JEFFERSON DAVIS.

[The following article is written by General Thomas Jordan, chief of staff to General Beauregard from June, 1861, to May, 1864, and subsequently on Beauregard's staff at the close of the war. Without indulging all the opinions of the writer, we present it as giving the views of one who, from his position, had the most ample means of forming a correct judgment as to the character and abilities of the Chief of the late Confederacy.—Ed. Harper's Magazine.]

ALL that can throw light upon the hitherto hidden causes of events, uncover somewhat the ruling motives, or give a correct measure of the character, capacities, and purposes of Confederate leaders, will of course be eagerly sought after by the historian who shall fully write the story of our time. Moreover, any thing tending to those ends must have present interest, especially that which may aid in forming a just conception of the chief personage to whom the Southern people intrusted the conduct of their ill-fated movement. Believing that I have possession of historical matter that may serve these purposes—that will indeed explain, in some measure, much that otherwise may appear inexplicable in the course of events, I am induced at this early day to venture upon a sketch of Jefferson Davis, at the risk of saying much that, just now, may not be acceptable to many—much that may wear the seeming of personal feelings.

Jefferson Davis received a military education. He was graduated at West Point in 1828, and, entering the army, served as a subaltern in the First Regiment of Infantry until March, 1833, when, on the formation of the First Regiment of Dragoons, he was transferred to it, and became Adjutant. In 1835 he resigned his commission, became a planter, and subsequently a politician in Mississippi, making his first appearance on the stage of Federal politics in 1845, as a member of the House of Representatives. At the outbreak of the war with Mexico, May, 1846, Mr. Davis promptly resigned his seat in Congress, went to Mississippi, and raised a regiment of volunteer riflemen, which, under his command, won signal distinction at Monterrey and Buena Vista. In 1847 he was tendered by President Polk the grade of Brigadier-General of Volunteers, which he declined. He then entered political life as a Senator in Congress, in which high post he remained until his State withdrew from the Union in 1861, except during the period he was called to the Cabinet of Mr. Pierce, as Secretary of War—that is, from March 4, 1853, to March 3, 1857.

As Senator Mr. Davis unquestionably acquired a commanding influence, and was regarded with marked respect. His speeches, always carefully prepared, breathed an air of conviction, and were gracefully and effectively spoken. He signified himself particularly as the watchful, effective friend of the Military Academy and of the Coast Survey, doing much to avert injurious legislation, as well as to add materially to the value of these two public establishments, which have rendered such conspicuous services to the United States in the course of the war just ended. As Secretary of War the influence of Mr. Davis was overruling in all matters connected in any way with his Department, and his strong will was constantly felt in the councils of a Cabinet of which Mr. Marcy was the Premier.

It was Mr. Davis who sent to the Crimea a commission of three officers—one of whom was General M'Clellan, then a Captain of Cavalry, and another the present chief of the United States Military Engineer Corps—to study and report upon the state of the science of war and the condition of European armies. By the efforts of Mr. Davis likewise, four regiments were added to the regular army, two of which were cavalry, particularly valuable to the United States in the last four years. On the whole, it may be said that his administration of the War Office was received by the army and the people as able and successful, though indeed there were some who found in it strong traces of passion—decided traits of character, which gave cause for grave apprehension that he was unsuited for the place of Chief Magistrate of the new Confederation to a degree that must imperil success even with much larger resources than the Southern States could command.

One example of these perilous qualities may be seen in the course of Mr. Davis relative to staff organization. The United States staff system then as now was substantially that of the French army. It had worked with notable efficiency during the Mexican war, while the French staff had just gone through the Russian war with confirmed superiority over that of the British army. But Jefferson Davis had encountered in the American staff officers permanently attached who proved personally objectionable, and, on the other hand, officers of the line whom he wished to provide with staff positions not within his disposal. Only a radical change of organization would enable him to gratify his wishes. With these motives to animate and color his views, ignoring American and yet more recent European experience, with spurious arguments and dogmatic assertion, he sought to induce Congress to throw aside the permanent staff organization for one of details on staff duty, such as existed in the British service and had given such signal dissatisfaction there, showing that for the gratification of personal aims, prejudices, or a spirit of nepotism he was capable of subverting the organization of a vital branch of the army, which was approved by the experience of the military world.

It is the habit both here and abroad to speak of Mr. Davis as the very incarnation of the ideas, aims, and inspirations which led the Southern people into the course of disunion. On all sides we see ascribed to him the prominence—if not the
crime—of the arch-plotters who deeply contrived and resolutely inaugurated the revolution. So prevalent is this notion that we fully appreciate how difficult it will be to sketch him as one of the leaders of the Confederate States, in his true proportions, upon the historical canvas. Nevertheless the facts revealed by a mere glance at his political antecedents during the eight years preceding secession mark him not as the champion of revolution, not as a fanatical sectional chief by any means, but as one who, keenly alive to the value of great national establishments, sought to foster them; as one, too, whose ambition evidently looked up to a larger sphere than that which should embrace a section rather than the whole Union. This was conspiratorially the inspiration of his speech delivered in Maine, when there in pursuit of health, during the administration of Buchanan. Hence, too, after the election of Mr. Lincoln, and certain occurrences in South Carolina clearly portended her ultimate course, on the arrival of Mr. Davis in Washington in December, 1860, he was taken to Mr. Buchanan, and gave assurances that he would counsel moderation on the part of his section, and the exhaustion of all measures for accommodation, at least until after the 4th of March, 1861.

It will be seen, too, that his course in open Senate accorded with this agreement. His set oration of the 21st January, 1861, was a well-digested, careful statement of the alleged causes or grievances which had driven the slave-labor States into the path which they considered they must surely take in the event of the triumph of aggressive sectionalism by the election of Mr. Lincoln; nevertheless it was conceived in a temperate spirit. Several of the Senators of his section had already spoken. Mr. Pugh of Ohio, also had previously addressed the Senate in somewhat similar terms, with a lofty and fervid eloquence that no one who heard him can forget. The fact is, the people of the cotton States had gone far ahead of those of their leaders who had been so long their representatives at Washington as to be possessed with strong personal attachments for the life and associations there of national politicians, which they abdicated with extreme reluctance. The constituency of these gentlemen, ahead of their representatives, had been brought with remarkable unanimity to look upon a dissolution of the Union as their only means of relief from a state of political inequality, which they believed was fraught with the political, social, and industrial subordination of the Southern to the Northern States. Mr. Davis, with higher, better-founded hopes for Federal preferment than any other Southern statesman, naturally was more reluctant to enter upon a movement that made that preferment impossible. His course, both as Secretary of War and Senator, we affirm, must acquit him of any tendency to extreme sectional sentiments, which made compromise under the Union impossible—disunion inevitable.

So little, in fact, did the Provisional Congress regard him in the light of the peculiar leader or exponent of the movement, that he was elected Provisional President of the new Confederacy by a bare majority, not because of any recognized political leadership, but on account of his military education, experience, and reputation, and for his acquaintance with military administration, for which it was supposed he had special aptitudes; qualities and training which were thought to be especially desirable at that juncture, in their Chief Executive.

Unable, however, to comprehend the proportions of the struggle impending, or to realize that downright war for coercing the seceded States back into the Federal Union would be the result, Mr. Davis from the outset failed to avail himself of the resources of the cotton States to provide arms and munitions of war in the least degree adequate to the exigency. A just measure of his ideas of the state of affairs and of possible contingencies is to be found in the first orders sent to Europe for arms, which were for but ten thousand Enfield rifles. Ten thousand rifles with which to meet the shock of arms with a Power of such energies and resources as were wielded by his adversary! One in his place, of more civil experience, might be partially excused for such a mistaken policy; but an educated soldier, with views enlarged by connection with the functions of Senator and War Minister, surely must be held to the severest accountability for such a fatal misconception of the situation.* At that time the Southern people were anxious that their Government should take their cotton and tobacco. There was a very large amount of foreign exchange also in possession of the banks, which I know was offered at favorable rates. There would have been little difficulty in exporting the cotton and tobacco, and quite as little in importing arms and supplies into Southern ports at that early stage of the blockade, as was shown by the ease with which the commercial operations of John Frazer and Co. (including their large voluntary importation of small-arms, artillery, and powder) were carried on, not to speak of the large commercial marine successfully engaged in running the blockade in 1863 and 1864.

The Provisional Congress made their legislation square implicitly with the wishes and views of Mr. Davis touching military matters, found reflected here and there in his Reports as Federal Secretary of War or otherwise. Hence if provisions were not made by that body for an army organization and state of military preparation commensurate with the emergency, and such as a wise experienced statesman of military education and knowledge would devise, Mr. Davis is rightly responsible. Yet that legislation gives no traces of a proper conception of the measures which were really called for in a conflict with such an adversary as the Southern people had profoundly affronted and defied.

* Mr. Toombs. then Secretary of State, claims that it was first proposed to send for 8000 rifles, and that only at his earnest suggestion the number was increased to 10,000.
Mr. Davis had been at West Point, and subsequently served for several years in the dragoons at a frontier post with a subaltern officer to whom it happened he became attached. About the time the former resigned his commission to turn planter in Mississippi, the latter was disabled by an accident, quit his border post likewise, went to his home, studied medicine, and turned parish doctor. Mr. Davis became in time a politician, Lieutenant Northrop a Catholic convert, but so eccentric and full of mental crotchet as to be generally regarded in Charleston as of unsound intellect, and unfit for the management of his own small affairs. He had not served long enough in the army, nor been thrown in connection with considerable operations, to acquire familiarity with military administration; neither had his retired habits of life, his cast of thought, or avocations in Charleston, brought him in relation with men engaged in large commercial affairs, or turned his mind to the study of such subjects, and in that way attained to that breadth of view and knowledge of general business details and of men which may make up for the want of professional bureau experience after a separation of twenty-five years from army life. This man, with whom Mr. Davis had no personal association since they were cavalry lieutenants together on the Indian frontier, he did not hesitate to make his chief of subsistence, nor scruple to intrust with the organization and administration of a bureau upon which the very existence of the Confederate armies must depend, and for the labors of which it is apparent the soundest practical order of intellect was essential. One member of Mr. Davis's Cabinet* at least knew the local repute of Dr. Northrop; and we assert that had the inquiry been made in Charleston, his pre-eminent unfitness would have been universally certified. As might be anticipated, his administration at once took all the characteristics of that unhealthy brain. Mr. Davis supported him, however, in every vagary, permitted him to override all opposition, and ignored the views and wishes of every army commander when, as was of daily occurrence, they chanced to differ from those of Colonel Northrop. Indeed, the crazy courses in which this man was suffered to indulge, to the mortal injury of every Confederate army, are incredible.

But we have not the space for their relation, which would fill a volume. One example must serve to illustrate the surprising character of an administration which made success impossible. All reinforcements, ammunition, ordnance, and the greater part of the quarter-masters' supplies were necessarily transported to the Confederate forces assembled at Manassas Junction by the Alexandria and Orange Railroad, which, of course, was thus tasked to the utmost tension of its resources. But another railroad, branching from it at Manassas, communicated with the most fertile region of Virginia, the famous Shenandoah Valley, which teemed with subsistence that was also abundant in the adjoining counties of Fauquier and Loudon. Not required for the transportation of troops or ordnance supplies, that road was therefore available for the almost exclusive use of the Subsistence Department; and substantial supplies, we repeat, lay convenient to it, sufficient for all the forces the Confederates could possibly muster in that quarter. Nothing, indeed, could be more favorable for the Confederates than the arrangement of these two divergent roads. But all this was lost sight of by Colonel Northrop, who by some influence was led to determine that subsistence officers with General Beauregard should not draw their flour or meat either from the rich garners and stores of Loudon, Fauquier, or the valley counties. Forbidding his subordinates, imperatively and angrily, from purchasing supplies within easy reach and with ample means of otherwise idle transportation at hand, leaving them to fall into the hands of the enemy, he set other subordinates to gathering subsistence in the rear of the army, which he was obliged to send over the already overburdened Alexandria and Orange Railroad, for which he had to pay much more than such supplies could have been bought for in the Valley or in London. The consequences were that there was never in depot such a supply of subsistence as General Beauregard needed, and there was not one day's rations for the army at the time of the battle of Manassas (or Bull Run, as it is usually styled), nor more than forty-eight hours' supplies for weeks afterward of the material part of the ration. General Beauregard having urged the provision of a fortnight's supply for some twenty or twenty-five thousand men, Northrop fell into a passion, wrote to the General a letter of surpassing insolence, and at the same time relieved the staff officer from duty who, under General Beauregard's orders, had attempted to remove the evil. Mr. Davis, blind to the consequences, obstinately sustained this extraordinary conduct.

An army left habitually without supplies for more than twenty-four hours, and the wishes and views of whose commander in so vital a matter as its subsistence are offensively thwarted, it is needless to say, can have little mobility. Its commander can not have the power to handle it at will. This was signal the case with the Confederate army on the 21st of July, 1861. Want of subsistence rooted it fast to its depot, through which Colonel Northrop issued a daily dole sent up once in twenty-four hours by the Alexandria and Orange Railroad. Not was this state of affairs bettered as late as 17th August, when General Johnston, in a note to General Beauregard, wrote: "It is impossible, as the affairs of the Confederate are now managed, to think of any other military course than a strictly defensive base."

Why such a man as Northrop was dragged forth from his seclusion, his favorite church po-

* Indeed, flour bought by speculators in the Valley and Loudon was carried to Richmond, sold to the Subsistence Bureau, and transported back to Manassas.
lemics and squabbles and monomaniacal habits, to be thrust into duties profoundly intermixed with the very existence of his government, must ever remain one of the inexplicable mysteries of human history. Rendered arrogant beyond bearing, at length he used language one day which his doiting patron could not brook, and a quarrel resulted, it is understood. It was only then—about February, 1865—that this veritable tenacious "Old Man of the Sea" for the South was shaken off and his successor appointed; but too late for any radical benefit, for, in no small degree from commissariat follies, the Confederate cause was already in the throes of death.

If Mr. Davis did not fill the position of Quarter-Master-General with a special favor, but permitted its duties to be devolved upon the senior officer of the United States Quarter-Master's Department, who had entered his service, he is none the less responsible for the administration of that branch of his staff. We say this because we know that he constantly interfered with and decided matters that absorbed time which might have been better occupied. One instance of this kind will serve to show both his habitual course and his responsibility for what was ineffective in any Department under him. General Beauregard, early in June, 1861, in view of the similarity of the flags of the United States and the Confederate States, and of the uniforms also of their troops at that time, had proposed to distinguish his men by a scarf to be worn in battle, which he asked should be supplied without delay by the Quarter-Master's Department. But even this small matter Mr. Davis could not suffer his General to decide. Accepting the idea, he directed that not the proposed scarf, but an altogether different contrivance, should be provided. Therefore—if occupied with such petty details—the historian must hold him accountable when his main army is found unprovided, as it was, with the means of wheel transportation needful for the ordinary operations of the camp—not to speak of an offensive campaign.

On assuming command at Manassas, early in June, 1861, General Beauregard at once gave his attention to this material element of military operations. He made urgent, repeated requisitions for what he anxiously regarded as essential for the safe mobility of his force. The question was one which, as far as practicable, it was his province to determine. If possible, his requisitions should have been filled. Mr. Davis knew all about them, as well as of the badge matter. He had been besought to order compliance. The Quarter-Master-General either did not realize the scale of impending operations, and had little conception of the resources of the State of Virginia, or in his communications concerning this matter and his actions was but the echo and organ of the Executive, to whom the responsibility must attach in either case. If competent to be the chief of a great revolution, he would have compre-

hended that the requisitions of his General were both in accordance with exigent military needs and not in excess of the available supply of the country.

We know that General Johnston dwells upon other reasons for not pursuing M'Dowell than the want either of subsistence or transportation for munitions of war; but, be it observed, this was in connection with any direct movement upon the line of retreat of that General's routed forces. Had it been practicable for the Confederates to take the offensive at once after the battle of Manassas, assuredly Johnston's main army would not have lost time by following M'Dowell, but would have been thrown across the Potomac near Leesburg, and marched rapidly to the rear of Washington. This was rendered impracticable by the want not only of subsistence, but of means of transportation. It is in this connection that Mr. Davis may be rightly blamed for the failure of his army to pursue and reap the legitimate fruits of a really wondrous victory, and not because he opposed at the time a proposed forward movement, as has been ignorantly alleged by partisans of the two Generals. As is known, he was at Manassas the evening of the 21st July, 1861. Until a late hour that night he was engaged with Generals Johnston and Beauregard, at the quarters of the latter, in discussing the momentous achievements of the day, the extent of which was not as yet recognized at all by him or his Generals. Much gratified with known results, his bearing was eminently proper. He certainly expressed no opposition to any forward movement; nor at the time displayed a disposition to interpose his opinions or authority touching operations and plans of campaign.

Looking back, however, we see a marvelous array of proof that Mr. Davis lacked the very qualities the supposed possession of which had elevated him to the head of the Confederate Government—those of the military organizer and statesman acquainted with the higher ranges of war administration.

Without showing by his measures of preparation, by recommendations to Congress, or in any way whatsoever, that he believed the war would be prolonged beyond a year, but the contrary indeed; yet before leaving Montgomery for Richmond he had declined to receive a large number of men tendered for twelve months, for the reason that they were not offered for the war or three years. If he had anticipated a long war, few and short indeed were his steps for the contingency. But the fact is, his course and the utterances of his Cabinet indicate that he looked for an early pacification, either through that recognition by France and England "in ninety days" which Mr. Benjamin was ever confidently looking for and predicting, or from other causes; therefore it is hard to understand why he should have inflexibly proscribed these enrollments for less time than three years or the war

* We are assured quite 100,000 of these men were tendered.
at so early a day. By that course he greatly diminished the effective force that might have met McDowell—risked, we may say, that battle, and weakened Johnston and Beauregard especially in cavalry—one of the reasons given by General Johnston for not having been able to pursue his adversary and discover the actual extent of the disaster inflicted.

Will it be credited, moreover, that as late as the middle of August, 1861, there was no engineer or other officer on the staff of General J. E. Johnston competent to plan an ordinary railroad bridge.* In fact all the staff departments of that army were organized on the same inconveniently inadequate scale.

It was not until the middle of September, 1861, two months after the battle of Manassas, that a single Major or Divisional General was appointed for that army, and then but two—Generals Van Dorn and G. W. Smith—though six of the grade had been earnestly asked for by General Johnston, including G. W. Smith, whom he specially desired to place in command of his own corps (old Army of the Shenandoah), so that he might be enabled to give exclusive attention to the chief command. Smith was indeed made a Major-General; but as if Mr. Davis could not possibly coincide or sympathize with the views of his Generals, Van Dorn was at the same time sent to report, with a senior commission. An element of discord was introduced into the army by this act, which, whether casual or not, we must regard as another illustration of the prudence of Mr. Davis to lose sight of—in fact how little he was wont to consider—public interests, when they conflicted in any way with his personal will, fancies, or schemes. Some weeks later several other Major-Generals were commissioned, though not to the number requested.

Meantime Mr. Davis had visited head-quarters. A discussion had likewise grown up between him and his Generals relative to the organization of their army. He had taken it into his head to direct that the troops of a State should all be brigaded together, and commanded by Brigadiers from such States. With some exceptions, thought to be specially for the good of the service, this had been already done. But it chanced that one of these very exceptions was in the way of the promotion of a brother-in-law to the command of a brigade, and could not be tolerated. At the same time the division of the army into two corps was objected to. Long communications were written on this subject by Mr. Davis and his Secretary of War that will amaze the military reader who, we are sure, will be at a loss to understand with what possible end, other than an "apple of discord," this discussion was cast between Mr. Davis and his Generals.

"The President disapproves the division of the army into two corps," wrote the Chief of the

Bureau of War to General Beauregard October 18, 1861. And on the 20th of October Mr. Davis himself characterized the division as irregular, and in conflict with law as well as "the plainest principles of military organization."* Intermixed was also the question of the position of General Beauregard, who, as "second in command," Mr. Davis thought should not have "special charge of any subdivision"—that is, corps—of that army; "because in the absence of General Johnston" Beauregard's "succession to the command of the whole would not disturb the relations of the officer and troops," nor "involve any changes of position on the line occupied." Moreover his acquaintance with the whole body of the army, and the absence of any identification with a part of them, would better qualify him for the succession."

Mr. Benjamin, thrown forward to reinforce these curious notions of his chief, with "wise sharp quiblets of the law," does it with characteristic assumption of superior knowledge even of the details of military organization, while attributing ignorance to the generals of the laws germain to the subject. "I beg to say, in all kindness," writes the lawyer, * "that it is not your position which is false, but your idea of organization of the army as established by the acts of Congress, and I feel confident you cannot have studied the legislation of Congress relative to the army . ... I have entered into these details because, in a conversation with the President since his return from your head-quarters, he has informed me that he found the same views as to the organization of the army which you seem to entertain very generally prevalent."

These details are as follows: * "You are second in command of the whole Army of the Potomac, and not first in command of half of the army. The position is very simple, if you will take the pains to read the sixth section of 'the Act to provide for the Public Defense,' approved 6th March, 1861. You will see that the President has no authority to divide an army into two corps of forces, but only into brigades and divisions. Now your rank being superior to that of a commander of a brigade or a division, and there being no other component part of an army into which the army can be legally divided, you necessarily command the whole army; but having present with you an officer of equal grade but older commission, who also commands the whole army, you become second in command."

This construction of the law was too far-fetched to be adhered to after it had served the immediate end in view at the time. Comments are unnecessary.

What functions Mr. Davis and his subordinates

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* Note of General Johnston to General Beauregard—in which he observes also: "It seems to me that we might employ half a dozen engineer officers to advantage."
secretary designed to be performed by the "second in command" we really can not understand, unless indeed those of the "spare wheel" which hangs to the rear of an artillery caisson. But he evidently fancied that what he desired was usual in European armies, and yet we apprehend it were difficult to cite an instance.* Indeed Mr. Davis himself appears to have forgotten these fancies in 1864, as he permitted General Beauregard to hold a special command, under General Lee, in the lines at Petersburg, when next in rank to the latter—a command, too, much inferior in size to that objected to in 1861, and actually inferior to those held by the Lieutenants-Generals of the same army.

When Mr. Davis was on a visit at the headquarters of the army, General Johnston submitted a plan, supported by Generals Beauregard and G. W. Smith, for an offensive campaign.

These Generals urged the immediate concentration in that quarter of the greater part of the forces dispersed along the sea-coast at Pensacola, Savannah, Norfolk, Yorktown, and Frederickburg, for example; with which, added to the troops already in hand, a campaign across the Potomac should be initiated, before General Mc-Clellan had completed the organization of his grand army. This, they believed, might be done without risk to the positions weakened by the measure—though, in fact, the principles of the art of war prescribed that places of such relative military unimportance should be sacrificed or hazarded for the sake of the vital advantage anticipated. A very considerable army of the best personnel could have been thus assembled—larger, be it observed, than either of those which subsequently General Lee was able to lead across the border under much less favorable military conditions. Their President could not be induced to sanction the measure, or to give up his own settled policy of dispersion, his waste of defensive resources in the attempted defense of every threatened position. He proposed, however, an operation instead, which may be fairly taken as a measure of his capable in war affairs.

General Sickles was posted at the time with an isolated force—about one weak division—on the Maryland shore, opposite to Evansport, on the Virginia shore of the Potomac, occupied by the Confederates. This force Mr. Davis proposed to capture by a coup de main. A glance at the map will show that the attacking party (with the scantiest possible means of forage in small boats) must cross the Potomac—there over a mile wide, navigable, and full of steam ships of war of the class of the Pawnee. Were a surprise effected, it would be nevertheless impossible for the Confederates to get away with impunity, much less to carry off the fruits of victory. From close proximity to Washington the alarm must be immediate; Federal war ships would take positions above and below Evansport, so as to command and render repassage of the river impracticable, it being impossible, from the features of the country, for the Confederates to occupy two points on the river with batteries within which the movement might be securely made. These views, forcibly presented by his Generals, he could not combat, and the project fell still-born. He then returned to Richmond, thenceforward to look with marked disfavor upon all the wishes and views of both Johnston and Beauregard affecting the army they commanded, even declining to confer the grade of Brigadier-General on their respective chiefs of staff, which had been asked not only as due to those officers for their services and professional experience, but as calculated to enhance their usefulness in their delicate and most responsible posts.

These are examples taken at random. Already they crowd the space allotted, and we must hereafter relate matters wider apart in order of time.

The Provisional Congress having met in Richmond, and the war spirit of the North having been excited to a pitch that made it evident all their immense resources would be lavished for the prosecution of the war at the call of the Federal President and General, we find still Jefferson Davis comparatively dumb—making no recommendations to Congress which indicate the least appreciation of the impending scale of attack, the least conception of measures requisite to meet and foil it. Such, for example, as a conscription law. Unadvised on this point, Congress indulged in the dream that a great war could be prolonged by voluntary contributions of brawn and muscle—volunteers—exclusively! Mr. Davis had at that time the influence to have corrected this fatal delusion, but he shared it equally with Congress; and here again fell infinitely short of the height of his position.

Affairs meantime grew troublesome in the West. Crittenden had been routed, and by the end of January, 1862, there were portents of the loss of the Mississippi River. General Beauregard, at the instance of Congressmen, was now detached to take command at Columbus, Kentucky, with the implied promise that he should be supported by the requisite general officers to enable him to organize his new command into brigades and divisions. Certain Colonels were named for promotion; but he was assured through his Adjutant-General, by Mr. Benjamin, that there was no need of this, as he would find his new command "admirably organized." This was not the fact, for the organization it had was altogether irregular and insufficient for the field! Corrected as far as practicable just before the battle of Shiloh, for the want of proper Brigadiers their duties had to be trusted to senior Colonels of brigades who were utterly without experience, as well as in some cases by no means the best of their

the relations between Mr. Davis and the plant Benjamin, always "liable to be used."* In Continental European armies the officer next in rank to the commander-in-chief is often unattached to any special command—in which event he is chief of staff, specially selected on that account, as was Count Gneisenau, under Blücher.
grade present. General Beauregard had taken the responsibility of carrying with him a capable engineer on his staff, whom he was able, therefore, to employ at once upon works which made the obstinate defense of Island No. 10, Madrid Bend, and Fort Pillow. But other engineer officers promised were not available until after the battle of Shiloh, and consequently it had been impossible to acquire accurate information of the terrain in the vicinity of that battle-field— a circumstance of much greater disadvantage to the Confederate General than may be apparent to the general reader. Those applied for were line officers, and might as well have been appointed in the first week of February as ultimately in April and May; but Mr. Benjamin, when urged to act at once and give the orders by telegraph, replied that he could not do so without first obtaining the permission of the President.

That is, not even a captain of engineers could be appointed, though reported to be capable and absolutely needed by an army commander, until the head of the Government had consented. The fact is, affairs of this sort engrossed his time, his thoughts, and left little for matters that legitimately belonged to his high functions.

Finding his command virtually unorganized Beauregard, by telegraph, applied again for the officers he had specified in February. The reply was that, belonging (as Colonels) to Johnston's army, they could not be spared, and officers attached to his own forces must be recommended for promotion instead. Time was pressing, and certain officers were now designated by Beauregard on the recommendation of Generals Polk and Bragg. The answer then was that he must wait until he could nominate officers as deserving and capable, from his own knowledge. One or two promotions were made, however, but when recommendations were again made the reply came: Recommend such officers as have won promotion in battle. Under all the circumstances this was downright trite; and the want of these officers was one of the chief reasons why the battle of Shiloh was not brought to a decisive close by noon-day on the 6th of April, 1862, which must have made the arrival of Buell too late to be of the least use in rescuing General Grant's army.

General Beauregard, for some time in bad health, thought it best for the service to take advantage of the ill in operations incident to the position of his army at Tupelo after the successful evacuation of Corinth, and by a short respite from duty seek to recuperate. He therefore retired to Biadon Springs, some twelve hours distant by railroad, turning over the command to General Bragg, with instructions looking to the preparation of the army for the field at once on his return, which he anticipated would be in three weeks. But no sooner had Mr. Davis heard of this step than he telegraphed General Bragg to assume permanent command. General Beauregard was thus laid on the shelf, not to be reinstated, as Mr. Davis passionately declared, though the whole world should urge him to the measure.*

What General Bragg achieved in the campaign which he soon undertook has passed into history; what General Beauregard, in his place, might have accomplished may only be inferred from the plan of campaign which he submitted at the time to General Cooper, a copy of which has been published. The military reader, it is believed, will approve that plan, and will find it difficult to understand why General Buell was not obliged to accept battle at Murfordsville, Kentucky, and why it was that Bragg's and Kirby Smith's forces operated on separate lines in that campaign.

Passing now to the campaign of 1863, so filled with heavy disasters to Confederate arms, we witness on all sides evidences of the hand that was surely guiding the Southern cause to utter ruin.

The extent of the defeat inflicted by General Lee at Chancellorsville in May, 1863, is admitted; but it may not be generally known that Longstreet's corps was absent from that field, having been detached under instructions or at least a pressure from Richmond, due to that evil genius of the Confederates, Northrop, though General Lee believed an attack imminent.

During the fortnight following that brilliant Confederate success never did affairs look so propitious for the Confederates. The Federal army, stunned and much disorganized, lay behind the Rappahannock. Bragg confronted Rosecrans at Duck River with a force strong enough to hold him at bay. One corps would have enabled him to take the offensive under conditions so unfavorable to Rosecrans as almost to insure decisive defeat; defeat with the Cumberland River behind his back to embarrass retreat, and with no supporting force available, while without such a stock of subsistence as would have enabled him to decline battle behind impracticable intrenchments. General Lee might have commanded; the transfer of the corps could have been made in ten days at most, for two lines of railroad as far as Chattanooga, were then open to the Confederates; the time was far more favorable indeed than when, after the defeat at Gettysburg, Longstreet was actually sent. Such an operation was in strict accordance with the cardinal principles of the art of war. The Confederates occupied the interior

* Notes of interview of Congressional Committee with Mr. Davis to request restoration of General Beauregard to his command.

† Two corps could have been spared without risk long enough for the operation. When Longstreet was finally detached, and took part in the battle of Chickamauga with such effect, Meade's army had acquired prestige at Gettysburg, and was much stronger than Hooker could have been on the heels of the signal defeat at Chancellorsville.

‡ This is shown by evidence of General Rosecrans himself before the Congressional Committee on Conduct of the War. When Longstreet ultimately was sent to reinforce Bragg, in September, Rosecrans was stronger than in May, and Bragg was weaker. General Halleck's letters to Rosecrans about this time also confirm my views as to the proper strategy for the Confederates.
lines, and should have seized a patent opportunity to concentrate their masses in superior force upon this army, which the blunders of their adversary had isolated and exposed.*

Had this been done the corollary was equally apparent, and equally important too for the Confederates. General Grant had just entered upon his campaign against Vicksburg. The Confederates held Port Hudson, so that neither supplies nor reinforcements could reach him from the south. Were Rosecrans defeated, one Confederate corps at least would then have been disposable for a juncture with Johnston: a detachment from it taking Fort Pillow at the same time, and thus cutting off reinforcements and subsistence from the north as the possession of Port Hudson did from the southern quarter. This the military reader will readily perceive, as also that Johnston would then have been superior in force to General Grant, who, for lack of subsistence, must soon have been obliged to fight under all possible disadvantages, with nearly certain disaster.

Deaf as an adder were the Richmond authorities to all the promises of the situation. Their fiat went forth; the Gettysburg campaign was inaugurated—that is, the old policy was continued of keeping the Confederate forces divided and operating on widely divergent lines. General Lee is too great a soldier not to have read aright at that time the clear lessons of his art, not to have seen at a glance what was to be gained by the blow at Rosecrans with a crushing force, and what the continued dispersion of forces in war inevitably involved. We have never heard the Gettysburg campaign defended except as a commissariat device, and this gives the clue to the inspiration that prompted it—the Confederate Commissary-General.

From it "woes unnumbered" followed for the Confederate arms. The campaign itself ended in disaster and the loss of over thirty thousand men at Gettysburg, where also was buried much of the prestige which had hitherto wondrously strengthened the dauntless "Army of North Virginia." Bragg was forced first out of Middle Tennessee, and then from Chattanooga, East Tennessee was lost in turn. Vicksburg and Port Hudson, with their large garrisons, succumbed to the indomitable Grant. The Mississippi River passed into Federal possession, and communication with the trans-Mississippi portion of the Confederacy was cut off. In brief: a long train of almost mortal disasters was only interrupted by a transient success at Chickamanga, the value of which was soon "shook in air" by Jefferson Davis, who, visiting the field, detached Longstreet to be baffled before Knoxville; while Rosecrans, strongly reinforced, beat Bragg decisively. From the effects of such immense losses of men, and from the natural deep depression consequent, the Confederate people really never recovered; for it had become apparent that their President, unmoved by experience, was inflexible in his adherence to his favorites, to his passionate prejudices, and in his policy.

In relation to the defense of Charleston, also, we might show that had the Richmond ideas been carried out the city would have fallen on the 10th July, 1863, but our space will not permit.

Congress at length, despite Executive fancies, was brought to pass a somewhat comprehensive act for the organization of a staff kindred to that of European armies. Mr. Davis disapproved it. At the next session it was re-enacted, with a clause, however, giving him the power to carry it out at his discretion. Under these circumstances he signed the law, but absolutely withheld its execution until the 1st day of April, 1865, when General Cooper was directed to put it in force—that is, the day before General Lee's lines at Petersburg were broken, and the end was plainly at hand. Actuated by the narrowest views concerning both the rank and number of staff-officers who should be employed with his armies from the outset of the war, time and the wishes of his generals but served to fix him ineradicably in his notions, the nature and scope of which may be better understood by the foreign soldier when assured that Confederate generals of the highest rank, including General Lee, were allowed only two aids-de-camp, and these but of the grade of lieutenants. Napoleon, en campagne, placed at the head of his staff a Berthier or a Soulle, Marshals of the Empire, who had commanded armies. Blieher had the assistance in such places of a Sechmehlst and a Gneisenau, officers of profound skill and military experience, next in rank to their chief. Officers of similar rank and character have also filled staff positions in recent European wars. The chief Adjutant-General on the staff of General Lee was a young officer of the grade of a lieutenant-colonel; doubtful judicious, apt, clever, zealous, but who was a bank officer at the outbreak of the war, with no knowledge of military routine and administration. His two assistants—majors—were of the same description, as were also the small staff of inspectors. General Johnston was placed in the same situation. And all this was the result of Mr. Davis's peculiar inflexible notions.

More than in any other service did the Confederate armies need high rank for their staff-officers, for the patent reason that, lacking enough officers of professional training, the attraction of high rank became necessary to induce civilians of the highest ability, ripest culture, and large knowledge of men and affairs, to accept and retain staff appointments with Confederate generals—men who could most readily make up for the want of soldierly culture. If Napoleon found advantage in a numerous staff of high rank, headed by Soult when Berthier was lost to him, assuredly General Lee must have been materially benefited by a larger staff than was granted him, with some officer upon it of high

* We have not space to dwell upon the consequences of a defeat of Rosecrans in respect to Tennessee and Kentucky.
rank and military experience. If M. Thiers feels warranted in ascribing the loss of Waterloo in part to Marshal Soult's inexperience as a staff-officer,* we may believe that General Lee and other Confederate generals must have suffered serious detriment from the extraordinary abnormally high staff organization imposed by Jefferson Davis, and specially prescribed by orders in the face of law, in April, 1864, just as General Grant began his campaign. Surely even the general reader in this must see one cause for the defeat of Confederate armies—a cause which must have tended to clog the efforts of the highest genius, and made success impossible, denied, as Confederate generals were, the aid of staff-officers of the character employed by their adversary, and such as have been available to all successful commanders, since Frederick down to the recent war in Italy, on both sides.

About the middle of May, 1864, General Beauregard reached Drury's Bluff below Richmond, and had an interview with General Bragg, at the time exercising a species of general command. This officer appeared to apprehend that General Lee, yielding to the pressure of superior numbers, must before long give way and lose Richmond. Beauregard replied that he did not regard the situation as so unfavorable if the right remedy were promptly applied. He then pointed out the isolated position of Butler, south of the James, as affording an opportunity for his destruction with a superior force, and that such a force might be assembled if General Lee would furnish 10,000 men. Falling upon Butler under such circumstances General Beauregard thought his capture was inevitable, and with him must fall the depot at Bermuda Hundred. This effected, at a concerted moment he would throw his whole force upon General Grant's flank while General Lee made an attack in front. All circumstances favored the plan, and General Bragg expressed his approbation. Mr. Davis, informed of it, came at once to see General Beauregard, who explained all its details and earnestly urged the attempt. Mr. Davis seemed much impressed, but objected that it would involve the retrograde of General Lee from his position at Spottsylvania Court House, which "could not be thought of." "Yes," rejoined the General, "what of that when it will enable him in two or three days at most to gain a great victory?" That is, when like the Titan he would touch the earth to spring up refreshed and all the stronger. This line of argument was fruitless. Nothing that affected General Lee's army, however temporarily, could be entertained. Beauregard had said that he might beat Butler without the force he desired, though it would be, like so many other Confederate successes, without material profit. This ability to gain the color of victory caught Mr. Davis's attention and the attempt must be made. It was made. Butler was driven from his position the next day; but, just as Beauregard predicted, no substantial results followed the success. In the end, too, as might have been anticipated, unless some such decided success as that sought over Butler had been gained and enabled the concentration of the scattered Confederate forces, General Lee was forced step by step to follow the march of his opponent.

The removal of Johnston from his command and the substitution of Hood, who was expected by Mr. Davis to strike at least "one manly blow" for the defense of Atlanta, few will now venture to deny was a sad mistake for the Confederates. That was indeed "the feather that broke the camel's back." When Sherman began his march from Atlanta the inevitable issue was pointed out unless a force was collected strong enough to vanquish him after he had penetrated deeply into the interior, where defeat would entail not merely a foiled but a destroyed army. If permitted to traverse the land unchecked the consequences were mortal. Bold, prompt measures alone could avert dire calamity. Great sacrifices had now become inevitable: the "heroic treatment" could alone serve the "sick man" now. Especially after the fall of Savannah was this urged upon those in power, who as little comprehended the crisis as the antedote. Even when General Beauregard directed the evacuation of Charleston, and urged a similar course with respect to Wilmington, so as to provide a force with which to fall upon Sherman, Mr. Davis wrote such a dispatch to General Hardee, commanding in Charleston, as led him to suspend the evacuation, and obliged Beauregard to assume command and to direct imperatively the measures to be completed. Of course Wilmington, of no use since the fall of Fort Fisher, was held to the last; and with no force afield to check his course Sherman marched like Fate through the heart of the country.

In the conduct of civil affairs the same traits have characterized the régime of Jefferson Davis which we have sought to show governed his military administration, and with the same baleful results for the cause placed in his keeping. We shall not have space, however, to spread the proof upon the record, except so far as this may be done by the relation of two occurrences.

When Mr. Toombs quit the Cabinet to become a Brigadier-General, Mr. Hunter of Virginia took his place, which he soon left, for reasons best known to himself, to take the seat of Senator in Congress, only secured after a warm contest. There was a Virginia statesman pre-eminently fitted to succeed Mr. Hunter in the Cabinet. We mean W. G. Rives, whom all recognized as a man of great breadth and accuracy of culture, enlarged views of statesmanship, and who, having served as a diplomatist with high credit, was regarded as of a grade superior to those generally employed in that capacity by the United States. His connection with the Cabinet must have given weight to the cause abroad. But Mr. Davis could not stifle that characteristic distrust and intolerance of superior men of independent minds, which have made him,
by his course as President of the Confederate States, at once a patricide and a moral suicide. It was enough that Mr. Rives was brought to his notice as one whom the people would like to see among his advisers. That looked like dictation—like an interference with his prerogative. Mr. Judah P. Benjamin was transferred to the State Department; General Randolph—as it happened, a gentleman of real administrative ability as well as of too much independence to remain a Cabinet officer merely in name—was made Secretary of War, though at the time little known for capacity beyond the place of his residence.

A little later Mr. Davis also appointed as his Attorney-General—the law adviser of his Government—a gentleman doubtless of much civil worth, but who at the time was a lieutenant-colonel under General Bragg, in arrest under charges for an act of recent insubordination of such flagrant character as to make General Gladden place him for a time in close arrest in his tent in charge of an armed sentinel.

Mr. Davis must be judged at the bar of history by the aggregate results of his administration. He must be measured by what was done or left undone—successes and reverses—either directly by himself or through the instruments of his will, the men on whom he relied for the performance of the highest services of the State. Brought to this rightful test, what statesman of whom history tells us will be found more deficient than Jefferson Davis?

Had he been equal to his position he would have known how to develop, combine, wield the splendid resources of his land in such a manner as to produce the largest possible results. With his long experience and acquaintance with the public men of the United States he should have known the best men to call around him, and should have known, too, the best course for baffling the statesmen opposed to him. Foregoing his predilections as well as his antipathies—like Napoleon as in the case of Moreau and Talleyrand—he should have been wise enough to attach to his Government and secure the services of men of talent, even though perchance not well affected personally toward them. A genuine leader of men would have done so—would have stifled personal passions, which alone, it would appear, have influenced Mr. Davis since an early day. Swayed by these, and aninous to an incredible degree of the office-giving powers of his place, and the exercise of which absorbed by far the larger part of his waking hours, he was blind alike to those insuperable as to those favoring circumstances or favorable occasions which the statesman will be quick to recognize.

As a natural consequence of the predominant qualities of the man, there immediately grew up in the South a party of "President's Friends," from whose ranks, as far as possible, were drawn the occupants of all civil places. Men for the most part malleable to his will, who, looking up to him as the source of the highest wisdom in both civil and military affairs, upheld his views and wishes as the only safe rule and law for the times. Thus in a little while almost every person of ability, nearly every one of spirit, was driven from the councils of the South and the direction of affairs, leaving the Government to a large degree in the hands of those from whom efficient administration was not to be expected—selected as they were for instruments thought to be best adapted to his purpose: that of absorbing in himself all the substantial functions of the State.

As obstinate as James II. or George III., whom he greatly resembled in many traits of character, as in the management of public business—with the same tendency to employ mediocrity and the same dislike for independent ability—Jefferson Davis for four years illustrated, like his monarchical prototypes, that no two natures are so widely opposite and unlike as the willful and the wise. Impersonal, yet without genuine vigor of character, pride and weakness were strangely blended in his actions. It was said of George III. that he even scorned victory whose laurels had been called by Chatham. Mr. Davis looked with a moody brow and a sanguine spirit when either Johnston or Beauregard tendered the trophies of successful war. Napoleon, once urged by an undistinguished general to confer upon him the marshal's baton, exclaimed: "It is not I who make a marshal—it is victories!" What Napoleon would not attempt Mr. Davis did without hesitation, making major and lieutenant generals who previously had not been in battle, and if possibly capable, had never had opportunities to show capacity for high command; some of whom too, we may add, whose promotion has not been justified by subsequent events.

The longer he held power the narrower grew his conceptions, the more imperious his will, until to differ from or cross the orbit of his fancies, or even to run counter to the plans and wishes of his favorites, became a personal affront. No man in as high and critical a position ever less understood the value of wise, independent ministers, or was ever less able to give up a minor personal object for the sake of a major advantage. He and his ministerial clerks, always as sanguine as Napier describes the British Cabinet to have been in 1810, like that Cabinet were always "anticipating success in a preposterous manner"—always displaying little practical industry, and quite as little judgment in preparing for contingencies. In no instance did he and his favorites comprehend at their value the golden opportunities that more than once were vouchsafed them, and by seizing which with a resolute hand they might have neutralized the superior resources of the United States. With a leader like William of Orange in his stead this had surely been accomplished.

We have heard much, from Mr. Davis and his friends in the last months of the struggle, concerning the frightful extent of desertions from Confederate armies. Unquestionably this evil was very great; indeed, so numerous had deser-
tions become that added to the natural tendency of all but regular troops to quit their colors in times of serious reverses, some of the Confederate corps, like a circle in the water, were almost "dispersed to naught." But here too the handiwork of Jefferson Davis may be made apparent. The broadcast, inevitable interposition of his prerogative of pardon by the second year of the war had made it plain to the men of the army that there was the fullest immunity for desertion. A merciless, inexorable personal adversary we know Mr. Davis ever was, and never less so than during the time of the giant struggle of his section for independence. How then may we account for this almost irrevocable mercy granted to those whose acts made success impossible?

Gibbon, summing up the character of Constantine, uses language which we find singularly applicable to our subject—in whom there has been manifestly the same "timid policy of dividing whatever is united, of reducing every active power, and of expecting that the most feeble will prove the most obedient." In fine, his course may be likened to that of the captain of a ship of war in action with a greatly superior adversary, who, while mailing his flag to the mast-head and shouting stout words of defiance to his foe and of supreme confidence to his crew, nevertheless from the outset of the battle has been secretly scuttling his vessel and all his boats besides.

[Since the foregoing paper was in type I have read an able article, in the July number of the Quarterly Review, on "The Close of the War," which presents Mr. Davis in a highly favorable light as a wise statesman, to whom was mainly due such successes as the Confederates achieved. This writer urges as the "chief" and "the principal cause" of the failure of the Southern people to win independence, "the great superiority of the North in numbers and resources." In other words, that necessarily 23,800,782 souls overcame 7,666,335. This proposition, in the face of history, I dispute. The disparity in numbers and resources was formidable truly, but not so great after all, as that with which Frederick the Great had to contend during the "Seven Years War," when handling his resources in accordance with the true principles of the art of war—not squandering them habitually by division, as did the Confederate President—he failed and defeated the combinations of Austria, Russia, Sweden, and France, despite their "numbers and resources," and raised up a new power to rank among the first-rate monarchies of Europe."—T. J.]

**MY BURGLAR.**

**THE story of my burglary is as follows:** if indeed you can call a man a burglar who meets you at mid-day, sitting on the grass, instead of choosing the far more appropriate and classical midnight hour, illuminated by the fitting rays of a dark-lantern and the gleam of a polished blade. Such as he was, however, he was the only burglar I ever met, although I have been nightly on the watch for him ever since I can remember.

I must begin by describing what delightful little picnics our particular "set" used to indulge in a few years ago. Model picnics; none of your crowded omnibuses, with a brass band on the top, and fifty incongruous people unable to escape from each other for a long, long weary day; spoiling all the silent beauty of woods and rocks; flinging their lemon peel and empty bottles down the silver waterfalls, and generally fulfilling the spirit of the old hymn-lines:

"Where every prospect pleases
And only man is vile."

Ours were little impromptu affairs: a boat-load of friends sailing down to the Cove or Light-house, or some other favorite spot, or a drive in our several carriages to Mount Carmel or Wintergreen Falls; with no greater preparation than could be crowded into the hour during which the party would be proposed, arranged, and started.

It was on a bright June morning five years ago that such a boat-load of friends assembled at the water-side, matronized as usual by sweet bright little Mrs. Gilbert and her dear old doctor, whose united presence insured the complete success of any of our little festivities. There was the usual set, Amy and Adelaide, Professor Tucker and his sister, a clergyman, a lawyer, an officer, my rattle-brained cousin Charley of the senior class, and last but not least to each other were Frank and myself. As usual, Mrs. Gilbert's immense hamper was lifted out of the carriage with much ceremony and deposited on the wharf, putting to shame the little baskets which Amy and I carried, filled with any thing we could find at the moment in the harder. Mrs. Gilbert's larder was always in picnic order, and we grew to depend a good deal upon that well-known hamper, and to think our duty done if we carried forks, spoons, and cups enough to aid in dispatching its liberal contents. Frank's great dog, of course, accompanied him, for our picnics would not have been at all complete without good old Nero. But unfortunately this day, as we sat on a pile of boards waiting for the sails to be hoisted and the cushions to be placed, Amy's red shawl, which she always carried for the picturesque, was flung not into the boat but into the water; and, of course, dear old Nero, being a Newfoundland, could not for an instant refrain from jumping to its rescue, so that both were in quite too dripping a condition to be thought of as companions in so limited a space. "No, no, Nero!" cried Frank, as the dog sided up to me for a comfortable shake over my white dress, "you're in no state for a boat ride with ladies, so you may lie down and take care of this till we come back;" and he flung the dripping shawl up on the wharf, where it lay in a gorgeous scarlet heap, and beside it lay down its obedient guardian; and as we pushed off we knew that thus they would lie, and so we would find them when we sailed home under the setting sun.

How beautiful was the sea that day! how cool the breeze which swept us dancingly along, and how the Fairy dipped and skimmed with her great white wings spread and her colors flying! Frank took his seat by me, yielding his post of responsibility and honor as master of the