A MEMOIR

OF

HECTOR TYNDALE,


Born March 24, 1821.
Died March 19, 1880.

PHILADELPHIA:
1882.

Gift of

Mrs. Victor Tyndale,

of Philadelphia.
PREFACE.

It is just and proper to place on record the words and actions of men of noble lives, to the end that their examples may be held in lasting remembrance.

Hector Tyndale was eminent for his heroism and love of truth. Firmness and loyalty to his convictions were his chief characteristics, and he was naturally earnest and sincere in language and action. He was gentle and affectionate to his friends, attentive and helpful to the brave men under his command, and just and considerate to all who approached him. His actions were generous and noble. Great integrity, a strong and masculine intellect, and a feminine tenderness of heart were so happily blended in him, that they produced the harmonious effect of an admirable and exalted character.

When with him, one was impressed with his high moral nature, and the purity of his aims and motives. His conversation, like a fine education, was instructive and elevating. In the beauty of his daily life, he recalled many of the traditions of Bayard and Sir Philip Sidney.

Living for others, and dying—as he did—before his time, a sacrifice to his patriotism, he won a love and remembrance which are destined to survive the passions of the great war, and the forgetfulness of the silent grave in which he reposes.

J. McL.

July, 1882.
MEMOIR OF GENERAL HECTOR TYNDALE.

The Tyndales are of Danish origin, and the earliest records of them in England place them in Northumberlandshire, in the valley of the river Tyne; and from the latter locality the surname of Tyne-dale, or Tyne-dall was derived.

In the War of the Roses the head of the Tyndale family fought on the side of the House of York, and after its downfall his rank and property were forfeited for treason. After this loss, he lived in Gloucestershire, under the assumed name of Hitchens, his maternal surname. William Tyndale, the martyr, the first translator of the New Testament into the English language, and who displayed the striking characteristics of his race in the firmness and courage with which he maintained his convictions, was one of his descendants.

At a later period some of the Tyndales emigrated to Ireland and settled in the county of Carlow, where several of their descendants still reside. During the Insurrection in Ireland in 1798, William Tyndale, the grandfather of Hector Tyndale, raised and commanded a troop of cavalry, his son Robinson, the father of Hector, being the cornet. This troop did valuable service on the side of the Government, and on the occasion of a review by General Sir John Moore, afterwards killed at Corunna, in Spain, it and its officers were highly complimented by that commander for their military bearing and strict discipline.

In the early part of this century, the former cornet, Robinson Tyndale, while still a young man, settled in Philadelphia, and some years later he married Sarah Thorn, a native of that city, a descendant of a New Jersey family, and a member of the Society of Friends. He established himself in business on Third above Market Street, where the subject of this Memoir was born, March 24th, 1821.

Hector Tyndale soon manifested strong moral and mental char-
acteristics, which developed with his strength and years, and distinguished him through life. The clearness, quickness, and grasp of his mind, his courage, energy, and sound judgment, were remarkable at an early age; and to these strong qualities in later years were added the graces and refinement of a cultivated mind, with the glow of an ardent and generous temperament.

He had a strong desire for military pursuits, and when sixteen years of age, was offered a cadetship at West Point, but at the persuasion of his mother declined it, and gave up this cherished wish.

Soon after this he was sent to Texas on business, and remained there nearly two years, at the time when the young Republic was fighting for its independence. On Hector's return to Philadelphia, he engaged with his father in business, which he pursued for many years. He was an active member of the Artillery Corps of the Washington Grays, and at the age of twenty, while one of its corporals, was elected captain of another company, which he reorganized under the name of the "Cadwalader Grays."

In the month of August, 1842, he married Miss Julia Nowlen, of Philadelphia, whose gallant brother, Major Garrett Nowlen, was killed at the battle of Ream's Station, Va., in August, 1864. He soon afterwards resigned the captaincy of the Cadwalader Grays; but, during the anti-Catholic riots in May and July, 1844, he commanded the citizens' police force of the middle ward of Philadelphia, and devoted much of his time and energy to protect property, and restore law and order.

The fatigue and loss of rest incurred in this duty injured his health very seriously, and in the spring of 1845 having been invited to join an expedition of cavalry under Major—afterwards Major-General—Sumner of the 1st Dragoons, U. S. A., he accepted the invitation, making a long march into the Northwest Territory, now Dakota, and Montana, among the farther tribes of Indians.

His father dying in 1842, the business was continued by his mother; and after his return from this western trip, he entered into copartnership with his brother-in-law, the late Edward P. Mitchell, under the firm name of Tyndale and Mitchell, and
remained actively engaged in business until he went into the army, in the war of the Rebellion.

During the year 1851, he spent several months in Europe, visiting all the celebrated manufactories of china, pottery, and glass; also its museums and art galleries, with a view to improve his knowledge and cultivate his taste. The ceramics which he brought to Philadelphia, together with his collection in the fine arts, showed rare knowledge, and a refined and correct taste.

In the "irrepressible conflict" which then agitated the country, he was active in favor of Free Soil and Free Speech, and though not what was termed an abolitionist, yet all anti-slavery movements had his earnest sympathy and active support.

In the canvass for the Presidency in 1856, he was the untiring supporter of John C. Frémont; was a member of the Republican City Executive Committee, and spent much time and money in advancing the cause.

In December, 1859, Mrs. John Brown visited Philadelphia on her way to pay her last visit to her husband, before his execution. Her friends endeavored to procure an escort for her to Harper's Ferry on her sorrowful mission, but were, for a time, unsuccessful. An appeal was made to Hector Tyndale, which moved his chivalrous spirit; and, after consulting his wife, who counselled him to go, if he felt it his duty to do so, he at once tendered his services to Mrs. Brown, and they were very thankfully accepted. Mr. and Mrs. J. Miller McKim also accompanied her. The antipathy and hatred towards John Brown and his followers which existed at that time, cannot be understood or appreciated by the present generation. Even pronounced anti-slavery people joined in the general detestation of them. The attack on Harper's Ferry was believed by many to be so severe a check to all opposition to slavery that, for a long time to come, any efforts in that direction would be futile.

The pro-slavery men became more intolerant and brutal in their demeanor and speech, and to show sympathy with John Brown was to invite in Virginia and in the South generally assaults, or even assassination. The few who sympathized with Mrs. Brown in her great distress, had grave fears for the personal safety of those who dared to accompany her; and many believed
the escort would never return alive. On the morning of the day of the execution, Hector Tyndale and his friends, while walking in the environs of Harper's Ferry, heard a sharp report and the whistling of a bullet close to them; they could not discover who fired the shot, but they felt that they were exposed to the dangers of assassination from an unseen enemy.

John Brown was hanged at Charlestown, the county seat of Jefferson County; his body was placed in a rude coffin, and sent by railroad to Mrs. Brown at Harper's Ferry. When the coffin arrived, Hector Tyndale declined to receive it until the lid was removed and the remains identified. This request caused an outburst of anger, and imprecations and threats were angrily made against him; but he remained calm and determined, and finally, being supported by some of the men employed by the railroad company, the coffin was opened, and was found to contain the body of John Brown, in the condition in which it was when removed from the gallows.

For a time before John Brown was hanged, it was threatened in Southern newspapers that his body would not be given up to his family, but would be treated in some ignominious manner, and instead of its being put in the coffin something different would be substituted. Hector Tyndale had heard this, and consequently determined to see what the coffin contained when it was delivered to him. His courage thus carried him safely through a very great danger.

On the arrival of Mrs. Brown and her escort, with the body, at the railroad station in Philadelphia, they were met by Mayor Alexander Henry, with some officers. The mayor peremptorily ordered the body to be removed from the city, and when expostulated with by Hector Tyndale on the inhumanity and indecency of this conduct, replied that he was responsible for the peace of the city, and if the body was kept in it over night he feared a riot. Yielding to superior power, Mrs. Brown was compelled to carry the remains of her husband to the city of New York, where they were placed in the hands of an undertaker and properly cared for. This incident will show how debased was public sentiment at that time in Philadelphia, and the odium which attached to all who in the remotest degree were connected with John Brown.

Although Hector Tyndale knew nothing in advance of the raid
of John Brown, did not approve of it, and had no personal knowledge of him, yet his assisting Mrs. Brown in her sad duty brought upon him the condemnation of many, and several of his old acquaintances did not speak to him for some years afterwards. Directly after his return he was approached by a friend of the companions of John Brown, still confined in the jail at Charlestown, Va., and asked to assist in an attempt to rescue the captives. He positively refused, and at his urgent request the unwise attempt, which was certain to end in disastrous failure, was abandoned.

In July, 1860, he started for Europe on important business, expecting to be absent one or two years, and in October of the same year was joined there by his wife.

In the mean time Abraham Lincoln had been elected President, and the secession of the Southern States soon followed. The news of the attack on Fort Sumter reached him in Paris, and realizing the importance of the conflict, the danger to his country, and his duty as a citizen, he at once closed up his affairs—at much pecuniary loss—and returned with Mrs. Tyndale to their home.

He immediately offered his services to Governor Curtin, but, though highly recommended by General McCall and other military men, he failed to obtain an appointment.

In June, 1861, he met Col. John W. Geary, who had just been authorized by the War Department to recruit the 28th Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers, and on the 28th of the same month was mustered into service as major of that regiment. He gave important aid in raising the regiment, and contributed largely of his private means to subsist the men until they entered into the United States service. Through Major Tyndale's personal influence the War Department very reluctantly gave permission to increase the force of the regiment to fifteen companies, or three battalions. The Secretary of War empowered him to recruit a new regiment, of which he was to have been the colonel; but feeling that he was in honor bound to assist Colonel Geary and the 28th Regiment, he promptly declined the offer: the Secretary finally yielded to the request for fifteen companies. The result was, one of the finest regiments, if not the finest, in numbers, material, and discipline, and which
had a war record second to none in the Army of U. S. Volunteers. There were on its roll, from first to last, 2834 men and officers, of whom about 500 were killed or severely wounded. It fought in eight States of the Union, in twenty-four battles and engagements, and in nineteen skirmishes. At the battle of Antietam all but one of the color bearers and guards were killed or wounded, and the list of casualties was 80 killed and 250 wounded! After one of its most brilliant charges, one of the veterans shouted to Colonel Tyndale as he passed, “I would sooner be a member of the 28th than king of the whole world.”

Major Tyndale went to the front in August, 1861, and during the fall and winter commanded the post of Sandy Hook, opposite Harper’s Ferry, and a line extending ten miles along the Potomac. He had frequent skirmishes with the troops of Col. Ashby, and participated in the action of Bolivar Heights. These duties kept him actively employed. While stationed at this post, a skiff containing six soldiers of the 28th Regiment was sent, by order of Col. Geary, to the Virginia shore to begin the laying of a rope ferry. A freshet was surging down the Potomac, and trees, logs, and débris were swept along with the torrent. The skiff was swamped, and the men were left struggling in the angry waters, those on shore being horror-stricken at the sight, and helpless to afford relief. Major Tyndale at this moment coming up, he and Lieutenant Greenwalt threw off their swords, coats, and boots, and rushing into a small, leaky skiff, rowed out to assist their struggling comrades. Their brave efforts were of no avail, as the last man sank when the skiff was within a few feet of him.

The enemy visited many of the buildings in Harper’s Ferry which had been deserted by their occupants, and used them as a shelter from which to fire on Major Tyndale’s pickets. On February 7th a man, apparently colored, was seen waving a white flag in a landing arch on the Virginia shore and calling for a boat to be sent to him. A scout named Rohr, a loyal Virginian, was sent in a boat in response to the flag and call. When the boat was near the opposite shore the scout discovered that the man who held the flag was not a negro but was a white man blackened and disguised, and soon after he saw a number of men concealed in the landing arch; two shots fired by this party mor-
tally wounded the scout, who was rapidly rowed back to Sandy Hook.

On receiving this report Major Tyndale crossed with Lieut. Greenwalt, and several men, and burned the buildings in Harper's Ferry, the engine-house in which John Brown fought and was captured, being one of them.

When General McClellan crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry in February, 1862, the 28th Regiment was in Col. Geary's Brigade, of Banks's Division. During the spring and summer of that year the command of the regiment devolved largely upon Major Tyndale, who was constantly on outpost duty, and engaged in all the movements of the left of General Banks's column under General Geary.

On April 29th he was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel, but he did not receive the commission until the month of June, being meanwhile in active service in the field.

Early in May, with three companies of his regiment and a troop of cavalry, to which a section of artillery was afterwards added, he was sent to Front Royal, Va., to hold that position, its vicinity, the adjacent railroad bridge, and fifteen miles of the railroad. As a depot of valuable supplies was soon after established there, he advised that reinforcements should be sent to him.

Having reason to believe that the enemy were advancing in that direction, on the morning of May 21st he made a daring reconnaissance up the Shenandoah River to Brownstown, ten miles distant, and to a point three miles beyond. He ascertained that rebel forces were probably coming down on both sides of the river, and that their advanced troops were not far distant from Front Royal, though concealed in the woods and mountains. He captured a rebel scout from whom he obtained similar information. On his return, late the same day, to Front Royal, he telegraphed General Banks of the result of his reconnaissance, and that an attack might be expected at any moment. In reply General Banks complimented him for the "energy and enterprise" he had displayed. Two days later, May 23d, Colonel Kenly, with the 1st Maryland Regiment, by command of General Banks, relieved Major Tyndale, who, with his command, was ordered to rejoin his own, Geary's Brigade. The next day, having marched about thirteen miles, he heard the attack on
Front Royal, and found the enemy in force between him and that post. Colonel Kenly's command, after a brave resistance, was overpowered and captured, with the exception of one company which, being on outpost duty, had been cut off, and soon after joined Major Tyndale, who waited for stragglers until the morning of the 25th, when he rejoined General Geary's Brigade at Rectortown, Va.

On the 9th of August, some hours before the battle of Cedar Mountain opened, Lieut.-Col. Tyndale, in command of his regiment and a squadron of cavalry, was personally directed by Gen. Banks to "retake and hold Thoroughfare Mountain, from which our signal corps had been driven by some rebel regiments." Gen. Banks thanked him for the successful termination of this movement and for the information brought of large trains passing up "The Valley" on our right.

In the exhausting retreat of Pope's army, Lieut.-Col. Tyndale was always in the rear-guard, participating in the battles, exposures, and hardships of that discouraging campaign. Supporting batteries in action or otherwise in engagement or movement by day and marching by night, he performed successfully that hardest of all duty—bringing up the rear-guard with the ammunition, baggage, and stores of the retreating army. By the direct command of General Pope his regiment was detailed to destroy the immense railway trains stopped by the cutting of the trestle bridge over Kettle Run. As these were numerous and of very great length and filled with stores, a high compliment was thus paid to Tyndale's command. His well-disciplined regiment preserved order even in this scene of destruction, which offered so many opportunities for plunder and riot to the worn and hungry troops. Again, by the direct order of General Pope, Lieut.-Col. Tyndale, with the 28th Regiment, and some cavalry and artillery, was ordered, on the afternoon of the battle of Chantilly, to hold some bridges and fords over Bull Run, in the rear of our army, then moving towards Washington, which he did successfully. By the same direct orders he rejoined his division, bringing with him safely the lagging baggage trains of the corps.

Nearly all the field officers having met with casualties, or being sick or exhausted by the privations and hardships of this retreat, Lieut.-Col. Tyndale, on the 8th of September, assumed command of his brigade of the division then commanded by Gen. George
S. Greene, of Mansfield’s Corps. This brigade consisted of the 28th Pennsylvania, the 5th, 7th, 29th, and 66th Ohio regiments. The 29th Ohio Regiment was temporarily detached some days before Antietam, leaving the brigade but four regiments in that battle.

At Antietam, Tyndale’s Brigade, at about 7 A. M., went into action to check the advance of a part of “Stonewall” Jackson’s Corps, which had thrown a portion of McClellan’s right wing into disorder and retreat. The enemy was not only stopped, but with the terrible fire of his brigade, Tyndale drove him back into the shelter of the woods; and, while charging, he was struck by a glancing shot upon the hip. On no part of the line was the struggle so severe, continuous, and sanguinary as that in front of the Dunker church and the adjacent fields, near the Sharpsburg Road, fought over by this brigade, with its reinforcements. The enemy charged the brigade three times, and were repulsed with great slaughter. By counter-charges and steady advances, taking advantage of every inequality of the ground, Lieut.-Col. Tyndale forced the enemy’s line back more than half a mile. His brigade captured one battery, silenced another, took seven battle flags—destroying or breaking the regiments that bore them, and killed or wounded more than its own number of equally brave troops. In one charge, after hours of constant fighting, and having had two horses shot under him, one of his regiments wavered an instant, under a fearful fire; all of its color-guard being shot down, when he rushed into the line, seized the colors, and waving his cap, led the charge to success. About two P. M. the enemy threw a large force on the right and front of Tyndale’s Brigade, forcing it to the left and rear. While rallying and forming his command, he was struck in the head by a musket ball, and his body, supposed to be dead, was dragged off the field by Lieutenant Borbidge and a sergeant of the 28th. He was soon attended by Surgeon H. Ernest Goodman, of the 28th Regiment, and received his most friendly and skilful care. When consciousness was restored, his first act was to send, what he believed to be, a dying message to his command. “Thank the officers and men for their great courage and endurance this day; and tell them that, though I have always been very strict with them, it was for their own good, and I love and respect them.” Soon
afterwards, General George S. Greene, a brave, devoted, and intelli-
gent officer, complimented him in the highest terms for his gallant and soldierly conduct during the battle, and promised
to earnestly recommend the promotion, which he so richly de-
served. From the field he was removed to a hospital in Hagers-
town, and, two days later, was sent, with some other wounded
officers, in a freight-car by railroad to Philadelphia.

The capture of the battle flags of seven regiments in action,
at the battle of Antietam, by Tyndale's Brigade, was an achieve-
ment perhaps without a parallel in the war of the Rebellion.

For resolute courage, conspicuous gallantry, self-possession, and
judgment at Antietam, Lieutenant-Colonel Tyndale was promoted
to the rank of Brigadier-General U.S. Volunteers, November 29th,
1862. Prostrated by his almost fatal wound, enfeebled by fever,
and partially paralyzed, his convalescence was slow and uncer-
tain; in fact, he never fully recovered. The ball had struck the
skull, near the left lower edge of the occipital bone, and glancing,
passed close to the spinal cord, and lodged in the flesh of the
neck, between the jugular vein and the carotid artery, where it
was found and extracted. The wound discharged occasionally,
and caused partial deafness in one ear. There was a compound
fracture of the skull, which, in healing, produced a slight pres-
sure on the brain, and induced angina pectoris.

In May, 1863, though hardly fit for duty, he applied for active
service in the field. Early in June he reported to General Dix,
at Fort Monroe, who assigned him to a brigade in the corps of
General Keyes, near Yorktown. After Gettysburg, he was
ordered, July 8th, with three regiments of another command—
two of which he had never before met—to report to General
Heintzelman, at Washington. One of these regiments, whilst on
a transport ship, had obtained liquor; and, with the exception
of one company, arrived in Washington drunken and mutinous, the
men utterly refusing to obey their officers, whom they abused
and threatened. The privates claimed that their term of enlistment
had expired, and refused to enter the railway cars, en route for
the Army of the Potomac. The mutiny became serious, and
bloodshed seemed inevitable. A regiment was ordered in readi-
ness to act, when General Tyndale arriving, rode in among the
mutineers, and by his demeanor and courage formed them into line, marched them into the cars, and sent them off to the front cheering for him. He joined General Meade's army just previous to the retreat of Lee across the Potomac, and was assigned to the command of a brigade in Schurz's Division of Howard's Corps—the 11th—and, with the Army of the Potomac, followed in pursuit of Lee.

Soon after the disaster of Chickamauga, the 11th and 12th Corps, under Hooker, were sent to the relief of Thomas, then closely held in Chattanooga by the rebel army. On the evening of October, 28th, 1863, General Tyndale, anticipating an attack by the enemy during the night, ordered the men of his brigade to sleep in regular regimental formation behind their stacked arms, and issued orders as to the disposition of the regiments, in case of a hurried movement. Frequent picket firing occurred until about eleven o'clock, when it became heavy in the direction of General Geary's camp, about two and a half miles distant. Lying, with his staff, not far from General Hooker's quarters, just before midnight Tyndale heard this General give orders to an aid-de-camp for General Howard, commanding the 11th Corps, "to move at once with his whole corps, to the relief of Geary, who is sorely pressed." Within five minutes' time General Tyndale's Brigade was in rapid motion towards the heaviest firing, which very soon increased into the roar of battle. The regular road deflected to the left, and ran close to the base of three densely wooded hills. He decided to leave this road to the left, and to lead his command through an open country in the direction of the heaviest firing, and the other brigades of the 11th Corps followed his line of march. General Howard accompanied him for some distance, and then remarking, "Your brigade is well commanded," he rode off with his staff to announce to General Geary that aid was near, leaving General Tyndale in command at the head of the column. After moving about a mile in the open field towards the sound of battle, the enemy, concealed from view along the wooded hills, opened a sharp fire on the left and front of Tyndale's Brigade. He immediately halted, changed front, and forming in line with supporting columns, attacked the enemy, and by a vigorous and persistent charge with the bayonet, drove them from the hill, and
placed his command on its summit. The next brigade, half a mile to the left and rear, commanded by Colonel Orland Smith, was fired upon in the same way, and in the same manner drove the enemy back, and occupied the adjoining hill. These hills were afterwards known as "Tyndale's Hill," and Smith's Hill." The battle in General Geary's front now ceased, and the enemy retreated under cover of the night and dense woods; aided, too, by their better knowledge of the road, but there was frequent and brisk skirmishing in the dark.

The successful issue of this battle was mainly due to General Tyndale's promptness and good judgment. Had he followed the regular road in this night march he would have fallen into an ambuscade, when he would have been attacked, perhaps surrounded by the enemy lying in wait, with probably serious and even disastrous results. His quick perception and energy inspired him with the idea of marching by the shortest and most direct line towards the sound of battle, where his comrades were manfully resisting the attack of a much larger force of the enemy; and when the disappointed rebels opened fire on his brigade, his prompt and vigorous attack changed the tide of battle, which up to that time was decidedly against the Union troops. The battle of Wauhatchie was the turning point of this campaign in Tennessee, and the rebels were afterwards forced to defensive warfare. Had Geary's command been captured or destroyed, the Union army would have been cut off from its communications, and without supplies would have been in a most embarrassing and dangerous position.

The defeat of the enemy was decisive, and this result made the succeeding movements of Grant's army practicable.

General Tyndale was soon afterwards introduced to General Grant, and received the personal thanks of the latter for his conduct in the battle of Wauhatchie.

The Count of Paris, in writing his history of the Civil War in America, sought information from various sources, and, at the request of Col. John P. Nicholson, of Philadelphia, General Tyndale furnished the Count with the details of the battle of Wauhatchie, and the succeeding movements and engagements. In a letter dated November 27, 1879, acknowledging the receipt of the statement, the Count of Paris said: "The remarks of Gen-
eral Tyndale are very interesting, and show his clear and comprehensive judgment."

At Chattanooga, November 28th, General Tyndale held the left of Grant's line, in Howard's Corps, and, with General Hecker's Brigade, chased the enemy from Citico Creek and vicinity. He participated in the series of battles which, after five days' fighting, resulted in driving the enemy from our right on Lookout Mountain to our extreme left on Missionary Ridge. On the 28th of November, immediately after these movements, the 11th Corps was detached to Sherman, and Gen. Tyndale was hurried off with that command to the relief of Burnside, sorely beleaguered in Knoxville. The troops had but three days' rations, were without knapsacks, tents, or transportation, and were badly clothed. The march and return of about two hundred and fifty miles, was made in one of the coldest and most inclement of winter seasons. Many of the men were barefooted and all badly shod, and yet they marched and slept on the bare ground, in rain, sleet, and ice. Their sufferings, privations, and hardships were intense, and were endured alike by every soldier and officer.

On their return to Lookout Valley, in the latter part of December, General Tyndale thanked his brigade for their conduct on this march, "made without straggling, and without complaint."

In January, 1864, he received his first leave of absence, other than for sickness, and went home for thirty days. On his return he assumed command of Schurz's Division, and while holding this command was ordered by General Thomas to have the loyal refugees from Alabama formed into a regiment. In April, when the 11th and 12th Corps were consolidated into the 20th, he was assigned to the command of the 3d Brigade of General Williams's division of that corps. The severity of the Knoxville campaign, and constant suffering from his wound—he being still lame and partially paralyzed—had, however, broken him down. Unable to ride or walk, and confined for days together to his bed, he was sent home on sick leave in May. Months of rest brought no relief or return of health, and his anxiety to resume active service only aggravated his nervous sufferings and made him more unfit for the resumption of his duties. Sensitive as to holding a commission when unable to perform its attendant obligations, and
feeling that he was standing in the way of others who were deserving—the number of general officers being limited by law—in August, 1864, he resigned from the service, stating his reasons therefor. The following is his letter of resignation:

PHILADELPHIA, August 24, 1864.

TO THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A.,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

GENTLEMEN:

In accordance with paragraph 10 of extracts of General Orders No. 183, Adj't-Genl's Office, 1863, I respectfully tender my resignation from the service of the United States—having complied with regulations and orders in regard to my reports of health.

Since having been severely, and at the time thought mortally, wounded in the head at the battle of Antietam, I have twice returned to my command; but the effects of that wound and of disease contracted in the campaign of 1862 under Major-General Pope in Virginia, have each time, after considerable intervals of active duty, compelled my return to my home. My physician declares that I require many months of rest before I can regain strength for duty of any kind. I therefore trust that my resignation, offered with painful regret, may be accepted, and a vacancy thus be made for one of the many brave officers now in the field who deserve promotion.

Very respectfully,
Your ob'd't servant,

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Brig.-Gen'l U. S. Vols.

His resignation at this time was a most unselfish and patriotic act, and was characteristic of him; but it was an unnecessary sacrifice, not required by the War Department, and was dictated solely by his high sense of honor and duty.

His inability for active service owing, as it was, to the effects of his wound and disease caused by exposure and hardships in the field, he should have retained his commission and pay until honorably discharged or mustered out of the service at the close of the war, when, no doubt, he would have been entitled to a pension. He never claimed or received one, although it was justly his due.
Without his own knowledge, and for gallant and meritorious services during the war, he was given a commission as Brevet Major-General U. S. Volunteers, dated March 13th, 1865.

As an officer, he was a rigid disciplinarian, but was kind and watchful for the comfort and safety of his command. His soldiers at first disliked him for his severity, but they soon learned to admire and love him for his unceasing care of them; his great self-denial; his skill and judgment as a commander; and for his undaunted courage in action. While in the army, he allowed no selfish or private interest to divert him from his aim, which was always to do his whole duty.

In 1867 he was appointed by Governor Geary one of the Commissioners of the State of Pennsylvania, to examine into and report as to the expenditures and arrangements in establishing the soldiers' cemeteries at Antietam and Gettysburg. This duty he performed with care and thoroughness, as is shown by an exhaustive report, made in conjunction with the other Commissioners, to the Governor.

In the month of June, 1868, he was nominated by the Republican Convention of the city of Philadelphia, as the candidate of that party for the mayoralty of the city. The heated party feelings engendered by the civil war made the canvass an exciting and bitter one. Unassailable in his character as a man, a citizen and a soldier, his political opponents attacked him for his action as to John Brown, and for his religious opinions. These attacks finally induced him to write a letter, in which he vindicated himself, and at its close said: "Although not a member of any church, I am not an irreligious man, as all my friends will attest." The next Sunday morning church-going people and others were startled by placards on the walls containing, in large bold characters, the words, "I am not a member of any church; Hector Tyndale." The election was a close one; it was freely charged and generally believed that General Tyndale and the other candidates on the same ticket were defeated by fraud; and a contest of the election was demanded, and made. The final result of this was the defeat of General Tyndale by sixty-eight votes; but those who were in a position to know the facts, believed that this was a flagrant injustice.

General Tyndale was not suited to the plans and schemes of
the men who then ruled the Republican party in Philadelphia, and it was clearly manifested during the canvass that he could not be used for any improper purpose, no matter what the inducements or pressure might be. It was plain that, if he were elected to the important office of mayor, he would inflexibly perform his duties for the best interests of the people, without regard to the wishes of rings or cliques. His election to that office would have been a severe check to those who afterwards so shockingly misgoverned the city and fastened upon it its immense indebtedness.

In 1871 General Tyndale spent several months in Europe, on business and for pleasure. He visited Paris immediately after the overthrow of the Commune, as bearer of dispatches from the American Minister in London to Minister Washburn, and witnessed the ravages of the war in and around the French capital; the streets being obstructed by barricades and the débris of buildings destroyed by artillery or fire, and some of the suburbs, St. Cloud, Neuilly, and others, he found were reduced to masses of ruins.

While in Belgium he endeavored to obtain permission from its government to erect a tablet or simple monument on the spot, in the town of Vilvoorden, where, in October, 1536, William Tyndale had been burned at the stake; but this application was unsuccessful.

When, in 1872, his cousin, Prof. John Tyndall, of the Royal Institution, London, delivered a series of lectures in this country, General Tyndale was his constant companion, and when in Philadelphia was his host. He was appointed by Professor Tyndall one of the trustees of the Tyndall fund, and acted as managing trustee until his death, when, owing to his care and judgment, it had increased to a handsome amount.

In 1873 the Municipal Reform Association of Philadelphia requested General Tyndale to be its candidate for sheriff. While he had a great dislike to political contests, and there was no hope of his election, he consented to permit his name to be used from a high sense of public duty and in the interest of good municipal government, and he received the highest vote on the ticket.

He took a great interest in the progress of the Centennial Exhibition, and upon its organization he was selected and appointed
one of the judges on ceramics and kindred arts. He performed this duty in the most creditable and intelligent manner, and here, as ever, won the approbation and respect of all connected with him. The clear, comprehensive, and thorough report on pottery, glass, and similar articles displayed was mainly his work.

His position as a judge gave him a fine opportunity to examine critically the exhibits of ceramics in all their branches; and he selected and purchased many rare specimens, which were added to his already valuable collection. His love for the beautiful and the artistic had ample scope, and he gratified his refined and cultivated taste by increasing the variety and extent of his own collection with objects of the art and skill of many nations.

Towards the termination of the Exposition he was stricken down by a typhoid fever. He was subject to this disease owing to the exposure and hardships of his service in the army, this being his third serious attack, and his sufferings during two months were of the most debilitating character.

When the great riots occurred in July, 1877, in Pittsburg and elsewhere, and for a time threatened to spread to Philadelphia, the War Department at Washington contemplated raising volunteer troops to assist the regular army, for its force being small, it was feared that it might prove inadequate to protect property and preserve the public peace. General Tyndale was selected to command such men as might be called out in his native city. Fortunately the riots were suppressed before such action became necessary.

During the last three years of his life he suffered at intervals from intense pain in the chest, frequently accompanied by symptoms of paralysis in the lower limbs, and his nervous system was seriously impaired. On the 15th of March, 1880, whilst suffering from a severe attack of angina pectoris he had a congestive chill, and two others followed at brief intervals. His strength failed, and it was evident that he could not survive. His mind, however, remained clear and undisturbed until his noble spirit passed into eternity. He died on the morning of March 19th. His funeral took place on Monday morning, March 22d, and his remains were attended to their last resting place by the Pennsylvania Commandery of the Loyal Legion; delegations from the
veterans of the 28th and 147th Regiments of Pennsylvania Volunteers; and numerous sorrowing relatives and friends.

The following Sunday, March 28th, the Rev. W. H. Furness, in his Easter sermon, referred to him as follows: "And now I pause to pay a tribute of respect to one of our fellow-citizens recently departed, a man of no ordinary simplicity and elevation of character; a lover of Freedom and Humanity from early youth — in a righteous cause knowing no fear. At a time when it was at the peril of his life, he 'confessed with his mouth' his faith in the Right, which is one with the truth of Christ. After the execution of John Brown, Hector Tyndale went to Virginia with the widow to receive the remains of the hero. There amidst the yells of a brutal mob who threatened to throw him and the coffin into the river, he not only claimed it, but he required that the coffin should be opened and the body identified; and so calm and fearless was his bearing that one of the roughs came and whispered to him, 'We are not with you, but you are a man, and there are some of us here who will not suffer a hair of your head to be injured.' He was severely wounded in battle, and never wholly recovered. His death sent a shock through a large circle who knew and honored him. He is joined now to the invisible host of patriots and martyrs, whose memory speaks to the people of the North with mediatorial power, charging us to be faithful still to the sacred cause for which they suffered, and to permit no advantage purchased for Justice and Freedom with their blood, to be lost through a base and cunning policy."

His bereaved family received many letters of sympathy and condolence, and the following are extracts from some of them.

Professor John Tyndall, of the Royal Institution, London, thus wrote:

"When I first met my cousin he was one of the strongest built men I had ever seen. He was here when the civil war broke out, and I clearly remember our discussing the chances of the war at a Philosophical Club dinner, where he was my guest. He returned immediately to the post of duty, and was soon in the midst of the fray. Exposure and wounds made their marks upon him, and though, when I last saw him after the war, he
seemed still robust, yet I could also see that the vigor of his former self had been invaded, and that he had lost a portion of that life the whole of which he was so willing to give in the service of the cause for which he had fought and suffered all his life. . . . . He had a most noble intellect. I do not know that I ever met a more supple and vigorous mind. Strong and elastic at the same time, it used to charm and astonish those who knew him in London. And surely that intellect was matched by a loftiness of character fit to guide it into all noble action. Had he been a noisier man—a man more in love with public display—he would assuredly have made a deep mark in the politics of his country. But for me, his kinsman, it is far pleasanter to think of the strength, purity, and generosity of his private life—to think of him as a man in whom strength and truth were mixed in the happiest proportions with tenderness and love.”

Major-General Carl Schurz, U. S. V., ex-Secretary of the Interior:

“I do not exaggerate when I say that I do not remember any man whose character I held in more profound esteem, whose motives in life were purer and whose principles and aims nobler. The sternness of his virtues deprived him of many of those successes which seem to be easily attainable by more pliable natures, and only those who stood near him could know and fully enjoy the real loveliness of his character. I have never met a more genuine man.”

Mr. E. Dunbar Lockwood, of Philadelphia:

“In all my experiences with public men, I never met one who seemed more thoroughly honest and courageous in his convictions, or who impressed me more fully as to his purity of intention and patriotism, and I feel that Philadelphia has indeed lost one of her brightest ornaments.”

Alfred E. Lee, Captain U. S. V., and a member of General Tyndale’s staff, late U. S. Consul at Frankfort-on-the-Main:

“For the death of my old commander I was not prepared. He was one of those whom I still greatly needed and most fondly remembered. I needed him because his friendship and confi-
dence was a treasure to me, and could not fail to be a treasure to any one who possessed and appreciated them. I remembered him because he was one of those rare men whom, once intimately and thoroughly known, one never could be able to, and never would, forget. The period of my acquaintance with him was one of the most eventful of my life. It was a period, for him especially, of great trials and responsibilities; a period that would thoroughly test any man, and show of what materials he was made. I found him, under these trials, one of the manliest and bravest of men. He was the soul of true chivalry, and his sense of honor was of that knightly quality which would feel a stain like a wound."

F. A. Seely, late Captain U. S. Vols., and a member of General Tyndale's staff:

"I am glad to say that I learned to esteem General Tyndale's character long before his death. His manner perhaps did not attract the multitude. He did not desire popularity or turn from his course to win it; but those who came to know him well were forced to acknowledge his integrity and his fearless devotion to the duties of the hour. I suspect that, in the old 'shell mound' days, I knew him better than most of those around head-quarters, and for that reason held him in the highest regard."

Prof. Charles J. Stillé, LL.D., Provost of the University of Pennsylvania:

"I have seen a great deal of General Tyndale of late years: my admiration of the man's character has constantly grown. He belonged to a small group of men here, whose independence and honesty are the support of those who hope that in the reign of corruption and false pretences under which we live, we may not be wholly destroyed. It was most refreshing to be brought into relations with such a man, for in every sentiment he expressed, and in all he did there was the unmistakable mark of true nobleness of nature. I never talked with him without feeling how true it is that the world, and especially this community, does not recognize men of real greatness.

"With no trait of his character was I more strongly impressed than with his genuine modesty. It was characteristic of the man
that he never spoke of his illustrious services to the country with the slightest tinge of self-asserting spirit. Often as he talked to me about the scenes of the war in which he had taken a conspicuous part, he always left the impression on my mind that he felt that he had only done his duty, and that the approval of his conscience was the highest reward he sought. The death of such a man is a public calamity; nowhere and at no time has there been greater need of examples of lives such as his. I sincerely hope that our people may honor his memory, if they neglected him living; for examples such as he gave us of devotion and high duty are a priceless inheritance."

Prof. E. L. Youmans, of New York:
"My acquaintance with General Tyndale could not be called intimate, but I have known him through occasional meetings, and such opportunities of social intercourse as led me to entertain a very high esteem for his manly excellencies. I had a most favorable opinion of his clear intelligence and sound judgment, and much admired the marked candor, frankness, and sincerity of his character. He was just my age, and having corresponded with him frequently in later years, he was often pleasantly in my thoughts, and the news of his sudden decease shocked me as if it had been that of an intimate relative. I may say that I can give no better evidence of my complete confidence in the strong ability and absolute integrity of our friend who is no more, than the perfect trust I had in his ability to manage the Tyndall fund with wisdom and discretion."

Major-General Winfield S. Hancock, U.S.A.:
"I very much regretted to hear of the General's death. When I last saw him, a few months ago, I thought from his appearance that it would have been a very long time before the end of his earthly career. He had quite a reputation as a soldier, and his action and manner indicated a valuable and rugged character. I was quite pleased with him on the occasions of our meetings in Philadelphia the last year or so, and very much regret that a continuation of such intercourse is no longer possible. 'Death loves a shining mark.'"
On May 5, 1880, a number of veterans who had served on the Union side during the civil war, and who desired to continue and strengthen the comradeship formed in the time of hardship and of battle, associated together as a Post in the Grand Army of the Republic, and desiring to honor the memory of a gallant soldier, they adopted the title of the "General Hector Tyndale Post."

This brief sketch has been prepared by one who knew Hector Tyndale long and intimately, and who has for his memory the strongest feelings of honor, love, and reverence. It was the writer's rare good fortune to have the confidence and friendship of this great man, and the benefit of his noble precepts and example. The favors thus conferred are freely and lovingly acknowledged, and their good influences will remain with him until the last moments of life.
SELECTIONS

FROM THE

MILITARY REPORTS, PUBLIC ADDRESSES,
LETTERS, ETC.

OF THE LATE

GENERAL HECTOR TYNDALE.
The following telegram from the chief clerk of the War Department was received by Major Tyndale, whilst he was endeavoring to procure authority to increase the 28th regiment to fifteen companies. He promptly declined the offer of a regiment, of which he was to be the Colonel, feeling bound in honor to remain in the 28th, as a Major.

WASHINGTON, July 30, 1861.

TO MAJOR HECTOR TYNDALE.

You will gratify this Department very much if you will organize a new regiment, and accept the command yourself; the Secretary is decidedly opposed to permitting Geary's regiment to be increased to fifteen companies; if you will consent, I will forward letter of acceptance at once, and you can have the companies mustered in at once; telegraph yes, as the Secretary wishes.

JAS. LESLEY, JR.,
Chief Clerk.

RECEIVED 12.30 P. M., May, 1862.
From River Station, 1½ miles from Front-Royal.

TO MAJOR R. C. SHRIBER, A. A. Gen. Shields' Division, Woodstock.

The road hence, via Chester's Gap to Warrenton, is an ordinary country one, practicable at this season. I can hear of no rebels, other than guerillas, this side Conrad's store, on Shenandoah, 10 miles east of Harrisonburg, and think the movement feasible by the route named. But your flank will be exposed to the rebel transportation by the railroad north from Gordonsville through Culpepper C. H. Whether any bridges remain on the north fork of the Rappahannock, by which that river could be crossed, or whether that stream is fordable, I cannot say. My field of knowledge and observation is limited merely to the movements and vicinity of this brigade. I respectfully advise stringency against stragglers. This country is very quiet, but bitter. I refer you for state of railroad facilities, etc., to Col. D. (29)
C. McCallum, Military Director and Supt. of Railways of U. S., Washington, D. C.; but should answer your question affirmatively, if there be rolling stock enough. The road is finished up to this point now. On Wednesday, 14th inst., it will be ready to within two miles of Strasburg.

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Major 28th Regiment P. V. Commanding.

There is a better road rather south of the one named, by way of Flint Hill and Amissville to Warrenton, but of course nearer to rebel lines.

FRONT ROYAL, May 11th, 1862, 9.40 P.M.

MAJOR R. C. SHRIBER, A. A. G. Shields’ Division,
Newmarket, Va.

The bridge near this place will be finished by to-morrow, it is temporary, and for railway alone. Wagons cannot cross on it at all; they can ford the river, however, I am told by ferry master. Infantry can cross upon the bridge with a little trouble, for which some notice should be given. Respectfully,

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Major 28th Regiment P. V. Commanding.


FRONT ROYAL, May 15th, 1862.

TO GENERAL JOHN W. GEARY.

Difficulty in getting cars; am hunting Quartermaster, to get some unloaded, to carry company as you direct. A part of company will go down as guard for timber up to this point. General Shields’ advanced brigade reports having seen a number of rebels in front of Chester Gap this afternoon. Shields is going on to Warrenton. After he passes, this detachment and neighborhood must be reinforced. I believe that rebel cavalry and light troops are advancing on both sides the Shenandoah, and will attack Front Royal as soon as Shields is out of the way.
The thing is feasible, now that Banks is no longer to the south of us.

Respectfully,

HECTOR TYNDALE,

FRONT ROYAL, MAY 16th, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL N. P. BANKS,
Commanding Department, Shenandoah, Strasburg.

GENERAL: Two deserters from 8th Louisiana regiment of rebels have come in. They left Ewell's division on Tuesday last; it consisted of Taylor's, Elzey's, and Trimble's brigades—in all ten to twelve thousand men, with three batteries. Taylor's brigade was the 6, 7, 8, and 9th Louisiana regiments and Wheat's battalion, is about 5000 (five thousand) men, and is the strongest and best one. Regiments very full. The division is encamped in Swift Run Gap, west side. They saw two (2) regiments of cavalry, previously encamped near them, going, they thought, towards Culpepper C. H. Many are without shoes, and since the Mississippi has been cut off, can get none. Full flour rations and half meat rations. They know of no orders of any kind. Thanks for your promise of reinforcements; I need them.

Respectfully,

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Major 28th Regiment P. V., Commanding Post.

RIVER STATION, NEAR FRONT ROYAL, MAY 16th, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL BANKS,
Commanding Department Shenandoah, Strasburg.

GENERAL: Owing to attack made yesterday afternoon on a company of this regiment, ten miles hence, by (estimated) 300 cavalry, one of my companies has been taken away by General Geary, and this important bridge and the stores here are unguarded. I have one company in Front Royal—1 1/2 mile hence—guarding large stores for you, and keeping off an attack on road. Another company is 3 miles hence, at an important point. I would respectfully advise immediate sending of at least two companies of infantry here to guard bridge. I have been left here much too weak and unprotected by Gen. Geary, who I be-
lieve commands the regiment too, against my remonstrances. We had one killed, and fourteen captured yesterday.

Respectfully,

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Major 28th Regiment, P. V., Commanding Post.

FRONT ROYAL, May 16, 1862.

To General John W. Geary.

Shields’ Division all gone to Warrenton. Rumors are rife that the enemy are in front of me in rather large cavalry parties. Will you send me at least one company of this regiment, and a section of its battery as reinforcement? Our interests are large, and should not be given up without all efforts being made.

Respectfully,

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Major 28th Regiment P. Vols., Commanding Post.

FRONT ROYAL, May 17, 1862.

Major-General N. P. Banks, Strasburg.

Since my last telegram I have information from a scout that there are cavalry pickets, to the number of three hundred (300) and more within three to four miles of this town. I respectfully suggest that you send down good cavalry, with infantry and guns as soon as possible. There is a fine position for guns about 4ths of a mile from town, towards the bridge. The rebel cavalry is from Ewell’s division, I hear. The amount of your stores here is large, and together with the bridge over river, invites attack even from a division.

Respectfully,

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Major 28th Regiment P. V., Commanding Post.

FRONT ROYAL, May 17, 1862.

To General John W. Geary.

There are reported, and truly I believe, three hundred (300) cavalry pickets in front of us, at three miles distance, said to be from Ewell’s Division. I have telegraphed Major-General Banks
about it. We invite attack even from a large force. Please send me two guns at once by railroad.

HECTOR TYNDALE,

FRONT ROYAL, MAY 17, 1862.


No such communication passed through my hands. All quiet this morning. The cavalry guard the bridge. My two companies infantry hold town and guard stores.

Shields' Division met and drove in rebel pickets yesterday. Cavalry Com'y I, 1st Mich'n Reg't, are again out of rations for two days. Something is wrong in the Quartermaster's Dep't—that company has suffered for provisions.

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Major 28th Reg., P. V., Commanding Post.

FRONT ROYAL, Va., May 17th, 1862.

Brig.-General John W. Geary,
Commanding at Rectortown, &c.

General: I replied to your telegram of this morning by telegraph. I send you down by this train two deserters from the 8th La. Regt., Taylor's Brigade, Ewell's Division, of rebel army, who came into my lines yesterday afternoon. Had I had more force I might have captured 16 others, but I would not risk my charge here for an offensive act. I regret exceedingly the loss of chance to have taken so small a body so easily, but I dare not risk, with a Captain's command (guarding a division's stores), anything outside of my orders.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Major 28th Regiment P. V., Commanding Post.

I have promise of reinforcements to-day from General Banks, to whom I telegraphed yesterday my situation.

H. T.
FRONT ROYAL, May 17, 1862.

To Col. De Korponay,
Commanding 28th Regiment P. V.

Colonel: I have withdrawn Comp’y B of this regiment from its late position into this town, where are very large government stores, which invite attack. I have thrown off the responsibility, arising from inadequacy of force here, to guard such valuable stores and works, by asking both from Gen. Geary and yourself additional aid, which you have replied to by declaring yourselves unable to grant my repeated request, so that I have done my duty on that score. Yesterday I telegraphed to Major-General Banks, and he says he will reinforce me this noon, so that, at least, I hope my isolated position will be strengthened to a self-supporting one, though on such a small scale. There are many stores here, together with the easy destruction of bridge, to pay the rebels for bringing a whole division here. Parties of them are reported in various places.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Major 28th Regiment P. V., Commanding Post.

FRONT ROYAL, May 17, 1862.

To General John W. Geary (then in Rectortown, Va.).

Colonel John S. Clarke, of Gen. Banks’ Staff is here; Gen. Banks is sending fifteen (15) companies of infantry here, but has no means of sending guns, and you have more than he has. Please send me by railroad four (4) at once, if you can; at any rate, a section. It is pressing.

HECTOR TYNDALE,

FRONT ROYAL, May 17, 1862.

To General John W. Geary, Rectortown.

Colonel Kenly’s regiment is here, and five companies of Gordon’s Brigade are between the bridge and Strasburg. The guns just arrived; small parties rebel infantry seen within four miles this afternoon.

HECTOR TYNDALE,

P. S. Col. Clarke and Major Copeland are here.

H. T.
River Station, May 20, 1862, 10 A. M.

Major-General Banks,
Commanding Department Shenandoah, Strasburg.

General: A non courteous difference is between Col. Kenly and myself. I have but one company in Front Royal, and another at important position two miles distant, ordered there specially by Gen. Geary. I have asked the favor of Col. Kenly to lend me two companies temporarily, or to place the two now doing picket duty, one in, and the other in front of town, and both under his control, under my command. He thinks my duties those merely of police, which my company is enough for; whereas, I think, if you desire it, that I am to command the town, its guards, approaches, and stores, not being hampered by the presence of troops not under my command. I do desire to hold the town, &c., for a short time, and should be glad to have, say, two companies detailed from either 29th Penna. or other regiment, and the lines of Col. Kenly defined as to within one-fourth mile north of the town, he naturally assuming command only, as you said, in case of attack upon the town. I will await here your reply.

Very respectfully,

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Major 28th Regiment P. V.

Front Royal, Va., May 22, 1862.

Brig.-Gen. John W. Geary,
Commanding Brigade Rectortown, Va.

General: At midnight of 20th-21st, I took about one hundred men—about seventy of Company I; this regiment, with thirty of Company A (same), the latter temporarily under my command, and marched about eleven (11) miles south of this place on the mountain road, not on any map I have seen. I left orders with Capt. Acker, 1st Mich. Cavalry (Company I), to follow me with thirty men, at an interval of two hours; this was done that the infantry might noiselessly advance at head of column. We found no troops, not even pickets, along road, although reports had made me believe them there. We reached Browntown, ten miles distant, at daylight, 8 A. M. 21st inst., and surrounded it, this being the place reported as centre of
several infantry squads of rebels. But none were found therein; they had, however, occupied one house the night before, to the number of 20 men, of 8th Louisiana regiment, Taylor's Brigade, Ewell's Division, which last heard from, as entombed altogether, in Swift Run Gap, west side. Capt. Acker arrived at Browntown about one hour after the infantry, and while going to surround a house, at three miles distance (said to contain a company of infantry), with orders not to engage, but merely to hold them in check, if found, until his messenger could reach me, and the infantry come up; he took prisoner one man of the 8th Louisiana Vols. This man—Cox—was in citizen's dress; he is a Kentuckian, and seems desirous to have quit the rebel service "honorably" and "regrets only" that he was in "citizen's clothes." He was going, he says, back to regimental headquarters to procure uniform, which to that time they had been unable to give him. I send this man down to you by train; he will tell you of the straits which Ewell's Division is reduced to, and this one of the best in the rebel army. He was communicative to me, and I credit his story. Capt. Acker found no other rebels. My whole detachment returned safely (after a most wearisome and harassing march, made rapidly, of about 25 miles) yesterday at noon. I heard from several persons, more or less reliable, of the sounds of drums being heard, as coming from the west side of Shenandoah River, westward from a point about five miles south of this. Also reports of several parties of cavalry, from fifty to two hundred, but all on roads other than that I took in returning, which can be defended against fourfold odds. Moreover, the common belief, confirmed by the prisoner, is that infantry forces, besides cavalry, are expected "down" in this direction. It was told me by several that we could not get back, if at all, without a fight. The enemy were impressing militia, mostly timid Union men, slaves, of all and any "ownership," and horses, besides subsistence, using for these objects small detached bodies of foot and horse; and it was to capture or drive these out, as well as to reconnoitre, that I made up my little expedition, which I hope will meet your approval. I yesterday sent a telegram, after seeing you, to Maj. Genl. Banks, who this morning was kind enough to thank me for "the energy and enterprise" of the little matter.
The officers and men did all that was possible, and made the most rapid advance I have yet seen; and all came back in order, showing excellent discipline.

With respect, I am your obed'srv't,

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Major 29th P. V.,
Commanding U. S. Troops—detachment at Front Royal.

P. S. I will send down soon the arms, equipments, horse, etc., taken from the prisoner Cox, and the arms of the two deserters sent you some days ago.

H. TYNDALE,
Major, etc.

FRONT ROYAL, May 21st, 1862, P. M.

MAJOR-GENERAL N. P. BANKS,
Commanding Department of Shenandoah, Strasburg.

GENERAL: Last night at 12 o'clock with one hundred men, I went about eleven miles south of this. I have this moment returned. I did not find the squad of rebel infantry I was pursuing, coming a day too late—they are in the mountains. We took one of them however on the road. His name is —— Cox; he is now here, and is a member of the 8th Louisiana regular infantry. This was the only party of infantry I could hear of definitely, and consisted of about twenty. There are numerous rumors of cavalry parties, and from several seemingly reliable sources; also reports of the sound of drums being heard at a point about five miles south of this on the Shenandoah river. The prisoner, and others say, that large bodies will be sent up this way. I mention this as a rumor only.

Respectfully,

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Major 29th P. V., Commanding Post.

MARKHAM, May 23, 1862.

GENERAL GEARY.

Capt. Myers, Co. G. this regiment, has returned from scouting. He reports nothing to be seen or heard of, several miles south of Barber’s Cross Roads.

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Maj. etc.
Markham, May 23d, 1862.

General Grary.

Pretty sharp cannon firing has been going on for nearly half an hour towards Front Royal. Cannot secure attention of operator at that place or river station.

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Major, etc.

Markham, May 23, 1862.

General John W. Grary.

Firing continues. Air calmer and reports louder. The guns are heavy, probably some eighteen or twenty-four pounders at perhaps distance of Strasburg. My outposts say, that firing began at two and a half o'clock to-day. All western communication by telegraph is cut off from this station. Guns are fired one, two, and three per minute.

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Major, etc.

Markham, May 23d, 1862.

General John W. Grary.

I am sending six mounted men to Linden to convey intelligence to and from that point, as there is no telegraph station there—all is quiet now.

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Major, etc.

Markham, Fauquier Co., Va., May 23, 1862.

Brigadier-General John W. Grary,
Commanding Brigade, Rectortown, etc.

General: I arrived here this morning with Co. I., of this regiment, at the earliest moment possible after receiving your last order per telegraph. Co. B. has doubtless reported to regimental head quarters before this. Capt. Acker's command, except a guard for waggons, has also arrived, and I have assumed command of companies D. G. and I. 28 Reg. P. V. and of Company I. First Mich. Cavalry at this post. I have not yet visited Piedmont, which post, by your command, has been placed in my detachment. The roads around here have occupied my attention.
Company G. of this regiment, and one Company of 1st Mich. Cavalry went out to reconnoitre towards and below Barber's (or Bailey's) Cross Roads; they have not yet returned. Intending to do my duty I shall not trouble you with calls for aid unless I believe it necessary. My command at this point is one company short of the number promised me on the 21st inst. by yourself, when you spoke of four companies of infantry and one of cavalry here, and one each of infantry and cavalry at Piedmont.

I am respectfully your obed't serv't,

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Major 28th Reg. P. V., Commanding Post.

MARKHAM, May 23d, 1862.

General Geary.

Capt. Tucker, First Michigan Cavalry, who went up on train at noon to-day, was cut off with train three and half miles this side of Front Royal by the rebels. He has this moment ridden here. He reports a battle going on since one P.M. on the river close to the railroad bridge near Front Royal. Some people report three thousand rebel infantry, and Captain Tucker counted, by reports, four guns on their side and two on ours, which is correct as to our side. Capt. T. left his point of view at six o'clock P.M. and then the smoke from small arms arose from the same position they had occupied at one o'clock. It is still quite light. I hear no more guns.

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Major, etc.

MARKHAM, May 23, 1862, 9 P.M.

General Geary.

Nothing since report of Capt. Tucker, who adds that the inhabitants of Front Royal had fled the town. All is quiet here now.

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Major, etc.

MARKHAM, May 24, 1862.

General John W. Geary.

A messenger just in from Linden, which is still held by about fifty of First Maryland Volunteers. He reports the rebels in position off Front Royal with seven thousand men under Ewell
and Long. That Kenly with what remained of his badly cut up regiment had fallen back two and half miles towards Strasburg. He had held his ground over two hours before retreating.

I will send further telegrams as they may arrive. Something must be done at once and in great force, or Virginia is cut in two, and Banks will be lost, if that has not already happened.

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Major, etc.

MARKHAM, May 24, 1862.

GENERAL GEARY.

It is of no use to hold Linden with 50 men. It can be taken again if we need it, so I have ordered them in at once. As for sending my dragoons to you, it can be done only in case we are to leave here, as our tents, property and subsistence must be held. Our late front has now changed to a thin flank, and this post will be the advance of a long narrow line, projected towards the enemy, without a base. There is but one of two things to be done now for a column this side of the Shenandoah river, and that is either to withdraw it, or make it very large and throw it down at once to or towards Little Washington, or Springville, Rappahannock County. Unfortunately, Thornton's Gap is held by rebels, but it can be taken, though not so easily as before. This will hold the whole line of railroad better than double the force extended along a picket line, the longer the weaker, salient and weak everywhere. Thoroughfare Gap, itself, is of no use to us now. Besides this latter plan would take Madison or Culpeper C. H. and render possession of Swift Run Gap useless to the enemy, and if done at once the rebels, triumphant in Front Royal, can be completely cut off. Do you want me to withdraw my force to you after the coming in of the Linden Post detachment?

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Major 28th Reg., etc.

MARKHAM, May 24, 1862.

GENERAL GEARY.

I am ready and will leave on arrival of the Company of 1st Maryland Volunteers from Linden.

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Major, etc.
MARKHAM, 24th May, 1862.

General John W. Grady.

Captain Gallagher, of 1st Maryland Regiment at Linden, tells me the rebels are advancing with one hundred and fifty men and two pieces artillery. Can you send up to this point or to meet us on road two guns? Capt. G. reports the rebels about three miles from Linden.

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Major, etc.

HEAD QUARTERS DETACHMENT U. S. TROOPS,
Happy Creek Station, near Front Royal, Va., June 14th, 1862.

General: In accordance with your suggestion, I write upon what I spoke of to you yesterday, concerning a new, and, it seems to me, a better advanced line than our present one along the Manassas Gap railroad. I assume that it is desirable to penetrate, as far as possible, into the enemy's country, keeping up the best means of communication and supply with our base line. The line I propose would commence at some point on the Alleghanies, thence eastward through Harrisonburg (or Staunton?), Swift Run Gap, Madison C. H. and Culpeper C. H. to Fredericksburg, with outposts on the Rapidan river—the line upon the left, below Fredericksburg, can be held by gunboats. From the latter place the Rapidan fork of the Shenandoah river forms a good and defensible line for a considerable distance to the right. The Rapidan itself continues westward, rising in the German Ridge and Bluff Mountains—spurs of the Blue Ridge projecting ten or twelve miles to the eastward—leaving an open country (between these spurs and the defensible point of Rapidan river), not exceeding twenty or twenty-five miles in width. Whereas, the line now held along the Manassas Gap railroad, from the Shenandoah river to the Orange & Alexandria R. R. (fifty miles), is salient at every point. The Rapidan line is shorter, more defensible, and more communicable than the present one, with the advantages, among others, of being forty miles further south, with a railway, as a means of supply and communication, which runs into and heads upon the line (as at Culpeper C. H. or at the Rapidan crossing), differing therein from the present sole line of supply and communication (the Manassas R. R.) which presents
a long and weak flank to the enemy inviting attack and obstruction at every point. Moreover, the Rapidan line will better hold the line of the Manassas R. R. than if we were more immediately upon that road, as it would then be beyond reach of rapid movements of the enemy, and a few pickets could then hold that railroad all the way from Mount Jackson to the Orange & Alexandria road. Culpeper C. H., about the centre of that line, would make an excellent hinging point upon which to turn troops in any direction. This line (with outposts upon the Rapidan river) would be within easy striking distance (say, twenty-four hours) of the rail-way circle, within which the enemy's force is concentrated, and which, when broken, destroys their connected line of communication with "The Valley" and the west. Furthermore, that line would deprive the rebels of some of their richest and best foraging fields, and supplies of fresh horses. The adoption of the Rapidan line would necessarily cause a greater diffusion and weakening of the enemy's forces to guard their threatened circle, and thus relieve our more southern armies. To show the importance attached by the rebels to the Orange & Alexandria railroad, running through Culpeper C. H., they tore up the track for many miles above and below Warrenton Junction, burning the cross-ties and bending the rails (which they did not do upon the Manassas R. R.), indicating a strong desire to keep us from using that road, and showing, too, that they felt it to be one of their weak points. (The damage done to the Orange & Alexandria R. R., if not already repaired, can be in a few days.)

Politically, the Rapidan line is advantageous as removing the burdens of the war from the more northern counties, thus giving opportunities to the inhabitants thereof to become reconciled to the inevitable Union, by affording them the advantages of a settled peace, which they will not speedily desire to have again broken.

Very respectfully, General,

Your obed't serv't,

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Major 28th Reg., P. V., Commanding Detachment.

To Brig.-Gen'l JAMES B. RICKETTS,
Commanding Front Royal and vicinity.
HEAD QUARTERS DETACHMENT U. S. Troops,
Happy Creek Station, June 22d, 1862.

BRIG.-GEN. JOHN W. GEARY,
Commanding U. S. Troops, Rectortown, Va.

GENERAL: The last of Shields' troops left yesterday. General Crawford's brigade, which was close to the river bank on the other side, has been drawn back from the river a mile or two. Our regiment is about Front Royal, but with no orders to make a stand in case the enemy should attack. All the railroad hands have left and the last train went down this morning. All business has ceased upon the road. The telegraph operator left and went eastward this morning by order of Gen. Crawford. There is no further use in holding this road, as supplies are drawn via Winchester. It is preposterous to strive to hold the road with this force. I have drawn in Company I. from the westward to form a reserve of one company, which, should it stand, will merely be slaughtered. I am awaiting orders relative to my present position, as my scattered detachment is unsupported. Please send me a message by a fresh rider. Should I not receive an order by six o'clock to-morrow morning, I will act in my discretion as may seem best, without regard to former orders, which circumstances have rendered null. With any "show" or with use in it, I will remain, but otherwise, not without absolute orders. I send a letter from Gen. Crawford's headquarters for Gen. Hart- suff, to be forwarded.

Respectfully your obedient servant,

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Lieut.-Col. 28th Reg. P. V., Commanding Detachment.

HAPPY CREEK STATION, MANASSAS R. R., two miles east of
FRONT ROYAL, June 22, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL N. P. BANKS, Commanding Department.

GENERAL: I desire most respectfully and seriously to call your attention to the position of this regiment, still attached to your command, and to that of the railroad which it guards. From the junction of the Orange & Alexandria railroad to the Shenandoah river, we guard with fifteen companies, fifty-two miles of the Manassas railroad, without any force in front of us to arrest
movements of the enemy, without any force in the rear of us to fall back upon in case of attack, or to support us in case of need—we reach from our eastern flank, with its troops on the Orange & Alexandria road, to your corps on the Shenandoah, an anomaly of a chain of outposts, without a centre or a nucleus to the rear—a curtain, or a fringe of a curtain of troops, stretched over fifty miles. Companies extended an average of four miles each on picket duty—say, from sixty to seventy men of each on daily outpost or picket duty; posts at every quarter of a mile along the road and on the country cross-roads, leaving in every four miles a reserve of perhaps a dozen men. Any neighborhood along the road can muster enough “guerillas” to break it at any point. This road, as at present, cannot be held when the rebels seriously intend to attack it, for one hour thereafter. If this road is of importance (as in holding this State, it must hereafter at least be), then I would ask to say that it can only be held by throwing self-defensive bodies to the south of it. Until this be done we can and may be cut off in detail—a useless waste of life, or troops. And here, General, permit me to recall, what doubtless has been evident to you for a long time, the excellent advanced line for this corps and for those of Generals Fremont and McDowell, conjointly, I mean the line of the Rapidan river. From Fredericksburg (supported by gunboats, our left on the navy), up to Culpeper C. H. (as a centre and supply depot of the line), to Madison C. II., through Swift Run Gap to Harrisonburg, and the right resting on the North or Alleghany Mountains. The Rapidan river, in front for an outpost line, is deep and easily defensible to a point south and west of Culpeper C. H. (and there are other strategical and topographical advantages to recommend it). With the railroad repaired south of Warrenton Junction to Culpeper C. II., there would be a good line of supply running towards the enemy, instead of one, like the Manassas road, traversing by the flank, the whole doorway of Central Virginia, which can be entered and the road broken at any point of attack. Besides, the rebels indicated their opinion of this route and have ruined it by destroying, as they did, from seven to ten miles of the Orange and Alexandria railroad below Warrenton Junction, going to the great trouble and delay of tearing up the cross-ties, heaping upon them the rails and firing the pile; and thus bending all the
iron of the track. The Manassas road (important as it is as an adjunct, and for holding purposes) skims the surface of the rebel country, whereas the Orange and Alexandria road penetrates it. The adoption of the Rapidan line would give rest to the more northern counties of this State, and enable them to recover a small part of their lost wealth, making them cautious of again inviting the actual presence of war.

In conclusion, General, I would very respectfully submit that this regiment has already done much arduous guard duty, for some months upon the Potomac, and since four months past, as a small ineffective separate command, too small for anything but active outpost duty, and with no opportunity for battalion and brigade drill. The present field officers never have had opportunities for such drill, and but for a day or two at a time, on not more than two or three occasions, of seeing their regiment assembled together. We do not desire to shirk any duty, but we do request that some new battalions may be assigned to this duty, thus placing us in brigade, where this well-disciplined and reliable regiment can have the ordinary advantages of drill, of acquaintance, and a consequent esprit de corps. If the Government needs experienced troops, we can furnish about twelve hundred such men, in infantry, whose places can be well supplied by green troops, who, with a little preliminary discipline, can enter upon this self-reliance teaching duty with advantage.

Respectfully,

HECTOR TYNDALE,

On the morning of the battle of Cedar Mountain Lieut.-Col. Tyndale marched to Thoroughfare Mountain, on the right of the field of battle, and held that position until night, when he received further orders from General Banks.

HEAD QUARTERS 28TH REG. PENNA. VOLS.
Near Culpeper, Va., August 11, 1862.

COLONEL: On the 9th instant, being ordered by General Geary, I took this regiment on to Thoroughfare Mountain, ten miles distant from this road, to retake possession of and to re-establish the signal station, driven thence by the enemy’s cavalry in the morn-
ing of that day. I found no signs of the rebels on the route, except some half a dozen scouts, who evaded the detail of fifteen cavalry under Lieutenant Leidy, of Captain Kerr's company, 1st West Virginia Regiment, who accompanied me, which scouts ran across the country to the southward. *En route*, I learned that the enemy was in large force at a point say three miles southeast from Thoroughfare Mountain, and about two miles from my road. I found Colonel Cluseret, with his brigade, at James City. On yesterday morning my command returned, by order of Major General Banks, and I reported to you in person in the afternoon.

The casualties upon the road were as follows: One of the cavalry was slightly shot in the hand by a concealed guerilla, and two men of same corps are missing, supposed to have been captured while carrying a message for me. Of the men of this regiment left behind on guard of brigade ammunition-train, one was killed and one slightly wounded. Another, reported killed, who being unwell, fell behind the regiment, returned to this road and entered the fight in another regiment.

The total number of this regiment present yesterday after the march was one thousand and thirty-four, or one less than the number beginning the march, as already stated.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Comd'g 28th Reg. P. V.

COLONEL CANDY,
Commanding 1st Brig., 2d Div., 2d Corps.

*En Route*, Sept. 1, 1862.

Brig. Gen. Roberts, Chief of Gen. Pope's Staff, directs that you will send the 28th Reg. and Knap's Battery back to the bridge over Bull Run, back of the camp we marched from to-day, and guard it to-night. It is understood that the Corps will not move far to-night. Very respectfully,

THS. H. ELLIOTT,
Capt. and A. A. G.

TO LIEUT.-COL. TYNDALE,
Commanding 28th Reg. P. V.
HEAD QUARTERS 3d DIVISION,
September 13th, 1863.

LIEUT.-COL. ASMUSSEN,
Chief of Staff 11th Corps.

COLONEL: The General commanding Corps has ordered the Pioneer company of this Division to report again at Corps headquarters to-morrow morning. I would respectfully suggest to the General commanding that, in my opinion, a wagon bridge over Cedar Run, near the railroad bridge (below), would facilitate the crossing of troops either way, as the necessity might arise; as well, for the same reason, I would suggest the making of a ford, i.e. the ingress and egress, near the same bridge, as, also, at the road, running nearly due south from General Steinwehr's headquarters across the run, which ford is now in bad order on the southern side. Having ridden over all that ground, I would respectfully ask the General, should he coincide with me, to relieve a large portion of the Pioneer company of this Division to do the work named by me, which I deem important, in view of the possibilities named by the General to me this morning. I am too tired and unwell to report in person, which otherwise I would do.

Respectfully your obed't serv't,

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Brig.-Gen. Commanding Division.

The following endorsement appears on the above communication:—

September 13th, 1863, 5 P. M.

The General commanding coincides with you, and desires me to request you to take this matter in your hands, and get the work done by your pioneers as soon as possible.

The Pioneer company will therefore not report to these headquarters to-morrow.

Respectfully,

C. M. ASMUSSEN,
Assistant Inspector-General.
Head Quarters 1st Brigade, 3d Division,

Major-General O. O. Howard,
Commanding 11th Army Corps.

General: Permit me to offer the following suggestion: Would it be worth while to survey for a double track horse railway (requiring little if any grading or cutting) from Tracy City, to or near Chattanooga, via Purdon's or Thorman's; from Manchester via Altamont; from Jasper via Thorman's, up the Sequatchee river; or from McMinnville, via Hickory and Altamont, or by Rickett's and Poe's?

One of such lines, if practicable, with Bridgeport as a depot, fortified and the railroad strongly held back to Stevenson's depot, also fortified, would secure us the line of the Tennessee river with two interior lines of communication with the base of Decherd or Cowan, of Tullahoma or of Duck River Station (if the latter was connected with Manchester) as might be preferred. * * The kind of rail or tramway laid down and used in Philadelphia will permit, with a proper width of track or gauge, either railway-carriages, especially constructed, or the common wagon—being a broad flat rail with a low rise or flange, weighing less than fifty pounds per yard, or, for a double track, less than one hundred and seventy-five tons per mile. The iron and railway cars can be had and brought to Nashville by boat, in a very short time. The whole of any of these roads could be finished this winter. On them, two horses can draw the load of six or eight on ordinary or even good roads, and in much less time. With two horses, in relays every six miles, loads of three thousand to four thousand pounds (additional to weight of cars) can be drawn from sixty to eighty miles per day, over more than an average hilly country, and yet easily keep the horses in good order. "Dummy engines" are used, too, on these roads, but the use of these involves some time in making them. These are safer for military roads, and are liable to fewer accidents, than the railway for steam power.

Very respectfully, General,
Your obedient servant,

Hector Tyndale,
Brigadier-General.
Head Quarters 1st Brigade, 3d Division 11th Corps
December 18th, 1863.

General Order No.—

To the Officers and Soldiers of the First Brigade.

Soldiers: Accept my sincere and hearty thanks for your invariably prompt and ready performance of duty while on our late successful, important, and severe campaign.

Superior Officers will thank you, and my thanks and theirs will express to you something of the Nation’s appreciation of your soldierly duties done well and cheerfully. Your readiness in action, your well-borne privations, your alacrity to work, and especially your long marches in midwinter, over ground frozen and rocky, (many of you with naked feet,) have made deep footprints in the nation’s path of honor and glory.

Commanders of Regiments, and Officers, I thank you for your prompt and ready co-operation; and also the Staff Officers of the Brigade for their full and ready performance of arduous duties.

Officers and Soldiers, with your aid, and with the help of God, no brigade in the service shall give its soldiers a prouder name than this, on the Nation’s Roll of Honor.

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Brigadier-General.

Head Quarters 3d Division 11th Corps,
Shellmound, Tenn., April 5th, 1864.

Special Orders No. 53.

"Extract."

1. Commanders of Posts at which detachments of the 1st Alabama Regiment of Cavalry are stationed, will caution the Officers and men of that Regiment against abusing the power placed in their hands as scouts.

A few instances of thefts, and of other irregularities committed by men of this regiment, have come to the knowledge of the Brigadier-General commanding the Division.

Those men, above all others, should know the strict obligations all soldiers are under to maintain discipline, and to restore law and order to this deceived and ruined people, and more than others should do all in their power to mitigate their sad situation.
The severest punishment shall follow any abuse or wrong done hereafter, and any scout presuming on his being in the United States service to commit acts of tyranny or wrong, shall be made to know that this Government desires no aid from wrong-doers, and oppressors.

By command of Brig.-Gen. Tyndale.

EDWARD ROBINSON, JR.,
Capt. & A. A. Gen.

HEAD QUARTERS 3D BRIGADE, 1ST DIVISION 20TH ARMY CORPS,
Opposite Bridgeport, Ala., April 25th, 1864.

BRIG.-GEN. WM. D. WHIPPLE,
A. A. G. Department of Cumberland.

GENERAL: Based on the enclosed medical certificate I respectfully ask for twenty days' sick leave to enable me to go to my home for rest and treatment.

Respectfully your obedient servant,

HECTOR TYNDALE,

HEAD QUARTERS 3D BRIGADE, 1ST DIVISION, 20TH ARMY CORPS.

Brigadier-General Hector Tyndale, commanding this Brigade, having applied for a certificate on which to ground an application for leave of absence, I do hereby certify that I have carefully examined this officer, and find that on account of a gunshot wound received on the battle-field of Antietam, produced by a bullet entering in the immediate vicinity of the atlas under the base of the cranium, passing through the neck, a general numbness and severe neuralgic pains principally on the right side keep him almost constantly laboring under nervous irritation, much pain in his head and dizziness, and affect also the kidneys and bladder, and that in consequence thereof he is, in my opinion, unfit for duty. I further declare my belief that he will not be able to resume his duties in a less period than twenty days. This affection requires great rest of body and mind, and change of climate to avoid permanent disability, or even more fatal results.

Dated at Station opposite Bridgeport, Ala., this 25th day of April, 1864.

H. AYMÉ,
HEAD QUARTERS 3d DIVISION 11th CORPS,
SHElLMOUND, TENN., March 25th, 1864.

LIEUT.-COL. SAML. BRECK, A. A. G.,
Washington, D. C.

COLONEL: Complying with Circular from your Department of January 30th last, I make the following statements of my military service, made without records or means of access to any. Believing that the desire of the Department is not to have merely private memorials, but those which may be used in collecting general records, I shall make the following statements somewhat full, though I hope they will be succinct.

I was in Europe at the breaking out of the rebellion, and having many years before been engaged in volunteer military organizations in Pennsylvania, commanding, with the rank of captain, an active and honored company, I came home, arriving early in May, 1861, to take some part in the War.

I was mustered into the service of the United States on the 28th June, 1861, as Major of the 28th Regiment Penna. Vols., and was on duty in Philadelphia recruiting (after the regiment was filled) an additional battalion of five companies, or fifteen in all for that regiment. This was granted to me by the War Department, which offered me the command of a regiment instead of this battalion, but this offer I declined. In August, I rejoined the first ten companies at Point of Rocks, Maryland, in Major-General Banks' Division.

In October, I was on active outpost duty along the Potomac river, under Col. John W. Geary, who was in command of the regiment, and was in some small affairs or skirmishes with Ashby and other rebels at Point of Rocks, Harper's Ferry and Bolivar; and the day after the fight at Ball's Bluff marched to Edwards Ferry but did not cross the river.

About October 29th, with nearly three hundred and fifty men, I took command of the Post of Sandy Hook opposite Harper's Ferry, which with ten miles of the river I held, with some small and unimportant, but not infrequent, skirmishing with the rebels, and with considerable activity of service that winter, until February 24th, 1862, when the forces of Banks and others crossed the Potomac under Major-General McClellan at that
point, when with some cavalry, and a battery, the 28th Penna. Reg. crossed both the Potomac and Shenandoah rivers at Harper's Ferry.

In the months of March and April, in Colonel Geary's command, my regiment marched many times across and through Loudon, Fauquier, and adjoining counties of Virginia, occupying Leesburg (three or four days after the retreat of the rebels from that place), Snickersville, Upperville, Middleburg, Aldie, White Plains, Rectortown, Piedmont, Salem, and other points; the enemy, whose light troops were near our front, retiring almost without opposition, but keeping us on the alert. In the latter part of April the command fell back from White Plains through Thoroughfare Gap to Catlett's Station.

About May 2d we again marched to Rectortown via Warrenton. At the latter place General Blenker's Division, marching towards Ashby's Gap, overtook us.

About this time Geary's brigade occupied White Plains and the adjacent country. Early in May, with three companies of the 28th Penna. Reg., a troop of cavalry, and a section of artillery, afterwards added, I was sent by General Geary to Front Royal, to hold that position, its vicinity, and adjacent railroad bridge, with fifteen miles of the railroad. As a depot of valuable supplies was established during my command at Front Royal, I advised reinforcements, and on the 21st or 22d May made a reconnaissance up the Shenandoah river and Blue Ridge, when I ascertained that rebel forces were probably coming down on both sides of the river, and that their advance troops were near Front Royal.

By order of Major-General Banks, the 1st Maryland Regiment, Col. Kenly, relieved me, and on the night of the 23d May, being ordered by Brigadier-General Geary, I went to Markham, thirteen miles, towards his brigade centre. On the 24th of May Col. Kenly was attacked at Front Royal, the enemy being in force between us. On the morning of the 25th, after awaiting the arrival of one of Kenly's companies, which, being on outpost duty, had been cut off, my command, less the two guns which had been left with Kenly, moved back to Rectortown, the brigade headquarters. From that place, on the same day, the Brigade moved back to White Plains, and from thence to Thoroughfare Gap. Here
on the 26th, with part of the 104th New York Reg. I made a
reconnaissance of some miles on the Bull Run Mountains, but
found no enemy or signs of any. On the same day, the brigade,
now temporarily reinforced by the 104th N. Y. Reg., hastily
fell back, destroying some public property, to the Orange and
Alexandria R. R. at Manassas Junction, arriving there on the
26th, I think. In this month (May) I received my commission
as Lieut.-Colonel of my regiment, a vacancy having been made
by the promotion of Col. Geary to be a Brigadier-General of Vol-
unteers. About May 28th, Geary's brigade again marched, via
Aldie, to Ashby's Gap, arriving about the 31st. From thence
it moved, about June 2d, to the Manassas R. R. at Piedmont,
from whence I was again ordered to guard the railroad from
Markham to the Shenandoah. I found part of General McDow-
ell's forces at Front Royal.

The brigade, being ordered to rejoin Gen. Banks at or near
Middletown, about June 20th I marched, by orders, to that
place, by way of Markham, Piedmont, Upperville, Snickersville
(where I overtook the remainder of the brigade), Berryville, and
Winchester, arriving about June 27th. After some days of
picket duty, near the south fork of the Shenandoah, about July
8th, my regiment moved, with the rest of Banks' command,
through Front Royal, Gaines' Cross-Roads, Amissville, and
Waterloo to near Warrenton; and thence by the same road
through Gaines' Cross-Roads to Little Washington, where Gen.
Geary's brigade was strengthened by the addition of four small
regiments, viz.: the 5th, 7th, 29th, and 66th Ohio Vols. During
nearly all this time I had been in command of my regiment.

About the 5th of August, we moved, under command of
Major-General Pope, via Sperryville to Culpeper C. H. On the
morning of August 9th, while in march south from Culpeper,
General Banks detailed my regiment, ordering me to retake and
hold Thoroughfare Mountain, ten miles from Culpeper C. H.,
from which two regiments of rebels had driven our signal corps
that morning. I moved to take the hill, traversing the line of
the battle of Cedar Mountain, which commenced after my move-
ment had begun, and found that the rebels had retired. At the
foot of the hill, I found the brigade of Colonel Cluseret, who
had, I believe, come from the direction of Madison Court House
that day, and who rejoined his division (Sigel's) that night or early next morning. On the next day, August 10th, by order of Major-General Banks, I moved back to his position on the road south of Culpeper C. H. and two miles in rear of the battlefield of the day before, not interrupted by the rebels, who were then moving forces to our right. After two days, in which Colonel De Korponay took command of the regiment, we moved back to Culpeper C. H. and encamped there until about August 18th, and then moved to Rappahannock station. Here, for about two days, we were on the left of Pope's army, below the R. R. bridge; my battalion of six companies on the extreme left with Knap's battery, until the troops of General Reno arrived. About the 20th, we were pushed over to the opposite flank or right (the left in retreat) of Pope's army. Here, I again assumed command of the regiment.

At the action of Freeman's ford, I was moved to the support of Bohlen's brigade, Sigel's corps, and at Sulphur Springs, near Warrenton, supported three batteries in that action. From thence, with continued suffering, being in the rear and on the flank of the retreat and out of the line of supply, we slowly moved by way of Catlett's station. The division (2d of Banks' corps) held the rear of the army at Cedar Run and at Kettle Run. At Bristoe station, being in the rear of the retreat, by direct orders from General Pope, I fired large railway trains, entirely destroying them.

After crossing Bull Run, where the corps lay for twenty-four hours, and reaching Centreville, where the army was massed, I was ordered back with my regiment, a squadron of the Second Penna. Cavalry, and a section of artillery (Knap's), with orders to hold the bridges and fords of Bull Run in our rear. During that night our army moved towards the Potomac. On the next day, by direct orders from Gen. Pope, I moved after Banks' corps by way of Centreville and Fairfax station, and overtook it on the road to Alexandria, where my regiment arrived that night with the wagon-train of the army. About the 1st of September, we crossed into Maryland, advancing towards Frederick, and as all the senior officers of the brigade (the 1st of the 2d division, Gen. Greene commanding, of the 12th corps, General Mansfield then commanding) were sick or broken down
by the hardships and privations of the retreat, I assumed command of the brigade about the 8th of September, and had the honor to lead it at Antietam. Never having had an opportunity of making a report of my brigade in that battle, I do so here, although with inadequate justice to the troops composing it.

About September 14th, the 29th Ohio Reg. of my brigade was detailed to guard stores at Monocacy Junction, near Frederick. This left me four regiments—the 5th, 7th, 66th Ohio, and 28th Penna., numbering about one thousand and fifty of effective muskets on the morning of the 17th of September. About seven to eight o'clock of that morning, being near the right of our forces, General Greene ordered the advance of my brigade through an open wood, distant about a quarter of a mile from a cornfield in the front, in and about which the battle was then fiercely raging, and I deployed it under a heavy fire of the enemy, who, having broken some of our brigades in the cornfield, were following them rapidly.* The deployment was made very steadily and in fine order, and the counter fire of my brigade, commencing with the 28th Penna. Reg., which was on the right, was splendidly accurate and cool. The punishment of the rebels was very heavy, destructive, and rapid. They finally broke from our continual and near advance, after this hard pounding, with great loss; our own loss being severe.

Having driven them from our front, my line was obliqued to the left,† charging and driving the rebels with great carnage from a hollow field, and ledge of rocks therein, on the north side of the Sharpsburg road, thus covering my left, which, thrown back, was supporting, under a heavy fire, Knap's battery, which in turn covered the left flank of my first line, forming an obtuse angle. Three charges of the rebels were made while we occupied this position, two of them against my left, which were repulsed handsomely, although necessarily with much loss to us. The third of those charges was made en masse down a hill.

* My 1st position, or deployment, was about half a mile to the front and right (our right) of the Dunkard church.

† 2d position—held for some hours, of hard fighting, by my brigade—on the upper side of the Hagerstown road, about a quarter to a third of a mile directly in front of the Dunkard church, and the 3d position (which was in fact but an advance from the 2d) may be called part of my 2d position. H. T.
through a cornfield, the hill presenting a solid mass of men, on
my right flank, which they endeavored to turn.* This was met
by a terrific oblique fire, which melted down their ranks like
wax—the terror and agony of the men in the front and centre
of their lines, who endeavored to push their way from this
dreadful fire, back through their own advancing columns, is
most memorable. In the mean time a sharp fire was kept up
upon us from the front, from behind breastworks and natural
hollows.† Between us and the road was a rebel battery of four
guns which we captured.

A battery came in on my right and did us excellent service in
sweeping the packed woods, which was done at my request, in
my front on the other, or south, side of the Sharpsburg road,
surrounding the small school-house or the Dunkard church on
that road; and then it passed to the left, where it did fine ser-
vice. I regret not knowing its name. I believe it was com-
manded by Lieut. Evan Thomas, U. S. A.‡

Knap's battery on my left flank, and its steady support, held
that flank secure by a line of fire, oblique to my front. Losing
continually under a constant fire (which we returned carefully as
ammunition was scarce) the brigade stubbornly held that posi-
tion (advanced beyond our general lines on both flanks), for an
hour or more, when, ammunition arriving, about noon, my right
and centre advanced across and over the Sharpsburg road, rout-
ing the enemy from their breastworks of rails, and driving them
from the woods and church spoken of.§ In this charge, my line
had difficulty in passing over the dead and wounded of the

* During a great part of this time the troops of my command were lying on
their faces, taking advantage of every inequality of surface, and delivering
an accurate, close, and rapid fire from that position.
† The enemy used the rails of the fences along the Sharpsburg turnpike, in
making breastworks.
All the fences in front of the Dunkard church were down when my brigade
crossed the road; the centre of the brigade being about opposite to the church;
in front of which was a rebel battery, or portion of one.
‡ Son of General Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant-General U. S. A.
§ The 3d position, see last page.
The dead and wounded were stripped of their ammunition, and rifles (muskets)
were exchanged; as they became too foul for loading, which finally had to be
done by means of hammering the ramrods with stones. H. T.
rebels, in the front of our last position, who lay, in one instance, in long lines or ranks in ghastly mechanical regularity, requiring exertion to avoid treading upon them. I then formed on the low crest of the wooded hill (beyond the church, about one-third of a mile behind it), which opened on a narrow cultivated hollow, or sort of meadow, on the opposite side of which the rebels had a battery of six guns, from which the gunners were driven to shelter behind a stone wall (afterwards found to be rocks outcropping) running nearly parallel to the hollow.* On my right was a wooded ravine running perpendicularly to my line. Here I learned, from the wounded, that Jackson was in front of that position, and that he had crossed the Potomac with large forces that morning. The 111th Penna. Vols. (under command of the brave Col. Stainbrook, who commanded a brigade), was brought to strengthen my right, which it did nobly—for though young it stood splendidly in the hot fire we were under. And though Col. Stainbrook was my superior officer, yet he very handsomely placed his regiment under my command.† Here, Brigadier-General Geo. S. Greene, commanding division, brought up two regiments, placing them on my right. My position at this time was far in advance of our lines, and was, I believe, directly opposite the last position of the enemy and near the river bank, which commanded, I think, all positions in its front and rear. Having silenced the battery, I thought to drive the enemy from the stone wall or rocks, which, if done, I believe would have cut their line, and from this wall (rocks) they kept up a severe fire. To do this, it was necessary to maintain our position, and to advance close skirmishers up the hollow ravine on my right, to which the stone wall or rocks ran obliquely—placing the enemy in relation to my front, with their right refused. After cautioning the last two regiments, brought to reënforce me, as to the importance of their position, and changing their front to a

* After leaving my 3d position and passing the Dunkard church, I obliqued considerably to the right—in the woods south of the Hagerstown Road or towards the river.

† 4th position. In the woods behind or south of the Dunkard church (towards the river), the front of this position being the open glade or meadow referred to above. This was the most advanced position I had, or held, and I believe the most advanced by far of any of our army on that day. I was about one-third of a mile to the rear and right (our right) of the Dunkard church. H. T.
line thrown back at nearly right angles to the line of my own brigade and that of the 111th Pa., and nearly parallel with the ravine, I went to my centre and left, to which the third battalion of the 28th Pa. was now added, as I had ordered it up from my extreme left, to send it out as skirmishers. But the enemy, anticipating me, moved *en masse* rapidly down the ravine on my right and almost instantly routed the regiments there before them, there being no time for changing front—exposing the flank and rear of the brigade, which was thus simply and unavoidably rolled up. It retreated to the left, through an open field, and began reforming behind some haystacks and in an orchard near by. At this time, while reforming the troops, a musket ball striking me on the back of the head, I fell senseless.*

I wish to record here a disinterested, noble, and courageous action. First Lieutenant, now Captain Charles W. Borbridge, of my own regiment, who was one of the last to retreat, seeing me fall, at once turned back, in the face of a heavy fire from the advancing enemy, who were within a hundred yards. He had a rebel battle flag (of which my brigade that day captured, I think, seven) in his hands, but with the aid of a sergeant, whose name I could never learn, dragged my apparently dead body, seemingly shot through the head, behind a haystack, at least fifty yards distant. Here, I afterwards learned, the enemy were stopped by the sharp and continuous fire of the brigade, and that position was held by us, at least until the wounded were taken off†

* It is proper for me to say, that I had no regular staff at this time, as during the retreat of Pope's army, and in Gen. Geary's absence from his command and the rapid change of brigade commanders, the members of the staff had disappeared or returned to their regiments. I acted, during my command of this brigade, with a few officers, taken from regiments, as I could find them. But the regular staff was not present—besides many were sick or worn out, in our hard campaign. This serious want of aid made the conduct of the battle immensurably harder upon me.

† It is proper to add that the numbers of my command were strengthened by remains, or parts, of other commands, which being broken in the battle, from time to time joined my troops, falling into my regiments, and acting well and bravely.

Two or more of my regiments fired on that day more than one hundred and fifty rounds per man, and all, I believe, over one hundred rounds, and this at close quarters.

• H. T.
The brigade lost that day, thirty-six per centum (my own regiment forty-one per centum) of its numbers in killed and wounded, losing no prisoners, except a few wounded. While the loss it inflicted on the rebels was, I believe, more than double, perhaps more than three fold our own, and probably exceeded the total number of my command.

* * * * * * * * * *

Having been ordered home I remained there until the latter end of March, 1863, suffering from the effects of the wound (which very much, perhaps permanently, injured my nervous system) and from diarrhea contracted on the retreat of Pope’s army. During that absence I was nominated and confirmed as Brigadier-General of Volunteers, dating from November 29th, 1862. Not receiving my commission, in the latter end of March, 1863, I went to Washington, D. C., on my way to rejoin my regiment. Being thought too weak to resume my duties, I was ordered by Dr. Clymer, Surgeon U. S. Volunteers, back to Philadelphia to regain strength and health.

In the latter part of April, 1863, I received my commission as Brigadier-General, and accepted it on the first of May. Asking for employment, I was ordered, early in June, to report to Major-General Dix, at Fort Monroe, who ordered me to duty under Major-General Keyes, commanding parts of the 4th and 7th Army Corps, who assigned me to the command of the post at Gloucester Point opposite to Fort Yorktown, Va. The command consisted of the 4th Del. and 169 Pa. Reg., the 8th N. Y. Independent Battery, detachments of the 2d Mass., 2d N. Y. and 12th Ill. Cavalry and the fort at Gloucester. The 4th Del. Reg. was at that time detached and near Williamsburg, Va. The brigade formed the 1st of the 1st Division under Brigadier-General Rufus King.

On July 8th, I received orders to report to Major-General Heintzelman, at Washington, with three nine months regiments, viz. the 169th and 172d Pa. and the 168th N. Y. I so reported on the 10th, and was ordered, with my command, to Major-General Meade. Two of the regiments I had never seen before, and one of them, the 168th N. York, I found at Washington, drunken, demoralized, and mutinous, refusing to go further—stacking its arms when ordered into the cars by its commanding officer.*

* This mutiny was a very serious affair—and might have become dangerous—the Colonel commanding having been driven from the regiment by his men,
This caused some trouble to quell and settle, but on Saturday, the 11th, I reached Frederick, Md., and on Sunday, the 12th, I reported my command to Major-General Meade near Boonsboro, Md., and by him was assigned to Major-General Howard, commanding the 11th Corps.

On Monday morning, the 13th of July, I reported to General Howard, who, distributing the command in his Corps, gave me the 1st Brigade 3d Division, Major-General Schurz commanding. The brigade consisted of the 45th and 143d N. Y. Vols., the 61st and 82d Ohio, 82d Ills., and 172d Penna. On Tuesday, July 14th, we moved with the corps to the Conococheague creek, near the Potomac, but the enemy having crossed, we moved from thence with the army in pursuit through Hagerstown, Berlin, Mountsville, White Plains, &c., to Warrenton Junction, and from thence to Catlett's station, arriving in the latter part of July. About this time the 172d Pa. went home. August 8th, I took command of 3d Division during the absence of Major-General Schurz until September 19th, when, General Schurz returning, I, being in ill health from disease contracted in the campaigns of 1862, obtained sick leave.

The corps was ordered to the Department of the Cumberland, during my absence, and I joined my command at Bridgeport, Ala., on October 19th, and found the 82d Ills. Reg. had been removed from mine and assigned to a new brigade. October 27th we marched towards Chattanooga, Tenn., arriving in Lookout Valley in the afternoon of the 28th. On that day the 101st Ills. Reg. reported to me for duty.

About midnight of the 28th-29th Oct., a force of Longstreet's rebels attacked Brigadier-General Geary's command—which had encamped at Wauhatchie, some miles in our rear, with several lateral lines of approach from the enemy between his position and ours. In going to his relief, guided by the heavy firing, my brigade being in the front, when about a mile from Geary the rebels opened fire on the 11th Corps from some hills on our left, whom he had allowed to become drunk to madness. A regiment was ordered into line and a battery ordered, should it become necessary, to quell it forcibly, but by resolute and firm conduct and good temper the mutinous regiment, with its worst mutineers in irons, went off into the cars, towards the front, in tolerably good humor. The men insisted that their period of enlistment had passed.

H. T.
along the base of which our road lay.* Whereupon, my brigade and that of Col. Smith, of the 2d Division, faced and drove them from their strong positions on the two hills, opposite our respective flanks. Upon this, the firing against Geary suddenly ceased and the rebels rapidly fell back, as we were on their line of retreat, and had we known the country or the roads, they would, probably, have been destroyed. But the shades of the dense woods on the hill-sides and in the gaps, while it favored our attack, enabled them to retreat. But the taking of those hills, which should have guarded their retreat and stopped our advance to Geary’s aid, saved him, I doubt not, from great loss, if not from destruction.

As Lookout creek was, for several weeks afterwards, the only line between our pickets and the enemy’s, we were very hard at work, every day and often at night, making rifle-pits, breast-works and battery works. During this time the enemy’s fire from Lookout Mountain was incessant, though not rapid, and some few men and animals were lost by their shells. The works were made pretty strong, abattis put up and large spaces of timber slashed, notwithstanding the fire, so that “Smith’s” and “Tyndale’s” two hills—the two or three taken in the night attack, which were in the front—became strong points, defensive or offensive. During this time the desertions from the enemy became so frequent that their commissioned officers stood along the outposts to guard the sentinels.

November 22d, the 11th Corps, with no transportation, no knapsacks, and with three days’ rations, moved to Chattanooga, and on the afternoon of the 23d, my brigade being in front, it took the left of the line, which position it held during the series of actions around Chattanooga, Missionary Ridge, and other places, following the enemy closely in his running fight of five days, and always flanking his right. On the 28th, with three days’ rations added, we began our march under Sherman for the relief of Knoxville, and, under the circumstances of our preparations, made one of the severest campaigns of the war—over bad roads, the weather freezing or stormy, the ice or stones cutting the men’s feet, large numbers became wholly barefooted, and all the

* See my full narrative of this action—together with map of the ground.

H. T.
shoes were worn through, many without shelter tents, and all with ragged and insufficient clothing and with unusual and often stinted food. With this there was no straggling, no stealing, and no grumbling. The march of about two hundred and fifty miles to near Knoxville and return, including five days, in which we were ready for action or were engaged, took twenty-six days. We arrived at our camp in Lookout valley on the 17th of December.

Immediately after our return, and before quarters could be built or shelter tents had for all, the corps was put to daily fatigue duty, by brigades, making corduroy roads to bring supplies from Kelley's and Brown's ferries, and it did this work while living upon half and even smaller rations.

About the first of January, 1864, the men began to build winter quarters, from which they moved again on the 25th January. My brigade going to the Tennessee river opposite Bridgeport, Ala., guarding the long railroad bridge and the adjacent country.

Three of the regiments, the only eligible ones of my brigade, viz.: the 45th N. Y., the 61st and 82d Ohio, reënlisted and went home as "Veterans" on furlough.

January 11th, I left upon my first leave of absence, other than sick leave, and returned to duty on the 14th of February, having been absent thirty-four days; four days over time, caused by suffering from old wounds and by missing trains.

At that time I assumed, my present temporary, command of the 3d Division 11th Corps, during the absence of Major-General Schurz. The duty of the division, is guarding the east side of the river and the bridge at Bridgeport, Ala., and the railroad from thence to East Whitesides, Tenn.

I have during the whole time of my service been on active and nearly always on outpost duty.

I have been on duty in but one court martial, and that on as President, which was held in Lookout valley, beginning 29th December, 1863, and ending January 1, 1864, there being but one case before it. The Judge Advocate was Capt. Francis Lackner 26th Wisconsin Vols. Of personal staff I have no other than officers of my command, acting temporarily as aides.

I have the honor to be

Very respectfully your obed't serv't,

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Letter to George Alfred Townsend, Esq., relative to the battle of Cedar Mountain.

Philadelphia, February 16th, 1870.

George Alfred Townsend, Esq.

SIR: To day, for the first time, I met your book—"Campaigns of a Non Combatant."

In it is the following statement, which does a grievous wrong to a gallant regiment of the late war, a wrong, I am sure, you would not wish to do. Speaking of the battle of Cedar Mountain, you say—on page 271—"I fell into a little difficulty here, by unwittingly asking aloud of the 28th Pennsylvania Regiment, if that was not the organization which hid itself during the fight? The 28th had been ordered, on the morning of Saturday, to occupy Telegraph Mountain—an elevation in the rear of Cedar Mountain—which was used for a Federal signal-post. Nobody having notified the 28th to return to camp, they remained on the mountain, passively witnessing the carnage, and came away in the night."

Allow me, for the sake of the thousand brave men, who at that time composed the 28th Pennsylvania Regiment, and for the truth of history, to correct this.

As Lieutenant-Colonel, I was then in command of that regiment, consisting of fifteen companies. At about ten or eleven o'clock of the morning of the day of the battle of Cedar Mountain—9th of August, 1862—after the regiment had passed through the town of Culpeper Court House, and was a mile or two to the southward of it, General Banks and staff passed us, going to the front. The General stopped and told me that two regiments of rebels had driven our signal-corps from Thoroughfare Mountain, and that he had specially detailed the "28th" to recapture and hold the mountain, and that he would send me regular orders at once—adding, that the mountain was eight or ten miles west of our road.

I thanked the General for the honor he had done the 28th, in thus selecting it himself from his entire corps. (It was not the first or the last honor so paid to it.)

The men of the regiment, when told of the detail and its purpose, showed proper pride and eagerness. In an hour or two...
after this General Geary, our brigade commander, rode up and
gave me verbal orders to exactly the same effect as had General
Banks; i. e., I was to take and hold Thoroughfare Mountain and
await further orders from headquarters. A squadron of cavalry
(I think of the 1st West Virginia) was added to my command,
and as soon as proper dispositions could be made, it changed its
course, at nearly a right angle to its previous route, and moved
over an entirely unknown country towards Thoroughfare Moun-
tain.

It was one of the hottest days of that very hot summer, many
men were sunstruck, and there was great difficulty in keeping
the close order so necessary in presence of the enemy.

The country was generally wooded and rolling, so that at no
point of our march could we see a mile in any direction. I knew
nothing more than I have told you of the enemy’s force in prese-
ence, nor had any further supposition of it, than that if two rebel
infantry regiments were there, they would not be alone. After
moving several miles, much to my surprise, the battle opened on
my left and rear, distant, seemingly, some three or four miles.
This was the first intimation I had of an immediate action, ex-
cept the one for which I looked at my objective point. In sus-
pense, I halted the command, and, after much thought, consulted
with its oldest officers as to whether we should continue to the
mountain, according to orders, or should cross the country and
go into the fight. Three times did I anxiously debate within
myself and as often with my officers, as to the proper course,
and each time determined to adhere to orders. This action, I
thought, might be, probably was, but a prelude to a grand battle
—for I knew from the extent of the line of fire and from the
position of our troops en route, that but a part of our army (Pope’s)
was engaged, and probably that our corps (Banks’) was clearing
the way for a field of which, perhaps, Thoroughfare Mountain
was a key position, and a failure to take that position might lose
the battle. I must obey orders, except upon supposition, that the
commanding General was surprised—and by what right could I
disobey orders so direct? Besides, a courier could overtake us
in fifteen or twenty minutes, if our return was required, or in
view of any change of orders. And I grew confirmed, in think-
ing further, that the command would not have been sent on so
distant and hazardous a movement, in immediate presence of the enemy, unless with a greater aim than the reestablishment of a signal-station, and I felt prouder, than before, that the “28th” had been selected for so responsible a duty.

I am not excusing myself, for up to this time, except in your work, I have never heard a word of suspicion or in derogation of the “28th” or of myself in connection with it, but I am explaining fully and setting right the errors, which appear in your book. Under the same circumstances, I would again act as I did on that day. At this distance of time, my sense of duty and my conscience unite with the judgment, which determined my action on that occasion.

At the foot of Thoroughfare Mountain, we met Colonel Cluse- ret, who, with his brigade, was coming from the westward to join the army, which he did that night. The position we held then upon the hill, knowing nothing of the issue of the fight, nor of the country in which we were so cut off, being eight or ten miles from the battle-field of the day before, was a very serious and hazardous one, involving great responsibility. All night was spent in posting troops against attack and in studying the hill, from which the enemy had withdrawn after driving off our signal-corps.

About seven or eight o’clock on the next day (Sunday) I received orders to return, which we did, avoiding our road of the day before, passing directly north and then east. I reported in person to General Banks about noon, informing him of the passage westwardly, in the direction of Madison Court House, of long trains of wagons and of seeing large clouds of dust. General Banks was again pleased to thank the command through me.

Permit me further to say that the 28th Pennsylvania Regiment was among the bravest, most reliable and steady regiments in the service. It never hid, never shirked duty, nor from cowardice avoided an action. Its record is clear, none brighter or better. It needs no defence, but I ask of you to do it simple justice in the best and clearest way you can render it, not doubting that you will. I know how, during the war many reports, most of them not intended harmfully, were spread among the troops. The absence of such a regiment, as the 28th, from immediate action might well be observed, and soldiers, ignorant of the cir-
cumstances and smarting from supposed neglect by companions, might, as they often did, say bitter and ugly things, which deserved and had no record among themselves.

Very respectfully,

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Brevet Major-General U. S. Vols.

Letter to General Joseph Hooker relative to the battle of Wauhatchie.

No. 1021 Clinton Street,
Philadelphia, January 5th, 1874.

Major-General Joseph Hooker, U. S. A.,
Astor House, New York.

My Dear General: I have yours of the 30th ult. acknowledging receipt of the documents I sent you, relating to the battle of Wauhatchie.

I regret that you, for an instant, should have thought that I, in those documents, in any way referred to or inculpated a “sense of justice” in alluding to your official report of that action. It would have been a gratuitous discourtesy to have done so, and, I may say, such a thing is impossible to me. Reports or statements of any matter, not under absolute and immediate observation, may be made, not doing equal justice to all parts or parties connected therewith, without involving the sense of justice of the maker of them. One may have heard too much from or of one, or too little from or of another actor in any affair, and thus honestly have made a partial statement of it. In that sense, I used the word “justice” impersonally. I referred to the action of troops, and not to the conduct of officers.

As to the subject matter, I never made an official report of the action of my brigade that night and during the following months, except the very brief one in my general “statement of military services,” made directly to the War Department, by its order. My official silence arose from several reasons; two of them being of the strongest, viz: 1st, that I was very much occupied for a long time following that affair, in necessary field duties; and 2d, because, arising from a previously received severe
wound in the head, the mere physical act of writing, and the fixed attention it required, caused me acute suffering; so much so, that the mere signing of my name to official papers became a torture. Thus, I had to dictate what was absolutely necessary to be written, and I did not wish to occupy the time of the hard worked soldiers with my own affairs. There was another reason for my silence, and that was not good, but which existed nevertheless, from an early period of the war. That was pride; an indisposition to thrust myself forward, where I saw so many self-thrusters, which became, finally, a dislike to claim even simple justice, where there was no involvement of personal character.

I sent you a copy of my statement, plan, etc., of Wauhatchie, solely because I thought it might please and, perhaps, interest you, and besides, as being an honest recital of what I know of that affair. In making my account of it, I may have erred in drawing too large or, perhaps, incorrect conclusions as to results, or as to the plans or intentions of others, but in my statements of the facts observed, I kept singly to the truth.

In mentioning the names of my superior officers who were with me, at least for part of the time, at the front of the action, I did so without any thought of past or existing differences; I did only a proper act of respect and courtesy, as, being there, it might have been thought proper for them to have taken the immediate and direct command, and of course, to have been entitled to whatever credit may have been attached to the action of the brigade.

As told you in a previous letter, I wrote my statement and made my plans, only to show my own connection with, and personal observation of, the battle of Wauhatchie, to a gentleman, who is preparing memoirs of Pennsylvania officers, and for his information, and not for detailed publication. As you, doubtless, have noticed, I claim (more strongly, and it may be more self-assertively, than in my official statement of military services, an extract from which I sent you with the other documents) that the remarkably prompt movement, and the rapid and resolute advance and attack of my brigade, in large part (from which I do not exclude the actions of others), helped to save, I might say saved, General Geary from destruction, and perhaps, produced even more important results. At least, I have
the satisfaction of believing this, and I am tolerably well con-
versant with Geary's position and need of help that night.

If you have an extra copy of your official report of Wauhatchie, you will confer a favor on me by lending it to me for a short period—it shall be carefully returned.

Reciprocating your kind wishes for the New Year, and wishing good health to you, I am, without arrière pensée of any character,

Respectfully and truly yours,

HECTOR TYNDALE.

Letter to General E. A. Carman relative to the battle of Antietam.

PHILADELPHIA, 7th April, 1877.

General E. A. Carman,
Jersey City, N. J.

Dear Sir: Until the receipt of yours of the 30th March, I was under the impression that I had sent, for your reading, the two papers inclosed in my last—but I now remember that the papers sent you were in reference to the actions of Wauhatchie, and to the movements about Chattanooga, etc., which you returned. In reply to your questions of the 30th ultimo: First, I do not know the names of the Confederate regiments from which my brigade captured seven (or nine) battle flags at Antietam. On that day, I had no regular staff, which is stated, in a note, on the margin of the copy of my official service report sent you; and further, during the latter part of that battle I had no horse, as I had been dismounted three times (that many of my horses having been shot), and was, besides, somewhat sore from the blow of a glancing bullet on the hip, and was weak from a slow fever and a diarrhœa, contracted in Pope's campaign. As a consequence of all this, my time was more than occupied with rapid movements made in all parts of the brigade, and partly on foot. Moreover, as I was very badly wounded (and rendered insensible) about 3 P. M., I learned nothing after the battle, having been sent home. By this, I mean to say, that during that battle I had time for nothing but the closest attention to my duties, for the
shortest means of acquiring information, and for consequent action. In relation to the Confederate flags, however, I presume
the names and numbers of the Confederate regiments, on that
part of the field, could be obtained from the War Department,
and the flags of any of those regiments, in the possession of
the department would surely dispose of your question. I should
think, that Greene's or Williams' report would give the names
you ask for. It may seem strange, but I have never seen any
official report of any part of the battle of Antietam, except
the imperfect one made by myself, in the paper referred to.
I have seen the maps or charts published by the War Depart-
ment, which are somewhat vague, and are not altogether as I
remember them, nor are they according to my notes or compari-
sions with other officers. The number of battle flags captured by
my brigade was officially returned as seven, but it was said, and
urgent if insisted on, that two others were carried off by mem-
bers of some of the regiments in the brigade. This I learned
subsequently from General Geary and other officers. I should
like to state, moreover, that I did not return to my old com-
mand, where I would have learned many more details of the
action, as during my long illness I was promoted to the position
of Brigadier General U. S. Vols. and, on my partial recovery,
was sent down to the Peninsula.

Second, I do not know the Union brigade which was routed
in my front at the time of my deployment, as on pages 8–9 of my
brief speech, to which you allude, but I was always under the im-
pression it was Hartsuff's brigade, of another corps, but then, I
had no time to find that out. I cannot tell why or how I re-
ceived that impression, but it still rests with me. I should be
greatly obliged for any information upon that point.

Third, At the time of my first deployment, the 28th Reg.
Penna. Vols. was on the right and front of the brigade. We
came up about seven o'clock A. M. from the rear, in column of
divisions. I never saw a better or steadier movement, nor such
a splendid and telling fire as that—cool and firm as a dress
parade. Several years since, a North Carolina officer who, at
the time of the battle of Antietam, was on the staff of one of
the brigades of Jackson's division, when talking of that battle
to me, spoke of the movement of my brigade, and said it was
made by "regular" troops, meaning to give the highest praise to his enemy. He did not know me at all as being, in any way, attached to the "regular" brigade he spoke of.

Fourth, That deployment was made in an open woods in front of and opposite to a cornfield, to the right of the Dunkard church—the cornfield of Antietam! This field, being on an opposing slope, running down towards us, its far side or end terminating, seemingly, in a wood at the top of the slope. I have used the word "hills" in speaking of Antietam, but more properly, perhaps, I should have said slope, as "hills" might lead to an incorrect idea of a merely rolling country.

Fifth, I know nothing of the position of the second brigade of the division, and only remember the 111th Penna. Reg., because Col. Stainrook told me his name and the number of the regiment (his own) brought up by him. He very handsomely placed it and himself at my disposal. That regiment behaved well while with me, and I remember that, in a rather heavy but desultory firing it was under at the time, I thanked the regiment for its conduct. Stainrook came up about one or two o'clock P. M., after I had crossed the turnpike and was in the woods around and behind the Dunkard church. After this, at the farthest point reached by my brigade, about half a mile or so to the right and rear of the church, Lieutenant Markle, of the 28th Penna Vols., a grandson of "old Governor Markle," of Pennsylvania, was shot through the head. He was, I believe, the nearest to the enemy's last line of any man killed that day. When shot, he was in front of his company watching the enemy's movements behind their line of defense—a limestone ledge. His body was sent to the rear.

While the fit of garrulity is on me, permit me to say, that it has always surprised me that the battle of Antietam was not a decisive and nearly final or total defeat of the Confederate army. From my position, and from the ground my troops took, and occupied for hours, it certainly seemed as if a great and decisive victory could be won. I remember very well, just after an advance (when we had thrown the enemy again and again back into the woods, and they seemed almost disheartened) riding up to an officer commanding one of my regiments, and saying to him, with the clearest and plainest convictions of the truth of
the words, "if they'll give me ten thousand men I'll win this battle in an hour." A year or two before General Meade's death, I told this incident to him, and he replied, "And so you could, from your position, with ten thousand men, you could have won the battle in that time." Besides the noble fighting of the enemy, we had two great obstacles that day. One, was the absence of ammunition, several times repeated, and the other, a fatal want of the reinforcements for which I several times urgently asked, while, at the same time, stating mine and the enemy's positions. These were taken by us, and the ground was held, which was of vital importance, and yet no officer of commanding power came near us to see what had been done, or to learn the results of our fighting, although it could not have been wholly unobserved. I blame no one. I know nothing of the then seeming necessities and requirements of the movements of the entire army for a general success, but I shall always regret, that the opportunities given that day by the noble soldiers, given without stint and with perfect heroism, should not have been utilized. I do not doubt, that our movements on the right were determined a priori, and our local success, if it had been promptly and properly followed up, would have involved a change of plans not deemed well or wise to make. If there is one thing more painful than many others to a commander in action, it is to lose the lives of men over whom he exercises almost unlimited power, and to whom he owes more than life itself—to lose them uselessly in a barren or resultless, even though glorious battle. If war consists merely in killing men (which I do not believe), then, my regrets are unfounded; but unless that killing, leads to a higher end for humanity, all wars are merely damnable, and without justification of God or man. But Antietam is not alone among fields, fertilized with blood, which yielded little or no harvest of visible results.

I have taken the liberty to send you, by this mail, a copy of the brief speech I made at the reunion of the 28th Reg., in 1871, as you may possibly like to place it, as a small addition, among the floating papers on the war. I take, too, the greater liberty, wherein I trust you will not think me immodest, of sending you a portrait of myself, engraved since the war, to file away with the many likenesses of the soldiers of the 11th, 12th, and 20th Corps, which, doubtless, are in your possession. I shall
be gratified if you think it worthy to be placed among them. The other copy of my speech, having some pencil memoranda, and the copy of my official service report, please return at your leisure, when you may have done with them.

Very truly yours,
HECTOR TYNDALE.

I owe you many apologies for the tediousness of this, and hope you will pardon, if you do not peruse it.

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Letter to Colonel JOHN P. NICHOLSON, accompanying the communication for M. le Comte de Paris.

PHILADELPHIA, September 27, 1879.

COLONEL JOHN P. NICHOLSON,
Philadelphia.

MY DEAR COLONEL: In acknowledging yours of the 23d inst., I thank you for the gratification of reading its enclosure, the letter of M. le Comte de Paris of the 10th inst., addressed to you. The gratification is due to the admirable presentment of his questions proposed for General Longstreet. The first of these questions, viz.: "Why the Lookout Valley, which was the key of Chattanooga, was so feebly defended against Hooker, and why, after the slight affair at Wauhatchie, no effort was made to recover its possession?" covers the whole ground of the relief of Thomas and the possibility of the subsequent battle of Chattanooga. The second question: "Why, when Lookout Mountain had become totally useless it was still occupied, although it was a source of weakness for the Confederate Army?" is also a pregnant one, and, like the third question, "Why Bragg recalled Cheatham and Stevenson from Eastern Tennessee at the very time he was sending there Hood's and McLaw's divisions, making a chasse-croisé which caused a useless loss of time and labor?" relates, prima facie, more especially to the ability of Bragg as a commander than to the relative positions of the two antagonistic armies. As you ask me for any memoranda I may make, as possibly useful to you in replying to questions you may ask, and in understanding any statements you may receive, as to the siege and campaign of Chattanooga, I shall confine myself to remarks
suggested by question first, upon the opening of Lookout Valley, so properly called "the key of Chattanooga," which, when taken, made the battle of Chattanooga afterwards possible to us.

After the disastrous action of Chickamauga, the Union troops were thrown back upon Chattanooga, a very strong place and an important position, but hardly tenable without better roads than those that were at that moment open to the Union forces. The Tennessee River, a great highway to that position, was held by the enemy in holding Lookout Valley, through which the river runs. To retreat from Chattanooga meant not only great disaster to Thomas's army, but a great loss of prestige and of territory, at least temporarily, to the Union cause. The ordinary roads of that country were exceedingly rude, passing over a very rough, hilly, even mountainous land, and were entirely inadequate, for transportation, for so large a force as that of General Thomas. Moreover, one piece of the best of these roads was, in part, commanded by the enemy's guns across the Tennessee River. It was a common occurrence, for lightly loaded six horse or mule supply teams to leave some point on the railroad, south of Nashville (as at Tullahoma, a distance of from sixty to eighty miles from Chattanooga), and to arrive at the latter place with but two or three horses or mules, and with loads correspondingly lightened. Thomas's troops were getting very inadequate supplies—it was said not one-quarter rations. Evidently, this could not last, and the 11th and 12th Corps of the Army of the Potomac were detached and, under the command of General Joseph Hooker, were sent to Thomas's relief. Hooker had to move by railroad not less, I think, than twelve hundred miles; a large part of this way through a people friendly to the enemy and in constant correspondence with them. The movement was made very rapidly and in excellent order, the troops taking with them, however, necessarily, but little camp equipage, and no supplies of clothing, other than those in use and worn by them, which led afterwards to much suffering. Several weeks had passed between the battle of Chickamauga and the arrival of Hooker at Bridgeport, Ala., on the Tennessee River, where he lay with the 11th Corps and a small part of the 12th (the remainder of the latter corps being stationed along the railroad northward) for some days before crossing the river for his advance up Lookout Valley. The people here, as along the valley itself, were friendly
to the Southern cause, and it is almost incredible, that nearly accurate accounts of the movements, and the numbers engaged in them had not reached General Bragg, and that he did not know that Hooker could have had but one objective point, and that Lookout Valley was the key of Chattanooga. Besides, Bridgeport was within thirty miles of Bragg's left—an easy half day's ride down the valley. When the movement up the valley began the position of Thomas was very critical, and the question was, "how many days can he hold out?" So plain was the fact that Lookout Valley was the road, the only road for us to Chattanooga, that when General Howard displayed to me, at Bridgeport, a large map of that, then unknown vicinity, and asked my opinion as to a road of approach, relief, and supply, after ten minutes of study, I suggested the seizing of Brown's and Kelly's Ferries, or other points on the river on the side of Lookout Mountain, and thence to hold the river, and the road on the other, or right bank, open for supplies; and that this would involve, doubtless, heavy and hard fighting, but at any rate it should be attempted, and, if we could force our way, at the worst, we could enter Chattanooga and take our chances with Thomas.

This was the plan adopted that very day, I believe, and I relate it only to show how plain must have appeared "the key of Chattanooga," and yet General Bragg seemed surprised at the coming of Hooker to the foot of Lookout Mountain, within four miles of Chattanooga, and that, too, after parts of two days had been occupied in the almost unopposed march up the valley, during which his officers were plainly within our sight, signalling our movement, which was made just under their eyes and feet.

The force, led by Hooker up Lookout Valley, was composed of the 11th Corps (comprising, I think, five brigades) of about six thousand men; one brigade, Greene's, of the 12th Corps, of about two thousand men; some batteries of artillery and a few cavalry, used only as scouts, orderlies, etc., making in all about eight thousand five hundred men. My own brigade, the largest in the 11th Corps, had about fifteen hundred muskets. Believing General Longstreet to be a very able soldier, I have always given him credit for quickly seeing the position and for his attack which rapidly followed, but, I have never been able to learn why he did not make it with a proper force. I have, how-
ever, since seen another account, perhaps his own, stating that the attack upon Geary (Greene's Brigade) at Wauhatchie was made only to seize some transportation or supply trains. If this be so, it adds to my wonder at the inadequate force employed. Another and still greater wonder was that, of the non-recognition of the absolute position. It was a momentous period in Bragg's history—he was about to lose the key of Chattanooga. Two courses of action, at least, were open to him; either to permit Hooker, as he did, to march nearly in quiet up Lookout Valley and then to attack him heavily from the rear, and destroy him or drive him into Chattanooga, and thus cause the question of supplies to be still more difficult of solution; or, he could have prevented Hooker's advance, and, it may be, have driven him back to Bridgeport. The first of these courses, I have always supposed, was the one attempted by General Longstreet in his attack at Wauhatchie; but if so, the attempt was a very feeble one, wholly inadequate to the large purpose of the movement. From twelve thousand to fifteen thousand men would, probably, have carried into effect either of the courses mentioned. Just after the affair at Wauhatchie, and before the Union lines were strengthened by works, a heavy attack upon them would have been a serious matter for the Union cause. As M. le Comte de Paris suggests in his first and second questions, another perplexing thing in the matter is, that failing or not attempting to drive us from our positions in the valley and into Chattanooga, why did he not prepare at once for the inevitable general engagement that must have quickly followed? If you are not already tired of this long-drawn theme, and should wish any further suggestions or explanations of these, I would refer you to my account of the affair at Wauhatchie and subsequent matters, written some time since, and of which I enclose a copy.

Please pardon this recital of what, no doubt, is perfectly well known to you; but it may be as well to recall to one's self the state of affairs at the time, to which the very pertinent questions of M. le Comte de Paris, relate.

With kindest regards, Colonel, I am

Very truly yours,

HECTOR TYNDALE,

Brevet Major-General U. S. V., late Brigadier-General U. S. V.
The accompanying plan of the battle of Wauhatchie, Tenn., and the numbered explanations, are made mostly from memory, and are intended to be sufficiently accurate only so far as my command was concerned. The general relations of plan, however, are correct, although in minor points there may be inaccuracies. The distances from the muddy branch to Geary's position, and from "Smith's Hill" back to the bivouac of 11th corps, are much too short upon the plan.

On the afternoon of 28th October, 1863, the 11th corps, in Schurz's division, of which I had a brigade, and a small part of the 12th corps, both under command of General Hooker, arrived and bivouacked near to closely pressed Chattanooga, in and about which were great expressions of joy upon our coming, and of gratitude for the relief we brought to its brave and much enduring army under General Thomas.

On our march upward from Bridgeport, Ala., through Lookout Valley, a part (about two thousand three hundred of Geary's division) of the 12th corps had been left behind, between the railroad station of Wauhatchie and Kelly's Ferry—a very important point on the Tennessee River, and one necessary for holding that river open for supplies. Geary's position was about two and a half miles from the bivouac of the 11th Corps.

In this upward movement we cut the enemy's lines, and drove them from the valley, back upon Lookout Mountain. Observing the situation, I thought the proper thing for the enemy to do, was to make a heavy attack upon us that night, before we had organized and entrenched our positions. I, therefore, ordered the men of my brigade to sleep in regular regimental formation, behind their stacked arms, and that the commanders of regiments and their staffs, as well as my own, should be ready for instant motion. I issued other brigade orders, as to the disposition of regiments in case of a movement.

There had been a continuous, angry picket firing since sun-down, which gradually swelled in volume, until about eleven o'clock, when it became a pretty heavy and long outpost chain of fire. Lying, with my staff, not far from Hooker's quarters, just before midnight I heard him give orders, to an aide, for General Howard, commanding 11th Corps, "to move, at once,
with his whole corps to the relief of Geary, who is sorely pressed.” Within four minutes from that time, my five regiments (the 45th, 143d New York, 61st, 82d Ohio, and the 101st Illinois), were in rapid march towards the heaviest firing, which very soon burst into the roar of battle. This very rapid movement, followed soon, upon my left and rear, by Colonel Orland Smith’s brigade, saved Geary’s command from destruction, as the enemy’s attacking force greatly outnumbered his; for my brigade cut off their line of battle and supports from their reserves, the latter of which my brigade and that of Colonel O. Smith attacked, driving them, and causing the instant withdrawal of their attacking line, which was pounding Geary terribly, and his fate hung upon minutes of time.

The instantaneous spring of my brigade had sent it a pretty long way to the front, where a very fortunate deflection from my line of march upon the regular road, through or into a large open space, made by me in order to move more directly upon the firing, saved my own, if it did not our other brigades, from great peril, perhaps from destruction. The enemy’s reserves, as it subsequently appeared, lay on hills covered by dark woods, through which our road-way ran, and were placed there, doubtless, to intercept our relief and to conceal their movements. Now, had my brigade entered those woods, in following the road, we should have been at a great disadvantage, to say the least, and had the head of our column been destroyed, or even checked, it would have been most disastrous. The country was entirely unknown to us, and, as it afterwards proved, the road-way was the proper approach to Wauhatchie, because of deep muddy grounds in the fields.

It was a bright moonlight night, and our movements in the open field were plainly visible to the enemy, while his positions and forces were hidden from and unknown to us. The battle, raging in our front, was also entirely invisible to us, being in dense forests, from which came only the increasing crash of musketry and the roar of artillery. Geary’s command was, evidently, in sore strait, and we pushed on quickly and steadily past the enemy’s, then unknown, positions of reserve.

After moving about a mile in the open field, and being about the
same distance from Geary, my skirmish line was suddenly stopped by a muddy branch, the position of which was reported to me by the officer in command of the 45th New York, who were acting as skirmishers. The enemy seeing the halt, and not knowing the cause, and believing, I doubt not, that—because we had left the road and now seemed to be making dispositions for attack—we knew of his positions for interception, and further, in order to check my movement, which would soon have thrown my command upon the rear of his line of battle, opened fire upon us, at long range, from what was afterwards known as “Tyndale Hill No. 1.”

This was the first intimation I received of the enemy being on my left, as well as in my front. I at once changed front and forming line, with supporting columns, attacked the hill and, with persistent and vigorous efforts, carried it at the point of the bayonet. After clearing away the base of the hill, the 61st Ohio, Colonel McGroarty, and the 82d Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson, formed and swept up the steep and rugged hillside to the very top, driving the enemy at every toilsome upward step. Captain McGroarty, brother of the Colonel, and others of both regiments were killed on the very crest—the enemy’s line making a last stand there before it was pushed down the opposite slope. Nearly simultaneously with the first firing against me from the hill, Colonel O. Smith’s brigade, then about half or three-fourths of a mile on my rear and left, was checked by a heavy and disastrous fire from another hill, upon his left, while advancing, which hill he soon attacked and carried in the most gallant manner. This was afterwards known as “Smith’s Hill.”

With the first opening of the fire upon my brigade and our attack on the hill, the firing against Geary suddenly ceased, and the enemy fell back through the dark woods, as their line of retreat was imperilled, and, had we known the country and our position, it was possible that it would have been lost to them. From the gaps at both ends of the hills, and from my right, there was now lively skirmishing—both parties feeling in the dark. The 45th New York was thrown back upon my right, which was threatened by the enemy then withdrawing from Geary’s front, which we knew, as all sounds of battle from his position had so suddenly died away. After this, the 143d New York,
Colonel Boughton, and the 101st Illinois, Colonel Fox, drove the enemy’s covering force from a hastily formed breastwork in the gap between the “Tyndale Hills” numbers one and two, and carried the latter hill about daybreak.

Skirmishing all along the line, entrenching our positions and throwing up long and strong works, connecting with other commands upon the right and left, occupied us all the following day and for many weeks thereafter. Lasting all the succeeding night, was one of the coldest and heaviest of storms. We had no food, no shelter-tents, and the men and officers alike were in light fighting trim and all suffered greatly. Added to this, we were under a constant and annoying fire of shell from Lookout Mountain. The latter continued during the whole of our stay in Lookout Valley, until the series of battles around Chattanooga, beginning, November 23d, and ending with the brilliant battle of Lookout Mountain, November 24th. For the most of this interval, the troops had half and sometimes only quarter rations issued to them. The 11th Corps moved to Chattanooga on the 22d, and entered into the series of battles around that place, lasting until the 27th November, when, with Sherman’s Corps (both corps under his command), it commenced the march to the relief of Knoxville. For a brief recital of that march, its privations and sufferings, I refer to my “Official Statement of Military Services,” of which I have sent you a copy. See page 15 or thereabout.

The battle of Wauhatchie afforded a good test of the courage of our soldiers. Awakened about midnight and hastened into unexpected action, they behaved in the handsomest manner and with the coolest discipline, showing, what Napoleon desired in his troops—“Two-o’clock-in-the-morning-courage.”

The officers and men of my command did their duty well, and I should like the opportunity to thank them again in person. But they deserve much more than this, for Wauhatchie, in its results, was one of the most important minor actions of the war.

General Thomas, in Chattanooga, was beleaguered by Bragg’s forces, and when Hooker’s command (the 11th and 12th Corps), or a part of it, had reached Bridgeport, on the Tennessee below Chattanooga, the sole question was, “How many hours can Thomas hold out?” There was but one road of approach left
open to him; a long, circuitous and dangerous road, over which not one-fourth of a supply could be carried. To retreat from Chattanooga, would have been perilous in the extreme, and might have led to a great loss of trains, to heavy losses of men, to a demoralization of the troops, and, perhaps, to the loss of the State of Tennessee, at least temporarily, to the Union cause.

The rapid coming of Hooker's command, and the seizing of the most important points on the Tennessee River, done in conjunction with some of Thomas's forces under General W. F. ("Baldy") Smith, raised the siege, opened the river line of supply, and saved Chattanooga. Then "Wauhatchie" made the subsequent victories around Chattanooga possible, by firmly holding open the road we had seized. Had Longstreet succeeded in seizing the river points again, and in driving the 11th Corps into Chattanooga, our coming would have been a misfortune—so many more unfed mouths added to the suffering and almost starved army of the noble Thomas. Parenthetically, I may say, it is a great pleasure to me to believe that I gave even one slight blow for the safety and aid of George Thomas, whom I respected as a commander and loved as a friend.

For the reasons I have given, I say Wauhatchie was one of the most important minor battles of the war in its results. Longstreet deserved credit for seeing the situation and for striking so promptly, but the force he used was inadequate to the needs and value of the work. He employed, according to the appended extract from "Southern Generals," one division of four brigades—how many muskets these carried I do not know. Had he added another division to his force, it would have given him the preponderance, over the entire 11th corps, which had only five or six brigades in all. Besides, he had the great advantage of knowing the country. One division pushing straight on, would almost instantly have destroyed Geary's command; then changing front towards Chattanooga, it would, in connection with its supporting division, or divisions, have forced the 11th corps, which must have offered battle at a disadvantage, or have consented to be shut up; while Longstreet himself could have accepted or declined battle, as he might have chosen. Our advance up Lookout Valley, with only the 11th Corps and a small part of the 12th, which latter corps was holding open the
roads in our rear, was a daring yet necessary movement for sav-
ing Chattanooga, and what was seized so opportunely, was held
courageously and with great good fortune.

In corroboration of what I have said of the battle of Wau-
hatchie, and of the general correctness of its plan, sent here-
with, I refer not only to General Hooker’s report of it, which I
think does not do justice to all of his command, but also to
Greeley’s “American Conflict,” and to a work entitled “South-
ern Generals,” in which is a memoir of General Longstreet.
From this memoir, I extract the appended statement, as to
the battle of Lookout Valley or Wauhatchie. I also append
an extract from my official “Statement of Military Services,”
written at “headquarters of 2d division, 11th corps, Shellmound,
Tenn., March 25, 1864.” These, together, will show that my
account and my claims, as to Wauhatchie, were not made up
artificially, nor with any intention to make actual results agree
with seeming well laid plans, nor without a proper basis, but
that my short and nearly contemporaneous official statement
agrees with the account given in General Longstreet’s memoir,
published long afterwards, and both, with this present very ex-
tended paper. I must add, that General Schurz, commanding
division, was with me at the front of that battle (one of his
aides having been shot at his side), near to me, or he was bring-
ing up reënforcements during the action. General Schurz was
very kind and considerate in his action and treatment, doing me
the honor of saying that my brigade was “commanded,” and
General Howard was pleased to say the same.

HECTOR TYNDALE,
Brevet Major-General U. S. Vols.

PHILADELPHIA, December 23d, 1873.

The most serious error made in the account of the action of
Wauhatchie, taken from the life of General Longstreet, is in the
numbers attributed to the Union forces—these are largely over-
estimated. My own brigade had about fifteen hundred muskets.
Extract from memoir of General James Longstreet, in "Southern Generals, who they are and what they have done." New York: Charles P. Richardson, 540 Broadway, 1865.

"On the 19th of October, General Grant arrived at Chattanooga and relieved General Rosecrans. The Confederates, at this time, occupied the south side of the Tennessee River, above Chattanooga to near Bridgeport below, and taking in the valley, Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain.

"General Grant quickly determined to drive them from those positions by uniting his forces, and, on the 26th, commenced operations, by a series of excellent movements under Hooker, with the personal superintendence of General "Baldy" Smith of the Engineer Corps.

"During Monday night (the 26th October) the enemy crossed the Tennessee in the rear of Chattanooga, passed over the narrow peak, known as the Moccasin, again crossed the river, and entrenched themselves on the heights which align its margin. The movement was designed to pave the way for the advance of a column from Bridgeport, up the valley towards, and, if necessary, into Chattanooga. The latter must have commenced nearly simultaneously with the one first mentioned, for, on the night of Tuesday, our commanders learned of its approach in this direction.

"During Wednesday morning, the head of the column was espied in the distance from Lookout Peak, and by dusk it had effected a junction with the forces in the neighborhood of Brown's Ferry. Subsequent developments showed, that the 11th and 12th corps of Meade's army—the former under command of Howard, and the latter under command of Slocum, and the whole under Joe Hooker—had taken this method of reaching the Union army of Tennessee.

"On Lookout Peak,' says a writer, vividly describing the affair, 'gazing down upon the singular spectacle—a coup d'œil which embraced, in curious contrasts, the beauties of nature and the achievements of art, the blessings of peace and the horrors of war—were Generals Bragg, Longstreet, and others, to whom this bold venture of the enemy opened at once new vistas of thought and action. Infantry, artillery, and cavalry all glided silently by, like a procession of fantoccini in a panorama, until among
all the sundown's sumptuous pictures, which glowed around, there was not one like that of the great, fresh, bustling camp, suddenly grown into view, with its thousand twinkling lights, its groups of men and animals, and its lines of white-topped wagons now strung, like a necklace of pearls, around the bosom of the hills. The Federals had succeeded in effecting a junction with their army of Chattanooga.'

"An attempt on the part of the Confederates to check this movement, it is said, would have been impracticable, without bringing on a general engagement, since an interposition of their forces across the valley would have necessitated a fight on both front and rear, and on both sides the enemy had the advantage of flanks protected. The first corps having passed, and a portion of it gone into camp, there was still visible below a considerable number of wagons, guarded, apparently, by an escort of from fifteen hundred to two thousand men. Hoping to capture these, General Longstreet determined, during the night, to make an attack, and accordingly ordered General Jenkins, commanding Hood's divisions, to take position for the purpose.

"The enemy occupied a line of hills, parallel with the river in the neighborhood of Brown's Ferry; Law and Robertson the same line of hills, but nearer to Lookout Mountain, to prevent an attack on Bratton's rear, and Benning a position on the left of the two last named, being intended as a support to Colonel Bratton. These three brigades, as it were, covered the bridges across the Lookout Creek, over which they had marched, and threatened the line of the enemy at Brown's Ferry. Colonel Bratton, with Jenkins' brigade, now moved over to the left a mile or more up the valley, to attack the supposed rear guard, and capture the wagon train.

"Skirmishers being thrown out, the Federal pickets were soon encountered. These falling back, the enemy were found in line of battle, and, instead of being surprised, received our troops with a heavy volley. It was not long before it was discovered that, instead of a paltry body of men, who would yield as soon as discovered, we were fighting a whole division, belonging to the 12th Corps, General Slocum, who had closely followed in the rear of the preceding column, and encamped after night. Nothing was to be done but to fight it boldly out, and to make
up in pluck and obstinacy what was lacking in numbers. On our part, we had but six regiments—the 1st, Colonel Kilpatrick; 2d rifles, Colonel Thompson; 5th, Colonel Coward; 6th, Colonel Bratton; Palmetto Sharpshooters, Colonel Walker; and Hampton Legion, Colonel Gary. Steadily as on a parade, these filed into position, and in a few moments artillery and musketry were playing with terrible effect through our ranks.

"The enemy, in the neighborhood of Brown's Ferry, discovering a battle in progress, had already thrown forward two columns, one of which advanced to attack the line occupied by Generals Law and Robertson, while the other moved steadily past that front and aimed to penetrate the long interval between Bratton and Benning; in other words, to cut Jenkins' brigade off from the bridges over Lookout Creek. The first column met with little success, being checked by the sharp fire of the Alabamians and Texans; but the second promised other results. The situation was a critical one; but General Jenkins, quickly divining the object of the movement, met the issue by ordering Bratton to return to the bridges, and the remainder of the division to hold its position at every hazard, until the safety of the former was assured. Lieutenant-Colonel Logan, of the Hampton Legion, with fourteen companies, whom he had relieved from picket, having reached the field, was ordered to the left of Benning, where, occupying a hill, he extended our line, and naturally contributed to the check of the enemy.

"Although we had not achieved a victory, we had, judging by results, been blessed with a providential success. The Federals encountered by Jenkins' brigade, were undoubtedly on the eve of a disastrous defeat, as is shown by the facts already set forth, namely, the breaking of the lines, and falling back in front, and on the right and left flanks, until wagon trains and prisoners were captured in the rear. On the other hand, the pressure of the Yankee columns from Brown's Ferry, where it was known there were at least two corps, not distant more than a mile and a half, so threatened the integrity of our position, that it eventually became critical in the extreme. Probably from seven to ten thousand troops enveloped the line designed to protect Bratton from an attack upon his rear, and in a few
moments they would have intersected the only road by which he
could return.

"Being unable to counteract a movement on so grand a scale,
with the small force at his command, General Jenkins did the
next best thing, which was to recall Colonel Bratton, and to
compel him, at the moment of success, to abandon all the fruits
of his struggle, which had been so gloriously wrested from the
enemy. Instead of censure, therefore, praise belongs to every
officer and man concerned in the expedition. On the part of
General Longstreet, the design was just like himself—bold, dar-
ing, dashing; and had it not been for the circumstances men-
tioned, it would have resulted in complete success."

Extract from the official Statement of Military Services, made by Brigadier-
General Hector Tyndale, from his temporary command of the 2d division of
the 11th corps, dated Shellmound, Tennessee, March 25, 1864.

"About midnight of the 28th–29th October, a force of Long-
street’s rebels attacked Brigadier-General Geary’s command—
which had encamped at Wauhatchie, some miles in our rear,
with several, lateral lines of approach from the enemy, between
his position and ours. In going to his relief, guided by the
heavy firing, my brigade in the front, when about a mile from
Geary, the rebels opened fire on the 11th corps from some hills
on our left, along the bases of which our road lay. Whereupon,
my brigade and that of Colonel Smith, of the 2d division, faced
and drove them from their strong positions on the two hills, op-
posite our respective flanks. On this, the firing against Geary
suddenly ceased, and the rebels rapidly fell back, as we were on
their line of retreat, and, had we known the country or the roads,
they would probably have been destroyed. But the shadow of
the dense woods on the hill-sides and in the gaps, whilst it fav-
ored our attack, enabled them to retreat. But the taking of
those hills, which should have guarded their retreat and stopped
our advance to Geary’s aid, saved him, I doubt not, from great
loss if not from destruction."
Extract copied from official statement of services made to the War Department by Brigadier-General Hector Tyndale in 1864, and subsequently.

"November 22d, 1863, the 11th Corps, with no transportation, no knapsacks, and with three days' rations, moved to Chattanooga, and on the afternoon of the 23d, my brigade being in front, it took the left of the line, which position it held during the series of actions around Chattanooga, Missionary Ridge, etc., following the enemy closely in his running fight of five days, and always flanking his right. On the 28th, with three days' rations added, we began our march under Sherman for the relief of Knoxville, and, under the circumstances of our preparation, as stated, made one of the severest campaigns of the war. While marching over bad roads, the weather being freezing and stormy, the ice or stones cutting the men's feet, large numbers became wholly bare-footed, and all the shoes were worn through; many were without shelter tents, and all with ragged and insufficient clothing, and with unusual and often stinted food. With this there was no straggling, no stealing, and no grumbling. The march of about two hundred and fifty miles to near Knoxville and the return, including five days, in which we were always ready for action or were engaged, took twenty-six days. We arrived at our camp in Lookout Valley on the 17th December."

Letter from M. le Comte de Paris to Colonel John P. Nicholson.

Chateau D'eu,
Seine Inferieure, France.

Dear Sir: I received about a month ago your letter of the 12th of October, and I beg to apologize that I did not sooner return my best thanks for this letter, as well as for the letters from Generals Longstreet and Tyndale, which you were kind enough to send me. I keep these carefully, as well as the statements of these two generals concerning the battle of Wauhatchie, which you forwarded to me several months or perhaps a year ago. The remarks of General Tyndale are very interesting, and show his clear and comprehensive judgment. Although General Longstreet thinks rightly, that Gettysburg was the turning point of
the war, and that the slightest incident, which affected the issue of that conflict, had a greater importance than the most bloody battle fought afterwards; nevertheless, his letter, concerning the operations around Chattanooga, is full of useful information. I was struck especially by what he says of Bragg's obstinacy in denying the possibility of Hooker's arrival in Lookout Valley. I thought that the Southern generals were much better informed of the movements of their enemies, and the wilful ignorance of Bragg is very extraordinary. It explains the success of the operation, which relieved Chattanooga.

I beg you to return my best thanks to General Tyndale for his valuable communication, and I remain, dear sir,

Yours truly,

L. P. d'ORLEANS,
Comte de Paris.

Address of Hector Tyndale, before the Mercantile Beneficial Association of Philadelphia, May 8th, 1850.

The Association, the members and friends of which I am now addressing, had its origin in the hearts and minds of some benevolent and far-sighted merchants of this city, who, in the year 1842, formed themselves into a society for the following objects, as stated in the preamble to our Constitution, to wit: "the promotion of friendship and brotherly affection among its members; the distribution, under proper regulations, of pecuniary aid to such of them as may at any time stand in need of it; the pleasant interchange of kind feelings and views between the elder and younger members, whether merchants or clerks, employers or employed, and the elevation of the mercantile character of the city and State." These gentlemen were all members of the mercantile profession, and as it was suited to the requirements of that profession more than to any other, it was, and is, confined to members of the same.

The objects, as stated, or at least such of them as were at that time most easily accomplished, were carried out under the private guidance of these gentlemen, until a charter was given to the society by an act of the Legislature of the State, dated the
11th day of April, 1844, by which act our still young "Mercantile Beneficial Association of Philadelphia," was recognized as one among the many good and ameliorating institutions, by which we are surrounded, and which, alas, have so much room for their benevolent operations. The society then assumed a name and place, and so far has, under the guidance of active working men, been productive of much good, or rather has mitigated much of pain, and perhaps averted many evils. The peculiar character of our Association in affording pecuniary aid to its members, is, that in cases of application for relief, an amount is given sufficiently large to place any one above and beyond the mere present wants of the time, and for this purpose a "Relief Committee" of five persons exists, whose duties are to receive applications and to furnish the necessary aid, within certain limits; the names of persons making applications and receiving aid, being known only to the members of that Committee.

Up to this time, however, owing to the need of a certain permanent fund, the Boards of Managers, to whom have been entrusted the direction of the Association, have been unable to do more than to extend pecuniary aid to such of the members as may have needed relief; and in all cases this relief has been given most cordially, and accepted cheerfully and as a right. But your present Board has (by the accumulated fund, now amounting to about $7000, besides the contributions of about 400 members, who each pay three dollars annually), I say your present Board has been enabled to commence the attempt to carry out the other, and most prominent and useful objects of the Association. These are, the bringing of the merchant and the clerk into a better knowledge of each other, thereby promoting kindly feelings; the assembling of the members where the younger may profit by the long experience of the elder, where we may all learn from those of our profession from other places—and we hope to introduce many intelligent strangers here—the nature and character of the products and mode of business prevailing in their neighborhood or States—of giving something to the members that will be of sufficient interest to awaken within them an ambition or a strong desire for self-improvement, and to give them a place where they can interchange their ideas upon business, and of its relations to life.
For these purposes, then, your Board of Managers have taken this room, which they propose, with the aid and assistance of the members generally, to open every evening of the week for the use of the members. It is then in this, the first room of the Association, that we invoke the blessing of our Father upon our efforts to promote brotherly feelings and kindly affections amongst its members; it is from this room, we will hope with His aid, that a beginning shall be made in the elevation of the mercantile character, and, through that, the elevation of the community in which we live, and of our State; and, if successful now, not here will this change stop, but throughout this brotherhood of States will this ever widening circle roll, and still extending, with the free thoughts that always radiate from truth, however humble, it will progress throughout the world. These may appear as visions, and so they are now, but time and labor bring all things nearer to us.

The world has ever been governed by one dominant sect or party, creed or profession. Commerce is now the ruling power; and where there is power there should be an enlightened understanding, or all will be confusion, a leading of the sightless by the blind. I make this assertion of the supremacy of commerce without fear of contradiction, for the mutual dependence of men and of nations, in the necessary exchange of products, is now so strong, and still becoming stronger by commerce, that no one, having the slightest observation, can fail to see it. What, then, is our part, acting as we do, as intermediate agents between the various producers of the world, who are also the consumers? Shall we, the working agents of the children of toil, be content to rest in ignorance and in sloth, while all the world is marching, wheeling nation after nation, into light? As merchants, or agents of mankind, as men, it is not fit for us so to rest idly. Our place is on the battle-field of life; in the thickest of the din, amid the serried ranks of labor we should be found. Ours is the rank of aids upon that battle ground. Then let us know the field, over which we are to pass between nation and nation, bearing the commands and wishes of our commanders-in-chief—the people.

It is with a view, then, of producing harmony of thought and action among members, of opening to the view of every member of our society the various volumes which the Deity has bound up
in man, enabling each to read the thoughts and to feel the sentiments of others, and taking from that library, what he cannot so well learn from books—a love for the true and sincere, an affection for our co-laborers and brothers, which no printed leaves can give. It is for these purposes that we have opened this hall, and its success depends mainly upon ourselves. Your Board of Managers and your Room Committee can do much—and they will do it gladly—but with you, individually, rests the prosperity of our undertaking. Upon your manifestation of interest in the matter, depends its success. It will be but a trifling expenditure of time to each of us to come here once or more in every week, to meet those, who, from a similarity of pursuit, would doubtless be congenial in thought, and this will be amply repaid to us, in the satisfaction of having worked for a good cause, in having struck a blow for the right; and let me hope, too, that it will not be without a corresponding profit to ourselves. To the merchants, then, of our community, we address ourselves—and by that name we include all, however humble may appear to be their rank, who may be engaged in trade, in the interchange of products, whether of the ground, of the hand, or of the brain—we ask their co-operation and assistance.

Let us examine into the character of our profession, and ascertain its tendencies; let us see what parts of the whole man it most develops and strengthens, and what parts are left to slumber, or perhaps to die. And this, if properly scanned, will be of incalculable use to us. Perhaps, the best results of our profession, upon ourselves, are the confidence and trustfulness, which are, of necessity, produced by it, and the almost necessary qualifications of honesty and industry. These last are almost necessary qualities, and they would become entirely so, were it not for the interference of laws and of things, which exist in the present state of society; but the exceptions to this are not the result of trade alone; that requires confidence and trust, with diligence and a faithful performance of our duties. The worst result of trade upon individuals is, probably, the centralization of thought upon self-interest, selfishness, in an eager desire to accumulate; and yet this, perhaps, is not owing so much to the profession as to the extrinsic value set upon wealth by all communities; and this observation can be properly made upon all professions, or rather upon society
at large. But, as the representative of value, money, is the basis of our exchanges, it may, and probably does, assume in our eyes a significance and value that should not be attached to it. But the worst of this selfishness, is the habit it engenders, of resolving all questions by the test of success, and that too, a success of our own interests. Instead of referring to and examining all questions by broad general principles, we too often weigh them in the scales of selfish prudence, with their chances of success for weights. This habit is in consequence of the many vicious and artificial schemes that have been engrafted, from time to time, upon the simple, natural, necessary and beautiful exchange of the products of toil. I do not, at this time, intend to go into the examination of the tendencies of our profession, as neither your patience nor my time will allow it; what I say, in this opening address, is intended to be, simply suggestive of an outline. The subject, no doubt, will be taken up in detail by others, and made, as it deserves to be, of interest to all of us.

If a state of barbarism and of primal savageness be not the only proper, the true state of existence of man; if civilization, with all its accumulating knowledge and its unceasing, imperative demands for progress, be the ordained, organic condition of mankind, then the interchange of sentiments, of thought and of products of toil, between man and man, and nation and nation, must act a part, and a great part too, in that civilization. This interchange, this intermingling must be effected by some one, whose time and whose talents must be devoted to it; for it is impossible that the producer, whose constant attention is required by his vocation, can leave his field, his anvil, or his loom, to carry his products through the world, seeking for a market; he selects then his agent, and receives from him a convenient representative of value, and this agent comes to be the merchant. Such, in short, is the necessity of society and of civilization. I have used the terms, in connection with our profession, of "the interchange of sentiment, of thought, and of products of toil," and of those who may doubt the connection of sentiment and thought with material things, I would ask, if they have either sentiment or thought unconnected with nature or her materials? The character of the mind, and through that our very religion, is influenced by the circumstance around us; soil, climate, food,
clothing, household furniture, our works of art, all have their influences upon the spirit of man. This being so, then he, who modifies these, through them, will act upon the sentiment and thought of man.

The merchant, is he who weaves the many wants of mankind, with their varied products, into one homogeneous web, binding State with State and Continent with Continent by bands of interest, along which pass the electric qualities of love and brotherhood. This is a high vocation, and one that demands high and firm resolves. It is a glorious employment, and needs a broad and strong view of things and men. It calls for no avarice, it has need of no trickery. These are stumbling-blocks, my friends, devil-strewed along our path; we should throw them out of our way or trample upon them; we have fallen too often over them, we have stooped to raise them, we have carried them with us, in many instances, to the grave, and there let us hope that they have not proved dead-weights to carry us down to perdition.

I do not, I would not strive to exalt our pursuit above any other; I cannot if I would; I ask for justice simply. He, who by the labor of his hands, has wrought the iron, has shaped the tree, has sown, nurtured, and reaped the fruits of the earth—who has given to the crudities of nature, in any way, a form and shape of usefulness, he is a benefactor of his fellows, and his employment is, in itself, a noble one; he is in a manner a creator; and as such, deserves to be called, as he really is, the child of our Creator and our common Father. Labor, in any form, in any condition, still preserves its heavenly origin, for the Father of us all is the centre of all labor. He, therefore, who forces from the willing earth the food we eat, he, who transports it to a place of need—whether it be by land or by sea, by hand or by beast, by wagon or by steam—and he, who stores it for a future demand, or ships it to a distant port, have all added an additional and real value to that food; the value of necessary labor. All are equally necessary and honorable, and all should be in harmony. The farmer, the wagoner, the sailor, the merchant, the porter, the weaver, all have enriched and clothed the world, and all are equal in His sight, who, when the laborer has taken off his garments and laid him down to sleep and to rest in the sweet repose of death, will pay to each the fair wages of honest toil that he has earned.
These are truths, my friends, we cannot impress too strongly upon our minds; they are, or ought to be, a part of our religion, and that religion too, which is not lip service, but which should be graven on our hearts and ever present to our minds; they should accompany us to our temples of labor, to our stores and workshops; there they should most be present, for it is there we are to apply them.

No one of the professions, into which society is divided, is more directly interested in the universal application and ultimate effectuation of all great principles, than the mercantile. Because, it is, in itself, dependent upon them for a successful issue. Does trade flourish amid rapine and slaughter? Does it extend and grow surrounded by dishonesty and fraud? Is it increased and benefited by irreligion? Do hatred and ill-will encourage and foster it? No. None of these advance the merchant’s honor or his profit. But on the contrary: peace fills the harvest-field, honesty and confidence unlock capital from mouldering hoards, the religious feeling of mankind explores the desert wilderness, and peoples it with reclaimed savages—who become the producers of our merchandise—good-will and love extend their gentle arms across the waste of waters, to feed the starving of other lands, and the white wings of commerce are spread over all the seas. The advance of Christian doctrines, and the consequent progress of civilization, must inevitably extend and increase all sciences and all arts, and these are the lifesprings of commerce.

There are questions, which are presented to us on each day; there are affairs, however trivial they may appear, which are occurring at nearly every hour of our daily business, having relation to and connection with the broadest principles. It is the sum total of these small affairs, and of the solution of these familiar questions, that make up the characters we are to bear through life; and not only that, but to tinge, perhaps forever, the character of our destiny in that boundless future, which the soul, firm in its own faith, delights to wander in with more of joy, than does the eye into that vast expanse of blue encircling the visible universe. It is in the solution of these questions, in the conducting of these small affairs, that the man of business can show true strength and courage. For, if the temptations be strong, so must be the resolve to withstand them.
Honesty, which is Justice, Hope, which is Faith, Fidelity to our trusts, which is Courage, Love for our fellow man—and this we cannot have without the deepest love for Him who dwelleth chiefly in the hearts of men—which is Christianity, all demand of us to labor for the right. Then, for the sake of our own interests, for the elevation to its true dignity of our profession, for the increase of our own best happiness, for the advancement of that progress in mankind, which, although our energies may retard or advance it, do what we will, must advance, for the sake and cause of all, let us strive to understand and to do well what we have attempted.

Whatever we feel deeply, we should act for strongly. All men, who act firmly, resolutely, and heartily, act from a deep and strong feeling within them, whatever it may be. Even he, who turns all the powers of his life upon money-getting, does so from a strong sense of the need of it, or for some ulterior design. The deep-seated conviction, the idea, however perverted, is the ruling element of our natures, and, therefore, the greater necessity for a true idea. He, who goes to fight upon the battle-field does so from a strong inward motive, and however misdirected may be his energy, it is still his sense of duty, the impelling idea; and this we must change before his energy will take its proper course.

The crusaders of old, who went out, leaving home and kindred, to battle for their religion, in a strange land, a land of pestilence and dangers, were sincere, and, therefore, to be respected; however strange and unaccountable may appear to us their bloody battle-rites for the cause of the religion of peace; however absurd the thought of upholding the cross with the bloody lance and the reeking sword; we yet should view them as they were, embraced, like Laocoön, in the crushing folds of their feudal systems, surrounded by their unenlightened and degraded masses; and judge only of, and respect them for, their motives. By the appeals of the hermit, Peter, to the higher of their dominant feelings, they were urged to do what we now look upon, and properly, as a crime. They acted, as men should always act, from their sense of right. However low their standard, it was the highest they could appeal to. But now, that we have a nobler ideal, a truer knowledge of the cross and its requirements, should there not be a stronger and deeper devotion? Does not a better cause demand a better love?
Do we see and feel the duties of our appointed work as strongly as did those stern men, who perilled all for their religion? Have we not the knowledge, that power is in our hands for good or for evil? Do we not know, that peace, universal peace, and love among mankind, can be aided by our efforts? That much of wrong can be controlled and much of truth be spread through the instrumentality of the labor we have chosen? O, that some Peter the Hermit, who had lived observingly in the deep hearts of men, would rise and lead us on. If so much of enthusiasm could be awakened in the bosoms of those, whose most worshipped cross was that upon their iron-hilted swords, to do what in itself is evil, can we not love with our heart's deepest devotion that cross pure and holy as we see it now? If they could charge unflinchingly upon the savage hordes of armed foes, with the battle-cry of “death to the infidel,” can we not, as bravely, bear our banner of light among its deadliest foes, indolence, doubt, and prejudice, with the ringing cries of “God for the right,” and “life and light for the people”? If we have the temptations of avarice, and slothfulness, and pride, had not they the same? He, who faltered in the fight around their holy city, who fought more for personal renown, than for the honor of their cross, who ransomed captives for his own greed, rather than for the welfare of the crusade, met with the same reward as he should meet, who now stoops from his path to acts of dishonesty and of selfish aggrandizement.

I like not idle abstractions; but working abstract principles are of another sort. If a theory be good, then is it good for practice; or it is good for nothing. The merchant should never be a visionary; and yet what is he, who, while he professes to hold to, or perhaps put forth, certain principles, or laws of action—principles he pronounces true, and to the spread of which he perhaps contributes largely; what is he, I ask, but an utopian, who believes and promulgates ideas, but deems them impracticable. All truths, when you consider their source, must be practical, and it rests with man to make them so. The raw material of truth, like all materials, is given us by God, and we are to weave them into the web of life, if we would have that web bear the inspection of the Overseer, to whom we must render up our work when life's work is closed. It is your real prac-
tical man, who believes what he receives as truth, and believing, strives to bring it into practical uses.

Let me again ask of you to aid us in this effort; do not yourselves the injustice of believing what you really deem impracticable or foolish, but give us the favor of your countenance and assistance. Not simply your attendance, nor a certain sum of money—though we mean both—but whatever time you can spare from your numerous duties, and whatever warm feelings you may give from the many calls upon them made by home, by social life, and by the many other good works in which you may be engaged, and which the age demands.

Address of General Hector Tyndale to the Committee of the Republican Nominating Convention of the City of Philadelphia, June 16, 1868.
Gentlemen of the Committee of the Nominating Convention:

With diffidence, measuring my ability beside the duties of the office, I accept the nomination of the Republican party for the Mayoralty of the city of Philadelphia. Not of my own desire, but by the wishes of my friends, and, as it seems now, by the choice of the Republican voters of our city, I have been placed in nomination for an office of great honor, trust, and responsibility.

It should be our highest civil duty always to recognize the obedience due to the popular will, deliberately expressed, and the self-sacrifice required of the wearer of the proudest title of the world—citizen of the United States. Feeling so, whoever is called to public duties must lay aside all doubts and fears, that he may work wholly for the good of the Republic. Those duties, which, by your action, may become mine, are mainly to enforce and give action to the laws, which the citizens have made or may make. In the performance of those duties, it appears to me, that the great effort of the city’s executive should be to reconcile strict obedience to law with the largest possible liberty of the individual. If elected, I shall honestly and faithfully strive to make such accord, and to execute the laws without fear or favor, and always in the full recognition of the broad, divine truths which underlie all systems and all laws. I shall endeavor
to act for the benefit of the whole community and of all its citizens, in the light of the republican doctrines and through the instrumentality of the republican party, with which I have been long connected, and in the success of which I believe lie the safety and prosperity of the Union. That success, permit me to say, is, I believe, assured; under Grant, with Colfax, we shall reestablish the government of all the States in harmonious action upon the great road of human progress and civilization.

For the great mark of confidence reposed in me by your constituents, I am sincerely thankful, and I can make no better return to them than in my earnest efforts to fulfill whatever duties may devolve upon me. The flattering manner of the nomination is exceedingly gratifying. I should fail were I to attempt to tell you how greatly so.

For your personal allusions to myself, and for this visit, I am obliged to you, and I shall always remember your kindness and consideration.

The following letters explain themselves. They appeared in the public press near the close of the canvass for the Mayoralty in 1868.

PHILADELPHIA, October 5, 1868.

GENERAL HECTOR TYNDALE.

DEAR SIR: Having seen in the "Sunday Mercury," of yesterday, a repetition of the story that you had said, that John Brown was a better man than Jesus Christ, and the authority of Messrs. George W. Childs and Furman Sheppard being, by insinuation, given for the report, we have since then called personally on Messrs. Childs and Sheppard, and have received from both of those gentlemen a prompt, full, and explicit denial that any such declaration was ever made by you in their presence, or that they had ever in any way authorized the use of their names in that connection. Both gentlemen, moreover, did you the justice to say, that they did not believe the story, and considered it an unworthy electioneering trick to injure you.

Yours, truly,

JAMES T. MITCHELL,
430 Walnut Street.

JOHN McLAUGHLIN,
712 Market Street.
Philadelphia, October 5, 1868.

To the Editors of the Evening Bulletin and Other Newspapers.

Sirs: So long as the slanders upon myself, invented by my political enemies, were confined to anonymous or irresponsible sources, I took no notice of them; but now, that the names of two respectable gentlemen have, unknown to themselves, been connected with those slanders, I here brand all the irreligious and vulgar assertions that have been made as attributable to me, as groundless, malicious, and base falsehoods.

Both gentlemen, alluded to above, have been seen by friends, and both have unqualifiedly and wholly denied any knowledge whatever of the assertions, to which their names had been attached by indirection, and both have done me the justice to say that they did not believe such statements made against me, looking upon them as political squibs. I state here, as a final answer to all assertions of the kind, that I am not an atheist—never have been, nor can be. I never compared, or dreamed of comparing, John Brown with the Great Founder of Christianity. I am not a member of any church, but I am not an irreligious man, as my personal friends will attest.

Very respectfully your friend,

Hector Tyndale.

Address of Brevet Major-General Hector Tyndale, at the reunion of the 28th and 147th Regiments Pennsylvania Volunteers, and Knap's Battery, in Philadelphia, November 24th, 1871, in response to the toast "The 28th Regiment."

Comrades of the 28th, I shall speak to you of your own and your dead comrades' deeds. I heartily thank you for the opportunity.

As there were twenty-five three months regiments from Pennsylvania, at the beginning of the war of the Rebellion, so the 28th became the third of the three years regiments raised in this State.

It was organized in Philadelphia, although its members represented very many of the counties of the State. Ario Pardee,
Sr., of Hazleton, aided this organization very greatly. It was mustered into the service of the United States, on the 28th June, 1861, John W. Geary being Colonel.

The War Department gave permission to increase the number of its companies to fifteen, forming three battalions, the first two of which went to the front July 27th, and the third battalion in August of 1861. This made the effective force of the regiment about fifteen hundred and fifty men and officers, the most of whom were accustomed to and were dexterous in the use of fire-arms, many of them being experts. It was at first brigaded under Colonel, afterwards General George H. Thomas, in Banks' division. From Sandy Hook, it moved to Point of Rocks, Maryland, and while at this point the well-known and splendid Knap's Battery was formed from the regiment, with which it was and is identified as of one flesh and one blood.

During the fall and winter of 1861-62 the 28th guarded about twenty-four miles of the Potomac, reaching from Monocacy River to Antietam Creek, including Point of Rocks, Berlin, and Harper's Ferry. Its first action was that of Bolivar Heights, Virginia, near Harper's Ferry, on the 16th of October. It marched to Edward's Ferry after the disaster of Ball's Bluff, to support our troops which were thrown across the Potomac at that point. During all that winter the regiment was somewhat actively engaged in skirmishes along the river, so that when the army under McClellan, in February, 1862, crossed into Virginia at Harper's Ferry (in which operation the 28th was the advance, holding the town and the bridge-head), the regiment had already passed more than six months in the best school of the soldier—active outpost duty.

Under Lieutenant-Colonel, afterwards Colonel De Korponay, and brigaded under Colonel, afterwards General Geary, in Williams' division, the regiment formed the left flank of Banks' army corps, and held, with the first Michigan Cavalry, the counties of Loudon, Fauquier, Warren and others during the spring and part of the summer of 1862, while Banks occupied the valley of Virginia. Here, it did a great deal of exposed and hard work, which showed and trained the manly pride and spirit of its members.
One morning early in that spring, while marching in the falling snow, then of the depth of a foot, the officer* immediately commanding the regiment, observing a pale, delicate boy-member staggering under the weight of his accoutrements, and showing signs of distress, ordered him to report to the surgeon for the ambulance train; whereupon the brave fellow, who had been carefully and tenderly nurtured, said, "Oh, please not, sir; I'm plenty strong enough, and prefer to march with the boys if you'll let me;" this granted, then he asked leave to retain his musket, as "every soldier loved his musket." This boy, Rhodes of Allegheny, brave and true comrade, was afterwards killed at Ringgold, Ga.

Again, on another occasion, at White Plains, when the snow lay mid-leg deep over all the country, the sentinel in front of an officer's* tent, was seen to suffer intensely from exposure and a severe cold. When told to call the corporal of the guard to be relieved because of his illness, he drew himself up, and saluting the officer, said, "Please, no, sir, I've never yet lost a day from duty, and, please God, I never will"—and he never did until he was shot in the front of battle and died upon the field, he and his loved companions had won.

In the sharp and bloody action of Front Royal, in May of that year, Knap's Battery lost heavily in common with Colonel Kenly's Maryland regiment, both behaving nobly in the affair.

When the army of Virginia was formed under General Pope, the 28th was placed in Augur's division and in Geary's brigade, together with the gallant fifth, seventh, twenty-ninth, and sixty-sixth Ohio volunteers, and these regiments remained together, in the same brigade, during the whole war.

Under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Tyndale, the regiment participated in the battle of Cedar Mountain. By the direct and personal orders of General Banks, it took and held an important position, far on the extreme right of the army. For its conduct it received the thanks of General Banks, as it had done on former and did again on after occasions from him and other general officers.

* The officer on both these occasions was Major Tyndale.
During Pope's retreat it showed its previous training and discipline in its close and steady marching, and by its promptness, courage, and steadfastness under the severe and constant pressure, upon our army, of Lee's overwhelming forces. But the 28th was not downcast then. During the gloomiest part of the retreat, the whole command having been nearly three days without food of any kind, an officer,* to whom a biscuit had been given by a friend belonging to a relieving regiment, offered it to a member of ours. Our comrade hungrily put out his hand to take it, and, then, drawing back, he blushed, and said, "No, sir; thank you; but you need it more than I do." Among the thousands now sleeping on the battle fields, no one was more beloved by, or was more true to his peers and companions, whom he knew and trusted so well, than you, dear comrade, brave Harrison White!†

The series of actions and battles after Cedar Mountain was continuous and destructive to our forces; it included Brandy Station, Rappahannock, Freeman's Ford, Warrenton Springs, Bristoe Station, second Bull Run, and Chantilly. At this last action, the gallant Kearny rode along the ranks of the 28th and complimented it as a soldier should for its brave behavior.

Here, by the direct orders of General Pope, the regiment held and afterwards destroyed two bridges over Bull Run, thus adding to the security of the army. By the same direct orders, the regiment was detailed to destroy the immense quartermaster and commissary stores which could not be passed across Kettle Creek bridge, as the enemy had cut the trestle-work.

The 28th, severely and sorely tried, arrived at the Potomac, perhaps the last regiment of our army, and the nearest to the enemy. It then numbered about or less than seven hundred men, many of whom were sick, but who requested to be and were kept on active duty. At the battle of South Mountain, the regiment, under Major, afterwards General Pardee, was in reserve in the brigade‡ commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Tyndale, General Greene's division of General Mansfield's corps.

At the battle of Antietam, with about six hundred and fifty

* This officer was Lieutenant-Colonel Tyndale.
† He was a cousin of General George B. McClellan.
‡ This brigade had about eleven hundred muskets at the battle of Antietam.
muskets, the regiment, in the right wing of our army, entered in front of the cornfield and the Dunkard church—and from both of those well-known positions, and from that entire vicinity the enemy was driven with terrible loss by the brigade, of which the 28th formed more than a full half.

Let me here detail a fragment—*Ex pede Herculem*.

At the instant, and in the face of your deployment, one of the best and finest brigades in our service was in full retreat—routed by the closely following enemy, who were pushing heavily and rapidly down the cornfield. Here, with its ranks somewhat disordered by the retreat of the brigade referred to, the steady 28th threw in such a fire, that it is spoken of to this day by those, yet living, who heard its volume, and also by those who felt its force. For full twenty minutes this pounding was mutual and earnest—then the enemy broke, leaving hundreds more upon the field, which Hooker's forces had already piled with dead. Immediately after this, the regiment and brigade obliquing to the left, drove the enemy from a strong position, which, while somewhat sheltered from the fire from the woods beyond, to a certain extent commanded the cornfield.

From seven in the morning until three in the afternoon, the 28th was in one continuous roar and flame of fire. But its spirit did not abate one jot. After one of its charges, when it had again and again been thanked by the Lieutenant-Colonel, a company "M" man roared out, "I'd rather be a member of the 28th than king of the whole world." Then how you cheered, as if you had not been fighting for hours, and though nearly one-half of your number lay behind you, on the ground you had won. The whole regiment was eager and full of spirit. Towards the middle of the day, the enemy's sharpshooters were annoying our front, from which their line had again been driven. Company "A," Captain Fitzpatrick, was ordered to, and did clear them out quickly, but other companies almost clamored to assist the detail. One member of Company "F," Captain Greenawalt, asked and was granted leave to go out with "Company A." He soon came back with "his man," whom he had "spotted," exchanged shots with, and, after wounding, had captured, much to the satisfaction of our comrade.

While the regiment lay in the hollow field, some distance in front of the church, the enemy tried a sharp *rise*. All at once, from the woods at the top of the cornfield, upon our right, which
they had again and again vainly tried to turn, came a quick, rattling musketry fire, and then a large number of blue coated men, many without arms, came running before a dense and heavy column of the enemy, who followed at their heels. This trick succeeded for a moment, as it stopped our firing for a time, but sharp-eyed Sergeant, afterwards Captain Knight, called out, "Why, they're all greybacks"—and then came a shout of "give 'em hell." Then, followed one of the most destructive fires of the war. Being on a hill-side, every shot told on the enemy's column, and their whole masse melted away like an icicle when thrust against a red-hot stove. In vain did their officers strive to make them advance, they were hopelessly beaten and were thrown back to the woods, from which they were shortly afterwards compelled to retreat.

Here, let me relate a terrible incident of that battle to remind you, if it could be forgotten, how brave were the men against you, who gave up the ground that day, foot by foot. About one o'clock, the brigade was again in the charge, moving immediately on the church and the woods behind it; its wings were slightly advanced according to the formation of the ground. The enemy had fallen back from the wings, but in their centre, in a hollow, just in front of the church, stood a brave regiment, which, when our centre, then held by the 28th, advanced over a slight elevation, delivered a point blank and heavy fire upon it. A momentary pause* and our whole brigade belched forth a concentric and simultaneous fire, which in the twinkling of an eye swept that devoted regiment from the earth. The enemy lay in long, straight lines—the heads of the front in the laps of the rear rank. They were splendid and true soldiers. Upon that field, a few years ago, nailed to a tree, was a board inscribed, "Here lie the bodies of two hundred and forty of the —— North Carolina regiment killed upon this spot."†

* At this moment the colors of the 28th regiment were taken by Lieutenant-Colonel Tyndale.
† This relation of the board and the numbers, were given to the speaker by Mr. Miller of Antietam, upon whose grounds this event occurred. The regiment is believed to have been the 8th North Carolina. The board, it was said, had been nailed to the tree by some of Lee's army of invasion, in 1863. Mr. Miller told General Tyndale that the number was three hundred and forty, but he reduced it, as perhaps, nearer the truth.
Three times upon the right of your regiment and brigade, and as often on your left, did the enemy push hard-fighting, with heavy masses, and each time they were repulsed. In one of these attacks upon your left battalion—at the time under Major Raphael, who was just then supporting Knap's battery, which all day gave and received very hard blows—the enemy rushed almost to the guns. Here occurred hand to hand encounters, which showed that your personal courage was equal to your high qualities, as disciplined and reliable soldiers. In one of these encounters Lieutenant, afterwards Major Borbridge, cut the regimental colors from the hands of a South Carolina sergeant, who fought most bravely, and who stubbornly held his flag after he had been cut down.

After each of these repulses the wings advanced, while your centre fought its way foot by foot to the front, taking position after position, until about two o'clock, when you stood far beyond the church, and facing the last hill between you and the Potomac, behind which hill lay the fighting yet beaten enemy, who were of Stonewall Jackson's forces. You will remember, that at this time, the enemy's left had been weakened by the withdrawal of forces to their right, to meet Burnside's attack. While facing this last position, it was determined to attempt the hill in front, and your commanding officer* called for a hundred volunteers of the 28th to lead the advance against it—a forlorn hope almost. What response did you make to this, comrades? Every man stepped forward, as cheerfully, as if going on parade—the light of battle still brightly burning in each face after many hours of fighting, and when nearly all of you had fired more than one hundred and fifty rounds apiece. But that charge was not to be: some troops of another brigade, which had been brought up and posted upon our right and rear, gave way, and let in upon us heavy columns of the enemy, causing our brigade to fall rapidly to the left.

The loss of the 28th regiment, on that day, was about two hundred and fifty killed and wounded—missing none; but the blows struck upon the enemy in front were terrific, and their losses in killed and wounded were fearful—far exceeding those of your

* Lieutenant-Colonel Tyndale.
entire brigade, and estimated by many, and, probably correctly, too, at more than the numbers of your brigade when it first entered the fight. The fighting on the part of the 28th, as of the whole brigade indeed, was magnificent—charging, repulsing, sometimes lying on the ground, always self-contained, always aggressive, and always advancing, until about three o'clock, when your right was turned by vastly superior numbers, and, then, receiving the fires of the enemy from the front, right and rear, you made your way to the left, and there held them at bay, until with our batteries in the rear, your collected fire and their own exhaustion forced the beaten enemy to retire from before the thinned ranks of that noble brigade. But even here, you acted like true soldiers. While in full retreat and almost surrounded, our comrade Lieutenant Borbridge seeing his superior officer* fall dead, as he supposed, he stopped, turned in the face of a heavy fire, and with the aid of a sergeant, whose name is unknown,† dragged the body to a shelter, from behind which, comrades, your accurate, firm, and persistent firing soon checked the advancing foe, who, at last, though but for a short time, had seen your backs.

Your brigade, upon that day captured seven battle-flags, some say nine, of which the 28th took five or six; drove or destroyed the regiments which had carried them, and captured one battery and silenced another.‡ It gives me great pleasure to say, that not only were you thanked personally several times during that day, but that your immediate commander, Major Pardee, was warmly complimented on the field for his and your conduct.

From his foot, know Hercules—from this sketch of one action, judge ye of the whole career of “the steady 28th.”

Following the enemy into Virginia, the regiment, in its old command, was stationed all the next winter, 1862–63, at Dumfries, and here aided in the repulse of Stuart’s Cavalry, which attacked that point. While lying here, the third battalion of five companies (namely, L, M, N, O, and P,) was detached from the 28th, and, with three other Pennsylvania companies, was

* Lieutenant-Colonel Tyndale.
† Supposed to have been afterwards killed.
‡ It is proper to say that many men of Union regiments and brigades, which were broken up in the progress of the battle, gallantly joined you during the day, and somewhat compensated for your losses.
formed into the 147th Pennsylvania regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel, afterwards General Pardee. But these two noble regiments should not be spoken of separately, as they were and are one in every feeling, as they were in every action.

The 12th corps having been formed, the division and the brigade, of which last the 28th and 147th remained a large part, were also placed in it.

At Chancellorsville, the regiment again suffered heavily, and did noble and signal service. Its loss in that battle was over one hundred, out of three hundred and seven men engaged. The works thrown up by the 28th on the field were marvels of rapidity of execution, and of ingenuity. The tenacity and holding-power of the regiment were here again demonstrated.

Present at Gettysburg, the 28th did not lose heavily but it was hard worked, and, with the most of Slocum's corps, was moved from our right to the support of the left, which was so terribly pushed on the afternoon of the second day of that battle, and those most worthy and gallant companions of the regiment, the brigade of General Greene, inflicted very heavy loss upon the enemy in front of their works, on Culp's Hill. These works were in part constructed and defended by the 28th, and the enemy's loss in front of them was immense.

With the old fighting army of the Potomac, under Meade, it moved in pursuit of Lee after Gettysburg.

After the Union defeat at Chickamauga, with its own and the 11th corps, both under Hooker, the 28th was moved out to Alabama under command of Capt. Flynn. While at Bridgeport, holding that point, occurred the action of Wauhatchie, Tennessee, one of the most important and interesting, in its results, of all the minor battles of the war. Fought at midnight of the 28th of October, 1863, in an unknown country, against heavy odds, that action reflected glory not only upon the brigade which was engaged in it, but upon its comrades and compeers, with whom it had so often and so long marched and fought side by side. Glory not only to Greene's brigade and to our Knap's magnificent battery—General Geary in command—but to the whole 12th corps and to the brave, patient and true soldiers of the 11th, Howard's Corps—some of whose brigades carried the hills, at the point of the bayonet, on which were posted the enemy's
reserves, and thus caused or aided in causing all their forces to fall back. The 28th had no cowards among its companion regiments.

Following this, in a few weeks, came the five days’ battles around Chattanooga. On this day, November the 24th, eight years ago, the 28th, in its old brigade and division, moved upon Lookout Mountain, as part of the general plan of Grant at Chattanooga. As explained to the speaker by General Hooker, it was a beautiful movement well carried out. The mere ascent of Lookout Mountain, through the wild forest, over immense rocks and fallen trees, was of itself a toilsome feat, and the “28th” and their companions should be proud of the brilliancy and beauty of that action. You did not lose many on that day, so well timed was the movement of General Osterhaus on the other flank of the mountain, but the hard work performed and the rapidity of its execution made it tell heavily on the whole command.

The 28th was afterwards actively engaged around Chattanooga, and following the enemy down into Georgia, losing sharply at Ringgold.

One of the noble fellows wounded at this battle lay dying in the hospital at Chattanooga, and, when spoken to by an old comrade, said strongly and with cheer, “Never fear, sir, I’ll be back again with the boys of our old regiment!” And he is with very many of them to-day—with our loved and lost comrades.

Returning to Wauhatchie, the 28th reënlisted for three years from December, 1863, under Colonel Thomas J. Ahl.

In the spring of 1864, in the army of that great and good commander, General Thomas, the regiment, under Colonel, afterwards General John Flynn, moved, in the grand army of Sherman, through Georgia to the sea. All the way down—before and at Atlanta, Rocky-faced Ridge, Resaca, Kennesaw, Mill Creek, Dallas, Snake Gap, and elsewhere—there was one continuous advance and fight. At Peach Tree Creek, the regiment lost severely, but inflicted heavy blows upon the enemy. What those hundred days cost that army, none but soldiers can know. What the soldiers suffered, no one can tell—their heroism is known, in its fulness, only in heaven. But they marched and suffered and fought and went on clear down to the end—yea through the bitter end out into the full light of their gloriously saved Union.
You marched on through Milledgeville to Savannah, where the "28th" was among the troops which garrisoned that city. Through the Carolinas to Raleigh, to Richmond, and to Washington! Then, what you felt no one but a soldier can feel. The divine hands of appreciating sympathy were laid upon the soldiers and they were blessed.

The 28th, the 147th and Knap's battery, "three joined in one," were mustered out of service in June, 1865.

Upon the rolls of the 28th, from first to last, there were twenty-eight hundred and thirty-four men and officers. The number of its killed and severely wounded in action, so far as the speaker can learn, was about five hundred, not including those of the 147th. How many died of disease in the service and of disease and wounds after their discharge can never be known.* It fought in eight States of the Union, in twenty-four battles and engagements, and in nineteen skirmishes. From it were made two regiments; one battery of six guns (Knap's); two Brevet Major-Generals with the full rank of Brigadier-Generals; two Brevet Brigadier-Generals; six Colonels; two Brevet Colonels; four Lieutenant-Colonels; three Brevet Lieutenant-Colonels; six Majors; three Brevet Majors—add to these whole scores of brave and deserving line officers, and all these and more were made by you—more, for you made nearly three thousand excellent soldiers, and—better yet, for, less the number of your dead, you have made that many intelligent, self-respecting, and honored citizens.

The great war was ended, and our living heroes came home. On the ninetieth anniversary of American Independence, on the 4th of July, 1866, our dear old State gathered into her arms all the battle-flags of her sons, and hung them upon the peaceful walls of her Capitol—among them were those of the 28th and 147th Pennsylvania regiments, and of Knap's battery, which were as radiant with glory as the best—and no man can say more than this.

Oh, country, saved by heroes! cherish your living soldiers, and mourn, never forgetting, the brave who died to save you.

* Many of the statistics here given were furnished by Colonel John P. Nicholson, a diligent investigator of the history of the "28th."
Letter of General Hector Tyndale to the Committee of Arrangements, at Frankford, near Philadelphia, to decorate soldiers' graves on Decoration Day, 1872.

He had been invited by the Committee to deliver an oration, but was compelled to decline. In reply he wrote the following letter:—

Philadelphia, May 20, 1872.

Edwin A. Ashmead, Esq., Chairman Committee of Arrangements for Decoration of Graves, etc.

My Dear Sir: I have the pleasure to acknowledge your kind note of the 18th inst., and to thank you for the compliment it conveys. I sincerely regret that engagements will deprive me of the honor of being present at Frankford on the 30th inst., at the decoration of the graves of our soldiers and sailors who fell in the war of the Rebellion. Otherwise, it would have been to me a sad memory-laden pleasure to have spoken, even my poor word, for our noble dead. My own heart will be as dust, my own body as lifeless as theirs, before I can forget the augmenting debt due to those, over whose remains you will strew commemorative chaplets. The memories of their deeds will throb through the future, in the great hearts of patriots and heroes, and history will do them justice.

You, too, companions of the mighty dead, whom future generations will revere, when, in a few years, all shall be joined together again, then, in the loving memories of heroic youth, kindling their souls to action, you, also, will be associated with those you mourn to-day, as worthy and steadfast comrades in that grand epoch, which history will call the first war for humanity, guided by practical and Divine love of mankind.

With sentiments of personal esteem, I have the honor to be,

Very truly and gratefully, yours,

Hector Tyndale.

Mr. David Clark proposed the health of the 28th and 147th Regiments, and Knap's Battery. Responded to by General Hector Tyndale, as follows:—

Comrades and Dear Friends: I am profoundly grateful that the thread of my life is again visibly interwoven with yours—even for one short evening. On this evening, let us pledge again our lives and fortunes to the service of the great country, whose broad hospitality is freely given to all the world. Let it be a continual source of pride, that America is in accord with the large movements of the world; that not one land on the face of the earth can feel it is poorer or weaker by any act of our Union—whose drum-beats we followed through our States until our hearts beat in unison with them. Crowded memories of hours, days, months, and years throng within me. If the mountaineer loves his mountains, associating them with the dangers and perils of his life, which he has gloriously overcome, how much more should we love those memories, which cluster around the many tall and rugged peaks of duty, those of self-sacrifice, of hunger, of thirst, of pains, of marches, of battles, and of sundered and riven hearts and homes? Yea, God keep our memories green, and our hearts tender to these.

It is proper that you, my comrades—you without public recognition, title, rank, or fame; you, who have only the love of your comrades, your own self-respect, and the just pride of your households to bear you up—it is proper that you should speak to-night.

I shall say little, and that only from my emotions, which are always keenly aroused when before your loyal hearts and faces. This is our second Reunion. But one year has elapsed since we met last, and yet how many of our members have passed beyond the sound of recall to earth and its duties? Each of us can remember some one or more, who have thus passed out of sight and sound—comrades no more, except in memory and hope. One of these, a great soldier tried and true, a gentleman beyond reproach, who one year ago sat with us at the very head of our
social board, has moved on out of sight or signal, but not beyond faith, in the grand march of eternal life. The memories of Meade, and of the thousands more of our beloved comrades—all manly and self-sacrificing as their noble leader—shall not pass away from us.

Brothers, let us always recall the past—not in repulsion or in hatred, not to perpetuate antagonisms between fellow-countrymen of one race, and speech, and stock—but in warm gratitude to the All-Upholder, to the unthinkably loving Father of us all. Gratitude that we have known and been companions of those, who, in the throes of national affliction, sped from the warm and tender embraces of their homes to bear all the burdens of civil war. Those, who yielded every promise and hope of life to enter into privations and exactions, almost without a parallel; who sunk, almost beyond recovery and without a murmur, their own burning individualities in the great seas of humanity, which composed our armies. Those, who bore all the fitful tempers of man and nature, and who, voiceless to or unheard of in history, made to their country and mankind the supreme gift of their young and iris-tinted lives. Comrades, let us never forget them!

Address of General Hector Tyndale in response to the toast "Antietam," at the Reunion of the 28th and 147th Regiments and Knap's Battery of Pennsylvania Volunteers at Belmont, Fairmount Park, Philadelphia, September 17, 1873.

Antietam! Among the great battles of our civil war, like Gettysburg and Chattanooga (in all of which, my comrades, you bore a brave part), it ended a campaign and rounded off, in gory volume, most bloody seasons.

To the nation, Antietam has a broad significance. It means the first great battle of the war, wherein the Government demonstrated its power of self-defence. It means the turning-point, whereat began the ebb of the theretofore haughty swelling tide of dread disruption. Among the first, it was among the grandest of our battles, and gave to the people high heart and courage that not even the after-pangs of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville could bate. To those who have studied the two fields,
there is considerable resemblance between the two great battles fought on northern soil—Antietam and Gettysburg. A resemblance not only in result, but something in the physical features of the country and in the reversed contours of lines of battle. For, while at Gettysburg you bore the fierce assaults of attacking columns, at Antietam you were hot assailants—and never were brave men met more bravely on either side.

Americans of every section may point with the pride of courage to Antietam, as to a field whereon was solved the problem of equal numbers and equal courage given in the fight, how much would weigh the persistent pressure of common sense and a firm faith in the traditions and continuance of the Republic. To the “28th,” Antietam brings back hundreds of cherished memories, enshrined in the battle-flags, and entombed amid the roar of the batteries of hostile cannon our regiment captured on that field. While to me that bloody tournament brings the memories, as it were, of my children slain, it also means that it was the last day, on which I was personally to lead my tried and true and loved companions of the “28th”—the dear old “28th,” and that your actions at Antietam made one more General of Brigade.

What a memory it is, and to what other memories linked! The clouds of years roll off, and the sun-burst of eighteen sixty-one floods recollection to the brim. In that time, when “dogged War bristled his angry crest,” and “piercing the night’s dull ear,” bayed the peace-full moon to a blood-red sunrise, how in that early hour of the years of storms you flocked, as knights in battle for the holy tomb, to save the imperilled country. No need of pay, no thought of bounty led you to the mustering of souls, but willingly, trustfully, holly you gathered under “the bloody sign of battle then hung out.” Without fee and without price, you marched to the front, and thence onward to the end. What memories come to sadden me, my comrades, from the long, full, toilsome days of the first year of strife! Comradeship has a deep keel, and like a proud vessel ploughing through the seas, stirs deep the elements it sails on. To me nothing was sadder than our parting, as it seemed forever, after that bloody day of Antietam. As fresh to me as of yesterday is it, when, your then Division Commander, the noble Greene, thanked your wounded
senior officer, thinking they would never meet again on tented field; yea, fresh, as of to-day, is the spontaneous reply of grateful pride, "Sir, a soldier, who cannot command a brigade like that is either a fool or coward; and so, General, please thank the brigade for both of us." And you and your comrades were then more than half of that war-worn brigade.

Yes, at Antietam, as before many other high seats of judgment, you sealed "the purple testament of bleeding War," wherein you devised all unto your mother country. Pardon me for mouthing the words of Shakespear's Fifth Henry, which aptly rush in here:—

"He that outlives this day and comes safe home
Will stand a-tiptoe when this day is named.
He that shall live this day, and see old age,
Will yearly on the vigil feast his friends;
Then will he strip his sleeve and show his scars.
Old men forget, yet all shall be forgot
But he'll remember, with advantages,
What feats he did that day."

Well worthy were you of brave Harry's praise, when, as soldiers in the hot rush of battle, you left

"The hermit pity with your mothers,
And when you had your armours buckled on,
The venomed vengeance rode upon your swords."

But, thanks to God, by whose ordered laws all this has passed away, "the word of peace is rendered," and the white-winged angel sings to quiet harvesters over all our land, and the sails of commerce float over all the seas.

Now that "our stern alarums are changed to merry-meetings," and time has "tamed the savage spirit of wild war," which lies "gently at the foot of peace," we have learned that,

"Peace is of the nature of a conqueror,
For thus both parties nobly are subdued
And neither party loser."

You have fought a good fight, and the nation owes you much. If its possessions were divided by the rule of salvage, then were you all rich and honored. More remains behind—other Antietams to be fought on far different fields. The most of you are
yet young, and life spreads out before you in great breadths of unknown seas. What storms fate and time may cast upon your sails lie yet within the gathering clouds. Your past, in large part, guarantees your future. Your armor, firmly buckled on in youth, shows bright and strong, but through the smallest joints may enter the poisoned darts of keen temptation. But fight on, even as you have fought—only for the Right. Guard all the accidents of life, as you well knew how to guard your outposts in the days gone by. Remember that you sought not war, its privations and its battles, for honor, or fame, or riches. That you stood only for the True, shoulder to shoulder, by the side of those, whose souls have gone before us, and whose ashes to-night give life and food to the growing green grass above them. Here then, beside and among their memories, and in the manly hope of greeting them again, let me say in their memory and for our hopes, that,

Who seeketh honors only
Shall have the vulgar fame
With men of narrow bound;
But, though poor and lonely,
Who maketh truth his aim
By Honor's self is crowned.

Speech of General Hector Tyndale at the reunion of the 28th and 147th Regiments and Knap's Battery of Pennsylvania Volunteers at Pittsburg, Pa., September 17, 1874.

"The Rank and File of the Army," responded to as follows by General Hector Tyndale: To the toast of "The Rank and File," I add "of the Volunteers and of the Regular Army." I do so advisedly, because I have thought of late, that there was a growing tendency to lessen the services of the volunteer for the supposed benefit of the regular element of the army. The great names of Sedgwick, of McPherson, of Thomas, of Meade, and of their soldiers of all ranks, should not be blotted and grimmed with exaggeration for self-glorifications of class; nor should the services of the many living soldiers, who commanded our armies, be placed in antagonism to the volunteers, either to their officers,
or to the rank and file, who, together, made the great war of the rebellion a war of the people in behalf of the rights of the people—the rank and file. This toast, like the rod of Aaron, swallows all the others. Who speaks of the rank and file must speak with thoughtful respect, and with some knowledge of the accelerating development of the masses of mankind.

The war of the rebellion, waged neither for conquest, or dynasty, or hierarchy, was the first great war of mankind for humanity. Besides that of burning patriotism, there were other and even deeper human impulses driving us on to that war. Waged, as it was, against a brother people, and seemingly in favor of an alien and despised race, its more direct and governing impulses were indignation against wrong, and the inherent love for right. Those impulses, prompted by love of moral truth, recognized its claims as being above and commanding the kinship of blood. The occasion was the application in the loftiest sense of the grand injunction, to give up all and follow the divinest manifestations of truth. For I hold, that the divinest or highest manifestation of truth within our knowledge, is that, which gives most to the full development of man, through law, to love. Nearly all the races of mankind were mingled in that great war, and each race was exalted by the high emotions coming with a new-born truth—the unity of human rights—a truth conceived in history long past, and born among the woes and travail of battles. The human tides, in widening currents, had for generations swept upon the American shores the drifting enterprise of all the world. So, when all-grasping wrong, backed by old authority, denied the commonest rights of men, all those sea-drifted, American-rooted masses, hardly yet formed into national organization, rose indignant at the foe, and went straight to meet him, carrying on their banners the device of "Liberty, with the liberty of thought and co-action." An universal and simultaneous cry arose against slavery, as the nearest idol of past worship, and the world-gathered races, well-ordered iconoclasts, ranged themselves under our flag, as the rank and file of the grand American army.
A Map, covering four miles by two and a half miles, scale of four miles to the inch. Made from memory, and indicating only the part taken in the battle of Wauhatchie by Tyndale's brigade of Schurz' Division 11th Corps.

The map of the battle-field of Chattanooga made by the War Department, and published in 1875, omits any, save the merest, mention of the 11th Corps, and with one exception—Buschbeck's—it names no subordinate command of that corps. Whereas, the action of that corps, principally, or certainly as much as any, contributed to the victory of Chattanooga. It is a singular omission, and one not creditable to the makers of the map. The troops of that corps, for instance, seized and held the positions in Lookout Valley under Hooker; on the night of the 28th-29th October, 1863, it saved Geary's command from destruction by the enemy, and seized, held, and fortified the hills in that valley; taking such positions as gave a road of supply to the army at Chattanooga, all of which enabled or allowed the battle of Chattanooga to be fought with success. In that battle, too, the 11th Corps participated, on the extreme left wing, closing around the enemy's right. Their work and privations, continuing for several weeks previous to that battle; their good conduct in the series of actions lasting for four or five days, followed up, as it was, by one of the hardest infantry campaigns of the war; the march to the relief of Knoxville, under Sherman, and their subsequent and continuous work, certainly entitle the troops of the 11th Corps to as honorable a mention as that of any other corps participating in that campaign.

On the map in question is represented, among others built by the 11th Corps, a long line of strong and enduring earthworks a mile in length, which were thrown up by my brigade, but there is no mention of the names of the command or the corps. This lack of proper information and discrimination is also shown by the manner in which large drafts of credit are drawn by commands or officers of the western troops, as e.g. the successful carrying out of the march of Hooker's command, is more largely or altogether attributed to officers attached to the western armies, whereas, the movement and accompanying action, the danger, work, and privation were undergone chiefly by the 11th and by a part of the 12th Corps. I protest against this unjust—whether unconscious, still unjust—neglect of honorable and worthy soldiers.
INDEX TO MAP.

A. Foot of Lookout Mountain, from which the enemy's batteries subsequently were playing.
B. Lookout Creek.
C. Direction of Chattanooga, distance about three miles from that point.
D. Direction of Bridgeport, Ala., distance twenty-two miles from that point.
E. Open fields and country, through which the supporting columns of Eleventh Corps moved to the front.
F. To Brown's Ferry, distance about two miles.
1. Position of bivouac of Tyndale's Brigade.
2. Position of bivouac of other troops of Eleventh Corps.
4. General Howard's headquarters. Near by were General Schurz's headquarters.
5. Common road, Bridgeport to Chattanooga.
6. Railroad, Bridgeport to Chattanooga, etc.
7. Branch road leading over northeast base of Lookout Mountain.
8. Wauhatchie R. R. Station.
9. Geary's line of defence.
10. Enemy's line of attack on Geary.
11. Tyndale's line of march to relief of Geary.
12. The point of deflection of Tyndale's Brigade from the road, made in order to move more directly toward the firing.
13. Position of Tyndale's Brigade when temporarily stopped by a muddy branch or slough, and when fire was opened on him from "Tyndale Hill, No. 1," which betrayed the enemy's reserves, and his lines for interception of relief.
14. Tyndale's advance on "Tyndale Hill, No. 1."
15. Col. Orland Smith's advance on "Smith's Hill."
16. "Tyndale Hill, No. 1."
17. "Tyndale Hill, No. 2."
18. "Smith's Hill." Carried very gallantly.
19. Muddy branch or slough running through fields.
20. Lines of enemy's retreat, covered by dark woods and unknown to us.
22. Headquarters of General Tyndale after the battle, until the beginning of the series of battles around Chattanooga, on Nov. 22d, when he moved with Eleventh Corps to Chattanooga.

The distance from No. 1 to No. 9 was about two and one-half miles. The range of isolated hills in Lookout Valley were steep and stony, difficult to climb. The adjacent lands are flat and heavy. Lookout Valley lies between Lookout and Raccoon Mountains—the former about 1800 feet high. "Tyndale Hills" and "Smith's Hill" are about 100 to 150 feet high, and abrupt, from one-third to one-half a mile long and one-fourth to one-half a mile wide at bases; all three covered with woods.