CHANCELLORSVILLE.
A Defense of the First Division, Eleventh Corps.

A COMPLETE ROUT.
Attacked in Front, Flank and Rear, the Men Retreat.

SOMEBODY BLUNDERED.

Placing the Responsibility for the Disaster Where It Belongs.

BY CAPT. R. B. MONROE, CINCINNATI, O.

The First Division of the Eleventh Corps, commanded by Brig.-Gen. Charles Devens, Jr., was made up of two brigades, with two squadrons cavalry. The First Brigade, (Brig.-Gen. Leopold Von Gilsa) was composed of the 61st, 65th and 56th N. Y. and 153d Pa. The Second, (Brig.-Gen. N. C. Haines) composed of the 66th, 68th, 70th and 107th Ohio and the 17th Conn. This last was commanded by the Ohio Brigade. The Division, with the Eleventh Corps, left Brooklyn Station at 5 a.m., April 27; marched to Hartwell Church; left Hartwell Church at 9 a.m., April 27; and crossed the Rapahannock River at Kelley's Ford. It marched again at 12 o'clock, reached the Rapidan at 7 p.m., April 27; crossed at Germania Ford at 4 o'clock the next morning. On April 28, it marched to the Wilderness of the Chancellorsville battlefield, and at 5 a.m. camped on the west side of the road between the tarpaulin and plank road, near the Valley or Hatch House. At 10 o'clock of the morning of May 1 there was a sharp battle fought south of us, and the division was ordered into line to repel the attack. Again at 3 o'clock and from 5 to 6 p.m. there was a sharp firing in our front. We lay on our arms all night. At noon of May 2 the Eleventh Corps was put into position on the extreme right of the army, along the tarpaulin. The First Division was deployed on the tarpaulin from the Valley House west, facing north, the extreme right, right flank in the air; two regiments detached to the right and south. The 57th Ohio was placed on the reserve of the Second Brigade, and the 57th Ohio on the reserve of the First, behind the right of deflection.

The Third Division of Gen. Carl Schurz was on our left, extending to Parke's Tavern, with Gen. Stiver's Second Division on his left. This was the situation during the afternoon of May 2. During this time.

STONESTOWN JACKSON was noticed from east to west along our front with 25,000 men about one and one-half miles from our battle-line; his cavalry and scouts reconnoitering to find a weak point. Their attacks being seized, the attacking party would disappear. These vast attacks were made during the afternoon—on paroled by a detachment of Schurz's Division, one by the pickets of McNair's Brigade, and another by the 15th Pa. of Von Gilsa's Brigade. Before these warning attacks, the men of the Second Brigade saw the enemy moving in a large force toward our right on the Brack road where it intersects a cross-road through the camps in their front. About 2 o'clock the First Sergeant of Co. B, 57th Ohio, was sent to the pickets with instructions that the enemy was marching on our right flank with infantry and artillery. Stories were sent out by Col. Noble, of the 17th Conn; Col. Lee, of the 57th Ohio, and Col. Richardson, of the 58th Ohio. These were advanced until forced back, and all confirmed the report of an army moving on our right flank. All of them were sent to the brigade, division and corps headquarters, and were telegraphed and ordered. Great anxiety was felt in the Second Brigade, as we were told that it was only an observation; that Jackson was retreating toward Richmond with Pickets at his head. At about 4:30 p.m., when the valley from the 15th Pa. was heard, three of the Colonels of the Second Brigade rode out to the position of the 57th Ohio and held a conference with Col. Riley, who joined them and rode out to the front of the First Brigade for observation. Col. Riley returned in his regiment he seemed very excited, and, calling the men to their feet, he hissed them into action, made a very impressive speech that an officer of the regiment must fight and fire. Among other things he added: "A great battle is pending, in which many lives will be lost. Some of us will not see another sunrise. If there is a man in the ranks who is not ready to die for his country, let him come to me, and I will give him a pass to go to the rear; for I want no half-hearted, unwilling soldiers or cowards in the ranks to-night. We need every man we have to fight the enemy. If a command falls, do not stop to take him away or act for him, but fight for

Please Comment, Correct, and Suggest Changes in Return to E. C. Grenfan, 175 E. 24th St., Cincinnati, Ohio.
A VISIT TO THE FRONT.

Biddle's and Colton's Divisions, which came in with our skirmish line all the afternoon, but nothing to indicate that the enemy was driving in our prairies. About an hour before the attack we heard a single volley of musketry, which was fired by the 13th Pa. at a small tree of half decay which appeared on their front. The first notice that we had of the attack was a single shot from a battery posted on our right rear, and very close to our right flank. The shell went over our heads and reached as far as Suchor's Division, passing over the line of battle from the rear of the left of Devens Division. This was followed in the cress by a heavy volley from the charging columns.

THE EIGHTH BATTERY.

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voice, "Col. Riley, don't shoot my men!"
The regiment being fully formed, our front clamped, the refuge behind us, and the Confederates within 30 paces in front, delivered a volley from range, making terrible havoc among the enemy, checking their charge and, before they could return, delivered several volleys, holding the ground until both ranks were enveloped by the enemy, which was bearing down upon them like an avalanche. When thus overpowered and unable to escape, Col. Riley gave the order to shoot. This was repeated several times before the men compromised it and turned to obey. Just at this time Col. Riley fell, mortally wounded. By his side fell Adj't J. W. Ginn, with a bullet hole through his shoulder-joint, and with him left 14th officers and men in the line of battle. A perfect avalanche of Confederates then passed over the line where the dead and wounded lay, and those who were able to walk were taken to the rear, among them Adj't Ginn, who says the ground became solid in a line in front of the 72d Ohio was literally covered with dead and wounded rebels, showing the dead effect of the fire of the regiment. Sgt. C. W. Wilson, who remained on the field to care for the wounded, sent a message through the lines to the regiment in these words: "All honor to the 72d; she left her dead and wounded all in line of battle."

The 4th and 45th N. Y., with a battery of artillery, were also precipitately struck on their flank, front and rear. They made an effort to change front, but were under such an awful fire that they fell and were routed, covering to the rear over the Second Brigade in hopeless confusion. This was inevitable. No equal force existed as they were could have done otherwise, and the charge of cowardice is a slander that no honorable ex-soldier should repeat.

AT THE FIRST FIRE

The 72d Ohio, the reserve regiment of the Second Brigade, was deployed into line, in front clamped, and, under the immediate direction of Gen. McLean, advanced several hundred yards, Col. Richardson, while leading his regiment, was accidentally wounded. The 72d and 107th Ohio and 72d Ohio, lying on the south, became the center of a front, flank, and rear, and the regiment was deployed in column of fours. Gen. McClellan then made an effort to form them in the rear of the division under the protection of the 32d Ohio, which was making a heroic effort to hold the ground at a point about 300 yards to the left and rear of whom the 72d Ohio was making such a desperate stand. The First Brigade gone, the 72d having fallen back, the 72d was forced back, and the
brigade line was not partially formed, when they became the target for 20,000 men, massed and moving on them like a flood. Under the command of Maj.-Gen. Schurz, the companies of the 5th Ohio concentrically withdrew from the right, the 4th, the 7th, the 2nd, and the 1st, each forming a line to the rear of the 5th Ohio, where they fought until both regiments were swept from their position by the overwhelming force of the attack. Col. John G. Lee having his horse shot and being himself disabled. Maj. Schurz was wounded, and fell into the hands of the enemy.

The 7th Ohio, forced with the right wing south of the road, west of the Tabby

House, and at right angles to the left wing, which was on the road. The right wing was fixed in the rear, and stopped the attack of the right wing of Johnson's Division, manned in column of division by brigades. This was a new regiment, but yet they fought with the courage and discipline of veterans. Col. Hoke was wounded, Lieut.-Col. Walter killed, and the ground was strewn with their dead and wounded. The 7th Ohio attempted to change front and form on the left of the 5th Ohio; in so doing they suffered severely, Col. Meyer being severely wounded. The Second Brigade was then deployed, but not thoroughly organized for effective resistance.

The First Brigade goes they find several valleys, where they were forced back in confusion: portions of regiment held together, rallying several times. The 7th Ohio (with which I was mounted), after falling-back in the thick underbrush, fell back in good order (ready to form on the first support) as far as the Wilderness Church, where we found about 200 men of Schurz's Division behind trees. Capt. Ben Morgan, who found himself the senior officer fit for duty, with the writer, rallied a fragment of the regiment. Here we give a few voltages more, and the enemy was again slightly checked. From this point the advancing force looked like a sheet three or four lines deep, and to the right an open field was spotted with rebel flags.

Our next rally was at the railroad embankment, where men of all regiments and brigades were mingled together and offering stubborn resistance. Officers were commanding men they never saw before, and men were ready to rally under the common flag, no matter who carried it or led them. Our brigade was finally rallied by Gen. N. C. McLean at 6:35 a.m., under the guns at the feet of the hill near the cemetery. I did not see the stumps as often spoken of as being the Champion Hill House. It had burned before the men I was with fell back that far.

I believe in the light of subsequent events, that the stubborn resistance of a part of the 7th Ohio saved the army from a greater disaster, the holding back of the center of the line of battle causing their wings to swing around toward their center, without line, in the shape of a horseshoe. When we were first found by the Wilderness Church line of the enemy could be plainly seen, and was in the shape of a half-circle, with both horns of the circle past our flank, so that, when our men gave way, their center advanced rapidly and our line was crouched into about half its original length, thereby crowding them together and preventing such confusion that it was impossible to check them, especially under the cover of the thick darkness that was enveloping them. Stonewall Jackson thereupon sent for his reserve division, under command of Gen. Hill, and placed it in position to advance and withdraw the division of Ewell and Colon to the open country near Dough's Tavern, and there reinforced them. This confusion prevented a night attack of Jackson's whole corps, which would have been very disastrous in view of the situation at the close of the day.

After the battle many lines and accurate reports were published throughout the country about the condition of the Eleventh Corps, and those were especially severe on the Thirteenth Division, commanded by Gen. Cist Scott. (Then in command.) Report of regiment was properly handled, and called upon his brigades and regimental commanders to make full reports in view of these incalculable calamities. Under the shape of the 1st Ohio wore a drum, without exception, they all made full and elaborate reports, which were sufficient, but for the fact that some of them thought it necessary, in their own defense, to give the responsibility upon the First Division, commanded by Brig.-Gen. Charles Dever. Gen. Scott, holding, who commanded the First Brigade of the Third Division, and who was a mile or so from the right flank, had the audacity to say in his report, "Von Gilsb's Brigade bring one round per man, and Gen. McLean's, not one round at all. It is silly necessary to say in answer in this case Dever, divisional commander, and Gen. Von Gilsb, commanding the First Brigade, were wounded; that Gen. McLean, of the Second Brigade, lost three men, and that the left, right down and left on the field; and that all but one of the field soldiers of this brigade that were in the battle were killed or wounded; that the loss of the 1st Ohio was 300, and the loss of Von Gilsb was 300, making 700 in the division. This is a violent assumption that McLean's Brigade would suffer such a loss without firing a shot. Then, again, compare this with the official reports of the losses in Shiloh's brigade, which were not being nearly one mile from the point of attack, and having more time to prepare for resistance.
The following is intended as a record of what came under my observation and what I learned during the battle. I have avoided expressing an opinion as to who was responsible for the disaster. There is no difference of opinion, however, in the Ohio Brigade as to its being a complete surprise to the command of the army and corps, which might have been prevented. The officers and men believed there was sufficient evidence of an army massing on our flank, leg the positive orders from Headquarters to maintain the position assigned to the division, without change of front, partially dissuaded them and prevented their convictions as to the form and design of the enemy. I think Gen. Hancock, McLean, and Van. Gillen did this, but were powerless because of positive orders from Headquarters. After the firing began Col. Lee went twice to Gen. Duvall, begging permission to change his front, but was refused. Gen. Van. Gillen, after his brigade was forced back, galloped to How ard's Headquarters, asked for help to assist the attack, and was told to go back to his men and hold his line, as the attacking force was small. Gen. R. E. Lee, of Hickey's Corps, who found the worst, sent Gen. Graham's Brigade and Tromblon's battery to Gen. Howard at Duvall's Tavern. They were refused by Gen. Howard and marched back. Brackenridge's Brigade, of the Eleventh Corps, had been located on the skirmish line, with Gen. Van. Gillen's Brigade, to cover the flank in case of an attack, and was refused by Gen. Howard, under instructions from Gen. Hoke, to have that position at 4 p.m., and go the support of the right wing of Gen. St. John's Corps, and they started at once. Gen. Hoke and Van. Gillen were under orders of Jackson's moves, but uncertain as to his destination, they refused to make any change in the dispositions of the Eleventh Corps until Jackson should develop his purpose. He was not expected to make an attack until the morning of May 3. In view of these facts, and many others which may be gathered from the army records, it is clear to my mind that the division and brigade commanders are not blameless, but that the responsibility rests behind them. Among the reports of the battles published in the press of the country after its occurrence, there appeared in the New York Tribune a letter from the Baltimorean, describing the part taken by the Eleventh Corps in the battle of Chancellorsville, which was received by the corps as so accurate and
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Keach 3
Clarke, Botetourt, Roanoke, and Montgomery, and Smyth, sharing in this increase. Roanoke owes its decrease to a separation of the value of Roanoke city from those of the county in 1885; why the other counties decreased we do not understand.

Rockingham increased its value over 23 per cent. Rockbridge increased its value $1,012,249, or over 33 per cent. The former the result of farm improvements by its sturdy German-descended population and a new railway, and the latter from three new railways and a large iron blast furnaces. Winchester shows again a gain of over 20 per cent. 

7,324,087
In the month of March 20 the "Veteran General" composed the following order to Hookey's operations at Chancellorville in May 1863. As to what was done and left unnumbered, we have no materials for writing an account of that campaign, as for the rest of the historical records of the war, historians will most likely remain as ignorant as the declaimer of to-day. The principal original material of this account of this campaign is the following:

The testimony of Hookey, Hookey, Hookey. The Hookeys did not publish it in the report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War. The report of Long and about thirty of his subordinates General, published by order of the Court Martial. This is the only original Richmond edition it is rare; but I am inclined to think that it will give an entire view of the story of the "Rebellion's deed," soon be too serious. The--this week the two opposing armies, and is mainly very far and accurate. The army at any time however, there are near us. Rappahannock, which show all the topographical features of the region, which must impress itself on every side; and it's an enumeration of the Confederate arms. It seems to me, I will, but in no case will they vary essentially from the actual figures, as given in the official document.

Near the close of April, 1863, Hookey had about 120,000 for the defense and protection of the town. Hookey had with him 90,000, having sent some 50,000 to his army in the rear of Richmond. The command he was to give Long only 45,000, or, at most, 90,000; he had at least 250,000, and 10,000 the other corps. Hookey had also 13,000 cavalry, but he has had but 8,000 infantry, according to Hookey, for a separate operation, which effected nothing, and had no influence on the operation of the two armies. The 13,000 cavalry, under Hookey, had done nothing. The 8,000 cavalry, which, likewise, were of essential service to him, although not brought directly into action on Sunday, the 21st of April, 1863, Hookey had, by complete surprise, turned the Confederate right. Hookey was advancing against the town. Hookey was left near Chancellorville to make this turn, and to use her as such as far as the town at all. The division was to cover the heights at Fredericksburg, and was advancing with a fresh force some 20,000 strong. Long feared portions of his army. The military portion of the Army's, about 15,000 in all, in most part, trusting them to run, was held by Hookey for some time in the rear. The order to march reached Fredericksburg at 11 o'clock on Saturday, April 21, 1863. It was, he showed himself and prepare to handle an army. It was daylight when the division reached Fredericksburg, a distance of nearly 30 miles. Six or seven hours passed before he ventured a serious advance. The Confederate leaders were all killed, wounded, or captured. Hookey's division, after some delay, pressed on, at the hour of 10 o'clock, and the Confederates still left, for Hookey was by this advance out of reach for his men to reach Hookey's left, which Hookey had, who had recovered sufficiently to resume command, did not make the slightest effort to join Hookey, who was forced back, and Hookey had some distance to the right with 8,000 men to the left with 1,000. At 11 o'clock a sudden charge was made upon the strong position at Marter's Hill. It was carried in an hour of time, with the loss of 1,100 men of the Confederate division, the main body, well armed and well managed, was on the heights.

In the afternoon the retreating Confederate division stood still, and were on the point of disintegrating, when the reinforcements, which had been brought up by Lee came upon the ground and stayed the Union advance. During the night Hookey, who had recovered sufficiently to resume command, did not make the slightest effort to join Hookey, who was forced back, and Hookey had some distance to the right with 8,000 men to the left with 1,000. At 11 o'clock a sudden charge was made upon the strong position at Marter's Hill. It was carried in an hour of time, with the loss of 1,100 men of the Confederate division, the main body, well armed and well managed, was on the heights.

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**The LIFE INSURANCE BOND BOBBONE.**

On the 20th of December last, the Highland Company rejected a bond, made payable in London in 1842, more than half of whom had not yet purchased at 1 1/2 per cent., with Queen's advantage.

But his preparations were checked and he had to return to Edinburgh, where he was met by the bridesmaids at Frederick, and was received with a fresh face and some 1,800 strong. The company had been held by a single large bond of Confederation, but more than 1,800 strong, for Rastas was the same distance to the left of 1,800 and was taken by the left, with 1,800. Indeed a small charge was made upon the strong position at Maryville. It was carried in a quarter of an hour, with the loss of 1,800 men. But the defenders were never all killed, wounded or captured. After some little leisure, pressed on, driving before them the 1,800 to the right of the whole, for his life by in all the intersments.

Lay in the afternoon the returning Confederates made a stand, and were on the point of evacuation, when the reinforcements came down by 18,000 men. This was not made either by him or by his masters. There was no great obstacle in the way. That bond having been made for 18,000, white men, now joined the 1,800, would have had less than one half. That bond having been made for 18,000, white men, now joined the 1,800, would have had less than one half.

The bond which was not on the ground and stayed the Union advance. During all the afternoon however, who has recovered sufficiently to render some command, did not make the slightest effort to join Richmond, who was hardly half a dozen miles away. His life by in all the intersments.

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