it. Resuming the march, our troops became exposed to the fire of the batteries on Lookout Mountain, which commanded that part of the valley; but the shells they threw did no injury. Between four and five, the mouth of Lookout Valley was reached and a junction effected below it by Howard with the command of General Hazen. The Eleventh Corps went into camp less than a mile from Brown's Ferry, with its left resting on the ridge occupied by Hazen, and its right at the base of Raccoon Mountain. Geary's division was directed to encamp near Wauhatchie, three miles from the Twelfth Corps, in a position covering the two roads leading from Lookout Valley to Kelley's Ferry, the first below Brown's.

We had lost but a few men so far, but the enemy did not intend to yield the position of Lookout Valley so easily. They had observed the division of Hooker's force and de-
determined to take advantage of it by a night attack. General Hazen was said at the time to have been so strongly impressed with this danger that he sought General Hooker and urged him to concentrate, but without effect. Hooker considered an attack improbable, and the control of the roads to Kelley’s Ferry too important for any risk. General Geary’s division consisted of three very weak brigades numbering together not over 1500 men. This division commander had noticed that his movements and numbers were clearly observable from the rebel signal-station on Lookout Mountain; moreover, very active signalling from it made him apprehend that something was contemplated against him during the night, and he therefore exercised extra precaution in posting his pickets and grand guards. But as Howard’s corps had apparently cleared the valley of the enemy to the north, he assumed that any move upon him would come from the south, and he guarded against surprise mainly from that direction. His men slept on their arms, with their cartridge-boxes on. Their rest was not disturbed until nearly eleven o’clock, when some picket firing led General Geary to have the whole camp aroused. All was quiet again until after midnight, when the discharge of the guns of our pickets to the north and east gave warning of the approach of the enemy from the side he was least expected. General Geary had barely time to form a line when a heavy body fell upon his left, firing and cheering.

Lieutenant-General Longstreet, commanding the left of the investing army, was ordered on October 27 to dislodge our troops from their new position at Brown’s Ferry. While observing it with General Bragg from Lookout Mountain, he was apprised of the approach of Hooker’s column. Repairing to a nearer point of observation, they watched the march of Howard’s corps down the valley and saw Geary’s division, which they took to be the rear guard, come to a halt. They made a correct estimate of the strength of both bodies, and saw in the long distance sep-
rating them their opportunity for swooping down upon and destroying the smaller one. General Law’s brigade, a detachment of which had been encountered by Howard’s cavalry advance, already lay in concealment behind one of the low short ridges traversing the Lookout Valley, half way between Howard and Geary. General Longstreet directed the other three brigades of Jenkins’s (formerly Hood’s) division, which were lying on the east side of the mountain, to concentrate at its base, and to move around it and join Law, who was ordered to advance close to the road between our two bodies. Part of the division was then to move upon Geary, the remainder to prevent the Eleventh Corps from reinforcing him, by blocking the road, and, if circumstances were favorable, to attack and stampede our troops over the river. Otherwise, Jenkins was to withdraw after Geary’s destruction. Jenkins moved with three brigades, as ordered, but found it so difficult to work around the mountain that he did not reach his destination before midnight. Law’s and Robertson’s brigades were to hold the position occupied by Law, Bratton’s was to surprise Geary, and Benning’s to be stationed within reinforcing distance of Bratton. The main reliance was on the panic which they expected to produce on our side by the night surprise.

Bratton attacked with the Hampton Legion and Fifth South Carolina on the right, and the First, Second, and Sixth South Carolina and Palmetto Sharpshooters on the left. His line advanced within short range before firing, when a hot exchange of musketry ensued. The enemy tried to force first our left, then our right and centre. Bratton asserts that he drove part of our line through its camp and beyond the trains behind it; but Geary insists that not a foot was yielded at any point, and that every rebel forward move was repelled. He admits, however, that the Hampton Legion almost succeeded in gaining the road to Kelley’s Ferry in his rear, but they were caught in flank and driven back with considerable loss in killed and wounded. The
enemy had no artillery, but our division battery kept up an incessant shower of grape and canister upon the assailants at short range. The fighting continued till after three o’clock, when our men’s cartridge-boxes were nearly empty. Fortunately, the hostile fire then slackened, and the rebels gave up the struggle and withdrew from the field, leaving their severely wounded behind. Geary naturally claimed a decided victory, but it appears conclusively from the rebel official reports that Bratton was ordered to retire by General Jenkins in consequence of what had happened in the meantime to the brigades of Law and Robertson.

The sudden and heavy firing towards Wauhatchie was heard and its meaning at once understood by General Hooker, who immediately sent a direct order to Schurz’s division, which was encamped close to his headquarters, to hasten to the aid of Geary, and, at the same time, notify General Howard of this order, with the further one to double-quick Steinwehr’s in the same direction. The two divisions were promptly under arms. General Schurz, after making sure that his three brigades were ready to move, put himself at the head of the leading brigade under Brigadier-General Tyndale. The corps commander joined him and rode with him for a time. The column moved, with flankers on each side, in bright moonlight. After marching for half a mile, the left flankers were attacked, and the head of the column received a heavy volley from a hidden force, wounding one of Schurz’s staff at his side and several men. The leading regiment stopped and a few shots were fired in return, when the march was resumed. Schurz then learned that his other two brigades, which he had supposed to be following Tyndale’s closely, had been halted some distance behind by order of General Hooker. About the same time, he received an order from the latter, by an aide-de-camp, to take from the enemy and hold a height to his left, commanding the gap in the spur of hills through which the main road to Chattanooga turns to the east. Tyndale’s men were formed and climbed up
the steep slope and speedily drove the rebels from the intrenched crest after a short engagement, and remained in that position. This encounter was with Robertson's brigade, which formed the left of the rebel line on the hills.

Meantime, Steinwehr's division had a similar experience. After being under way for a short time, its head also received a volley from another hill flanking the Chattanooga road on the north. Howard ordered the height to be taken, and Steinwehr assigned the task to Smith's brigade. A line of three small regiments, not exceeding 700 men in all, made for the hill and ascended it under severe fire, without returning it, trusting to their bayonets, as ordered. As they reached the crest, the enemy fled, leaving their intrenching tools and fifty prisoners in our hands. They proved to be Law's brigade, outnumbering our force by one-half. It was the capture of the two hills which led the rebel division commander to the conclusion that his venture was hopeless, and to his order to all his brigades to fall back beyond Lookout Creek.

After Tyndale's brigade was in position, General Schurz, in order to ascertain why his other brigades were kept behind, rode back and found General Hooker, and, reporting to him that the hill had been occupied, asked for further instructions. The Commanding General asked him curtly why he had not pushed his column to the support of Geary. He answered very properly because only Tyndale's brigade had been at his disposal and employed in taking the hill. He was then ordered to reinforce Geary without delay, and did so; but none of his troops reached the latter before half-past five, over two hours after the rebels had given up the fight with him.

The affair has become known as the "Battle of Wauhatchie," but hardly deserves to be designated as such, considering the smallness of the number engaged and the losses on each side. Our casualties were 420, of which Geary lost 216 and Smith's brigade 164. We had eleven officers killed, including the two of Geary's battery, which
also lost one-third of its men and half of its horses. The rebel loss was much exaggerated in our reports. Even General Thomas gave it as 1500 in his despatches to Washington. In reality, it was not much over 500; that of Bratton's brigade alone was 356. But while this encounter was of small importance in this respect, the effect of it was very consequential for us, as it deterred the enemy from any other attempt to recover control of the left bank, and put our ability to hold the place beyond all doubt, and thus gave us the undisputed use of the river route for supplying Chattanooga. The rebel surprise was well planned, but turned out only another of the many instances of night attacks (owing to the great difficulty of managing them properly, especially in a broken and wooded country), becoming more hurtful to the assailants than to the assailed. If Law's and Robertson's brigades, which were very well placed for preventing Howard from succoring Geary, had attacked determinedly, instead of remaining more on the defensive, the result would probably have been different. Even as it was, they kept Howard's two divisions from giving aid to Geary until he had saved himself by the gallant struggle of his command. The passiveness of Benning's brigade, which does not seem to have fired a shot, has never been explained.

General Bragg was bitterly disappointed by the failure of his best division, numbering fully 5000 men, as he said in his report to the War Department, and pitted, as they were, against "parts of the 11th and 12th Corps, troops which have more notoriety for their want of steadiness under fire than anything else. The officers do not seem to have appreciated a night attack. It should have been made with great vigor and promptness, and completed before the enemy could have time to know our purposes. . . . The reports of Generals Jenkins and Law conflict, each apparently claiming that the other was at fault." Bragg ascribed the miscarriage directly to the jealousy of these two generals.
On our side, the affair had a painful sequel. As has been seen, although General Hooker promptly issued orders, as soon as the firing was heard, to reinforce Geary with the whole of Howard's corps, not a man reached Geary until long after his fighting was over. My narrative shows how this happened. But, strange to say, General Hooker, who was solely responsible for it, committed the outrageous injustice in his official report of charging General Schurz and one of his brigade commanders, by implication, with disobedience of orders in not going promptly to the relief of Geary, as ordered. The censured generals did not see Hooker's report until January, but then at once made application for courts of inquiry. General Schurz obtained one, before which the facts were proved by the most conclusive evidence to be just as I have related them. The result of the investigation was a complete exoneration of the division commander and his subordinate and a thorough humiliation of Hooker, whose conduct was explained at the time by his being under the influence of liquor during the engagement. Another explanation is that he had hated Schurz ever since the battle of Chancellorsville, and that the utterly unfounded charge was probably due to vindictive malice.
CHAPTER XXXVI

Preparations for the Offensive.—1863

The general headquarters learned of the fighting at Wauhatchie within two hours after its commencement. The news caused great uneasiness, which was allayed, however, before daylight by the tidings of the repulse of the enemy. Generals Grant and Thomas set out in the early morning for Lookout Valley, via Brown’s Ferry, after ordering two brigades to reinforce Hooker. They returned after noon, satisfied that Bragg could not recover the positions gained by us. They found the approaches to Brown’s Ferry already well protected by the erection of connecting redoubts, under the direction of General Smith, on the ridge held by Hazen and Turchin. Hooker was also rapidly intrenching on a well-chosen line. General Palmer’s two brigades, which had been detained by difficulties in crossing the river, were about to join with them. The force available in Lookout Valley for meeting a new attack numbered nearly 25,000, and was ample for the purpose. Moreover, the rest of the army at Chattanooga was within supporting distance.

Reports of the night fight, more or less exaggerated, spread rapidly through the camps around the town and produced general rejoicing. It instantly revived the spirit of the troops, as it was generally understood to mean nothing less than the definite laying of the spectre of famine and the quick restoration of full rations. This general elation prevailed, in spite of the steady fire which the enemy kept up all day, from four guns on Lookout Mountain, as though to vent his anger at Jenkins’s discomfiture in the Lookout Valley. An ocular demonstration that
a return to plenty might confidently be expected was made that very day. One of the two disabled boats which had fallen into our hands had been repaired, and was now got ready to pass down the river in order to carry supplies between Bridgeport and Brown's Ferry. As the rebel batteries upon Lookout Mountain completely swept the horse-shoe bend of the river by which Moccasin Point is formed, the boat had to run the gauntlet of their shell and shot. Midnight was therefore fixed for the daring attempt. I went to the landing near that hour, to witness the start, and found a crowd of officers already there. The boat was manned by volunteers with experience in steamboating. It got off soon after the appointed time, with our silent good wishes. After it had been under way for about twenty minutes, the stillness of the night was suddenly broken by reports of single shots and volleys from small arms, followed in less than a minute by the reverberation of the fire of heavy guns. We thus knew the craft had been discovered, and trembled for the crew. But in less than an hour later, three whistles—the agreed signal—told us that it was safe after all, when we broke out into three grateful cheers. The boat was not hit by heavy missiles, but received a shower of bullets, one of which perforated a steam-pipe. This did not, however, impede its progress down the river, and the damage was easily repaired. It took on a load at Bridgeport and started on the up-trip the same day. We learned the next morning that the boat which had been captured and repaired at Bridgeport had come up and landed a heavy cargo at Brown's Ferry the evening before. The two boats and the barges they could tow could bring up between 700 and 800 tons a day, or more than the daily consumption of the army. Notwithstanding the high stage of water, the natural obstructions between Brown's and Kelley's Ferries caused so much trouble and loss of time that the boats at first ascended no higher than Kelley's, eight miles by wagon road from Brown's. But the road became so bad by severe
use and rain that the boats, after a few days, again ran to Brown’s. Complete relief of the army, however, remained thenceforth assured.

The credit due for General Smith’s achievement was given him by General Thomas in a very complimentary general order issued on November 1. General Hooker’s command also received special recognition in another, dated November 7, in which this passage (rather overdone, considering that we suffered scarcely any losses in taking the hills) occurs: "The bayonet charge of Howard’s troops, made up the sides of a steep and difficult hill over 200 feet high, completely routing and driving the enemy from his barricades on its top, and the repulse by Geary’s division of greatly superior numbers who attempted to surprise him, will rank among the most distinguished feats of arms of this war." In another respect, Generals Grant and Thomas had so much ground for dissatisfaction with the behavior of General Hooker that he would not have been distinguished by that order if they could have helped it under the army rules entitling the superior to a share of the glory actually achieved by a subordinate.

As shown by his report of October 26 to the General-in-chief, General Grant at first had some doubts of the possibility of sustaining the army at Chattanooga, and discussed the contingency of leaving the defense of the place to part of it and moving the bulk nearer to regular supplies. With a view to this, General Smith was ordered to resume work on the fortifications, which had been allowed to lag owing to the all but continuous rain, and push it to completion, which he agreed to do within three weeks, so that 10,000 men could hold the place against any hostile force. In the same report, Grant gives expression to his strong apprehension that the enemy would have a large force up the river and cross it between Blythe’s Ferry and Cotton Port, thirty to forty miles northeast of Chattanooga, and then repeat Bragg’s former movement upon our communications via McMinnville. In that case, the weak
condition of our artillery horses and our deficient supplies would prevent the army from following the enemy. This fear led him to send orders to General Sherman to drop the repair work he was doing on the railroad along the Tennessee and push eastward with his troops as quickly as possible. In explanation, he stated that the enemy was evidently moving a large force towards Cleveland (a railroad centre twenty-five miles east of Chattanooga), and might break through our lines and move on Nashville, in which event his (Sherman’s) troops would be the only available forces that could beat them there. He added that, with Sherman’s command at Chattanooga before the enemy crossed the Tennessee, we could turn their position so as to force them back and avoid the possibility of a northward move that winter. General Grant was misinformed as to the alleged rebel movement. Bragg had not stirred at that time, but it turned out that soon afterwards he decided upon a diversion to the east.

The alarming news was brought to the army headquarters by some of our spies from the rebel camps that Longstreet had started with a large force for East Tennessee. As it was confirmed from other sources on the next day, and as the movement doubtless threatened great danger to General Burnside, General Grant at once considered with General Thomas the possibility of either attacking Bragg’s position or moving against his communications to the northeast, in order to bring about the recall of Longstreet. Grant thought that Bragg had only 30,000 men left on our front, while Thomas’s estimate was 40,000. After carefully weighing all the circumstances, the two generals came reluctantly to the conclusion that nothing aggressive could be safely undertaken before Sherman’s advent. Renewed orders to hasten his movements were sent.

The regular flow of sufficient supplies for men and animals, the fruit of our successes at Brown’s Ferry and in the Lookout Valley, freed the minds of Generals Grant and Thomas from all doubts as to our ability to remain in
Chattanooga. The approach of Sherman further promising enough strength for the resumption of the offensive, the two commanders now entered upon plans for raising the siege. It was clear that to make Bragg withdraw by long-distance strategic movements was out of the question, owing to the nearness of the inclement season, the impossibility of accumulating sufficient supplies, and the condition of our draft animals. There was no other way than to drive off the enemy by direct aggressive operations. Perceiving this, the generals were receptive of suggestions which General Smith was ready to make to this end. After repeated and close observations of the ground, the engineer-in-chief was convinced that the northern end of Missionary Ridge, from the tunnel by which the Chattanooga & Cleveland Railroad passes under it to Chickamauga Creek, was not occupied by the enemy; that a passage of the Tennessee could therefore be forced at the mouth of the creek, the terminal heights of the ridge seized, and the rebel left thereby turned. Having satisfied himself by a personal reconnaissance that the topographical conditions were correctly represented, General Grant resolved to attempt the seizure of the position described, and directed all necessary preparations to be made as quickly as possible. The operation was not to be undertaken, however, before the advent of the reinforcements under General Sherman, for whose fine troops a leading part was reserved. With them there would certainly be sufficient numerical power for a decisive blow. According to the official returns, the effective strength of the Army of the Cumberland, at the end of October, was, without cavalry: 4th Army Corps, 19,781 officers and men on duty; 11th Corps, 6152; 12th Corps, 9211; 14th Corps, 19,220; reserve artillery, 1219—or nearly 56,000; and fully half as many again were being led towards Chattanooga by Sherman, making a total of between 85,000 and 90,000.

It is now time to speak in detail of Sherman’s doings. When General Grant received orders to send all the troops
he could spare to the aid of Rosecrans, General John E. Smith's division of General McPherson's Seventeenth Corps was going up the Mississippi to join General Steele's command, for an expedition up the Arkansas River. The division was ordered to disembark at Memphis. Next, General Sherman, whose Fifteenth Corps was lying along the Big Black River about twenty miles east of Vicksburg, was directed to send one of his divisions at once to that town, for immediate embarkation. He detached the first division, under General Osterhaus, and it marched immediately. The following day, the corps commander was ordered to report in person to General Grant at Vicksburg. He was there told that he and his corps would be sent to Eastern Tennessee, except one division which was to remain on the Black River; but, as a substitute for it, Smith's division of the other corps, already up the river, would be placed under his orders. His first division embarked on the 23d, but the second and fourth were delayed some days by the want of boats. General Sherman started on September 27 and reached Memphis on October 2. He found his instructions from General Halleck, according to which he was to conduct the troops that had come up the river and all others that could be spared from Western Tennessee to Athens, on the Tennessee River, following the railroad and repairing it as he moved. From Athens, he was to report by letter for orders to General Rosecrans as Commander of the Army of the Cumberland. Osterhaus's division had already been moved by rail to Corinth, and Smith's was being moved to that point. Finding that, owing to the limited supply of rolling-stock, it would take weeks to get all the rest of his troops off by rail, General Sherman shipped only his guns and wagons and made the men and animals march. On the 16th, his whole force was assembled at Corinth and reached Iuka on the 19th. Here the railroad repairing commenced, making further progress slow. The first and second divisions led, under the command of F. P. Blair, Jr., and constantly skirmished
with mounted enemies. Being ordered to drive the rebels beyond Tuscumbia, they had a considerable fight with them at Cane Creek, and occupied the town on October 27.

On October 24, an aide-de-camp of General Grant personally delivered to General Sherman despatches conveying the first information that General Grant had been put in command of the three departments and armies of the Tennessee, Cumberland, and Ohio, and that Sherman himself had been appointed to the command of the Department and Army of the Tennessee. He at once issued general orders placing West Tennessee under General Hurlbut, and Mississippi under General McPherson, and ordered the former to select 8000 men from the best troops of the Sixteenth Corps and send them under General G. M. Dodge after him. While his fourth division was crossing the Tennessee at Eastport by the use of two gunboats and a scow, a messenger arrived who had floated down the river in a boat, and brought General Grant's order of October 24, already mentioned. It had been sent to General Crook, who had forwarded it by the water route—a rather risky venture, it would seem, but successful in this case. The order was executed instantly, the two divisions called back to Eastport, the only practicable crossing, the railroad work abandoned, and every nerve and muscle strained to expedite the further march to Bridgeport.

The leading division, with General Sherman at the head, reached Florence on November 1. Marching on to Rogersville and the Elk River, the column found the latter impassable and was obliged to follow it up to Fayetteville. Here, orders reached Sherman from Grant to march to Bridgeport with the Fifteenth Corps and to leave General Dodge's command at Pulaski, to guard the railroad from Columbia to Decatur. Accordingly, General Blair was ordered to march with the second and third divisions by way of Newmarket and Bellefonte, while, of the other divisions, the first moved by Decherd and Stevenson, and Smith's by University Place and Sweesden's Cove. General Sher-
man himself accompanied the latter, and, pushing on in advance of it, reached Bridgeport on November 13. Having reported his arrival by wire to General Grant, he was desired to come to Chattanooga at once. He took the upriver boat the next evening and reported at the general headquarters on the morning of the 15th. He received a most hearty welcome. The proposed plan of operations was fully explained to him. His four divisions were to come to Chattanooga, three direct and the other after a diversion to Trenton in the Lookout Valley, in order to create the impression upon the enemy that the flanking movement of Rosecrans in September was to be repeated. His troops were not to enter Chattanooga, but to move past the town, concealed as much as possible, up the right bank, to a position opposite the mouth of Chickamauga Creek, and there, at the concerted time, cross the Tennessee on a pontoon-bridge, seize the northern outrunners of Missionary Ridge, and thence turn the rebel right. His command was to perform the principal part in the proposed operations, which were to be preceded and accompanied by supporting movements by the Army of the Cumberland, as well as by Hooker's column.

November 15 was mainly spent by the three commanding generals in a discussion of the plan, with the aid of maps and topographical sketches. The next day, they rode, under the guidance of the engineer-in-chief, to several commanding points, from which the visitor easily obtained a very clear comprehension of the positions of friends and enemies, spread out like a panorama before him. He was made fully acquainted not only with the character of the task assigned to him, but also with the anxious desire of all he conferred with for its speedy accomplishment. He could hardly help discovering a feeling that the approach of his divisions had not been as rapid as it might and should have been, and he took occasion to demonstrate that, ever since he had received the order to push through with
the least delay, he had done his best to accelerate their movements. The prevailing impatience, as he himself described this feeling, was chiefly due to the great and growing solicitude for the fate of General Burnside and his command in Eastern Tennessee. All he saw and heard at Chattanooga "inspired me," to use his own dutiful words, "with renewed energy." He telegraphed immediately to his fourth division, which had arrived at Bridgeport, to prepare for the march via Shellmound to Trenton. A perfect understanding having been reached with his fellow-commanders, he started on the return trip on the morning of the 16th. He rode to Kelley's Ferry, and was greatly disappointed to find that he was too late for the day's down-boat. Loath to lose precious twenty-four hours, he, nothing daunted, embarked with his staff officers on a small boat, with a steersman and four rowers, and started down the river. It was a very hazardous venture, not only because rebel scouts were still making their appearance on the banks, but because neither the man at the helm nor the oarsmen had had experience on the river. But the valuable load was safely landed late in the evening at Bridgeport, and thenceforth the General strove, day and night, for the redemption of his promise to General Grant to have his legions on the ground, ready for the struggle set for the 20th.

I was apprised of General Sherman's coming before his arrival, but I made no effort to see him during his brief stay. I knew that he had no time to spare for anything else than his duties. I was certain, too, that he would refuse to see me or any other correspondent. His hostility to the press had become more and more pronounced, and, in striking evidence of it, there were circulating at the time some vehement outbursts from him against it. In one letter to a publisher he had said that he thought praise from a newspaper was contamination, and he would willingly agree to give half his pay to have his name kept out of
the public prints. In another, to the editors of the Memphis Bulletin, he expressed himself thus:

I don't think you can conceive the mortification a soldier feels at the nauseating accounts given to the public as history. That affair at Collierville [an attempt to capture the town of that name by the rebel guerrilla Chalmers] should have been described in these words: "Chalmers tried to take Collierville, and did not." But ridiculous, nonsensical descriptions have followed each other so fast that you ought to be ashamed to print Collierville. Now I am again in authority over you, and you must heed my advice. Freedom of speech and freedom of the press, precious relics of former history, must not be construed too largely.

In the face of these fulminations, it naturally seemed the part of discretion to keep away from the General.

The diversion of Longstreet naturally inspired our commanders with confidence in the success of the impending attempt to force the enemy from Missionary Ridge. By it the Confederates themselves paved the way for our eventual triumph. It seems the more incomprehensible that they should have taken the false step of dividing their army as they were fully aware, notwithstanding our efforts to conceal the arrival of our reinforcements, that Hooker's command had already joined us and that Sherman's columns were rapidly approaching. They determined, indeed, in spite of this knowledge, to hurry Longstreet to East Tennessee to crush Burnside, and get him back before Sherman could reach Chattanooga. Their hardihood became our opportunity. Here is the story of their folly.

About November 1, a camp rumor reached Longstreet that he was to be sent against Burnside. Two days later, General Bragg summoned him to a council, at which Lieutenant-General Hardee and Major-General Breckinridge were also present, for a general discussion of possible movements by their army. Various operations were proposed, and finally one into East Tennessee came up for considera-
tion. Longstreet pronounced in favor of it, provided it could be executed secretly and with great rapidity and with no less than 20,000 men, and provided further that the remainder of the army would be withdrawn to a strong position behind the Chickamauga until the return of the expeditionary force. (This is Longstreet's version of what occurred at the council, but General Hardee, when requested in writing, some months later, to confirm it, replied that he did not recollect the suggestion of the temporary withdrawal behind the Chickamauga.) It was decided to try a coup against Burnside. Longstreet was to undertake it with two divisions, against which he claims to have protested as too small a force for quick success, but he was overruled and yielded. Marching orders were issued, and the two divisions, with an extra complement of artillery, numbering not much over 16,000 men, were under way by the 5th. But, owing to all sorts of unforeseen impediments and unexpected delays, the march was not rapid, but very slow, so that the rebels did not appear near Knoxville, behind whose fortifications Burnside had concentrated most of his command, until the 18th, and actually delivered the famous unsuccessful attack upon the place only on the 29th.

A decided improvement had taken place in our life since the raising of the blockade of the river. Mails and newspapers arrived again daily and banished the oppressive feeling of isolation from the rest of the world. While the mass of the army was, of course, ignorant of the plans of the commanding generals, the presence of Grant and the visit of Sherman were generally looked upon as sure indications that something was up, and that action would soon supersede our passiveness. Aware as I was of the reconnoitring of General Smith and his excursions with the commanding generals to the north of the town, I could guess their intentions without asking any questions. The dread of being shut up maybe for the winter months in Chattanooga, and the long continuance of the prevailing
monotony, had greatly discouraged me, but the prospect of stirring developments restored my buoyancy. The weather in November, too, was more favorable. We had heavy fogs instead of all but steady rain; and the sun shone now and then in the middle of the day. I was lucky enough, in the second week of the month, to secure the use of the horse of a field officer during his furlough, so that I could get necessary exercise and spend my time more agreeably in making visits. The long evenings and the want of lights were trying at first, but, with the reappearance of candles, card parties helped to pass the time pleasantly. Within a week after the coup at Brown’s Ferry, not only were full rations restored, but sutlers’ stores were available to supplement them with solid and liquid luxuries. Even fresh meat could occasionally be had. Fritz rejoiced in the enlarged opportunity for demonstrating his mastership in the culinary art. Instead of three or four, he had now many strings to his bow, and the sameness of fare with which General Willich and myself had had to content ourselves, was followed by a savory variety in our meals that would have done credit to a first-class restaurant.
CHAPTER XXXVII

THE BATTLE ABOVE THE CLOUDS.—1863

The preparations of the engineer-in-chief for the coming reckoning with Bragg were of two kinds. One was the completion of the defensive works at Chattanooga. Heavy details of men were made and the work pushed day and night, and, on the day fixed for the attack on the enemy, the fortifications were pronounced in a sufficiently advanced condition to defy any assault. The other was the collection of enough material for two bridges. One was to be thrown over the Tennessee, which was 1300 feet wide at the selected point, and another across the Chickamauga, at its mouth, of a width of 180 feet. The spare pontoons scattered between Chattanooga and Bridgeport were gathered together by strenuous efforts, and the two sawmills of the town put in operation to furnish the rest of the material wanted. It was decided, in order to screen the movement from the observation of the enemy, to haul the pontoons by land to a point opposite the mouth of the North Chickamauga, some six miles north of Chattanooga, and to float and load them there with the first landing force and row them to the landing-point. On November 20, the boats were in the river, provided with oars and crews. Then a formidable obstacle to the laying of the pontoon-bridges arose. The Tennessee in its actual swollen stage brought down great quantities of heavy drift-wood, which broke both the pontoon-bridges at Chattanooga and Brown’s Ferry. This naturally gave rise to the fear that it would not be possible to throw the two bridges for Sherman, or to maintain them, if thrown, long enough for the passage of the troops.
General Sherman strove hard to have the whole of the Fifteenth Corps opposite the mouth of the Chickamauga in time to strike on November 20, but found it beyond his power. General Ewing's division was the first to cross at Bridgeport, but made the détour to Trenton. General John E. Smith's followed next and reached its destination by the above date. But Generals Morgan L. Smith's and Osterhaus's were then still struggling with the badly cut-up and encumbered road between Shellmound and Brown's Ferry. A serious oversight had been committed in allowing the heavy division trains to follow each division, instead of moving the infantry and artillery ahead of them all. General Grant was greatly surprised when he learned of the blunder, but generously assumed the responsibility for it, though Sherman deserved the direct blame. Rain, too, again set in and impeded the marching. General Sherman reached General Hooker's headquarters on the afternoon of the 20th, and there found General Grant's order to him to make the attack the next day; but he was unwillingly obliged to ask for a postponement, which was reluctantly granted. The second division (Gen. M. L. Smith's) succeeded in crossing at Brown's Ferry only on the 21st. Ewing's had marched down Lookout Valley from Trenton and was to cross next, but, owing to the repeated breaking of the bridge by the drift-wood, did not get over till the 23d. So much damage was caused to the bridge after this that it would apparently take several more days to get Osterhaus's division on the other side. Hence, General Sherman felt it his duty to offer to undertake the movement against Missionary Ridge with the three divisions already over, and to let the other operate under the orders of General Hooker, provided a substitute was placed at his disposal. General Grant sanctioned this proposition, and Osterhaus acted under Hooker during the whole of the subsequent operations. On the afternoon of the 23d, Sherman's troops, reinforced by Jefferson C. Davis's division, were concentrated behind the hills opposite the mouth of the
Chickamauga, ready for action. It should be mentioned here that the three divisions of the Fifteenth Corps were under the direct orders of Major-General Blair through the ensuing crisis. He had been appointed by General Sherman to this command on October 25, and had exercised it since, although Major-General Logan had been transferred by order of the President on October 28 from the command of the Seventeenth to that of the Fifteenth Corps. The reason was that General Blair intended to take his seat in Congress at the coming session, but continued at his post in order to allow General Logan to take a furlough.

How much Sherman took the delay to heart, and how clearly he appreciated the demands of the situation, is well shown by the following passages from a despatch of his to General Grant on November 23, from opposite the mouth of the Chickamauga: "I need not express how I felt, that my troops should cause delay. . . . As you ask for positive information, I answer: No cause on earth will induce me to ask for longer delay, and to-night at midnight we move. . . . Every military reason now sanctions a general attack. Longstreet is absent, and we expect no more reinforcements; therefore we should not delay another hour, and should put all our strength in the attack."

According to the plan of operation, all the available force of the Army of the Cumberland, with the exception of the number needed to man the fortifications on the right and centre, were to be concentrated in line on the left, so as to be within reach of connection with Sherman after he had crossed the river. One division should constitute a mobile reserve, ready to move to the support of any part of the line. In order to make up for the detachment of J. C. Davis's division, 7000 strong, placed under Sherman's orders, General Howard was ordered to report to Thomas, and marched on November 22, by the two pontoon-bridges at Brown's Ferry and Chattanooga, into the latter place, and took position behind the Army of the Cumberland. This move was made as ostentatiously as possible,
in order to lead Bragg to believe that Sherman's men were crossing at the town, and render him doubtful as to the real point of attack. This ruse proved effective. Our signal officers, who had by long observation managed to understand the rebel signals, read one from the station on the summit of Lookout Mountain to Bragg that a large force, apparently a whole corps, had passed over the bridge into the town. Hooker's command consisted, up to November 20, of the Eleventh Corps, Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps, and the brigades of General Whitaker and Colonel Grose of the first division of the Fourth Corps, which had been sent to reinforce Hooker on his march to Lookout Valley and had been stationed at Shellmound and Whiteside. The two brigades had set out from Chattanooga under General Palmer, but were now commanded by Brigadier-General Charles Cruft.

The detachment of the Eleventh Corps chagrined and irritated Hooker greatly. As I heard at the time from general officers, he openly charged that it was a deliberate scheme to deprive him of all active share in the coming battle and to throw its management entirely into the hands of General Sherman. He asked leave of General Thomas to accompany the Eleventh Corps, on the ground that it was his duty to follow the part of his command going into battle, and received permission to do so. But, before following Howard, he received orders on November 23 to remain in the valley and to make a demonstration as early as possible the next morning against Lookout Mountain. His anger at this was appeased before the close of the same day by the assignment of Osterhaus's division to his command. The three divisions thus placed under his orders had never been united under one command before, and their officers and men were total strangers to each other. General Hooker himself knew only those of Geary's. His total force was a little under 10,000 effectives. To cover the advance of Hooker, the guns in the works on the Brown's Ferry bluffs and a battery of eight Parrott 20-
pounders established on Moccasin Point, directly opposite Lookout Point, were ready to open a sweeping cross-fire.

Let us now glance at the situation on the Confederate side. The removal of Lieutenant-Generals Polk and Hill and Major-General Hindman (the latter's restoration to command did not take place until after the culmination of events before Chattanooga) and the detachment of General Buckner led to so many changes in the commanders and so many reformations of commands as to constitute almost an entire reorganization of Bragg's army. There had been numerous changes among the brigadiers, and some consolidations of brigades and transfers of regiments from one to another. The cavalry corps under Major-General Joseph Wheeler, with the four divisions of Wharton, Martin, Armstrong, and Kelly, was mostly off on detached duty, and no part of it became engaged in the coming conflict. After Longstreet's departure with his two Virginia divisions, General Walker's division was attached to the corps of Lieutenant-General Hardee, who assumed command of the whole left, while that of the right was exercised by Major-General Breckenridge. The division of Stevenson was also withdrawn from the latter and transferred to the former. Up to our resumption of the offensive, the rebel lines included the crest of Lookout Mountain, and extended from its western slope around the northern to the eastern, and thence over the valley of Chattanooga Creek to and along Missionary Ridge, to within three-quarters of a mile of Tunnel Hill. The entire front was connected and protected along Missionary Ridge by rifle-pits and breastworks, with emplacements for batteries at suitable points, while on the plain of the Chattanooga Valley, towards Lookout Mountain, redoubts and redans formed part of the defensive works. Stevenson's division lay on the top along the crest of the mountain; next came, down its western slope, Walker's, Stewart's, Bushrod Johnson's, Cleburne's, Bate's; and last Anderson's at the extreme right. The strength of the three rebel infantry corps, in-
cluding artillery, was, on October 31, according to the official report of the number present in effectives: Longstreet’s, 14,674; Cheatham’s, 15,181; Breckinridge’s, 16,309; Artillery Reserve, 332—making an aggregate of 46,496. Deducting the 16,000 Longstreet took away with him, the force in our front was reduced to 30,000 men.

Longstreet’s expedition, however justifiable it seemed in its inception, proved a great mistake in the light of after events. It is almost beyond belief, but yet a fact, that a further blunder in the same direction was deliberately committed by Bragg on the very eve of our aggressive movements. On November 22, he issued orders to Major-General Cleburne to start at once with his own and Bushrod Johnson’s divisions in the wake of Longstreet for East Tennessee. The order was promptly obeyed, and two of Johnson’s three brigades embarked the same day by train for Loudon. General Cleburne was superintending the shipment of the other brigade of Johnson and of his own division, the next morning, at Chickamauga Station, some two miles west of Missionary Ridge, when he received another order from General Bragg, countermanding the previous one, and directing him to stop on the way such of the troops as had already left. He had succeeded in halting Johnson’s two brigades at Charleston Station, when a third order reached him to return as quickly as possible and to march the other brigade and his division back to the front at once. As Johnson was preparing to turn back, he received direct instructions from the army headquarters to proceed, which he did, and joined Longstreet. This further diminished the enemy before us by between 2000 and 3000 men. Cleburne was made to camp on the night of the 23d on the eastern base of Missionary Ridge, as a reserve to the army. Cheatham and Walker were absent on leave, and their divisions were respectively commanded by Brigadier-Generals Jackson and Gist; but General Cheatham returned to duty at night on the 24th.

Even before the withdrawal of Longstreet, the Confed-
erate line was altogether too extended for the available force. Its length was fully six miles, and the difficulty of maintaining it was augmented by its windings and ups and downs on the left. Its further attenuation by the detachment of Cleburne’s and Johnson’s divisions had much increased its weakness. Cleburne’s troops were eventually employed in protecting an extension of it to the north. Stewart and Bate were ordered to fill the gap caused by Cleburne’s and Johnson’s withdrawal, by extending their lines towards each other and drawing up their reserves. But this left them still weak.

The orders to the Army of the Cumberland to get ready for the offensive were already issued on November 18, but, owing to the detention of Sherman, it remained inactive till he was within striking distance. As its main object was to be to second his efforts against the rebel right, the first requirement was to insure communication with him after he had reached the left bank. To this end, Citico Creek, a deep, narrow stream following a crooked course from Missionary Ridge to its confluence with the Tennessee, about half a mile east of the town limits, was bridged during the night of the 22d. Until then the first and third divisions of Granger’s Fourth Corps had formed the left, extending from the Tennessee River, within the lines of our advanced rifle-pits, to the Rossville road. The second and third divisions of the Fourteenth Corps joined them on the right, their line extending around the fortifications to Chattanooga Creek. The latter corps was now under Major-General John M. Palmer, who was promoted to that command when General Thomas vacated it, not for his military merit, but through the pulling of political strings, against the wish of General Grant and by the partiality of the President, who was an old politicalcrony of the favored general. The two corps received orders at 11 A.M. the next day to move into position for the work expected of them. The infantry had been in good enough condition for weeks for another trial of strength
with their old adversaries, but the artillery could hardly have stirred had not teams for the guns been borrowed from Sherman and ferried over the river the day before—a telling exemplification of the effect of the siege on the Army of the Cumberland. The two corps advanced a short distance and then formed with the Fourth Corps in the front line, with Wood’s division on the left, extending to near Citico Creek, and Sheridan’s on the right. Baird’s division of the Fourteenth, refused en échelon, supported Granger’s right. Johnson’s division was held in readiness under arms in the intrenchments as a mobile column to reinforce any weak point. The Eleventh Corps was massed behind Granger’s centre. General Hooker stood still until the next day. Although the accession of Osterhaus to his command had been announced to him, it did not actually take place till then.

General Willich, my host, and I had been in constant expectation ever since the 18th of the order to break camp, and had become very weary of waiting, but this mood gave way to excited rejoicing when the command to move was at last received shortly after 11 A.M. on November 24. In less than half an hour the brigade was in motion. It now consisted of nine regiments; the Eighth Kansas, Sixty-eighth Indiana, Twenty-fifth and Thirty-fifth Illinois, and Fifteenth Wisconsin having been added to it only a short time before, to the General’s great satisfaction. Yet the nine regiments numbered not much more than 2000 effectives. Understanding that the two corps would only make a demonstration that day, and that the serious work would not come off till the morrow, I concluded to accompany General Willich, and it so happened that the main task of the day fell to him.

The corps line was completed by half-past one. Wood’s division extended without our rifle-pits through the open field in front of the casemated work named Fort Wood. On its right, Sheridan’s was posted along a railroad track, with his right resting on another enclosed work. The
troops moved into position as deliberately and regularly as though they were forming for a parade. The day being bright, they were in full view of the enemy, whose pickets at a distance of less than a quarter of a mile could be seen to watch them leisurely, with hands in their pockets, apparently wholly unapprehensive of our hostile intent. They were soon undeceived. On our side, too, the grand spectacle was watched from the ramparts of our forts. On those of Fort Wood, Generals Grant, Thomas, Smith, Quartermaster-General Meigs, C. A. Dana, and scores of staff officers were eager observers. At twenty minutes to two, the order to advance was given by bugle signal. Our brigade on the left and Hazen's on the right formed the division front. Beatty's was in reserve in the rear of Willich. The front brigades were preceded by double lines of skirmishers, and advanced in two lines; the first deployed, the last in double column in the centre, closed en masse. The Eighth Kansas served as our skirmishers.

Shortly before the division started, I learned that something more than a demonstration would devolve upon it. Major-General Granger had been ordered to advance in force to Orchard Knob, a hill rising boldly about 100 feet above the plain northeast of the town and a little over a mile from it and a mile from Missionary Ridge. It had served as an outpost to the enemy since the beginning of the investment. The object was to discover whether the enemy was still in strength before us. On the 20th, General Grant had received a notification under flag of truce from General Bragg, as follows: "As there may still be some non-combatants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal." This was considered a mere piece of bluff, and no attention was paid to it. But, on the night of the 22d, a rebel private deserted to our lines and reported that Bragg was falling back. This led to the theory at the general headquarters that the quoted letter might be a ruse to mask his real intention of retreating. The attack upon Orchard
Knob was accordingly to test the presence or absence of the enemy.

First some open fields, swampy and difficult to cross in places, and next a wide stretch of heavy timber, intervened between our starting-point and the Knob. Timber covered the latter and a low rocky ridge separated from it by a hollow, and running for nearly a thousand yards to the southeast. Along the crest of this ridge the rebels had protected themselves with rifle-pits and breastworks of logs and stone. Rifle-pits extended also around the east and north base of the Knob, and from it for a mile to Citico Creek and beyond. These defences were concealed and protected by the timber. As we got into motion, our guns in Fort Wood and the next adjacent work, Fort Thomas, opened on the Knob, and their roar inspired us all the way. The rebels made no reply, as they had no artillery in that position. The first shots from small arms were heard within a few minutes. Our skirmishers had come upon the rebel pickets about half-way to the Knob. With their rapid advance, a rattling fire developed, growing noisier as we neared our objective-point; but the brigade line never fired a shot. We had orders to take the Knob proper; Hazen the pits and breastworks on the ridge. Within twenty minutes, we were at and over the pits at the base, and, in a minute more, our men swarmed up the hill and cleared it of the enemy. Our loss was only four killed and ten wounded. Hazen had much harder work. His men received a destructive fire from the sheltered enemy, but, without faltering or firing, rushed up to the breastworks, and, leaping over them, captured nearly all the defenders, consisting of nearly 150 officers and men of the Twenty-eighth Alabama, of Manigault's brigade, with the regimental flag. Our loss was severe—two officers killed and fourteen wounded, twenty-six men killed and 127 wounded—and fell almost entirely upon the Forty-first and Ninety-third Ohio as leading regiments. In the course of the afternoon, the rifle-pits to the left of the Knob were
cleared by two regiments of Beatty’s brigade, with small loss. Simultaneously, the two divisions of the Eleventh Corps also advanced on Beatty’s left, and their skirmishers became briskly engaged as they moved forward. The rebels were forced back beyond the Creek, and the new line designated was occupied and intrenched. Schurz and Steinwehr lost four killed and thirty-two wounded.

Thus, what was intended to be only a reconnaissance in force, had accomplished a decided success in giving us possession of a very important position. The division and corps commanders came up to it as soon as it was carried, and, on recognizing its importance, asked General Thomas for authority to hold it, which, being given, our men were at once set to work intrenching it. The enemy’s batteries on Missionary Ridge opened a hot fire of shot and shell upon us and kept it up till nearly dark, but we suffered only one slight casualty. The two brigades labored all night, in relief parties, and by morning a line of rifle-pits and barricades was completed along the whole front of the division. Our brigade also constructed an épaulement on the top of the hill for a six-gun battery. As a rebel attack might be made at any moment, and as it was generally assumed that we would resume the offensive in the morning, I remained at the front for the night. I slept with Willich in a hut quickly made for us by Fritz and the orderlies, with a rubber blanket between me and the ground. Contrary to expectation, we remained quietly in our new position during the whole of the next day and night. A drizzling rain had set in during the night and made our bivouac rather uncomfortable.

General Sherman had kept his promise to begin the crossing of the river during the night of the 23d. General Smith’s brigade of his second division marched up the bank under cover of the hills to where the one hundred and sixteen boats lay. They were filled with thirty men each, and at midnight the movement down the river began. On nearing the mouth of the Chickamauga, a small
force was landed first, to capture the rebel pickets, which was smartly done, an officer and twenty men being taken and only one escaping. The rest of the brigade was next put ashore above and below the mouth. Then the pontoons, a ferryboat, and another steamboat commenced the transfer of the troops from the opposite bank, and by daylight fully 8000 men and one battery had been brought over and were well intrenched. The work of laying the two pontoon-bridges over the Tennessee and Chickamauga was commenced, and pushed so energetically that both were completed within less than seven hours, notwithstanding the powerful current from the high stage of water. Long's brigade of cavalry, which was to make a dash on the enemy's communications, had passed over the bridge by three o'clock. It succeeded in reaching and burning Tyner's Station, on the Chattanooga and Cleveland railroad, destroying the track and capturing one hundred wagons and two hundred prisoners. Another noteworthy exploit was the seizure, immediately after effecting a landing, of a number of torpedo rafts in the Chickamauga, which the rebels were about to send down the Tennessee for the destruction of our bridges.

General Sherman and staff passed over the bridge directly after the last pontoon was put in, and were gratified to be met on the left bank by General Howard, who had come up along it unopposed, with Buschbeek's brigade of Steinwehr's division, in order to open communication between his corps (the extreme left of Thomas) and the Fifteenth Corps. General Howard rode back to his command, but, at the request of General Sherman, left the brigade with him, and it shared the experiences of the Fifteenth Corps.

By noon, Blair's three divisions, with all their artillery and everything else, were on the left bank, and Davis's division was waiting at the east end of the bridge to follow the cavalry. At one o'clock, the march from the river towards Missionary Ridge commenced en échelon, with M.
L. Smith's division in the lead on the left, J. E. Smith's as the centre, and Ewing's on the right, with the front of each preceded by swarms of skirmishers. The northern end of the Ridge extends from the railroad tunnel under it for about a mile to the Chickamauga nearly north and south, and forms with that stream and the Tennessee three sides of a square, as it were. The ground enclosed within them is mostly level and consisted at the time of a succession of cleared fields through which the troops made the intervening distance of one and a half miles without much difficulty, although a drizzling rain was coming down. No resistance was met, and, at half-past three, the heights were attained by our skirmishers and soon after occupied in force. Here the Commanding General found that he had been in error in assuming that Missionary Ridge was a continuous, unbroken range. He discovered that his troops had gained only a fore-ridge, so to speak, about a third of a mile to the northwest of and separated from the main ridge by a little valley, and we were still half a mile north of the "Tunnel Hill," our real aim.

Three brigades, one from each division, were pushed up the fore-ridge. Brigadier-General Lightburn, commanding the one to the left, perceiving that the main ridge had not been reached, of his own accord ordered one of his regiments to occupy the point on it directly in front of him, which it did successfully. Half an hour later, the enemy moved over the valley against our left flank. There was then sharp firing of small arms and artillery for a time, and General Lightburn's advanced troops had to be reinforced by three other regiments. Towards dark, the rebels withdrew, leaving us in our positions, which General Sherman then considered so important that he ordered them fortified during the night. Our casualties were small, but included Brigadier-General Giles A. Smith, a very efficient brigade commander, who received a severe wound. The corps bivouacked in several lines for the night. M. L. Smith's division formed the left; G. A. Smith's brigade
resting on the Chickamauga, and Lightburn's on the fore-

hill. Next came Alexander's brigade of J. E. Smith's divi-

sion and Cockerill's brigade of Ewing's division as the cen-

tre, and the other brigades of the latter's division and Buschbeck's and Steinwehr's on the right. The two other

brigades of J. E. Smith's lay in reserve behind the centre.

One of J. C. Davis's brigades was moved up to the reserve, another remained half-way between the front and the

bridge, and a third at the latter. The enemy did not molest

any part of Sherman's lines during the night. Luckily, it

stopped raining and grew clear and bracing before morn-
ing. At midnight, orders arrived from General Grant to

make an attack at "dawn of day," with notice that General

Thomas would also take the offensive early in the day.

Bragg learned of our passage of the river during the

morning, and directed Cleburne, then en route for East

Tennessee, to send one of his brigades to protect the rail-

road bridge over the Chickamauga. When he was informed

of our advance upon Missionary Ridge, he at once ordered

Cleburne to occupy it, with his remaining three brigades, from Tunnel Hill to its northern extremity. It was in

executing this movement that Cleburne's leading brigade

of Texas regiments came in collision with Sherman's men.

Had our crossing been delayed twenty-four hours, or had

Cleburne been started a day earlier, Sherman would doubt-

less have rushed Tunnel Hill unopposed and Bragg found

himself obliged to fight with 6000 less of his best troops.

I have searched the Official Records in vain for Bragg's

reasons for detaching a second column for East Tennessee,

but have not been able to obtain any explanation of it.

The movement is likely to remain one of the insoluble mys-
teries of the Civil War, none the less puzzling because, two

days before he issued the marching orders to Cleburne,

Bragg telegraphed to Jefferson Davis that Sherman had ar-

rived, and on the strength of this asked for reinforce-ments.

There is good evidence, however, that the rebel Comman-
der-in-chief was under the delusion that a movement was con-
templated against his left until he was undeceived by Sherman's appearance on his right. Previous to extending it with Cleburne's command, he had already taken other measures to strengthen his threatened flank by transferring Walker's division (temporarily under General Gist), during the night of the 23d to the 24th, from its position in the Chattanooga Valley to the right, and by putting Lieutenant-General Hardee in command of all the forces on the right.

General Hooker's part in the programme of action for the 24th was to be by far the most dramatic and important. For the better comprehension of the unique performance of his force, which has found its place in history under the original but appropriate name of "Battle above the Clouds," a description of Lookout Mountain and of the rebel positions upon it is needful. The name "Lookout Mountain" applies not only to the huge headland rising abruptly between the mouths of Chattanooga and Lookout Creeks, but to the entire range running south and southwestwardly from it for a distance of nearly fifty miles, dividing the valleys of the streams mentioned, and affording communication between them through numerous depressions or gaps, by means of mere trails or roads. The mountain in its narrower sense presents three phases, to the north, west, and east. The northern and western are very abrupt and rocky, but furrowed; the eastern is less steep and broken. At the height of 1000 feet above its base, it becomes partially truncated, the recession of the upper portion forming a plateau of cleared and arable land. A mile southward, the "Palisades" tower straight up from 75 to 150 feet, a huge, cliff-like mass of rocks, above which rises the flat peak forming the highest point. There was then a farm on the plateau; the long frame house known from its owner as the White or Cravens house stood near where the western and eastern slopes meet in a sharp angle and form the abrupt northern edge of the mountain, making a conspicuous landmark. Roads came down the valley on
both sides of Lookout Creek and passed around the base of
the mountain, but only paths led up to the plateau from the
northwest; a zigzagging wagon road from Chattanooga
Valley ran up the east side to the summit.

On the morning of the 24th, there were six bri-
gades—Walthall’s, Jackson’s, and Moore’s of Cheatham’s
division, and Pettus’s, Brown’s, and Cumming’s of Steven-
son’s division—distributed over Lookout Mountain for its
defence. Major-General Stevenson had assumed command
of both divisions when Lieutenant-General Hardee was
ordered to the right. Pettus’s brigade was on the summit,
Brown’s guarded the passes from the top to Nickajack Pass
ten miles off. Jackson’s and Cumming’s brigades were sta-
tioned along the eastern base. Walthall’s and Moore’s
brigades lay on the western and northern slope, below the
Cravens house, on the left and right respectively, and they
provided the picket line about two miles long up the east
bank of Lookout Creek, in front of Hooker’s line.

Hooker’s first instructions, “to demonstrate only against
the mountain,” were changed so as to require him to take
the mountain if his demonstrations proved it practicable.
He decided to deliver his main assault directly up the west-
ern slope against the rebel left. To climb not far from a
thousand feet up the steep, broken, rocky mountainside
against the well-sheltered enemy looked like a most for-
midable task of doubtful issue, but the plan to strike in one
direction with all the available force brought success, owing
to the scattering of the defenders over the summit and the
three sides of the mountain at different heights, which made
succor from any one of the rebel positions to any threat-
ened point slow and difficult. On October 31, the present
effective strength of Stevenson’s division was 3102, and of
Cheatham’s 5467, or a total of 8569, while Hooker’s infan-
try, after deducting train guards and other detachments,
did not much exceed 7500. Hence, if it had been possible
to concentrate the Confederates on the west side, the out-
come would probably have been different. As it was, the
assailants had opposed to them only Walthall's and Moore's brigades of the last-named division—that is, about half their number; according to official returns, only 2694 effectives. General Stevenson having been assigned to higher command, they were led by Brigadier-General J. K. Jackson as division commander.

The line into which our troops moved for the operations of the day extended opposite the western slope behind the hills along the left bank of Lookout Creek. Geary's division was on the ground, but Osterhaus's division marched up from Brown's Ferry that very morning and reported for duty at 7:30 A.M. Whitaker's brigade of Cruft's division had marched on the day before twenty-one miles from Shellmound, and Grose's brigade thirteen miles from Whiteside over bad roads and in heavy rain. They reached the valley in a very fatigued condition, and bivouacked for the night near Hooker's headquarters. During the night, Cruft was ordered to send Whitaker's brigade to Geary, to whom it reported at 6 A.M. and remained under his orders all day. Geary was to work from the right, Cruft with Grose's brigade from the left, and Osterhaus from the centre. The rain ceased during the night, and, as it grew light, the summit of the mountain was found to be entirely concealed in drifting dark clouds, while heavy mists lay like thick veils over its sides. These conditions continued all day. They were a favor of nature, and of the greatest service to us, as they prevented the enemy from discovering any of our movements until we were nearly upon them.

Geary's command was marched up the valley to a point about two and a half miles from the mouth of Lookout Creek, where it was massed behind a mill soon after seven o'clock. The creek was found too deep to be forded. The pioneers were ordered to bridge it under cover of two companies. By a skilful manoeuvre the rebel pickets on the other bank, with their reserve to the number of forty-two, including an officer, were surprised, and surrendered with-
out firing a shot. A small detachment was sent up a trail bearing to the southwest, in order to mislead the enemy as to the real direction of our attack. It soon skirmished with the enemy. The bridge was finished by half-past eight, and the four brigades crossed rapidly. They were formed in three lines, somewhat en échelon, with eight regiments in front, four regiments about 350 yards to the rear as the second line, and two regiments as the third at a further distance of about 100 yards. Whitaker's brigade formed and followed as the reserve. The distance to be traversed from the starting-point to the plateau on the mountain was not less than three miles. At nine o'clock, the whole line moved forward, preceded by a heavy chain of skirmishers. For a mile and a quarter, no enemy but the most serious difficulties of ground were encountered. The mountainside sloped at an angle of nearly forty-five degrees, and was deeply furrowed by a succession of ravines of almost perpendicular ascents and descents. The troops not only had to do hard climbing, but, time and again, were creeping on all fours. Before ten o'clock, the hostile pickets were encountered and driven back for a mile upon their supports and Walthall's brigade, which awaited our attack in a position on the plateau protected naturally by thickly scattered rocks, and artificially by abatis and breastworks of sand, stone, and logs. As our line neared the enemy, it received a heavy musketry fire, to which reply was made with a few volleys, followed, as the fog lifted, by a rush with defiant cheers over the obstructions right upon the rebels, most of whom, after a brief resistance, threw down their arms and surrendered. Many of their dead and wounded were lying about the ground. Four flags and considerable equipment were taken. Sending his prisoners—the bulk of Walthall's brigade—to the rear, Geary continued his toilsome advance over great obstacles along the plateau towards Cravens house and the Palisades. Near the house, part of his line was checked and thrown into some disorder, but the reserve under Whitaker, which,
owing to the course of its ascent, had brought up on the right flank of the front line next to the Palisades, gave support and the advance was soon resumed. The house was reached about noon and two pieces of artillery captured near it. Pushing on around the Palisades, our right, in approaching them, became exposed to the fire of rebel shooters and to hand-grenades thrown from the crest of the Palisades, but got up to their lower bench, when orders to stop and fortify the position gained were received from General Hooker.

At this time, Osterhaus's command also appeared, and relieved some of Geary's regiments at the front. Of the former, Colonel Williamson's brigade had a bridge over Lookout Creek ready by ten o'clock, and General Wood's brigade another half a mile further up the creek by eleven. But both brigades did not move, according to orders, until Geary's fire was heard at the last-named hour. Our artillery opened vigorously to cover their passage of the creek. The crossing and the movements beyond were made so rapidly that Williamson got undiscovered to the rear of the picket line and grand guard of Moore's rebel brigade, and captured the whole of them. Osterhaus accomplished the ascent without meeting resistance.

General Cruft, on arriving, with his one remaining brigade under Colonel Grose, at the bridge which he was to repair and cross, found it held by the enemy, and that it would take too much time to refit for the passage of troops. General Hooker also observed this, and ordered him to leave two regiments at the bridge and move on with the remaining four to the one where General Wood was preparing to cross. After getting over the stream, Grose's regiments worked up the mountain between Osterhaus's brigades and reached the plateau about the same time.

The rebel force beaten back by Geary was Walthall's brigade. About the time Whitaker and Osterhaus appeared on the front, an offensive attempt was made against them, but was easily repulsed. It came from Moore's brigade,
which lay on the right of Walthall’s brigade before the action. When the firing commenced in front of the latter, General Jackson ordered Moore to move his command into the trenches next to Walthall’s, but the latter was not found in position, as he had decided to accept fight in front of his trenches. Before Moore reached them, he discovered that Walthall had been driven away to the rear of them on the left, but he claims to have occupied and held his side of them, in spite of exposure to an enfilading fire and repeated attacks, till between three and four o’clock, when he fell back about a quarter of a mile. Here he found support in General Pettus’s brigade of three Alabama regiments, numbering about 1000 men, of Stevenson’s division, which had been sent down from the summit ridge in response to a call from General Jackson for assistance. Later, Walthall placed on the latter’s left such remnants of his brigade as he had been able to gather together. Moore took position on the right of Pettus. The Confederates claimed to have held this line against repeated attempts from our side to drive them away. These alleged attacks were in reality nothing more than feelers from our front for the enemy, whose presence even at a distance of only 100 feet could not be detected on account of the fog. General Carlin’s brigade of the Fourteenth Corps, which had been ordered to reinforce Hooker from Chattanooga, reached the mountain at five o’clock, and was ordered to relieve Geary and Whitaker near the White House. It underwent a most trying experience in scaling the mountain in the darkness. The day closed with irregular firing along our front, which also continued till long after midnight. Carlin’s front was threatened twice by offensive demonstrations, which were easily warded off.

The main work of the day was naturally done by our infantry. But while neither cavalry nor artillery could accompany it in the ascent, the latter arm played a very useful part by maintaining from two full field batteries and a section of howitzers and another of Parrott twenty-
pounders an enfilading fire upon the lower parts of the mountain, which thoroughly demoralized the enemy occupying them. The Parrott in position at Moccasin Point on the farther bank of the Tennessee also joined in this roaring concert. Our missiles reached the rebel camps in Chattanooga Valley as well as the roads on the east side of the mountain. The artillery played most of the forenoon, but ceased firing after our troops were known to be on the plateau.

During the forenoon, there was a lifting and falling of mist and fog on the mountain, like the rise and drop of a stage curtain. There were spells when our climbing columns could be plainly seen, only to be suddenly and wholly shut from sight. The struggle culminated literally in a "battle above the clouds" at about two o'clock. Then the cloud cap of the summit spread and sank down its slopes into the valley, wrapping the entire mountain in a mantle of dense vapors. An eclipse-like darkness settled upon the scene. For a time only the sounds of musketry told of the progress of the strife. After a while, rifts in the cloud would bring ever and anon confirmation of growing success by passing views of our flags and men. During the intervals of obscurity, there was racking suspense among the anxious observers in the group of the Commanding General and his staff below, which at once yielded to intense joy as light was successively thrown upon the situation above. It was felt that while the atmospheric conditions had been an advantage in the ascent, they might be such to the enemy after they had come to close quarters. But the glorious achievement of the Union forces was fully accomplished without untoward incident from either the confinement of vision or the difficulty of maintaining order and regularity of movement over such encumbered, broken, and slanting ground. This heroic exploit cost us comparatively very small losses. They did not exceed 300 killed and wounded, and this mercy we owed to the fog.

General Hooker could well indulge in the paean of his
congratulatory order of the following day, and say to his command that "the triumphs of yesterday . . . will be remembered as long as the giant peak of Lookout shall be their mute but eloquent monument." A contrary mood was naturally induced in the mind of the rebel Commander-in-chief by the events of the day. Although he knew from the firing that a struggle was going on for the control of Lookout Mountain, he learned of the reverse to his left only about 4 p.m., when he immediately started for General Stevenson’s headquarters. Arriving there at sunset, he soon understood that the position on the mountain was lost, and determined to withdraw his troops across Chattanooga Creek to Missionary Ridge, and gave orders accordingly, which were carried out between midnight and daybreak, and so quietly as to be undiscovered. In his official report, Bragg tries to throw the blame for the disaster upon General Stevenson, and the reports of the three brigades engaged ascribe it to neglect of duty by the division-commander Jackson. But the truth probably is that the difficulty of communication and observation caused by the fog was chiefly responsible for the defeat.

The losses of the three rebel brigades reported in their official reports are utterly at variance with the statements of the Union generals. Walthall admits only 8 killed, 111 wounded, and 853 missing; Moore 9 killed, 39 wounded, and 206 missing; Pettus 9 killed, 38 wounded, and 9 missing; or a total of 26 killed, 188 wounded, and 1068 missing. Geary alone, on the other hand, claimed to have found 125 killed and 300 wounded rebels on the field and to have captured 1940 prisoners, to which latter several hundred taken by Osterhaus and Cruft must be added. The Records afford no means of explaining the discrepancies.

The object of our assault upon the Mountain was not only to complete the security of our lines of communication, but also to threaten the left flank and line of retreat of the enemy in support of the finishing blows to be struck by our left and centre on the morrow. If the Confederates suc-
ceeded in holding Hooker at bay, he would be foiled in this aim on the one hand, but, on the other, the hostile line would remain weak by reason of its excessive length and less capable of resisting the proposed general attack. General Grant felt certain anyway that our partial success on the Mountain would keep Bragg from strengthening his right, against which, according to programme, our next attack was first to be delivered by Sherman; hence he ordered the latter to "attack at dawn," with simultaneous notice that Thomas would also strike from the centre early in the day.

[Here the narrative of military operations ends abruptly. From this point the Autobiography is, as explained in the Preface, continued to the close in the third person.]
MEMOIRS OF HENRY VILLARD

BOOK EIGHT
FINANCIAL CAREER
CHAPTER XXXVIII

WASHINGTON, BOSTON, GERMANY.—1863–1873

Mr. Villard was compelled, by the return of his fever, to give up field work with the army in November, 1863. He spent the winter in Washington, where, early in 1864, with Horace White, who represented the Chicago Tribune in that city and held the clerkship of the Senate Military Committee, and Adams S. Hill, then in charge of the Washington bureau of the New York Tribune and now for the last thirty years Professor of Rhetoric at Harvard University, he organized the first news agency in competition with the Associated Press. By personal visits to the managers and editors, he succeeded in winning the Chicago Tribune, the Missouri Democrat, the Cincinnati Commercial, the Rochester (N. Y.) Democrat, the Springfield (Mass.) Republican, and the Boston Advertiser for the new undertaking, which was bitterly attacked by the Associated Press for disturbing its monopoly. But he was successful from the start. As the representative of this news agency, in May, 1864, he joined the Army of the Potomac under the chief command of General Grant at Culpepper Court House. He was the first correspondent to reach Washington with the news of the bloody drawn battles in the Wilderness. He returned to the army after it reached the Peninsula, and crossed the James River with it, witnessing the siege of Petersburg until after the explosion of the mine (July 30, 1864), when he responded to an urgent summons to Germany from his family.

He reached his native town of Speyer but a short time before the death from consumption of his elder sister.
Anna, which was preceded only a few days by that of her infant child. Mr. Villard's mother had died five years before. Most of the winter was spent in Munich with his father and with his remaining sister, who was married to an army officer stationed at Nuremberg. On the last day of March, 1865, he sailed from Liverpool, expecting to arrive in time to witness the final struggle between Grant and Lee, and was overcome with surprise on hearing, after landing in Boston on April 15, simultaneously the astounding tidings of the fall of Richmond, the surrender of Lee, and the assassination of President Lincoln.

Mr. Villard's friend, Horace White, having, in the meantime, assumed the chief editorship of the Chicago Tribune, offered Mr. Villard the position of regular Washington correspondent of the paper, which he accepted and filled for a year. Early in January, 1866, he married the only daughter of William Lloyd Garrison, and took his bride to Washington. In June, he received an invitation from the New York Tribune to go to Europe as one of two special correspondents, the other being George W. Smalley, to report the impending war between Prussia and Austria. He went gladly, and sailed for England with his wife early in July. There was no Atlantic cable at that time, and, according to the latest news received up to his departure, hostilities had not broken out. On landing in Southampton, he was amazed to learn that the battle of Sadowa had been fought, that the Prussians were advancing on Vienna, that peace negotiations were under way, and that, in short, the war was practically over. Nevertheless, he proceeded to Bohemia, and visited the several battlefields, followed in the wake of the Prussian armies through Bohemia and Moravia, and reached Nikolsburg, where the Prussian headquarters with King William, Crown Prince Frederick, and Bismarck were established after the cessation of hostilities. Mr. Villard subsequently spent some time at Vienna, where he was very kindly treated by the United States Minister, Mr. J. L. Motley.
The winter of 1866-7 Mr. Villard passed at Munich with his wife and her youngest brother. His sister had moved there in the meantime. In pursuance of his engagement with the Chicago Tribune as its special correspondent for the World’s Exhibition of 1867, Mr. and Mrs. Villard went to Paris in March. They remained there until the following February, with the exception of a short visit to England, where they met Mr. William Lloyd Garrison, who was then being fêted in Great Britain. Mr. Villard also spent some weeks at the bedside of his father, who died in his presence early in September, 1867. In February, 1868, he and his wife set out from Paris for their first tour in Italy. On the way thither they paid a visit to John Stuart Mill at Avignon, of which Mr. Villard wrote an account for the Chicago Tribune. To the same paper he likewise contributed a description of a violent eruption of Mount Vesuvius, for which the well-known Professor Palmieri allowed him the privileges of his observatory.

Mr. and Mrs. Villard returned to the United States in May, 1868, and lived at the Garrison home in Roxbury, a suburb of Boston, till the fall of 1870, during which time their only daughter and eldest son were born. Mr. Villard became a contributor of editorial and other matter to the Boston Daily Advertiser and other newspapers, and also wrote an article on Bismarck for the North American Review. In the fall of 1868, he was elected Secretary of the American Social Science Association, with an office in Boston, which position he filled for two years. Through this connection he came in contact with leading men throughout the country, and was instrumental in promoting public interests in various ways. Among his labors, the most noteworthy was his pioneer work in civil-service reform, for he helped to organize the first societies for its furtherance in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. The first public meetings in its behalf in the two former cities were arranged chiefly by him, in order to obtain a hearing
for the first Civil Service Reform Bill, which had been laid before Congress. It was personally elucidated by its author, Thomas A. Jenckes, a member of the House from Rhode Island.

Mr. Villard's Social Science secretarship led him to enter upon the investigation and study of public and corporate financiering, including that of railroads and banks. The subject of railroad securities especially interested him, and the knowledge acquired in this respect prepared him in a measure for his later business career, though he did not then dream that he would soon enter into that field. His attention was also attracted to the so-called "mortgage banks," so common on the continent of Europe, but as yet unknown in the United States, and he prepared and published a paper advocating their adoption.

The climate of Boston did not agree with him, and he suffered so much from catarrh that, in the fall of 1870, he decided to seek medical advice in Germany. During his stay there, he submitted to the management of a large bank in Berlin a project for the establishment of mortgage-banks in the United States. It was favorably received, and the institution agreed to raise the necessary capital in the Continental way, provided a special charter could be obtained for it in one of the older States. On his return to Boston early in 1871, he interested parties there in the plan, and it was decided to apply to the Massachusetts Legislature for a charter. The application failed, and nothing ever came of the scheme, but the relations into which it had brought him with financial circles in Germany proved subsequently of great value to him.

Mr. Villard's health began to fail during 1871, and he decided in the fall to go to Germany with his family, in order to recuperate. While passing the following winter at Wiesbaden, he was called on by some acquaintances from Boston to assist in the negotiation of a large railroad loan at Frankfort-on-the-Main and Berlin, and this business still further extended his circle of acquaintance among German financiers. The family, augmented by the
birth of a second son, spent the summer of 1872 in Switzerland, and the winter of 1872–3 in Heidelberg, where he had a number of relatives. Soon after going there, he had an apoplectic stroke, which was so serious that his physicians opined he would never be able to undertake mental labor again without great risk. But they themselves did not live long enough to see their predictions falsified.

While recovering from his severe illness, he received one day in February, 1873, a call from a gentleman residing in the place, with whom he was acquainted. His visitor asked Mr. Villard's opinion regarding an unfortunate investment he had made in American railroad bonds, and said that he had bought a considerable amount of the seven per cent. bonds of the Oregon & California Railroad Company of Oregon, on the strength of the statements made by the banking-house which had offered them for public subscription. Knowing nothing about the railroad company and but little of Oregon, Mr. Villard could not give the desired advice. At his suggestion, the gentleman obtained from the Protective Committee for the bondholders at Frankfort such information as it had regarding the company and the road. The material was ample, and in the light of it Mr. Villard gave an unfavorable opinion, and this led the chairman and another member of the committee to visit him and consult with him about the matter and to a subsequent invitation to join that body, to which he agreed after some hesitation, on the assurance that little work would be required of him. Such was the beginning of his business career. As shown in the preceding record of his first twenty years in America, he had never had any training for finance; but the determination and energy developed in him by his experience as a pioneer in Colorado and as a war correspondent, his extensive observation of and practical judgment in regard to national affairs, his wide acquaintance in the United States, the part he took in the mortgage-bank project and the bond negotiations just mentioned, all helped to prepare him for the new occupation upon which he was now to enter.
CHAPTER XXXIX

THE OREGON RAILROADS.—1873-1879

The Frankfort Committee had sent a delegation to Oregon, during the summer of 1873, for a thorough investigation of the railroad and the prospects of the State, and it was only after it had returned and made a report, and default had actually taken place in the payment of interest, that the labors of the committee began in October. There had been nearly eleven millions of the Oregon & California bonds sold at a little over 70 per cent. in Germany and England, of which the former country had absorbed by far the greater portion. The report of the delegates showed that only half of the nominal amount of the bonds had been received by the company in money; that, instead of 375 miles from Portland to the California State boundary, only 200 miles had been completed and were in operation, and that, owing to the small population and limited development of western Oregon, the road was producing only about one-third of the interest charge and could not well be expected to yield more for some time to come.

The first question before the committee was whether it should exercise the rights of the bondholders under the mortgage and take possession of the road by foreclosure proceedings, or compromise with the company, which was controlled by Ben Holladay, well known to the past generation as the owner of overland stage lines to California and of steamship lines on the Pacific coast. The latter course was decided upon after long deliberation. This necessitated the preparation of an agreement with the company for funding the interest and other purposes. As none of the other members of the committee knew Eng-
lish well, Mr. Villard soon found that the principal part of the work devolved upon him. All through the winter of 1873, he had to spend much time in Frankfort, and the outcome of it was that he was commissioned to go to the United States as the representative of the committee, in order to have the agreement put in form by American counsel, and to attend in person to its proper execution in Oregon. He sailed for this purpose for New York with his family in April, 1874.

He there met Ben Holladay, with whom and his lawyer, S. L. M. Barlow, and United States Senator Mitchell of Oregon, Mr. Villard, with his counsel, Professor James B. Thayer of the Harvard Law School, had a protracted tussle over the details of the compromise. Holladay proved a genuine specimen of the successful Western pioneer of former days, illiterate, coarse, pretentious, boastful, false, and cunning. Mr. Villard soon discovered also that Holladay's reputed great wealth was fictitious, and that he was, on the contrary, in financial extremities. That a man of such character should have found it so easy to command millions of foreign capital was quite a puzzle and shock to him. The explanation of this, he afterwards discovered, lay in the bad faith which the business men on the Pacific coast had shown to the European bankers who placed the bonds.

Mr. Villard set out for Oregon in May, accompanied by Richard Koehler, a German railroad engineer, who had been appointed resident financial agent of the bondholders at Portland under the articles of agreement, and who has remained there ever since and is now (1900) the general manager of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company for its Oregon lines. Mr. Villard spent some weeks in California, investigating the physical and financial condition of the California Pacific lines built independently of the Central Pacific with the proceeds of securities also marketed in England and Germany. He discovered that one of these lines, against which $3,000,000 seven per cent. bonds had
been sold, had not been built at all, and that the same company's ten per cent. income bonds, which were held by bankers abroad as prime securities, were really worthless. The discovery of this fraud added much to his standing in financial circles in Europe.

Mr. Villard started with his companion from San Francisco about the middle of July for Oregon, via the overland route, which then involved several hundred miles of stage travel. He was met at Roseburg, the terminus of the Oregon & California, by Ben Holladay and staff. What he saw of the scenery of Oregon on the way to Portland in the California, Yoncalla, and Willamette valleys, filled him with great enthusiasm. He was much impressed also with the evidences of agricultural wealth along the route. The picturesque situation and surroundings of Portland were an agreeable surprise to him, as was the unusual number of large and solid business buildings and of handsome private residences, together with the commercial activity of the place. He remained only long enough for the completion of his business, and for some short excursions into the interior of western Oregon. He did not dream of what was in store for him, and thought he should never see the town again. Soon after his return to the Atlantic coast, he sailed for Germany, to report in person as to the success of his mission. His lengthy printed report to the committee contained favorable accounts of his impressions of western Oregon, and expressed his belief in the promising future of the country and consequently in the certain improvement in the prospects of the bondholders. The greatest assurance of this lay in increase of population, with reference to which he made a proposition to the committee for the establishment of a bureau in the Atlantic States for the promotion of immigration to Oregon. His plan was approved, and he was commissioned to carry it out.

There was another reason for Mr. Villard's return to America before the close of 1874. Early in the preceding
winter, he had joined, upon urgent invitation, another committee, formed for the protection of the bondholders of the Kansas Pacific Railroad Company, which had been obliged by the severe crisis of that year to ask for the funding of two years' interest on three classes of bonds, representing a total of $12,000,000, most of which were held in Germany. He was chosen the delegate of this committee to conclude the funding arrangement with the company in the United States. On reaching New York, he found a despatch from the financial agent, Koehler, at Portland, reporting that an open conflict had already broken out between him and Ben Holladay about the execution of the compromise contract. It turned out that the latter, both because of bad faith and because of inability from want of means to make certain cash payments for which he had personally obligated himself, had violated the contract in several respects, and, moreover, that he was unwilling and unable to carry it out at all. It was discouraging to Mr. Villard thus to have a whole year's hard work so quickly brought to naught, but he resolutely exerted himself to find a way out of the complicated situation that had been created. It being out of the question to conduct litigation for the enforcement of the bondholders' rights at a distance of 7000 miles from Germany, on account of the great inconvenience and expense and long delay, he devised another compromise plan, under which Holladay would, for a certain consideration involving but a small sacrifice on the part of Mr. Villard's employers, peacefully surrender the control not only of the Oregon & California Railroad, but of two other transportation companies. One of these was an unproductive railroad, the Oregon Central, running fifty miles southwesterly from Portland, and the other a line of steamers of the Oregon Steamship Company, running between Portland and San Francisco, which formed the only regular connection that Oregon had with the rest of the world. Holladay had obtained from the same syndicate of for-
eign bankers that took the Oregon & California bonds an advance of a million dollars against Oregon Central bonds, with which money the unproductive mileage had been built, and also a large loan of $800,000 against the properties of the Steamship Company, not worth a quarter of the amount loaned. As in the Oregon & California case, Holladay accomplished all this through the dishonest collusion of the San Francisco agent of the German syndicate.

Holladay came East for the winter, as was his wont, and agreed to the proposition, holding out for a time for better terms than offered. As not only the consent of the Oregon & California, but of the two sets of creditors mentioned, was necessary for the new compromise, Mr. Villard went to Europe once more, in the spring of 1875, to procure it. He had to labor strenuously all summer and most of the fall, and journeyed repeatedly between Frankfort and London before the approval of all parties in interest could be secured. According to the agreement as finally formulated, Holladay was to retire entirely from the management of the three corporations, and surrender all his interest in their share capital to the bondholders and the two classes of creditors respectively. There was to be friendly coöperation in the management of the companies between the former and the latter. Though the Steamship Company showed fine earnings, its wooden vessels were old, small, slow, expensive to run, and fast wearing out, and it was evident that, in order to preserve its business, the line would have to be re-stocked with modern steamers. To this end, the plan provided that the bondholders should furnish the necessary new steamers, in consideration of which they were to become the owners of the entire steamship stock upon the extinction of the creditors' claim, out of the earnings with which a considerable part of the debt had already been paid off. The bondholders also obtained an option to acquire the creditors' claim against the Oregon Central for one-quarter of the amount of their loan.
The combination was based on the theory that the three transportation interests could, by working together, by increasing their earning capacity by new outlays of capital for improvements and extensions, and gradually coming under the single ownership of Mr. Villard's employers, be so developed as to make good the greater part of their losses. The ways which he proposed to follow in order to reach this result were to attract immigration to Oregon, to extend the Oregon & California to a connection with the Central Pacific system, to add to the mileage of the Oregon Central sufficiently to make it a paying investment, and to equip the steamer line with larger, faster, and more economical vessels.

His faith in the future of western Oregon was so great —greater, as it turned out, than its resources warranted—that he fully believed in the possibility of the satisfactory solution of the difficult problem he had set for himself. In pushing his scheme, he found a general disposition, both in England and in Germany, to condition its acceptance upon his consent to make himself responsible for its execution by assuming the management of the companies. There was no escape for him from this, and he expected to have to remove to Portland with his family and to reside there for a number of years; but it happened otherwise. He was back in New York by November, 1875, and immediately began to carry out the new programme. Having already opened an Eastern immigration bureau for the Oregon & California in the preceding spring, and from it carried on a vigorous agitation for immigration to Oregon by advertisements in the press and the wide circulation of pamphlets descriptive of the State, written by himself, he began to look about for the purchase of a new steamer, and, early in the spring, bought the George W. Elder from the Old Dominion Steamship Company, and started her for San Francisco. Holladay had come East again to close the deal with him, but various informalities caused delays, so that Mr. Villard could not leave for the Pacific coast
before the end of April, 1876. He arrived at Portland two weeks later, and was at once elected president of the Oregon & California and Oregon Steamship companies, and assumed charge of them and, indirectly, of the Oregon Central. He remained several months in Oregon, making himself thoroughly acquainted with the business of the companies, and gaining the confidence of the community at Portland and of the public of the State at large by a number of reforms in the management of the railroads, and especially by proclaiming his determination that they should no longer be used, as they had been under the Holladay régime, as instruments for political party purposes. He devoted all his spare time to seeing as much as possible both of the western and eastern parts of the State, and came away confirmed in his conviction of the great future of Oregon, and inspired by the fine opportunities his new position seemed to open to him.

Mr. Villard intended to settle in Portland with his family in the fall of the same year, but was detained at the East by unexpected complications in the affairs of the Kansas Pacific Company. Owing to the utter failure of the crops in Kansas for several successive years, there had been a further decline, instead of an improvement, in that railroad's earnings, so that the company was unable to comply with the terms of the funding agreement. With the consent of the Frankfort committee of bondholders, it was decided to place the property under a receivership. As the representative in America of the bondholders, Mr. Villard was proposed as one of the two receivers to be appointed. He was reluctant to accept in view of his newly assumed responsibilities in Oregon, but, as it was mainly through his influence that the temporary funding of interest had been conceded in Germany, he could not well decline, and, accordingly, his appointment as receiver was made by the United States District Court for eastern Kansas on November 3, 1876. One of his first duties was an inspection of the main line and branches in company with
the officers of the railroad, which took him to Denver, as the western terminus of the road, for the first time since he had left the place in 1859. It was a strange turn of fortune that he who, only seventeen years before, had started from a town of perhaps a hundred frame shanties and log-houses containing not over one thousand inhabitants, to cross the Plains in a very humble way with an ordinary team, should now return riding on a special train behind a steam locomotive to a fine city of between thirty and forty thousand inhabitants. Another striking evidence of the wonderful change in that short span of time which he noticed on this trip was that, whereas in the summer of 1859 he had passed enormous herds of live buffaloes on his way to the Rocky Mountains, he now found that they were entirely extinct, and that their bones were being hauled eastward by the train-load for manufacturing purposes.

The proper care of the Oregon and Kansas Pacific interests kept him hard at work in the East during the following winter and the spring of 1877. In pursuance of his Oregon programme, he continued the propaganda for immigration, and kept pressing his European employers for capital for more new steamers and for extending the Oregon Central. But, notwithstanding all his arguments, based on the rapidly increasing ocean traffic and the growing unseaworthiness of the ships in service, he succeeded only in securing two additional steamers, one by purchase and another by construction—the latter only by contracting individually for it. He failed to obtain anything for railroad construction. As for Kansas Pacific matters, owing to the continued bad earnings, nothing could be done beyond organizing a strong American committee of bondholders to support him, and for cooperation with the German committee in formulating a plan of reorganization later on.

Early in the summer of 1877, he started with his family for a stay in Colorado, to be followed by one in Oregon. After passing some weeks in the former State, the party
continued on to San Francisco. On arriving there, Mr. Villard found a despatch from the War Department advising him that a regiment of infantry was being hurried overland by fast trains on account of the outbreak of the Modoc war, and that his Steamship Company was desired to hold a ship ready for the immediate shipment of the regiment to Portland on its arrival on the coast. Mr. Villard himself superintended the necessary preparations, and crossed the bay to Oakland to receive the regiment, in one of the cold fogs peculiar to the California coast in the summer. He had caught a severe cold while in Colorado, which the exposure at Oakland developed the same day into pneumonia. He was able to dine with his family in the evening, but was unconscious before midnight. (Shortly after, there were fearful nights, in which Kearney's "sand-lot" anarchists tried to fire the city.) The disease attacked both lungs, and in a week his life was despaired of, and his wife had finally to telegraph her relations that the physicians gave no hope and did not expect her husband to live an hour. Skilful treatment and his strong constitution saved him, but he was so reduced by the long illness that the contemplated sojourn in Oregon had to be given up, and the family returned to New York.

While he was struggling for life, an opposition steamer was put on the line to Portland, with the result that there was a great falling off in the earnings of the Steamship Company, which greatly discouraged his foreign supporters, and made his task of obtaining additional capital from them much more difficult. His principals at first approved of the vigorous policy he adopted in meeting the competition, but, after the struggle had lasted six months, they required him to make a compromise with the opposition, which went into force in the spring of 1878. This clouding of the prospects of the Steamship Company led to friction between the Oregon & California bondholders' committee and the foreign Steamship creditors over the payments for the new steamers, which culminated in the
termination of the union of interests under the second Holladay arrangement of 1876. A dissolution of the relations established at that date was effected by mutual consent, the Steamship creditors assuming exclusive control of the line. The bondholders, however, exercised their option for the Oregon Central and raised money for its extension for fifty miles. Mr. Villard remained president both of the Oregon & California and of the Steamship Company, but it was clear to him from the beginning that these new relations would not long be maintained.

Unexpected complications also arose from his connection with the Kansas Pacific. This company had been trying for years, ever since its junction with the Union Pacific by its branch line from Denver to Cheyenne, to get a share of the Utah, Nevada, and California business, to which it asserted a title under the Act of Congress subsidizing both roads; but the Union Pacific had steadily refused to pro-rate with it. The Kansas Pacific then sought relief both in Congress and in the courts, and made such a strong fight that the stockholding interests controlling the Union Pacific, of which Jay Gould held by far the largest part, adopted the plan which he had conceived of getting control of the rival company. Jay Gould and Sidney Dillon, the Union Pacific president, commenced negotiations to that end with the group of St. Louis men who owned a majority of the Kansas Pacific stock, and with Mr. Villard as representative of the bondholders, but proposed such a reduction of the principal and interest of the bonds that their offer was rejected by the committee. Gould vainly tried to win Mr. Villard over by the guarantee of a profitable participation in the syndicate to be formed for the reorganization of the Kansas Pacific. After a pause, Gould reopened negotiations, and, after many conferences, formally accepted the terms agreed on by Mr. Villard and the New York committee of bondholders. He even went so far as to form a reorganizing pool for the securities of the company other than the first-
mortgage bonds, including most of the stock, and, as a pledge of good faith, made Mr. Villard custodian of the deposited values, worth, according to the market quotations, over ten millions of dollars. Notwithstanding this, Gould changed his mind, went back on the bargain, and tried to force the bondholders to submit to his former terms by opening an offensive campaign, in which the St. Louis directors, who had at first stood by the bondholders, now joined him.

In order to frighten the bondholders, he caused the construction of a new line from Cheyenne to Denver, by which he could compel the Kansas Pacific to share its mainstay, the Denver traffic, with the Union Pacific. He made the company apply for the removal of Mr. Villard as receiver, on the ground that he acted partially as the representative of the mortgage-bond interest, and he was successful in this move, as Mr. Villard could not and would not deny that he had favored the bondholders in every possible way, having been appointed their representative. Gould also got the portion of the press which he influenced to heap slander and abuse upon Mr. Villard and the New York committee. But they and the German committees stood firmly together and ordered foreclosure proceedings to be commenced. Gould's ulterior object was, as he had repeatedly avowed to Mr. Villard when he tried to win him over, the consolidation of the Kansas Pacific with the Union Pacific by exchanging stock for stock, and issuing consolidated Kansas Pacific mortgage bonds against the other securities in the pool. As he had bought many millions of Kansas Pacific stock from the St. Louis directors and in the market below 12½, and the Union Pacific stock then ranged in the market between 60 and 70, and as the issue of the new bonds would also yield him a large profit, he played really for a harvest of millions. Upon the setting in of the great boom in Wall Street in 1879 with the approaching resumption of specie payments, Gould saw the great opportunity it offered for floating new secu-
urities, and, loath to lose it, made up his mind to come to terms with the bondholders.

One day, early in 1879, he appeared in Mr. Villard's office and told him that he was tired of fighting, and that he was ready to accept the committee's conditions. This time he was true to his word, and the result was, as he had anticipated, an extraordinarily rapid rise in Kansas Pacific securities. Under the terms of the settlement, two of the three first-mortgages were recognized in full, and of the third only the interest was reduced from seven to six per cent. When the receivers were appointed, the bonds under the former were selling at 50, and those under the latter below 30. They bounded up in jumps to above par; the last-mentioned bonds, with nearly six years' unpaid back interest, rose even to 140. Gould having purposely let his intention to consolidate the Kansas Pacific with the Union Pacific be known, the stock of the former, which had sold as low as 3 less than four years before, was quickly quoted as high as the latter and followed it far above par. Gould, not long after the consolidation, sold all his stock. He was understood to have cleared more than ten millions of dollars by the operation, which was one of the principal episodes in that speculative time. The triumphant issue of Mr. Villard's contest with that most unscrupulous and most dreaded machinator, and his fidelity to his employers, raised him to a position of influence in American financial circles, while it added greatly to his reputation abroad.
CHAPTER XL

THE OREGON RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY
1879—80

The peaceful relations thus established between Mr. Villard and the Union Pacific leaders bore important fruit in another direction. Ever since his first visit to Oregon, he had conferred from time to time with the parties controlling the Central Pacific, in both San Francisco and New York, regarding the possibility of a joint scheme for the connection of the Oregon roads with the Central Pacific system. The Central Pacific people were willing to build to Oregon, provided they could obtain a subsidy from the State, and had submitted a formal proposition to that effect in 1876. It had not met with a satisfactory response, and the plan was dropped. As it was a self-evident proposition that direct railroad communication between Oregon and the rest of the country would be of the greatest advantage to the local transportation lines, it occurred to Mr. Villard to make an effort to induce his new Union Pacific friends to build from Ogden to the Columbia River. The time was most propitious for new railroad enterprises, as the appetite of the public for new securities seemed insatiable. The Union Pacific had years before made a preliminary survey of a line from its western terminus to the Columbia under the direction of General Grenville M. Dodge. Mr. Villard studied the report of this expedition, and, with the material it contained and his own knowledge of the Upper Columbia country, prepared a formal project and submitted it to Jay Gould and Sidney Dillon. They were both favorably impressed with it, and, after several
meetings, it was agreed in writing to form a construction company for carrying it out, to the capital of which the Union Pacific people should contribute one half and Mr. Villard and his friends the other half. On Mr. Villard's recommendation, they authorized him, as the first step, to acquire a controlling interest in the Oregon Steam Navigation Company, a flourishing company with its seat at Portland, which had a monopoly of the traffic of the Upper and Lower Columbia and Snake River through its ownership of the portages by short railroads around the obstructions to navigation on the Columbia at the Cascades and the Dalles. With this special object, he left New York in April, 1879, on his usual spring visit to Oregon.

In the meantime, new trouble had sprung up for the Oregon Steamship Company. The pooling arrangement with the first opposition had been in force only about seven months when a new competitor appeared on the Portland-San Francisco line. Some California speculators had bought the Great Republic, a laid-up old side-wheeler of great carrying capacity, put her in repair and on the route, evidently for blackmailing purposes. The cutting of passenger and freight rates to losing figures soon followed. The European creditors, who for a long time had received nothing on account of the principal and interest of their original advance, owing to the payments for the new steamers and the losses from the first competition, now became hopeless, and early in the year 1879 Mr. Villard was advised that they were willing to sell out at a large sacrifice. He urged them not to do so, but, as they persisted, he made his first effort to form a syndicate in New York to buy them out. He easily accomplished his object, and the transaction was closed before he went West. It ended his dependence on the creditors, much to his relief, as the duty of satisfying a group of disappointed foreign bankers had gradually become very irksome. The success of the new venture of himself and his friends depended upon the cessation of the opposition. He was surprised on his way
overland by the news that the *Great Republic* had run ashore at the mouth of the Columbia and was completely wrecked, but fortunately without loss of life. These tidings led him to consider the practicability of forming, under the auspices of the new Construction Company, an ocean and river navigation company out of the Oregon Steamship and the Oregon Steam Navigation Companies, and he made up his mind, before he reached Portland, to try to accomplish this object. This was the germ of his remarkable creation, the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company.

The Oregon Steam Navigation Company was formed in 1862 with a capital of $2,000,000 by a combination of individual owners of steamboats running on the Willamette and Columbia Rivers. Subsequently the stock capital was increased to $5,000,000 after considerable additions to the properties of the company, paid for out of earnings. It was a close corporation, a large majority of the stock being held by five leading men of Portland, who formed the Board of Directors and exercised actual management. In 1871 these, met the party, representing the Northern Pacific Railroad, which had come to the Pacific coast to locate the western terminus of the line and to arrange for the commencement of construction in Washington or Oregon. The directors of the Navigation Company, being alarmed by the prospect of railroad competition with their boats on the Columbia, tried to induce the Northern Pacific delegation to buy them out, and the latter took a proposition with them to the East for the sale of the whole of the Navigation stock for $2,000,000 or forty per cent. of the nominal value of $5,000,000. A deal was consummated in Philadelphia some months later with the purchase by Jay Cooke & Co., for account of the Northern Pacific, of three quarters of the $5,000,000 at forty per cent., half cash and half in Northern Pacific bonds at 90. The Portland directors retained the other quarter of the stock and continued in the management.

Jay Cooke & Co. held the three-quarters of the Naviga-
tion stock as collateral for their advances to the Northern Pacific when they failed in 1873, and the stock became part of their bankrupt estate and was distributed by the trustees managing it, mostly in small lots among the numerous creditors of the firm in part settlement of their claims. The recipients knew nothing about the Navigation Company, and the stock came into the market at very low figures. The Portland directors were not slow in improving this opportunity to buy back the control of the company, and they and their friends held again, in the spring of 1879, over four-fifths of the stock.

On his arrival in Portland late in April, Mr. Villard immediately asked J. C. Ainsworth, the president of the Navigation Company, whether he and his associates were willing to sell their holdings. After some deliberation, they informed him that they were disposed to sell, but they wanted a high price, and suggested that, before beginning formal negotiations, he should inspect all their properties, and to that end visit the Upper Columbia and Walla Walla country once more. Accompanied by one of their number, he spent ten days in doing this. His previous highly favorable impressions of the Upper Columbia country and of the present and future business of the Navigation Company were fully confirmed. On his return to Portland, an inventory of the company's properties was produced, aggregating $3,320,000, including a fleet of side- and stern-wheel steamers and the twenty-one miles of portage railroads. A statement of earnings for several years was submitted, with an offer to sell 40,320 shares at par. The directors thought that it was too big a deal for Mr. Villard, but, as the earnings showed twelve per cent. on $5,000,000 for the past year, with a certain large increase for the current year, he considered it a fine bargain and one well worth securing. They readily entered into a plan he had matured on the Upper Columbia, after seeing the difficulties of handling the large and fast-growing grain traffic owing to the natural obstructions to navigation, which involved breaking
bulk three times and the use of three sets of boats. It was to form a new company, which should absorb both the Oregon Steamship Company and the Oregon Steam Navigation Company, and which should be provided with capital enough to build a narrow-gauge railroad from the Lower Cascades up the left bank to a connection near the mouth of the Snake River with the existing narrow-gauge road to the town of Walla Walla. This railroad would secure, in his judgment, by the safe occupancy of the Columbia Valley, the only outlet of eastern Oregon and Washington to the Pacific, against both river and railroad competition—a far more important matter than the economical transportation of wheat.

After days of negotiation, it was agreed that the new company should be organized under the name of the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company, with a capital of $6,000,000 stock, and issue $6,000,000 six per cent. bonds. Mr. Villard secured for $100,000 cash an option till October 1, to call for 40,320 Navigation shares at par, paying for them fifty per cent. in cash, twenty per cent. in the bonds, and thirty per cent. in the stock of the new company. He was allowed $1,000,000 stock and $1,200,000 in bonds for the acquisition of all the Oregon steamship properties and for a fourth large new steamer; $2,000,000 stock and $2,500,000 bonds to raise the cash required for Ainsworth and friends, leaving $1,800,000 stock and $1,500,000 bonds for the purchase of the thirty-five miles of the Walla Walla railroad and the construction of the new railroad along the Columbia. For $10,000 he obtained an option, also till October 1, to buy the Walla Walla line at a satisfactory price.

The Navigation people did not think it possible for Mr. Villard to raise so much cash, and considered him a reckless fool to put up the stake of $100,000, which they felt certain of pocketing. He left Portland at the end of May in a high state of elation at what he had achieved, and reached New York on June 8. The scheme he brought with him differed from that agreed on with the Union Pacific people;
but as it contained so much of immediate promise, he was confident that they would gladly accept it. He submitted it at once to Jay Gould, but the latter received it coolly, and within a few days sent a note to Mr. Villard saying that he and his associates preferred not to participate. Nothing daunted, but rather glad at this parting of their ways, Mr. Villard invited his financial friends to join in exchanging the new Oregon Steamship for Oregon Railway & Navigation securities, and to subscribe for the required cash payments for bonds at 90 with a bonus of seventy per cent. in stock. He met with such prompt response that within ten days he was able to telegraph to the Portland parties to send on their Navigation stock for delivery on July 1, when all the cash, bonds, and stock due on it would be ready to be paid and delivered to them. This was actually done, and in addition the balance due to the foreign creditors for the Steamship Company was remitted and enough cash left in the treasury of the new company for the fourth new steamship and for beginning construction on the Columbia River railroad line, which was being surveyed as rapidly as possible. This quick work caused astonishment in American as well as in European financial circles, and the achiever of it received far more public notice than he ever expected or cared to have. It would seem a trifling operation in these later years, in which scores of millions have often been raised by syndicates for the reorganization of railroads and the formation of industrial combinations, but in those early days it was an unexampled performance.

The reception of the securities of the new company by the public also made an extraordinary "record," best shown by the following incident. Mr. Villard was overworked, and, after setting up the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company, embarked for Europe with his family, early in July, for a rest of some months. The shares were listed at the New York Stock Exchange during the summer. He did not return until late in November, and, on
reaching the dock, he noticed one of his counsel in the crowd waiting, waving a piece of paper at him. It turned out to be a broker's report of a sale at 95 of the stock that had been given five months before as a bonus. This rapid rise was due to the fact that the net earnings of the two constituent river and navigation companies were sufficiently large to warrant the payment of bond interest and eight per cent. dividends on the stock, payment at which rate had already been commenced. This astonishing increase naturally raised Mr. Villard to a still more commanding position in Wall Street. Yet it was but the beginning of a series of like successes.

The vast region drained by the Columbia and its tributaries formed a very empire in its extent. Its material development was entirely dependent upon the present and future transportation facilities within its limits. Mr. Villard's rule over these and, through them, over the whole future of that promising part of the country was rendered all but absolute by his personal success. He was fully conscious of the duties his great task imposed upon him to the new corporation and to the people of Oregon and Washington. He devoted himself to their fulfilment with all the energy at his command. Before going to Europe, he had closed a contract for the construction of the fourth steamer, named the Columbia, which was the finest in every respect that had left the yards of John Roach, the well-known shipbuilder. Having become interested in the incandescent electric lighting as perfected by Edison, he insisted upon having the Columbia provided with it. Roach was strongly opposed at first to the innovation, but yielded, and the first electric plant ever placed on a sea-going vessel went into the new boat and gave perfect satisfaction. The novel illumination was also at first objected to, strange as it may now seem, by the marine underwriters.

The shipment of railroad material for the Columbia line also occupied his attention. It having been decided to formally consolidate the two constituent companies with
the controlling one, the acquisition of the outstanding minority of the Oregon Steam Navigation stock devolved upon Mr. Villard, and proved a troublesome undertaking. Last, but not least, a contingency arose in the resumption of construction activity by the Northern Pacific in Washington Territory, which threatened the monopoly of the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company on the Upper Columbia. The former company had succeeded in raising enough capital to build that part of the main line from Lake Pend d'Oreille to the confluence of the Columbia and Snake rivers, known for a time as the Pend d'Oreille Branch. The continuance of this line down the right bank of the Columbia, parallel to the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company's line on the opposite bank, was a menace to the latter, whose location really constituted an indisputable encroachment, moreover, on the right of the Northern Pacific to build on either bank. Mr. Villard entered into negotiations with the Northern Pacific early in 1880 to obtain, in consideration of a liberal traffic contract, a concession of the right of way on the left bank to his company, and an agreement on their part not to build on the other bank. It was then merely agreed, however, that he should meet the late Joseph D. Potts, of Philadelphia, one of the directors, on the Pacific coast, and with him go over the ground and find a basis for a mutually satisfactory arrangement. They met, travelled together, and joined in recommendations to their respective corporations, and early in the fall the preparation of a contract embodying the above suggestions was begun in New York. Mr. Villard spent the greater part of the summer on the coast, and expedited the construction work on the different lines as much as possible. In view of the negotiations with the Northern Pacific for using his company's Columbia River line, and of the surprising increase of the river traffic, it was decided to abandon the narrow for the standard gauge. An exploration trip which Mr. Villard made with Messrs. George M. Pullman and William Endicott, Jr., of Boston,
through eastern Oregon and southeastern Washington led to the determination to commence at once the construction of a number of branch lines as feeders to the river line. During this tour he met and addressed gatherings of settlers at different points, explaining his purpose to give them railroad communication, and urging them to increase their wheat planting. He made it a point to ask his hearers what rate on wheat to tide-water would be satisfactory, and was able to promise them lower rates than they asked. He defined his policy as that of a beneficent monopoly, and his executive action bore him out, for, upon the completion of the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company’s railroad system, the cost of transporting grain to the sea was at once reduced forty per cent. and more.

To provide the additional capital required by the change of gauge and for the construction of feeders, the capital stock of the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company was increased by $6,000,000, which was offered to the stockholders at par, who took it readily, as the market price of the shares had risen to above 180 before the new issue. In his first annual report as president, published in the summer of 1880, Mr. Villard announced that 115 miles of the river line were about being completed, and that the grading on the branch lines in southeastern Washington was done.

During his sojourn on the Pacific coast in 1880, a project for another company matured in his mind, the object of which should be the development of the natural resources, mineral, agricultural, and otherwise, of Oregon and Washington, and the North Pacific coast generally, in cooperation with the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company. The name of Oregon Improvement Company was adopted for it, and it was authorized to issue five millions of stock and five millions of bonds. The latter were offered at par with the full amount of stock as a bonus, and were eagerly subscribed for by Mr. Villard’s followers. His success was even more immediate than with the Oregon Railway &
Navigation Company, as the subscriptions sold at a premium of from forty to fifty per cent. before the lists were closed, and the shares reached 91½ at the New York Stock Exchange within a few months. The new company bought and worked a coal railroad and mine in western Washington, and purchased a large body of select agricultural lands from the Northern Pacific in the so-called Palouse country in eastern Washington; brought out three large new coal steamers from the Atlantic coast; erected a great coal dock at San Francisco, and eventually acquired the capital stock of the Pacific Coast Steamship Company, which had pooled its earnings with the Railway & Navigation Company for the San Francisco-Portland line. As the last-named company had a good many dealings with the Improvement Company, Mr. Villard decided not to assume the presidency or be a director of the latter, but he directed all the investments of its capital elsewhere referred to.

Early in the summer of 1880, a change occurred in his relations to the Oregon & California. During his visit to Germany in 1879, he had informally agreed with the Frankfort committee of bondholders to bring a proposition before the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company to buy all the interest of the bondholders in the two Oregon railroads for a guarantee of principal and six per cent. interest on half their nominal holdings of Oregon & California bonds. A committee of Navigation directors, consisting of Messrs. Pullman and Endicott, was charged to examine the roads and report upon the proposition. But Mr. Villard himself withdrew it when a Scotch company commenced the construction of a competitive narrow-gauge system in the Willamette Valley. As the Navigation Company operated boats on the Willamette which affected the traffic of the railroads, he deemed it his duty to resign as president of the Oregon & California and as a member of the committee, which he did at the time stated. But the severance of his relations with that company did not con-
continue long. During 1879 and 1880, the control of the majority of the Oregon & California bonds had gradually passed from German to English holders, who started a movement in London for the reorganization of the roads. A plan was perfected, and, with Mr. Villard’s knowledge and sanction, was unanimously approved at a special bondholders’ meeting.

In order to provide capital for the completion of the Oregon & California to the California boundary, where its junction with the Central Pacific was expected, the issue of new six per cent. bonds, at the rate of $20,000 a mile and $12,000,000 preferred and $7,000,000 common stock to be given in exchange for the old seven per cent. bonds, was authorized. Under the direction of the Improvement Company, with Mr. Villard’s assistance, an underwriting syndicate for $6,000,000 of the new bonds was successfully formed, after which he was re-elected president of the Oregon & California Company, which had absorbed the Oregon Central. The work of continuing the main line southward from Roseburg was at once started and pushed energetically.
CHAPTER XLI

Completion of the Northern Pacific Railway
1880-3

The negotiations with the Northern Pacific were resumed in September, 1880, by Mr. Villard, assisted by Thomas F. Oakes, whom he had induced to resign as general superintendent of the Kansas Pacific and assume the functions of vice-president and general manager of the Railway & Navigation Company. The Northern Pacific parties were lukewarm and hard to satisfy, but a contract was signed on October 20. Mr. Villard's side secured in it all the essential points it had been striving for except a covenant by the other party not to build down the north bank of the Columbia, which it could, however, hardly make without risking a forfeiture of a large portion of its land grant in Oregon and Washington. The Northern Pacific recognized the other company's right of way on the southern bank and its title to the station grounds, and waived all claims for damages, and, most important of all, agreed to a division of territory, with the Snake and Columbia as the dividing line, except that it consented to the construction of a line into the Palouse country by the Railway & Navigation Company. In consideration of all these concessions, the latter agreed to complete a standard-gauge road within three years from the western end of the Pend d'Oreille division at the mouth of the Snake River to Portland, and to grant the Northern Pacific the right, without the obligation, to run its own trains over it at a fixed charge per train mile. It also agreed to carry Northern Pacific construction material at reasonable and fixed rates, and to effect the sale at $2.50 an acre of three hundred thousand
acres of Northern Pacific land along the Palouse line to the Oregon Improvement Company.

Mr. Villard and his friends were exultant, and the Navigation stock rose considerably on the announcement of the signing of the contract, to which the Northern Pacific would not have assented if the negotiations had been protracted a little longer. Its management had not found it easy to raise money for the resumption of construction east and west, and would not have been able to command the means to build along the Columbia. Moreover, it had shrunk from a contest with a young and vigorous concern like the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company, with apparently unlimited financial resources, under a bold and aggressive leadership. Its defensive position was entirely changed within a month of the execution of the contract by the sale of $40,000,000 of its first-mortgage bonds to a powerful syndicate headed by Drexel, Morgan & Co., Winslow, Lanier & Co., and A. Belmont & Co. The transaction, then unparalleled in its magnitude, assured to the company $36,000,000 of money, which was then generally assumed to be sufficient for the completion and equipment of the entire main line.

Mr. Villard heard of this portentous operation only a few days before its consummation. He now understood why his own offer during the negotiations with President Billings to raise $10,000,000 for the Northern Pacific against its mortgage bonds was at first warmly received but afterwards declined. He perceived at once distinctly what damaging consequences the great financial strength thus secured to the other company might have for the interests represented by him. The fear, indeed, was justified that his company would be struck in its vital part by the continuance of the Northern Pacific main line down the Columbia. He knew that the mere threat of this would greatly affect the market value of his company’s securities, and much impede the raising of additional capital for it. In a short time he decided upon the adoption of a radical remedy for
these threatening consequences. He formed the boldest resolution of his whole business career. It was nothing less than the acquisition of a sufficient amount of Northern Pacific shares to influence the direction of Northern Pacific affairs, to which stock interest should be permanently joined the large majority of Oregon Railway & Navigation stock held by himself and his followers, so as to insure lasting harmony between the two corporations.

In pursuance of this object, he conceived the plan of forming a new company which should purchase and hold a controlling interest in the Northern Pacific as well as in the Oregon Railway & Navigation. Foreseeing that a regular supply of capital would be needed for years for the development, by branch lines and otherwise, of the enormous stretches of wild country tributary to the two companies, he enlarged the scheme so as to make the new corporation also a financiering company for the two others. He had gained enough experience in Wall Street by this time to know that, if his intention to form such a company for such a purpose became public, he would never be able to secure his main object—the purchase at reasonable figures in the open market of the large amount of the two stocks he needed. He therefore determined to begin by buying as secretly as possible all that his private means and credit permitted. Only a few of his most intimate friends were aware of his operations. Having gone as far as he could on his own account, he decided, in February, 1881, to call on his supporters generally for further funds in such a manner as not to disclose the object he sought to accomplish. With his absolute faith in the soundness of his project, he felt justified in taking large responsibilities, and did not hesitate to make the boldest possible appeal to personal confidence by asking his followers to intrust their money to him without being told what use he intended to make of it. Accordingly, he issued a confidential circular to about fifty persons, informing them that they were desired to subscribe towards a fund of $8,000,000, to
which he himself would contribute a large part, in order to enable him to lay the foundation of a certain enterprise the exact nature of which he would disclose on or before May 15, 1881. Payments were to be made in three instalments.

The effect of the circular was astonishing. The very novelty and mystery of the proposition proved to be an irresistible attraction. One-third of the persons and firms appealed to signed the full amount asked for before the subscription-paper could reach the other two-thirds. Then a regular rush for the privilege of subscribing ensued, and, within twenty-four hours of the issue of the circular, more than twice the amount offered was applied for. The allotments were made as fairly as possible, but hardly one of the subscribers was satisfied with the amount allowed him. All wanted more, and Mr. Villard’s offices were crowded with persons pleading for larger participations, including some of the first bankers of New York, of whom several protested angrily when refused. The subscriptions commanded twenty-five per cent. premium at once, which rose to forty and fifty per cent.; in other words, people were willing to pay fifteen hundred dollars for every thousand they were permitted to contribute. The eight million dollars was promptly paid, notwithstanding the great stringency of the money market at the time.

The subscribers received a personal receipt from Mr. Villard, reading as follows:

Received this day from . . . . . the sum of . . . . . . dollars, as his contribution to, and which entitles the holder hereof to a proportionate interest in, the transactions of a Purchasing Syndicate to be formed with a capital of $8,000,000, by agreement in writing of the parties in like interest, for the acquisition of properties, real, personal and mixed, for the purpose of the sale thereof to and the consolidation with the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company or the Oregon Improvement Company or both, or to serve as the basis for the formation of a new Company. It is understood and agreed that the undersigned shall account to the
holder hereof for the use of the moneys for which this and like receipts are given on or before May 15, 1880, but not sooner, and that the holder hereof shall participate equally in all the profits and benefits of every description with all other persons in like interest in proportion to said contribution. This receipt is not transferable except with the written consent of the undersigned.

The promised accounting was postponed until June 24, when the subscribers met by invitation of Mr. Villard in his offices, and received for the first time full explanations of his plan to form a new company for the double object already explained. The project was so well received that his simultaneous invitation to subscribe $12,000,000 more was generally responded to. The new company was organized immediately in Oregon, under the name of the Oregon & Transcontinental Company, with an authorized capital stock of $50,000,000, of which $30,000,000 was issued and distributed among the subscribers for the $20,000,000 cash paid in.

This unique financial feat, without precedent or parallel, gained for Mr. Villard much of the kind of reputation which he least coveted. Wall Street dubbed it the "blind pool," and the newspaper exaggerations and fictions indulged in throughout the country regarding it gave him a most distasteful notoriety. The new corporation was the first of the companies, now called "proprietary," which have since become numerous. Its conception was considered by eminent bankers as a stroke of genius, and the belief in its practicability by men of the highest standing was evidenced by the composition of the company's board of directors and the list of stockholders. Yet the company was destined to prove a grievous disappointment and the greatest possible trial to its originator. Even before the purchasing syndicate was wound up, unexpected troubles were born with the new company. In forming it, the founder had no intention of ousting the existing management of the Northern Pacific, but only to bring about a
close alliance between it and the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company. But President Billings rejected his advances, and would not even listen to his request for a small representation in the Northern Pacific board. Thereupon he offered to purchase the stock holdings of Mr. Billings and his fellow-directors, but this offer was also declined. The Northern Pacific directors, knowing that this would result in their displacement at the next annual election, then tried to fortify themselves by the sudden distribution of the $18,000,000 of common stock still in the treasury. Mr. Villard got wind of this and sued out an injunction against the issue. After some litigation, a compromise was effected. A new board of directors was agreed upon, with a majority of representatives of the Oregon & Transcontinental, and elected at the annual meeting in September, with Henry Villard as president, T. F. Oakes as first vice-president, and Anthony J. Thomas, an officer of the Oregon & Transcontinental Company, as second vice-president. Thus, in a little over two years from the birth of the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company, Mr. Villard had assumed the burden of forging a new rail chain across the continent, twenty-seven hundred miles long, by connecting the existing links.

The new management considered its most important duty the pushing of the construction of the main line of the Northern Pacific with the utmost energy. It found a balance of no less than $34,000,000 from the sale of the $40,000,000 first-mortgage bonds available for this purpose. Yet, in spite of this seeming abundance, serious financial embarrassments arose during the first year of the new administration from two sources. In the first place, large expenditures were incurred for grading, bridging, and tunnelling at points in Montana, a long distance from the two ends of the track; but no money could be drawn from the building fund for outlays not resulting in finished road. Under the terms of the mortgage, the proceeds of the bonds became available only upon the completion and acceptance by the United States Government
of the main line in 25-mile sections of road. In the second place, there was serious trouble owing to the lingering illness of President Garfield and the refusal of his successor, President Arthur, to appoint commissioners to inspect completed sections because bills forfeiting the company's land grant were pending in Congress. Although Mr. Villard induced one Republican leader after another to appeal to the Executive on behalf of the company for the appointment of commissioners, President Arthur remained immovable until September, when he yielded to the arguments of Roscoe Conkling. For more than a year, the company had been obliged to meet requirements for construction and equipment at the average rate of over $2,000,000 a month without reimbursement from the proceeds of the bonds. It was a period of most harassing anxiety for Mr. Villard. More than once the situation seemed desperate, and he prevented a breakdown only by the unhesitating use of his personal credit and by assistance from the Oregon & Transcontinental Company, the availability of which fully demonstrated the practical value of its creation. Notwithstanding these financial hindrances, the progress of construction was not delayed an hour.

During the whole of 1882, and up to midsummer of 1883, Mr. Villard devoted himself unceasingly to the double duty of meeting the money requirements for construction and equipment and of accelerating the grading, bridging, tunneling, and track-laying by the several companies under his presidency. He sought to inspire the engineers in charge and the contractors with determination to do their utmost to complete the main line of the Northern Pacific and the river road of the Oregon Railway & Navigation by the end of the summer of 1883. Construction was also proceeding on the Oregon & California. Moreover, Mr. Villard, through the Oregon & Transcontinental, in accordance with its programme, had taken in hand in 1883 the building of nearly five hundred miles of Northern Pacific branches in Minnesota, North Dakota, Montana, and west-
ern Washington, including the important Yellowstone Park branch. The forces employed by the several companies formed a total of over twenty-five thousand railroad men, mechanics, and laborers, including fifteen thousand Chinesemen, and the total disbursements on all accounts reached fully four millions of dollars a month. He aimed at an achievement the like of which had never before been attempted in the civilized world—nothing less than the completion of not far from two thousand miles of new road in two years, or nearly three miles a day, including scores of miles of tunnels, bridges, and trestles. No man in this country, indeed, had ever before at one time had supreme charge of such gigantic operations, extending from the Upper Mississippi to the Pacific Ocean, and from Puget Sound to the northern boundaries of California.

After protracted negotiations with the Union Pacific officials in the early part of 1883, Mr. Villard finally induced them to agree definitely to construct their Oregon Short Line to the Snake River as fast as possible, in consideration of which he undertook to continue the Baker City branch of the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company to a junction with their extension. The enlargement of the construction programme of the latter company had called for another issue of $6,000,000 stock in 1882, and the agreement with the Union Pacific now led to a third issue of the same amount, so that the total outstanding stock capital was $24,000,000. As the net earnings of the company had risen in the first three years of its existence from less than a million to nearly three millions, the successive issues of stock were readily absorbed. The company was then the only one in the United States that met all its pecuniary requirements without putting out a single additional bond after the first issue, of which fact its president was justly proud.

Mr. Villard spent many months, both in 1882 and in 1883, on the road in personal visits to the principal construction columns. In April, 1883, occasion arose for him
to be in Portland by a certain date, which he could only do by making an accelerated trip across the continent. Owing to the courtesy of the lines between Chicago and San Francisco, he was able to arrange for a special train running through without stopping anywhere except for a change of locomotives about every two hundred miles. The run was watched by the whole Western public, and the newspapers reported regularly the progress of his train. Everywhere along the route, people turned out to see it fly past and cheer its occupants. It went through in less than half the time of the regular passenger trains, being the fastest trip hitherto made.

Mr. Villard's sojourns in Portland had always been times of hard work, but the one following the flying journey overland was an extraordinarily busy one. He worked out the details of a lease of the Oregon & California lines by the Oregon & Transcontinental Company on what seemed advantageous terms to the latter; the lease was subsequently submitted to and approved by the stockholders of the two companies. The construction of the extension from Roseburg had far exceeded the estimates, and the proceeds of the new bonds were exhausted before the very costly lower end, crossing the Siskiyou Mountains, was reached. The lease therefore provided for the completion of the line by the lessee for the remainder of the authorized Oregon & California first-mortgage and all of the second-mortgage bonds. Mr. Villard also closed a lease of the narrow-gauge system built with Scotch capital in the Willamette Valley. Next, he perfected the organization of a separate Terminal Company, which was to create the terminal facilities, including a large passenger station, a bridge over the Willamette, machine-shops, freight-houses, round-houses, docks, etc., required for the three railroad systems, the Oregon & Transcontinental Company, Oregon Railway & Navigation, and Northern Pacific, which would terminate at Portland. The estimated outlay of the Terminal Company was nearly $3,000,000, which was pro-
vided for by the issue of bonds to be guaranteed by the three railroad companies. As Portland did not have a single decent hotel at the time, Mr. Villard also purchased a suitable site for a large modern one, and gave a leading firm of New York architects charge of its erection. Its completion was delayed for some years, but "The Portland" stands to-day, as planned by him, the finest establishment of the kind on the Pacific coast north of San Francisco.

Oregon had an institution which went by the name of University, of which it represented, however, but a very small beginning. It had received little support either from the State or from the public, and was so embarrassed by indebtedness that it would probably have been obliged to close its doors, had not Mr. Villard come to its relief by paying its floating debt in response to an appeal from the Board of Regents. He also presented it with the nucleus of a library. In May, 1883, he offered to donate fifty thousand dollars to it on condition that the State would levy a tax sufficient for its maintenance on a moderate scale. This being done, he paid over the promised sum, in recognition of which gift a hall was named after him. About the same time, he intervened to save the Territorial University of Washington from suspension by the failure of the Territorial Legislature to make an appropriation for it. He also helped various local charities on the North Pacific coast.

Before leaving for an overland trip to St. Paul along the finished and unfinished parts of the Northern Pacific main line, he delivered a speech to a large audience at Portland. Referring to the fact that construction on the Oregon Railway & Navigation lines had progressed more rapidly than had been expected, as shown by the completion of the Columbia River line the previous November, three months ahead of time, and in view also of the advanced state of the work on the Northern Pacific, he said he hoped the

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1 This "intervention" meant the reimbursed for this outlay by the support of the institution for two Legislature.
announcement he was about to make without hesitation would find credence—that he would come to Portland again early in the fall, and be the first passenger to alight from the first through-train from St. Paul to that city. He further announced the terms of the understanding he had reached with the Union Pacific regarding the coming junction of the Baker City branch of the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company with the Oregon Short Line. Thus he could promise them not only one but two railroad connections with the East within a short time. In response to this, the enthusiastic audience gave him a great ovation. He was able fully to redeem his promise regarding the time and manner of his next arrival in Portland.

Accompanied by a party of railroad officials, he set out for the eastward land journey. At that time there was still a gap of four hundred miles between the eastern track end on the Upper Missouri near Gallatin and the western on Clark's Fork of the Columbia, which he traversed by vehicle and on horseback. At one time he drove in a buggy over a grass-covered height, rising in less than half a mile about three hundred feet, which divides the source of the Columbia from that of the Missouri. His observations impressed him greatly with the agricultural richness of the company's lands in eastern Washington and the timber value of those in Idaho and Montana. The immense unexplored region he traversed gave rise in his mind to a desire to start a thorough scientific exploration of the entire unknown portion of the Northern Pacific land grant; this was subsequently carried out by the organization of a transcontinental survey under Professor Raphael Pumpelly. The hearty welcome which Mr. Villard received in all the towns and settlements cheered him, but cause for depression also arose on this journey. His conferences with the superintendents of construction and contractors, and what he himself saw of the local difficulties that had already arisen and that had still to be grappled with, led for the first time to apprehension on his part that there would be a large
excess of actual outlay over the estimates of the chief engineer. On arriving at St. Paul, after having spent nearly three weeks on the way, having also inspected the work on the new branch lines in Dakota and Minnesota, he immediately ordered the chief engineer to make a special report to him as to the money requirements for the completion of the main line that summer, of the possibility of which his tour had satisfied him.

In St. Paul he was occupied chiefly with the formation of a terminal company in the interest of the Northern Pacific. The company had insufficient grounds in St. Paul, and as good as none in the sister city of Minneapolis, yet there was urgent need of ample facilities in both places in view of the approaching change of the Northern Pacific from a local into a transcontinental line. The reason was that its line connecting the main line at Brainerd with the Twin Cities was only partially owned by the Northern Pacific. He conceived and carried out the project of acquiring the connecting line entirely, through a reorganization of it under the name of St. Paul & Northern Pacific Company; a new bond issue providing for the necessary acquisition of real estate and other improvements. He concealed his plan until the large grounds needed had been quietly bought up by third parties for his private account without attracting attention, as publicity would at once have resulted in such a rise in prices that the purchase at reasonable figures would have been impossible. When he had secured all that was needed, he turned the whole over to the St. Paul & Northern Pacific Company at cost and interest. The properties acquired cost about $300,000, but became worth several millions, and without them the Northern Pacific would have been simply strangled in the two cities. This disinterested action was especially recognized and commended by resolution of the Northern Pacific board. The St. Paul & Northern Pacific Company was very successfully financed by the same syndicate that had taken the Northern Pacific first-mortgage bonds.
Mr. Villard also received at St. Paul a deputation of officials of the Canadian province of Manitoba, with whose Government he had been in communication for some time regarding the breaking up of the Canadian Pacific's statutory monopoly of the through east-and-west business from the province. As, under Dominion law, in order to prevent American lines from being extended into the province, no railroad competing with the Canadian Pacific could be built within fifteen miles of the international boundary, a plan was adopted to build a Northern Pacific branch from the main line to the boundary and another from Winnipeg, the capital of the province, down to the forbidden belt, and to carry passengers and goods across the interval by ordinary vehicles. It proved an impracticable scheme, and had to be abandoned after the construction of the line to the boundary from the south had been commenced, and Mr. Villard regretted the mistake he had made in entering into it. The enterprise was sold to the St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railroad Company, which was allied to the Canadian Pacific at that time.

The report of the chief engineer on the cost of the new part of the main line reached Mr. Villard soon after his return to New York late in June. It contained the startling admission that the actual requirements for the completion of the main line would exceed the estimates by more than fourteen millions of dollars. This revelation was a doubly staggering blow to him, because it discredited all his confident statements to his associates and followers based on the original estimates and confirmed time and again to him as true by the engineering department, that the cash resources in hand were ample for all wants, and because it imposed new financing burdens on him. It was certain, too, to affect unfavorably the securities of his several companies. At this time, there became perceptible, indeed, the first signs of a reaction from the great rise in prices which had continued almost uninterrupted, especially in railroad shares, since the resump-
tion of specie payments. The shares of his companies had followed the general upward tendency and more than led the market. The Northern Pacific preferred stock rose above par and the shares of the Oregon & Transcontinental almost to par in September, 1882, with enormous transactions in both, aggregating some days seventy thousand shares for the one and thirty thousand for the other.\(^1\) Both stocks were believed, even by cautious bankers, to hold out promise of much greater appreciation. They assumed that the gigantic land grant would yield a great deal more in money than the principal of the first-mortgage bonds, that upon the completion of the line the preferred stock would receive a full eight per cent. dividend, and therefore rise far above par and be quickly retired out of the lands especially pledged for its redemption. Assertions that this assured extinction of the prior securities made the common shares more certain of a greater rise than any others on the list, were frequently heard, and the most sanguine prophesied that it would double and triple their nominal value.

While made anxious by the construction deficit and the premonitions of the approach of a period of decline, Mr. Villard kept up his courage, and tried to infuse it into the minds of the doubters beginning to appear among his followers. He strengthened himself and others with the seemingly indisputable proposition that the Northern Pacific could certainly be expected to earn much more as a through transcontinental line than as one operated in disconnected sections, and he looked forward to the completion of the main line as the end of all his present troubles and the dawn of haleyon days. Buoyed up also by the renewed affirmation in the report of the chief engineer that the two ends of the track would be united before the end of September, he overcame the remaining difficulties with his usual resoluteness and fertility of resource.

\(^1\) On December 17, 1883, the day of Mr. Villard's resignation from the O. T. presidency, there were sold 113,800 shares of O. T. stock.
With a view to attracting European attention to his enterprises, he thought it well to make the opening of the Northern Pacific as a new transcontinental route the occasion for an international celebration. At his instance, the company extended invitations to the members of the United States Government and the governments of the seven States traversed by the road, to leading members of the United States Senate and House of Representatives, to over a hundred representative men from all parts of the country, and to the leading newspapers, to be present at the driving of the last spike. The whole diplomatic corps was also invited, as well as several score of prominent Englishmen and Germans. As nearly all those invited accepted, it was necessary to arrange for four special trains from the East and one from the Pacific coast. For the benefit of the Company's guests, he had had printed a history of the Northern Pacific Company, forming a large volume, together with a guide-book descriptive of the cities, towns, and the country along the line, as well as a small pamphlet with special instructions for the trip. The preparations for the excursion across the continent added much to his labors, but they were all completed, so that it got under way from the East on August 28.

Mr. Villard led it himself, accompanied by his whole family, including his baby boy, Henry Hilgard, who was only three months old. Two special trains started from the Atlantic; one was added at Chicago, and another at the Twin Cities. The Ministers of Great Britain, Germany, and Austria were of the party. From England, Lord Justice Bowen, Charles Russell (the late Lord Chief-Justice), James Bryce, Judge (afterwards Lord) Hannen, Horace (now Lord) Davey, Lord (now Earl) Carrington, Albert H. G. Grey (now Earl Grey), Earl and Countess of

1′History of the Northern Pacific Railroad. By Eugene V. Smalley. by him to the compiler. It has partly drawn upon the 1883.' The chapter relating to Mr. foregoing narrative.
Onslow, Sir W. Brampton Gurdon, Hon. St. John Brod-rick, and a dozen others had come over to join the party. The German guests were Professor Dr. Gneist, Professor Dr. A. W. Hofmann, the great chemist, Professor Zittel, the famous geologist, Georg von Bunsen, Dr. Paul Lindau, the novelist, official representatives of the cities of Hamburg, Bremen, Berlin, Stettin, and Frankfort-on-the-Main, General Robert von Xylander, his wife (only surviving sister of Mr. Villard), Colonel (now Lieutenant-General) Emil von Xylander, several well-known financiers, including Dr. Georg Siemens of the Deutsche Bank and Otto Braunfels of the Jacob S. H. Stern firm of Frankfort-on-the-Main, several correspondents of leading newspapers, and some old personal friends of the host. Among the Americans were General U. S. Grant, several members of President Arthur's Cabinet, several ex-secretaries, seven governors, distinguished judges, United States Senators and Representatives, mayors of Western cities, and over a score of journalists.

The movement of the special trains over the continent formed a leading daily topic in the American and foreign press. The first formal reception given to Mr. Villard and his guests took place at Chicago, and was arranged by the municipal authorities and the Board of Trade. From there on they had a triumphal procession, the people all along the route turning out in vast numbers to give them an enthusiastic welcome. These popular tributes far exceeded Mr. Villard's expectations, and often embarrassed and burdened him as the central figure in the demonstrations. With their traditional rivalry, St. Paul and Minneapolis had striven to outdo each other with decorations, triumphal arches, salutes, parades, and entertainments. Military and civic associations more than twenty thousand strong passed in review before Mr. Villard and his guests in the morning in St. Paul, and over thirty thousand in the afternoon in Minneapolis. President Arthur, who was travelling in the West, and General Grant were also present.

There were other noteworthy incidents on the journey to
the coast. One was the laying of the cornerstone of the State Capitol of Dakota at Bismarck by Mr. Villard in the presence of a great multitude. His address was followed by remarks made by the famous Indian chief, Sitting Bull, who had been brought there for the occasion from his place of captivity. Another was the gathering, by permission of the Secretary of the Interior, in eastern Montana, right on the line of the railroad, of a tribe of Crow Indians numbering two thousand warriors, squaws, and pappooses, with wigwams and fifteen hundred ponies. The men appeared in full war array, and performed war dances for the benefit of the excursionists. So weird a spectacle, the like of which will never be seen again in the United States, naturally appealed very strongly to all the European guests. The act of driving the last spike (not a golden one, as the press had it, but the very first one driven in 1872 on the Minnesota Division) was performed in the waning light of September 3 in western Montana, at the point where the train with guests from the Pacific coast was met. It was preceded by addresses by Mr. Villard and Mr. Frederick Billings, his predecessor as president, an oration by William M. Evarts, and short speeches by the seven governors and United States Senator Nesmith of Oregon. A thousand feet of track had been left unfinished in order to give the guests a demonstration of the rapidity with which the rails were put down. This having been done, amidst the roar of artillery, the strains of military music, and wild cheering Mr. Villard hammered down the "last spike." He had his family next to him, as also the head chief of the Crows, who formally ceded their hunting-grounds to the railroad after the baby Hilgard had touched the spike with his little hands. Mr. Villard's emotions at that moment may be imagined. Speedy relief from the load of anxiety which the gigantic task had imposed upon him seemed to be promised. What wonder that he felt indescribably elated at this consummation of his peaceful conquest of the West?

During the passage of the trains over the new track in
Montana, Idaho, and Washington, Mr. Villard realized to the full the serious responsibilities he had assumed in providing for the comfort and safety of his guests. There were as yet no stations on hundreds of miles of the line, which rendered the direction of the movement of the trains most difficult. This devolved upon him. There were no supplies to be had for half the distance, and the different trains had to be stocked daily from a special provision-train. Mr. Villard was in constant trepidation, too, lest accidents should upset the schedule of the trains. Several minor ones did occur, indeed, east of the Rocky Mountains, but they caused no injury to persons, and but little delay. In descending the western slope, after passing over the switchback road above the Mullen tunnel, not then completed, he was much alarmed by the breaking into two parts of his own train, owing to a defective coupling. A collision ensued, the end of the car occupied by the British Minister and six other prominent guests being smashed, without, however, doing injury to any of the inmates.

The closing receptions at Portland, Tacoma, and Seattle were not surpassed by those at the eastern end of the Northern Pacific in lavishness of hospitality and in enthusiastic popular participation. In Tacoma, Mr. Villard put himself at the head of his guests, and, preceded by a military band, marched them from the station to Commencement Bay, where they first saw the waters of the Pacific Ocean, and where they embarked for Seattle. The magnificent giant of the Cascades, Mount Tacoma, rose right before them, covered with an alpine glow wonderful to behold, for the sun was setting just as they reached the shore. Seattle was reached with an escort of more than a score of steam vessels. The last scene of the transcontinental celebration was fittingly enacted in the grounds of the University of Washington, which Mr. Villard had relieved from distress. An address to him, the most eloquent and most moving of all, was delivered by the daughter of the president.
CHAPTER XLII

The Wheel of Fortune.—1883–1890

MR. VILLARD returned to New York, where his presence was urgently needed, after an absence of only six weeks. The decline in his stocks had continued, and worried him so much while away that he could only at times forget, during the festivities of the opening of the road, the dangers that threatened him. The Northern Pacific construction deficit had assumed still larger proportions. The Oregon & Transcontinental Company was carrying a very heavy debt, incurred partly by the assistance given the Northern Pacific and by further purchases in the preceding summer of the stocks of the companies he controlled, for which it expected to pay by means of another issue of its own stock. This had been rendered impracticable by its decline in the market. Some relief was obtained by the creation of a second mortgage on the Northern Pacific and the issue of twenty millions of bonds under it. The wisdom of inviting the foreign guests to the opening of the road was now demonstrated, the German bankers being so much impressed with the vast regions tributary to the road that they promptly undertook to market the greater part of the new bonds in Germany. The financial connection of the Deutsche Bank with the company, which was of such great help to it in after years, dated from that negotiation. The sale of the second-mortgage bonds relieved both the Northern Pacific from the embarrassment of the construction deficit, and the Oregon & Transcontinental to some extent through the repayment of its advances. But the placing of another mortgage ahead of the stock inevitably depressed the Northern Pacific shares, and
with their fall those of the proprietary company went still lower. Mr. Villard hoped for a counteracting effect from the expected large increase of earnings from through-business. But though he eagerly watched from day to day and week to week for better figures, the receipts showed, after a short spurt, not only no gain, but an actual loss, from the stoppage of the transportation of construction material.

With these unfavorable developments, the burden of carrying the great floating debt of the Oregon & Transcontinental grew heavier and more fraught with danger of a collapse during the latter part of the autumn. Mr. Villard learned then the lesson taught him so often in Wall Street, that the throng of people which follows with alacrity the man who leads them to profits, will desert him just as quickly when he ceases to be a money-maker for them. He soon found that many of his most trusted friends, who formerly visited his offices regularly, had sold out their holdings and stayed away. He even discovered downright treachery among his confidential advisers, two of the Oregon & Transcontinental directors using their private knowledge of the condition of the company for enormous "short" sales of its shares. The press, too, that had sung Mr. Villard's praises hitherto, contained criticism of his companies, became more and more hostile, and gradually even vented bitter attacks upon his management and his personal character. His unshaken faith in his enterprises and his naturally sanguine disposition led him to make the double mistake, in the first place, of assuring anxious stockholders that the downward movement in his securities was the result of bear operations, and that an upward reaction was bound to set in directly, and advising them to increase their holdings at the lower prices; and, secondly, of trying to sustain his shares by large purchases for his own account. He utterly failed to perceive that, besides the specific reasons for the fall of his stocks, the financial markets generally were already showing the first symptoms of that sweeping and wide-spread crisis which had been brought on
by overspeculation during the preceding years, beginning in the fall of 1883 and extending all over the civilized world for many years. His personal embarrassment was much increased by the collapse of the West Shore (New York) Railroad enterprise, in which, to oblige friends, he had taken a large interest, the greater portion of which was lost.

Mr. Villard struggled on, using all his mental and pecuniary resources; but, in the latter part of November, he lost courage and became conscious that neither he himself nor the Oregon & Transcontinental could be saved. His physical powers of endurance were fast being exhausted, and sleeplessness threatened him with nervous prostration. The desertion of friends became more and more frequent, the abuse of the press more and more violent, and the pressure of his own and the Oregon & Transcontinental creditors harder to meet. He was finally in such desperate straits that he called a council of his most faithful and influential friends and disclosed to them his condition, with an appeal for advice and help, pledging himself in advance to accept any decision they might reach as to himself, no matter what consequences it might have for him personally.

These friends, Messrs. Fabbri, Endicott, and Rolston, at once began their investigation, and worked day and night in examining his books and accounts, as well as those of the Oregon & Transcontinental Company. On December 16–17, Mr. Villard was aroused by one of the number after midnight at his hotel, and then informed of their findings and conclusions. He was told that he was practically insolvent, and that the Oregon & Transcontinental Company was on the verge of bankruptcy. A syndicate had been formed ready to advance to him, on pledge of all his real and personal property, a sufficient amount to meet all his individual liabilities, and to take care of the indebtedness of the Oregon & Transcontinental Company, provided he resigned the presidency of it and of the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company. Although he had often thought of
his possible retirement from the management of his companies, this sudden declaration was, nevertheless, a terrible shock to him, for he saw at once that his deposal as president of the former company meant also his loss of the Northern Pacific presidency. Knowing his own helplessness, remembering his pledge, and deeming no personal sacrifice too great for the salvation of his companies, Mr. Villard immediately accepted the terms proposed to him. The next day (December 17) the afternoon papers announced his resignation from the two companies founded by him; and the news of his downfall, like that of his triumph, went everywhere.

His fate was certainly tragic. Within a few years, he had risen from entire obscurity to the enviable position of one of the leaders of the material progress of our age. But a few months before, he had reached the pinnacle of contemporaneous fame, and received on his transcontinental journey such homage as few men have ever received in this country. But his fall from might to helplessness, from wealth to poverty, from public admiration to wide condemnation, was far more rapid than his rise, and his brief career was everywhere used to point a moral. At first, journalistic vituperation of him continued more vehemently than before. Hostility towards him was fanned by the untoward circumstance that, shortly after his resignation, he had moved with his family into his large private residence behind the cathedral on Madison Avenue, which he had begun to build a year before, when his fortune warranted its erection. He was loath now to occupy it, but he did so for reasons of economy, as the house was furnished and the family had no other city home. The house formed part of an imposing block, the whole of which he had built, and which presented the appearance of a palace, though it really consisted of six residences. Mr. Villard was attacked by a portion of the press for occupying a princely edifice in defiance of public sentiment and in mockery of the many who had suffered losses in his stocks,
and was charged with having saved his own fortune while sacrificing that of his followers. When, however, the committee of investigation announced that he had turned over all he possessed for the benefit of his creditors, and that nothing had been found to throw a doubt on his honesty of purpose in the management of the companies, a reaction quickly set in. Defence of him appeared in the press under the signatures of leading men, many expressions of sympathy and praise from public bodies in the West and from prominent individuals all over the country reached him, and many persons of high standing called to express their admiration of his conduct. Some offers of financial aid were also made to him, but were not accepted.

The fearful strain to which he had been subjected for months ended in nervous prostration. His physical condition would not have permitted him to discharge his executive duties any longer. For months he had had but little sleep, and was in such a state of exhaustion that he could not perform any mental work. His retirement from the presidency of the Northern Pacific followed by the end of the year. He continued to hold that of the Oregon & California, however, in accordance with the wishes of his London friends, but he was not expected to do any work in connection with it until he had recovered his health. What he needed, and secured, was relief from all responsibilities and complete rest. As freedom from disturbance could not be had in the city, the family removed to their country home on the Hudson early in the spring of 1884. They bade farewell to their grand city abode without regret, and they never returned to it.

After Mr. Villard had recovered sufficient strength, he considered it due to himself, to his family and friends, in view of the wide misrepresentation to which he had been subjected, to prepare an authentic record of his administration of the Northern Pacific. To this he devoted himself in the country, and his statement was published in pamphlet form in English and in German.
It was apparent that Mr. Villard's complete restoration to health could not be brought about as long as he remained near the scene of his rise and fall. The sense of the false-ness of friends and the outrageous vilification he had undergone remained in his mind, and the family concluded that he could recuperate better in different surroundings. Accordingly, he sailed for Europe on June 4, 1884, accompanied by one of his brothers-in-law, in order to select a temporary place of residence for the family in Germany. On his way there, he was presented in London by his English guests with a rich testimonial of their appreciation of the good care he had taken of them on the overland excursion, in the shape of a gold loving-cup.

In response to pressing invitations, he also visited his native province. It was the first time he had been there since his public benefactions to it. These embraced foundations for the support of the libraries and poor students of the two Latin schools (gymnasia) at Zweibrücken and Speyer, followed by two other gifts, one for scholarships to promising graduates from these two institutions to provide for their university education, and another for the support, at the Academy of Fine Arts in Munich, of young men of pronounced artistic talents from his native province. He had presented Zweibrücken with a fund for small loans to deserving mechanics, and built an American workingman's home there to serve as a model for others, which it has done; had helped the Provincial Industrial School and Museum at Kaiserslautern out of pecuniary difficulties; and had given freely to the Improvement and Historical Societies of Rhenish Bavaria for their respective purposes. When the Eastern Palatinate was devastated by a flood of the Rhine, he collected in this country by his personal efforts a large sum for the relief of the sufferers. At the instance of a schoolmate, Pastor Scherer, he gave the money for the erection of a hospital and training-school for nurses (deaconesses) in his native town, which has since grown into one of the largest institutions of the kind in Germany,
with over two hundred nurses, who nurse the sick all over Rhenish Bavaria. He had responded further to a great many minor appeals for charitable and other purposes. Escorted by the Governor and a reception committee, on a special train, Mr. Villard was honored like a king in the three principal towns of the Palatinate. The streets were decorated, the authorities received him formally, and banquets, serenades, and torchlight processions awaited him. Speyer and Zweibrücken each presented him with the freedom of the city. These ovations were entirely unexpected by him, and formed a most soothing and flattering compensation for the bitter trials he had passed through.

Having decided to make his new home in Berlin, he returned to America in August, embarking again with his family two weeks later. By October, they were fully installed in commodious apartments. He had purposely selected lodgings near the home of his old friend Friedrich Kapp (who played a prominent part in the United States between 1850 and 1870), in order to enjoy his company as much as possible. To his great disappointment and sorrow, Mr. Kapp died suddenly after Mr. Villard had seen him only once. With this exception, the two years in Berlin proved to be most gratifying to the family in every respect. Mr. Villard’s sister and brother-in-law had lived there for years, and they, together with other relatives and his German guests of 1883, made him acquainted with official society and with the leaders in science, art, literature, and finance, and their families. It seemed as if his misfortunes excited real sympathy, and that people were glad to have an opportunity to manifest it.

The family spent the winters in Berlin and the summers in southern Germany and Switzerland. Mr. Villard’s presidency of the Oregon & California Railroad made frequent journeys to London necessary during the year 1885, and the consequent long separations from his family led him to resign the position at the end of that year. In the winter of 1885–6, two singular propositions to resume
railroad work were made to him. One was contained in a letter from Oscar Straus, then United States Minister to Turkey under President Cleveland, conveying an invitation from the Sultan to go to Constantinople and take charge of the proposed construction of a system of railroads through Anatolia in Asia Minor. To one who had thrown open a vast wild region in the New World to civilization, there was something tempting in the opportunity to instil new life into the ancient regions of Asia Minor. However, the thought of settling with his family for years in the Orient was utterly repulsive to him, and he declined the proposal. He called the attention of the Deutsche Bank to the scheme, and found that the institution was already working for a concession to build roads in Anatolia, which it eventually obtained and under which a main line and branches, representing a large aggregate mileage, have since been constructed. The other offer was of an even stranger kind, it being nothing less than a proposition to take in hand the financing and building of a long narrow-gauge line from the coast of German East Africa to the interior. He felt, of course, even less inclination to enter upon that venture than upon the other.

His stay in Berlin really led, however, to his return to business life, not in foreign parts, but in his former American field. He was frequently consulted by the managers of the Deutsche Bank regarding American affairs generally and their own transactions with their correspondents in New York. The close relations thereby established gave rise to the consideration of the advantages of a regular representation of the Bank in New York City, for the purpose of enlarging its American business. After due consideration of the matter, it was agreed that he should undertake that duty for the Deutsche Bank and another powerful banking-firm at Frankfort-on-the-Main. Not being a trained banker, Mr. Villard was not to do general business for them, but to confine himself to transactions in good public and corporate securities—chiefly, indeed, to Ameri-
can railroad securities. As his reappearance in the financial sphere of New York under such auspices would be tantamount to his complete rehabilitation, he hailed such a prospect with profound satisfaction.

The family started for England at the end of September, 1886, on their way to America. While in London, Mr. Villard received, a few days before sailing from Liverpool, a cable offer from Whitelaw Reid for his residence on Madison Avenue, which had been vainly offered for sale during the intervening years. After the exchange of some despatches, a sale was effected. This was a great relief to the owner, as the price received discharged his last obligations resulting from the breakdown of 1883, and left him with sufficient capital for a new start in business. On his arrival in New York during the following month, he at once opened offices at his old place in the Mills Building. With the letters from his new constituents accrediting him as their representative, he was sure of the respectful reception he afterwards met from the leading houses in Wall Street, and he found them very glad to do business with him. The press, as a rule, announced his return to financial activity in a kindly tone. The welcome which the family received in private circles, too, left nothing to be desired.

Mr. Villard resolved not to engage at once in active work, but to content himself for some time with a careful observation of the general investment field, and a thorough study of the railroad and other enterprises with which it might be desirable to do business. He was inactive for so long a time that his German friends began to show signs of disappointment. The first opportunity that commended itself to Mr. Villard's judgment came only in the following spring of 1887, when he bought the entire issue of several millions of prime mortgage bonds of a Western road, and resold them within a few days at a handsome profit. In the course of the summer, a marvellous turn of affairs, almost stranger than fiction, occurred, which, with all but
magic suddenness, raised him once more to his former position before the public. The Oregon & Transcontinental Company had remained inactive, though holding its own, after the crisis of 1883; but its management, although it represented so large an interest in Northern Pacific shares, had not been able to come to a satisfactory settlement of its former financial relations with the Northern Pacific. The board of directors of the railroad company also refused to recognize its legitimate demand for a representation in that body. The parties in control of the Oregon & Transcontinental Company thereupon formed a combination to change the directory of the Northern Pacific at the next annual election in the fall. For this purpose, they largely increased the company’s holdings of Northern Pacific shares and thereby its floating liabilities. The Oregon Railway & Navigation Company, in which the Oregon & Transcontinental Company still held a controlling amount of stock, had created after 1883 $5,000,000 seven per cent. debentures, due April 1, 1887. To provide for their payment, the company issued $5,000,000 five per cent. consolidated mortgage bonds. The firm of Chase & Higginson, of New York, had purchased in November, 1886, on time, $4,000,000 of them at 102 plus accrued interest, which Mr. Villard had vainly tried to secure for his German supporters. The firm named made a public issue, but failed to dispose of more than $700,000. Chase & Higginson not calling for more bonds before the maturity of the debentures, the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company borrowed $3,300,000 on the remainder of the bonds from the Oregon & Transcontinental Company, which in turn negotiated loans on them. The tight-money spell which set in in the latter part of August made it impossible for the latter company to renew its loans then maturing. Its failure was imminent, and would have involved that of Chase & Higginson, as they were liable for the remainder of the purchase price of the bonds, and would have embarrassed the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company as a
borrower from the Oregon & Transcontinental Company. Mr. Villard was called on for help on August 27, 1887, by Elijah Smith, president of the Oregon & Transcontinental and of the Oregon Railway & Navigation Companies, and a representative of the imperilled firm. After explaining the threatening situation, they asked him for immediate assistance to the extent of not less than $5,000,000, for which they offered the Oregon Railway & Navigation bonds not taken by Chase & Higginson at 94, and twenty thousand shares of Oregon Railway & Navigation stock at 85 less 4¼ commission. They appealed strongly to his loyalty to save the two companies created by himself, and coupled with their terms an offer not only to turn over to him the management of both the Oregon & Transcontinental and Oregon Railway & Navigation Companies, but to place in his hands, unconditionally, sufficient proxies for the next Northern Pacific election of directors to put it in his power to elect to the board of that company any one he liked. What a revolution of the wheel of fortune! But his first duty was to his foreign clients, and, after obtaining the best possible conditions, he cabled them the details of the proposed transaction, laying particular stress on the necessity of an immediate decision which meant nothing less than the cable transfer of the full amount of $5,000,000. He did not himself believe that this sudden large call would be responded to, but, to his great surprise, his friends accepted, and the entire sum was at his disposal in New York within thirty-six hours. So sudden a transaction had never before taken place in the financial dealings between Europe and the United States. Its direct effect in Wall Street was to completely upset the exchange market. The press proclaimed the event with sensational comments,

1 In order to put an end once for all to the squabbles between the Northern Pacific and Union Pacific, threatening so much harm to each, he tried to bring about, in connection with the transaction described the election of boards for the two Pacific Companies, in each of which both companies should be represented; but this could not be attained.
and with positive inference that it meant nothing less than Mr. Villard's immediate resumption of the control of the three companies. He was hailed as the railroad king restored to his reign. Congratulations by telegraph and mail at once poured in upon him.

Seductive and overpowering as this sudden reëlevation was, it left him sober and with a clear perception of what the acceptance of his old position would signify to himself. He had received too severe a lesson as to the fleeting character of quickly-acquired wealth and the fickleness of public favor to be very eager to expose himself again to a like fate. After several days' reflection, he concluded not to accept any of the positions offered to him, but to remain entirely independent, and not even to allow himself to be reëlected a director in any of the three companies, but to continue to act simply as a financier. But when he made his decision known, a great pressure was brought to bear on him from all sides to induce him to change it. His nearest friends argued with him that it was his duty to himself and to the corporations not to shrink from resuming his post, and that it would be to his lasting discredit if he failed to do so. Some of the Northern Pacific directors, who had before not been friendly to Mr. Villard, sought him and urged him to at least allow himself to be reëlected a director, so that the company, which was in a bad way financially, could get the benefit of his advice and help. He finally yielded so far as to agree to reënter the Northern Pacific board, but only after he had submitted the case to his German friends and received their consent. He had the satisfaction of voting at the annual meeting of the company nearly one-half of the share capital (365,799 out of 754,193), although he did not himself own a single share of it. Mr. Villard's own judgment never approved the step, and he always looked upon it as the greatest mistake he ever made to burden himself again with corporate responsibilities. Subsequent events showed that he was right, and made him rue it bitterly.
He found the Northern Pacific in serious financial embarrassment, mainly owing to the excess, over estimates, of the cost of building the extension of the main line over the Cascade range to Puget Sound, as well as to the approaching maturity of the preferred-stock dividend scrip issued in 1882, and to the adoption of a badly conceived plan for the construction of a number of branch lines to mining camps in Montana. From these causes a large floating debt had accrued, measures for the funding of which were urgent. Against his advice, the board voted to issue, for this purpose and the current requirements, twelve millions of bonds under a third general mortgage. He considered this issue altogether too small, and advocated the creation of a large consolidated mortgage for present and future wants, but was outvoted. He took, however, most of the new bonds for his German friends, who placed them in their home market. Next, he thought out a scheme for the formation of a new company that would absorb all the Montana branches and issue uniform bonds at a fixed rate against them all. It was approved by the board and carried out in the following summer. Mr. Villard took all the branch bonds that could be issued for Germany, but resold them at a large advance in this country.

Mr. Villard took a strong interest in electric lighting from its earliest stages. He was one of the first stockholders and a director of the original Edison Light Company, which had acquired the patents for the incandescent lamp. His faith in the incalculable value of the invention was, like that of most of his fellow-stockholders, so great that he did not dispose of his holdings even when the shares, on the par value of one hundred dollars of which only thirty per cent. had been paid in, rose to four thousand. In Berlin he had become acquainted with Werner Siemens, the eminent German discoverer and inventor in the electrical field, and head of the great firm of Siemens & Halske, and also with the parties managing and controlling the General Electricity Company of Berlin, which has since
grown into the principal electrical manufacturing and contracting company in Germany. He proposed to them and to his syndicate, before his return to New York, that they should join with him and enter the electrical business in the United States by an alliance with existing American interests. In conjunction with leading New York firms, and helped by the invaluable counsel of the late C. H. Coster, he matured a scheme for the absorption of all the Edison Light and Manufacturing Companies into a new corporation, with sufficient fresh capital for manufacturing electrical apparatus on a large scale. Out of this grew the Edison General Electric Company, organized in April, 1889, with a capital of $12,000,000, of which he and the German parties named held over one half. He became president of it, and remained such until the summer of 1892. In that time, the capital of the company was increased to $15,000,000. The German friends made a handsome profit by the sale of their holdings before his retirement from the presidency owing to the consolidation of the Edison General Electric Company with the Thomson-Houston Electric Company as the General Electric Company, of which he disapproved. His judgment against uniting with the Thomson-Houston Electric Company was fully borne out by the collapse of the General Electric Company within a year and a half.

It is in place to mention here that Mr. Villard was a firm believer from the outset in the availability of electricity as a motive power for transportation. Just as he was the first to introduce an electric light plant on an ocean steamer, it was under his presidency that electric street and other railroads obtained considerable development. He was also convinced that the certain progress in the art of using the electric current for power and traction purposes would, sooner or later, lead to its substitution for steam even in factories and on standard railroads, and, as early as January, 1892, he convened a conference of electrical and railroad experts in New York to consider the prob-
lem of operating the Northern Pacific terminal lines in Chicago, as well as some of the branches of the main line, by electricity. The practicability of this at that time was negativled, but the growth of electric traction in the meantime has certainly rather confirmed than gainsaid his theory of the ulterior prevalence of current over steam. One of his transactions was the acquisition of all the street railway lines in Milwaukee, their change from animal to electric power, and their consolidation with the local electric lighting interests into one corporation, resulting, for the first time in the United States, in the distribution of electrical energy for light, power, and traction purposes from one central station. This combination has since grown into one of the largest and most successful light, traction, and power companies in this country.

Some very serious and complicated questions pending before the Northern Pacific board at the time of his reelection were its traffic relations with the Union Pacific, and the competition arising from the extension of the Montana Central system, now known as the Great Northern, into Montana. By means of the Utah & Northern line, the Union Pacific had enjoyed a monopoly of the Montana business until the completion of the Northern Pacific main line, and naturally opposed any encroachment upon its territory. The building of a Northern Pacific branch to Butte, where the bulk of the Utah & Northern's traffic originated, led to hostilities between the two roads in that quarter. Another bone of contention between them was the eastern Oregon and eastern Washington business. The managers of the Oregon & Transcontinental Company who succeeded Mr. Villard had abandoned his purpose of making the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company the outlet to the Pacific Ocean of the two transcontinental lines, and leased its system to one of them, the Union Pacific. This produced great friction; and actual hostilities, such as the building of new branch lines into each other's territory north and south of the Snake River, resulted. As to the
Montana Central, Mr. Villard looked upon it as a grave danger, especially in view of the openly announced intention of James J. Hill to build on to Spokane Falls and Puget Sound. But the executive officers not only made light of the effect of the completion of the Montana Central to Helena, but even contended that the loss from it would be made up by its furtherance of the growth of northern Montana. Their contention was borne out by the earnings at the time, but Mr. Villard, upon a close investigation of the case, became convinced that it was most important to prevent the completion of the rival line to the Pacific coast, or, if this could not be done, to forestall possible harm to the Northern Pacific in some other decisive way. It will appear hereafter what he did in this direction.

At his instance, in pursuance of his purpose to utilize the transaction with Chase & Higginson to bring about permanent peace between the Northern Pacific and Union Pacific, committees were appointed by the two boards to find a basis for a settlement of all the differences, but the negotiations were conducted mainly by Charles Francis Adams, then president of the Union Pacific, and by Mr. Villard. They extended from the fall of 1887 to the following spring, during which time many personal conferences were held and a voluminous correspondence was conducted by the chief negotiators. After considering a number of propositions from both sides, a formal agreement was finally reached which was to be submitted to the boards for ratification.

Mr. Villard went to Germany for the double purpose of trying the cure at Karlsbad for his gout, and of having personal consultations with his financial backers. The principal subject discussed with the latter was his relation to the Oregon & Transcontinental Company. While he had declined a reélection to the presidency or even to the board, he was being steadily urged to reconsider his declination and to again take charge of the company. He deemed it incumbent upon him to submit the question to
his principals, as there were indications that the advantages of the combination suggested by himself for the joint control of the Union Pacific and Northern Pacific for their common good had so impressed the managers of the Union Pacific that they themselves contemplated acquiring control of the Northern Pacific through the Oregon & Transcontinental. As the Deutsche Bank had already made itself morally responsible for the introduction of nearly thirty millions of Northern Pacific and Oregon Railway & Navigation bonds into the German market, this prospect was a serious matter, since the Union Pacific would surely manage the other companies mainly for its own benefit. It would also mean the loss to the Bank of the current business of the two companies, and of the steadying financial influence over them which the German bankers wished to and were entitled to exercise. The conclusion was reached that Mr. Villard should resume the Oregon & Transcontinental presidency, and that, in order to give him a proper backing, a syndicate should be formed to buy and hold 75,000 shares of the company's stock. Accordingly, he was chosen president on June 28, 1888, some weeks before his return from Germany.

From Berlin, Mr. Villard went to Karlsbad for treatment. While walking there on the principal promenade one day, he was surprised to meet Mr. Gardiner M. Lane, assistant to President Adams, who said to him: "I came here by special order of President Adams to deliver an important message to you by word of mouth." Mr. Villard suspected at once that he had changed his mind regarding the settlement between the two companies, and so it turned out. The message was, in substance, that the contract could not be ratified by the Union Pacific unless certain modifications of it were conceded. As these seemed to him unimportant, he cabled at once to the Northern Pacific, recommending the concession. The reply came that it had already been made, but that the Union Pacific had backed out of the agreement altogether.
On resuming the reins in New York, Mr. Villard found himself reluctantly obliged to resort at once to offensive measures when he ascertained that there was no hope left of coming to a peaceful understanding with the Union Pacific, and that the latter had already resorted to open hostilities by inducing the management of the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company to begin the construction of new lines into Northern Pacific territory. To stop this, legal proceedings were instituted to restrain the president and board of directors of the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company from the "misuse of the funds of the company in wasteful construction." But this injunction suit did not bring the building of the roads to a halt. The Northern Pacific retaliated by encouraging the duplication of the Oregon Railway & Navigation branch lines in southeastern Washington, and starting the construction of a line in Montana to break up the other company's monopoly of the Butte and Anaconda mining traffic. This state of things led to a determination on the part of Mr. Villard and his party to keep control of the Oregon & Transcontinental at the annual stockholders' meeting in June, 1889, and through it of the Northern Pacific, and to oust the hostile management of the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company, which defiantly refused to surrender, although the other side represented the majority of the stock. The Union Pacific party, on the other hand, resolved also to secure possession of the Oregon & Transcontinental at any cost for the better protection of its lease of the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company, and to put a permanent end to all harm from the Northern Pacific by making themselves masters of it. Mr. Villard received early warning that a most formidable combination was forming against him, consisting not only of the Union Pacific people, but of James J. Hill and his followers and some of the largest financial corporations and leading brokers' firms. Mr. Villard too was openly supported by strong institutions and firms, and both parties published calls for proxies, that
of the opposition being signed by Sidney Dillon, Elijah Smith, John H. Hall, and Samuel Thomas.

Wall Street was divided into two camps, and the contest between them absorbed its attention for the time. Both sides strengthened themselves by purchases of Oregon & Transcontinental stock in the open market. As is usually the case, the crowd of speculators also became eager buyers, and the result of the scramble was the rise of the shares, with enormous transactions, from below 30 to 64, and a regular "corner," which came very near producing a crisis. The excitement grew from day to day with the approach of the closing of the books. It was the bitterest fight Mr. Villard ever had to engage in, and he had not only constantly to watch the market, but to conduct a protracted controversy in the press. A great deal of slander and vituperation was aimed at him, and he had also to meet injunction proceedings begun by the other side. It was the severest strain ever put upon him. He was victorious, and elected his ticket by an absolute majority of the stock; but the triumphant outcome was no compensation to him for the unenviable notoriety which the battle had once more given him. It was but proof to him how well founded his fears had been of the disagreeable consequences to himself personally of his return to power, and he could not help upbraiding himself, even after the struggle was over, for not having followed his own better judgment and remained a private business man.

Mr. Villard proceeded to Portland, accompanied by counsel, in order to be personally present at the annual stockholders' meetings of the Oregon & Transcontinental and Oregon Railway & Navigation Companies; travelling over the Canadian Pacific. On reaching Seattle, than which no community on the Pacific Northwest was more friendly to him, he found that the whole business part of the city had been reduced to ashes the day before. The great conflagration had destroyed all supplies of food, so that the whole population had to be fed from public tables for sev-
eral days—a very sad sight. On reaching Portland, he learned that an injunction would be applied for to prevent the holding of the Oregon Railway & Navigation election. This led to negotiations which culminated shortly in the sale of all the holdings of Oregon Railway & Navigation stock of the Oregon & Transcontinental Company to the Union Pacific, at a satisfactory price. Mr. Villard came to the conclusion that this solution was the best one for his side, as he was advised by counsel that the lease of the Oregon Railway & Navigation system could not be broken, and as he knew, further, that the hostile branch lines north of the Snake River were completed and would have to be recognized as existing factors. In other words, the Oregon Railway & Navigation stock no longer embodied the power to protect the Northern Pacific, and, therefore, its principal value to the Oregon & Transcontinental Company was lost. From that time on, Mr. Villard never had anything to do with the management of the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company, whose creator he had been.

After the annual Northern Pacific election in September, 1889, Mr. Villard held for a month the chairmanship of the Finance Committee, and then, yielding once more to the importunities of his friends, consented to take the chairmanship of the board, a new office especially created in order to facilitate the more efficient supervision of the general affairs of the company other than the actual operation of the system, of which the president and the heads of departments had charge. The growth of the earning power of the road had been very satisfactory during the three years from 1886 to 1889, the earnings rising from $12,789,448.10 to $19,707,467.95 gross, and from $5,884,831.30 to $7,843,926.48 net, while the mileage had increased only from 2876 to 3419. With this favorable showing and the restoration of the company’s credit by the financial relief Mr. Villard had obtained for it, the new chairman looked upon his task of providing for coming needs as a not very difficult one. According to the reports of the president
to the board, a steady yearly gain in gross and net of from fifteen to twenty per cent. could be surely relied on, and this prediction was made good during the next few years. Encouraged by this prosperity, the executive department came before the board with one recommendation after another for the improvement of the track, the replacement of wooden by metal bridges, additional motive power and rolling-stock, the enlargement of terminal facilities, and the purchase and construction of new branch lines. It was but a repetition of the general experience of all Western roads developed under like conditions. A progressive spirit animated the board, and they yielded, no doubt too readily, to the arguments of the operating and engineering officers. But it was evident that a new departure in the financial policy of the company would have to be taken in order to supply the means for the proposed large new expenditures. The financiering of it had been only a desultory one, so to speak, since the creation of the first mortgage, which was expected to meet present wants but which had no reference to the future. Three separate general mortgages had already been made on the main line, and there existed three other mortgages on parts of it, besides nearly a dozen special ones on branch lines. Mr. Villard devoted himself to the problem of devising a financial scheme comprehensive enough to provide not only for the current requirements, but also for the gradual absorption of all the securities issued under existing liens into one form of indebtedness. A general mortgage large enough for both purposes seemed to him to offer the only practicable solution, and was finally decided upon. The details were worked out by himself together with the finance and executive committees, and the project was then placed in the hands of the several counsel of the company. Several of the legal questions involved were very intricate, and the lawyers spent many months in solving them. The plan was considered at several meetings of the board and definitively approved on August 21, 1889. It authorized the
issue of no less than a total of $160,000,000 of consolidated five per cent. bonds, of which $75,000,000 were to be reserved to refund first-, second-, and third-mortgage bonds; $26,000,000 were to be issued against existing branch lines; $20,000,000 were to be reserved for additional roads and extensions; $20,000,000 were to be reserved for terminals, etc.; $10,000,000 were to be reserved for premiums on bonds exchanged or refunded; $9,000,000 were to be issued for general purposes of the company.

It was by far the largest mortgage ever created up to that time on any American railroad, and its size excited much wonderment and varied comment, but its reception upon the whole was rather favorable. Its author became the subject of a good deal of banter in the press and in social circles. At a reception given to the late James G. Blaine, with whom Mr. Villard had been well acquainted for nearly thirty years, Mr. Blaine inquired after his health, and, on being told that he suffered a good deal from rheumatism, replied that it was not to be wondered at that a man who could float a $160,000,000 mortgage was afflicted with rheumatic pains.

His German friends had approved of the consolidated mortgage, and once more showed their faith in him and the Northern Pacific by purchasing immediately $6,000,000 of the new bonds and acquiring thereafter $4,500,000, all of which were introduced in the German market. His and their confidence was fully borne out by the gratifying growth in the earnings of the road from the figures of 1888–1889 to $25,151,544.09 gross and $10,211,141.91 net. This great gain was the more hopeful as it was earned notwithstanding the fact that the mining branches in Montana had begun to show a loss of traffic, owing to the decline in the market value of silver bullion. It even justified, in the judgment of the board, the distribution of a dividend at the rate of six per cent. on the preferred stock. Altogether, up to the spring of 1890, Mr. Villard was carried upward again by the high tide of success, and the prospects before him seemed never more serene and promising.
Notwithstanding the apparent clearness of the horizon, Mr. Villard judged that the gravest danger the Northern Pacific had encountered up to that time was the extension of the Great Northern transcontinental line to Spokane Falls and Puget Sound, for which, it was announced early in the winter of 1889–90, the necessary capital had been secured. In spite of all the reassuring arguments of the operating officers of the company, Mr. Villard was persuaded that the Northern Pacific would be put at a great disadvantage by a competing through-line which, owing to the decline in the cost of labor, material, and equipment, could be built for about half the cost of the Northern Pacific. The danger was all the greater because, since the rupture with the Union Pacific, President Charles Francis Adams had formed an alliance with James J. Hill, under which trackage rights over the Union Pacific line from Spokane to Portland were granted to the Great Northern. This alliance shut the door even to a compromise traffic arrangement. One way, however, for the prevention of serious consequences to the Northern Pacific remained open, and that was to acquire a majority interest in the stock of the St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba, which controlled all its western extensions. After ascertaining, through intimate friends of James J. Hill, that he was disposed to sell his own holdings with those of his group of friends at a reasonable figure, Mr. Villard matured a plan for raising the necessary funds, estimated at $20,000,000, by the creation of collateral trust bonds guaranteed by the Northern Pacific and secured by the stock to be purchased. Good dividends had been earned on the latter, exceeding the proposed rate of interest on the collateral trust bonds. The plan was approved by his German friends, who were willing to market the bonds in Europe. Formal negotiations for the purchase were then opened. Several sets of James J. Hill’s friends failed to come to conclusions with him. Finally, Calvin S. Brice, General Samuel Thomas, and Frederick P. Olcott undertook the task. The last two appeared late one evening at Mr. Villard’s residence in the
Tiffany House, New York, to announce that they had dined with James J. Hill and that he had positively agreed to sell a majority of shares at 120, and that they were all to meet at Mr. Villard's office the next morning to sign the papers. Mr. Villard told his visitors that he was very glad to hear the news, but he still doubted, in view of past vacillations of Mr. Hill, whether the bargain would go through. The callers protested against this, and insisted that Mr. Hill could not back out of his promise, and that he had positively agreed to sell. An appointment was made for ten o'clock the next morning, but Mr. Villard was the only one who kept it. After waiting an hour in vain, he called up Mr. Olcott by telephone and learned that Mr. Hill had slipped away again. In the light of the collapse of the Northern Pacific on the one hand and the great success of the Great Northern on the other, it is certainly not too much to say that, if this scheme had been carried out, it would have constituted the most important achievement in Mr. Villard's whole career, and the Northern Pacific would have had a record of unbroken and growing prosperity instead of passing a second time through insolvency.

Besides the consolidated mortgage, another very important proposition came before the Northern Pacific board at its meetings in the years 1889 and 1890. The parties who had been elected directors with Mr. Villard in 1887, in recognition of the claims of the Oregon & Transcontinental for representation, controlled the Wisconsin Central Railroad Company and the ownership of the terminal company that had been formed in order to secure an inlet into Chicago for that railroad. The terminal company had acquired a large body of real estate for right of way and for a passenger and freight station near the business centre of Chicago, for which the necessary buildings were near completion. The directors in question brought the subject of a lease of the Wisconsin Central and the terminal by the Northern Pacific before the board, which referred it to the chairman, the executive committee, and the
executive officers, for investigation and report. This brought up the general question whether it would be wise, with regard to other roads, for the Northern Pacific to establish its principal eastern terminus at Chicago instead of St. Paul. There were strong reasons for and against the change. In the board, too, opposition was shown at first, but, after the operating and legal advisers of the board had, upon long consideration of the subject in all its bearings, recommended the lease of the Wisconsin Central and the terminals, it was authorized by resolution of the board on April 1, 1890, and executed. The terminals were organized and leased as a separate company under the name of Chicago & Northern Pacific. In its organization, the chairman followed the same plan that had proved so successful in the case of the St. Paul & Northern Pacific Company, so that the Northern Pacific received one-half of the stock as part of the consideration of the lease. It was expected that this stock would, as in the other case, become valuable assets. These consequential steps, which were believed to be a great advantage to both lessor and lessee, turned out to have been grave mistakes, and were corrected in the reorganization of the Northern Pacific.
CHAPTER XLIII

THE GUEST OF BISMARCK.—1890

Mr. Villard's financial successes with the Kansas Pacific and the Oregon Railway & Navigation had made him in a few years a rich man, although his accumulations were by no means so great as they were reputed to be. As soon as he had an abundance, he bethought himself of ways of benefiting others. What he then did for the Fatherland has already been related. He was equally desirous to use his means for the benefit of his adopted country. Having been a journalist, he knew well the power of the press for good or evil, and that led him to the idealistic conception that he could render no better public service than by founding, or getting control of, a newspaper of absolute independence and outspokenness on public matters, one devoted to the discovery and advocacy of truth, regardless of party and of all other considerations, and with such recognized ability in editorial management as would secure for it not only a local but a national influence. The idea ripened into a fixed purpose when the cooperation of his friend Horace White was assured by the latter's removal to New York, and when Mr. Villard ascertained from Carl Schurz that he would be glad to be one of the editors, upon the expiration of his term of office as Secretary of the Interior, and that Edwin L. Godkin was willing to enlarge his sphere of journalistic activity as editor of the Nation by joining the two other eminent men.

Having accidentally learned in 1881 that the Commercial Advertiser was for sale in New York, he authorized Horace White to enter into negotiations for its purchase;
but, while these were progressing, he was informed that the half-interest of Parke Godwin in the New York *Evening Post* could be bought. This proved to be true, and a purchase was soon effected for his account by Mr. White, who took part of the stock. Not long afterwards, the interest of Isaac Henderson was also acquired by Mr. Villard, and the stock of the *Nation* exchanged for *Evening Post* stock. A new business management was installed, and Messrs. Godkin, Schurz, and White took charge of the editorial department. Mr. Villard was prouder of this combination of journalistic ability than of any of his business triumphs. He was confident that, under such auspices, the *Evening Post* would prove not only equal to the mission he desired it to fulfil, but also a good investment. Convinced, however, that his purchase of the controlling interest in the paper would become known, and that, owing to his prominence in Wall Street, the paper would surely be accused of being his personal organ and of being used for the promotion of his financial interests, and thus find it difficult to establish a character for entire independence, he determined upon an unusual step. He decided to take away from himself all power over the paper as a stockholder, by creating a trust with his entire holding for the benefit of his family, with full authority to the three trustees to protect the editorial department from all interference. This abdication of the right of ownership and practical self-effacement has continued to this day, and not a line of the editorial writing has ever been dictated by Mr. Villard. Every reader of the *Evening Post*, the whole American press, and in fact the American people generally, know that the paper has ever been true to those high aims for which he was ready to make many sacrifices when he purchased its control.

Once more, in 1890, Mr. Villard was the possessor of wealth. The joint operations with his German clients in railroad and electrical securities and other fortunate investments had enabled him to recover in a few years what
he had lost in 1883. As soon as he was able to do so, he resumed his practice of using his spare means for the benefit of others, and made good the promise of a donation to the Law School of Harvard University, which his misfortunes had prevented him from completing. He contributed largely to the building fund of the Red Cross Hospital and Nurses’ Training School at Munich, Bavaria. He also added to his previous gifts to the hospital at Speyer and to the Industrial Museum of his native province, and made a large subscription towards the Protestant Memorial Church at Speyer in honor of the famous Protest of 1529 at the sitting of the Imperial Diet in that city. Mr. Villard had a documentary history of Speyer compiled and printed at his own expense, and paid for the publication of an historical work on the Palatinate by the historian Professor Friedrich Menzel, of Bonn, a native of the province. At the request of the historian Von Sybel, he paid the salaries of two of his assistants pursuing special studies in Germany and Italy. On this side of the water, he provided the means for three years for an archæological exploration of the antiquities of Peru by A. F. Bandelier, and presented the collections resulting from it to the American Museum of Natural History in New York. He furthermore again became a regular contributor to numerous public charities and other enterprises for the public good.

While his business interests were thriving, Mr. Villard did not overlook the danger which menaced the whole country from the introduction into Congress of the Sherman silver-purchasing act. He saw at once that, if it became a law, the substitution of the silver for the gold standard would be but a question of time, and that very short. Hence, he tried to arouse the most influential bankers to realize the threatening prospect, and to urge them to an active agitation against it in the press and at Washington, but with only limited success. He found hardly any one willing to go with him to the capital to work against the passage of the measure. Indeed, Mr. Villard had, years
before, formed the opinion that there was a great lack of foresight and too much of a happy-go-lucky disposition among most Wall Street men, and this impression was now fully confirmed. His predictions that a general crash was bound to come in the wake of that law were simply sneered at. The head of one of the greatest houses even expressed the opinion that a little more currency would do no harm, but would on the contrary help the bankers to relieve themselves of the stocks and bonds they had been obliged to carry for want of a good market.

The detachment of the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company from the Oregon & Transcontinental Company, and the financial independence secured to the Northern Pacific by the creation of the consolidated mortgage, had rendered unnecessary the pursuit of one of the two principal purposes for which the Oregon & Transcontinental Company was organized, viz., to extend financial aid to the companies controlled by it. It was therefore decided, on Mr. Villard’s recommendation, to absorb it by making a new company, after paying off the outstanding Oregon & Transcontinental bonds issued against Northern Pacific branches. The absorption was effected in a remarkably quick time by the exchange of share for share of Oregon & Transcontinental stock for North American Company stock in the early summer of 1890.

In the spring of 1890, a great domestic grief came upon Mr. Villard’s family. The youngest son, a handsome, gifted lad of seven, passed through a long illness, and, after apparent convalescence, had a relapse and died. The whole family felt the affliction deeply. His friends urged Mr. Villard to seek diversion by a long stay abroad, and he decided to sail for Europe with his family early in July. After travelling some weeks in Ireland, England, and France, they went to St. Blasien in the Black Forest, and subsequently to Freiburg in southern Baden.

Suddenly, cable news of a most alarming character from America plunged Mr. Villard into the gravest anxiety. He
had taken the greatest pains to arrange his own private affairs as well as those of the Northern Pacific, North American, and Edison General Electric Companies so that he should not be disturbed by business cares while abroad, and he felt the more assured of unbroken peace of mind as he knew that the absorption of the Oregon & Transcontinental by the North American by the exchange of shares had succeeded with unparalleled rapidity. The cable informed him that, owing to the passage of the Sherman Act, a very severe stringency had set in in the money market, in consequence of which the North American Company found it impossible to renew loans maturing to the extent of $2,000,000, so that forced sales of securities at heavy loss were inevitable unless he could raise that amount at once in Germany on the assets of the company. The message burst upon him like a thunder-clap from a clear sky, but he promptly started for Frankfort and Berlin to appeal to his supporters for the money. He was successful, and made telegraphic transfer of the amount within forty-eight hours of the receipt of the cablegram. This was his sorry first act as president of the North American Company, to which place he had been elected after his departure. He heard at Berlin the first mutterings of the severe financial volcano that later affected the whole civilized world through the suspension of the great house of Baring Brothers. Being assured by cable that the remittance would make everything snug and safe, he went back to Freiburg, but his hope of unbroken quiet proved an illusion. No sooner was Barings' failure announced, a few weeks later, than there was flashed to him across the Atlantic another even more peremptory call for several more millions, as the only means of preventing the bankruptcy of the North American Company. Coupled with it was a most pressing summons to return to New York at once. This second danger was even more of a staggering surprise than the first, but there was no escape from immediate action. Mr. Villard summoned his German friends to a conference at Frank-
fort, where they promptly met him. As he expected, it was for him a most trying and embarrassing meeting, owing to the positive assurances he had given on the strength of his own advices that the loan already made would relieve the North American Company of all difficulties, and he at first found very unwilling listeners to his proposition for a further and larger advance. But, after two days of hard pleading, the desired help was granted once more. He was conscious, nevertheless, that the trust of his financial friends in him was shaken and that nothing more could be expected from them.

He declined, however, to follow the summons to New York, and offered his resignation as president of the North American Company, when the message was repeated every few days. He refused to go solely on account of his daughter's health. In other respects it would have been a boon to him to start for the other side, thereby ending the harassing condition of mind he endured day and night, as he had not a single person to advise with at Freiburg, and as the reports regarding the conditions in Wall Street grew more and more ominous from day to day. An all but crushing blow fell upon him finally when the news came of the failure of Decker, Howell & Co., who had been for years his principal brokers, for twelve millions of dollars, on November 11, 1890. Press despatches of the same date announced that it was generally expected that his own bankruptcy would follow that of the firm. There was not the remotest danger of this, as he was a large creditor of theirs, and not a debtor; but he knew that the collapse of the house imperilled the North American Company, for which it had carried loans of millions. This culmination of troubles really left him no choice but to cross the Atlantic. This he did after another visit to Berlin, during which an unusual incident worth recording occurred.

Mr. Villard received a call at his hotel from the aide-de-camp of the Imperial Chancellor, General Count Caprivi. The aide stated that the Chancellor, although he had never
met him, knew that he was an authority on all American matters, and hence was desirous of conferring with him on an important subject affecting Germany and the United States. Mr. Villard at once offered to pay his respects to the Chancellor, and met him by appointment, the evening of the same day, at his official residence. He found Count Caprivi a truly imposing personality in every way, of commanding physical presence, most polished manners, and a ready conversationalist. He impressed one at once as every inch a gentleman, with a superior mind, of strict integrity, natural frankness, and quick and correct judgment, all of which qualities he really possessed. The Chancellor told Mr. Villard that he wished to consult him confidentially regarding a serious problem that had come before him within a few days. The passage of an extreme protection measure by the American Congress (the first McKinley tariff) had moved one of the Continental Powers to suggest to the others that the time for a retaliatory policy against the United States had come, and to propose a conference for the consideration of joint offensive measures. He wished to know Mr. Villard's opinion as to the course Germany ought to pursue regarding the matter. His own judgment was against the proposed action.

Mr. Villard replied that he thought the Chancellor's conclusion the correct one. As for himself, he was a radical free-trader, and therefore his judgment might be biassed, but he was confident that the very extreme to which the new tariff bill had gone, and the suspicious circumstances under which it was passed, would immediately produce a reaction in the United States. He believed, too, that this reaction would find expression in the election of a new Congress in the following month. He could but urge the Chancellor to await the result of that election, which would no doubt of itself put a stop to the suggested demonstration of the Powers. Mr. Villard offered to cable to good judges of the political situation as to the outcome of the election and advise him of their answer. The Count ac-
cepted the offer, and another interview took place the next day, at which Mr. Villard produced the answers to his telegraphic inquiries confirming his views. The Chancellor then told him that he would remain passive and thanked him warmly for his courtesy. As Mr. Villard was still on the Continent at the time of the election, he telegraphed its result to the Chancellor, who was then on a visit to the King of Italy at Monza, and who, in acknowledgment of his despatch, said that he had proved to be a true prophet.

Mr. Villard had not made the personal acquaintance of Caprivi's predecessor, Prince Bismarck, during his two years' residence at Berlin in 1884–6. Although as willing as any German to render grateful homage to him as the creator of national unity, and to recognize the power of his giant mind, he still held to the unfavorable opinion of Bismarck's personal character, and his political methods before the Franco-German war, to which he had given expression in an article in the North American Review in 1869, then under the editorship of James Russell Lowell and Charles Eliot Norton. His prejudices against the Chancellor had been strengthened, too, by the latter's return in 1879 to a reactionary policy in the internal affairs of Germany, and especially by his openly proclaimed purpose of abandoning the revenue tariff for a protective one.

Early in the summer of 1890, a few months after the acceptance of Bismarck's resignation, while discussing that great event one day with the late Ludwig Bamberger, the well-known liberal leader in the Reichstag and the principal advocate of the gold standard in Germany, Mr. Villard mentioned incidentally that he had never met the Prince. "What," exclaimed Bamberger, "how has that happened?" On being told that it was from want not of opportunity but of inclination, Bamberger rejoined that he had made a great mistake in avoiding an introduction, and went on to say: "You know, I fully share your views of Bismarck's character and as to the vacillations of his policy, which I am opposing strongly in the Reichstag.
Moreover, I have not only public but private reasons for finding fault with him, because he has treated me badly, although I have never shrunk from any sacrifice of time and labor when he called upon me for service in the interest of the public. You may not be aware that I went to Versailles at his summons, and remained there a long time as one of his advisers in the peace negotiations with the Thiers Provisional Government. Nevertheless, although he is both selfish and unprincipled, he is at the same time, in my deliberate judgment, the greatest man of our age, and one of the most interesting. Why, I believe that as a conversationalist he is unequalled, and to listen to him for an hour would alone be worth a voyage from America. Be sure not to leave Europe again without having made his acquaintance. That is my urgent advice." Mr. Villard decided to follow it. It so happened that the very next day he was introduced by General von Xylander, his brother-in-law, who was also in Berlin, to Professor Schweninger, the Prince’s medical adviser, who, after numerous medical authorities had failed, had successfully treated him for rheumatism and neuralgia by simply opposing and conquering the patient’s willpower and making him restrain his inordinate appetite for food and drink. It occurred to Mr. Villard to ask the professor what the chances were of being received at Friedrichsruhe. "Why," he answered, "the Prince will bid you welcome at once. He knows all about you, and likes nothing better than to meet men who have accomplished something in the world. Just ask leave by letter to pay your respects to him and you will get a prompt reply. I expect to be with him myself in a few days, and I hope you will come while I am there." Mr. Villard wrote to the Prince on the same day, and, receiving a cordial invitation to come at any time that suited him and spend a few days with him, set out within forty-eight hours.

Professor Schweninger and a servant in livery received him at the station, which was only a few hundred yards from the mansion. The latter proved to be a very plain
building, being really but an enlarged country inn, and neither the exterior nor the interior revealed the splendor which the fame and wealth of the owner led one, not unnaturally, to expect. The guest was shown into a commodious chamber on the second floor, and was just making his ablutions when he heard heavy steps approaching his door, and immediately there appeared in it the erect form of the Prince, dressed in black, with a slouch hat of the same color,—the same costume in which Lenbach painted his best portrait of him—with a heavy stick in his right hand, and followed by two large Danish dogs. The Prince welcomed Mr. Villard heartily, and, when the latter apologized for being in his shirt sleeves and for not offering his wet hands, the Prince said: "Just go on with your toilet. I will sit down and we can talk while you wash and dress." One of the dogs, encouraged, no doubt, by his master's friendly words, now approached Mr. Villard, standing up before him and putting his paws on his shoulders and trying to lick his face. "There is another hearty greeting for you," the Prince remarked, calling the animal off. "I am really glad you came," he said, "first, because you are a German who has gained a high position in a foreign country, a sort of success which I have always especially admired, because I know how difficult it is to achieve; and, secondly, because I like company, and you are the only visitor I have had in a week except Schweninger." On Mr. Villard's expressing astonishment at this, he said: "Yes, it is just as I state it. The fact is that I am under a regular boycott. Ever since I lost my position, everybody is afraid to have anything to do with me from fear of displeasing the young chap who discharged me. Why, formerly my trouble was to keep people away from here. Everybody wanted to come, especially the officials who needed my good will. Now, none of the latter dare come lest their names should appear in the newspapers as my visitors and be seen by the new man on the throne. I know that men travel by here every day who, a few months ago, would have no more dared to pass this
place without paying their respects than they would have ventured to pass me on the street in Berlin without saluting me. But I ought not to have expected anything else, for hounds follow those who feed them." This outburst was a clear indication of what was uppermost in the Prince's mind, and prepared his hearer for what was to follow on the same line during his stay.

Mr. Villard's toilet being finished, the Prince and the dogs led the way to the rear of the mansion, where the two took seats on a sort of veranda. Professor Schweninger joined them, followed by Bismarck's private secretary, the Princess, her married daughter, Countess Rantzau, and the latter's children. The Prince, noticing the gouty formations on his visitor's hands, said: "I see you are suffering from gout. How long have you had it?" When told for nearly twenty years, he pointed to the Professor: "That is the man to help you. But for him I should have been obliged to retire from office long ago. Perhaps it would have been better for me if I had done so. All the medical professors had practised their arts upon me without doing me any good. He alone gave me relief and made life tolerable for me. You had better try him, although he is a great tyrant and exacts strict obedience. I found it hard to change my habits of life, but he made me do it. I now eat and drink only what he sees fit to allow me. See how gentle he looks. But I tell you he can be as rough [grob] as any old Bavarian [Altabaier], of which stock he comes.''

The Prince then began to question his guest regarding himself, about his early life in Germany, how long he had been in the United States, and about the course of his career there. He wanted to know how many miles of railroad he had built, in what time it had been done, how many steamships had been under his control, how many men he had employed, being very much surprised that fifteen thousand Chinamen had been among them, and saying: "Why, you had a whole army corps under your command!" He asked how much capital Mr. Villard had been obliged to
raise and how it was raised, and about the relative value of white and Chinese labor. He inquired whether he had named Bismarck, the capital of Dakota, after him, to which his guest had to reply that the place had been founded and baptized before he had anything to do with the Northern Pacific. Bismarck remembered that he had received thence telegraphic greetings from the German participants in the Northern Pacific opening excursion, and asked whether it had a future. In reply, Mr. Villard had to confess that it was not then very prosperous, and he explained that all the capitals of the several American States were as a rule of slow growth. This the Prince could not understand in the light of the contrary European experience. He remarked that what his guest had accomplished in a foreign country he never could have done in the Fatherland, owing to tradition and to the clinging to accustomed ways so characteristic of old countries. Did he not encounter a great deal of prejudice among native Americans against him as a foreigner in the pursuit of his undertakings? To this Mr. Villard replied that, on the contrary, he had found his chief financial backing and his main support among them, and that there was no people on earth among whom enterprise and energy prevailed to a greater extent, or that more readily appreciated those who possessed such qualities. To this the Prince said that he was well aware that the Americans were the most progressive people in the world, for which he admired them, but it was new to him that they were so free from national jealousies in appreciating merit.

An early dinner ended this first talk. The Prince sat at one end of the table, the Princess at the other. On his right sat Mr. Villard, on his left Professor Schweninger. The secretary and the Rantzau family formed the rest of the party. Behind the host at a distance of about six feet lay the two dogs next to each other, watching the proceedings eagerly, but not stirring until towards the end of the repast, when, upon a sign from their master, they approached
and sat on their haunches on each side of him. Then from time to time the Prince threw morsels into their open jaws. The table talk was of an ordinary kind, but one amusing incident is worth remembering. The Prince had one glassful of light Rhine wine, and then called for another. Schwenninger at once interposed, saying: "Your Highness, you have had your allowance for one meal, and you can't have any more." The Prince looked at Mr. Villard quizzically, and remarked, "Now, you see how I am treated. I have to submit, but at times when the censor is not here I jump the traces. He doesn't know, but I will tell him now [and he chuckled heartily] that I celebrated my last birthday by enjoying several bottles of wine and several glasses of beer." "Yes, you did," retorted the doctor, "and when I came here a few days afterwards, you growled dreadfully over fresh neuralgic pains."

After dinner, the Prince excused himself for his afternoon nap, after inviting Mr. Villard to go with him on his usual four o'clock drive. Punctually at that hour, the two set out for a tour of the "Sachsenwald," or Saxon Forest, as the extensive woods adjoining the mansion grounds are called. They consist largely of grand old oak-trees free from all undergrowth, under the canopy of which the carriage passed, now following roads, now regardless of them.

After describing his estate, the Prince began speaking English—"so that that fellow," pointing to the coachman, "may not understand us," and surprised his companion by his fluency, his command of idiomatic expressions, and his very slight accent. He began with these words: "Since I have been kicked out of office," which so astonished his hearer that he begged pardon for interrupting him and said: "Prince, that is an Americanism; where did you pick it up?" He answered that he did not remember where, but the expression fitted his case exactly, for the manner of his dismissal was but the equivalent of an application of the toe of a boot. He then proceeded to tell the story of his forced resignation. Such a rapid flow of keen wit, of cut-
ting sarcasm and bitter denunciation as followed for half an hour Mr. Villard never heard before and never again. It was a strange mixture of eloquence and loquaciousness. Bismarck's voice seemed not as deep and strong as his stature led one to expect, but it had a pleasant sound. A most intense sense of the wrong and ingratitude he claimed to have suffered made itself manifest. As an example of his unjust treatment, he recounted what he had done to unify the nation and to aggrandize the Hohenzollern dynasty. There was not only an unhesitating assertion of his own deserts as the founder of the German Empire, but an almost sneering and even contemptuous depreciation of other performers in the historic drama of his time, including even the old Emperor William, the unfortunate Emperor Frederick, and the Empresses Augusta and Frederick. His language became a perfect diatribe when he referred to the present Emperor and some of his ministers, whom he held responsible for his removal. His expressions regarding them were not only amazing but embarrassing to his hearer, who had close social relations with the ministerial objects of his scorn. To quote but one phrase: "Some of those rogues I picked out of the very gutter." Fortunately, he did not stop for any word of assent, but went right on until his pent-up wrath was expended. As he remarked, when it was all spent: "It was quite a relief to me to have this opportunity to speak without restraint to a gentleman who I am sure will honor my confidence." Even were it not for this restriction, some of the sayings the visitor heard and noted down at the time were so extraordinary that, if they were repeated, their reality would probably be doubted, and certainly the lese-majesty they involved would render it unsafe for one who repeated them to venture again on German soil.

The Prince's countenance during the excited delivery of his philippic was a study. The working of every vein and muscle of the face showed his intense feelings. The play of his great eyebrows was also very remarkable. Most impres-
sive of all were the spirit and light shining from his wonderful eyes. No one ever felt the presence of the Chancellor without a deep sense of the mind-power reflected from those large grey-blue orbs. Their flashing brilliancy and the piercing penetration of the glances shot from them were never to be forgotten. They seemed incapable of expressing affection, and their steel-like hardness only inspired awe for the towering intellect, the irresistible will, the defiant courage, the fiery energy of their owner. To watch the lightning changes of expression mirrored in them, reflecting the strong emotions evoked by humbled pride, wounded ambition, and thwarted selfishness, and above all by the loss of his absolute sway, was, indeed, an enviable privilege.

The Prince himself turned to other subjects when the "fumes of ire" had passed from him during the rest of the two hours' drive. He dwelt upon the marvellous rapidity of the material growth of the United States, and mentioned that he had felt a desire for a long time to see it with his own eyes. Before his retirement it was, of course, out of the question, but now he seriously thought of accepting the invitation of the Hamburg Line and crossing the Atlantic on the steamer named after him. He would have to overcome, however, the strong opposition of the Princess and of Dr. Schweninger to the voyage. When Mr. Villard assured him that his visit would be hailed with general enthusiasm by Americans as well as Germans, he said: "This is just the reason of the opposition of my wife and doctor to it, and I own that I myself dread the pressure and fatigue of public attention, and should much prefer to travel in strict privacy." He asked his companion whether he believed that the Union could be permanently held together notwithstanding its vast territorial extent, the rapid swelling of the population to enormous proportions, the free admission of large masses of foreigners, and the diversity of climate and local interests. He looked upon the many millions of negroes, whose number was fast increasing, and the prevalence of strong racial prejudices against them, as a grave
and permanent danger. He was answered that no man could foretell the fate of the American Republic in the course of the coming generations or centuries; but so far it must be admitted that the experiment of building up a federation of commonwealths under absolutely democratic institutions had been, upon the whole, a great success in both a political and a material respect. The problem of government was no doubt growing more and more complicated and difficult, both in the Union and in the several States, and might get beyond solution when the population should number hundreds of millions. There were even then symptoms of decadence, not material but moral; but the world had witnessed several serious popular aberrations which were followed by a return, sooner or later, to correct ways. Certainly, much could be expected of a people that successfully cut the cancer of slavery out of its body politic, at the cost of a million lives and of thousands of millions of dollars.

The Prince agreed to this and said that, for America, the existing democratic form of government was just as natural as a monarchy for Germany, and, indeed, the only feasible one. "I should be a devoted Republican, too, if I lived in America," he remarked. Mr. Villard ventured the inquiry whether Bismarck was satisfied with the workings of universal suffrage, the immediate adoption of which, upon the formation of the German Empire as the political basis of national life, was thought one of the boldest strokes, if not the very boldest, in his career. The Prince answered: "It cannot be said that the results of universal suffrage have been altogether satisfactory, but I always looked upon it as a just concomitant of, and compensation for, the general liability of our people to military service. Moreover, its adoption was indispensable as a sort of cement in the construction of the edifice of the Empire, as well as a means of overcoming the traditional centrifugal tendencies of some of our smaller potentates and tribes." The worst outgrowth of general suffrage he considered the So-
cial Democrats, and he expressed the conviction that the State would some time be compelled to extirpate this evil by force.

It was very pleasant for Mr. Villard to have the Chancellor bring up the subject of their mutual friend, Carl Schurz. The Prince said that not only his great public career in America, but the personal attractions he discovered in him at their several meetings, excited his admiration. It was a great pity that such a man served a foreign and not his own country. Just that type of man was needed in Germany to supplant the Geheimrat (privy councillor) species which had given him so much trouble. Bismarck said that he could not understand, and it was not easy to explain to him, why such men as Schurz were not kept in public life. He pronounced it a great shortcoming in the American polity that the eligibility of Senators and Representatives was conditioned on their residence in the States and districts they represented. This inevitably tended to develop champions of local instead of national interests, while the privilege the English and German voters enjoyed of electing any of their countrymen otherwise qualified, regardless of residence, insured the election of the élite of the nation to the parliamentary ranks.

At the end of the drive, the Prince retired to his working-room with his secretary to attend to his correspondance until supper-time. After the evening meal, the whole family gathered around him in the spacious sitting-room. He seated himself in a large easy-chair, and was handed one of the old-fashioned long German pipes. It was lighted for him with a paper taper, and from it he sent forth clouds of tobacco-smoke with evident great enjoyment. He sat like a patriarch, listening to the telegraphic news of the morning and evening papers, which was read to him, and he accompanied and followed the reading with free comments on current events. Their frankness, clearness, and point-edness afforded another rich treat to Mr. Villard. The Chancellor's remarks led to no discussion, as he did not
invite it, and everybody was content to listen to him. Something that was read led him to make interesting reference to the relations of Germany to Russia, to the pains he had always taken to keep on the best possible terms with the latter power, as of the most vital importance to his own country, and the fears he entertained that a change for the worse in this direction would come about under the new régime at Berlin. Schweninger broke up the evening's entertainment all too early by announcing to the Prince that his time for retiring had come. The doctor accompanied him to his bedroom to give him some treatment. He was the first one, too, to see him on waking. In fact, there never was a more faithful, self-sacrificing medical attendant than Schweninger. He did not reside at Friedrichsruhe, but had his office at Berlin. Owing to his success with the Prince, he had obtained a very large practice, extending all over Europe. Among his patients were some crowned heads, including the Sultan, a number of princes, and members of the highest aristocracy of birth and finance, so that he passed two-thirds of his time on railroad trains; but, no matter where he was, he never failed to look personally after the Chancellor at least once a month, and to pass from two to three days with him. While at Berlin, he was constantly at his beck and call, and often visited him once a week. Moreover, he would never accept any compensation for his services, but the Prince, who improved every opportunity to praise his fidelity and acknowledge his indebtedness to him, rewarded him in other ways by securing him a professorship at the Berlin University, together with titles and decorations.

Having suffered from neuralgic pains during the night, the Prince was ordered to stay in bed during the forenoon of the next day, but he worked with his secretary. About noon he appeared on the veranda, seemingly as well as the day before and as ready for conversation. Mr. Villard's second day was a repetition of the first; that is, lunch was followed by another drive, and dinner by another even-
ing in the sitting-room. On the drive as well as at home, the Prince's conversation was again pregnant with substance, and original and fascinating in form. He also favored his guest with reminiscences of the Prussian-Austrian and Franco-German wars, and dwelt upon his memorable long sojourn at Versailles during the latter war, his peace negotiations with Thiers and Jules Favre, and the pains that accompanied the birth of the German Empire; on the profound humiliation of the French by the proclamation made in the grand palace of Louis XIV.—which was his (Bismarck's) conception. All this he narrated in his inimitable way. But, as the same incidents have been published in his own memoirs, they need not be repeated. Bismarck's experience, however, with the adjacent city of Hamburg, "his biggest and best neighbor," he called it, he related with great gusto, and it may well be told. When he proposed to bring Hamburg within the custom-lines of the German Empire, he became the worst-hated man in that city, for the people thought that if it lost its prestige as a free port it would be ruined. But the status of a free port with a custom zone within its limits not only did not diminish its prosperity, but multiplied it. Then the supposed oppressor became the recognized and worshipped benefactor of the old Hanseatic commonwealth.

Mr. Villard took his leave of the Prince on the second evening, as he was to start for home in the morning before the Prince would be up. He assured his host of his lasting gratitude for the generous hospitality received, and was told in return that he would be welcome again at any time. He left Bismarck with the fixed impression that the Prince never would or could forget or forgive those who caused his compulsory abdication from power, that he felt nothing less than implacable hatred towards them, that any apparent reconciliation on the Prince's part to the new régime that might follow would be only a stage-show and not a reality, and that his thirst for revenge would not be quenched as long as he lived.
CHAPTER XLIV

LAST YEARS.—1890-1900

Mr. Villard arrived in New York early in December, 1890. The North American Company had practically become insolvent by the suspension of Decker, Howell & Co., but actual bankruptcy had been avoided by the action of its principal creditors, who formed a committee which secured speedy repayment of the loans by a sale of the company’s assets in the open market. He found the indebtedness of the company reduced to two millions, but it had been stripped, by the forced sales, of the great bulk of its assets at a heavy loss, and was prostrate and reduced to inactivity for years to come. There was really nothing for him to do but to try and keep alive what little there was left of the concern. He was not surprised to find that the collapse of the North American had affected his prestige hardly less than the crisis of 1883. His absence in Europe left him free from all responsibility for the new catastrophe, but he suffered just as much abuse as though he had been directly instrumental in bringing on the disaster, instead of having strained every nerve to save the company. This second breakdown utterly disheartened him, and he made up his mind then to resign all his corporate positions and absolutely retire from all business pursuits just as soon as possible. He was confirmed in this resolve by his conviction that the operation of the Sherman law would before long plunge the whole country into general disaster, and he determined to protect not only himself but also his German friends from the coming calamity. He addressed to them a letter in January, 1891, stating fully the reasons for his fears of the early advent
of the silver standard, advising and urging them to abstain from all long engagements, and to keep their investments in the United States in as liquid a form as possible. He gave them formal notice at the same time that, holding his opinion of a rapid approach to the silver standard, he could no longer take any responsibility for the investment of German capital in this country, and hence should consider their business relations as terminated. The letter was looked upon at the time as exaggerated, but after the crisis of 1893 had set in he was often complimented on having written it.

The Northern Pacific had securely passed through the months of stress before his return, but, as its position would be rendered much safer by turning its short loans into long loans, Mr. Villard set about accomplishing this, and succeeded in forming an international syndicate for that purpose. By the end of February, all he could do for the several corporations having been consummated, he rejoined his family at Cannes late in March, remaining in Europe until midsummer, and was not further disturbed by untoward developments, nor did any such take place after his return. On the contrary, the Northern Pacific continued to show increasing strength right along. Its gross and net earnings for the year 1890–91 were respectively $25,151,544.09 and $10,211,141.91, being the best showing since the completion of the main line, and more than double the gross, and nearly double the net, of the year 1884–85. On the 27th and 28th of April, Mr. Villard and his family, with the exception of his younger son, were in Zweibrücken, to lay the corner-stone of an orphan asylum that was to be Mr. Villard’s memorial to his lost boy.

In the fall of 1891, accompanied by his wife, he made what he meant and what proved to be his last official tour of inspection of the main line and principal branches of the Northern Pacific. He was everywhere very well received, and invited to address public bodies at different points on
the business situation of the country, much as in former years. In his speeches, as well as in published interviews, he did not hesitate to warn his audiences, in the strongest language, of the evil fruits the Sherman law was certain to bear. He told them that the blackest clouds were gathering fast, and would burst before long and sweep like a devastating tornado over the whole land, and exhorted them to put their houses in order, and especially to keep out of debt and new ventures, and prepare for the worst. From St. Paul to Tacoma and Portland, he got nothing for his pains except newspaper ridicule of him as a croaker and pessimist, and not a little abuse in the centres of silver sentiment. But he had the doubtful satisfaction, after the catastrophe of 1893, of being told by a number of his hearers that his predictions had proved but too true, and that they paid dearly for not having followed his advice. Scores of his acquaintances, among them the wealthiest men in St. Paul and Minneapolis and in the Pacific coast cities, were actually impoverished.

The journey depressed him not only because of the popular silver hallucination, but also because of his observation of ominous factors in the Northern Pacific situation. First and most threatening of all was the loss of business by the competition of the Great Northern line to Spokane. There was also the paralyzing effect of the great fires at Spokane and Seattle. The decline of silver production in Montana and the Cœur d'Alène regions in consequence of the steady depreciation of that metal in the market also portended more and more loss of traffic. But the most alarming impression of all made upon him was the revelation of the weight of the load that had been put upon the company by the purchase and construction of the longer branch lines in Montana and Washington, which he then discovered for the first time. There was the Missoula Branch to the Cœur d'Alène mines; the Cœur d'Alène Railway & Navigation, a mixed system of steamboats and rail lines; the Seattle, Lake Shore & Eastern; and the roads built into western-
most Washington, representing a total investment in cash and bonds of not far from $30,000,000, which together hardly earned operating expenses. The acquisition and building of these disappointing lines had in a few years absorbed the large amount of consolidated bonds set aside for construction purposes, which had been assumed to be sufficient for all needs in that direction for a long time. Under these circumstances, Mr. Villard came back to New York with increased apprehension as to the future of the Northern Pacific.

In his mind, there was but one way of saving the country and the road from a ruinous catastrophe, viz., by the earliest possible repeal of the Sherman Act, and the election of a President in 1892 who could be relied upon to exert executive influence for the repeal of the Act as well as for the establishment of the gold standard. All through the winter of 1891 and 1892, he devoted most of his time and his best energy to the pursuit of those two aims. He made several stays in Washington, and by incessant efforts with the leaders of both parties helped to bring about the introduction, reference, and report to the House of a repeal bill which failed to pass by only a few votes, owing to the jealousy entertained by certain Western Republican members towards Speaker Reed, who favored the measure. Mr. Villard had obtained promises from nearly two dozen New York political leaders, lawyers, and financiers to respond at any time to a summons from him to Washington to bring their personal influence to bear upon members in favor of the repeal. Of all these prominent men only one—Mr. William Brookfield—kept his word and appeared; so little even then did the elite of the professional and business community recognize the perils of the situation.

Although Mr. Villard had always taken an active interest in civil-service and tariff reform—for he had belonged to the Manchester School ever since he had read Adam Smith, Bastiat, and John Stuart Mill—he had never had anything to do with active party politics. His resolution to do
all in his power for the election of a sound-money and tariff-reform candidate now drew him against his wish into the political whirlpool. The force of circumstances turned him, indeed, for a time, into a hard-working politician. Benjamin Harrison having signed both the first McKinley tariff bill and the Sherman bill (the price paid by the protectionists for the former’s passage through the Senate), his candidacy for re-election called for the most earnest opposition. The whole Republican party was so impregnated with protectionism and silverism that there was not the remotest hope for salvation from that quarter. Only a Democrat, entirely sound on what seemed to Mr. Villard to be the two main issues, could meet the emergency. The record of Grover Cleveland pointed to him as the only available Democrat. There was, however, great opposition to him among the professional politicians of his own party, and most of them looked upon United States Senator D. B. Hill (who early in 1892 was receiving ovations in the South) as the rising star. It seemed, indeed, hopeless to renominate Mr. Cleveland, but Mr. Villard decided to try it. He first sounded Mr. Cleveland, and found him very reluctant to become a candidate, and obtained his consent to allow the use of his name only after several interviews. His next step was to win over the leading Democratic Congressmen to his plan. He went to Washington, and induced Speaker Carlisle to invite them to meet him at his house, and twenty-eight responded. Mr. Villard explained to them at length, and as forcibly as he could, the reasons for his conviction that the needs of the times called for the candidacy of Mr. Cleveland, and that he was the only Democrat who could be elected. Mr. Carlisle and William L. Wilson followed, expressing their full agreement with his views, while others expressed the belief that it was impossible to secure Cleveland’s nomination, as Senator Hill was all but certain of being presented as the candidate of the Democracy of his own State to the nominating convention. Mr. Villard then announced that he
and the other Independents and Democrats who were opposed to the machine controlling the Democratic organization of New York, would bring Mr. Cleveland forward at the national convention in spite of Hill's candidacy, and were confident of his nomination. Most of those present received this confident assertion with smiles, but it was made good to the letter.

Mr. Villard gave up most of his time during the Presidential canvass to campaign work at the National Democratic headquarters in New York, in conjunction with Don M. Dickinson, William C. Whitney, Josiah Quincy, and others. He raised money for the executive committee, and organized and conducted a German-American Cleveland Union with ramifications throughout the States. A few days after the election, he gave a large dinner-party to the President-elect and leading Independents and Democrats from all parts of the country. In his opening speech, he complimented Mr. Cleveland on his great triumph, and expressed his firm faith that the new Administration would meet the highest expectations of its supporters. He added that Mr. Cleveland was vouchsafed the finest opportunity since Washington and Lincoln of bestowing great benefits upon the Republic by insisting upon currency and tariff reform, which he would surely do much to further. Mr. Cleveland replied in what was generally said to be the most feeling utterance that he had ever made, and which moved the gathering deeply. The other speeches were also pitched in a very high key. The occasion attracted general attention, and the press immediately teemed with stories that Mr. Villard was to be a member of the new Cabinet, and otherwise play an important part under the new régime. The truth was that he had taken occasion to notify Mr. Cleveland immediately after his election that all he asked was leave to discuss pending public issues freely with him, which was readily granted and exercised up to the inauguration. The President-elect consulted him regarding Cabinet and high diplomatic ap-
ointments, but he confined himself to urging Mr. Cleveland persistently, all through the winter, to call an extra session of Congress immediately after March 4, for the repeal of the Sherman law, and to make his intention to do so known without delay. For he perceived clearly the portentous signs of a financial hurricane, and felt sure that if it came without an effort on the part of the new administration to prevent it through Congressional action, Mr. Cleveland would be held responsible for it, and its ravages would make the success of his administration impossible. He told Mr. Cleveland many times that, if he rode into power on the eve of a panic, nothing could save him from failure.

His efforts to persuade the President to call an extra session were faithfully seconded by other close friends, and by none more so than by Don M. Dickinson, of Michigan. One morning in February, the latter came into his office with a beaming countenance, waving a piece of paper and exclaiming: "We are all right now." He had spent the night with Mr. Cleveland at Lakewood, and, after hours of argument, got him finally to agree to the extra session. The paper contained the announcement in Mr. Cleveland's own handwriting that the President-elect had decided to call an extra session directly after his inauguration, for the repeal of the silver-purchasing act, and that members of Congress might take notice that appointments for office would not be considered by the Executive until they had done their duty and abolished the obnoxious law. The announcement was to be made in the afternoon papers. Mr. Villard was overjoyed, and at once telephoned the glad news to a number of friends. In less than an hour, he was obliged to recall it in consequence of the reappearance of Mr. Dickinson with the disappointing message from Mr. Cleveland that he had changed his mind and would do nothing before the 4th of March. Some other friends, who were opposed to an extra session, had talked him out of his purpose in the meantime.
When it seemed impossible in January, 1893, to overcome Mr. Cleveland's reluctance to summon an extra session, Mr. Villard and Don M. Dickinson got the President's consent, indicated by letters from him to leading Democratic members, to try to secure the repeal of the Sherman Act by the expiring Congress. They labored hard to this end for some weeks in Washington, and got the Democratic side ready for action, but the attempt failed on account of the unwillingness of certain influential Republicans to smooth the way for the incoming administration. Mr. Villard spent the last afternoon with the President-elect before his departure for Washington, and made a last plea for an extra session. But hours of talk only resulted in an invitation to come to Washington to repeat his arguments to the new Cabinet, and a promise that, if it voted in favor of an extra session, one should be summoned at once. He did as desired, witnessed the inauguration, and met all the Cabinet members except Mr. Olney in a parlor at the Arlington House. He presented his case as strongly as he could, but in the discussion that ensued after he had made his argument, it became evident that only the Secretary of Agriculture was unconditionally for the gold standard, and that the rest either were bimetallists or did not understand the subject sufficiently to express an opinion. So, the next morning, he told Mr. Cleveland he was satisfied that the Cabinet would vote against an extra session, and therefore he considered his mission ended and should go home. Once more, he had the sorry satisfaction of seeing all he had feared and prophesied as to the impending panic and its effect upon the fate of Mr. Cleveland's administration come to pass.

The campaign work in 1892 and Mr. Villard's labors for the gold standard withdrew him so much from his corporate duties that he felt their burden but lightly. This led him to postpone his intended retirement from his executive positions; but early in 1893 he announced his settled purpose to resign them. The last thing he did as chairman
of the Northern Pacific was to devise a collateral trust mortgage for funding the floating debt, of which he himself held a large part. His formal resignation was accepted by the Northern Pacific board only at its meeting on June 21, 1893, to take effect on July 19, when, as on his first retirement, his services to the company were acknowledged by the passage of a gratifying series of resolutions. His resignation from the North American board was accepted only in June, 1893.

He was fully conscious that, in obtaining this release from official cares, he did not free himself from the heavy burden of anxiety with which the growing certainty of a catastrophe to the Northern Pacific oppressed him. The accelerated decline in the earnings, the increasing paralysis of silver-mining, and the fast-spreading stagnation of general business, convinced him that the breakdown of the company would come inevitably with the general crisis which he expected would befall the country in 1893. It was perfectly clear to him, too, that the collapse of that company would again mean for himself discredit, calumny, and abuse. It seemed a hard fate indeed that he should have to pass twice through the same ordeal and receive such severe punishment for once more loyally uniting his personal fortunes with the same ill-starred company. Considering default unavoidable, he advised making it as early as April, but the officers still believed in the possibility of early recuperation and managed to pay the April coupon.

Early in 1893, a new temporary occupation fell to his lot which proved far more arduous, while it lasted, than he had anticipated when he accepted it. On his motion, the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York appointed a committee, of which he was chosen chairman, to make suitable provision for the proper entertainment in New York of the foreigners who had been invited by the United States Government as guests of the nation in connection with the Columbian World’s Fair. They included the Princess Eulalia, as the representative of the Queen of
Spain, and the Duke of Veragua, a lineal descendant of Columbus, and family, and the officers of foreign squadrons that participated in the great international review in New York harbor. On entering upon his duties, he discovered that, although Congress at its first session had extended formal invitations in the name of the nation, which had been accepted, no appropriations for the expense of entertaining the guests had been made. As the Democrats were to assume power both in the Government and in Congress in March, the appropriation committees, controlled by Republicans, apparently out of sheer partisan spite were doing nothing to enable the new administration to redeem the pledge of hospitality made by its predecessor. Mr. Villard called the attention of Mr. Cleveland to the awkward predicament in which his Government would be placed by being left without money to take care of the guests of the nation. At Mr. Cleveland's request, he went to Washington with letters from the latter to prevent such a disgrace. He begged Secretary of State Foster to remind the appropriation committee of the urgency of the matter, which Mr. Foster did; and also exerted himself personally with the committee. But the shortness of time, and political prejudice, prevented any action, and Congress actually adjourned without having voted a dollar, so that the new administration had only the contingent fund of the State Department, really intended for other objects, to draw from for the purpose. Mr. Villard be-thought himself of two ways of avoiding an international scandal, viz., the raising of a considerable fund by private subscriptions, and the financial help of the City of New York. The former he successfully undertook himself, and the latter was obtained to the extent of $100,000, with the help of some Democratic friends who engineered the necessary special act through the State Legislature in the nick of time. Thus the expense of the great street parade, the banquet at the Waldorf, the ball at the Madison Square Garden, and the other entertainments was provided for. As is
usually the case on such occasions, the chief burden of responsibility fell upon the chairman, and he literally had to labor day and night for weeks to prevent the failure of the programme which he had proposed. One thing he was taught very thoroughly by this experience, viz., that Americans, however hospitably inclined they may be, do not care to bother with foreigners who do not speak their own language.

Mr. Villard went to Chicago to see the World's Fair. He was filled with the greatest admiration for this marvellous achievement of American genius, which had never been equalled before and, in his opinion, never would be thereafter. For weeks he spent every day and many evenings in the Exposition grounds, without being satiated by their great attractions; but his stay was terminated by an urgent summons to New York, in the middle of June, from the Northern Pacific's president, to which he responded at once. As he anticipated, the occasion was the question of the payment of the July coupon. The panic had in the meantime broken out in full force in Wall Street and throughout the country. There was a very tight money market, and extraordinary commissions—at rates often exceeding one hundred per cent.—were charged for loans. Mr. Villard argued against the payment, which could be made only by borrowing a large part of the required amount at a heavy extra cost, as only a short makeshift, but he was not heeded, and the payment of the coupon began with little over one half of the $1,500,000 needed in hand. As was to be foreseen, default was postponed for only a few weeks, and, by mid-August, receivers were appointed for the whole system.

The Deutsche Bank, which had placed in Germany the bulk of the junior bonds most to be affected by the suspension of interest payments, was morally bound to do its utmost for the protection of the holders. As Mr. Villard shared in its responsibility, he deemed it his duty to do all in his power to bring about the appointment of re-
ceivers whose character and experience offered a guarantee that the company would be extricated from its difficulties as early as possible; and in this he was successful. The importance of an immediate and effective organization of the majority of the bondholders in Germany under the guidance of the Bank was also perceived by him, and with the timely cabled notice to the institution of the inevitable default he sent an urgent appeal to lose no time in forming a strong and friendly committee, which should at once send a delegation with full power to this country, with a view to the formation of an American committee willing to coöperate with the German. These recommendations were promptly acted on, and, in October, the delegation, headed by Dr. Georg Siemens, the principal director of the Bank, arrived in New York. The first thing Mr. Villard had to do was to demand a formal revocation of and an apology for an offensive circular issued by the Bank in hot haste to the bondholders, full of glaring misstatements, unjust criticism of the railroad management, and an evident attempt to make a scapegoat of himself. This was conceded, and the correction given even wider publicity in Germany than the circular. Mr. Villard informed the delegates, after he had fully posted them concerning the situation and the measures it called for, and initiated the organization of an American committee, that, having done all that was possible for him to do in the interest of the bondholders, he should withdraw altogether from Northern Pacific affairs and go abroad for several years. The delegation was much taken aback by this announcement, protested against his purpose, and insisted that he must remain in the country and take an active part in the reorganization of the company. He replied, however, that, owing to his failure in 1883 and the present crisis, his usefulness as a financial adviser and leader was obviously entirely gone, and that it was his firm belief that, in view of the bitter attacks upon him which had already begun, it would positively injure the work of the committees if he played a leading part in it.
After some exciting scenes, his proposed course was approved, provided a proper substitute for him could be found who would serve as chairman of the American committee of bondholders, and constitute the connecting link between the latter and the German committee and also act as confidential adviser to the Bank. He recommended Edward D. Adams, and, after some delay, the delegates voted to authorize him to offer the position to the man of his choice. Mr. Adams hesitated at first, but was finally persuaded to accept. The main share which he had in the extraordinary success of the reorganization of the company made a splendid record for him, and the managers of the Bank subsequently expressed to Mr. Villard at Berlin their great sense of obligation to him for having recommended Mr. Adams. The outcome of the reorganization was such that none of the holders of the company's securities, who held on to them, lost anything in the end. This result compensated Mr. Villard for the personal annoyances which, as he had foreseen, grew out of the Northern Pacific collapse. As men with similar experiences necessarily do, he made a number of bitter enemies, who then saw their opportunity for revenge. He and his associates in the formation of the Chicago & Northern Pacific Railroad (Terminal) Company were charged in the press with having made millions for themselves out of it, and a small stockholder was even procured to bring suit for the recovery of these alleged ill-gotten gains. In his answer to the bill of complaint, Mr. Villard made an absolute denial of every one of the charges, and so completely that no further move was ever made in the case.

He sailed with his family, except the elder son, in November, 1893, direct for Gibraltar. The party first travelled in Spain and then passed over to northern Africa. They visited Melilla, Oran, Blida, Algiers, Philippeville, Constantine, Biskra, the famous oasis in the Sahara; and reached Tunis by the middle of January, 1894. Thence they crossed to Sicily, and, at the end of the month, took
steamer at Naples for Egypt, where they spent two months, during which they made the usual tour of the Nile. From Egypt they went to Greece and thence to Constantinople. In April, they reached Vienna, where their stay was somewhat protracted. The summer was spent in the Austrian Tyrol, on Lake Constance, and in Central Switzerland and on Lake Geneva. In October, the rest of the family went to Italy over the Mont Cenis, and visited the principal places from Turin to Naples. While in Florence, in the first week in December, Mr. Villard received a letter from his associate in the Northern Pacific management, Thomas F. Oakes, one of the three receivers, advising him of his arrival in Paris and his desire for a meeting with him. It was decided that Mr. Villard should proceed thither.

Since Mr. Villard's departure, developments had taken place in Northern Pacific affairs which affected him personally, and regarding which it was very desirable he should learn more details than he had received while travelling. Control of the Northern Pacific had been obtained, at the annual election held after the appointment of receivers, by parties bitterly hostile to the former management. They brought about the filing, early in 1894 in the United States Circuit Court, which had appointed the receivers, of a series of charges against Mr. Oakes and Mr. Villard, accusing them of having derived large personal profits out of the construction of certain branch lines, and moved for an investigation. This the court granted, without giving Mr. Villard an opportunity to be heard, and appointed a master to take testimony.

Mr. Villard heard of this only after arriving in Vienna, and he immediately by cable and by letter asked to be summoned by the master, but no summons ever reached him. Instead of the naturally expected report against further proceedings, to Mr. Villard's great surprise and indignation he learned in Switzerland that the master had exonerated Mr. Oakes, but recommended that the court order a suit to be brought against Mr. Villard for the recovery
of alleged illegitimate profits in connection with the building of the Northern Pacific & Manitoba branch line to Winnipeg. It was assumed that the court would order the suit, and it was regarding this trouble that he wished to confer with Mr. Oakes.

He rejoined his family at Munich on his return from Switzerland on December 17. His sister and her husband resided there, together with several other relatives and a large circle of old personal friends. Mr. Villard had caused the receivers to be informed that he was ready to return and respond at any time to any summons in any suit against him, and in answer had received official information that they had been ordered to bring suit, but thought it proper to call on him first for certain explanations. He concluded to respond to this in person, and was able to notify the receivers early in May, 1895, that he was back and held himself at their disposal. Some correspondence with the receivers followed, but nothing further was done in the case until the following winter, when the court renewed its order to bring suit, which was then commenced. But the suit never passed beyond the first stage—that is, the filing of the complaint and the defendant's answer. The case remained there until after the completion of the reorganization of the Northern Pacific Company and the discharge of the receivers. Mr. Villard received then the fullest possible vindication by a dismissal of the suit without his solicitation, and a certification from the principal conductors of the reorganization, E. D. Adams, Francis Lynde Stetson and C. H. Coster, that no evidence whatever had been found to sustain the charges against him. This is the place in which to mention also that it was proved, through a most searching investigation of the Northern Pacific accounts made by order of the court, that not a dollar of the corporate funds had ever been improperly used.

When Mr. Villard announced his settled determination before his departure for Europe in 1893 to withdraw from
all business pursuits, most of his friends did not believe that a man accustomed to such extraordinary activity could be content to live in retirement. These sceptics expected him to resume his rôle in Wall Street upon his return in 1895. But they did not know the man. Although he kept a small office in the financial quarter, and retained his interests as a security-holder in the North American Company and some other corporations in which he had been interested for years, he resolutely declined to become again responsible for their management as director or officer. He was always found ready, however, to help them with money and advice. He had three reasons for this retirement: one was his growing deafness, and a second one his unwillingness, in the light of past lessons of ingratitude from others, ever again to be responsible for the use of other people's money, directly or indirectly. The third reason was the sacrifices he had made as a consequence of his practice, out of kindness and generosity, to assist inexperienced relatives and friends of both sexes in their investments. He always looked upon advice given to such as involving a moral obligation, and never shrank from the personal consequences of this view, as is proved by the fact that he made good losses to numerous sufferers from his counsel, to the extent of hundreds of thousands of dollars, especially from losses in Northern Pacific bonds.

He was rendered proof against Wall Street temptations by another fact. In spite of his all-absorbing material occupations for so long a period, he had never lost his preference for a life devoted to what he considered higher and nobler objects, such as he had followed before he became a business man. With the attainment of freedom from all obligations to others, this feeling grew stronger, and he not only never had a moment's regret because of the obscurity which he had deliberately sought, but he rendered thanks every day for the abundance of leisure it had secured him for extensive reading, literary labor, reform work, and the
philosophic contemplation of the momentous events following each other so rapidly in our time.

He had chosen two fields for literary occupation. One he had entered upon long before his withdrawal from business life. Nearly twenty years before, during periods of rest, he began to write his personal memoirs. As soon as he had command of his time, from the summer of 1895 till the winter of 1899-1900, when his health began to be seriously affected, he devoted himself steadily to their preparation. As a means of reviving and fixing his recollections as a war correspondent, he made a careful study of the Official War Records so far as they related to the campaigns of the Civil War on land and sea which he had witnessed. This work proved very fascinating to him, as the Government publications contained the documentary history of the operations not only of the Northern but also of the Confederate armies. It revealed to him for the first time the whole, instead of but one side, of the bloody pictures of the battle-fields of the great struggle. He found it most absorbing work to test the accuracy of the statements of the loyal commanders by those made by their antagonists, and to unite their separate accounts into one complete, consistent, and comprehensible description. The flood of new light radiating from this double source led him to enlarge the scope of the narrative of his own observations of the great collisions of the war into full battle descriptions. He was untiring in the collation, sifting, and testing of his material from all available sources, and took the greatest pains to be impartial and accurate. It required many months to bring some of his battle stories into a shape that satisfied him. When he was obliged to stop work, he had got no further than the second day's fighting at Chattanooga. The next subjects would have been Grant's battles in the Wilderness and the siege of Petersburg. He was very anxious to describe these later episodes, and had revisited both scenes in 1897, going over the ground carefully with the Official Records and accounts of war historians in hand.
His other literary scheme was to write a history of the Franco-German war of 1870–71. He had for some years employed two young German historians, trained by Professor von Sybel, to collect material for him, but gave up the project on finding that the French material procurable was altogether too scanty for as full and accurate a history of the part played by the vanquished as the abundant German sources permitted to be written of the part of the victors.

Although he was no longer a working participant in current affairs, it was not in his nature to be simply an indifferent observer of passing events. His sympathies were moved as quickly and deeply as ever by all good causes, and his indignation stirred as readily by public and private wrongs. It remained a standing grief to him, as a free-trader, that the prospect of tariff reform had grown so apparently hopeless in these latter years. The thought that, through his instrumentality, it was rendered possible to wage an incessant war against public abuses of every kind through the Evening Post's relentless championship of political reform, was a source of just pride to him; but it did not surprise him that praise of this championship was followed by denunciation when the Evening Post had to oppose popular delusions, as in the case of the unjust war against Spain. That national frenzy roused his strongest antagonism, for he clearly foresew all the moral decadence, all the blighting effect upon all reformatory movements, which that fatal aberration was certain to bring in its train. He and his wife could not stand the war-racket which broke out in the spring of 1898, and went to Europe, not returning until after the conclusion of peace.

With the exception of this absence, Mr. Villard passed his winters with his family in their apartment in New York, and his summers at their beautiful country-seat at Dobbs Ferry, on the Hudson, until the summer of 1899, when he made what he felt to be his last tour over the Northern Pacific system. The journey was extended to
Alaska, which, though the Oregon Steamship Company had opened commercial intercourse with it under his original administration, he had never found time to visit. As he had not been over the road for eight years, he was prepared to be, if not forgotten, at least only slightly remembered. It was therefore an agreeable revelation to him to find that he and his work were well remembered all the way from the Lakes to the Pacific Northwest. He was heartily welcomed everywhere and by all classes, and met a great number of old acquaintances. The most pleasing reception given to him was at Eugene City at the State University of Oregon, of which he had been a benefactor. It interested him, of course, very much to compare what Oregon and Washington were when he first made his advent on the coast twenty-five years before, with their present stage of development. The two Territories in 1874 had together a population of only 100,000; now each of the two States claimed about half a million. Portland's had risen from 15,000 to 90,000, Tacoma's from 5,000 to 45,000, Seattle's from 6,000 to 65,000, and Spokane's from a few hundred to 40,000. Marvellous changes in one-third the length of a human life!

Mr. Villard was of such a fine physique that he was generally supposed to enjoy perfect health, which was not, however, the case. He had been for more than thirty years troubled with rheumatism and gout, and had passed through several dangerous diseases. After 1896, he had some attacks of heart disease and a slight apoplectic stroke. His real decline began in 1899.¹

No American citizen of foreign birth could have had a higher appreciation than Mr. Villard of the privileges of American citizenship, and of the incomparable advantages arising from the free play of the human faculties enjoyed in this country. He never forgot that he was himself a living illustration of the benefits of these conditions, and never failed to acknowledge his indebtedness to them. Yet,

¹ Mr. Villard died at Thorwood, November 12, 1900.
with all his faithfulness and gratitude to his adopted country, he also remained loyal to the land of his birth. Notwithstanding his residence of nearly half a century in the United States and all the American infiltration and engrafting he underwent in that long time, he always remained and was proud to be a true German. He sought to have his native language acquired by all the members of his family, and to make them personally acquainted with his relatives and friends in the Fatherland. The family altogether lived nearly twelve years at different times in Germany, and Mr. Villard visited his native province on an average every two years. He considered it a sacred duty to do all he could for the welfare of his countrymen in America, and for the promotion of close friendly relations between the two countries. He enjoyed the personal friendship and confidence of all the diplomatic representatives of Germany in the United States from the days of Lincoln, and was ever ready to give them the benefit of his long and varied experience and wide acquaintance on this side of the water. He always believed that the two countries ought to know more of each other's special characteristics, and this induced him to provide for sending thirty-three young German artisans, artists, and literati to the World's Fair at Chicago in 1893. The same motives led him to entertain at Thorwood the officers of the German squadron that was ordered over to join in the international naval review in the spring of that year.

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