MEMOIR

OF

JON A. BAELGREN

A NAVAL OFFICER, WITH ADDITIONAL

ACCOUNTS

OF HIS SERVICES ABROAD

AND

PORTRAITS FROM LIFE.

REPRINTED AND REVISED

N. STONE

AND COMPANY
MEMOIR

OF

JOHN A. DAHLGREN

REAR-ADMIRAL UNITED STATES NAVY

By his Widow

MADELEINE VINTON DAHLGREN

WITH

PORTRAITS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

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PREFACE.

The writer has, it will be seen, arranged the Memoir of Admiral Dahlgren as a totality, and yet divided it into three distinctive portions, in order to present as clearly as possible in one united whole so multiform a life: one replete with varied action, but having from beginning to end the single steadfast purpose, — to serve his country well and faithfully.

This record has in great part been given by his own pen, with no ulterior purpose of publication, and thus bears that stamp of absolute truth with which every man speaks to his dual self when he communes with his own soul.

It may be objected to this Memoir, that no adequate mention is made of the brave officers who were associated with Admiral Dahlgren in the operations off Charleston.

The reason of this enforced silence will be found in the very nature of this work, which marks its limits. In other words, this book does not assume to be a history of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, but is intended as a Biography of Admiral Dahlgren, although
the temptation to swell the record into larger proportions has been very great.

But the Biographer cherishes the hope that her more limited theme may serve to point the way to the future historian, who will make full record of the splendid service given by this Squadron in its prolonged and arduous labors. As yet, this history remains unwritten, and thus the nation has not had properly presented for a due appreciation its heroic sacrifices, and its essential aid.

The brilliant victories of Farragut and Porter dazzled the Republic with the effulgence of the electric flash; but the task assigned to the brave men of this Squadron and their devoted leader, although of equal magnitude, required sustained and painful efforts which the popular apprehension failed to grasp. But when History, in her final judgment, shall hold even balanced the scales of exact distribution, then shall the good work done by this Squadron find its appropriate niche in the temple of Fame.

Admiral Dahlgren was a man of science, of inventive genius, of professional skill; but beyond all these, he was a patriot. While climbing, at first with slow and toilsome, but reliant steps, and, later on, with swifter, surer progress, that summit to which his genius urged him, he was often and again confronted by the clamor of discontent, the jealousies of his profession, and the various forms of opposition his rapid, upward course evoked: and until the present generation of actors in the great drama in which he played so conspicuous a
part shall have passed away, it will be difficult to
gain an impartial opinion. Yet Death having arrested
his ultimate conceptions while yet midway in his career,
and set the final seal upon his actions, we are content to
leave the verdict of a "last appeal" to his beloved coun-
try and the hearts of a grateful people.

M. V. D.
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THE NAVY OF THE PAST.
MEMOIR OF JOHN A. DAHLGREN.

CHAPTER I.

HIS EARLY YOUTH.

"Shall we review the past and find therein no augury of the future?"

A sketch of the early life of the late Admiral Dahlgren may aptly bear the title of "The Navy of the Past;" for the important discoveries made by his genius at a later period of his career, finally ended in an entire reorganization of our naval ordnance. These improvements, being accompanied by changes equally great, incident to the introduction of steam, and involving corresponding differences in the construction of our men-of-war, have essentially modified the navy life of the present day.

These circumstances make the record kept by John Dahlgren in his own journal—extending with slight interruptions from the year 1825 to the time of his death, in 1870—a picture of that which is now no more. During this period not only has the course of studies of the officer, but also the routine of the quarter-deck, experienced considerable alteration; and the old tar, who once gloried in "handling the ropes" with consummate skill, is in a measure supplanted by the new element of steam. With these present phases of the seaman's life, disappears much of the romance
and sentiment which made the ancient type of sailor interesting.

The journal of young Dahlgren gives an exact portrayal of this transition period of our Navy, and must also engage the attention as a true picture of the navy life.

Our main object, however, is to produce a correct biographical sketch of this distinguished commander. With this view we shall strive to let the subject of this memoir speak for himself, whenever his own words can be interwoven with our narrative. To this end extracts from his journals and fragmentary writings from his pen in our possession will be collated and freely used, the proper credit being given their author. We prefer thus to enable the reader to discriminate between our own assertions and the direct utterances of the Admiral himself.

Preluding this memoir, we deem it not irrelevant to make some mention of those from whom Dahlgren claims a lineal descent, and who stand on the genealogical record as the principal men of the race. The stamfather, or founder of the Dahlgren family in Sweden, was named Borje Ericsson, or Ersson, and was born in 1593 at a place called Dahlen. In the year 1615 he assumed, by royal license, the name of Dahl-gren,—taken from the place where he was born; Dahlen signifying in English "dale," and grén, a "branch" or "bough,"—doubtless intimating thereby that he was a branch or offshoot from his ancestral home. It is thus noticeable that of the two distinguished inventors that Sweden has given by extraction or directly to the United States—Ericsson and Dahlgren—both bore a common ancestral name. The surname of Eric occurs more frequently than any other in the genealogical
registry of the Dahlgrens, which is a clear and uninterrupted record from the sixteenth century to the present day. Yet the device on the original escutcheon—"*Hvad Himlen föden ex a fvand öder*" (old Swedish), "Envy cannot destroy that which Heaven creates"—would seem to indicate the old struggle for recognition in the beginning.

We pause to allude to several members of the family who have been sufficiently conspicuous for learning and usefulness to entitle them to some public mention.

The grandfather of the late Admiral was Johan Adolf Dahlgren, and a son of Bernhard Ebbe Dahlgren and Lady Anna M. Neuhauser. He was born in 1744 at Norrköping. After receiving from private tutors a thorough rudimentary education, and having studied practical chemistry and pharmacy with the Admiralty chemist Sahlberg in Stockholm, he was enrolled, Nov. 2, 1764, as a student in the University of Upsala, whence he graduated after a term of eleven years, and received his diploma as Doctor in Medicine. This long course of diligent application in order to prepare himself for the responsible duties of practising physician forms a striking contrast to the hurried education of our students of medicine previous to their graduation. Does not such haste, which requires the young physician to gain a knowledge of his profession by *experiment*, rather belong to the domain of empiricism than to that just and accurate field, of observation which is alone acquired by experience founded on previous investigations? In his youth Dahlgren had been a *protégé* and friend of the great naturalist Linnaeus, whose signature is attached to the medical diploma now in possession of the writer. Dr. Dahlgren was a very active and energetic man, and a
skilful physician. His professional writings are voluminous, and are held in high repute by the Faculty.\(^1\) He was named, Oct. 14, 1789, Chief Physician or "Assessor" of the Province of Finland, and finally died there, May 14, 1797, much respected by the authorities, and beloved by the poor, who in a large body followed his remains to the grave, — a civic funeral having been decreed him by the town of Uleåborg, where he had resided. Of his children, Sir Carl Adolph, Knight of Wasa, also graduated at Upsala and was made sub-physician in the Royal Navy in 1797. After three years he left the Navy; but on the outbreak of war in 1808, he offered his service, and was ordered to the army of Finland as Staff Surgeon, serving to the close of the war. He then re-entered the Navy. In 1809 he was appointed Court Physician, in 1813 he was named Field Surgeon to the army operating in Norway, and in 1838 he received the sinecure of Field Surgeon in Chief to the Elfsberg Regiment; the King at the same time making him a Knight of Wasa, in recognition of long and eminent service. He died in 1844 at Stockholm.\(^2\) His son, Sir Johan Adolph, was, we believe, the last representative, in Sweden, of the name which since his death only exists in this country. But Sir John closed the long record in Sweden by an honorable life. He had likewise been created a Knight of Wasa in recognition of prolonged and useful service to his country. He was the author of various dissertations on chemistry and medicinal botany, and was likewise a discoverer in the domain of practical chemistry.

In 1871, in consequence of impaired health, he resigned the Directorship of the Royal Military Hospital

\(^1\) See Sacklen's History of the Faculty.  \(^2\) Ibid.
in Stockholm, and after that lived in retirement. When the writer in 1872 published a "Memoir of Ulric Dahlgren," the heroic son of the Admiral, and written by his father, Sir John translated and republished the book in the Swedish language. He died June 7, 1876, aged sixty-three.

Bernhard Ullrik, the father of Admiral Dahlgren, was born May 12, 1784, and was a son of Dr. Johan Adolph, whose sketch we have given. He also graduated at Upsala. He was a man of herculean stature and strength, being six feet four and a half inches in height, and otherwise of majestic proportions. He was an adventuresome traveller at an early age, and made frequent expeditions to hyperborean regions. In 1804, becoming involved in an attempt to disseminate republican principles at Gefle, he was obliged to flee from Sweden, and his property was confiscated by the Crown. After extended travel, and after incurring much hazard, he finally embarked from Spain for New York, where he landed Dec. 4, 1806, having had a boisterous passage. The home government having withdrawn its persecution, he held the post of Swedish Consul at Philadelphia up to the time of his death, which occurred in 1824. He was also well known as a merchant of ability and signal integrity. The late Daniel Lord, the eminent New York barrister, once said to us that he distinctly remembered to have heard Mr. Dahlgren spoken of as "The Man of Ross," in allusion to his reputation for strict probity; and that he was constantly called upon among all classes of people to decide disputed matters so as to avoid litigation. So great was the confidence reposed in his impartial and clear judgment, that his arbitration was accepted as conclusive. The motto which he used in preference
to the old one of his race in Sweden was, "Candor and Fidelity," and was indeed descriptive of the rule which guided his upright life, as well as of his own prominent traits of character; and he was fortunate in transmitting to his son John the sentiment of loyalty to every trust. Nov. 19, 1808, he was married to Martha Rowan, and on Nov. 13, 1809, the subject of this memoir, John Adolphus Bernard Dahlgren, was born in the city of Philadelphia. The house, pulled down long ago, has since then become the site of a public building, "The Exchange," on the corner of Walnut and Third Streets.

In 1821–23 the family lived in a house on Sansom Street (the site is now occupied by stores), and afterwards moved to one in Front Street, near Walnut, where Mr. Bernard Dahlgren died in 1824; he was buried in the old Swedes churchyard. The mother of John, who did not survive her husband many years, was the daughter of a Revolutionary soldier, James Rowan, who served as commissary in General Lacy's brigade (Pennsylvania Line), and sustained heavy losses by advances to the service that were unpaid, or paid in Continental money which collapsed and was worth nothing. He was a lineal descendant of the once influential Mortimers of the North of Ireland, and claimed collateral lineage of the De Rohans ofBrittany. Another of his great-grandfathers, McConnel, lies in the old Presbyterian churchyard in Pine and Fourth Streets.

At the Quaker school-house in Fourth Street, near Chestnut, John was grounded in Latin and mathematics by hard study. The Admiral says in some written memoranda, dated 1868, in allusion to his mother:—
She was a lady richly endowed with the best qualities of head and heart, the memory of which has remained with her son during a long and varied career. Her family was amongst the earliest settlers of Pennsylvania, and her father had borne active part in the Revolutionary War, and had been present at the battles of Germantown and Princeton.

The received idea that a gifted son is apt to resemble the mother is sustained in the case of the late Admiral; for this son, who has given such important service to his country, possessed the peculiar temperament of his mother. She had a special talent for designing, and the Admiral has often been heard to say that he inherited from her the inventive faculty.

Mr. Bernhard Dahlgren, having been thoroughly educated at one of the most celebrated universities of Europe, very naturally spared no pains or expense in the education of his son, and on more than one occasion turned aside from the cares of business to take a chair near the schoolmaster and "hear a class." Nor was the labor bestowed in vain; for while yet a boy, our lad was a good Latin, Spanish, and mathematical scholar. The early spring of life passed away unmarked by other events than those that usually befall school-boys; but the mind of young Dahlgren was being gradually trained to those habits of close and regular investigation which so well served him in after life. It was fortunate that he profited with diligence by the care of a good father; for when deprived of this aid by rapid and unexpected disease, he was but a mere boy, left to begin the battle of life with no resources other than those of well-disciplined mind and habits. His father had been a successful merchant, it is true; but so liberal was he as a citizen, and so constant were his charities, that at his death he left a
widow and four children, of whom John, then about fourteen years of age, was the eldest, in straitened circumstances. At a later period the Admiral writes of himself:—

That my thoughts should have been turned seaward in pondering over the all-important course of future life, may be readily accounted for by several early associations which, though seemingly slight, had taken deep root in my young fancy. Within sight of father's doorstone deeply freighted ships lay at the wharves densely packed, and were daily arriving or departing in the course of trade; for the foreign commerce of Philadelphia was then far from waning. The navy-yard, too, was not beyond the limits of a holiday ramble, with its huge three-decker, the “Pennsylvania,” that perished so ingloriously in the flames at Norfolk in May, 1861; and the frigate “Raritan,” then deemed a masterpiece. More than one of my schoolmates, also, had passed from his place in the class to the quarter-deck; and Cooper, who held the public mind in the spell of his beautiful sea-tale, “The Pilot,” had captivated my imagination.

But whatever prompted the wish, it was soon gratified, and I found myself endued with the simple but much-prized insignia of a Midshipman, and in daily proximity to the gallant seamen whose names had already been made historic by their deeds. Commodore Biddle had taken the “Penguin,” and assisted in capturing the “Frolic.” Elliott, who commanded the “Cyane,” had been second to Perry in the battle of Lake Erie, and Hoffman was in the “Constitution” when the “Cyane” was captured, and acted as prize-master to the United States.

Thus wrote the Admiral in the last years of his life, when recalling its earlier memories, from which we now turn to the record of the moment, as kept in his journal when a boy. Bearing the date of October, 1825, he being then sixteen years of age, we find some of the first pages of a journal, which he faithfully kept during life, and which was only discontinued at
slight intervals, up to the time of his death, in 1870. In almost the very first pages allusion is made to his application for admittance to the Navy, and to the recommendations which had been sent to Washington in his behalf. These papers consisted of letters from his teachers, from his father's friends, and of a document signed by many members of the Pennsylvania Legislature.

The youth who may peruse these pages will doubtless be interested to notice the opinions expressed by the teachers of young Dahlgren, as to their pupil.

One writes, —

Mr. John A. Dahlgren has been under my tuition for more than two years. He has received more honors than any other individual in my classes in the same time, namely, one gold medal, and four other premiums. His amiable conduct, sound education, and excellent disposition cannot fail to endear him to his future companions in life.

Another master writes, —

His knowledge of the fundamental principles of the mathematics is good, and his application of their principles to surveying, navigation, etc., has been very satisfactory to me.

A third instructor states, —

He has studied the Latin under my care as far as Horace, and progressed more rapidly than is usual among scholars.

Among the estimable circle of his father's friends, Mr. Vaughan says: —

Mr. John Dahlgren, aged about sixteen years, son of my late much lamented friend Bernhard Dahlgren, was recommended to me most earnestly by his worthy father, shortly before his death. . . . I have known him from his infancy, and watched his progress. His father was a man of strong mind, and very attentive to the education of his children; and his
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success with Mr. John Dahlgren is best known in the certificates from his respective masters who have verbally confirmed to me what they have certified. . . . Mr. Dahlgren's father was highly respected, and had he lived a few years longer would have left his family in excellent circumstances. . . . As it is, the children must as early as possible free themselves from dependence on the mother. The decided wishes of John are for the Navy and a seafaring life, and no other object has any temptation for him. From his excellent education, his good principles and habits, both from example and natural inclination, and his strong predilection for the Navy, he is marked as one who if he succeed promises to fill with honor the station he may be able to obtain in that department.

JNO. VAUGHAN.

PHILADELPHIA, Dec. 31, 1824.

Dr. Samuel Colhoun writes to the Hon. Secretary of the Navy:—

I have known John from his earliest infancy. At the age of ten and eleven years he developed uncommon intellectual dispositions; he was continually occupied in reading the Universal History, particularly those parts of it relating to Greece and Rome, and passed opinions on the policy of these great nations, and upon the characters of their celebrated men, which astonished those who knew him. His knowledge was minute, critical, and accurate, particularly of the history of Rome, and induced me to believe that a boy who could devote himself with so much assiduity, perseverance, and success to a study which rarely attracts attention till a more advanced period, must be possessed of talents which may with a proper direction be of great usefulness to his country. His character at school was equally distinguished. . . . He has studied Euclid, plane and spherical trigonometry, algebra, navigation, surveying, geography, and has made considerable progress in the Spanish language. I write this letter to you, not under the ordinary motives to recommendation, but because I am under the prepossession that it may be of benefit to our common country. . . . I beg leave to state that the family of my young friend is highly respectable, and his own character ex-
emplary. His father, lately deceased, was the former Swedish Consul, and had a highly respectable standing among the citizens of Philadelphia.

A letter from Mr. G. M. Dallas to the Hon. Secretary of the Navy, dated Jan. 27, 1825, may not be uninteresting. Mr. Dallas says:

I most heartily unite in recommending to your partial consideration the application of Mr. John Dahlgren for a warrant in the Navy of the United States. The father of Mr. Dahlgren was unquestionably one of our most respectable and worthy citizens. He died suddenly and much lamented. The education of young Mr. Dahlgren has been carefully attended to. He gives more than common promise of future capacity and usefulness. Our members of the Legislature, generally aware of these facts, have cordially signed a recommendation in his behalf, and many of our most esteemed gentlemen are extremely solicitous for his success. I can only add that the appointment of Mr. Dahlgren will impart much gratification to all your friends, and to no one more sincerely than to, dear sir,

Very truly yours,

G. M. Dallas.

Joseph McIlvaine writes:

His father was known to me as a man of high character, whose premature loss was severely felt by the Republican party. . . . I am convinced by what I have seen and heard of the young man himself, that his merit and promise are of no common order. He has talents that must be ornamental to any service, with advantages of early and correct instruction, which are the surest guarantee for his gentlemanly and officer-like deportment.

We quote from a letter of Judge Richard Peters, who says:

John Dahlgren is a youth of great promise and of most amiable deportment. . . . If the solicitations and recommendations of members of our most respectable and influential citizens could obtain the situation of a shipman for young
Dahlgren, he would be furnished with those of every member of our Masonic Institutions of this city, his father having been one of the most respected of their Grand Officers.

Edward King, in a letter to Washington, makes some sensible remarks regarding the nature of various letters that he forwards. He says:

I have the pleasure of forwarding a number of recommendations in favor of John A. Dahlgren, and addressed to the Hon. Secretary of the Navy. You will find them few, but of a special character; it being my impression that general and indiscriminate recommendations have but little operation, and that the Department would attach more regard to such as came from individuals of character, who of course would stand pledged for the correctness of their statements.

I cannot but attach great weight to the favorable sentiments expressed towards my young friend by the members of the Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth. Among those who have united in his support you will perceive the two Speakers and many of the most respectable members of both bodies from every quarter of the State.

From an intimate acquaintance with Mr. John Dahlgren I am convinced that his appointment would secure to his country an officer of chastened morals, disciplined understanding, and cultivated mind.

Joel B. Sutherland writes,

In recommending this young gentleman to your notice, I feel confident that he is just such an individual as would, if appointed, be a credit to his friends and in time an honor to his country.

We give entire a beautiful letter from the mother, found in the “Midshipman’s File.”

PHILADELPHIA, July 7, 1825.

Sir,—I hope the fond anxiety of a widowed mother will be sufficient apology for troubling you in behalf of John Dahlgren, who some time since made application for a warrant as Midshipman in the Navy of the United States, to whom you have been pleased to send a refusal.
Deeply interested in my son's welfare, and solicitous to obtain for him the only situation he is desirous to fill, I must beg your kind indulgence in granting a commission to him, who is without flattery both dutiful and affectionate.

Believe me the favor will always be held in grateful remembrance by

Your most obedient servant,

Martha Dahlgren.

A letter from the Hon. Daniel H. Miller, his Representative in Congress, sums up the claims of John Dahlgren for the appointment of Midshipman by stating that

His very great desire to engage in the service of his country, and, above all, his almost unequalled personal merit, make this case particularly meritorious, etc.

And yet, at first, all these applications met with a refusal! In looking over these and other testimonials from the prominent men of the day in Philadelphia, it is noticeable that no appeal is made upon party grounds, but the higher motive of personal fitness and the benefit to be derived to the common country in a remote future, are the inspiring motives. The strong predilection of the youth for the Navy is also greatly remarked, as also his very unusual moral worth, talents, and acquirments. Mr. Vaughan writes of the young applicant for naval honors, Sept. 22, 1825,—

He is a good-looking young man, and so passionately bent on the destination of the Navy of the United States that he cannot be diverted from it.

We give one more paper, testifying to the excellence of the young aspirant, and also addressed to the Secretary of the Navy, the Hon. Samuel L. Southard, and having appended to it forty-seven signatures.
MEMOIR OF JOHN A. DAHLGREN.

HARRISBURG, Jan. 14, 1825.

Sir,—The undersigned, members of the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, beg leave to recommend to your consideration the application of John Dahlgren for a warrant as a Midshipman in the Navy of the United States. The qualifications, mental and personal, of the applicant they believe to be such as would render him an ornament to the honorable profession to which he is desirous of devoting himself; and they consider that the patronage of a free government can never with more propriety be extended than when in aid of youthful education and genius.

We sum up this chapter of recommendations by transcribing the letter written by the boy himself, which is a model of its kind.

PHILADELPHIA, Feb. 13, 1825.

To the Hon. SAMUEL L. SOUTHARD,
Secretary of the Navy of the United States.

Sir,—Having long been anxious to adopt as a profession the naval service of my country, and being sustained in my wishes by the kindness of many of my respectable friends, I beg leave to solicit the appointment of Midshipman in the Navy of the United States. For my qualifications I would respectfully refer to the sentiments of my recommenders, assuring you at the same time of my earnest disposition to pursue such a course, if appointed, as will not cause my friends to regret their interference in my behalf.

I remain most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
JOHN DAHLGREN.

The place sought for was not obtained for several months, and meantime we open his journal of 1825, to trace his daily life. For some hours of each day he was employed as an amanuensis by the venerable Rev. Dr. Collins, the pastor of the old Swedes church, who gave him some slight compensation, the receipt and expenditure of which he noted with that scrupulous
exactitude which characterized him through life. We find by these accounts that the greater part of his little earnings were given to his mother. From this journal, which commences Oct. 18, 1825, we make here and there an excerpt.

Oct. 25, 1825. — At Dr. Collins' from 9\(\frac{1}{2}\) till 12 o'clock, A.M. In the afternoon went to see the Chev. Lorich,\(^1\) who lent me the 1st vol. of Franklin's Life, and the 2d vol. of Coxe's Travels.

Oct. 28. — Dr. Collins told me that he was going to publish a book relative to the Swedish settlements near Philadelphia. Time hanging heavy on my hands, I have written "A Fragment" for the "Saturday Evening Post."

Oct. 31. — In the morning accompanied Mr. Van Buren of New York to the Navy Yard. What most attracted my attention was the huge frigate which was building there. Mr. Van Buren not having any money but New York notes, and they not passing here, I went with him to John Gibbs, Broker, who exchanged them for Philadelphia notes at 1\(\frac{1}{2}\) discount.

Think of New York notes being exchanged at a discount in Philadelphia!

Nov. 1. — At Dr. Collins' from 9 till 12\(\frac{1}{2}\) o'clock. In the course of conversation the old man told me that he had been very intimate with Dr. Franklin; that he was with him in his dying hours, not as a clergyman but as a friend (an honor few enjoyed); and that he died a good man and an excellent Christian.

Nov. 2. — At Dr. Collins' from 9 till 12 o'clock. Having sold my library and being in want of books to read, Dr. C. lent me a book entitled "Tour to Morocco," which was very entertaining. In the evening went with Mr. Van Buren to the circus and saw there some of my acquaintances, viz. Willing Wharton, Wistar, etc.

\(^1\) The Chev. Lorich was the Chargé d'Affaires for Sweden to the United States.
Nov. 10.—At Dr. Collins, from 9 till 12 o'clock. Asked him for my baptismal certificate.

Nov. 11.—Have read "Guy Mannering" and "Tales of my Landlord," which I got out of the library. I paid at the rate of 6½ cts. per week per volume.

Nov. 12.—I have refused offers from the Consul General, of a Midshipman's and then a Lieutenant's warrant in the Columbian service. In order to obtain a knowledge of my intended profession, on the 30th of March, 1825, I embarked "before the mast" on board the brig "Mary Beckett," owned by Lyle and Newman and commanded by Charles Sandgren, bound for Trinidad de Cuba. On the 2d April experienced a very severe gale from the N.E., in which several vessels were lost, and on the 20th April anchored in sight of the town, after a passage of twenty-one days. The 23d May we again set sail from Trinidad for Philadelphia. On the evening of the 29th May the most severe gale that had ever visited the coast of the United States commenced. It lasted till the 4th of June. Twenty-four hours more and our fate had been sealed. We were doubling the northwest head of Cuba when it commenced. Not being able to carry any sail we were drifted by the current on the western coast of Florida, a lee shore. It was that eventful time that suggested the "Fragment." Upwards of fifty vessels perished, with all their crews, in that gale. However, I landed safe at Philadelphia on the 18th of June, 1825.

We think "The Fragment," which duly appeared in the "Saturday Evening Post," and was the first essay before the public, as a writer, of its author, worthy, after this interval of fifty years, of republication. It is from the "Saturday Evening Post" of Nov. 12, 1825.

A Fragment.—Too much agitated to retire to my berth, I threw myself on the cabin floor and soon fell asleep, dreaming of the various hardships to which we had been and were still exposed,—of our dreadful prospects. I already fancied I felt the shock of the vessel striking, and the cries of the sailors. The shrill whistle of the boatswain rang in my ears. I started
from my bed and fancied it a dream, but the hoarse cry of "All hands ahoy!" convinced me that it was dreadful reality; I was on deck in a minute. The vessel was lying to under a close-reefed main-topsail, and so strong was the gale that it alone was sufficient to heave her on her side; the bleached strip of canvas on the mizzen, that was exposed to the wind, was just discernible by the steady but feeble light from the battle lanterns on the quarter-deck, and the proud bunting at our peak was fluttering madly amid the blasts. The commander was standing near the wheel, with a desperate calmness stamped on his features, and with keen interest watching every plunge she made, and then gave his orders to the helmsman, in a low distinct voice, to "Ease her with the helm." All was confusion. The object of summoning all hands on deck was "to clear the boats and anchors and bend the cables," which being done, all retired to their berths who had been called up. Scarcely had I closed my eyes when the hoarse summons of "All hands ahoy!" called me on deck again. How different! The moon had just risen, the wind had abated in a great degree, and rendered the loosening of the topsails, fore, and main sail safe, and the orders were accordingly given. The order of "Ready about" was answered by a general cry of "Aye, aye, sir," and hardly had the words of "Hand-a-lee, fore-sheet, fore-top-bow line, jib and stay-sail sheets let go," issued from the master, before the helm was put hard down, and the gallant ship bore up, and looking in the wind's eye fell off majestically, as the yards were braced sharp, and bowing down to leeward seemed to fly from the dangerous coast which had so lately threatened us with destruction. — J. A. D.

This fine description, written by a mere boy, has the spirit of the old sailor. The journal says: —

Nov. 15, 1825. — In the morning wrote another piece for the "Post." In the evening Dr. Collins gave a party, to which I was invited, and of course was present. The old man was very lively; sang a song and told anecdotes; will be eighty years of age next July; came to America in the year 1770.

Nov. 18. — . . . Got "Undine" out of the library.
Nov. 23. — Got Sir Walter Scott's last novel out of the library. It is called "Tales of the Crusaders."

Dec. 28. — In the evening went to see Judge King. He had received a letter from Daniel H. Miller, M.C., which he gave to me. The contents related to my appointment in the Navy, and were not the most favorable.

Dec. 29. — Damp, cold, and rainy. Returned the "Monastery" to the library and got no other book out, not being able to afford it. In the afternoon wrote a note communicating the probable failure of my attempt to get in the Navy.

Dec. 30. — Wind N.E. and very high. Rainy. Judge King received another letter from Mr. Miller, but contained nothing decisive.

And thus closes the first journal book of the fatherless boy, which shows him brave in spirit, and calm under what must have been a severe blow. Even this depository of his inmost thoughts gives no indication of petulant complaint or of despondency in an hour of doubt and trial.
CHAPTER II.

A MIDSHIPMAN'S FIRST CRUISE.

Yet he was very near the desired goal, for his midshipman's warrant dates only a month later. The system of training for the Navy at that time, placed the youthful tyro at once on board ship, where he was expected to brave the hardships of the sailor's life at a tender age.

The experience thus gained in this harsh school, strengthened those who could endure the ordeal into a rugged vigor that made sailors of them, "every inch." The present needs of the Navy, however, have in part displaced the quarter-deck for the school-room, in the initiatory education of its officers.

We believe that Goldsborough was entered a midshipman at the earliest age on record, being only seven when a midshipman's warrant was obtained for him, although he did not really enter the service until four years later; while Farragut entered into actual service at nine years of age, under the redoubtable Porter. But the average ages of actual admission were very nearly then as now, from fifteen to seventeen years.

As the appointment sent to John Dahlgren is of itself descriptive of the plan then pursued, we give it entire. It reads as follows: —

NAVY DEPARTMENT, Feb. 1, 1826.

Sir,—You are hereby appointed an Acting Midshipman in the Navy of the United States; and if your commanding officer
shall, after six months of actual service at sea, report favorably of your character, talents, and qualifications, a warrant will be given to you, bearing date the same as this appointment. I have enclosed a description of the uniform, and requisite oath; the latter, when taken and subscribed, you will enclose to this Department, with your letter of acceptance; but your pay will not commence until you shall receive orders for actual service. You will also state the place and year of your nativity.

Respectfully, &c.,

SAMUEL L. SOUTHARD.

To Acting Midshipman JOHN DALGHREN, of Pennsylvania.

To which young Dahlgren responded:—

The Hon. SAMUEL L. SOUTHARD, &c.

Sir,—With the most grateful sentiments I acknowledge the receipt through the Hon. Daniel H. Miller of your letter of appointment constituting me an Acting Midshipman in the Navy of the United States. It shall be my future pride and pleasure to exhibit to you and those friends who have taken an interest in my fate that your favor has not been misapplied. I was born in the city of Philadelphia, in the year 1809, on the 13th November. I have enclosed the blanks forwarded me, filled up as you required, from which it will be perceived there is a small mistake in my name,—it being John A. Dahlgren; and I remain, with the most profound respect,

Your most obedient servant,

JOHN A. DALGHREN.

The correction of "the small mistake in the name" was doubtless repeated thousands of times, during the succeeding forty-four years of John Dahlgren's life, to thousands of persons who have never yet learned to spell it aright, and probably never will "stand corrected."

It will be noticed from the above letter that midshipmen were not then entitled to pay, after their appointment, until they had received orders for actual service and obeyed such orders. The warrant bore date with
their appointment, however, with the view of giving them their relative rank in the Navy. On the 12th April, 1826, he received orders from the Navy Department to "proceed to Norfolk and report to Captain James Barron for duty on board the United States frigate 'Macedonian.'" The next journal book is labelled "Private Journal of John A. Dahlgren, United States Navy, on board the United States frigate 'Macedonian,' on a voyage from Norfolk, Va., to the coast of Brazil;" and the first date is

April 23, 1826.—At 12 o'clock started from Philadelphia for Norfolk. . . . Captain Biddle, who goes out as commodore of the Brazilian squadron, was also a passenger in the steamboat. . . . Arrived at Newcastle at 4½ o'clock. . . . At 5 o'clock set out for Baltimore.

April 24.—We arrived there this morning at 2½ o'clock. . . . I first took my passage in the Norfolk steamboat, and as she did not start till 9 o'clock, I strolled through Baltimore. . . .

April 25.—After a passage of twenty-four hours I arrived at Norfolk at 9 o'clock. . . . I crossed the river to Gosport Navy Yard and reported to Commodore Barron for duty on board the United States frigate "Macedonian." . . .

May 16.—Dropped down between the forts, and hoisted the American flag for the first time.

June 6.—A very unfortunate accident happened to me this evening. It was my mid-watch from 12 till 4 o'clock. I was very sleepy, and the night very dark; in walking to and fro the quarter-deck I missed a step and was instantly precipitated down the hatch.

This mishap detained the poor boy several days in his hammock, in great pain, but proved to have no serious consequence.

Sunday, 11.—At 9 p.m. the pilot left us. His little boat had been hovering around us, at one time riding quietly on the crests of the waves, and at another shooting across our bows
with the swiftness of a dolphin, her long pennant streaming from her tapering masts.

July 29.—At half past six in the evening we crossed the Equinoctial Line, so celebrated for ducking and shaving; Commodore Biddle, however, would permit neither, rightly considering the practice as subversive of true discipline.

This frolicsome custom, here alluded to as displeasing to so dignified a disciplinarian as Commodore Biddle, was a sort of hazing of new men. The term haze is peculiarly a sailor's word, and this was a rough sport intended to try the spirit of the raw recruit. The modus operandi was somewhat in this wise. On crossing the line, a sailor personating "Father Neptune" arises all dripping from the briny deep and appears on the quarter-deck adorned with frosted beard, bearing his three-tined sceptre and wrapped in his mantle. All his subjects at once crowd around him. Then he sternly demands the new-comers, whereupon these unlucky wights are presented. Stretching forth his trident, "Father Neptune" orders that they shall be duly installed as his leal followers, when the poor sailor is at once seized and seated upon a cask which is filled with water and has a sort of trap top. After he has been rudely shaved with an iron hoop, the trap is suddenly sprung, and he gets a good ducking, amidst the uproarious mirth of the jolly lookers-on.

Thursday, Aug. 10, they made land near Cape Frio. On nearing the entrance of the harbor of Rio the next day, the journal says:—

We hoisted a "Jack," fired two guns for a pilot, and then hove to for a small boat with a lug-sail which was approaching us; within hearing hailed him three times. Upon his not answering, Commodore Biddle directed a musket to be fired over his boat; before this was done they let us know it was the
pilot-boat. He was a gray-headed dirty old chap, with no coat, and his shoes in his hand. He took us as far as the Sugar Loaf, where another pilot boarded us.

Here they met the "Cyane," and received visits from the French admiral and also the British admiral, the American chargé d'affaires, Mr. Raguett, the French chargé, &c. On all these occasions the usual salutes were given and returned, and on the 16th August they sailed for Bahia. Brazil was then at war with Buenos Ayres, and seemed to make small scruple as to the laws regarding the capture of prizes. For example:—

A Brazilian brig of war came in with a French ship and brig, an English brig and schooner, a Danish ship, and the American brig "Ruth,"—prize. The "Ruth" was one hundred miles from the coast when examined by the Brazilian, but her being bound to Buenos Ayres, then blockaded, was sufficient excuse to make her a prize! On her arrival Commodore Biddle sent Lieutenant Bigelow to the prison-ship, where the crew were immured, to inquire into their situation, which was quite bad enough. He also, on his return, boarded a French prize brig, and took out two seamen who had been transferred to her from the "Ruth" by the Brazilian. On Sept. 1 sent Midshipman Shaw on board the prison-ship for the purpose of liberating the American seamen confined there, which was accomplished. . . .

Sunday, Sept. 10.—About this time we received information of the deaths of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, upon which we hoisted half-mast colors and fired thirteen minute-guns at sunrise, noon, and sunset. . . .

Of the harbor of Rio he says,—

The entrance is narrow, and defended by a strong fort. On one side is a mountain about 700 feet high, called the Sugar Loaf.

About this time they sailed for Bahia (or St. Salvado). The journal says:—
The Commodore seemed determined that we should have a tolerably long passage, keeping under easing sail, cruising in all directions, and occasionally exercising the senior midshipmen in tacking and veering ship, for hours together, which prolonged our arrival at Bahia. . . .

Tuesday, Oct. 3.—Discovered land ahead, bearing W.N.W. At noon several catamarans, or fishing-rafts, in sight, from one of which we took a negro, who offered to pilot us into Bahia. The land appeared to be table land, with white sandy beach, and on nearing, trees were very perceptible. . . . Numbers of whales and other fish were sporting about the ship the whole day. . . .

The harbor of Bahia is fine, but rather open, and affords excellent anchorage for the largest ships. . . .

As regards diversions, the opera here is miserable, and excepting it, there is no place of public amusement, and not a public house of entertainment in the place. . . . One part of the town entirely overlooks the bay, and the view is really splendid.

Thursday, Oct. 12, being the birthday of his Imperial Majesty Dom Pedro, at noon we fired a salute of thirteen guns. The forts and Brazilian men-of-war kept up a continual feu-de-joie at sunrise, noon, and sunset. One fort in particular fired one hundred and one guns each time.

Friday evening, Oct. 13.—A grand ball was given to Commodore Biddle and his officers by the American merchants resident here. Although the entertainment was sumptuous and the preparations had, no doubt, been very costly, yet the manner in which we were treated was highly displeasing, and satisfied us that riches alone never will constitute the gentleman.

On Oct. 15 they left Bahia and stood out to sea.

Again they cruised about, the Commodore exercising men and officers in tacking, veering, &c., and they did not re-enter the harbor at Rio till Nov. 7. Here they found Commodore Jones awaiting their arrival. Commodore Jones being the senior officer, and some difficulties having occurred with two of the younger officers,
upon which a court-martial was ordered for the trial of
the offenders, we find the following reflections, which
almost excite a smile, on account of their gravity, coming
from a lad of sixteen. He writes:

The want of discrimination exhibited by the Navy Depart-
ment in the selection of the candidates for midshipmen, was
here the cause of some very disagreeable transactions. Never
should the defence of our country be entrusted to any but those
who are really worthy of that honor. Influence, however, pre-
dominates; boys so young as scarcely to have a grammatical
knowledge of their own language, are appointed warranted mid-
shipmen, and remain three or six years in service before they
are fit to leave home, receiving full pay, however, all this time.
Others really meritorious are with difficulty appointed acting
midshipmen, and cannot receive pay till they perform the
duties.

The Brazilian government having laid an embargo on
all vessels until further notice, on account of certain war-
measures they were taking, and our Commodore Jones
wishing to sail as soon as possible, the journal gives the
following characteristic proceeding of this doughty com-
mander. It says:

The government sent notice that he also must be subjected
to the embargo, and intimated the position of certain forts.
Finding that threats could not bend Jones’s determination,
they made it a request, in consequence of which he delayed it
till Friday, 17th November, when early in the morning the
“Brandywine” and “Vincennes” got under way, and all the boats
of the squadron were sent to assist in towing. The entrance
of this harbor is very narrow, and defended by several strong forts.
I was ahead of the “Brandywine” in the “Macedonian’s”
fourth cutter; as she approached the fort not a sound was to
be heard save the roaring of the surf and the rattling of rig-
ging; anxiety filled every heart. However, she passed in
safety, and with her consort soon took her farewell.
The "Macedonian" remained at Rio for a month after this occurrence, during which an invitation was accepted by our midshipmen to visit the American chargé, Mr. RaguET, who had been an intimate friend of Mr. Bernard Dahlgren, and warmly welcomed his son.

On the 18th December the "Macedonian" got under way and stood out to sea. The journal says, —

Sunday, Dec. 24. — About midnight experienced a most severe squall from the south. The darkness was impenetrable but for the vivid lightning which flashed around the apparently devoted ship from all points of the compass, the voice of the first lieutenant occasionally heard above the din of thunder cheering the men. These, with all the attending circumstances of a strong gale, rendered the scene really awful.

After this, passing the Lobos Islands, they came to the island of Goritty; here they received on board the crew of the American ship "Pactolus," which had been captured and sent to Montevideo on suspicion of an intention to break the blockade, — a rather liberal construction of international maritime law, we think!

On Saturday, Dec. 30, they anchored opposite the city of Montevideo, at the distance of seven miles. As they passed the "Ganges," the journal says, —

Admiral Otway came out in the stern gallery in his morning gown and waved his cap to us.

Quite free and easy for a British admiral!

The usual salutes were exchanged all around, there being various vessels in the harbor, and permission having been given to go on shore, Montevideo was visited Jan. 10, of which a very clear description is given. We quote extracts, as it may be of interest to present a pen picture of that period.

The market is an open square (plaza) allotted to this purpose. The vegetables are placed upon the ground and the meat
on stalls. It is not large, nor is there a great variety. The fruits are pears, peaches, figs, cherries, strawberries, &c.; the two former are small, but the last are as large and excellent as any I have seen; the beef is good, and very cheap now. Montevideo is a walled town, the streets regular and laid out at right angles, the houses well built and very durable, with flat roofs and parapets, &c. ... In the afternoon went outside the walls and took a walk in the country. All is quiet and peaceful. To look at the inhabitants working at their daily occupations, ladies walking in all directions, everything going on as usual, you would scarcely imagine that two contending parties lay within a mile or two from the walls. The patriots always respect private property.

The "Macedonian" remained at Montevideo until the 24th April, a period of over three months, principally spent in watching the various movements between the belligerents. During this time the army of the Argentine Republic secured a considerable victory over that of the Emperor of Brazil, and Admiral Brown had captured a Brazilian fleet of eighteen sail in the river Irguay. The monotony of the ship had become tiresome, and they were not sorry to take the last view of the "silver river," and get the ship under sail again. Even the excitement of a storm was welcome, as we find by the following real middy description:—

At sunset looked squally. Everything was soon ready for a blow, and we amused ourselves considerably by kicking up a dust with to’galt yards, storm staysails, &c. In the mean time the wind came round to the south and west, and soon raised a devil of a sea, our ship keeping admirable time to it, rolling her main-deck guns under, and, among other things never to be forgotten, demolished the fairer portion of the Mid.'s crockery. As she was making her way swiftly through the water, however, it occasioned less regret than it would have done under other circumstances.
They again anchored abreast of Rio de Janeiro. The following account of the condition of their ship is not flattering: —

Commodore Biddle commenced overhauling the ship, but finding her so thoroughly defective, gave her no more repairs than were absolutely necessary. She is rotten, leaky, weak, and eaten up with rats, and withal such a beast that had there been much sea on the 28–9th, &c. April, her masts would inevitably have paid the price of her rolling.

The following is an incident characteristic of the hospitalities of the times: —

May 24. — We were agreeably surprised to-day by a visit from the master’s mates and midshipmen of H. B. M. ship “Warspite.” As they threw aside all the etiquette of their service in paying the first visit, and seemed very cordial, we felt ourselves bound to pay them every attention. By dint of some exertion, punch, wine, and grog were prepared expeditiously and set before them; they stayed till sundown and did honor to our cheer. By the time we parted we were as friendly as if our acquaintance had existed for years. . . . Monday afternoon the visit of the English midshipmen was returned in due form, and as a mark of our respect for their friendly disposition towards us, we gave a general invitation to dine with us on the 3d June.

June 3. — The whole forenoon all was bustle and confusion,—quartermasters tricing up flags to serve as screens, steerage boys flying about like wild Indians, in fact in every part of the Mid.’s apartments were heard the notes of portentous preparation; the utmost skill was exerted by the most veteran connoisseurs to prepare a mixture of whiskey, lemon-juice, &c., alias punch, which, combined with other potables, should compel even the brain of an English mid. to bend before them. About an hour and a half after noon the deputation of H. B. M. ship “Warspite” was announced, and shortly after their reception all hands turned to. The Englishmen stood the attack well, but what could a few do against numbers? Two were snugly deposited in the cockpit, but no one could stand the third; it was like pouring
water on a hill of sand. He drank bumper after bumper, and posed about half of his antagonists.

Of course the rollicking sports of such a day ended in "a regular set-to" between the friendly parties of such hilarious frolic. We leave the moralizing to the temperance reformers, having given them a good text. A day or two later our Middy makes the following very sensible remarks:—

Commodore Biddle visited the French admiral, and was saluted with nine guns. As a commander of a squadron, Captain Biddle is entitled to as many guns as any admiral afloat, and has hitherto always received that number from the English and former French admirals. This ranks among the chief disadvantages of our present naval system. A post captain, although the highest grade in our service, and considered by our government as ranking with the full admirals of foreign services, will never be considered as such by them, nor even above the same rank in their own navies. The next day the French admiral came on board and was received with fifteen guns.

We make this extract, because these reflections will hold as good now as then, in case we should ever make the mistake of abolishing the present grades and reverting to the system that then prevailed. Off foreign stations the dignity of our officers must always be measured by their relative rank as compared with other nations, and we simply place them at a disadvantage in sustaining the honor of the country when we deprive them of such evidence of our own consideration.

A few days later the journal mentions that he had seen "the Emperor and Maria of Portugal."

Dom Pedro was in a phaeton, dressed in plain black clothes, and managed his horses with great dexterity; his little daughter was seated beside him, attired in second mourning, precisely similar to one of our fashionable women. She has a handsome
face and figure, and although only eight years of age, might easily pass for fifteen. The Emperor is a fine-looking man, and rather above the middle size. He was followed by a small party of cavalry, but no marks of respect were paid him by the people, nor did he seem to expect any.

Commodore Biddle about this time set sail for Pernambuco, where the ship made a desultory visit, soon returning to Rio. The most noticeable incidents seemed to be the meeting several slave ships from the coast of Africa and the chasing a buccaneer. After a somewhat monotonous interval of time, they again set sail and arrived at Montevideo. Soon after, Commodore Biddle having determined to send the "Boston" immediately to Buenos Ayres, our Midshipman requested permission to go there in this ship and return in her. His application having been granted, he set sail in the "Boston" Nov. 13, 1827 (his eighteenth birthday), and on reaching the place he at once hired a room ashore and remained in Buenos Ayres for some weeks. The journal gives quite a lengthy and very clear description of this city, from which we shall quote a few extracts, to show how little change time has made in the principal features of a South American town of fifty years ago, as compared with the present time.

The writer says:—

The land on which the city is located, and that surrounding, being very low, presents nothing striking or interesting at a distance by sea, but merely an extensive and ill-defined range of human habitations rising on the edge of the horizon; on a nearer approach, however, the shipping in the inner roads rises to view, and the unpleasing regularity of the houses is somewhat softened by the more natural appearance of the country about the Balcarce, and the singular variety of objects on the water,—boats, horses and carts, with their owners, being all huddled together.
A MIDSHIPMAN'S FIRST CRUISE.

The city is remarkably regular, the streets perfectly straight and crossing one another at right angles. They are conveniently wide, with paved walks on each side.

Then the eleven public squares, or plazas, are described, the richly ornamented churches, the theatre, the alameda, or public walk, and all with the most admirable lucidity. The pen-and-ink picture is so well defined that it, as well as the observations of the youth, show the culture and maturity of intellect he had already attained. The professional remarks about the harbor, the commerce of the country, the state of its navy, are worthy of a trained officer's eye. But these have lost their value, doubtless, through lapse of time. Of the men who were then commanding the Buenos Ayrean navy and fighting against Brazil, he says:—

Admiral Brown is old and very lame of one leg; his face is very red and weather-beaten; the expression is nowadays remarkable. I have seen him often, but never in uniform; his fool-hardy exploits are probably the result of a thorough conviction that nothing else will preserve him the confidence of this waver- ing government.

Grartfell has attracted considerable attention. His countenance is pleasant, but rough-featured; he lost his left arm in Brown's desperate action off Ensenada. Rynon has nothing remarkable in his appearance; his countenance is common, with slight expression of decision. Wales is his native country. Coe is small, but well made and extremely juvenile; he possesses a fine, frank, but decisive face; his gentlemanly manners and amiable deportment render him a universal favorite with superiors, equals, and inferiors, and these, joined to considerable personal beauty, make great impression on the fair sex. . . . The army is principally composed of liberated slaves and gau- chos. The former may be considered on a par with the Emperor's black soldiers, but the latter are a determined, fearless set. They wear handkerchiefs on their heads, and high black hats.
Ponchos, with coarse wide trousers, complete their dress. Their chief pride is in their horses and accoutrements. The stirrups and bits are frequently of silver.

The old story of the effect of a depreciated paper currency may not be irrelevant at this time. The journal says: —

The paper money was formerly as valuable as silver, but it has depreciated to such a degree that one Spanish is equal to four paper dollars; one paper dollar is worth eight copper reals. This is the only current money here at this time; all the gold and silver currency is retained, into whosesoever hands it may pass. The people, however, receive the paper with as much willingness as silver, whereas at Rio, although the milrea notes had not depreciated by half so much, yet tradespeople in several instances kept their goods rather than receive them in payment.

The journals, weekly and daily, are then spoken of, and comments made on their partisan and heated tone. He says, —

Politics run very high here, and editors when on opposite sides are extremely severe in reflections on one another. A short time ago, to such a degree was this carried, that one of the editorial corps used to carry loaded pistols, &c.

After about three weeks' stay at Buenos Ayres, the "Boston" got under way and stood down the river. When off Enseñada they were witness to a sea-fight between some Brazilian and Buenos Ayrean vessels. Upon arrival at Montevideo our Midshipman took leave of the "Boston" and rejoined his own vessel, the "Macedonian." Among the various incidents recorded in the journal of attempts to evade the species of blockade at that time instituted by Brazil, we transcribe an account of the "Yankee trick" of an American captain, who
thus saved himself from the disastrous consequences of an unsuccessful effort: —

Sunday, Jan. 13, 1828.—At daylight discovered the American brig "Rio" at anchor near the Mount; signal of distress at the main. Boats went from our ship, Brazilian "Admiral," and British ship "Alert," warped him off the rocks, and towed him into harbor. His tale was, that he had drifted there during the night; but the truth was, that under cover of the darkness he stood out of harbor and attempted to run up to Buenos Ayres. The wind hauling ahead after clearing the harbor, the captain found it impossible to beat, and having a perfect knowledge of the land, he chose a safe but apparently dangerous berth near a reef, and there anchored. Everything coincided so well that the Brazilians suspected nothing of his real intentions.

We transcribe the following, which is very characteristic of Commodore Biddle: —

Sunday, Feb. 24.—In the evening a large ship came in from the south and eastward and anchored about two miles distant from us. . . . Next morning it proved to be the United States ship "Boston," from Rio nine days. Also discovered at anchor to the westward the American ship "James Birckhead," from Rio.

Tuesday, Feb. 26.—The president of the Banda Oriental ordered the "James Birckhead" to be removed into the harbor. The admiral, Pintos Guesdes, likewise took away her register. The captain of the vessel complained to Commodore Biddle of these unjust proceedings, and all remonstrance from the latter having failed, next morning, Wednesday, Feb. 27, an armed boat was sent from the "Macedonian" with orders to get the "James Birckhead" under way and anchor her under the guns of the "Macedonian." The Brazilian force consisted of the "Principe Imperial," 64, and "Imperatrice," 32, and as resistance was anticipated, the "Boston" was ordered to drop in harbor and convey the "James Birckhead" out, defending her against the fire of the "Imperatrice." The "Macedonian" was likewise prepared for the "Principe Imperial," her decks
cleared for action, cable hove short, and topsails mastheaded. At 10.30 A.M. the "Boston" and "James Birkhead" got under way and commenced beating out of harbor. The Brazilian ships loosed sails. At 11.30 A.M. both ships anchored on our quarter. . . . Thus not a show of resistance was offered to us in bringing out the "James Birkhead," much to the disappointment of the inhabitants of Montevideo, who had assembled on their azoteas to view the sport.

As a sequel to this plucky action of the Commodore, —

*Friday, Feb. 29, 1828.* — Commodore Biddle demands the register of the "James Birkhead" from the Admiral. The latter replied that he had forwarded all the documents connected with the "James Birkhead" to Zuniga, President of the province, and referred the Commodore to him, at the same time accusing Biddle of infringing on his neutrality, and threatened to report his conduct to his government.

*Saturday, March 1, 1828.* — Commodore Biddle demands the register of the "James Birkhead" from Zuniga. After a deliberation of two days the contested documents were given up by the latter.

We give the following beautiful description of the departure of the Commodore from the ship, —

*Wednesday, April 2, 1828.* — It had been generally understood that the Commodore would remain here in the "Boston" and Captain Hoffman would take the "Macedonian" to Rio de Janeiro for the purpose of overhauling her rigging and hold. At 9 A.M. the t'gall't-masts were fiddled. Shortly after the gig was called away, and all the officers of the ship had assembled on the quarter-deck to bid farewell to their respected commander, the gangway and forecastle were crowded with seamen, and so perfect the silence that even the light step of the Commodore was heard as he ascended the ladder. He then approached the first lieutenant, and having communicated his last orders, turned hastily to the senior officers and bade farewell to each. He shook hands with each midshipman with a convul-
sive grasp as he uttered "Good-by, gentlemen." It was very plain that the feelings of the man were too strong to be subdued; the big tear, the pale cheek, the quivering lip alike proclaimed the distressed state of his feelings at parting with those whom he had treated like a father, and who had always showed the sense of the obligation. As he hurried over the gangway, the broad pendant slowly descended from its accustomed place, and a long whip fluttered in its stead. The gig passed under the stern, the word was given, and in a few moments the rigging swarmed with men. One roll of the drum and the air rang with hearty cheers; another and another; the burst of feeling was universal; the crew of the gig arose and returned the compliment, our old commander joining in the response. One more from the ship, the men slowly left the rigging, and all was as silent as the grave. At 10.30 p.m. his flag was hoisted on board the "Boston" under a salute.

At noon Captain B. V. Hoffman took command of this ship.

The "Macedonian" then proceeded to Rio de Janeiro, where she underwent the needed repairs. A little record about this time shows the filial devotion of the young lad, whose means were limited to his small pay.

Friday, May 9. — Yesterday I paid the city a visit; in the course of my rambles my attention was attracted by a pretty ring set with nine diamonds,—value, forty Spanish dollars. Where could that look better than on the hand of my dear mother? thought I, and in a few minutes my determination was put into practice.

May 20. — Fifty men were allowed to go ashore on liberty. They all returned, and fifty-eight more went on shore; and in this manner the whole ship's crew enjoyed a cruise on shore of two days, each man with five dollars in his pocket, which was generally disposed of before returning on board. This single act procured more popularity for Hoffman than all the acts of kindness which the crew had received from Commodore Biddle during his command of 22½ months, and which had always characterized his conduct to them during that time.
About this time "an expedition up the bay" is so well described in the journal that we shall give some extracts.

The bay upon which Rio de Janeiro is situated is of considerable extent; the eye is delighted by the wild, romantic scenery which encircles its shores, as well as by the traces of cultivation which extend themselves through its valleys. I had long thought upon a tour in this direction, but, as well as my brother mids, had been deterred from applying for permission to make the attempt by at least the culpable indifference, if not aversion, of our first lieutenant to our acquiring knowledge in any line not directly professional.

However, to my great surprise, upon making known my desire, he granted it immediately to the extent of his power. . . . Accordingly, having leave of absence for three days, with the second cutter and four men and a midshipman, sails, provisions, compass, chart, arms, &c., on Monday, the 26th May, at 1.40 p.m., left the "Macedonian" with a strong sea-breeze and stood up the bay.

All the incidents attending this first command of the future admiral are very minutely described, and were doubtless keenly enjoyed by the party; nor was he indifferent to the surrounding beauties of nature. He says: —

The scene was truly romantic and interesting; not a breath of wind disturbed the surface of the extended expanse upon which our boat glided; the rays of the setting sun gleaming on the water would well induce the spectator to imagine that the reflection was really what it appeared to be, a sheet of liquid fire from the orb of the bright luminary, while from the small bay formed by two projecting points of the island, and which we were rapidly approaching, the soft tones of a solitary flute rose upon the stillness of the evening, forming a striking contrast with the wild discordant screams of a flock of gulls which were hovering about a detached parcel of rocks. These
imaginary charms were, however, all the inducements which this place offered to a visitor. Substantial comforts there were none.

On the 18th August the following was handed him by the Commodore:

NAVY DEPARTMENT, April 14, 1828.

SIR,—The regulations of the Navy require that acting midshipmen, after six months' service at sea, should forward to the Department such certificate from their commanding officer as will entitle them to a warrant. If you wish to remain in the service, you will lose no time in complying with this regulation.

I am, respectfully, &c.,

SAML. L. SOUTHARD.

Acting Midshipman JOHN A. DAHLGREN, in the Brazil.

The journal remarks,—

It has always been the custom to receive the letter at the end of the cruise.

On Aug. 29, 1828, the departure of the "Macedonian" for home is thus chronicled:

We had now fairly taken our leave of Brazil, after an unexpected and protracted cruise of two years; it had been spun out to the last minute. The weakness of the ship was such as to render every exertion necessary to insure her safety at sea; her appearance was completely ruined by excessive hogging, and, "to cap the climax," the majority of the crew's time had expired, and considerable constraint had been used to prevent their leaving the frigate at Rio de Janeiro.

Such was the unsafe condition of the ship at the outset of their homeward voyage, when, on the 2d September, being only five days out, the most loathsome and dreadful disease made its appearance. A seaman had the small-pox in its most malignant form; and, although he was transferred to the after-part of the gun-deck and all communication cut off, except from those in attend-
ance on him, and the body of the poor man, who died, with bed and bedding, was instantly thrown overboard, yet all these precautions proved useless, for the disease had taken root. The journal says:

On the 22d September a headache which had troubled me for some days became so violent, attended with sickness of the stomach and extreme debility, that I was obliged to leave off duty and go on the sick-list. At this time the gun-deck was crowded with cots for the sick, and the odor was so offensive as to be hardly endurable. Meanwhile we had approached the line. The fresh trade had died away, and by day and night only the loftiest sails felt the light air. The tropical sun threw his bright and scorching rays on our miserable ship, and these were reflected from the mirror-like surface of the sea, heaving in one long swell, but smooth and unruffled. Now death added the last horror to the scene, and day after day witnessed the sailor's rites of sepulture; and it was shocking to see the remains of the dead denied an undisturbed grave in the great deep. The splash of the water was but the signal for myriads of sharks to rush to the spot for all that was left of poor humanity. In this manner the ship crept over the degrees of latitude nearest the equator, and it was not until she approached the United States coast and felt the bracing air of November that the loathsome disease was checked.

At one period there were forty-five persons on the sick report, all down with confluent small-pox.

Our Midshipman escaped with a mild form of the disease, and there is the simple record at the close of his malady,

Oct. 9.—I returned to duty.

Oct. 30.—The "Macedonian" anchored in Hampton Roads.

The writer has often heard the Admiral, in the last years of his life, forty years later, allude to the awful scenes on board this pest ship, and never without emotion. What pen can ever describe them?
CHAPTER III.

A CRUISE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

The ship in which John Dahlgren had passed his novitiate, the "Macedonian," had been one of the finest frigates in the British navy, and by the valor of Decatur now graced our list. Another ship of that squadron, the "Cyane," had been derived from the same source by Commodore Stewart, and by a curious coincidence the captain of the British flagship at Rio de Janeiro, where the ships first assembled, had commanded the "Cyane" when taken. Reverting to these circumstances in later life, Admiral Dahlgren says:—

Our midshipmen never heard any but respectful mention of our opponents, with full acknowledgment of the gallantry they had displayed; and many little occurrences indicated that the animosity of a past day had not suppressed the higher and nobler feelings. Thus, when news reached Rio that our ex-Presidents Adams and Jefferson had passed away, the commander of the British vessels present did not hesitate to half mast his colors with those of our own ships, in token of respect for the memories of these patriots; and yet they had once been proscribed as traitors by the British government.

Under such influences, and the inflexible practice of a stern disciplinarian like Biddle, who had also distinguished himself by the capture of the British brig "Penguin," was the first cruise made.

When this cruise of the "Macedonian" had been brought to a conclusion, young Dahlgren returned home
to spend a few months, and then left for service in the Mediterranean on board the ship "Ontario." Referring to the same notes, we find the following:—

Nothing could be more different than the circumstances of this cruise from those of the last. The "Macedonian" was, as became her record, a plain, well-disciplined, earnest man-of-war, regardless of paint and ceremonial, and the very atmosphere of the ship was that of 1812, with all its historic associations. But the "Ontario" was a light o' heel, rakish rover of a craft. Her captain, to be sure, had commanded one of Perry's vessels at the battle of Lake Erie, but he was still too young to be typical of a day gone by; a handsome, open-hearted sailor, with a friend in every man on board. The other officers had entered since 1812, and were to be the men of another day, among whom were Dupont and Davis, afterwards admirals, and Hollins, of Graytown memory. Nothing could be more perfect than the order and high finish of the "Ontario." The nautical critic could not detect a slack rope, or a mast of a line, or an unsquared yard, and her light, graceful hull shone in polished black. Our "first" was a love of a sailor, who waggishly reefed topsails in stays, looked well in his uniform jacket, and towards whom the sailors intuitively cast a smiling lurch of the eye; and as they sprang lightly up to the rigging at the first sound of the trumpet, but one spirit moved all. Duty was done with exactitude, but in a dashing manner, and when done, pleasure was hunted down with untiring zeal in all the gay rounds of the midshipman's life. From the United States to Gibraltar it was fun and frolic, yet without infringing in the least on duty or discipline. The Mediterranean was then, as it was in Cooper's day, and will so continue, the best school for an officer. The constant activity and habitual experience in handling a ship in close proximity to the shore, the entering and leaving all kinds of harbors, the contact with the finest ships of England and France, gives at once a standard for comparison, and one to strive to excel, if possible, while intercourse with the best officers of the service of these nations, as well as with the people of so many highly civilized courts, all contribute to stimulate sentiments and cultivate manners which no other naval station can supply.
In this school our Middy finished the nautical training so soberly begun in the quaint old "Macedonian," having had the advantage, with one or two other midshipmen, of taking the deck in place of a lieutenant, so that with the conceit of early years he fancied his sea education complete.

We find among the papers of Admiral Dahlgren an unfinished sketch, marked "Second Cruise—1829-30-31." It was never completed, nor extended beyond December, 1829; but such as it is, we think it best to publish it entire. The writer says:—

Early in November, 1828, I arrived at home in Philadelphia from a cruise in the Brazils. My mother was boarding at Mrs. Drummond's in Seventh Street, and there also I took up my abode. The time passed in agreeable intercourse with friends, and when this had been indulged in sufficiently, I applied for sea-service.

1829, June 5, date of orders to report for duty in the "Ontario" (Branch, Secretary Navy). By the 16th my equipment was completed, and I once more took leave of mother for a cruise. The time between Philadelphia and New York was 6 A.M. to 4 1/2 P.M. (10 1/2 hours). Think I remember taking steamboat to Bordentown, coach to South Amboy, steamboat to New York. There was no railroad. I put up at Bunker's Hotel, not far from the Battery, which, with the City Hotel not far above, were the principal hotels of the city. The Astor, Metropolitan, and all the city up that way were hardly thought of at that time. The next day I reported to the Commandant of the Yard, Chauncey, a hale old sailor, and on the morrow commenced duty on board the "Ontario." Gregory was Captain of the Yard. The "Ontario," just new from rebuilding, was a nice sloop-of-war of twenty-two guns,—all-a-taunto, but lacking a good deal below. As neither men nor officers were aboard, I put up at a house just outside the Yard kept by a gunner, Cobb, which was frequented by the officers.

Besides the "Ontario," at the Yard were the "Peacock," fitting for the South Sea; the "Natchez," nearly ready for sea; the
"Ohio," "Franklin," and "Washington," 74's, in ordinary; the frigates "Savannah" and "Sabine" on the stocks; and the famous "United States," in which Decatur captured the "Macedonian," and now used as a receiving ship, with only lower masts in and stripped to a girt-line; while just off shore were the remains of the "Fulton," but a few days since blown to pieces by explosion of her magazine, when thirty-five persons perished. The bodies floating up and coming ashore at times presented a horrid spectacle. This vessel was Fulton's great effort. If he had been a shipbuilder as well as an engineer, she would not have been the failure that she was permitted to become, lying for years, a mere wonder, and the advent of steamships thereby postponed for many years. Who would not help him? or would he not allow himself to be helped?

The progress on board our ship was slow enough, till one day orders from Washington said "Hurry." Then there was some bustle, gun-carriages and casks and water and provisions all shoved aboard in haste; the guns, too, 32-pdr. carronades and a couple of 18-pdr. Chase guns,—rather different tools from those which one of her officers would one day give the Navy to carry!

No crew was yet on board, the work being done by yard gangs and balls. Some officers, however, were here,—Dupont, a lieutenant, one day to be an admiral, and Whittle, who afterwards rebelled with his State.

Of the midshipmen, there was Walke, who was to do good service in the Rebellion; but Young, Johnson, Bannister, Macomber, are now all dead. The captain came along about the 25th, and took possession by hoisting the ensign and his pendant. In a day or two the middies commenced regular duty in watches. The glorious Fourth was duly honored by salutes from several vessels. Work still went on, but the crew were not on hand, so the captain had permission to open a special rendezvous, and Dupont and myself were detailed for this duty.

A few days after this the "Boston" came in from Brazil, having

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1 A few days earlier and I would have taken my chance in the accident, as the officers of the "Ontario" had been quartered there.
made the passage from Montevideo in thirty-five days. This was the shortest passage on record, and in keeping with the high repute of the ship. She was the first of the new class of sloops. It was rumored, however, that Captain Hoffman had taken leave rather unofficially, and would have to answer for it. He had been on the coast of Brazil thirty-nine months, and had fulfilled his term with Commodore Biddle. But Creighton, who came out in the "Hudson" (frigate), did not relish losing a fine ship from his ghost of a squadron, and withheld Hoffman's orders from the Department to return. Thereupon Hoffman took a chance at sea one fine breezy day, and hauled off. The Flag signalled in vain, and even tried to chase; but the "Boston" was too fast for that, and so "Bulley" Hoffman got away, but he paid for it. About the 15th July the "Ontario" hauled off from the wharf, and a week afterwards the officers were summoned to live aboard. Then the crew were brought from the receiving ship, and the special rendezvous was closed. By the end of the month the anchors and boats were in place, courses and topsails bent, and the men exercised at the guns for the first time.

August drifted away—the first half of it—amid the bustle and work of fitting things, animate and inanimate, into their places. The ship began to look to rights; one officer after another reported for duty; and at last, one pleasant day, the yard fasts were slipped and the ship drifted down the East River with its strong tide, then headed up the North River and anchored off the Battery.

Two or three days afterwards bluff old Chauncey came on board to inspect officially.

The yards were alive with men in their best trim, and the usual salute was fired.

On the 20th, Colonel Lee and his wife came on board as passengers. He was to go to Algiers as Consul-General. Next day his official salute was fired and the "Ontario" unmoored. Proceeding down the bay, she met the flood-tide off the quarantine, wind ahead, too, and anchored. When the tide slacked the ship was beat down the bay, but at dark had to come to inside the light-house.

On the 22d August the trim "Ontario" again weighed anchor,
and by the breakfast hour was rapidly passing Sandy Hook under a cloud of canvas. The little community she carried included some who had been, and others who soon were to be of mark, though most of them are nearly forgotten now in the lapse of only a third of a century.

Captain Stevens was a gallant man, in the prime of life, who had served with Perry in his glorious battle on Lake Erie. He commanded a little vessel and did his duty zealously. He passed away many years ago.

Dale was first lieutenant, a son of Commodore Dale of the Revolutionary navy, a tall, portly gentleman, stately and polished, a moderate seaman, and too easy to be a good "first." He has gone many years ago. Hollins was "second," a fine specimen of a "tarry" officer, such as the old seamen loved to look on. He was short and stout, with an abundance of black hair, a quick black eye, good-humored expression, a mellow and distinct voice,—a perfect seaman and splendid with the trumpet. Poor gentleman! After serving under the flag for many long years, when the Rebellion came he served against it.

Dupont was a "third." He was tall, and of very fine presence. A good officer, an accomplished gentleman in and out of his profession, with an irresistible voice and smile, and loved by men and boys, was Frank Dupont. He did his duty to the country in peace and war, and finally ended a grand career as admiral. Peace to thy ashes, gallant heart, loyal in every pulse!

Whittle Ogden was "fourth." A nice gentleman was Billy, and profound in the amenities of society. He, too, has gone.

Davis was the sailing master,—a passed midshipman with an acting appointment; he is still alive, and enjoying the dignity of a flag, and superintendent at the Observatory.¹

Of the midshipmen, the greater number have closed their career, and among them Bache, Young, Johnson, Macomber, &c. Walke is still alive, however, and has had many a hard-fought battle for the flag.

Of the passengers, Colonel Lee was highly gifted and a fine

¹ Rear-Admiral Charles H. Davis died at the Observatory during the winter of 1877, having survived the writer over six years. — M. V. D.
writer. There were three in the ward-room and five in the steerage, making in all sixteen full-grown men in the box of an apartment which was hardly large enough for two; and yet it might have been worse, as two were left behind. And so the little "Ontario" issued out on the broad Atlantic with many prayers from the closely packed inmates for a short passage across,—the shorter the more pleasant. Some two weeks of fair sailing bore ship and freight to mid-ocean, where a brief episode of stormy weather was destined to mark the way.

On the 8th September a gale was evidently brewing. As it came on the ship was gradually got under short sail, but, it seems, not short enough. She was running off S. E., with wind at S. W., under reefed courses and treble-reefed topsails, when about four in the afternoon the catastrophe came on us.

I had just finished my watch on the forecastle and was taking it easy on a locker, when in an instant the laboring ship was keeled over on her side so as to pitch me right on the deck. A young man of twenty served in such wise is soon on his feet; but I was only in time to be hustled with a rushing crowd to the nearest hatch, for the watch below, not able to escape by the usual hatches, made for those of the officers, and up together went officers and men. It is doubtful if those on deck knew clearly the sequence of events by which the ship had been brought to her beam ends. The atmospheric freak that had done the mischief was nothing more than the shift of wind from S. W. to N. W., so well known on our coast as destructive, if not well cared for. The "Ontario" had been running with the S. Wester on the starboard beam, and carried rather more sail than was prudent, though only a close-reefed maintopsail, fore and main spencers, and fore storm staysail. When the wind shifted so violently into a hurricane the helmsman must have luffed round following it, yet not as quickly as it shifted; so that, when the blow came, it took us about abeam, and the ship, being deficient in stability and over-masted, keeled over until the whole of the lee side, to the main yard, was down in the water. A few minutes in such a position would have been fatal; but happily the maintopsail sheets parted and the gaffs gave way, thus relieving the pressure of the sail. Meanwhile a few men, directed by the officers, had run aloft and cut the
gaskets of the foresail, the fore tack was boarded, the ship paid off like lightning, and was soon driving before the fury of the gale at the rate of a dozen knots. The scene was superb; such a sea had been raised that no little apprehension was still justifiable. Right over the stern the wave could be seen gathering and gaining on the ship, and presently it seemed like a dark wall of water ready to topple on the ship,—higher than her tops. This was the critical moment. If the vessel swerved she would be swung right round and keeled over. Fate lay in the helm; it was in skilful hands, and Hollins stood near the taffrail conning. "Starboard!" "Port!" "Steady!" The ship's stern was lifted on the mountain and then settled as the bow rose. Once the wheel was too late,— the sea came in on the quarter, snapped the boat at the davits like a twig, and flooded the decks, threatening to sweep every one away. Aloft, the maintopsail was threshing to ribbons in the gale. No one could venture there; the spences were adrift, the ports open, hatches battened down, abundance of water on the deck, officers and men in groups looking on at what no mortal skill could abate. Amid this scene of confusion and danger the sun descended below the horizon in a blaze of glory, and soon after the moon came up, undimmed, to light our stormy path.

There was no sleep that night for weary mariners; but when the sun once more returned the gale abated nearly to calm, and the watch was permitted to seek repose. When I gained the steerage the water there was still knee-deep; almost famished, I caught a floating biscuit, devoured it, laid my head on the table, and soon fell sound asleep.

In the discussion of this incident, general opinion found fault with the flat bottom and the lofty lower masts, not forgetting something of bad management in the bargain. There was occasion, however, for thanksgiving, for the "Hornet" perished in the same gale, a few hundred miles further south.¹

This storm was succeeded by good weather, and on the 17th September Cape St. Vincent came in sight. We neared it, then

¹ The writer remembers a spirited conversation about this storm, between Admirals Davis and Dahlgren, who were "middies," together on this ship. They both agreed that a more narrow escape from destruction could not have been made. — M. V. D.
squared away under stud-sails and stretched along the land. Next morning Trafalgar was visible. We passed the various headlands speedily, and as the afternoon advanced the great Rock of Gibraltar was seen looming up in the distance, and Ceuta opposite. How the grand masses of the two continents lowered on either hand of our ship! We were soon up with Cabrita Point, where the whole bay bursts into view. The big ships looked tiny enough under the shadow of that great granite Rock. The "Ontario" passed close by a good-looking frigate that flaunted the "Red Cross" flag, and dropped anchor about five o'clock. Next day the fortress was duly saluted, and replied. A French frigate, standing past us in a grandiose way, ran aground, and was floated with aid from Americans and English; so the next day the captain came on board to say "thank ye."

The claims of duty gave our "Middy" no chance to land for three or four days, but this indulgence was not needed to give interest to the visit.

As there is but a single landing-place for all comers, the crowd of boats seemed as difficult to penetrate as the defences of the Rock; but, struggling through all obstacles, one gains the narrow and irregular by-ways of the town, where you have the satisfaction of being hustled by Jews, Turks, and Christians, a picturesque if not savory throng, and, mixed amongst them, stout, ruddy Anglo-Saxons in British scarlet. Tired, if not sated, the cruise ashore ended with a dinner, which led to the impression that the fare of the place was as hard as its Rock.

After two or three more days, given to necessary ceremonial and for supplies, the "Ontario" was ready to proceed.

On the 24th September the anchor was weighed, and after butting an English packet in some involuntary evolutions, our ship moved from the anchorage, rounded Europa Point, and steered along the Spanish coast.

Our course lay for Algiers, in order to land Colonel Lee there; but progress was hindered by the adverse easterly wind. So we beat up along the Spanish coast to Cape de Gatt, then stretched over to the Barbary shore, and continued working to
windward until the 2d October, when the high land about Algiers was plain in view, away to the southward and westward some twenty miles.

Favored by a good breeze, we closed rapidly with the coast, which, on near approach, disclosed evidences of cultivated soil, dotted with numerous residences. But the city was as yet invisible, being shut from view by the elevation of the Cape. Passing this point, Algiers burst full upon the sight, its mass of white dwellings rising in triangular shape upon the ascending slope, until terminated in a point on its brow, crowned, as it were, by the residence of the Dey. This was a large square building, half palace, half fort, with bastioned angles and a tower in the centre, quite sufficient to protect the pirate prince and his treasury from any raid of his savage subjects.

Fringing the sea-front of the city, and close to the water-edge, frowned that line of famous batteries which had defied Christendom many a long day, and were not quelled even by that stout old Viking Exmouth, but were destined to yield at no distant day to the bayonets of the Fleur-de-lis. The breeze now began to decline, and barely fanned the "Ontario" to the anchorage. The sails were gathered to the yard, and an officer despatched to the shore to meet the usual formalities. A couple of hours elapsed, and our boat returned, followed by an Algerine in which was the Consul's dragoman, the Captain of the port, and some minor personages, all attired in Turkish costume, which was rich enough in the upper apparel, but rather curtailed in its continuation, so as to present the stout sunburned legs in most primitive nudity, and produce a contrast calculated to provoke critical remarks. Some twenty half-clad, dirty, swarthy Arabs, or Moors, served as the crew. Among civilized nations, a new-comer salutes the national flag first, but here the reverse is practised, probably in virtue of a present for the same. And so the Mole gave us twenty-one guns, which the "Ontario" duly returned. Then began a great commotion. Everybody was at work extracting the luggage of our Consul-General from every possible cranny of the ship, hoisting out boats, and cramming them to the gunwale. Such a turmoil must naturally exhaust itself before long, and at last we all
gathered to the gangway to say good-by to our shipmates, Colonel Lee and his wife.

This was done with regret, for in a sojourn of two months on board they had obtained the good wishes of all, officers and men alike.

The calm that had followed the sea-breeze was broken in upon about one o'clock by a good breeze from the land, the excessive sultriness of which impressed us very strongly with the difference between the winds of Africa and those we had left.

Late in the afternoon up anchor and out for sea, when darkness soon shut out the last glimpse of land. In a couple of hours some strange sail were visible at no great distance, the motions of which seemed to indicate them to be the French squadron of observation; for the Dey had given some cause of offence, and the Bourbon King was said to be meditating reparation. In the obscurity of the night we passed without question, indeed, perhaps unseen.

No great time was consumed in spanning the distance to Minorca, but much more in getting in after we made the island, which occurred on Sunday afternoon, signified by the towering peak of Mount Toro, that peered like a huge cone above the horizon; but the wind came out ahead, the sea was heavy, and the ship not at her best play under close-reefed topsails.

Next day it was noon before the weather moderated, but we could see Mala, the bluff but not very high cape that marks the entrance of Mahon harbor. Neither the compliment of a gun, nor a light, served to bring out old Pons, but the next morning the needed functionary got alongside about nine o'clock, and in an hour or two contrived to anchor the ship safely in this most snug of harbors.

Not far from us was the "Java," a fine frigate built in memory of the British ship sunk by the "Constitution" in the late war, and in the upper harbor the "Delaware," a grand sample of the finest line-of-battle ships, wearing the broad pendant of Commodore Crane, that fluttered from the lofty masts which towered above the intervening land.

The "Warren," too, was there, and a French squadron, consisting of a ship of the line, a frigate, and three brigs. Having duly
saluted the "broad pendant," our skipper proceeded to make himself very comfortable with anchors and hawsers, as if for a "full due;" but he speedily learned otherwise, for on hearing that we had not brought away the old Consul from Algiers, signals were soon out to go back and do so.

Accordingly, early the next morning the anchors were up, and after breakfast the "Ontario" was at sea scampering southward before a fresh nor'-easter, which looked like a gale by midnight, but moderated as we neared the African coast. The next day the land was seen early, and several vessels nearer to us, which soon showed the French white,—a frigate, barque, and brig. As they clearly intended to have some parley with us, being close aboard about noon, the "Ontario" ruffled her feathers like a game rooster, showed her bunting, shortened sail, and coming to the wind with the maintopsail to the mast, fired a lee gun in token of "at your service." Thereupon the French barque sent a boat to us, a few pleasant words passed, and the "Ontario" filled away for Coxines.

This was the French blockading squadron, but too distant to meet its purpose. It was dark when the waning breeze had carried the ship near enough to anchor off Algiers,—and pretty far off too. Next morning the Captain sent down to the steerAGE a general leave to visit the place,—an opportunity very quickly taken advantage of by every one that could be spared. Great things were done in the way of renovation and preparation within the narrow limits of middies' apartments, for not one had seen Algiers before. So nothing less than swords and cocked hats would serve, and after the serious operation of boating five miles under an African sun, each and all stood on the mole duly equipped according to regulation. In brief time we were threading the narrow streets under the guidance of a native, gazed at from every hole in the walls and by troops of vagabonds in the streets, until sheltered in the friendly domicile of our quondam shipmate, the Consul-General. Then, fortified with a suitable guide, we commenced a general cruise in this city of lanes, and in due course reached a building used as a menagerie by the Dey. Some magnificent brutes were here in custody,—huge ferocious beasts fresh from the desert or the mountain, very little like the poor sheepish lions and tigers.
palmed off on us at home, but raging savagely to get loose from their bonds. Descending from the upper story and about to pass out, we encountered a number of French sailors, who had been wrecked in a brig of war, and thus captured. Some of them had been put to death on the spot and their heads shown about the town. The others were here, liable to any fate. Poor fellows! we sympathized with them as fellow Christians, and gave them what money and tobacco we had. Happily the end of all this was not far off. Before another year should roll around, the pirate flag was to give place to a Christian banner, the Crescent to the Cross, and the scimitar go down before French bayonets.

Sunset came, and soon after we again trod our own decks, well satisfied by the fatigues of the day to do so.

The next day the late Consul, Mr. Hodgson, came on board, and the ship was again got under sail. Light winds lengthened the period of transit, but at last Minorca hove in sight, the pilot came alongside, the narrow entrance was safely passed, and the ship secured head and stern by anchors and hawsers. We found what we had left here,—the Commodore, with the “Delaware” and “Jura” and “Warren,”—and the French squadron too.

On the next day we had a glimpse of an American frigate off the harbor, which we divined could be no other than the “Constellation,” expected here with the new Commodore. A wholesome fear of dry soil kept her off for a couple of days; but, tired out on the third, the ship was run close in to the mouth of the port, whence some strings of boats from all ships pulled her to the anchorage among us. Commodore Biddle was on board, as the relief of Commodore Crane, whose term had expired.

Being under quarantine, coming from Algiers, the spare time was used in rubbing off the rust of sea-cruising, and polishing up in a variety of ways. The ten days of probation wore away in due time; pratique was given, the dirty old “Sanidads” were hustled ashore, and the ship warped from quarantine limits near the other vessels.

Then came the rush of tailors, shoemakers, and washerwomen,—the whole tribe of Ponces and Orfilas, but only one Gilbert,
one Cacho,—gentle, smooth, intelligent Gilbert, so patiently waiting his turn to measure you for boots, and round, ruddy-faced Cacho,—our host of date-fish soup memory, and woodcock and monkey soup!—only too anxious to introduce you to his fare, which some sixty days on salt grub have made you all too willing to know! What a Babel of English and Spanish and Mahonese, and a queer jumble of all three into the slang made use of by those who are perfect in none! Each and all of the natives wish to conciliate your good-will with a present of grapes and kill-jacks, and many delicacies not conceivable elsewhere; and not merely dainty parcels provocative to a hungry palate, but great baskets filled, that the box of a steerage finds not space for. How these famished middies dip in! These pleasant Mahonese are a neat, tidy, painstaking people, and what they bring will bide the instant imposition of hands. While hands and mouth are filled with these grateful offerings, some Pons or Orfila is serenely passing his tape about your person, seeking the proper dimensions for the garment which you have instantly ordered, or that prince of leather, good Gilbert, has you seated and is genteelly manipulating your foot.

The same services have been rendered to generations of squadrons before. These people, or their progenitors, have ministered in like wise to Perry and Decatur and Morris, and all our naval standards in days gone by, doing their office so faithfully, so meekly, and so cheaply, that their memories are borne along in the tide of time with all the recollections of pleasant things when we were young and "Mahon fuit."

But the day wanes; our visitors, one by one, having fulfilled their mission, glide ashore in their neat, comfortable skiffs, and that evening most of the Ontarios realize practically the merits of Mahon.

On the 22d October, Commodore Biddle hoisted the Red Broad Pendant on board of the "Java," which saluted and received a like compliment from the out-going power in the "Delaware." The departing Commodore also notified, with punctilious propriety, each commander, in writing, of the change in command. This is more commendable than the slovenly practice of later days, which seems to leave such things to chance or intuition.
Once more getting ready for sea, water and provisions aboard and a cargo of spare articles ashore, yards, spars, and rope,—the allowance for the cruise. Our purpose was to land Mr. Hodgson at Marseilles, so the "Ontario" was once more "in the open" on the 28th. The breeze was ahead, strong enough for reefs in the topsails, and the sea was rough. This made our guest very sick, and the wind being ahead, he was glad enough to prefer an easy run to any other port; so we bore up for Barcelona, and soon made the Spanish coast, but light baffling winds kept us off till the 31st, when we anchored off the place. So soon as a boat could be got ready the Consul went ashore.

The customary course was got through without delay. Our officers wandered ashore, some Spanish officers visited the ship, salutes were duly exchanged, and before sunset the "Ontario" was under all sail steering southerly,—her destination Gibraltar.

The wind was light and ahead, and the slow process of beating to windward was the only resort. Day after day improved one's acquaintance with the Spanish coast, which was not considered worth that expenditure by the impatient masts. But on reaching Cape de Gatt a friendly Levanter picked us up and quickly carried the ship to Gibraltar.

On the tenth day the great Rock was in sight. We rounded Europa Point and anchored near the frigate "Dartmouth," of some notability as having fired the first shot at Navarino.

The business here required no great time to effect, being merely to procure the amount of specie presented to the Dey of Algiers when a new consul makes his bow,—another name for the tribute paid the savage for abstaining from plundering our merchant vessels and making slaves of the crews. A little of our native iron would have been vastly better! However, the dollars were obtained and stowed away safely, and on the 16th November the "Ontario" was under way standing out of the Bay of Gibraltar. Troublesome times were ahead for us. The light westerly breeze carried the ship some thirty-five miles from Gibraltar, then died away; a calm, and then came out the Levanter,—E. S. E. to S. E.,—thick, heavy weather, with squalls and sea. The light canvas had to come in, one sail after another, until
midnight found us with three reefs in the topsails, and before
day broke it blew a gale, ship lying to under try-sails, then the
wind abated. Spanish coast being seen ahead, sail was made,
and through the day the beat was not bad; but this is not the
play of the "Ontario" in much sea. Darkness seemed to renew
the gale, and the ship was soon brought to low canvas, and so
we lay during all next day and night. Now it was evident that
we were doing no more than drift to leeward, wearing the ship's
head one way or the other as the land of Spain or of Africa
came in sight; while even the small comfort permissible at
sea vanished, for the decks were strained open so that every
seam let water on us below: it fell on the tables as we ate, and
soaked our bedclothes at night. The consequences of these
hardships were injurious to many, and fatal to some. The next
day brought a repetition of these evils, and another trouble.
Our drift must have consumed most of the distance that had
been made from the Straits, and the speedy appearance of land,
on either bow, as the ship was worn on one tack or the other,
confirmed this opinion. The ship would evidently be unable to
claw off if gotten too near, so that the Captain resolved to run
for the passage. At ten o'clock bore up off the wind and made
sail. Went before the gale for three hours or more, but caught
no glimpse of what was sought through the thick air, so very
reluctantly shortened sail, and came to the wind for the night.
There was companionship in our perilous situation, for vessels
of various rigs were doing their best. The Sabbath followed,
and brought the crisis. As the sluggish light of a November
morning lighted up the heavy clouds, the dim outline of high
land peeped through and aroused general attention. It seemed
to look on our decks, and the hint of such proximity made
movements very lively. In a smart ship like the "Ontario" it
was the work of a few minutes to get head off shore and get
under fully, under command. About the middle of the fore-
noon the heavy clouds opened sufficiently to give us a glimpse
of the Rock. It was very lucky, for in the severe gale that
was going we were just sure of room to weather Europa
Point. The ship bore up, and sail was made to full courses,
topsails reefed. The "Ontario" bounded madly under such a
pressure, but was kept to the due course; as we neared the
Rock, a large brig was plainly visible ashore in the bight, and, not being able to claw off, was lost,—the sea making a clear breach over her.

About noon we were rounding the Point, and soon after anchored near the inevitable "Dartmouth," well pleased to get out of that scrape, and unconscious that some trouble was still ahead. During the night the gale continued, though under the lee of the neutral ground and the Rock, with two anchors, we could afford to let it pipe. No abatement by day, and rather worse as night came on again, wind changing to S. E. and the rain falling heavily. A little after midnight of the 24th the gale came out in an instant at S. W. with increased violence, making no little change in affairs; for now both wind and sea came full up the bay, sweeping fairly at us, protected no longer by a friendly shore. There was no time to lose; down went the sheet-anchor, lower yard, and all upper spars. The ship rode bravely to it, and might well do so, as no great drift would take her ashore. But the great rolling sea would often rush clean over the decks from one end to another. So we spent that day and most of the next night; then the storm seemed broken. It had done mischief enough; for when day came in, nineteen vessels were discovered ashore at the head of the bay.

Four or five days passed by before the weather recovered its good humor; but at last the westerly wind set in steadily from the Atlantic and brought a fine sky. Just on the point of tripping the anchor a bearer of despatches came to Commodore Biddle from the United States, which properly altered the immediate destination to Mahon; so thither we went. The wind was "e the shoulder of the sail" and strong, so the ship ran along merrily 7 to 10 ½ knots the whole way, and in some seventy hours came up with Minorca early in the morning, the wind so capricious that in a few hours studding-sails gave way to close reefs; but as we drew near to the entrance it moderated so as to permit some reefs out over courses. In we went, passing a Dutchman who was grounded on the reef off Fort St. Philip.

The "Delaware" had departed home, but the "Java" and "Constellation," "Warren" and "Lexington," lay in their
former berths. This was Wednesday, and that day week found us again on the move, with scarcely time to replenish our mess chests, and renew a short acquaintance with the magnates of Mahon.

It is to be supposed that the Broad Pendant liked to see how his squadron looked together, so the three ships sailed out in company, the "Java," "Warren," and "Ontario." The "Constellation" had gone to Gibraltar. Having cleared the harbor, the Commodore, with the "Warren," steered for Malta, while the "Ontario" looked towards Algiers, anchored there in good season, sent the specie ashore, and in three hours was bound back to Mahon. But calms and light airs lengthened the passage to nearly seven days. Even then our boats were needed to get into the harbor, and in so doing passed the English ship "Pelous" hard and fast off St. Philip, and leaving us just room to pass in. We found the French and Dutch squadrons still there.

Coming from Algiers meant ten days' quarantine, of course; so up went the yellow at the fore, and the Sanidads took bodily possession of us.

The wear and tear of men and ships cruising here during the winter months has almost made it a custom to keep ships of war in port whilst the stormy weather of the season prevails; a further reason being that the general character of the Mediterranean harbors affords no convenient anchorage for national vessels calling incidentally on their ordinary business, the artificial ports created by moles being only adapted to crowd in small merchantmen, like so many herrings, and the roadsteads too exposed and distant for easy communication with the shore.

There are some very fine harbors, such as Toulon, Malta, &c., but these are the depots of France and England, and all their facilities are required by their own fleets. Nor is unrestrained intercourse with republicans acceptable in monarchies, for their very presence is suggestive of political tenets rather stimulating to the great masses.

Mahon is free from all these objections, and has a harbor not surpassed in the world. It is a paragon of the kind, — a perfect basin, — cut, as it were, into the soft volcanic rock that forms the
island. The water is deep enough for the heaviest three-decker, the banks steep, too, so that you rub your sides when you touch bottom. It is bluff, and just high enough to protect the hulls from a gale, the heaviest of which raise no sea within. It is easy of access from without, and never a lee shore, as the gales here do not come from the southward. To these natural advantages is added the extensive navy yard, with its ample buildings and appliances, as left by the English when they finally abandoned the island, probably because the acquisition of Malta rendered it unnecessary to them.

Then, as to any danger of republicanizing the Ponses and the Orfilas and the Diegos of Minorca generally, even Spanish hidalgos would deem the idea a supreme joke, of no more importance to them than the particular political creed of St. Helena would be to England. The presence of our squadron is probably even acceptable, as it gives the benefit of a large cash expenditure to a worthy people who otherwise would suffer, or be obliged to seek a livelihood elsewhere.

The continued intercourse of nearly half a century has begotten a feeling of the kindliest character between the townspeople and the Americans. The latter are always at home in Mahon, as one would suppose by the liberties our seamen take occasionally with the small Spanish guard maintained here.

One would suppose that so fine a harbor as Mahon would be appropriated by the power to which it belongs for its own use. But Spain has two seaports (Cadiz and Carthagena), which not only afford all the conveniences required for her navy, but are also secure against any maritime enterprise during war, while history shows that Minorca is entirely at the mercy of any great naval power that may temporarily dominate in that quarter.

Even Great Britain lost it twice during periods of her greatest power on the ocean,—once in 1756 and again in 1782.

The Spaniards also lost it in 1708. The island produces no more than will scantily supply its small population, and so Spain, having no occasion for its use, makes no objection to the presence of foreign squadrons, even from republican states. And thus we find in Mahon exactly what our national vessels
most need in the Mediterranean, particularly as the English fleet makes its headquarters at Malta, and the French at Toulon.

So our ships seldom pass Mahon, in the cruising season, without touching for stores or letters; and if a quarantine is to be performed, nothing can be more convenient than its spacious lazaretto. When the winter storms prevail, it is usual for all the ships to assemble there and seek its friendly shelter and refit, renew old friendships, and rest after the continued labors of cruising. Jack, too, who can seldom land elsewhere without being pounced on in his unguarded moments by some crabbed policeman, safely treads the dry soil of Minorca and never finds monotony in the unvarying round of a day ashore in Mahon. Plenty of kill-jacks and liquor, a jackass ride, and a regular spree ending in a row with the Spanish guard, and perhaps a lock-up in the calaboose, were to him pleasures as simple as unexceptionable. The good people of Mahon, looked with compassion on these eccentricities, as an infirmity inseparable from a nautical nature, for they knew that these roaming, rollicking tars were kind and charitable to their own poor who flocked around the ships, and never failed to give them a hearty welcome, when (God help them) no other help was there for them. Just about the meal hour, little skiffs in compact masses were wont to beleaguer each ship, and the shrill piping of the boatswain and his mates summoning the sailors to their meal was a signal for a general rush of the Mahoneses to the gangway. Over they came like a storming column, women and children, and were quickly distributed among the messes with the familiarity of guests long accustomed to the hospitality. Perhaps, indeed, some brought small offerings of fruit or other delicacy, or a drop of the "crittur" dexterously concealed within the brown skin of a sausage, a token of devotion most heartily appreciated by Jack, inasmuch as its discovery brought sundry pains and penalties to all parties. Nor was it easy to escape the vigilance of the sharp-eyed master-at-arms who stood at the gangway, a terror to such offenders.

At this point, the "sketch," as written by the Admiral himself, is broken off, and we now turn to the material
left by his various journals, in order to continue the narrative of his life. There is a hiatus in the private journal from Nov. 7, 1829, to June 19, 1830; but we see in the ship's record, that he kept with admirable precision for his own use, that in this interval of time the "Ontario" got under way and put out to sea from Mahon, stopping at Barcelona, then beating along the Spanish coast as far as Gibraltar, from Gibraltar to Algiers, then returning by the last of November to Gibraltar, there taking on board a bearer of despatches to Commodore Biddle at Mahon. The "Ontario" stood in for Mahon Dec. 2, and again stood out to sea Dec. 9, and sailed for Algiers with six boxes of specie,\(^1\) returning to Mahon about Christmas, where they found the French squadron in the lower harbor and the Dutch squadron in the upper. During the months of January and February, 1830, the "Ontario" was busy overhauling sails and rigging, and painting the yards, the guns, the outside of the ship, and so on. We note, Jan. 18, "Sent some of the carpenter's gang aboard the English sloop 'Pelous' to assist in repairing her damages;" and again, Jan. 28, "The American squadron hoisted the English ensign and jack in honor of the accession of George the Fourth," showing the friendly feeling existing between the American and British navies at that date. Early in March a voyage was made from Mahon to Marseilles, returning to Mahon and sailing thence in April to Algiers, taking as passengers to Mahon on their return, April 15, the families of the Danish and Spanish consuls at Algiers. Another voyage from Mahon to Tunis, from Tunis to Gibraltar, and back to Mahon, occupied the month of May. They sailed from Mahon

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\(^1\)$17,000 in specie, for presentation to the Dey, being the usual compliment, or rather tribute, on a change of consul.
in June; and the 19th June, "at sea," the journal resumes:

The ship is making her way through the water with a fine breeze from the N. E. On the weather-bow the "Constellation" presents a beautiful appearance. We have cruised together for months, and without her I should really feel lost. In storm and calm we have been companions, and we shall part with some regret. Since the 7th November our lot has been a checkered one; much has been risked, much enjoyed. New inmates have not disturbed the tranquility of our little ship, and when I look back on the past, there is nothing that I would now wish otherwise.

These ships now cruised continuously, first along the coast of France, then of Italy, touching at Genoa, Leghorn, and on the 8th August entering the Bay of Naples, from thence again reaching Mahon in September, spending the month of September at Mahon; during October another voyage from Mahon to Gibral-tar and back to Mahon.

In November, 1830, the monotony of these repeated voyages to and from the same ports was varied by a voyage from Mahon to Smyrna.

Nov. 29. — Weighed anchor in the Bay of Smyrna. The Austrian commodore visited the ship. Saluted him with thirteen guns. A shot which had been suffered to remain in one of the larboard guns struck the main boom of a Dutch gun-brig, cut away the main lift and brace of a French gun-brig, and passed through the side of an Austrian merchantman!

This is the quiet announcement, in the Middy's journal, of this luckless incident, to which I have heard the Admiral refer, some forty years later, with a merry twinkle of his eye, while describing the utter consternation of the volatile Frenchman and the quiet amazement of the phlegmatic Dutchman at this unlooked-for freak
of an American gun,—a gun which was not "a Dahlgren." Resting in the anchorage of Smyrna the greater portion of the time, and without special incident, the months glided away until the return to Mahon in May, 1831. Nearly a month was passed at this harbor, during which Captain T. H. Stevens relinquished the command of the "Ontario" to Captain W. L. Gordon. The last of June another voyage was made to Marseilles; and on the return of the "Ontario" to Mahon, Aug. 27, 1830, Midshipman Dahlgren joined the "Brandywine." He had been ordered to the "Ontario" June 17, 1829. It may be interesting to know who were the officers of the United States ship "Ontario" at that time, as some of these names of old comrades have since made history. They were:—

G. N. Hollins, First Lieutenant.  "  D. Cameron.
S. F. Dupont, Second "  "  J. A. Dahlgren.
A. E. Downes, Third "  "  T. P. Green.
W. S. Ogden, Fourth "  "  E. R. Thomson.
C. H. Davis, Fifth "  "  W. S. Young.
Passed Midshipman C. McBlair,  "  B. I. Morelle.
Acting Sailing Master.  "  R. E. Johnson.
Midshipman B. W. Hunter.  Dr. J. Plummer, Acting Surgeon.
"  J. P. Parker.  J. C. Hall, Acting Sailmaster.
"  C. Macomber.  J. Lewis, Acting Boatswain.

On the 8th September, 1831, Midshipman Dahlgren was assigned to duty on the United States frigate "Constellation," Captain Wadsworth, then in the harbor of Mahon, and Oct. 5 she set sail homeward for the United States, and about sundown, Nov. 12, 1831 (the eve of Dahlgren's twenty-second birthday), she anchored near Norfolk, her crew being discharged. Historic events had not been wanting to give interest to
this cruise, and our Middy witnessed the transit of the French armada to Algiers, which soon after passed from the Crescent to the Cross; and one day the “Ontario” sailed into Marseilles to find the drapeau blanc displaced, and supplanted by the Tricolor with all the emblazonry of the Empire. But this episode of life had its end, and Dahlgren returned to the United States to stand the customary examination.
CHAPTER IV.

A PASSED MIDSHIPMAN. — THE COAST SURVEY. — PROMOTED TO A LIEUTENANCY. — THREATENED LOSS OF SIGHT. — THE FARM LIFE.

On Nov. 16, 1831, a leave of absence for three months was granted Midshipman Dahlgren, but in consequence of an approaching examination, he requested to spend the time at the Naval School at Norfolk. *Sic itur ad astra!* This school was at that time under the direction of P. G. Rodriguez, Esq., and was a sort of precursor of the present system of instruction.

Before leaving the "Ontario," the Captain had given him the following very flattering letter, addressed to "The President of the Board of Examination."


Sir,—Midshipman John A. Dahlgren, who will deliver to you this letter, has served for two years in this ship under my command, to my perfect satisfaction; and I desire to present him to the Board, as possessing in an eminent degree those attributes of the officer and seaman which will, I trust and believe, eventuate in much future usefulness to his country and reputation to himself.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

THO. HOLDUP STEVENS.

The name of John A. Dahlgren appears number nine among the thirty-one who passed the examination in April, 1832, of the seventy midshipmen of 1826.
It is curious to trace the recorded career of these seventy midshipmen of 1826, and note what had become of them during a period of forty years. In 1866, of this number there were,—resigned, 27; died, 18; dismissed, 9; on the active list, 9; on the retired list, 6; no account of, 1. Total, 70. Of the nine on the active list, two were Rear Admirals, four Commodores, and three Captains. Of the six on the retired list, one was Captain, four were Commodores, and one was Lieutenant.

Of the two Admirals, John Dahlgren was one; and yet of these seventy young men who in 1826 entered the service of their country, each one trusted to reach its highest naval honors! How suggestive are these figures of the illusory nature of human hopes, and the relative proportion between those who aspire to and those who gain the prizes in any profession. John Dahlgren received a Passed Midshipman's warrant, and we find a detached note in which he says:

I had now served a faithful apprenticeship to my profession, extending nearly to the term of seven years, prescribed by the oldest usage to make a master in any craft, and so I naturally looked to some result; but it came not.

That bane to the Navy, "lack of advancement," was already exerting its deadening influence. A new grade, Passed Midshipman, acting only as master, intended to meet the evil, utterly failed of its purpose. The young officer who knew that he had passed through a more complete training than had any who had preceded him could not be contented to serve another term in a capacity far short of the coveted epaulet.

In January, 1833, John Dahlgren applied to be detailed to the "Philadelphia Rendezvous," but the complement of officers had been sent there before the receipt of his letter. The laudable desire to be near
his widowed mother, to whom he was tenderly attached, had its weight in making this application. Somewhat later, in April, 1833, he was ordered to the United States receiving vessel "Sea Gull," Lieutenant Charles Gauntt commanding, and Commander James Barron, at the United States Naval Station, Philadelphia.

To remain idle was not in his nature, and ever desiring to add to his stock of knowledge, he studied law during the leisure of duty on a receiving ship. We have before us a series of very carefully prepared "Notes on Blackstone," made by him in 1832–33. These notes evince an attentive study of English history, and give an able analysis deduced therefrom, in connection with the masterly teachings of this writer on law.

The duty at the Rendezvous was only temporary in its nature. In August, 1833, he was ordered to assist in transporting a draft of men from Philadelphia to Norfolk. About this time the precarious state of his health rendered it necessary to ask for leave of absence, which indulgence was granted by the Department, and extended from month to month as his continued physical feebleness required, until Feb. 10, 1834, when he was ordered for duty connected with the survey of the coast, and to report to the Hon. R. B. Taney, the Secretary of the Treasury, for such duty.

The Admiral says, in a desultory note, speaking of the beginning of the Coast Survey:—

This great national work was just about to be renewed by the vigorous action of General Jackson's administration. It had been begun more than twenty years before, but after struggling for a few years against the difficulties of a first inception, it was stifled by adverse influences and was forgotten save by the vigilant eye of its project, Mr. Hassler. And to him was again confided its fortunes, this time to be triumphant over all
opposition and to be launched on a successful career, which has not ceased to increase in importance, until the Coast Survey is now recognized as the great scientific institute of the United States.

Mr. Hassler had to meet the perplexities and the trials, to bear the hours of tribulation that beset the first organization of the enterprise; and to him must ever remain the honor of giving birth and shape and a future to the survey. Yet no less credit is due to the successors who have maintained and matured this truly national work!

About the period of time that John Dahlgren was ordered to report to the Coast Survey for duty, and during the months of February, March, and April, of 1834, he published a series of remarkable papers in the form of open letters, addressed "To Mr. Southard, Chairman of Naval Committee, United States Senate," which appeared in the "National Gazette" of Philadelphia, and were signed "Blue Jacket." These essays were admirably written, and excited much comment, and diligent effort was made to find out their authorship. But the incognito was strictly preserved, and even the editor of the "Gazette" never discovered the real name of his able contributor.

That so dignified a journal as the "Gazette" was willing to publish these anonymous contributions without any knowledge whatever of their authorship, was in itself a high compliment to the author. Prefacing article No. 4, the editor says: "'Blue Jacket' is a strong writer, and he understands his important subject." We have before us a letter addressed "To Christian Chesholm, Esq., Philadelphia," and dated March 6, 1834, from "the editor of the 'National Gazette,'" in which he says, "'Blue Jacket' runs no risk of discovery from any one connected with the 'National Gazette.'" But even this assurance did not induce the
young knight to raise the visor of his helmet. Nor can
we blame his prudence, when we consider that these
open letters were addressed to the Chairman of the
United States Senate Naval Committee, by a passed
midshipman, who dared to boldly attack the new code
of regulations framed by his superiors for the Navy, to
demonstrate that they were oppressive to the corps of
officers in general, and that the effect of their practice
would be "to concentrate in a superior grade uncon-
trolled authority." He says in letter No. 2:—

It would be far from my wish wantonly to call in question
the intentions of the gentlemen who arranged the new code,
but at the same time the interests involved are too important
to permit any hesitation between mere respect for persons and
the obvious path of duty.

This noble defence of rights which the new code
sought to invade, this clear exposition of the true spirit
which should dominate the Navy of his country, this
merciless attack upon the abuses of authority to which
the new code must lead, this eloquent support of a
system which had done its work well and was about
to be displaced for one of dangerous experiment, could
not openly emanate from a young passed midshipman,
who would at once have been condemned therein by
one of those very "articles" which he sought publicly
to controvert. If indeed he spoke at all, he must needs
forget self, and trust to the excellence of his logic, and
the truth of his cause, for a hearing. He could not,
like Don Quixote, tilt an open lance against a windmill
whose monstrous wheels would have dashed him to
pieces in their first revolution. During the last year of
his life, when the "Blue Jacket" of quondam days had
won not merely the "coveted epaulets," but stars glis-
ten on Dahlgren's collar that had not then appeared
in the Navy firmament of his country's award, when he had borne most important commands, and when the act of wielding high authority had been so long his, as a right, as to have become habit, the Admiral said to us, in allusion to this episode of his past career, that having re-read these papers, he must say that he had never written anything more carefully considered, and that the intervening experience of thirty-six years in his profession had not caused him to change his opinions on the points therein discussed. He added with a smile, that perhaps as to the style, he would now somewhat restrain their rather sophomoric display of Latinity! We then understood him to say that their authorship had never been made known. "Blue Jacket," like Junius, could only utter oracular wisdom, as an abstraction. We close the notice of this correspondence by quoting from the "National Gazette," Feb. 25, 1834, in which the editor says: "'Blue Jacket' has found in Ovid the very motto for 'the party,'—Servitii signum service gerentem. The Navy, at least, will never wear the collar." Such was the Navy of 1834!

John Dahlgren's habits of application, his mathematical training and proficiency, and some knowledge of the use of instruments, speedily attracted the attention of the learned chief of the Survey, Mr. Hassler. He soon transferred to the new assistant work that had been reserved for his own personal labor. Mr. Dahlgren passed step by step through the various departments of geodesy, and finally he received charge of a section of triangulation, the other officers preferring the hydrographical branch as more akin to their vocation. We here quote from J. T. Headley's Sketch of Dahlgren, to be found in his history of "Our Naval Commanders," &c. Headley says:
He was remarkable for his proficiency in mathematics, and hence was detached from the regular service, and put on the Coast Survey, under Mr. Hassler, who at the time had no equal as a mathematician in the country. He was selected to serve in the triangulation of the survey, and assist in the astronomical observations, as well as the measurement of the base on Long Island, the first base line ever measured scientifically in this country, that of Mason and Dixon being merely a chain and compass measurement.

So high was Hassler's opinion of his mathematical skill, that he chose him to make the counter calculations of the base, to compare with and verify his own. He was engaged in these labors from 1834 to 1836, when he was selected to assist in making observations of the solar eclipses of that year. In the autumn he was offered the appointment of sailing master in the "Macedonian," which had been selected as the flagship in the Southern Exploring Expedition. He declined it because he did not think it would ever sail until reorganized. His views proved to be correct, for it was deferred, remodelled, and eventually sailed under Wilkes. He was now detailed from the second triangulation to assist in the first trials of the great theodolite of Houghton, which had just been completed for Hassler. On this occasion, heliotropes were first used in this country in the survey, instead of tin cones, and their glittering points could be seen by the naked eye from stations at the astonishing distance of thirty or forty miles.

In the winter of 1837 he was engaged in bringing up the work of the summer. This being done, Hassler made him second assistant in the survey, and gave him charge of a party of triangulation. No higher compliment could be paid his mathematical ability than this, for no other naval officer had ever held this position.

There is not much to add to the narrative of Headley as to this portion of Dahlgren's life. A book for fugitive thoughts which he kept, and which is inscribed, "Memo-randa — Coast Survey," shows great mental activity and incessant labor. There are in this book speculations on
the political situation, which was at that time a very excited one, in consequence of the financial distress occasioned by the removal of the deposits from the United States Bank.

But as regarded the Navy, he is decided in his expressions of admiration as to the course of the President. He says: —

The measures of the General are stamped with boldness, and that defiance of old prejudices which characterizes his course, and make him a man of clear, strong, and unfettered thought. While former administrations have been content that the Navy should drag on its wearied march groaning under the tyranny and arbitrary ideas and exploded notions of a few old captains, Jackson at once calls into action the fire and originality of the younger officers, which had so long been rebuked by the timid, time-worn policy of old men. I think that the Pay Bill and New Code sealed their fate.

This doubtless reflected the opinions of the then "younger officers," who at a later day did so much to illustrate the Navy. During the period of Mr. Dahlgren's service in the Coast Survey there existed considerable difficulty in adjusting the proper pay of Army and Navy officers detailed to this duty. Their position was a very exceptional one, and it was found necessary to establish particular rules in their regard. The private as well as the documentary evidence before us, shows that Mr. Hassler, the learned superintendent, had to wage earnest war in behalf of these young assistants. The Coast Survey had been placed under the charge of the Treasury Department, which again complicated matters for the officers of the Navy placed upon this duty. They were expected to perform the same duties as the civilians engaged, at a greatly reduced rate of compensation, and one entirely inadequate to
cover the increased expenditure incident to their line of duty. Referring to this anomalous position, Mr. Hassler, in a letter, Sept. 30, 1836, to the Hon. Levi Woodbury, Secretary of the Treasury, says:—

It would be improper for me here to omit the repetition of the request formerly made, that the service of naval officers in the Coast Survey, on land, as well as on the water, shall be declared by the President (in whose power it fully stands) as to rank like sea service in respect to all advancement, promotion, and emoluments. Upon this point, all the midshipmen are more intent than upon the compensation; it appears in justice due to them, and no reason can exist why a public service, requiring qualifications superior to common sea service, should be ranked below it.

And in another letter, addressed to the Secretary, Hassler mentions by name Midshipman Page, and Messrs. Dahlgren and Jenkins, engaged in the Coast Survey, and recommends the necessity of an early and favorable consideration "and disposition" in their regard. This very troublesome matter was finally adjusted by allowing additional compensation to these gentlemen, affording, however, a very limited relief, and not equal to the rate of pay made to civilians performing similar duties. It was also agreed that the time of midshipmen attached to the land service of the Coast Survey "be allowed as sea service." This was another important point. The Secretary's report, March 18, 1837, says:—

The officers of the Army and Navy employed in the Survey will not be permitted to suffer in rank or promotion for want of service with their companies, or sea service during the periods they are so employed, if in all other respects they are considered qualified.

Mr. Dahlgren was promoted to a Lieutenancy March 8, 1837.
Mr. Dahlgren was now about to undergo a prolonged and most trying ordeal. He was threatened with blindness. In the summer of 1837 he was compelled to relinquish active duty and repair to the United States Naval Hospital in order to obtain medical aid. But the amaurotic trouble steadily and alarmingly increased, so that there was reason to fear entire loss of vision. Sept. 10, 1837, he addressed a letter from the hospital to the Superintendent, Mr. Hassler, requesting "permission to visit Paris and there obtain the advice of some eminent oculist." In this dark hour kind friends were not wanting to speak encouragement. A brother officer writes words which at this day read like prophesy. He says:

Keep up your spirits, and remember that Heaven has given you talents of no ordinary kind, and those talents may still reap both fame and honor to you... until Admiral Dahlgren's flag has been seen, upholding the reputation of his country in the farthest seas, &c.

Strangely verified, thirty years later, were these words of one lieutenant to another of the same grade, who was then in danger of hopeless blindness, while, stranger still, the Admiral's flag, which he predicted would be won, had as yet no place in the navy organization of the country. How true, that oft and again, in the life of many, some gleam of futurity is cast momentarily athwart the dark horizon, which again and as suddenly closes heavy and lowering around us!

Other friends interested themselves warmly in his behalf, notably Mr. Hassler and his assistant, Mr. Ferguson, of the Coast Survey. Mr. Hassler was quite unwilling, notwithstanding the obstinacy of the disease, to have him detached from the Coast Survey, and
wrote to the Hon. Secretary of the Treasury, asking that the compensation of Lieutenant Dahlgren might be continued during his absence in Europe, alleging that his eyesight had become impaired by exposure in the performance of his duties in the Survey, and stating that while abroad he might still render service to the work in obtaining objects at Paris useful for it. The President, under these circumstances, consented that his pay should be continued during his absence, for a limited period.

His passport from the State Department is dated Nov. 8, 1837.

He took abroad the most flattering letters of introduction. One from Edward King, of Philadelphia, to Benjamin Rush, at London, who says, "Mr. Dahlgren is the son of an old friend, now no more, and is a gentleman in whom I have long felt a strong and deserved interest," &c.; a very kind letter from the Hon. Levi Woodbury, Secretary of the Treasury, to the American Minister at Paris, the Hon. Lewis Cass; also a letter from the Secretary of the Navy to General Cass, in which he says, "Lieutenant John A. Dahlgren is a meritorious officer, and holds a high rank for his scientific attainments," &c. With these letters, and others equally kind, he sailed for France, where he placed himself under the care of the celebrated Sichel at Paris. He mentions his friendly reception by the American Minister and his family, and the hospitable attentions by which they and others sought to make his stay as comfortable as possible. Under Sichel he began to improve slightly, so that at the expiration of five months he ventured to return to the United States. Lieutenant Dahlgren arrived in Washington in May, 1838, but not materially better. Here he was called upon to
endure a new trial. Making a formal call upon the Secretary of the Navy, his call was construed into an intention to report to that Department, and he was thereupon detached from the Survey. We mark this moment in his private notes as one of deepest dejection. He had been detached from the Survey without the privilege of resigning, and he was rendered doubly sensitive, by the sense of utter helplessness his terrible malady inflicted. In an application to be reinstated, made to the new Secretary, the Hon. J. R. Paulding, Secretary of the Navy, Aug. 31, 1838, he says:—

The condition of my eyes not now permitting the exertion required, I am compelled to avail myself of the hand of another to make this communication to the Department.

Then, after recapitulating his service, he says:—

Having now no hope of ever being able to resume my duty in the Survey, I visited Mr. Hassler in Washington expressly with the view of resigning. His unwillingness to believe that my disability was so serious, induced me to give way to his proposition of retaining the appointment without the pay. The formal call, which, as an officer, I have always made on the Head of the Department, was construed as a report, and I found myself detached from the Survey without the knowledge or consent of the Hon. Secretary of the Treasury or the Superintendent. . . . Mr. Secretary Dickerson himself proposed to remedy the matter by an application from me to be reinstated, which he promised to grant. The letter of Mr. Hassler to this effect is now before me. My only object in obtaining an order was to immediately carry into effect my intention of resigning. This might seem, perhaps, an unnecessary form, but when the feelings of an individual are in question, such a slight indulgence might reasonably have been granted.

In connection with this letter to the Department from Lieutenant Dahlgren, such a beautiful appeal was made
by the high-minded Superintendent that we cannot refrain from giving it entire, especially as it forms in itself a complete summary of his Coast Survey service. Hassler says:—

Lieutenant John A. Dahlgren, U. S. N., entered as assistant in the Coast Survey in April, 1834. Then he assisted in the measurement of the base line upon Long Island, and some astronomical observations that were made then. After that he assisted in the secondary triangulation, in Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey, during 1835, and in all the calculations therefrom arising, of which there is always a great part made necessarily by night, to accelerate the work by clearing the results obtained, and preparing for the subsequent operations.

In the winter he was always engaged in calculating the triangles, as well primary as secondary, the geographical position of the points, and projecting them.

In summer, 1836, he was assisting in the main triangulation, in the observations, in the calculations, and he assisted then, as in the preceding years, in all the astronomical observations, by day and night, and the calculations therefrom arising. Lastly, he took upon him, as chief, a party of secondary triangulation upon Long Island.

It is self-evident that all the above works require a perfect, healthy, and acute sight, which he must have had on entering the Coast Survey; however, during this last his eyes began to fail, and then the disease increased to such a degree that he was obliged to have recourse to medical assistance, for which also he went to Europe.

But it appears that not sufficient relief was obtained by all this, so that the trial to resume his work proved unsuccessful, and he finds himself now unable to pursue further such works as he has done in the Coast Survey, which all require peculiar health and strength of visual power, which they are taxing heavily. His services in the Coast Survey were such as to make their discontinuance much regretted, and he deserves all attention, and regard, for those he has rendered.


F. R. Hassler.
Lieutenant Dahlgren was informed by the Navy Department that they would "be happy to assign him active service . . . so soon as the state of his health would justify it," and he was then placed upon extended "leave of absence," renewed from time to time, while awaiting more complete restoration of sight. Thus was a career which gave promise of brilliant scientific success cut off in this direction, and a long mental rest enforced. With him this rest was not inaction, but was, as the French say, "reculer pour mieux sauter," or only the recoil which gives greater energy and force to the rebound.

Mr. Dahlgren never forgot the generous appreciation and active efforts in his behalf of Mr. Hassler, but to the last day of his life often spoke of him with genuine admiration as a man of science, and with true affection as a cherished friend.

And now that continued loss of vision seriously threatened to destroy all his bright prospects and condemn him to a weary life of inactivity,—at this dark hour, when struggling against the heavy pressure of an adverse fate, he had the happiness of being united in marriage, on Jan. 8, 1839, to a very lovely lady, Mary C., daughter of Mr. Nathan Bunker, of Philadelphia, who was an influential merchant of that place.

He was now advised by Dr. Thomas Harris, U. S. N., to try the bracing effect of country life, where pure air, regular habits, and constant exercise with some labor in the open air, might, by building up the general strength, give vigor to an enfeebled constitution to throw off his afflicting local malady.

A small farm of about fifty-five acres, with a comfortable dwelling-house upon it, was purchased, near
Hartsville, Bucks County, Penn., and there Mr. Dahlgren's family remained until May, 1843. A year previous, May 3, 1842, he was once more able to return to duty, through the restoration of his sight, consequent upon the long period of repose permitted. Nor was this change for the better a mere improvement. It was, happily, an entire restoration. When he had first entered the Navy, his powers of vision had been unusually strong. This faculty had been impaired in the labors of the Coast Survey; but now, the long trial past, he was for the remainder of his life enabled to make the most unwearied and exacting use of his eyes, which never after failed him in any way. Nor can we here refrain from making some remarks, forced upon us by the favorable result to the Navy brought about by its indulgence in the hour of need to a deserving officer, who had contracted this disease in the service of his country. Early in 1839, when the probability of prolonged disability could not be denied, although there was hope of ultimate recovery, the Department seemed at first to hesitate about renewing its leave of absence from time to time for a period so indefinite. But upon representations made, and a proper consideration of the peculiar hardship of this case, it finally concluded to give the rest Nature demanded in order to complete her cure. It was after his recovery that John Dahlgren was once more enabled to use his eyes, and to such good purpose, for scientific research and glorious achievement. In future, our young navy officers, when disabled in the line of duty, may justly point to this case, and ask that the same timely consideration may be extended to them which alone served to restore Dahlgren's eyes and thus permitted him to illustrate the Navy of his country!
During this lengthened and enforced retirement the peculiar habits of Mr. Dahlgren's mind were very manifest, in the exactitude and careful system with which he managed his little farm. He kept a farmer's journal with the utmost system and order. Only a few lines each day made the record, but the mental elaboration is all that one who would make a careful study of farming could desire. In these little manuscript books, covering a course of observation which he had closely pursued for three years and a half, nothing had escaped his attention. We find a summary of a statistical account of the weather, the effects of the various atmospheric changes upon agricultural interests, the deductions of his mind as applied to practice, the care and management of stock, a regular record as to the care of a dairy, the treatment and best manner of enriching soil, the relative yield to be hoped for as a result, and exact tables of expenditures and profits. With these little journals the merest tyro could try his hand at farming, and feel that he had a sure and simple chart of guidance. But now the scene changes, the rural life is at an end, the farm, so long a peaceful harbor in the storm, must be sold, and the little family that already was his, transferred to another home. Charles Bunker, born Oct. 24, 1839, Elisabeth, born Oct. 4, 1840, and Ulric, born April 3, 1842, all first saw the light in this country home near the Neshamony. Ulric was a year old when his parents removed to their new home at Wilmington, Del., and the farm in Bucks County passed into other hands.

Although Mr. Dahlgren had a year previous been ordered to report to Commodore George C. Read for duty on board the receiving vessel at Philadelphia (under Lieutenant Commander Magruder), yet his little
family had remained upon the farm, where from time to
time he could visit them. In April, 1843, a house was
rented at Wilmington, and some weeks later the removal
was made. The new home stood a few squares from
the main street of Wilmington, but yet in the open
country, with "a lot for a cow" around it, as well as
a playground for the children. The journal of 1843
says: —

A material change in all that constitutes home and living had
now been accomplished, but we were too busy to think of it —
to realize it; that is reserved for the future.

And —

Monday, May 29, 1843. — I once more resumed duty in the
receiving vessel, having been absent twelve days by leave. By
the steamboat I am enabled to be in the city by 8.30, and again
in Wilmington by 6.30. I therefore sleep each night at home.
The fare every trip is 12½ cents.

June 9. — Up to this period I have continued to perform duty
on board the vessel, and therefore absent each day from home
from 5½ A.M. until 7 P.M. Matters there are gradually taking
their contemplated form, and we begin to feel at home.

Saturday, July 1. — Received a letter from McLaughlin, say-
ing that the "Missouri" would go to the Mediterranean, and
that Captain Newton would be glad to have me as Flag Lieu-
tenant. Asked me to write to Captain Newton, which I did
next day.

Strangely enough, after being asked to make the
request, it was not granted, for his journal of July 31
says: —

The "Missouri" leaves Washington for Mediterranean. So
much for Captain Newton's promise that I should go in her. I
have been exceedingly disappointed.

Aug. 30. — Applied to Navy Department for orders to "Cumber-
land" as Flag Lieutenant.

Aug. 31. — Left Philadelphia with a draft of men for New
York. While in New York I went to Blunt's and saw the corrected edition of the "Sheet Anchor," in the Addenda of which my name appears on the subject of "Ranges of Sea Ordnance." The book itself I do not admire much. It always has been a standard work in the profession, but time makes changes in the notions of sailors as well as of other people. . . . This will not make any difference to my part,—that is original enough,—for I have condemned the whole of the old gunnery tables with a vengeance, and very deservedly, for they are a disgrace to the name of science.

Sept. 1.—Friday, at 5 p.m., left New York for Boston, and arrived there next morning, the 2d September, at 10 A.M.

Sept. 2, 10 A.M.—Saw Commodore Smith, who is to command the Mediterranean squadron; said that he had applied for me as his Flag Lieutenant, on hearing from Captain Mercer that I wished to go.

Sept. 3.—Arrived at Wilmington at 6.45 P.M., and found that my orders for the "Cumberland" had arrived.

On Sept. 26, 1843, Mr. Dahlgren left his home at Wilmington, and, reaching Boston on the 28th, reported at the Navy Yard, where the "Cumberland" was at the dock. Oct. 2, three hundred and thirty men were sent on board, and the wardroom officers dined in the messroom, and on Nov. 20 they sailed for the Mediterranean.
CHAPTER V.

CRUISE IN THE U. S. SHIP "CUMBERLAND." 1844-1845.

The record of this episode in "Lieutenant" Dahlgren's life is to be found in a series of journal letters which he has left carefully numbered, and marked on the outer wrap, "Letters from the Mediterranean, being the only journal of my cruise in the United States Steamer 'Cumberland' in those years." We shall therefore give such extracts from this journal as may best serve not only to mark this portion of Lieutenant Dahlgren's career, but also to give *currente calamo*, *some picture of the Navy of that day*. At a later day the Admiral, in reference to this cruise, says:—

Once more at sea I found myself on familiar ground, but things had changed. Mahon and the days of the "Roaring Javy" had gone by. The Mediterranean was still the school for the officer, but under more subdued circumstances. Steam had now pretty well established itself, and was making rapid progress to a future which the most sanguine of that day had never dreamed of. The "Cumberland" was in splendid order, Smith as Commodore, Breese Captain, and Foote First Lieutenant.

All were afterwards Admirals. The cruise therefore could not have been made under more favorable conditions. *Mais revenons*. Our Lieutenant says:—

*Tuesday, Oct. 3, 1843. Wardroom of the "Cumberland."*—
We dined on board for the first time. I have met with a hearty
welcome from old shipmates. About an hour after noon the crew arrived. The men are good-looking fellows, and it was interesting to see how suddenly the quiet which had pervaded the huge ship was changed into a universal bustle by masses of prying seamen, curious to learn something of their new domicile. The effect on the ship is magical. The dirt and dust of years are disappearing fast. I say of years, for though the frigate was launched a year ago, she was built twenty years since. She is a fine, warlike vessel, carrying on the main deck twenty-six long 32 and four 68-pounders, Paixhans. On the upper deck twenty carronades, 42-pounders, and two long 32's. The general opinion is that she will not sail fast, though I think she will prove a very easy ship in a sea way. . . . The accommodations below are noble, the wardroom being the finest I have ever seen.

It will be remembered that Lieutenant Dahlgren had applied for duty in the "Missouri," and was disappointed. He says:—

The news of the "Missouri's" loss reached here, from which I have to learn that it was very well that I did not sail in her. N. has the character of being a very unlucky man. Captain G. said to me that he seems to have fared badly ever since he cut a boat adrift from the brig "Spark" in 1823. It was blowing a gale at the time, and the officers and men perished. He commanded the old "Fulton;" she was blown up. Then the new "Fulton;" there, a heavy gun burst and cleared her decks. Afterwards, the "Missouri;" she grounded in the Potomac, and in kedging off lost a lieutenant and fourteen men; and lastly his ship takes fire and leaves her wreck in Gibraltar Bay.

No wonder the sailors thought this captain "a very unlucky man."

Oct. 22.—To-day we had the honor of a visit from a distinguished visitor. Dinner was on table and we were about to draw up, when Commodore Nicolson appeared at the wardroom
door with two strangers. We rose and asked him in. One of the strangers was an old man of middle size, and well set, dressed in black. His manner was very courteous, and of finished excellence. It was Marshal Bertrand, the faithful friend of Napoleon. The other was his son, Captain Bertrand, a tall, good-looking young man. The Marshal was very much pleased with the ship, said more than once that she was larger than the "Belle Poule," the frigate he went out in to convey the remains of Napoleon to France. He examined the state-rooms closely. A pause followed, and as we stood in group, the Marshal in the centre facing the dinner, all dished and covered, I stepped in front of him and said, "Marshal, the officers of the wardroom will be much pleased if you will dine with them." The old gentleman, extending both hands, said it would give him pleasure; and here he looked at the Commodore, who reminded him that the Marshal was to dine with him. Soon after he left the wardroom, bowing very low several times. His presence stirred us as a trumpet, and it has been a long time since I have felt the blood mount as to-day in the presence of this veteran and faithful friend of the Emperor. How many great events passed before the mind's eye with which he has been connected!

And here is a reverie of home:—

Oct. 31. Boston Harbor.—Here there are few quiet hours, for all is bustle and preparation; yet often comes the picture of the bright little country home. There comes the fancy that I am once more returning after a few hours' absence. The horse pauses again ere he descends the steep hill, and of all the objects that are spread out in the wide landscape, my eye singles out the well-known house, marked by the silver pine that stands in front. In a few minutes it seems that I shall be there, and yet it is only a delusion.

I am as pleasantly situated as I can be during absence from home, and my messmates are all agreeable, clever men. . . . I have been very busy watching everything going on, and feel surprised at finding so little has escaped my memory since I have been at sea. Everything is as familiar as if I had never done duty on the Coast Survey, or looked after crops and stock.
This is of course to be attributed to the thorough training I received while a young officer, for I had charge of a deck, worked ship, and did Lieutenant’s duty the last two years of my Mid.’s probation. If my sight were sound I should be well satisfied to do the ordinary routine of duty. As it is, the Commodore prefers that I should only do signal and flag duty, though I may yet be put in for the shell service.

Monday, Nov. 1.—Cold and cheerless as can be, but withal a grand gala day, for two reasons. Commodore Downes, the Port Admiral, performed the ceremony of inspecting ship previous to sailing, and our Commodore’s secretary had a party of ladies from Boston, and very distingué too. . . . Very soon the company passed to the wardroom, where we had a very fine table set, and here they held on for a good while. . . . I drink nothing myself, but the manner in which I helped the Commodore D. to sundry good things was curious. I had posted one of the boys with some champagne, with which he filled the old fellow’s glass whenever he turned his head to talk with the ladies. He thought he had emptied it, but always found it full. . . . At last the Port Admiral was to leave. The ladies assembled on deck to hear the salute. The guard presented arms, the drum rolled. The Commodore went over the side, and then his barge pulled ahead. Now spoke the battery’s thunder tone, and loudly too, for the first gun from the “Cumberland.”

Nov. 6.—This ship is now awaiting the action of the Navy Department. All is in readiness for sea, and when the sailing orders arrive we shall soon be on blue water. On Saturday evening I dined with Mr. Ticknor, and had a pleasant time. . . . In the library were 18,000 volumes, in Greek, Spanish, German, Italian, French, Portuguese, and English. Mr. Ticknor told me that he read all these fluently. Over the mantel hung an original of Sir W. Scott, by Leslie, done for Mr. Ticknor, Scott sitting expressly for the purpose. Mrs. T. expressed the greatest concern about my eyes, having often noticed the privation to which similar disease exposed Prescott the historian, who is very intimate at the house.

Nov. 20.—Our ship is now under way, moving slowly before a gentle breeze from N. W. . . . Astern is the “City of Boston,”
and around, the hills of our glorious country rejoicing under the
bright beams of an unclouded sun. The deck echoes under the
tread of the moving masses, and the ditty of the landsman rises
tunefully above every other sound.

Dec. 8. — I had the opportunity of firing the first shot from
the "Cumberland." There are four Paixhans, or shell guns,
in the ship, and these have been assigned as my division. The
Captain sent me orders to fire a shell from each piece. Ac-
cordingly I had the heavy 68-pound shot drawn and shells
substituted. The guns were laid by myself, and the first
gazes of three were point blank, the last much elevated. The
effect on the water was very pretty, the shells dashing the foam
high into the air and bounding four and five times on the
surface. Though I could not see as distinctly as the officers on
the spar-deck, as the smoke so enveloped us after the discharge,
I had the satisfaction of proving a plan for point-blank fire, and
of finding it answer fully,— that is, of laying the disparl by the
horizon. The great motion of a ship renders some means of
correcting the level of a gun very necessary, and this is so
simple that the capacity of the sailor readily takes hold of it.
For some days I have had my division in training, and was
much pleased to see the result of my labors successful. It was
amusing to-day, when about to fire, to notice that the crew had
left the gun, as if desirous of avoiding any accident from the
shell, which is new to them and seems alarming. I at once
ordered them to stand to their quarters in their proper places
at the gun. Shot they do not mind, but shell they dread.

This gives one of the first glimpses of that capacity
for gunnery which was so soon to develop into inventive
genius for ordnance.

We transfer the following graphic sketch of the perils
of the seafaring life: —

Saturday, Dec. 9. — Towards sunset the wind began to rise,
and sail was reduced to reefed topsails. The First Lieutenant
was bracing the head yards, when a man fell overboard. The
life buoys were cut away, and the ship hove to immediately.
Some confusion ensued among the men, who are very raw, but
a boat was soon manned and lowered. It was now becoming
dark, and the last gleams of the setting sun were hidden by the
heavy clouds that skirted the horizon. The night wind howled
in fitful gusts amid the spars and rigging, and the whole pros-
pect was gloomy. The boat that left the ship was soon lost in
the darkness, and officers and men stood in melancholy expec-
tation, for it was evident that the lost man was in fearful
jeopardy. The moments passed rapidly, and so much time
elapsed without hearing of the cutter, that signal lights were
shown and blue lights burned. Presently a gun was fired for
her direction, and the sound boomed like thunder over the waste
of waters. Soon the sound of oars was heard. The boat re-
turned, but only to report that after pulling repeatedly round
the spot where the man had fallen, no trace of him could be
perceived. In a few minutes the frigate was once more put on
her course, and we descended to muse on the sudden fate of the
poor sailor, thus called to his reckoning without an hour's
warning.

Approaching the Bay of Gibraltar, they were driven
about for many days, the Levanter blowing a gale off
shore, keeping them near port and yet unable to reach
it, the Commodore not caring to attempt entering the
Straits without a fair wind. At times the land appeared
like a blue mass against the sky, and then again they
were so near that light and shade had their due effects,
and the shapes of every hill could be seen. Around
them many sail dotted the water. Under the bold
rugged mountain that forms the Cape, the water was
unruffled by the easterly gale. By "Dec. 20, at four
in the morning, all hands were called." The journal
says:—

When I reached the deck the Tarifa light was seen a little
on the lee bow, the vessel under a press of sail moving forward
most dashingly. Around us the mountainous shore rose gloom-
ily. . . . Faint light gleamed in the east, then it grew stronger
till objects were distinct, and finally day broke forth upon the
narrow channel. To one who had never seen but our own extended, low-looking coast, it would be difficult to describe the effect produced by the rugged and picturesque line of land that rises on each side of this narrow entrance. Mountains of 1,200 to 2,000 feet are thrown together in the strangest manner. The light of day now made visible every deviation of surface in this highland scenery. In some parts the color approached a green, but generally the hue of the rock is imparted to the whole, save when in the distance the lofty peaks throw back the rays of the sun, or melt them into blue. . . . The ship drew near to the head of the bay, thrown off at times by the flaws from the rock, and by 10 A.M. was passing close to the American frigate "Congress." . . . From the five hundred men that stood on our deck, not a sound arose,—even the orders through the trumpet were in the lowest tones, but the men performed every evolution like lightning. It was really beautiful, and the first thing I heard ashore was that all had been duly noticed, and much admired. By 10.30 the desired position had been reached, and the anchor was let go, about five hundred yards inshore of the "Congress." Several of her officers came to see us, and I was pleased to receive friendly messages from some of my old cronies. Porter and Bache I talked with for some time, but was soon called off to go ashore for the Commodore. The barge was manned, and in a short time I stepped on the solid granite quay in full costume,—cocked hat and sword, &c. There I met our Consul, Mr. Sprague, and walked to his house. The novel and curious scene which this place presents to the eye of a stranger, I found had lost but little of its force by having been seen often before. Aloft frowned the rock nearly overhead. One battery descended below another, to the water's edge. You thread the way through the avenues of the ramparts until the principal way or street is reached. Here you are jostled by every class of Turks and Moors, by Spaniards, Rock lizards, and foreigners.

The soldier alone strictly yields the way and salutes the uniform in the most precise manner. The sentry squares himself on his post, and his well-kept arms rattle as he gives the usual courtesy. . . . In the afternoon the officers made a rush for the shore, and pretty well satisfied themselves by sundown
that the first sight of the Rock conveys nearly all that is worthy of note.

Frigate "Cumberland," at sea, Jan. 1, 1844. — The sun rose in all his splendor, and the bright beams were thrown back from the snow-covered peaks of Granada's lofty mountains, that stretched before us some fifteen or twenty miles distant. White towers and lighthouses and dwellings dotted the eminences, and the clear light of the morning made the shadows very deep cast by the Sierras over the intervening valleys. The light easterly breeze played over the blue waters, and urged our ship slowly to the Spanish shore. In all directions vessels of different sizes are seen. Far in the southern board appears the high land of Africa, though perhaps fully sixty-five miles off. This is New Year's Day, the first that I have spent from my happy home. One year since I was seated by a peaceful fireside, with every blessing around that any reasonable man could desire, and now a wide ocean intervenes!

After dinner I was again directed to try shells from my division.

The mess are much amused at this moment with some large plates of the stomach showing the effects of liquor on it. Mr. Foote (afterwards Admiral Foote), who is indefatigable in the temperance cause, brought them with him from the United States.

Saturday, Jan. 6. — By 8 a.m. the ship was close in with the entrance of Mahon harbor, the pilot came on board, and in an hour the "Cumberland" was anchored in the upper harbor, within two hundred yards of the "Delaware," a fine magnificent line-of-battle ship, looming on the placid water of the harbor like a floating castle. At her masthead was displayed the broad pendant, symbol of chief command; for though Commodore Smith is to command, he does not take the reins until his senior leaves, nor show his flag in presence of that senior. I was immediately directed to repair on shore with the fleet surgeon and obtain pratique for the ship. This custom is well denominated, for so much has been suffered in these seas by the transmission of diseases, that it is the practice to inquire strictly into all matters concerning the health of the ship. A material deficiency in this respect entails vile durance in quar-
antine for some weeks. It is amusing to see the precautions that are taken to prevent contamination, of two most unwholesome dirty-looking old rats, by our presence. The doctor and myself were held at bay by a double bar and the intervening space, until the paralytic functionary was satisfied, when he gravely opened the bar, stepped out with true Spanish dignity, and shook hands. I returned to the ship, where the Commodore was waiting for me; he stepped into the barge, and in a few minutes we were ascending the lofty side of the "Delaware." The officers were grouped on the deck, the marines presented arms, the drum rolled, and Commodore Morris stepped forward to receive his successor. I had the pleasure of shaking hands with many old comrades, and descended to their messroom to give and receive information. The wardroom officers mess on the afterpart of the lower gun-deck, where there is abundance of light and air; but most of them have state-rooms on the orlop, where there is a lack of both. I was well pleased with the order of her battery and the great space which her dimensions afforded.

Jan. 10. — Commodore Smith received the command of the squadron from Commodore Morris, and gave a dinner to him and his officers. It was handsomely arranged, and did credit to the ship. Commodore Smith took one side, with Morris on his right, Captain Breese opposite, and Mr. Foote, First Lieutenant, at one end, and myself at the other.

Jan. 18. — The "Delaware" unmoored ship, and was ready to weigh. . . . The anchor was tripped, the ship paid off, and for a while seemed hardly to feel the influence of the light breeze. . . . At this moment the topsails of the "Cumberland" were let fall and her batteries gave a parting salute. The report reverberated like thunder among the old cliffs, as if to shake them asunder. As the echo of the last gun died away in the distance, and at a word, our rigging was crowded with the crew, who made the welkin ring with their hearty cheers. Now came the return. The heavy battery of the "Delaware" gave back gun for gun, and then nearly a thousand seamen started aloft, so that her lofty spars teemed with life. Three cheers were given, responsive to our own. One more from the "Cumberland" in acknowledgment. One more in answer
from the departing ship, and the men slowly descended to the decks. The huge mass moved onward slowly, and erelong passed round the island midway in the harbor. Every eye was fixed on the lofty sails as they receded from us,—they were to carry our comrades to dear home. How many recollections started into life, and almost into reality, at the thought! God speed the gallant ship with favorable winds, and restore in peace and health each one of the busy crowd within her to those who, in anxious expectation, await her arrival.

Commodore Morris has been exceedingly popular with the officers of his ship this cruise. . . . I have seen something of him during the short intercourse, and I can say that in deportment it would be difficult to conceive a better model for an officer of rank,—dignified without haughtiness, affable and easy without familiarity, intelligent without affectation, he bears well the honors of his present position as well as of his earlier days. When a midshipman he served on this station, and with Decatur was the first on the quarter-deck of the "Philadelphia," then in possession of the Tripolitans. For this he earned one step in his profession. In the last war he was First Lieutenant of the "Constitution" when the "Guerriere" was captured, and the achievement brought reward to all concerned. Morris was made a Captain for his share. A desperate wound on this occasion has ever since affected his health, and prevented him from going to sea very often. With the care he uses, however, he will probably enjoy long life, though his flag may never again float from the masthead. . . . I was much distressed to hear of the death of my poor old friend, Mr. Hassler. The place for which so many have struggled is now empty, and it may occur to the appointing power that their greatest difficulty will be to fill it as ably as it has been done heretofore. When I look back to the ill-judged persecution that has beset this son of genius for years, and brought sorrow to his latter days, I cannot help feeling something akin to rejoicing that he is now far beyond the effort of his foes. . . . For years I experienced his confidence and his friendship, and I often look back with pleasure to the hours spent with him.

Jan. 23.—The work of overhauling goes on rapidly. The
Cruise in the U. S. Ship "Cumberland.

Commodore and Captain have gone ashore to live, while the cabins are being touched up. . . .

The moral condition of the crew is excellent, owing, no doubt, to their unexampled abstinence from liquor. The cause has been perseveringly advocated by our First Lieutenant, Mr. Foote, from the beginning, and has been very successful by reason of the practice prevailing among the officers themselves. Of seven lieutenants, five use nothing stimulating, and in the whole mess of fourteen persons two or three only take wine, and they do so sparingly, yet there is but one of them who is a member of a temperance society. The men are allowed liberty constantly, and of the whole crew of four hundred and fifty men, not ten have returned to the ship under the influence of liquor. And this occurs in a place which is proverbial for the temptations which it holds out to seamen, and where the officers hitherto have found it nearly impracticable to prevent the smuggling of liquor into the ship itself.

On the 8th March notice was given to prepare for sea, and there was no small stir in the ship. They were to go to Toulon. The past two months had slipped away very quietly, the "Cumberland" having undergone general repairs. The painting and other refittings being now complete, she was ready to sail, and Toulon was reached, after an uneventful voyage, on the 17th March.

Immediately in front of Toulon, at a distance of perhaps five hundred yards, is built a strong wall which rises about thirty feet above the water and forms a capacious basin for shipping. Part of this is entirely devoted to vessels of war, the other is for the navy as well as for merchant vessels. . . .

March 18. — Towards noon the Commodore, Captain Breese, and myself went ashore to make official visits.

After calling upon Vice-Admiral Baudin and Rear-Admiral Turpin, second in command, the visit to the Rear-Admiral afloat is thus described: —
In due time the barge was alongside the huge three-decker. Inside the entering port the Commodore was received by the Captain and officers of the ship, the former of whom bowed the way to the ladder leading above. We ascended to the upper gun-deck, thence to the quarter-deck. Here stood the Rear-Admiral, uncovered, as well as his suite. The guard presented arms, the drum rolled, and the band struck up. It was a most imposing sight on the spacious deck, glittering with the military display. The Rear-Admiral (Parseval) was attired in a military frock coat, with epaulettes. In the most stately manner he ushered the Commodore and his party into his cabin. . . . There were two apartments,—the first seemed the salle-a-manger, the other was like the splendid drawing-room of a royal personage. Whatever there might be of nautical fittings and appliances in the other parts of this ship, there was certainly nothing here to remind you of the gale or the battle. Antechambers separated the saloon from the sides of the vessel, and the stern ports resembled large doors opening into a spacious and elegant gallery. There was a fireplace and the genial blaze; magnificent carpets under foot, ottomans and chairs covered with brocade, centre tables with richly bound books, mirrors, elegant hangings,—everything most costly, and arranged with taste. How different from the cabins of our commanders, where the panoply of war obtrudes its grim visage, and the fittings for domestic use are temporary, plain, and entirely secondary, and where, in a few minutes, all could be thrown aside and the heavy battery be ready for its dread use along the whole line! In the saloon wherein I now sat, a Nelson might be softened to a Sybarite. It would certainly be a mockery to look for a sailor in the occupant. Be that as it may, the Rear-Admiral was certainly a polished and courtly gentleman. Tall, rather slightly made, but not thin, a pleasant, expressive countenance, hair somewhat thinned and light, eyes blue, intellectual calibre moderate, the style of the face and the manner much reminding me of Commodore Biddle, but softer. As I was obliged to interpret between him and the Commodore, the conversation was, as usual, limited. After a stay of half an hour, the Commodore took leave. . . . As the barge dropped astern of the "Ocean," her battery opened in thunder, each gun
driving a sheet of fire through the air. Ten guns were fired, but as two went together, it seemed to our ship like a salute of nine. We all uncovered, and after the last gun the oars once more dropped into the water, and the barge resumed its course. I must premise by saying that the subject of salute and ceremony has always given rise to discussion, and sometimes to difficulty, between the French Admirals and the American Commodores. With us and the English, the latter always has, like a Rear-Admiral, thirteen guns, but the French make a difference of two guns. This we do not admit. When the "Cumberland" arrived, the Rear-Admiral afloat received thirteen guns. Now he gives the Commodore fewer: As the Commodore noticed but ten guns, and knew there must be a mistake,—as every salute is an odd number,—he sent on board to inquire, and was informed that eleven guns were to have been fired, but that one missed, and two went together.

This visit was returned by the French Admiral the next day, when our sturdy Commodore Smith returned the salute, in like fashion. The battery told off eleven guns, the same number that he had offered to the Commodore, and two less than the usual number. The "Ocean" then answered with two less, again indicative of the Admiral's determination to mark the inferiority of the broad pendant.

Speaking of Toulon, the journal says:—

The population is chiefly military and naval, or of such persons as may be brought here to supply their wants, and carry on the trade connected therewith. The garrison may amount to five thousand or six thousand troops. Those of the artillery regiments appear to be the largest men, and also the best appointed. The infantry are mostly under size and light, and though the general style of their dress would seem rather slovenly and careless in comparison with the trig, well-fitting uniform of the English soldiery, yet on inspection it is found to be clean, and well adapted to the exigencies of hard service. The pantaloons are red, an overcoat of gray cloth descends below the knee, the cross-belts are unconfined by one around the body, leaving the whole person unconfined, and free for any
action. The appearance, however, of every arm of the military service is so inferior to the stout athletic proportions and soldierly bearing of the English, Austrian, and German troops, as to excite no small surprise at the fact that with such personnel, Napoleon planted the Eagles of the Empire in the capital cities of Spain, Germany, Austria, and Prussia, and swept away opposing armies as if they had been chaff,—another proof of the greatness of the master spirit that could work its will with even indifferent means. . . . Much as I have seen females employed abroad in labor unusual in our country, I never saw a woman porter till a few days since. Being at the Custom House with the Commodore, a young man, apparently just returned from sea, came in, followed by a porter carrying on the head a trunk with a bed lashed on top. Both were of small dimensions and light, but still full weight for the porter, who was a short, stout female, young, rosy, and black-eyed. Her features were clean cut, but long exposure had rendered a good skin rather coarse. Her arms were bare to the elbow. A good stout dress protected her body, and fell in folds scantily below the knee, while a coarse but clean kerchief was drawn around the neck and tied behind the waist. She stood patiently looking on while the trunk was examined, then with some exertion and assistance got the load once more on the head, and followed her nice young employer with measured step. I felt indignant at first at a usage so ungallant among the most polite; but when I reflected how much better even this most unfit employment, than the fate that would attend idleness in one of her class, the feeling was somewhat softened. She was said to be a Genoese, and many from the same country follow the same occupation.

Speaking of the Navy Yard at Toulon, a very careful description is given, closing with the following remarks:—

But it seems to me that when it is said that this establishment is on a large scale, and the mason-work very complete, all is said of its superiority that can be. In the application of power, ingenuity of contrivance, beauty of models, and excel-
CRUISE IN THE U. S. SHIP "CUMBERLAND." 97

ience of detail generally, the whole is inferior to the present condition of things at similar stations in the United States. Let any one who doubts this, compare for an instant the Rope-walk at the Navy Yard, Boston, and that now in operation at this place. . . .

Speaking of the Galleys of Toulon, he says: —

It will be a question for philanthropists to determine whether this state of things is better than a state-prison, as with us, or not.

*Sunday, March 81.* — Commodore Smith himself read the church service to-day, the first instance, I suspect, of its being done by an officer of his rank.

The next day a visit to a Swedish sloop-of-war suggests thoughts of the ancestral home.

As I stood on the deck and gazed on the Northern race around me, fair as women, stalwart seamen as they were, it was not forgotten that these were the countrymen of my good father. Amid all the thoughts that crossed his mind, could he ever have imagined that his son would some day stand in the relation of a foreign officer to Swedish men. I asked an officer who stood near me if he had ever met with any of my name. His eyes glistened and his face lit up at the very mention. "Oh, yes," said he, "it is a real Swedish name."

After an interval of four weeks, the "Cumberland" again returned to Mahon, early in April. Mr. Dahlgren was indefatigable in drilling his division. He says of them: —

The second (my own) did the best firing; their volley was like one crack. I always tell them that I must have them the best in the ship, and one would smile to see how they go ahead when I say, "Come, Second Division, we must not be last."

Some six weeks spent at Mahon, and the "Cumber-
land" is again on its way to Toulon. Approaching Toulon, the journal says: —
Beautiful indeed are the high mountains of *la belle France* edging the northern circumference of the blue circle of sea, and the surface of the water dotted with light feluccas and larger ships. There is not the slightest motion in the ship, and such weather might make sailors of old women. I hope, however, that our representatives who have spoken so contemptuously of what they called "the splendid pageantry of the Mediterranean," would not think it unkind to wish that they had tried the sample we have had in the "Cumberland" for the last six months. Worse weather or more discomfort rarely falls to the lot of ships in any part except the Baltic or Northern Seas. . . . The truth is, that in the whole year the summer months alone are pleasant, but these are so lovely, and so many opportunities are afforded at the same time of visiting the choice places of resort, that one hardly thinks of alluding to the heavy weather and discomfort of spring and winter.

In a few days they sailed from Toulon for the coast of Italy, Smyrna, Syria, and Alexandria. On the eve of sailing, Lieutenant Dahlgren received the afflicting intelligence of the death of his baby, John, who died April 2, 1844. His own record of this event is most touching, and shows the loving heart of a parent. He writes:

"Dear little fellow, he has a firm place in my memory, though my eyes have never been blessed with a sight of him. The first letters from home tell me of his birth, and each one since bears tidings of his rapid growth and vigorous health,—of all the promise that a parent could ask. In an instant this vision of lovely childhood is taken from me, and the fatal sentence goes forth that I never am to see my child. Cruel misfortune! Before me lie a few sheets that have often solaced a weary hour. They are the brief record of my infant's yet briefer career. His little life has been included in a few months of absence, and the stern messenger summons my little boy ere I can return to welcome him. How hard! Papa is never to play with his baby by day, nor to care for it by night; never to
know the music of his laugh, nor the sweetness of the little countenance. The darkness of the tomb shrouds all that is left, and the hand of the stranger has administered the last rites. Kind earth, bear lightly on those remains. Hour after hour have I mourned over the sad news, and when duty permitted, have withdrawn to my state-room to shed bitter tears, until wearied nature found repose in sleep. And even the wretched privilege of indulging grief in undisturbed privacy is not mine, for the thin divisions of our rooms will not shut out the jest or hearty laugh that intermingles with the conversation around the mess table. My child, what would I not have suffered that you should have lived!

Those who mistook the calm exterior of John Dahlgren's superb self-control for coldness, may here see the true tenderness of his heart.

May 26.—We cast anchor within the harbor of Genoa.

May 28.—Of all most unpleasant duties, one devolves on me to-day,—that of sitting on a court-martial. I feel peculiarly unfit at this time, for my own misfortune has softened me too much to deal out the severe inflictions of military law on others.

June 1.—The Consul having dined our officers and given a musical soirée, the wardroom returned the civility by a dinner to-day. I, being caterer, have to shoulder the most perplexing of all ceremonies.

During the stay of the "Cumberland" at Genoa the officers received various hospitalities from the notable personages of the place. These are all duly described in the journal kept at the time. In company with Mr. Foote, Genoa la superba was fully enjoyed. Her palaces, her collection of paintings, her pieces of sculpture, all exquisite for their beauty, and several venerable as specimens of Grecian antiquity, were appreciated, and admirable pictures are given of the social customs, with life-like portraits of the principal people of the place.
He was especially pleased with the Marquis di Nigro, who is spoken of "as remarkable for his hospitality and attachment to liberal principles," and who had among his tenants several descendants of the Columbus family. The concluding remarks on Genoa mention, that

One cannot avoid being struck with the evident devotion of the numbers that flock to worship in the churches, where silence and reverential attention prevail. It cannot be denied that the people are religious.

After leaving Genoa, the "Cumberland" stood leisurely along the Italian coast, and on the 8th June they anchored off Livorno, or Leghorn, some three miles distant in the open road. Here again he went ashore with the Commodore to visit the Governor and the United States Consul. The journal says of the Marquis that he had

Gold-laced hat with a green plume, coat buttoned to the throat, laced pants, and a huge sabre. In due time we took leave, and a prodigious deal of bowing was executed. The Consul then took the Commodore to his own house, where, after sitting awhile, the Marquis was announced, to return the Commodore's call, for he told us that his government did not allow him to visit foreign ships of war. The door was thrown open, the clank of sabres was heard on the stairs, and in flew the Governor with a whole suite of huge fellows, with epaulettes, orders, and moustaches in abundance. We all fell to bowing vigorously and then sat down, when some conversation took place. The Marquis asked the Commodore to dinner, which was not possible, as the latter is going to Florence. . . . In half an hour the party rose, the bowing again was gone through, and leave taken. . . . Livorno conveys the idea of a place that has known its origin in a modern period. The buildings are fine, the streets regular and wide, but you do not feel the interest that Genoa creates. It is a commercial place, and this is impressed on all around.
Leaving Livorno June 13, and beating leisurely along the Italian coast, the "Cumberland" entered the far-famed Bay of Naples on the 19th. So much has been said and written of the unrivalled beauty of this scene, that our narrative will merely refer to this one visit, and the descriptions given of the celebrated city. The 4th of July again found the "Cumberland" running on her course away to the southward abreast of the island of Stromboli, and in the distance the lofty peak of Ætna. Swept onward by the breeze towards Messina, through the rapid and dangerous currents of Scylla and Charybdis, opposite the bold and picturesque shores of Calabria, then clearing the straits, and in the open sea. The ship moved on rapidly, and by the 11th they coasted along Morea's hills. As the northern breeze played lightly over the water they were wafted past these shores so famed in past story; and thus they passed through the Grecian Archipelago. The ship was soon abreast of Ægina's Isle, and Athens was ahead! The port of Athens, now called, as in old time, the Piræus, was reached July 15. The journal here says:—

Great injustice has been done to Athens in one respect. Most writers speak of the harbor very indifferently, and Sir J. Hobhouse in particular says that it is small, and so shallow that an English sloop of war was deterred from entering. Now I have seen some of the finest ports in the world, and none of these surpass the Piræus. In facility of entrance, depth of water, and good bottom, it is equal to Toulon and Mahon; and it is better than either in being free from all shoals, rocks, or obstruction. Fifty sail of the line might be anchored within the harbor.

While at Athens that classic old citadel, the Acropolis, was seen, and the exceeding beauty of the Parthenon's ruins admired. Here they had various visitors, English, Turkish, French, Albanian, &c. Of the Turkish
Commodore the description is especially graphic. It says:—

He was very tall and powerful, and perhaps not quite so graceful as one of the same rank might have seemed some years back in the national costume, when they assumed such superiority over Christian dogs. A handsome set of features received the most savage expression from a pair of keen fierce eyes, and the sun had browned his complexion to full mahogany tinge. . . . He was shown round the ship, and the manner that he steamed about the decks, in and out of apartments, up and down ladders, was something of a lesson to Mr. Foote and myself. We had the satisfaction, however, of seeing the perspiration running down his own tanned face, as well as of suffering ourselves from such violent exercise. He told us very briefly that he admired the American ships more than the English or French.

July 20 they weighed anchor and passed Cape Colonna, whence the ruins of one of the most beautiful temples of antiquity may be seen many a mile seaward towering on the edge of a precipice, and where Plato is said to have made his favorite walk. Thence beating through the Doro passage, the ship, ever favored by a fresh fair wind drawing fast on “Scio’s rocky isle,” soon entered the Gulf of Smyrna, having made an exceedingly fine run.

The frigate stood in under easy sail to the anchorage near the fountain, anchored, and hoisted out the boats. The men were now very busy, some on the beach filling the casks from the fountain, others rolling it into the boat, some supplying the hose, boats going to and fro, while on board the water was hoisted in, to the cheering strains of the fife! The present plan of condensing sea water, although doubtless better from a practical standpoint, loses the picturesque effect here presented. It is a fair sample, where the old romance
of this "Navy of the Past," is now merged into patent applications of steam power. Yet the fancy loves still to linger beside these gushing streams of purest water and to view the busy seamen and listen to the screaming fife.

July 24, the "Cumberland" anchored off Smyrna. Here again the customary salutes and official visits had to be made, and a veritable Pacha of three tails was to be called upon. The journal says: —

Imagine a gross lump of humanity gathered into a corner of an ottoman, without a sign of the nether limbs, which were carefully tucked under, à la Turc, the upper part surmounted by a large head the visage of which was sunburnt and pock-marked, bearded and turbaned. An old garment like a fashionable sacque covered the body, but when it occasionally was opened by the movement of the hand, one might see that a pair of huge trousers rose to the armpits, and that the shirt was merely buttoned at the neck. This was the mighty Pacha! He did not attempt to rise, but looked very civil. Chairs were handed, and soon after pipes to all of the party who wore epaulettes. Then coffee in small cups and a dish of sweetmeats, of which each took a spoonful. . . . Of all the changes that occur to me since my last cruise in these seas, none seem greater than that which has come over the Turkish people in this place and in others within my notice. The iron rule which was without exception exercised over every unbeliever, whether Jew, Greek, Armenian, or European, and extended alike over circumstances of trade, religion, and dress, asserting the most contemptuous superiority for the follower of Mohammed, has almost vanished. The Pacha no longer takes off heads at will, or uses his mere pleasure instead of a law. Now individuals may follow caprice or convenience in costume, may dwell in the Turkish or any other quarter, and have the protection of a kind of jury in questions touching life or property. The mosques themselves, unpolluted for centuries by the tread of infidels, are now open to their gaze; and most of all, the Turkish Government has stipulated that no proselyte shall be punished
with death, though such is the command of the Koran, and has been the practice from the first. . . . On Friday I visited a mosque, and was shown over every part by one of the attendants. It was a fine and airy building with a large dome, two pulpits and a gallery opposite, the floors covered with mats on which the Turks squat. A few years since, when I was here, death would hardly have been sufficient in the eyes of a Turk to punish the sacrilege of an infidel putting foot in this place. Now may they write "Ichabod,—the glory has departed;" for with the power and the pride seems to have gone the barbarian virtue of the Moslem. So far the vices only of the Christian have been adopted. . . . The Catholics seem to me to be more successful as missionaries wherever I have heard of them than the Protestants; and this may be considered as one of the results of the discipline peculiar to their church.

July 30.—The officer commanding the troops quartered here, visited the ship, with nearly a dozen officers in his suite. They wore blue frock coats and white pants; epaulettes, with embroidered cuffs and collars. The red cylindrical cap was the only relic of Turkish costume. In due time the whole party was seated in the cabin, and you may suppose that the conversation was not very lively, as they only spoke Turkish. Dragomans were the mediums of communication. At the end of half an hour they departed, having demolished ice-creams and smoked. The Colonel and his second had their pipes carried by attendants, but the others were forced to submit to good Spanish cigars; and it was amusing to see the efforts they made, getting the wrong end in the mouth, lighting the other, and then puffing until the perspiration trickled down. I am certain that I gave them no chance of laughing when I smoked at the Pacha's, for I kept my eye on the old gentleman and imitated him so well that my pipe blazed like a regular Turk's.

Aug. 1.—The warmth of the weather is excessive, though a good breeze ordinarily prevails at times through the day. Many complain of great prostration, and I feel it not a little. Indeed, a long stay here would prejudice the health of the crew sensibly. Provisions of all kinds are plenty and cheap.
Aug. 4.—The wind continuing ahead, the "Cumberland" was got under way in the morning, with a light breeze to beat through the channel.

The ship, moving rapidly to the southward, passed, Aug. 7, the ancient Patmos where John wrote the Gospel that bears his name, thence passing in succession Lero, Calymnos, and Cos; steering between Scarpanto and Rhodes, they took leave of the Grecian Archipelago. By Aug. 11, the outline of Lebanon's lofty mountains could be seen, Cape Bairout to the North—the point of the Cape rounded and the beautiful view of town and shore came in sight. During the entire voyage they had suffered from the most oppressive heat, but here a refreshing breeze moderated the strong beams of a Syrian sun.

Bairout was indeed most lovely to look upon; for, instead of a close and compact mass of houses, the white roofs peep here and there from out an extensive grove of trees. The fleet of the Sultan, comprising probably his entire navy, was at the anchorage. The Captain Pacha was duly visited by Commodore Smith, accompanied as usual by Mr. Dahlgren as Flag Lieutenant, as well as by other officers. This Pacha was of high rank, being by his office third in the empire and also brother-in-law to the Sultan. The Pacha who governs the province had also to be called upon, as well as the captains of the English, French, and Austrian ships in the harbor. Visiting the town, however, they were glad to escape through the narrow and filthy streets to the landing and leave the shore.

Aug. 13 the "Cumberland" stood out to sea, passing the ancient Tyre and Sidon, now but wasted ruins, standing along the Syrian coast. Acre lay close at hand, the red flag of Turkey floating over those battlements.
where the blood of Jews, Christians, and infidels has been shed like water about its walls. The bare and mountainous rock of Mt. Carmel forms the point of the bay opposite to Acre; and south of Carmel, directly on the water's edge, were seen the ruins of Caesarea, from whence moving rapidly along the coast of Palestine, the frigate was anchored a mile and a half distant from Jaffa. Aug. 16, the journal says of Jaffa:—

It stands on a small conical hill, the houses rising from the very edge of the water above each other to the summit. They are all built of a grayish stone, and so closely packed as to seem carved from one huge rock into habitations. The view here is not as beautiful as around Bairout, and the burning sun seems to fall on a white sand alone. . . . In the evening I pulled quietly ashore by myself to put my foot on the Holy Land. After a walk through crooked streets ascending and descending, I stood before an arched doorway of stone, passed through a wretched entrance leading through the dwelling into the court, part of which was sheltered by a wall; the other was open to the sea and the winds. This court was the site of the house where dwelt "Simon the Tanner" when Peter abode with him. It was covered with the crumbling dust of the stone, but the foundation was like the rock, for the battlement rose perpendicularly from the edge of the sea some forty to fifty feet, and was built in the firmest manner. A robust Turk was smoking his pipe in the back door, while his decrepit sire, in the dotage of extreme age, seemed to note nothing around. The interesting incidents recorded in Acts x. came fresh to my mind. It was here that the Apostle had witnessed the hand of the Lord in a miracle. . . . And here I stood on the spot over 1800 years afterwards, one of a continent not then known. The sun was just lingering at the horizon when I was recalled to the scene around me by the harsh sounds of the Turkish language. I gazed on the sea for a moment; it was a lovely evening, and our frigate rode the wave buoyantly, while the new moon displayed her slender crescent just above the depart-
ing star of day. The Crescent of the Turk, thought I, has cursed this land of promise long enough. Who sorrows to see its glory and its power waning like the mist of the morning before the banners of the Cross? And hath not the land been watered with the blood of Christendom?

The "Cumberland" had now reached the most distant point from home on this station, and Aug. 21, standing to the westward with at first a dead calm and then a fair wind, they passed Damietta, and the Delta, or low lands between the mouths of the Nile, and Aug. 26 reached Alexandria. The few points of land high enough to be seen, appeared like shadows along the horizon. But clear and distinct rose Pompey's Pillar, like a black line. Alexandria is chiefly built on the neck of land projecting seaward from the main, and on a bend with which it terminates is the palace of the Viceroy, the Dock-yard, &c. At anchor were Egyptian, French, Austrian, and English ships. The Commodore and the party of officers who were to accompany him, with the United States Consul, repaired the next day to call on the Viceroy. The journal thus describes the famous Mehemet Ali:

As he was in a sitting posture, it was difficult to judge of his stature, but the frame was robust and well knit. Though seventy-five years had whitened and thinned the beard, of rather moderate dimensions for a full-blooded Turkish pacha, they had left the features and arms full and round. The dark hazel eye, too, was undimmed, and glanced rapidly and keenly. The face is large and well proportioned, the features regular, nose straight, forehead ample, the expression calm and perfectly grave, nothing in it denoting cruelty, but rather matured thought, with immovable resolution for any difficulty that might arise. He was attired in the ordinary Turkish jacket, pantaloons of dark olive fine cloth, but without decoration or ornament, and wore the fez, or red cap. . . . I could not but
feel that all my expectations of this remarkable person had been realized, and in some respects I had been agreeably surprised. In the struggle which has occupied nearly his whole life to obtain and secure the power now enjoyed, and to compel, it may be said, the people from ignorance and indolence into comparative civilization and industry, he has shed blood almost at every step.

On losing sight of Alexandria, Sept. 7, nothing occurred to vary the monotony of light and contrary breezes, and Sept. 23 the ship was close in with the island of Malta. As they entered the southeast harbor, buildings line the water's edge, and above them arose others, but among them and about them the regular lines of the fortifications strike the eye everywhere. Here the Cross and the Crescent met in desperate affray, and the blood of thousands was shed before the Moslem turned away from the stronghold of the Knights of Malta. A prolonged quarantine was enforced, and it was not until Oct. 9 that the yellow flag was hauled down from the fore, and free communication with the shore was permitted. The customary visits had then to be made upon the various official personages. The Commodore and suite, therefore, first drove to the Admiral's house, then pulled across the harbor to call on the Rear-Admiral, Sir L. Curtis, then landed and called on the Governor, Lieutenant-General Sir P. Stuart, who resided in the old palace of the Grand Masters. General Stuart is described as a fine-looking officer, with very pleasing manners. They then visited the Armory, that contains all the pieces of armor remaining of those belonging to the knights, as well as some curious ordnance. Thence they drove to the residence of the Lord Bishop. The journal mentions that this dignitary, speaking of the Jerusalem Bishopric, said: ---
The chief object of the King of Prussia in being mainly instrumental in founding it, was the union of the churches of England with his Protestant churches, which failed through the mistakes of both parties.

The next day the old Church of St. John, of exceeding interest, was visited, and the tombs of the Grand Masters inspected, where this solemn sanctuary of the dead inspired many reflections on the mutability of human events. Of Malta, the journal remarks:—

The streets are regular and well arranged, the houses handsome and well built of the soft white stone peculiar to the island, and the shops are filled with every commodity, purchasable at low rates. Order and no small degree of activity prevail, and on the whole the English have given to it the wholesome condition which they rarely fail to impress where they have the power.

Oct. 10 the "Cumberland" slipped from her moorings, and spreading her canvas to the breeze soon gained the open sea. The weather was variable, with squalls of wind and rain; then the fresh west wind increased to a gale, and finally came out to the east, when the ship put before it on her course. Fresher and fresher came the breeze, until the frigate was along the Sardinian shore, at the rate of ten knots an hour, thus reaching Mahon the evening of Oct. 19. Here Mr. Dahlgren received the first letters from home that he had had since the 25th May, when the sad missive that gave the sorrowful intelligence of the loss of a child came to him on the very eve of sailing from Toulon. A dreary blank to the heart, of nearly five months' suspense, had intervened, with not one word of comfort from, or of information regarding, his family at home. These are the weary trials of the mariner's life; but how little are they appreciated by those who dwell in peace
and comfort and domestic happiness at home! He was then, however, made happy by the knowledge that all was well.

The journal says of the arrival at Mahon:—

In a twinkling the ship was invaded by a host of washerwomen, tailors, and shoemakers. These people have generally been acquainted with every ship in the squadron for ten, twenty, or thirty years, as may be. They are honest and faithful, and looked upon us as ancient acquaintances. Such a shaking of hands and inquiries after "Missa" this or that. One could hardly turn. Then came the rush of officers from our other ships, eager to exchange news. The three ships being here together, there is a deal of visiting and assembling ashore. Friday evening the band of the "Columbia" played at Cala Figuera, a beautiful dell of limited circumference, enclosed by high shelving rocks, where ladies, officers, and citizens stood listening attentively. The effect was uncommonly fine,—the evening calm, and the waters of the small cove perfectly smooth, with the additional attraction of a rising moon.

Nov. 3.—The wardroom officers gave a dinner, the time passing pleasantly, and we sat from five to eight. I passed around on a slip the customary toast of a Saturday evening on shipboard, of "Wives and sweethearts," which was welcomed by all; and as wine is never used by the mess, except at formal dinners, it happened to be the first occasion for the presentation.

Nov. 6.—All the ships are busy doing such small repairs as may be required, and getting in stores of all kinds, for the wear of a ship, and the consumption of many hundred men, amounts to something in six months. As there is not a man in the ship who draws his spirit ration, the greater part of the liquor is being sent ashore, and the space in the spirit-room appropriated to other purposes.

Nov. 11.—To-day the Commodore directed me to pen a letter to the Secretary of the Navy on the condition of the signal book. This I did in short but very strong terms, recommending a revision of the whole signal book on the principles,—1st. Of its
containing sentences only. 2d. Single words, to be telegraphed. 3d. The addition to the code of such terms as the introduction of steam might render necessary. And, further, prohibiting all officers from making any changes in the book. The telegraph to be used when necessity might require other sentences than those found in it. The Commodore signed the letter and forwarded it.

Nov. 16.—A court-martial has been assembled, of which I am a member.

Nov. 22.—The sentence of the court-martial was given. . . . Among the melancholy news by the steamer was the decease of Mrs. Gilley. Her son, a mere child, now with us, is thus left an orphan, and perhaps without a friend. His father fell in the duel with Graves. From that time his widow declined, and, being dependent on her husband's exertions, she was left without means. General Harrison immediately gave a mid.'s warrant to the eldest son, then nine or ten years old, and with tears in her eyes she told an officer at Boston that what her son saved from his pay was almost all she had to live on. As I entered the Commodore's cabin in the afternoon, one of the sofas was occupied by a diminutive form wholly enveloped in a cloak. It was the little orphan, and my heart sickened on hearing the continued sobbing, to think how deep a sorrow had so early stricken the young soul.

What a picture of the sequel of a duel!

On Nov. 23 the "Cumberland" was again prepared for sea, and in company with the "Plymouth" made a trial of speed for Gibraltar, although from some of the casualties that seem invariably to attend nautical experiments, the difference could not well be ascertained.

Dec. 14 the two ships again left Gibraltar in company, and returned to Mahon. The departure from Gibraltar is thus beautifully described:—

The topsails were reefed, the anchor weighed, and soon the "Cumberland" and "Plymouth" were under way. We stretched along the head of the bay, then tacked past our late berth, and,
ranging by the ships at anchor, kept course for the point that marks the extremity of the Rock. The sight was lovely to look on. Glints of sunshine peeped through the swollen clouds that gathered thickly around, while the frigate gave yet more canvas to the wind, not unheeding the dark squalls that threatened, for clewline and buntline were held by hundreds of hands, but hoping to clear the Rock before their influence should reach her. From aloft, flags of every color rapidly appeared and disappeared, as their meaning was recognized by our consort, which, under a press of canvas, was still astern. Just as we passed Europa Point a magnificent rainbow threw its bright arch directly over the rugged Rock, springing, as it were, from the base, and circling it to the very summit as if with a diadem.

Again at Mahon, and again a member of a court-martial, the fourth within ten months at which he had assisted. Lieutenant Foote sat as prosecutor. At this time Mrs. Foote was living in the ship for some weeks, occupying the Captain’s cabin, having joined her husband a short time previous. The circle of American society had Mrs. Hunter, Mrs. Adams, Mrs. Porter, Mrs. Reynolds, and Mrs. Boyle at Mahon, and beside these ladies, wives of officers, there were various Mahonese families who claimed to be compatriots by alliance. The seamen of the “Cumberland” about this time started an amateur theatre to be held at the Navy Yard. Speaking of this attempt at amusement, the journal says:—

My belief is, that any association in a military body is likely to mar discipline, therefore I object to them. It matters little whether the object be good or bad. The law is sufficient to insure order, religion, and morality, each being provided for in separate clauses, and if the officers show a good example and do their duty in enforcing the law, obedience, sobriety, and attendance at the customary religious service follow. If the men
lack amusement, it is their own fault, for they have liberty to their content and a liberal allowance of money, far beyond the practice of other ships. When they want sport, they can play ball, or indulge in other manly exercises ashore.

Another milestone of life’s journey has been reached by this narrative, and 1845 marks the irrevocable flight of time, which ever goes on, on, unceasingly, to the end. The new year found the “Cumberland” at Mahon, and the usual monotony of life there unrelieved by special incident.

Jan. 21 the first attempt at ordnance invention is noted in these lines:—

I am much occupied with having made a model of a spring percussion lock, which is to overcome the insuperable difficulty that has hitherto prevented its use. The exploding powder escaping by the vent has always destroyed the lock hitherto. . . .

The journal resumes:—

Feb. 5.—I have introduced many little improvements into my room, which have been followed by others. For instance, the bottom of the berth is suspended by two iron straps, at each end, moving on different centres, which nearly counteracts the motion in a seaway, and the air-port is closed within by a glass sash which slides, so that the cold air is kept out in winter without darkening the room.

The “Cumberland” remained at Mahon until the middle of April, during which time the ship underwent general repairs, and being provisioned for five months, left her winter-quarters, her first destination being Toulon. During these dull months, when there was so little to relieve the uniformity of social life, the especial friend and companion of Lieutenant Dahlgren was Mr. Foote, at that time First Lieutenant of the ship.
Speaking of this intimacy, which was never chilled, but rather increased by time, the journal says:—

Foote is a warm friend to me, and never suffers any chance to pass of manifesting his feelings. His high standing as an officer and a man makes this very valuable to me. It is, moreover, pleasing to me to know that with each member of the mess I am on the best terms.

Saturday, April 26.—A little before noon the anchor was weighed, the wind very light from S. E. Our direct course out lay nearly through the French fleet ahead, and the beautiful and seamanlike manner in which the ship was handled by the First Lieutenant, Mr. Foote, commanded all admiration. . . . Never did a ship display finer qualities, never were they more ably put in requisition. To have missed stays or tackled in wrong time would have made an awful crush among the French ships or put us on the shoal off the fort. The ports and decks of the French ships were crowded with officers and men, who might have looked with some anxiety to the results.

April 24.—A beautiful sunny day, and the ship is moving slowly before a light air from the westward, the Sardinian coast but a few miles from us, its mountainous and picturesque shore dotted by many a village perched here and there on an eminence. The snow whitens the summits, but since leaving Toulon we have been fanned along by more zephyrs, and the sea is smooth as the Delaware.

On May 1st the ship reached Genoa, where a short stay was made until the 12th. Here they found, just arrived from Turin, a Vice-Admiral, Prince Carignano, and also an Italian Rear-Admiral. The Prince Royal, a fair-weather admiral of twenty-seven, received the American Commodore very kindly and invited him and his staff to dinner, returned their visit and had them to dinner a second time, besides the stated soirées at the palace; so that, with other attentions added to these civilities, they had an excellent
view of the best society of Genoa. A steady stream of visitors poured on board ship during their stay; ladies, gentlemen, soldiers, vagabonds, went round the "Cumberland." More than a thousand persons were received on one day, so that they seem to have been uncommonly popular. On the eve of their departure they attended the weekly soirée of this Royal personage, where the Spanish Princes, sons of Don Carlos, were present. Sailing from Genoa to Leghorn, Mr. Dahlgren visited Pisa. He says in the journal of May 17:—

At noon a "Galignani" was sent to the Commodore containing the note of the Mexican Governor, and terminating diplomatic intercourse with the United States, also a statement of some difficulty with Brazil. The information is in no wise discouraging to the Navy; at least one would suppose so, if he could have heard the deliberations of our mess on the subject. The "Cumberland" is a noble ship, and a call for her services would give us all the greatest satisfaction. About 4 p. m. we weighed anchor with a light breeze and stood to the south.

Passing the bold rocky edge of Elba, stopping at Civita Vecchia, they anchored on the 23d May in the Bay of Naples. On the 26th the Neapolitan King gave a sham fight, storming a fort, &c., and on the 30th, the King's Saints day, there was a prodigious amount of firing from all the vessels. His Majesty also held a grand presentation, which was attended by the officers. Add to this the usual amount of sight-seeing, visits to and from officials, firing of any number of salutes, and the short stay at Naples until June 9 was full of incidents. Among the visits made to the ship, a large number of pupils from the College of Nobles came on board, Mr. Ryder (President of Georgetown College) being with them. The journal says:—
These students must all be noble for four generations; but any of our Yankee schools would turn out a much more promising set of fellows than these. As to Mr. Ryder, he appears to be a very able man.

On another day some American ladies dined on board. The remark is made,—

It was a treat to meet with some ladies who had not lost their American feelings.

We copy the following narration of an incident at sea June 11:—

The day was marked by one of those accidents that so often occur ashore, but which are so rare on shipboard that I have never heard of an instance before. Two men lost an arm each by the premature explosion of a gun. We had gone to quarters about 10 o'clock, the breeze light, the water smooth, and the target right on the starboard beam. The firing was going on with rapidity and precision, the shot falling so close to the target that they would have struck a supercificies of twenty feet square. Around me, the men of my own division were exceedingly animated, and I was just as busy as a bee, when, hearing a groan amid the thunder of the cannon, I turned around and saw two men bearing along another whose left arm was completely blown off, the blood dripping from it; the other man was passed on the other side of the deck and both were taken below to the surgeons. The seamen paused for a moment as the unfortunate sufferers were borne by, but they were soon as busy as before, and again the flashes and roar of the whole broadside were in full play. It seems that a gun in the 3d Division had been improperly sponged; as a consequence some fire was left in it, and the moment the cartridge was rammed home it fired and blew out the rammer, taking off the right hand of one man and the left hand of another. The latter is named Ross; he is from New Jersey, and he bore the operation of amputating with the greatest fortitude, encouraging the other by his words and demeanor. When the surgeon told him that an operation was necessary, he called out to his fellow sufferer,
“Do you hear that, Brady, my arm must come off!” The other groaned in agony. “Come, come,” said Ross, “don’t take on so; did you never read Plato?” “He be damn’d,” answered Brady, “I never hear tell on him afore.”

At noon of June 12 the ship was anchored in the Bay of Palermo: —

Among some papers sent by the Consul it appears that the new Secretary has ordered lieutenants to wear two epaulettes; so that after a service of nearly twenty years I have at last reached these baubles.

Six days were spent in Palermo. The American Consul was very civil and attentive, and gave a soirée, of which the journal says: —

Princes, Dukes, &c., composed the company, for titles here are as common as mere Mr. at home; and their owners, stripped of their large means, are nearly in the position of plain American gentlemen on $2,000 per annum, being no better bred and in no wise so intelligent.

June 24 Malta was reached, where the usual salutes and civilities were exchanged, and the ship was soon crowded as usual by watermen, washerwomen, and tradespeople all anxious to reap a harvest among the new-comers. On the 30th June the ship was again unmoored, and went on her course past the bold shores of Corfu and Albania and through the Straits of Otranto and up the Adriatic amid her numerous rocks and rocky islets that are neither green nor wooded nor refreshing to the eye, but barren, lonely spots. The scorching rays of the sun fell on the undimpled surface of the water, and the days came and went, and still scarcely the lightest zephyr stirred the air, while the ship with slowest snail’s pace crept by the many islands, for a long time even reposing in the absolute calm
close under the shadow of Pomo rock, where its single stony cliff rises abruptly from the fathomless waters. Yet after a time a light wind stirred the sails, and the good ship coasted the eastern shore, which was no longer so bold nor so barren, but looked cultivated. Again they experienced some of the changes of this sea, and heavy squalls lowered seaward and landward, and the wind came out at northeast and blew with great violence, until finally, July 15, the "Cumberland" entered the harbor of Trieste. Of this city the journal says:—

Trieste, as every one knows, is one of the results of the attempt to create a commerce for Austria, and a brilliant success has attended the experiment. One has everywhere constant evidence of the rapid growth of the place, and of the rich fruits that spring from fortunate commercial enterprise. The streets are broad and well paved, the houses regular, and the lower windows filled with goods. The people are well formed and good looking, and every one seems to be well-dressed. Since our arrival the ship has been crowded with visitors of all degrees, and I am bound to say that I have never seen so many respectable and well-behaved people on board, citizens or peasants; there is a steadiness and apparent self-respect in all that seems a part of the German character. The women are lovely,—dressed *tout comme il faut*, and not excessively; their manners too are so habitually courteous as to please all. On Sunday the crowd was so dense that one could hardly pass along deck; there could not have been less than 2,000 people on board.

A dinner with the Governor, whose father was Prime Minister before Metternich, is thus noted:—

After dinner I had a very long conversation with the Governor on the affairs of America. . . . he made one remark which seemed singular from the subject of an absolute sovereign. He said: "We have an Emperor who is absolute in almost everything, but there is still a public opinion, and though the sovereign may deviate from it at times, he cannot violate or defy it; everything would tend to revolution."
CRUISE IN THE U. S. SHIP "CUMBERLAND." 119

Monday, July 21. — Mr. Vincent Notte dined with me. He lived in New Orleans from 1805 to 1826 and assisted at the battle of January 8. His descriptions of the battle were very graphic; he spoke of the surpassing steadiness of the British line under the murderous fire, and he saw Packenham fall as he rode up to rally a regiment. He had pulled off his hat and with an impatient and contemptuous gesture motioned the men on; the next minute he fell.

July 26 the "Cumberland" left Trieste and directed her course out of the Adriatic, passing Syracuse and the Island of Malta, and reaching Tripoli on the 7th August, where they made a stay of a few days only. The town of Tripoli is spoken of as little more than an extensive fortress under Mahometan rule, the chief interest with which the place inspires an American, being connected with the early history of our country. Here it was that our infant Navy, led by Decatur, performed the most brilliant and daring exploits. Leaving Tripoli Aug. 11, they anchored on the 13th in the Bay of Tunis. Here the American Consul requesting some protection, the Commodore felt compelled to grant the request, as the Consul spoke of being in some difficulty with the Dey. Coming from Tripoli a quarantine of nine days was exacted, which expired on the 21st August, when the officers made a rush for the city, which stands at the head of a lake nine miles distant from the sea. Here our flag was first saluted by the shore batteries, differing in this from the custom of every other nation. This was exacted by the treaty of 1805 as a mark of humiliation after our squadron had compelled the pirates to relinquish further attacks on our commerce, and to surrender all American citizens held in slavery.

On the 23d the ship left this lonely place, and Sept. 1 Minorca was in view. They sailed hence for Toulon,
where, Sept. 23, the Commodore received orders from the Department to return home shortly, and anchor in the port of Boston. So on the 25th they again returned to Mahon to make final preparations for the departure homeward, and great was the commotion in the immediate circle at Mahon when it was reported that both the "Cumberland" and the "Plymouth" were to leave. In a few days the water-tanks were filled and the ship provisioned and in all respects ready for a war-cruise of six months. Finally, Oct. 1, the "Cumberland" passed from the harbor into the sea, the "Plymouth" leaving some hours later, and Oct. 13 Gibraltar was reached.

And now recommenced the tremendous bustle inevitable in a man-of-war in the required preparations for homeward bound and a winter passage. These at last completed, Oct. 15 the "Cumberland" and "Plymouth" left Gibraltar, the former ship having on board Mr. Carr, the Consul to Morocco, who was landed at Tangiers. The "Cumberland" then weighed anchor, received and returned the parting salute and cheerings of the "Plymouth," and, putting out to sea, made for the direct route homeward. On Nov. 8 the stout frigate "Cumberland" was safely anchored in the roads of Boston harbor, and Nov. 12 the last entry of the journal of this cruise runs thus:

At six in the evening reached my own home in Wilmington. Wife and children were seated round the table at the evening meal, little dreaming who was so near. . . . All in excellent health, thanks to Providence.

This cruise had lasted over two years, during all of which time Lieutenant Dahlgren had suffered greatly from the weakness of the optic nerve, but had otherwise been in good health.
ORDNANCE RECORD.
CHAPTER VI.

EARLY ORDNANCE CAREER. 1847-1850.

A Halcyon interval of tranquil rest succeeded this sea voyage, and for over a period of one year the home journal marks the enjoyment of great domestic happiness surrounded by his little family, to whose numbers, Aug. 9, 1846, a lovely flower had been added, the baby Paul. The father's journal, alluding to this new joy, says of this infant, —

The mild influence of his pure innocence is shed like a blessing on the house.

This uneventful life in the comfortable, old-fashioned house in Wilmington was interrupted by orders for ordnance duty received early in January, 1847.

This necessitated leaving home and repairing to Washington, which was now destined to be the scene of those severe studies and labors as an ordnance officer, that culminated some sixteen years later in placing John Dahlgren as the acknowledged head of the Ordnance Department of the Navy of his country. We have now reached that period of his career when every energy was directed to one aim and end, and when his inventive genius, aided by his great mathematical talent, rapidly attained surprising results.

The success attending his earnest and patient endeavors has linked his name closely and forever with the
naval ordnance history of the world, and the issue is so widely known as to make it almost superfluous to chronicle it anew. Let it, then, become our pleasing task rather to point out the wearisome steps of unremitting industry through which this end was gained.

The accomplishment of a destiny gives its most instructive lesson when we are enabled to point out the particular means, the toilsome effort, through which obstacles have been overcome.

And never did iron will and perseverance combine in a more signal manner to enforce their aim in spite of any and every depressing influence. In illustration of this trait, we have before us, as we write, a manuscript book which is a marvel of painstaking care. Every letter and figure is drawn with the incisive clearness of a steel engraving, and no sign of weariness or haste is anywhere indicated. We copy entire the record placed by the Admiral himself in the fly-leaf. It is this:

A story attaches to these manuscript tables that some of mine may profit by. They were written by me in the early part of 1829. I was a middy, just returned from the cruise on the coast of Brazil, and was boarding in Seventh, above Chestnut Street, corner of first small street, east side, at Mrs. Drummond's. My pay was about $820 a year, as it had been for three years and was to be for nearly a like period. The house was very respectable. My mother also boarded there, but for the little board I could pay, I must needs be content with a garret. Desiring much to have Riddle's Navigation, and unable to pay its price, which was very high, being an English book, I undertook to copy the part of most interest, his method of calculating *lunar distances*. It was midwinter, something in Philadelphia. I could not afford a fire; so I used to wrap up in an overcoat, and write until my fingers became too cold to continue. The work was fully accomplished before the winter ended.
We copy this extract explanatory of the work of a boy of eighteen as a *key-note* to the Ordnance career of John Dahlgren. *When genius is thus aided by energy, the world reaps the harvest!*

Pope says, "It is the *invention that in different degrees distinguishes every great genius.*" The utmost stretch of human study, learning, and industry, which masters everything besides, can never attain this. It furnishes art with all her material, and without it, judgment itself can only steal wisely.

*While, on the other hand, there can be no success but for those who know how to prepare it.* When Lieutenant Dahlgren was first assigned to Ordnance duty at Washington, Commodore Warrington was Chief of Bureau and Mr. Mason was Secretary of the Navy.

John Dahlgren was required to investigate and bring into use the Hale system of rockets. He was also given the supervision of such details of equipment as were then prepared at the Navy Yard of that place. A manuscript before us says:

The exceedingly primitive condition of naval ordnance at this date, may be conceived or understood from the fact that the percussion lock was being generally introduced as an admitted improvement on the match and flint lock; that the present elevating or tangent sight was only in contemplation; that shells with their fuzes were being cautiously allowed to come very slowly into our ships, and the old shot system, with the 32-pdr. as its representative, had just received a solemn revision of confirmation at the hands of a board of veterans, being but a copy of the last English decree on the subject.... These details seem insignificant compared with the questions that now occupy ordnance men, but they were the points of the wedge which is now being driven home.

However, as some reorganization of the Naval Ordnance had recently been entered on, it was required to
determine the ranges and other qualities of the new cannon, and this was also put into Lieutenamt Dahlgren's hands. Of this new system he says:—

It was only a copy of that just adopted in England, and realized the idea of which ordnance men had long been dreaming, viz., one calibre for every gun in a navy, and so far it was well; but as that calibre was the 32-pdr., it failed to attain the promised benefits, and was even inferior to the armament which it superseded, because it sacrificed a higher calibre, the 42-pdr. This was a fatal defect, and, in addition, the principal gun of the system was so defective in model as to be dangerous in action. These vices of the new system were quickly made evident in the practice which was carried on under my inspection, in order to adjust the sights and other details. The guns lacked accuracy and power, and the heaviest gun, endurance.

But we anticipate.

When Lieutenamt Dahlgren arrived in Washington, Jan. 8, 1847, and reported to Commodore Warrington for Ordnance duty, we have heard him say that this brave old officer of 1812, who so soon became one of his best friends, and ever afterwards remained so, received him at first rather coldly, and told him he would send for him when wanted. An interval of a fortnight elapsed, before he was told that he was wanted at the Bureau. The Commodore then gave verbal orders touching the rockets.

On the 28th January, Dahlgren went to the Navy Yard and commenced the making of Hale's rockets. The press was very small, and much of the machinery required new adaptations. The making of these rockets involved a secret principle, which Hale had sold to the United States. A month later, we find the following little paragraph in the note-book, showing how difficult it is, the world over, to guard a secret:—
EARLY ORDNANCE CAREER.

Before leaving the Yard a public letter-writer asked for some account of the rockets, which I declined giving, as not within my discretion. He then said that a workman had given him some details which he did not care about. On examination I found that they contained the entire secret. The paper was burned, at my request. I went to the Arsenal and told Captain Mordecai what had happened. He was much concerned.

This work went on in the beginning slowly, the machinery requiring changes. He says:—

At this time there was no ordnance establishment; the fuze stocks and cannon locks and shells were made and fitted in the plumber's shop. The only sign of ordnance was the laboratory, recently erected under Coston, and operations were given chiefly to the new fuze by Alger. Captain Powell, who was a sort of executive about the Bureau, used to come down for an hour or so, and inspect, give directions, &c. I was given a room in the office building, on the second floor, opposite the Commandant's office. Commodore McCauley was in command. I had to begin with procuring rocket tubing and making hydraulic press and screw press.

Two months later my duty was extended, beyond the rockets, to Powell's duty of inspecting locks, fuzes, shells, powder tanks.

Feb. 15 he notes:—

Planned a frame for rockets.

And April 8:—

The plan of an ordnance workshop suggested by me has been sanctioned by the Bureau and directed to be carried into effect.

We can thus observe that his inventive genius began to arouse itself, which had hitherto lain dormant for want of opportunity.

May 20 he notes:—
So much of my plan as related to placing the press has been changed. . . . It is ordered in a separate building at the Laboratory, thus disjointing the work and losing all the economy of steam.

Already his special adaptability for ordnance had been recognized by the astute Warrington, and the journal, May 26, notes:

Captain Powell told me that it was contemplated to make my duty here of a permanent character. The new 32-pdr. system was being introduced, and the business of completing the arrangements devolved on me, particularly sighting them, being the first appearance of tangent sights. But I said, to sight guns I must have their ranges, and there are none. So I must range them. To do this I must fire. Now there was no beach or ground, nothing but the river, and how measure ranges on the water! I conceived the idea of noting the position of the jet of water thrown up from points on the shore, established by triangulation, but to do this I must create the means to measure bases and angles, and there was no one to assist. I borrowed a theodolite from Coast Survey. Had an iron rocket tube cut to make two measuring bars from rocket tube (two-inch iron), and cut one to ten and one to fourteen feet,—ends faced on a lathe with great accuracy. Then obtained a level surface sufficient to give a base of 2,500 feet, and a base of verification of 1,000 feet in the yard. Then measured the angles of a main series, selected stations, and connected them with the main series. The difference between measured and deduced base of verification was $\frac{1}{36}$ inch. To note the site of jet some special instrument was needed. Thought of the table, and devised an alidade that was suitable.

The 1st of July he took to the Yard a lock he had contrived during the "Cumberland" cruise, and after a short absence on official business, returning to the Yard, he notes:
July 20. — Astonished to find at the Yard that a lock was being made on the very principle of mine!

July 21. — Permission to alter an old lock.

July 22. — Lock ready. Fired an eight-inch gun with four charges of 8 lbs. and one of 10 lbs. Captain C. said I ought to have waited. I answered I had done so long enough; that I had the principle in practice three and a half years ago. It was my own. Showed the lock to Commodore Warrington. Took out a caveat from the Patent Office. When Ashard's lock was tried, nearly three months ago, I talked of mine, and illustrated by a drawing on the watch box near the sun, made with the pencil with which I was writing, that is still perfect now.

The earliest notice that we find among the manuscript papers of this lock, is a memorandum made in 1835, in which it is said, "For percussion locks two principles are assumed." These principles are then stated, and their application explained. But the lock was not presented to the Navy until some years later. In April, 1848, a Congressional Committee of the House of Representatives asked for "specimens of all the locks and primers for discharging cannon which have been used since 1843." The memoranda sent by the Navy Bureau of Ordnance, when sending these samples, mentions:

No. 7 is a perforated hammer, invented by J. A. Dahlgren about the year 1835. First applied to actual use on board the frigate "Cumberland" in January, 1844, when the spring lock was used. This hammer is mounted on the body of a Hidden lock, and has fired a 32-pdr. two hundred and forty-nine times, shot and shell being used at various times, for practice and other experiments.

No. 8 is the same perforated head, attached by a single bolt to a small mass of metal on a model howitzer. From which it will be seen that the perforated hammer can be applied to any of the known methods of mounting a lock, whether a spring or direct action.
In a communication to the Congressional Committee relative to this invention, Dahlgren says:—

It was about the time above mentioned (1835) that my attention, like that of many others, was drawn to this matter, and the notion of a fixed hammer, with a vent for the escape of the blast, suggested itself to me. I made a memorandum of it at that time. (Copy annexed.) But duties of a widely different character engrossed every moment, and the paper was filed away with others until opportunity and leisure enabled me to try the experiment. In 1843 I was on duty in the frigate "Cumberland." The sliding lock of Hidden, as it now stands, had just been adopted, and I could not fail to notice its complicated arrangement. When the winter came, and with it the necessity for overhauling the ship, I obtained permission from Commodore J. Smith to try my hammer on one of the guns; and as the question was as to its capacity to remain over the vent and withstand the blast, I determined to use a spring lock, induced to this by the consideration that Hidden's was a new patent, and I was ignorant how far I might trespass on it by using a support. The plain hammer with the single bolt readily occurred to me, but was not admissible, as it would have required another perforation in the lock piece, and such a liberty would have been in direct violation of Bureau orders, which allow of no cutting or boring into the metal of a gun without leave from the Bureau. The lock was made by a Mahon blacksmith, and so clumsily and with such loss of time, that the ship put to sea before I could proceed any further. This lock is now deposited with the Bureau of Ordnance, and a letter of Commodore Smith on the subject is annexed.

The cruise ended, and the movements of an active ship gave no other chance. I returned, and after a leave of absence was detailed for Ordnance duty in 1847. As soon as leisure permitted, I prosecuted the matter, and it now rests as presented to the Committee.

The Hidden sliding lock is now in use in our ships. My own has never been used except at the Experimental Battery in this Yard, where I am permitted by the Bureau to use it, in the course of experimental firing. It can be applied to any kind of
lock, whether spring or plain action, with or without support. No. 1 on a Hidden support has stood two hundred and fifty rounds with shot and shells, never failing once, and No. 2 has been fired about fifty times.

It can be readily made of iron or brass, is cheap, not liable to be deranged by the incident of service, and has the advantage over the side lock within, that it will explode with any kind of wafer or primer, and requires no care in turning the vent primer towards its blow. With this, it has the advantage of Hidden's in confining the flame of the fulminate sufficiently to the vent, while the side hammer permits it to expand freely.

We next note: —

Aug. 16. — Received orders from the Bureau to take the direction of all the ordnance matters at this Navy Yard, making me head of this Department, uncontrolled by the Navy Yard Commandant.

Aug. 18. — While firing some fourteen 1-lb. rockets, I had the misfortune to burst one. Heavy fragments passed near the heads of Commodore Warrington and myself. Fired a 32-lb. shot, using my lock. Commodore Warrington much pleased with it.

The building of workshops went on slowly enough. Meantime, Oct. 4, the position of Professor of Gunnery at the Naval School, Annapolis, was pressed upon Lieutenant Dahlgren and declined by him, as he considered his position at the Yard as preferable. However, upon the Secretary of the Navy asking it, he offered to go twice a week and do the duty in addition to the work then in hand. A temporary arrangement was then made accordingly.

The journal says: —

In 1847 I asked leave to separate the ordnance work from the other work. Was allowed to have removed the ship timber
from the end of a timber-shed for the purpose. I got first one lathe, then another, cap machine, bullet machine. An office was cut off at the corner, a little room. Hydrometer and samples.

Meanwhile he was using every exertion to begin the practice for range with the new 32-pdr., and early in November he had the satisfaction of beginning. On Jan. 8, 1848, we find this record in the private diary:

One year since I left home for Washington on Ordnance duty. Since that I have returned home on leave four times. . . . Besides the regular duty at Washington, I have been on duty twice to New York in the spring, once to Philadelphia in July, once to Richmond in December, and six times to Annapolis, while doing the duty of Professor of Gunnery at the School,—about nineteen hundred and ten miles in all, of travel.

The next record is March, 1848:

In this month the Secretary of the Navy thought proper to order me an allowance of $500 a year for rent, &c., to enable me to bring my family to Washington, this having been advised by the Chiefs of Bureaus of Ordnance and of Yards, to whom it had been referred by the Secretary. . . . I therefore took a house in Four-and-a-half Street, in Washington, and went to Wilmington to make preparations. Precedent for granting this already existed in the case of Lieutenant Maury, who, while in charge of the Observatory, received such allowance. . . . It puts me on a footing with the Gunnery Lieutenant at the Naval School, as regards quarters, furniture, fuel, &c.

On the 19th March, 1848, my daughter Eva was born. . . . On May 20 my wife arrived with the five children. . . . During the summer I prosecuted my labors as usual, reaching the Navy Yard always before seven o'clock, and I was principally engaged in ranging the new guns, comparing chambered and unchambered pieces, eccentric and concentric shells. . . . A triangulation of the Anacostia was made to determine
distances required, in order to ascertain the ranges of Navy guns.

In 1848 proposed boat howitzers. Great objections made. Commodore Warrington gave leave. The first trial was a little bronze howitzer of my design, of two hundred and twenty pounds, cast in an old brass furnace (draft submitted 21st February), bored and finished on a lathe. *This piece was to initiate a system*. The fight had been hard, but ended rightly, and the boat armament dates from this small beginning.

To illustrate the prompt energy with which every idea was used, we have heard the Admiral relate that he was much puzzled for a carriage suited to this new piece. One night, at his home in Four-and-a-half Street, as he lay awake thinking over the difficulty, an idea of the model struck him. He was up at once, and walked down to his office before daylight. The model was made, and answered perfectly.

*Sept. 1.* — Permission from the Bureau for me to make two bronze howitzers.

*Sept. 22.* — The first gun was cast and delivered to ordnance shops.

But the first order was not given for the United States until some months later, and June 6, 1849, the journal says:

Howitzer complete in every detail,—lock, sight, and carriage; also the ammunition and equipment. Sent it to Boston for the "Adams," being the first howitzer ever made by the United States for the Naval Service.

The orders were now given in rapid succession for these howitzers, and one of the first notes reads:

The brass-founder, A. Davis, told me that the information gained and appliances resulting from the casting of bronze guns in his department, would produce a saving yearly of $2,000 in ladles and metal saved.
MEMOIR OF JOHN A. DAHLGREN.

Thus from the initial point was there an economical advantage, even in small matters of detail. For instance, Sept. 11, is noted:—

Hitherto primers have cost three cents each, in future the cost will be two and one half cents.

In 1849, Jan. 17, I was authorized to substitute my improvement of primer,—a flat paper head instead of the stout pasteboard head. (The primers remain to this day.)

On April 26 went to Boston to see personally to the fitting of sights to the guns of the "Falmouth," being the first instance of the kind.

By a singular coincidence as to date, on the anniversary day of John Dahlgren's birth, Nov. 13, 1849, he very narrowly escaped death by the occurrence of an accident at the Experimental Battery, while testing the accuracy of the long 32-pdr., by practice at a screen. He thus describes the scene in his journal:—

Gunner McLane was at the right side of the gun, and a man near him to hand the match. Captain Chauncey stood near the rear right corner of the platform, I, at the place between the front and rear corners of the right end, where the best view of the whole matter was to be had. I asked, "Are you ready?" McLane answered, "Ready, sir." I said, "Fire." An unusual explosion took place instantly. The battery was filled with smoke, and a great crash of timber was heard. Behind me I heard the ground ploughed up, and of the things that fell, something grazed my heels, which afterwards proved to be part of the breeching, a piece weighing two thousand pounds. Much stunned by the noise and the concussion, I turned to the battery. Amid the smoke, yet lifting slowly, the first object was the body of the unfortunate gunner stretched on the deck and quite dead.

Lieutenant Dahlgren asked for a Court of Inquiry to examine into the causes that may have led to the bursting of the gun, which court, being duly held,
testified to "the observance of the greatest degree of caution and vigilance on the part of Lieutenant Dahlgren in conducting the operations of the battery," but found it difficult to arrive at just conclusions as to the causes which led to the explosion.

We have heard the Admiral say that this accident made a profound impression on him as to the urgent necessity of having in the service a gun of greater security, and led him to investigate with the utmost diligence the whole subject of naval armament. In his journal he says: —

The result on shipboard when the men were at general quarters or in action, may easily be imagined as most destructive.

The finding of the coroner's jury on this occasion agreed that "the accident could neither have been foreseen nor provided against."

Lieutenant Dahlgren made at the time a very able report to Commodore Warrington on the causes which produced this explosion.

In summing up, he says: —

The great importance of heavy ordnance to a navy, is evident from its being its chief dependence, and too much care and expense can hardly be given to its improvement, so that neither the fate of a ship, nor the lives of men, may be jeopardized by the bursting of a gun.

He cites some instances of the bursting of guns on shipboard, viz.: —

The "Princeton's" gun, which was of wrought iron.

And of guns burst in action, he mentions: —

The bow gun of the "President," Commodore Rodgers, (flagship), a long 24-pdr., while chasing the "Belvidere," — sixteen killed and wounded.
MEMOIR OF JOHN A. DAHLGREN.

The bow gun of the "Pike," flagship of Commodore Chauncey, engaging the English squadron on Lake Ontario,—twenty-two men killed and wounded.

A broadside maindeck gun of the "Guerriere," long 24-pdr., flagship of Commodore Decatur, while engaging a Turkish ship, 1815, burst at the first discharge, being double shotted,—five men were killed and thirty wounded.

"Ariel" burst her only gun, battle of Lake Erie, &c.

This report closes with suggestions of precaution for the future.

In this state of insecurity, and of absolute danger to the sailor, was the cannon then in use, when, on Jan. 9, 1850, John Dahlgren "submitted to Commodore Warrington, Chief of Ordnance, a draught of nine-inch shell gun of nine thousand pounds," made entirely after his own views. The Commodore ordered one to be cast for trial at the West Point foundry, and he, on Jan. 14th, "submitted a draught of a 50-pdr. to Chief of Ordnance," also after his own notions, to weigh eight thousand pounds. On the 19th the Bureau ordered one to be cast at West Point foundry. On May 10, 1850, the first field carriage was completed, and a 12-pdr. (seven hundred and fifty) mounted on it.

May 21, both pieces, the IX" gun and the 50-pdr., were landed at Navy Yard from Cold Spring foundry. The journal, under date of May 18, 1850, says:—

One year has now elapsed since I began the fabrication of boat howitzers under the order of the Bureau, which then decided on submitting to the practice of the service the plans for howitzers and their carriages, which I proposed and had tried in two small pieces, and had laid before the Bureau in a report.

July 29, 1850, he submitted to Bureau of Ordnance plans and estimates for a Naval Ordnance establishment,
and on the 31st submitted to Bureau of Construction plan for arming frigates with six ten-inch pivot guns on spar-deck and nine-inch shell guns throughout on gun-deck. He notes:

Sept. 10.—The saluting battery on my plan finished and reported, and on the 12th Commodore Warrington visited the Yard. Saw the saluting battery, the boat howitzer on its new field carriage, which was also put into the launch.

Oct. 24 is noted an "order from Bureau to make a model of boat howitzer and carriages for Minister of Marine of France." And Nov. 11, "ordered by Bureau to print my Report on Practice."

Nov. 12, 1850, was born Lawrence, the seventh child and fifth son. The domestic journal book, in a concise résumé, here says:

A blank of two years in this journal has not been a blank in life. The time has been so busily occupied with affairs without and at home, as to leave no time for rest.

I am still at the Navy Yard, and the ordnance establishment, which I put in motion about the time of moving the family here, is now of some importance, and my duties have assumed a very responsible character, comprising the superintendence of the entire equipment for ships, the fabrication of boat howitzers, and their carriages for field and boats. Practice at the battery continues, and I have made an important discovery, which must end in the entire reorganization of our naval ordnance.

Thus closes the brilliant record of the rounding off of the half-century to 1850, whose first bi-centennial year opens a new era of systematized ordnance organization for the United States Navy.

Among the letters of quondam friends still preserved, we find, about this time, numerous expressions of commendation, indicating that the ordnance talent of Lieutenant Dahlgren already attracted attention and
enforced consideration from ordnance men. From these letters we propose to make a few extracts.

D. G. Farragut writes, Nov. 4, 1850: —

*Your lock* has met the universal approval of the Board, and no doubt will be recommended for adoption in the service.

In 1848 Foote writes in praise of this lock, and quotes Harwood.

J. C. Rowan, March 7, 1851, writes: —

I heartily congratulate you, my dear fellow, on your pecuniary advancement,¹ and I am surprised that X. and X. should object. Reflection on them! Ridiculous. Neither of them (without wishing to disparage their relative merits) was qualified to have commenced and brought forward successfully the series of experiments just reported by you; and now that the difficulties have been overcome, they surely ought not to envy.

And March 27, 1851, he writes:

Dupont is here, and we spoke about your lift last Congress, and he expressed himself delighted.

*Entre nous,* he shut X. up on the subject, by telling him he was a Captain and ought not to throw blocks in the way of one whom he himself acknowledged had so much merit.

Sept. 20, 1851, he writes: —

The English officers expressed themselves most favorably of your sights and manner of graduating them in yards. . . . Nine officers in ten will be pleased to hear of your pecuniary advancement.

A. H. Foote, July 19, 1851, on board United States brig "Perry," writes: —

I predicted four years ago that in less than three years you would be head and shoulders above the Select Ordnance Corps, and all you have done, proposed, or will do, I am prepared to

¹ This refers to the small increase of pay, already alluded to, in the shape of an allowance of $500 a year for rent, &c., as before explained. — M. V. D.
approve and commend as being the result of a sound discriminating mind, superadded to a highly cultivated intellect. . . . As your modesty does not often give me a chance to turn a compliment, you must not expect me to let this pass.

Respecting the then state of gunnery in the Navy, Percival Drayton, afterwards Admiral, writes: —

U. S. S. "INDEPENDENCE," LISBON, June 23, 1850.—We are, both in theory and practice, so far behind the maritime nations of Europe as to require the most energetic and well-directed efforts to make up for lost time.

And again, he writes:

My experience entitles me to say that gunnery may be considered an occasional divisional exercise, where the guns are run in and out, with the least possible trouble to officers and men. Target firing is a tradition, and shells a mystery which it is supposed will be explained some of these days. In the mean time poor Jack looks upon them with a mixture of fear and awe, and a lieutenant, not very long ago, asked me privately what composition was inside to cause the explosion. . . . And I heard a very warm argument in a wardroom as to which part of the shell should go into the gun first. . . . My cruise in the "Columbus" lasted three years. During this time not a gun was fired except for saluting. I think that, without much exaggeration, target firing may be considered almost obsolete.

Evidently the Ordnance of the Navy needed the electrifying touch of genius to resuscitate it!

Speaking of the want of a uniform system of drill, Drayton writes: —

This is at present as various as the number of vessels afloat, and I have frequently heard the orders, "In tube and prime," without a tube in the ship, and "Stand by your matches," when they had just put on a percussion cap. . . . I understand that you are about to introduce some highly improved boat guns, so I will say nothing about the sadly neglected armament of boats. You well know how deficient we have always been in everything connected with this subject.
In this letter Drayton mentions an amusing incident, which, although not pertinent to our subject, we give. He says: —

By the by, perhaps the greatest curiosity that I met with was in the "Leander," whose captain, Dacre, had been with Admiral Napier in his Syrian campaign, and when his flag was hauled down, persuaded him to give him the hat which he had on at the time, and which he had worn the whole cruise. Such a tile I never saw! Mashed in, rusty, and with a shockingly worn piece of crape round it. This hat hangs up in the Captain's cabin, over a likeness of Napier. He must have been a queer fish, but almost all clever people seem to be so, more or less.

Again, Drayton writes:

U. S. S. "Independence," Spezzia, April 24, 1851.—I am very much pleased to find that they have at last acknowledged your services at the Yard, not in the way that would have been done in any navy but ours, by promotion.

However, half a loaf is better than no bread, and the increase of pay is, in addition to other advantages, certainly a compliment, and shows some appreciation of your labors, which, in my opinion, are the most valuable rendered by any officer for years. . . .

I hope that you will be able to carry through your plan of a new armament. It strikes me as most admirable, and will, I have no doubt, tend to change entirely our present system, and must entirely drive out our old vessels, which in itself would be an advantage, as they are certainly behind the day.

And from Trieste, July 2, 1851, Drayton writes: —

I examined the "Dragon" steamer the other day in Naples. She has forward two ten-inch guns of eighty-five hundredweight; aft one of ninety-five. The lock they call the American lock, and is ours literally, with a very slight alteration, being placed rather more at right angles to the length of the bore. The tube is a quill, without any wafer, however, on the end.
But enough, for the present, is quoted to show that, from the very inception of his plans, they were seized with avidity by the master minds of the Navy, for such men as Farragut, Foote, and Drayton had no superiors. Yet, if these men gave unqualified commendation, and with them the honest veteran, Joseph Smith, his dear old Commodore, and Warrington, with warm-hearted generosity, yet there were others who, wittingly or unwillingly, opposed the threatened innovations. Of these Drayton says:—

I suppose you are hard at work, as usual, endeavoring to force your various plans for improving an ungrateful Navy, on unwilling ears.

I can well understand the disgust of an elderly gentleman, who thinks he has learned out, at having propositions presented to his attention and consideration which, if carried out, are to go far to upset what little he has acquired with so much trouble, and bid fair to keep him at school to the end of his days, to which inevitable process, however, in the present day of progress, a man must either submit or vacate.

Truly, indeed, does Jernigham say, "It is the especial office of professional prejudice to condemn." .

Nothing could have been more moderate than the scale on which Lieutenant Dahlgren had commenced his ordnance labors. He began his career as an ordnance officer, unassisted and on mere bare suffering, in the organized duties of the Yard. But, as we have seen, before the year had passed he contrived to separate a few machines and mechanics so as to collect them for one purpose for such of the work as more strictly belonged to ordnance, but had until then been scattered in the different departments of the Yard.

His attention had been early attracted to the contrivance of some description of light artillery adapted to
boat service, the lack of which had always been found inconvenient, but was now signally felt in the war with Mexico.

It had required all the influence which he possessed with the Commodore, to obtain permission for an attempt at a very small bronze howitzer as a sample. The result vindicated the promise, and from that day it was not possible to supply the increasing demands of the Navy for this style of gun.

The advantages and the necessity of a better kind of armament for the ships next occupied the thoughts of Lieutenant Dahlgren. He says in a note before us: —

Paixhans had so far satisfied naval men of the power of shell guns as to obtain their admission on shipboard; but by unduly developing the explosive element, he had sacrificed accuracy and range, and this permitted objections to exist to the full extension of this weapon, which reduced the number, and rendered them mere auxiliaries to the 32-pdr.

Lieutenant Dahlgren, as will be seen, rightly appreciated the nature of the difficulty, and devised the cannon bearing his name, and which has been so closely identified with the history of the Navy of the United States since then. This cannon properly combined accuracy, range, and explosive power, so as to render it possible to dispense entirely with the old shot-gun, and to constitute the naval batteries of our ships entirely of shell guns. But we anticipate; for it was not until 1855 that he had the satisfaction of seeing his views carried out in the well-known "Merrimac" and her class, and we have left our narrative, at the close of 1850, in order to mark the general appreciation of his thinking colleagues at that time, as well as the general state of that order of routine which he was about to displace by his new ideas.
In 1849, having been notified by the Bureau of Ordnance as to objections stated by Lieutenant Fairfax in relation to his new system of boat armament, the light howitzer of twelve hundred pounds meeting with entire dissent, even as the subject of trial, on the ground that it was too light to be efficient, he points out that the "purpose of boat guns is to operate against personnel merely," and "assuming musket range to extend to four hundred yards, the light twelve is effective considerably beyond this distance. . . . The object in view is to ascertain the minimum weight that can be used," in order that such boats as are unable to mount heavier pieces may have a piece that can be landed in the least time, and be, at least, superior to musketry.

The advantage of reducing the weight to a minimum will be apparent whenever a piece is to be landed under a pressing emergency, or when it is used at either extremity of a boat. . . .

The extreme distance at which artillery should be used against personnel is more limited than usually supposed.

He then enters into certain details with regard to the weight and form of the piece, internal and external, giving reasons why the experimental armament of boats should follow the principles explained. He adds:

The extreme limit to which it would be proper to carry the weight is left entirely open.

This paper is addressed to "Commodore Warrington, Chief of Bureau Ordnance and Hydrography," from the "Ordnance Office, Navy Yard, Washington, May 21, 1849," and is signed "Jno. A. Dahlgren, Asst. Inspector of Ordnance."

The manuscript copy we hold is thus indorsed:
The correctness of these views has been well substantiated since.

The loop, or navel ring, was adopted, and has proved equal in many respects, and superior in others, the trunnions particularly in the field carriage.

The little 300 was in one instance (Tullifinney) carried over a morass which was impassable to the other navy guns and to all the army guns, and that just in time to check a rebel column that was driving our men.—J. A. D., Rear-Admiral.

Thus did the experience of twenty years, culminating in the war uses, justify the initial arguments, asking for the adoption of this system of light artillery in 1849.

Continuing practice with the heavy 32-pdr., the results were all carefully noted and the inferences drawn, and stated in detail to the Bureau at different times.

In March, 1850, the Chairman of the Naval Committee United States Senate addressed certain queries to Lieutenant Dahlgren in relation to war steamers, "and to what point the addition of war steamers may be advantageously carried in our Naval establishment?"

This request was met by a very able paper, which, we think, has never appeared in print, but reaching conclusions verified by the more extended experience of our Navy at the present day. He shows the various ways by which "the application of steam may be made to national ships." After speaking of the extent to which it is possible to unite the two motive-powers of sail and steam, he points out the obstacles that "interfere to prevent the general employment of this class of steamers," and mentions that
Fast-sailing ships of force may be furnished with a moderate steam power, to be used only on special occasions, such as in action, in narrow channels, &c. . . .

He mentions that

Every improvement effected in ordnance is applied to the heavy steamers, they being of very recent construction, while the frigate, having been designed for a system and class of guns very inferior, can only be benefited in matters of detail, not in the general principle, unless at an expense in alteration which would make the entire first cost enormous.

He then alludes to his proposed change of armament, and as to the third query, "How far can the steamers employed in commerce be relied on for efficient use in war?" he points to the necessity "of stability and strength, qualities essential to sustain the weight and shock of heavy ordnance," and "regarding the smaller classes" of steamers gives the significant evidence of the experience of the Government in the war with Mexico. He advocates the use of screw frigates and smaller light draught fast steamers (eight hundred to one thousand tons), indicates the heavy battery steam frigate, with pivot cannon on spar-deck. He says, "Public opinion is evidently not prepared for shell guns solely, nor for very heavy cannon." Indeed, no one of the heavy guns had been tried, but was soon to be.

As we write, a copy of a letter addressed to Lieutenant M. F. Maury, U. S. N., then Superintendent of the Naval Observatory, lies before us. It is dated Dec. 24, 1850, and is in answer to queries. He says:—

The only IXth gun in the United States is that which has been cast after my proposition and draught. . . . I never would patch up an old idea to carry out a new principle. Let
us have new ships for heavy ordnance and steam, and the old frigates will make excellent coal-ships. A merry Christmas to you and yours, and I hope another year will enable us to say to the new Navy — A merry Christmas!

During 1850 a book, "32-pdr. Practice for Ranges," was printed. This book was, however, written in December, 1848.
CHAPTER VII.

INVENTION OF ORDNANCE SYSTEM OF NAVAL ARMAMENT. 1860-1865.

In 1850 Dahlgren first announced the result of principles he had evolved, and proposed to the Bureau two pieces, namely, a 50-pdr. of 8,000 pounds, and a IX in. shell gun of about 9,000 pounds. In proposing these guns he says: —

If it be true that a certain ratio of mass to velocity is indispensable to accuracy, then, as a consequence, any system of armament is directly at variance with a constituent principle of efficiency, which attempts to produce greater momenta by increasing the velocity alone of the projectile.

It is only by preserving this relation (whatever it be) that the cardinal requisites of good ordnance practice, due force and greatest accuracy, can be preserved.

The two pieces I beg leave to propose to the Bureau to enable me to investigate this question further, not as those which combine the greatest efficiency, but as a step forward on the road to this important point; while I have no doubt that both will add materially to the present broadside means of offence, one as a shot gun, the other as a shell gun.

I am aware that the principle now evolved, if established, would lead to an entire reorganization of the ordnance, and to great changes in the arrangements of ships which are to receive new metal. But neither of these considerations ought to be of weight in view of the advantages attributable to superior efficiency, especially if it be not overlooked that, with the exception of a single frigate, we have not a
model of a liner or frigate less antique than the third of a century. . . .

If you should decide to allow these, or pieces of different calibre, it will give me pleasure to furnish draughts conformable to the principles which I believe the practice has made manifest. — JNO. A. DAHLGREN, Assistant Inspector Ordnance.

The first IX\textsuperscript{th} gun arrived in May at the Yard. The professional criticism had been so decided on its model that Lieutenant Dahlgren, fearful of failure, had been induced to abate somewhat of its tapering chase. 50-pdr. of 8,000 also tried. A single day's practice confirmed his preference for the IX\textsuperscript{th}, and proved its weight, 9,000 pounds, not excessive, but manageable. The practice with the IX\textsuperscript{th} exhibited its alleged superiority, and Dahlgren asked for another IX\textsuperscript{th} and an XI\textsuperscript{th}. Commodore Warrington assented. The Navy Department, by official order, established the boat howitzers for use of Navy.

We annex the General Order.

The following regulations for furnishing boat guns and field pieces to vessels of the Navy have been prescribed by the Department.

1st. All boat guns and field pieces are to be of bronze, of howitzer form, and are to be chambered.

2d. They are to be of 12-pdr. and 24-pdr. calibre; are to weigh not more than 450 and 750 pounds for the 12-pdr.s., and 1,200 pounds for the 24-pdrs.

3d. Ships of the line and frigates are to have one boat gun of 24-pdr. calibre, and one field piece of 12-pdr. calibre, with a suitable carriage for each.

4th. The guns will be made after plans approved by the Bureau of Ordnance, and prepared with its sanction under the superintendence of Lieutenant Dahlgren, upon whose plan all the necessary carriages will be made.
5th. For each 12-pdr. for the above-mentioned classes there shall also be a boat carriage prepared, by which a field piece and a boat gun, or two boat guns, as may be found necessary by the nature of the service, may be used.

6th. Vessels below the class of a frigate, and of not less rate than a second-class sloop-of-war, shall each have a boat gun, which is to be a 12-pdr., mounted complete for boat service.

7th. Hereafter it may be deemed proper to extend the allowance of boat guns to the smallest class of sloops-of-war, and field pieces to first-class sloops; but that will in a measure depend upon the facility with which they can be prepared, and the service on which they may be expected to be engaged.

WILL. A. GRAHAM,
Secretary of the Navy.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, December 17, 1850.

At a later day, during the war of the Rebellion, this light artillery was asked for in every direction, and cases occurred where nearly two hundred have been called for in a single requisition. Admiral Porter illustrated their usefulness in the valley of the Mississippi. Admiral Farragut even carried them aloft in his tops when passing the rebel forts at the Balize.

The sailors in a brigade from Admiral Dahlgren's own squadron fought in line with the army at Boyd's Neck and the Tullifinney, and there made the howitzers do efficient service. These pieces have been carried in every part of the globe where our national ships float.

Jan., 1851, opens with this record in the private journal:——

This month was issued the first part of my Practice at the Experimental Battery, printed by order of the Bureau.

In his annual report, the Secretary of the Navy recommended my pay to be that of a commander at sea, and Congress incorporated such a provision in the Naval Appropriation Bill.
Unfortunately, it was opposed by two of my colleagues, though it had generally the approval of officers of the Navy. . . . Of course this distinction has not been lightly earned, nor is it likely to be enjoyed without effort on my part.

Around me now gather the hopes and responsibility of a large family.

Jan. 6.—Bureau of Construction ordered another 32-pdr. of thirty-two, to be put into the "Water Witch." Received orders to fit a carriage for it. The peculiar localities of the vessel would not admit one of the usual form. To be ready in two weeks. Rather a short time to plan and execute.

Jan. 24.—Tried the new carriage for "Water Witch." . . . Think it promises well.

Jan. 30.—Presented to Bureau a report on results of practice with IX\textsuperscript{th} gun, and recommended one of XI\textsuperscript{th} for trial, and a frigate to carry IX\textsuperscript{th} and XI\textsuperscript{th} on spar-deck, pivoted between fore and main masts.

This report states of the two experimental guns cast at the West Point foundry, and delivered at the Washington Yard in May, 1850, that

The tensile strength has proved to be higher than any yet made for the Navy. . . . The carriages and equipments having been prepared while the pieces themselves were in progress, the latter were mounted at the experimental battery without delay.

During the summer I was enabled, without interruption to the practice with the present Navy ordnance, to obtain one hundred and twenty rounds with the IX\textsuperscript{th} shell gun at various angles and with charges from eight to ten pounds.

The results have been highly satisfactory, and I think will fully confirm the idea presented to the Bureau in September, 1849, namely, that in projecting shot there is a velocity which cannot be exceeded without injuriously affecting the accuracy, so far as the purposes of sea ordnance are concerned.

2d. If with this velocity the momentum be insufficient, it must be increased by augmenting the mass, and not the velocity. Now it happens that in the principal calibres of the Navy the
reverse of this has obtained, &c. . . . I believe, therefore, that nothing is hazarded in saying that the true direction for future experiment should be to ascertain whether the most effective ordnance for ships is not

1st. The heaviest pieces that can be manoeuvred on truck carriages, and those throwing the heaviest projectiles that can be conveniently handled.

2d. The weight of projectile to be distributed in the form of a shell; shot only to be used in exceptional cases, and then with low charges.

3d. To ascertain the precise term of velocity that ought not to be exceeded with these calibres, in order to attain the greatest practical accuracy.

He then develops his idea of a ship suitable for experimental ordnance, and meets various objections that had arisen, or would be likely to arise, resulting from so radical a change. He proposes to pivot on the spar-deck of such ship XI\textsuperscript{th} shell guns of about 15,600 pounds, and offers, if the idea meets the approbation of the Bureau, to submit the draught for an experimental gun of this calibre.

He shows that the broadside power of the new frigate, expressed in weight, is only one hundred and fifty-four pounds less than that of the largest three-decker afloat, and that

The expression of the total weight of projectiles discharged from a broadside, conveys a very inadequate idea of the difference really existing between the power of batteries composed of the calibre now used and those proposed to be used. The concentrated masses of the latter operate effectually, when the former would have produced no comparable damage.

In presenting these and other views, he adds, in conclusion:

The times seem propitious to the development of our naval force, hinted at in the foregoing lines. The system which
thirty years ago was one step in advance of all, is now behind
the progress of England, and even of France, in naval affairs.

Jan., 1851. The report of 32-pdr. practice for ranges
was printed about this time.

Feb. 12, occurred a narrow escape. Lieutenant Dahlgren went to look at his new pivot carriage on the
"Water Witch." A marlingspike falling from aloft
struck him on the head.

In Feb., 1851, the Report of the Committee on Naval
Affairs, submitted to the House of Representatives by
Mr. F. P. Stanton, of Tennessee, recommends the new
system of heavy ordnance on the score of economy. It
says:—

The conclusion is irresistible that we may maintain in ac-
tive service a more effective naval force than that we now have
in commission, and save annually something like two millions
of dollars, under the heads of increase and repair, and pay and
provisions. Contrasting the proposed white oak Navy, with its
few guns and heavy shot, against the present live oak Navy,
with its many guns and light shot, the difference in the cost of
maintaining the two, and the saving to be effected by suffering
the existing ships gradually to disappear, would soon counterbal-
ance the whole cost of the new vessels, and place the Navy upon
a footing of economy which is impossible upon any other sys-
tem. . . . The most important and striking feature in the pro-
posed system is its economy. But it cannot be doubted that so
radical a change would draw after it others of equal impor-
tance. . . . It is an indisputable fact, that whenever a new
or improved piece of ordnance has been introduced upon the
ocean its introduction has been followed by ships built after
new and appropriate models, and has formed an epoch from
which to date improvements in naval architecture. And al-
though the committee are well satisfied that the late improve-
ments in naval ordnance are such as to make it indispensable
for the United States to get rid without delay of the old guns
and the ships which were made to carry them, in order to sub-
stitute the improved ordnance and ships adapted to this new species of great guns, they are equally well satisfied that this important transformation must be the work of time, wisely projected and gradually matured.

March 4, 1851. The Naval Appropriation Bill passed, with a proviso giving Lieutenant Dahlgren, as "the officer in charge of experiments in gunnery," the pay of a commander at sea ($2,750).

March 24, the journal notes:

Submitted draught of a new XIth shell gun, designed by myself, to the Bureau. It was ordered to be cast by Alger, at Boston. Asked also for a steamer's 64-pdr., ordered from New York.

March 29.—Sent first 24-pdr. howitzer away to Susquehanna. (No. 1.)

March 24.—Received request from Executive Officer of Bureau of Army Ordnance for draughts of the boat howitzers. Referred to Bureau. Granted.

April 18.—Sent a heavy 12-pdr. howitzer to school (Annapolis) on its field carriage.

April 30, 1851.—Draught of XIth gun, which Com. Warrington ordered to be cast by Alger. Alger recommends that it be made thicker at the charge.

May 8.—Com. Warrington consults me on this; I decline to assent, and Com. Warrington sustains me fully.

July.—The first 1Xth is cast.1

About this time there occurred, unfortunately for the unimpeded progress of his work, several changes in the appointment of his immediate superiors.

Captain McCauley, when in command of the Yard,

1 On the occasion of Boston being visited by the President of the United States, the various industrial classes of the community made a procession, Sept. 17, 1851, in which were included some of the most interesting samples of art. Mr. Alger sent this piece of ordnance, which was placed on a vehicle made for the purpose and drawn by three horses of great size and strength.
had given every facility promptly, and the form was never permitted to interfere with the substance, so that duty in the ordnance of the Yard had been a pleasure. But the reverse obtained with his successor, who made the discharge of the duty both irksome and difficult, and upon the death of Commodore Warrington, which took place Oct. 12, 1851, Lieutenant Dahlgren says:

I have to grieve for the loss of a friend. Few men of his age (not far from seventy) have enjoyed the same vigor of health and frame, for he was of very stout build. He was gallant and straightforward, but he was not a man of many words, and would never promise even what he had resolved to do. His manner was stern and his glance very piercing. He was usually very brief in his official directions, and disliked long speeches and letters. Not very apt to favor any one; but when he had a good opinion of an individual he was perfectly unreserved in his confidence. He sometimes remarked, "I never give my confidence by halves." My own case is a striking proof of this. Previous to being on ordnance duty (Jan., 1847) I had never met Com. Warrington, and as I had been ordered by the Secretary, without the usual courtesy of consulting the Chief of Bureau, Com. Warrington was not well disposed towards me, and for two weeks did not notice me, so that the prospect was not a very bright one. This was the beginning. Now, at the end of four and a half years, it is my pleasure to know that during the closest official relations for that period of time not one disagreeable word ever passed, and the records of the Bureau will witness the extent and responsibility of the duties entrusted to me. His last important acts were to accede to my plans for a new Ordnance Establishment at the Navy Yard, and to try the new XIth gun which I proposed.

His recommendation for increasing my pay is the best evidence I have to offer of his views of my labors. It is, indeed, a great loss to me. As an officer, no one stood higher than Com. Warrington; his service was continued from 1800 until the time of his death. He was one of the few that enjoyed the
honor of capturing a British ship in single fight, and his sterling reputation was undiminished through the long peace that followed.

But we have somewhat anticipated the record, as to time, and must revert to June 20, when the journal says: —

Coms. Warrington and Smith, Chiefs of Ordnance and Yards, came down to select a site for the new ordnance building. Being required to give an opinion, I pointed to the south face of a square, the west side of which is occupied by the Ordnance Laboratory.

The building was in effect placed there, and proved to be a judicious site.

June 28, 1851. — This day records one of the most afflicting events in my life: my dear little boy Lawrence, after an illness of short duration, was taken from me.

One pauses in the midst of the grave, intellectual occupations of this busy life, to sympathize with the unaffected heart-sorrow of the loving father. The grief, which is spoken of as so "afflicting," was but the precursor of other far deeper and greater sorrows.

During this month, (June) Lieutenant Dahlgren addressed an able paper, modestly styled "A Memorandum," for Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography, in relation to new model of 8-inch of 63 cwt. In this paper he develops in part his new theories with regard to his cannon. So great had been the opposition excited by the innovation of ideas, that his inventive genius, however impatient to soar, was held down by the need of caution and slow preparation of the ideas of others to meet his views.

In November of 1851 Commodore Charles Morris entered upon the duties of Chief of Ordnance and
Hydrography, and Commodore W. B. Shubrick was appointed Inspector of Ordnance. During this year, in the hurried intervals taken from the severe labor of 1851, "The System of Boat Armament in the United States Navy" was prepared for publication. This work was intended to explain his system of light artillery, which had been recently adopted, and has since proved so valuable an adjunct to the Navy of the country. The original design was to have dedicated the book to his good friend and patron, Commodore Warrington, whose untimely death has just been recorded. The preface of the book bears date Jan. 1, 1852, and contains an eulogistic notice of the Commodore. He adds:—

To him the system of boat armament owes its opportunity for existence.

We find but few journal notes during the year of 1852; he was too busy even to note occurrences briefly. The new ordnance building advanced slowly, the piles and granite foundation were just completed, and the structure had only reached its second story as the year of 1853 opened. This establishment was being erected after his own plans, and in view of the new status about being introduced in the ordnance administration of affairs.

In October of 1852 there was a change of commandant at the Yard, much to the relief of Lieutenant Dahlgren, who notes having been constantly harassed and annoyed during the past three years in the execution of his duty, by the retiring officer, whom he evidently saw depart with much pleasure. The new incumbent, however, was in very feeble health, and died at his quarters in the Yard, Jan. 4, 1853, in less than three months after
having been inducted. Captain H. Paulding then took command. About this period, towards the close of 1852, the Ordnance Bureau issued its new regulations.

Lieutenant Dahlgren complains in his notes that

The hard-earned results of five years' work at the ranges are therein embodied, without even saying whence they came. Sundry other facts were got from me and then tortured into a shape that no one would have recognized. Commodore Warrington had previously refused the delicate request of the very results now so unscrupulously used against my protest and a knowledge of Warrington's refusal.

Here we would ask, Why is it that governments give no protection against the piratical use of other men's brains, if these men happen to be officers of its army or navy, or attached even to its organization for scientific research or investigation? For this is a tyranny, but too often exercised.

In the summer of 1852 a paper was drawn up by Lieutenant Dahlgren, by order of the Navy Department, in reply to a letter from the Hon. F. P. Stanton, Chairman of Committee of Naval Affairs, H. R.

The Hon. Mr. Stanton states that

The Committee had requested him to report a bill for the construction of a ship-of-war of the best model for testing the value and importance of the improved heavy ordnance suggested by the experiments at the Washington Navy Yard, under the superintendence of Lieutenant Dahlgren.

And he asks for

A more minute and detailed statement in reference to the proposed ship.

The Bureau having ordered Lieutenant Dahlgren to comply with this request, he gives "a detailed explanation of certain propositions in regard to the armament,
&c., of the national vessels, which were contained in a paper on the 'Coast Defences' laid before the War Department" the year previous, by order of the Honorable Secretary of the Navy.

We only propose to give a mere glance at this paper, in order to show that time and experience have set the seal of sanction on his views, then held in advance of the day.

He first proves that

The paramount consideration which presents itself in relation to the efficiency of *ships-of-war* is their armament.

He then shows

That the batteries of our vessels are susceptible of important improvements.

He says: —

By an entirely different distribution of the metal contained in these pieces (the cannon), I propose to increase, in a high degree, —

1st. The weight of the projectile discharged.

2d. Their accuracy.

3d. Their force.

And fourthly, to preserve due range.

He then clearly exhibits that his new

Ⅵth gun possesses all these attributes in a higher degree than the present 32-pdr. shot, or 8-inch shell; that the principles of its construction and operation are fully in accordance with the physical laws now accepted without question, in regard to the general theory of military projectiles.

And the correctness of these propositions he establishes by a reference to

Facts collected in a course of trial to which the new gun has been subjected during the last two years.

He then proceeds to demonstrate that
The 32-pdr. is constructed in entire violation of the law which controls the accuracy of military projectiles.

And also that

A compliance with its requirements will just as certainly carry with it maximum force and due range.

And that,

On the other hand, the violation of the principle entails a loss of accuracy which cannot be compensated by any degree of force or range that is obtained by other means. As it happens that the most powerful and far-reaching ordnance in the services of the United States, France, and England, are constructed in violation of the principle referred to, the necessity of a total change is thus created.

He exhibits the difference in power between the unit of the battery then in use and the one proposed, and alludes to the fallacious opinions in regard to the law said to control the accuracy of ordnance, the practical criterion by which they "estimate it solely, in the degree of inflection which the trajectory may have;" but since projectiles do not invariably pursue the path assigned them, the conclusion in regard to accuracy is rendered fallacious, and the mischievous consequences pervaded every system of naval ordnance.

After contrasting the new battery with that then carried, as regards the accuracy, power of penetration, and range of their projectiles, he then points to the explosive capacity of the shells thrown from such a battery as he proposes, and of the power of shells of the calibre used in the IXth and XIth gun of his model.

The general outline of comparison between the 32-pdrs. and VIIIth shell guns and the new armament of IXth and XIth shell guns is then considered in connection with the collective capacity of their batteries. He says:—
An amount of shot or shell may be distributed over the surface of a ship's hull without any effect to be compared with that obtained by a far less quantity the effect of which is brought into a limited space.

This effect is viewed as regards penetration, and also the destructive power as regards the superficial extent of orifice. The concentration of effort as regards these vital points is shown to be very remarkable. He says:

Looking at the general result that may be expected from the evident gain that is made in weight of projectile and accuracy, connected with extended range in concentration of effect, both projectile and explosive, united to a facility for operating around the circle in all respects far greater than is possessed by any frigate afloat, I entertain the confident expectation that the combined power of the new broadside will look down even the show of opposition from any frigate armed with the present guns.

He then discusses the problem of producing for the new vessels a sailing speed equal to the highest yet attained, with the addition of an auxiliary steam power.

All these questions doubtless appear very trite to the ordnance authorities of the present day, and we only revert to them now because their present universal adoption proves the correctness of the system initiated by John A. Dahlgren, and the entire revolution in naval armament that he effected.

Unfortunately for the country, his plan met with but little favor, although, Aug. 17, 1852, the Chairman of the Naval Committee, Mr. Stanton, moved for an appropriation to build a frigate capable of receiving the armament of IX^a_ and XI^a_ guns, and made a very able speech in support.

This gentleman is entitled to much credit for the
pains he took to examine into the question and to witness the trials of the new guns. But the Navy Department gave no encouragement, and some old officers discouraged. So the efforts made were in vain, and, as a consequence, the appearance of the "Merrimac" class was deferred three years.

However, Lieutenant Dahlgren, perfectly assured in his own mind of the correctness of his theories, brought in support of his views the test of experiment, and in October of this year the first practice with his XIth gun was made.

We have before us two copies, in manuscript, of papers, one written in Aug., 1852, and signed "C. Morris, Chief of Bureau," and one of a later date, May 30, 1853. They contain various objections to "Lieutenant Dahlgren's propositions for substituting heavier guns for the present armaments of our ships of war." They doubtless embody the most intelligent professional criticism of the order of ideas about to be displaced, and yet even the non-professional reader of the present day cannot but smile to read in a grave paper, addressed by a Chief of Bureau of Ordnance to the Honorable Secretary of the Navy, passages like the following:—

First, It may be urged that to arm our vessels as proposed by Lieutenant Dahlgren would necessarily deprive them of all boats of sufficient capacity and strength to take out a bower anchor and cables in case of necessity, &c.

Secondly, Supposing the boats were to be relinquished, it would still be difficult to find space between the fore and main-masts for more than two pivot guns (one for each side), if hatchways were left for conveniently putting articles into or taking them from the fore and main holds.

Thirdly, The arrangements for working these two guns would render it difficult to stow the spare top-masts and other
spare spars which are now carried in ships, and which are considered important resources in a time of war.

_Fourthly,_ The length of the slides, which would of necessity be frequently across the deck in action, would render the passage of men fore and aft more difficult in working ship than with our present arrangements.

_Fifthly,_ It may be doubted, at least, whether XI\textsuperscript{in} guns of 16000 lbs. could be conveniently and safely worked in rough weather, or that its shell of 131 lbs. could be introduced into the gun and properly pushed home without much loss of time and danger of its falling out when the vessel should be rolling deep, and the object to be aimed at should be nearly or quite abeam.

_These objections emanating from the Bureau delayed the adoption of the new ideas._ The doubt as to the convenient and safe working of XI\textsuperscript{in} guns shows that the progressive and entirely new ordnance ideas as advanced by Lieutenant Dahlgren had not as yet met with _even a glimmer of comprehension by the chiefs of ordnance._ Had a vision of the heavy ordnance now in successful use, or of the still more enormous pieces now proposed, been theirs, what _wise_ objections would have been given! _Yet the genius of Dahlgren foresaw all these ultimate consequences._ _His_ was the herculean task given to all men who think in advance of the age they live in, to make smooth the way and remove obstacles. After the pioneer has done his toilsome work, thousands tread the beaten path, and pause not to do honor to the precursor.

On May 3, 1853, somewhat previous to the paper of Commodore Morris we have just quoted from, Lieutenant Dahlgren, addressing the Bureau, says: —

Although the practice with the IX\textsuperscript{in} and XI\textsuperscript{in} shell guns is not so fully completed as to enable me to present a final report, yet it appears to me to prove satisfactorily the correctness of the views upon which I based the proposed changes in the batteries of our ships. In accuracy and power the IX\textsuperscript{in} gun is
so far superior to the present armament of a frigate's principal deck (32-pdrs. and VIII\textsuperscript{in} guns) as to put the ordnance question beyond all doubt.

And he adds that

The changes in the ordnance of our naval batteries now proposed do not rest upon arbitrary assumptions, but are based upon the principles which were believed with some reason to be conducive to accuracy.

May 31, 1853, paper No. 2 was addressed to Bureau discussing scientifically the relations of IX\textsuperscript{in} and XI\textsuperscript{in} guns to others, and he concludes from the data given:—

1st. Wherever the spar-deck 32-pdrs. and VIII\textsuperscript{in} shell guns were operative, the XI\textsuperscript{in} shells would be so in a far higher degree and decisively.

2d. That the XI\textsuperscript{in} shells would be accurate and destructive at distances where the 32-pdr. shot and VIII\textsuperscript{in} shells would be nugatory.

On Dec. 9, 1853, paper No. 3 was submitted to the Hon. James C. Dobbin through the Bureau of Ordnance, in which only the partial adoption of his plan in the new "Franklin" is deprecated, and thus the opportunity postponed of settling the question in regard to future armament. For although the plan of Lieutenant Dahlgren was working ahead, the aversion to XI\textsuperscript{in} guns was not abated until the cruise of the "Plymouth" with an XI\textsuperscript{in} some years later dispelled it. In regretting the modification proposed, he remarks:—

The purpose on which the whole scheme pivots is to concentrate power at all practicable ranges, far or near, and thus to overmatch the present inferior calibres, certainly at long range.

In conclusion, he reiterates the opinion

*That the heaviest cannon which are manageable should be carried by ships,* and that the great problem in regard to naval
artillery is to decide which these are. Especially is its solution
of interest to a nation whose fixed policy it is to avoid the
burden of a large naval force in peace.

The Secretary of the Navy, in a letter dated Dec. 17,
1853, says:—

Sir,—Your communication of the 9th instant touching the
results of some recent practice with heavy ordnance conducted
by yourself at the Washington Navy Yard, and suggesting cer-
tain general principles which it is assumed should govern in
reorganizing our naval batteries, has been received and perused
with much satisfaction, &c.

The principle here asserted with regard to heavy
cannon was afterwards maintained in the scientific work
"Shells and Shell Guns."

During this year (1853) the manufacture of howitzers
progressed rapidly. The call for them came from every
ship, for they were the first light artillery for sea used
in our navy. Previous to this we had borrowed a few
light pieces from the army, which were entirely un-
suited to naval purposes.¹

The treatise on "Percussion Locks and Primers,"
explaining the system used in our navy and elsewhere,
was also written this year. The Department ordered
five hundred copies of this work when issued.

Of this book Maury says:—

It is a good thing, and what is more, it will strengthen your
hands for better things.

Captain S. P. Lee writes:—

Your professional friends have much reason to rejoice in
the progress you are making, and causing the whole service
to make, in that important branch of our business,—naval
ordnance.

¹ See introduction to "Boat Armament" for account of these matters in
the Navy.
And another friend says: —

I think we shall, after a while, have a better organized ordnance department, inclusive of all the arrangements on ship board, than can be found in any other service afloat. Barron tells me that no other service has such an "ordnance instruction" as ours, or any to be compared to it.

These are one or two among many compliments received at this time. Amid the trials, and while endeavoring to overcome the obstacles raised against his theories, John Dahlgren's busy brain used the pen with diligence as a weapon to achieve success. But the bare idea of an entire battery of shell guns, with the probable danger of stowing and using so many shells on board ship, still delayed the fulfilment of his plan. The authorities would not be persuaded to an experiment seemingly so dangerous.

In Oct., 1853, he was elected a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

1854.—The dawn of this year found a renewal of the same objections. Jan. 21, paper No. 4, in farther explanation of those previously presented, was submitted to the Secretary of the Navy, in relation to the proposed naval armament. This paper was also in answer to one from Commodore Morris presented to the Secretary, in which his objections had been stated to Lieutnant Dahlgren's plan.

In reply, Lieutnant Dahlgren refers to the conclusions of a Board, which admits the IXth broadside of gun deck, and admits a heavy pivot at bow and stern of spar deck, but only allows a Xth, and admits for broadside of spar deck, but dissents from the six pivot guns of the heaviest description between the fore and main masts. In lieu of these six pivot guns, discharging shells of eleven inches in diameter, the Board proposed
to substitute "twenty guns, discharging shells of eight inches in diameter." The defects of the unit 32-pdr. battery are pointed out, and the advantages of the "new armament" again explained. He says: —

Concentration of fire, we know, has been the object of anxious inquiry in the British navy for years, and so far, unsuccessfully, because they have pursued the matter almost exclusively by attempts to make a great number of light calibres concur in battering a given point, whereas by the use of heavier calibres, concentration of effect is the inevitable consequent.

Here we see a new principle is evolved, which, when adhered to, could be made capable of indefinite adaptations, as indeed we have evidence of at the present day.

This paper is a strong plea for a full and entire trial of his plan. He says: —

If the unity of principle upon which the plan rests is marred by engraving upon it amendments inconsistent with it, then it will never be possible to fix the responsibility of failure anywhere, as it will be impracticable to trace it to the true cause.

May 8, 1854, the journal notes: —

After long and wearisome delay, the new ordnance building is completed, and some machinery being up, steam was first started to-day. In a week all the remaining machinery, &c., will be transferred from the old building. This cradle of the ordnance I leave with regret. For five and a half years it has been the scene of many labors, and though now unable to contain the work, was most ample at the first. In it I have combated many a difficulty. Can I hope to be as successful in the spacious building just completed?

The new ordnance shop was two hundred and fifty feet long. The great extension of ordnance work had rendered more machinery necessary, and an appropria-
tion upon Lieutenant Dahlgren's estimate was made, and this fine building completed.

About this time the Senate concurred with the House bill for building six new screw frigates. Lieutenant Dahlgren waited on the Secretary at his office and applied for leave to arm one in his own way. The Secretary said he would have the Board together, and that Lieutenant Dahlgren should be there to discuss the matter with Commodore Morris.

After meeting various objections, it was finally ordered, some two months later, that the Bureau of Construction should supply him with plans and elevation so as to enable him to give the details of his arrangement.

July 29. — After repeated interviews with the Secretary, the chiefs of Bureau, and with Steers, the shipbuilder,¹ the journal says: —

The Bureau takes my plan for the gun deck, and Steers takes the spar deck, thus dividing me between them. The Secretary is evidently reluctant to interfere with the Bureaus, and so saddles me on Steers, whose ship can only take one half of my plan. So, after all, that is the result.

About this time being instructed to investigate the subject generally of establishing a communication between the shore and wrecked vessels, by means of a line and ball projected from a piece of ordnance sufficiently portable, he replies, with that ready concern for human suffering which ever characterized him, —

You may be sure that I enter upon this duty with the deepest interest, and if any exertion I am capable of can be

¹Mr. George Steers, who acquired so high a repute by building the famous yacht which took the prize at the London World's Fair. He was killed Sept. 26, 1856, being thrown from his carriage.
instrumental in saving the life of a fellow creature, it will be a more acceptable reward than any I have hitherto enjoyed. The sound of the cannon can never carry any but good tidings to those who hear it.

Continuing proof of his new XI\textsuperscript{a} shell gun, and busy with the routine of office work, the summer of 1854 passed away.

Oct. 25 he notes: —

Lighted the new furnace in foundry for first time, and had the satisfaction to find that the draft was more than sufficient, thus relieving me of no small sense of responsibility. My advice to the Bureau had been to send some one abroad for information, but it was preferred to put the onus on me.

Oct. 30. — A meeting of cannon founders at Bureau, convoked by Chief of Ordnance. There were present, Commodores Morris and Skinner, Inspector of Ordnance, Colonel Craig, Chief of Army Ordnance, Mr. Alger and son, from Boston, Captain Parrott, from Cold Spring, Major Wade and Mr. Knap, from Pittsburgh, Mr. Anderson, from Richmond, and Lieutenant Dahlgren. The views of all were invited upon the subject of making cannon for the new ships. These were the Dahlgren IX\textsuperscript{a}, X\textsuperscript{a}, and XI\textsuperscript{a} shell guns. The Commodore stated his approval of their principles of construction, and asked the opinions of the founders in regard to several points connected with their fabrication. The gentlemen concurred with Lieutenant Dahlgren.

He notes: —

Nov. 25, 1854. — At last decided by the Navy Department and Bureau that the XI\textsuperscript{a} guns are to "conform to my wishes," and not to be altered.

Nov. 28. — Required at the Bureau to advise about the terms
of contract for batteries of new propeller frigates. Those for XI\textsuperscript{th} guns were signed and sent to West Point and to Mr. Alger, with drafts. Fourteen in all to be cast.

Nov. 29. Forwarded draft of XI\textsuperscript{th} gun to Bureau.

In December, the contracts were issued for the guns of Lieutenant Dahlgren's design that were to constitute the batteries of new screw frigates, viz.:

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<td>Parrott, Cold Spring,</td>
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The form of these contracts subsequently caused much trouble to the government. It had been decided to place the Dahlgren IX\textsuperscript{th} shell guns entirely on the main decks of the new frigates, and a X\textsuperscript{th}, on same plan, at each end of spar deck, the Navy Department having also decided that he should arm the ship of Mr. Steers ("Niagara") entirely with the XI\textsuperscript{th} shell guns; and with this appreciable progress closes 1854.

Jan. 13, 1855, notes:

The great increase of the work has obliged me to add ten pieces of new machinery to that now going in the shop, about doubling it. As the foreman has as much as he can do, I have constituted the new machinery into a second division.

After several conferences during March and April with Mr. Steers regarding the details of the armament of the "Niagara," and finding nothing definite settled, and various alterations made in the plan of the ship, on May 31st Lieutenant Dahlgren addressed a letter to the Secretary objecting to the limited armament of the
"Niagara," which prevented the application of his system in full. He says:—

I regret it on my own account, because the labor of some years is thus destined to a farther postponement, and my only consolation is, that it will be but a postponement, for all the tendencies of the time look towards the point which I believe this plan fully attains.

And now in the midst of the toil, turmoil, and vexation to which Lieutenant Dahlgren was subjected, and which was incident to the development of his plans, was added the consuming grief of the loss of his beloved companion. By a mysterious dispensation of Providence, she who had so lovingly and faithfully shared the trials of his life, and as well the privations of limited means in rearing a family, was taken away before she could enjoy with him the full fruition of his success. In all these long years of hard struggle, not even promotion had come to the young officer to build hope upon. Yet even now, he was upon the very eve of gaining the world's recognition of genius. We pause to copy his beautiful tribute to this estimable lady. The journal says:—

One does not often meet with a person as intelligent, refined, and accustomed to intercourse with people of the highest social position, and yet so perfectly natural and unsophisticated. Her bright, joyous soul associated itself instantly with poor or rich, high and low, and sympathized freely with every sorrow. Most unselfish, she gave freely of all she had, and retained so little for her own use, that she seemed to possess nothing more, absolutely, than just what the moment required. All the finery and trinkets in her drawers would not have satisfied the merest girl. The little jewelry she had, was made of two or three memorials of her parents or my own.

And yet no woman ever stepped with more grace or dignity.
INVENTION OF ORDNANCE SYSTEM, ETC. 171

Her figure was rather tall, her face beautiful, and the dress, whatever it was, seemed to be just what it should be. Her raven tresses and brilliant black eyes more than equalled any ornament she could wear. In company, her manner was fascinating to a charm, and she commanded the attention of those who did not know her, and the affectionate greetings of those who did; for to the least glance was evident the most lovely creature,—one kind, elegant, and as unsuspicuous of harm as an infant. Looking back, as I now do, along the path made by many years, her life appears to have been as happy as the Creator often blesses mortal career.

And now that in turn the hand that penned these lines is laid low, it may be said for him, that to have had his companionship was a blessing, for to the never-failing charm of rare conversational powers, was added the treasure of a gentle and affectionate nature, and a loving and loyal care for all who had claims upon his kindness.

Upon the return of Lieutenant Dahlgren to official duty, after this sorrowful interruption of the cares of business, he sent to Mr. Steers a paper containing his objections to the armament of the “Niagara.”

June 22.—The Secretary ordered Mr. Steers to Washington, and sending for Lieutenant Dahlgren, the matter of the “Niagara’s” armament was fully discussed. They could not agree. The Secretary then decided that the ship should be tried with the armament which Mr. Steers had first agreed to, and that arrangements should be made to receive the additional guns.

A written statement of what the armament of the “Niagara” should be, was handed in by Lieutenant Dahlgren, who early in July went to New York to examine the “Niagara” and see how far a change of battery was practicable. On his return to Washington his report was sent in and approved by the Secretary. Mr.
Steers was unwilling to sacrifice the highest rate of speed possible, by placing an armament of heavy guns on the "Niagara," but as Commander Dahlgren pithily says:

*Speed is an essential requisite for a first-class ship of war, but essential only to go into action, not out of it!*

July 18, 1855. Burst the first XI\textsuperscript{th} gun, by 1959th round (655 solid shot). Mr. Alger was present.

The journal says: —

I know of no other gun of its size, or near it, that has done so well; one 8-inch Columbiad went to 2,582 rounds, and another to 1,500 rounds without bursting, but they were only \(\frac{3}{8}\)ths of the weight of this gun.

The note-book says: —

In the month of June, six Columbiads burst at Coldspring, in common proof, and soon after five out of nine were burst at Boston, by the common proof or its repetition. This wonderful and unusual occurrence was so alarming that I wrote to the Bureau and advised a course of extreme proof at each foundry, for the new guns.

Lieutenant Dahlgren, in a letter addressed to the Bureau, June 30, 1855, says: —

I respectfully beg leave, therefore, to request, not in an official capacity but that of a *private individual interested in the product of his own labor*, that some measures shall be taken promptly, before too many pieces are vitiated by inferior material or other causes, to ascertain fully the general character of the metal used for the new shell guns that have been cast. . . .

This was assented to by the Secretary, and terminated most disastrously for the Pittsburgh and Boston guns. At Pittsburgh three of the IX\textsuperscript{th} were burst, causing the rejection of forty-three guns. Two thirds of these guns were so defective in trunnions that they broke off before bursting — which would have been fatal to the guns of itself.
INVENTION OF ORDNANCE SYSTEM, ETC. 173

At Boston a IX\textsuperscript{th} burst at first fire, also an XI\textsuperscript{th}, which condemned the rest, though a IX\textsuperscript{th} went to 950 rounds (service).

At West Point the result was satisfactory.

At Richmond several had objectionable iron, which condemned them; the others were received.

Knap & Wade, and Alger & Co. were much dissatisfied with the decision of Commodore Morris, but the latter submitted. Knap & Wade, however, argued the case at length, but without success.

In his letter to the Bureau of June 30, 1855, Lieutenant Dahlgren also says: —

I would again respectfully draw the attention of the Bureau to two instances in which my models have been departed from or modified.

The first of these is in the omission of the side vent, for which the common central vent has been substituted. The second is in the form of the rough casting.

To both of these I have always attached the greatest importance, and have witnessed the changes with the greatest regret.

During the summer of 1855 Lieutenant Dahlgren visited these several foundries, inspecting closely the work in progress.

Oct. 10. The journal says: —

Mr. Cluss, draughtsman, left my department, — very sorry; — has been here five and a half years, and is always right.

Oct. 11, 1855. — Received my commission as a Commander in the Navy. \textit{Better late than never}!

And in the midst of a complicated correspondence concerning the terms for making the XI\textsuperscript{th} guns which he had sent at instance of the Bureau, the year 1855, which had been filled with anxiety and deep trouble, closes.
These guns were made under a specific contract drawn up by Commander Dahlgren for the Government; and in order also to protect his model as inventor against infringement, Article 14th of these terms says:

Any of these guns, cast under this or other contracts, which shall be rejected, shall be broken up, and the contractors will neither use these models nor permit them to be used, nor any particular of their construction or mode of production peculiar to them.

This article has been repeatedly violated.
Writing to a friend about this period, he says:

The founders resisted my views in respect to the form I prescribed for casting, and they have paid for it. Parrott finally gave in to it, and now he says he will not only follow it in making guns of my model but in all others. I picked out the weakest of those he made in this way, and it has gone to 1600 fires, with a fair prospect for 500 or 1000 more. Commodore Morris would not permit me to have my own vent in my own model of IXth and Xth. But it has since been tried in a single instance, and a letter of Parrott to me says, in relation to the result, "It is a most remarkable thing, and of the very first importance."

It is now five years since I presented my plans of cannon and armament, and in that time I have struggled against all that seemed possible to create of adverse thought and action. Now I come out of the smoke, but still stripped of much that gives value to my plans.

I have dislodged the 32-pdrs, and only a few of the old 8-inch guns find place in the new ships, their batteries being chiefly composed of my IXth and Xth shell guns. Still the presence of these 8-inch is a blemish and a weakness, and I have yet to get rid of the changes in the structure of the guns which injure their endurance. Whether I may not be finally worn out and used up by this continued and unnecessary struggle remains to be seen. But it must and will come right in the end. . . . Oh! that they would only go ahead.
I value time more than all else. *No man uses his lifetime who lets moments slip. Money is just a cipher in comparison.* Who can give me back the last five years?

1856.—As the difficulties promised to be tedious with the founders, Commodore Morris suggested that Commander Dahlgren had better go North, and settle them in person. The notes of Jan. 7, 1856, give the record of the last interview with Commodore Morris, which we copy *verbatim*:

Went to the Bureau. On entering, I observed that Com. Morris was sitting at his table, with hat and overcoat on, a stout wrapper about the neck to the ears, and moccasins. He did not look well, and to my inquiry replied that he had taken cold and felt it all over him. I remarked that he ought not to have left home, and had better return and be cared for. The Commodore said he was about to do so, and, after franking some documents, he rose from the table; he lingered, however, for a while, to talk about some business matters, and then we went from the room. *It was to be the last time I ever should see him alive.*

On Tuesday, Jan. 29, the funeral obsequies were performed at the Commodore’s residence, and at his request no military display took place.

*Jan. 30.*—The Secretary of the Navy sent for me. After entrusting the completion of some important work left unfinished by the Commodore, he told me, “If you were a Captain I should tender you the Bureau, and as it is, I am inclined to let things remain *until some legislative action will enable me to make you Chief of Bureau.*”

*Feb. 1.*—Saw Secretary at his house. He told me that Senator Fish had been to him on behalf of Commodore Perry. He answered that his preference was for me, and that he was only prevented by my want of rank.

*Feb. 5.*—Saw Secretary at office about Richmond cannon. He afterwards spoke of the Bureau. Said he was much troubled about the Bureau; did not know a Captain that he
could prefer to me. I took the opportunity to recommend a separation of the Hydrographic from the Ordnance, then attach the Bureau of Hydrography to the Observatory, and make Maury chief.

_Feb. 7._— Saw Secretary at his house in the evening. Talked ordnance. He said the chances were war with England in a twelvemonth; said I should be effectively the head of the Ordnance.

However, it was finally decided that _want of rank_ was an objection _not_ to be overcome! In a letter of this date, Dahlgren says:

It is not yet known who will have the Bureau. . . . Very much obliged for your friendly wishes in regard to myself, but in the first place it was impossible, and if otherwise, I am not sure that it would have been to my interest to be there. . . . My main purpose in seeking ordnance duty was to fit myself more fully for sea service. In so doing, I have become more interested in the pursuit than I intended at the outset, and identified with innovations which, however viewed by others, seemed to me essential. We had no naval light artillery, and our heavy batteries were organically defective. . . .

But it is probable that the common opinion attaches more value to service as a sea officer than as an ordnance officer, though my own opinion is, that the latter duty is very much underrated. I doubt whether in future any officer will incur the risk of being ostracized, in order to cultivate the knowledge which nine years of steady labor convinces me is not sufficient to master the art.

But Commander Dahlgren was not unsupported by the want of appreciation among the best minds of the Navy, and we shall here make some succinct extracts from letters, taken from a mass of correspondence so large as almost to defy inspection.

_May, 1853,_ Foote writes: —

Go on; you are building up for yourself a secure, a great reputation. You have the confidence of the corps, and already
LOAD OF BOAT-HOWITZERS.

Admiral Condlon in Chief of Naval Forces in E.I. Seas.

Published at Simoda, Japan, June 8, 1854.
have produced results. . . In fact, your new system displaces the old. I trust that with a jump we shall be as far ahead of John Bull, shortly, as he is, and has been for years, in advance of us.

And again, in December, 1854: —

My dear Dahlgren. — As a Navy officer, your labors in remodelling and improving the ordnance are watched with great interest, but as a friend I watch your course with deepest interest and the highest satisfaction. I look upon your criticism where ordnance and gunnery are involved, as final.

H. R. Thatcher, U. S. N., writes from the Naval Asylum, March 23, 1855: —

Every officer in the Navy should feel himself greatly obliged to you, my dear sir, for the infinite pains that you have taken, and are taking, to arm our cruisers in such a manner that we may some day prove equal, if not superior, to those other powers with whom we are like to come in contact. As for myself, I cannot but feel a national pride in seeing our system of naval gunnery brought to perfection by one of our own officers.

Commodore Jos. Smith says: —

Commander Dahlgren is the best Ordnance officer in the country, and the Navy is under the greatest obligation to him for improvements introduced.

But we dare not, at risk of being too prolix, refer to numerous other commendations of friends and admirers. These ordnance inventions were also arousing the interest of other nations. Some rather amusing instances are mentioned in the letters of Lieutenant H. A. Wise, who was, in 1855, at the Ordnance foundry of Algiers, in Boston, detailed by the government to inspect the process of fabrication of the new cannon, and report. He writes: —
Several English Navy officers paid us a long visit yesterday. They expressed the utmost satisfaction with the disposition of the metal in your guns, and praised its practical philosophy. The French consul has again been talking to me of the "little plan," and lest he may talk to any one else, I have requested Mr. Dean to keep the drawings locked up when not wanted....

Again, June 6:—

I had scarcely closed my letter to you yesterday, when I received a visit from Captain C., R. A. He made no kind of bones of asking for a look at the drawings, but I "regretted extremely that they were locked up in the iron safe, and Mr. Alger kept the key." He was very inquisitive, and evidently taking mental notes. After a while I was called out to the machine shop, and when I got back to the office I found my Royal Artilleryman gone, so I put into the foundry, and there I discovered him very busy measuring the diameters of the XIœ pattern! The instrument he used for this operation was a white grape-vine stick he carried. He desisted, however, as I approached, and then I started him out of the works. It was late in the afternoon, and I accompanied him back to the city and introduced him to the Club. There, in the beguilement of mint juleps and conversation, I secured that remarkable stick, and upon examination I discovered four distinct notches. These I carefully pared off with a knife, and notched a like number about four inches further down. It will be a wonderful gun to go on a bust with, if he ever has one made according to the dimensions I gave him. He never discovered my performance, and he went away with many thanks for my attentions. He is a very good fellow, but not so chock full of fleas as he thought himself.

We suppose our British lion would call this a cute Yankee trick!

The Secretary being still undecided as to the appointment, Commodore Smith remained the Acting Chief of Bureau for more than two months, during which
time he gave the control of the business regarding the ordnance matters under discussion, to Commander Dahlgren.

As the decisions of Commodore Morris concerning the fabrication of the guns had not been affirmed after appeal, the disagreeable task of arguing the case with Knap and Wade was thus left to Dahlgren.

One of the first measures was to restore the side vents to all his guns, which Commodore Morris had required to be omitted, much to his annoyance. He also introduced rifled muskets, the first going on board the "Portsmouth." The delay occasioned by the failures of the two founders, and the extreme proof at the two other establishments, made it doubtful whether the "Merrimac," now nearly ready for sea, could be provided, and Commodore Morris had informed the Secretary that it was improbable, in which case some other ordnance must be mounted for the nonce. Happily, a sufficient number were got ready from Cold Spring, and, by dint of great exertion, were fitted in time, so that the guns were in place when the "Merrimac" put to sea from Boston, about the end of February, 1856. On the 3d of March she anchored in Hampton Roads, with favorable reports of the new guns, which had been fired at sea. Feb. 23 the "Niagara" was launched. Captain Ingraham was appointed Chief of Bureau in March, 1856. In April, Commander Dahlgren went down, by direction of the Secretary of Navy, to visit the "Merrimac," and to try her battery on the way from Norfolk to Annapolis. In his notes he states:

The availability of the IXth guns was clearly proved.

And he adds:
MEMOIR OF JOHN A. DAHLGREN.

Thus, after delays and opposition and objections that have lasted six years, I had the satisfaction of seeing one of the largest ships in the world armed with the guns of my own model.

We make some extracts from the "Report" made to the Bureau on the trial of the "Merrimac's" battery at sea. It says:—

The suggestion of the Ordnance officer regarding the substitution of IXth guns on the spar-deck, in lieu of the VIIth shell guns, is of the first importance. . . . The gun-deck battery of the "Merrimac" is arranged according to the plan submitted by me some time previously, and I believe that no improvement could be made in the character of the pieces there, though it is possible that the number might be increased. . . . The Bureau is aware that I would have armed the spar-deck with heavy pivot guns, as illustrated by the "Niagara." . . . It would be desirable to have the broadside guns on that deck similar to those below, because if the cannon on the gun-deck are really the more powerful, there is a gain in power, and the utmost convenience in the supply of the battery, by using like pieces in broadside throughout.

At present, there being two species of guns on the broadside, it follows that there are two sizes of projectile, and two or more weights of charges, &c. These have to ascend from their distant places of deposit in the hold, along passages and decks, and up hatchways, through as many different hands, until they reach their respective guns.

When it is considered that all this takes place in the confusion, hot-haste and smoke of battle, it may readily be conceived that the liability of serving the guns with wrong charges is very considerable. . . . The difficulties arising from a variety of charges and projectiles are too well known to make it needful for me to argue it further.

The late Commodore Morris laid so much stress on this matter that, while inspecting the ships of his squadron, he has been known to pass by other prominent objects to which his
attention was invited at quarters, and descend to the berth-deck to examine the efficiency of the powder division.

In fact, it amounts to an axiom, that the utmost simplicity is indispensable in all the arrangements of the battery. . . . Another reason exists in the simplification of the carriages, equipments, &c. . . . Permit me again to reiterate my confidence in the entire plan that I proposed, by which the spar-deck would be defended by an entire battery of pivot guns, say ten of XI\textsuperscript{ma} . . .

After an elaborate opinion in favor of calibre, he says: —

The misfortune of the larger calibre is, that its substantial benefits are never visibly before those who continually experience the disadvantage of its greater weight. The bulk of the gun, the toil in handling it and its projectile, are ever enforced to the eye of the officer and to the exertions of the men. But the great power which it does confer is not exhibited by the ordinary practice, and remains a myth until the hour of battle discloses the important fact, and permits the heavy calibre to tell its own tale more eloquently than the most labored advocacy.

And now, only a score of years later, as our woman's pen retraces this earnest plea "for heavy calibre," thus made to the Bureau of Ordnance, one pauses to smile at the professional distrust of an XI\textsuperscript{ma}, in view of the enormous calibre now sought for, and which is but the outgrowth of the principles then first fought for and evolved for practical application by the penetration of John A. Dahlgren. But in proposing the new armament to Congress, another consideration, that of economy, was brought forward, and had great weight. A copy of a letter lies before us, dated Jan. 12, 1857, from which we make this extract: —

Apart from superior efficiency, it is claimed that an economy results in the number of men required, thus: If the "Merri-
mac’s” new ordnance were removed, and replaced by as many guns of the usual kind as would throw an equal weight of metal, more officers and men would be needed, particularly if the present mixed battery of 32-pdrs. and VIII" guns were used; but to avoid all exaggeration, and to give the old armament the best show that one can give it, let it be assumed that VIII" guns take the place of the IX", and 64-pdrs. of the X". There must be seventeen of the former on broadside, and three of the latter on pivot, in five ships and the “Franklin.”

The “Niagara’s” XI" guns, the “Powhatan’s” and “Cumberland’s” IX" and X" guns also to be included. From a rough estimate, these vessels would require 542 men and 55 boys more, in order to throw an equal weight of metal with the best of the old guns in the Navy, the yearly pay and rations of whom will amount to $150,000, and this difference in favor of the new guns will accrue every year. And thus, by one result alone of the change, there is this clear saving to the United States.

In April of this year (1856) the second edition of “Boat Howitzers” was published, of which the Navy Department at once took 500 copies. This book is dedicated to Commodore Jos. Smith. In July, 1856, Commander Dahlgren submitted his plan of heavy ordnance to the Secretary of War, who seemed to favor the model, but the Colonel of Ordnance had a variety of objections.

About this time, Dahlgren also made a computation of rifled cannon of 16,000 lbs., being the first of his papers indicative of invention in that direction.

Aug. 16, 1856, this plan of a rifled cannon was transmitted to the Department, also draughts of “Niagara’s” XI" gun carriages; and a model of a rifle musket and knife bayonet for ships’ use.

So great was his mental activity, that he had now prepared and ready for publication, his large work on
‘Shells and Shell Guns,’ of which the Department ordered in advance 300 copies.

‘Shells and Shell Guns’ has the following dedication: —

To Captain A. H. Foote, U. S. N., commanding U. S. ship ‘Portsmouth,’ this work is inscribed by the writer, in memory of a friendship that began as messmates, and has continued through the vicissitudes of many years.

A letter before me, from Foote, says: —

I thank you more than language can express for the dedication of ‘the best work on ordnance that ever has been written,’ as an English captain remarked to me on taking up a copy lying on my cabin table, of your ‘Shells and Shell Guns.’

That it was one of the most noteworthy books that had appeared for a long time, was soon proved by the attention it attracted abroad, the stir it created, and by the numerous and very extended notices that appeared of it in the literary and scientific journals of Europe. Among many notices, a few lines from the ‘London Morning Post’ may be permitted, as giving English opinion. The ‘Post’ says: —

To no one—not even Paixhans himself, it may be—is the naval shell system more indebted, than to the author whose able and interesting book now lies before us. Paixhans, indeed, had the intelligence to perceive the application of shells fired from long guns, and employed in naval warfare, but Dahlgren was the first to carry it out as an exclusive system of naval armament. . . . This great revolution of naval armament is chiefly attributable to the authority of Commander Dahlgren.

A leading journal of the day, the ‘National Intelligencer,’ of Feb. 20, 1858, closes an able review of the book by saying that

The value to the country of the improvement we have thus referred to, in a mere dollar point of view, cannot easily be
estimated. It has rendered obsolete much of the existing naval armament of the world; it has shorn the large fleets of Europe of much of their strength, and has compelled the great maritime Powers to start with us for the dominion of the sea. In any other land, its author would be invested with wealth and distinction. Under our government, titles and rank may not be conferred, but we trust that Congress will not pass away without associating with the name of Dahlgren the proof that republics are not always ungrateful.

This work contains an exposition of the principles connected with his inventions. In August of 1856, Mr. Secretary Dobbin informed Commander Dahlgren that he intended he should have the Ordnance ship "Plymouth," and to be allowed to equip her entirely as he wished. At this time the Naval Ordnance Department at Washington had acquired extensive additions,—the foundry for cannon, the mechanical department where they are finished, the gun-carriage shops, the experimental battery, equipment of all kinds, &c.,—so that a spectator might at one visit witness the entire operation, from the casting of a cannon to its being fired, and that with every perfection of the science.
CHAPTER VIII.

CRUISE OF THE "PLYMOUTH" TO INTRODUCE THE NEW SYSTEM. 1856-1860.

The Dahlgren gun may be said to have taken its place, but much, however, remained to be done in order to introduce these innovations into practice and to remove objections, particularly to the XI\textsuperscript{th} gun, which was considered too heavy for use at sea. Commander Dahlgren had, therefore, asked for the sloop-of-war "Plymouth," to be fitted with armament of his own selection, in order that the calibres and weights of ordnance best fitted to give the greatest power, could be definitely ascertained by practice at sea. As he says in his subsequent report of the cruise: —

Although the asserted strength of model, the power and accuracy of fire, were fully maintained by the most thorough course of experiment on record, extending through 1850, 1851, 1852, &c., yet the often repeated objection to the unwieldiness of such ordnance prevented their even being tested at sea until the armament of the new screw frigates came under consideration, when it was made manifest that no power of battery proportionate to the enormous size of these ships could be developed by any of the existing cannon, such as 32-pdres. and VIII\textsuperscript{th} shell guns. The Bureau (as we have seen) then adopted the IX\textsuperscript{th} shell gun for the gun-decks of these vessels, but unqualifiedly refused the pivot XI\textsuperscript{th} designed for the spar decks, mounting in lieu thereof VIII\textsuperscript{th} of 63 and pivot X\textsuperscript{th}. And there the matter might have remained for time
or accident to decide, so long as the question was limited in its application to our own Navy, but other powers have been prompt to follow the example set by the United States, and to improve on it; they have constructed ships yet larger than the "Merrimac" class, and given to them greater speed, and cannon of heavier calibre.

It is, therefore, imperative on us to be well assured that our batteries are established on a sound basis, and have their due extension.

The report of the Secretary of the Navy, Dobbin, sent in to Congress in December, 1856, has a lengthy notice, under the head of "Ordnance and Gunnery Practice Ship," of Commander Dahlgren's improvements, in which he gives a handsome tribute, from which we extract the following. He says:—

I know of no part of the service more entitled to the liberal patronage of the Government than Ordnance and Practical Gunnery. If the Navy be, indeed, the "right arm of defence," as is so often repeated, it may, with great force, be added, that her guns and ordnance appliances are the main sinews and arteries, the neglect of which would soon render it feeble and palsied. . . .

An effort is now being made to initiate a system, as far as it can be done in the absence of legislation. The "Plymouth" sloop-of-war is now at the Washington Navy Yard, placed under the command of Commander Dahlgren, and is being fitted out thoroughly for the purpose of a "Gunnery Practice Ship." A few officers at present, and a number of select seamen, will be assigned to her, and she will bear an experimental armament of heavy and light guns.

The experimental establishment at the Washington Navy Yard has been for many years an admirable adjunct to the Bureau.

Having at its head an officer of a high order of intellect and indefatigable energy, aided by a small corps of assistants, the
Department has found it a shield of protection against the introduction of the novelties of visionary inventors.

No innovation has been recommended until subjected to the severest tests; yet progress, and an eagerness to be in the foreground of improvement, have been manifest.

The recent adoption on the new frigates of the IX, X, and XIth shell-guns, to the exclusion of shot, was by no means inconsiderately or hastily made.

It was suggested by Commander Dahlgren, in 1850, that he could "exercise a greater amount of ordnance power with a given weight of metal, and with more safety to those who managed the gun, than any other piece then known of like weight." Commodore Warrington, then at the head of the Bureau of Ordnance, ordered the guns proposed. The proving and testing continued during the years 1852, 1853, and 1854. The points of endurance and accuracy were specially examined. The first gun stood 500 rounds with shell, and 500 with shot, without bursting; and subsequently other guns were proved to the extreme, and endured 1,600 and 1,700 rounds without bursting. Shells have been adopted because they are deemed preferable, not because of any apprehension that shot cannot be used in these guns with perfect security, that point being settled by actual experiment. . . . In addition to this heavy armament, our national vessels have, for a few years past, been supplied with boat guns—brass pieces, 12 and 24-pdr. They are truly formidable, and, under the management of trained men, are often discharged ten times in a minute. They are so constructed as to be easily placed in small boats, which can thus enable an approach to the enemy at points inaccessible to the large vessel, and, when landed, can be managed with facility and fatal effect.

The reports of their great service recently in China, very forcibly illustrate their great advantage as a portion of a ship's armament. But I forbear to pursue this subject, leaving it in the hands of able Ordnance officers. The cautious and sound judgment of the late Commodore Morris approved the new ordnance.

The six new frigates presented at once the question of supplying them with the guns after the usual old model, or in
accordance with the suggestions of our able Ordnance officer, tested by years of much consideration.

After investigation, I unhesitatingly sustained the recommendation to fit out the new frigates with their present formidable battery.

Sept. 26. — Mr. Steers was killed by an accident, occasioned by the running away of horses which he was driving. Thus the builder was never permitted to see his great effort in successful operation,—the steamer “Niagara,” then so near completion.

Oct. 9. — The “Plymouth” anchored off the Yard. The journal says: —

Oct. 10. — Required for “Plymouth” one XI\textsuperscript{ma} and four IX\textsuperscript{in} guns, carriages, &c., three 24-pdr. howitzers, and three 12-pdrs., one hundred new rifled muskets, of my own pattern, and fifty revolvers. The Bureau struck out the last, and changed the muskets to the old pattern.

Afterwards they were permitted to be introduced. These rifled muskets, the invention of Commander Dahlgren, were made expressly for the “Plymouth,” and were used by two divisions of the seamen, while two other divisions were armed with the old style musket. These being exercised together as a battalion, on board and in landing, during the cruise, afforded the best opportunities of comparing the qualities of the two arms in boats, in the ship, and ashore.

In all of these various services, the Dahlgren musket proved to be the best adapted to the use of seamen.

It is especially distinguished for simplicity of use, and capacity to endure the roughest usage.

Although with this, as with a variety of other ordnance of his invention, the trouble of obtaining a patent was not even taken, yet the United States were greatly
benefited thereby. These muskets are spoken of in the report of the Chief of Ordnance, 1864, who says:—

We have now in service 10,000 muzzle-loading rifled muskets of the heavy calibre of sixty-nine hundredths of an inch, known as the *Plymouth* musket.

In December the estimate for the "Plymouth" was sent in, and the constructor, Pook, was directed to make the required alterations. As the year closed, the constructor began the alterations needed to enlarge the port for pivot XI m.

About this time, being informed that the IX m. guns had been sold by Alger to others, he writes to an ordnance friend, Nov. 15, 1856:—

In June, 1855, Commodore Morris expressly enjoined confidence as to the style of the gun. Why has this been violated, especially in my own case, who have always advocated the private foundries as capable of the functions of a national foundry?

Yet, as we shall see, he was destined to experience other and more grave infringements on his right of property.

At this period letters were received from Commander Foote, saying that the ship "Portsmouth" stood her new battery, and had regained her old sailing. This was gratifying to Commander Daligren, who had advised the change, as well as the battery of the "Powhatan."

Early in 1857 official accounts reached Washington of the brilliant attack on the Barrier Forts, near Canton, China, made by the United States ships "Portsmouth" and "Levant," and ending in the utter destruction and demolition of these formidable defences. It will be remembered that this battle of the Barriers was brought
about by the infamous fact that the Chinese had, on several occasions, and without the slightest cause in extenuation, fired upon the American flag when passing the Barriers, and the honor of the nation required immediate notice of the insult. Commander A. H. Foote, commanding the "Portsmouth," was the leading spirit in this attack, although great valor was exhibited on all sides. The Dahlgren howitzers covered themselves with glory on this occasion. An extract of a letter before us says:—

I will make special mention of the howitzers. These pieces of our squadron have gained everlasting fame. The English and French say they are the best pieces that they ever have seen.

The howitzers of the "Portsmouth" made about 2,000 Chinese take a right-about-face and run.

This is the enthusiastic expression of a man just out of a hot and successful fight. The commander of the squadron, Commodore Armstrong, however, in his official dispatch, says:—

The shell guns, such as the "Portsmouth" has in her battery, are the most efficient guns I have ever seen.

Thus early, did this invention stand the battle test.

The British Admiral, speaking of this handsome affair, says:—

These forts were of enormous strength and solidity, being entirely built of large blocks of granite, with walls nine or ten feet thick.

And Captain Foote, in a letter to Commander Dahlgren, dated Jan. 24, 1859, says:—

The walls of the Barrier Forts were built of granite blocks, five to eight feet long, and a foot square, and were twelve feet in thickness at base, and eight feet at the top, and in height
twelve feet, surmounted by a parapet eight feet high and three feet thick, also of granite.

They were considered, indeed, as perhaps the most formidable of the Chinese defences, and among the Chinese who defended the forts were 120 men who had been drilled as French man-of-wars men for nearly two years in the French frigate "Sybil," so that they made skilled opposition.

While speaking of the service done by the brass light artillery, the reports of other officers engaged will show how far these pieces are to be relied on; as, for instance, that of Lieutenant Pegram, who was complimented by the State of Virginia for his gallant contest with the Chinese pirates in 1855, when our boats were so much overmatched, and encountered imminent peril. This brave officer worked his own gun on this occasion, and the terrible effects of his fire were such, that he mounted the sides of the "Admiral" almost unopposed.

At about the same period of time, Catesby ap H. Jones, writing from the "Merrimac," said:—

The ship attracted much attention in England. Your guns were particularly admired, the naval and military men admitting that they were constructed upon proper principles. . . . Repeated applications were made for their dimensions, which, as a matter of course, we declined to give, and informed the officers that the Bureau had also always declined to give any information.

The radical change effected in our ship batteries by the system of Commander Dahlgren was announced and set forth in detail by the Navy Department in the Annual Report, December, 1856, and its successful result was later mentioned in the Annual Report of December, 1858, p. 5, to which we desire to refer.

The results of the Ordnance Establishment were
given in the Report of the Board of Officers to the Navy Department, in which is mentioned its condition and operations. (Executive document House, No. 34, pp. 75, 76, 77.)

In March, 1857, Dobbin retired with President Pierce, and the accession of President Buchanan brought Mr. Toucey into office as Secretary of the Navy.

A few days after his confirmation, Mr. Toucey sent for Commander Dahlgren to give an opinion as to the mounting of the battery of the "Niagara" in her trip to lay down the telegraphic cable across the Atlantic. The preparation of the "Plymouth" had been slowly progressing, and, in spite of the earnest efforts of Commander Dahlgren to expedite matters, it was the 22d June before he received sailing orders. As this ship was a specialty, we give some extracts from these orders:

Sir,—Congress, at its last session, having made an appropriation to enable the Department "to arm and man the ordnance ship 'Plymouth,' with a view to the improvement of ordnance and gunnery practice," and that vessel being now ready for sea, you will proceed in her on a cruise for the purpose of carrying out the objects of the appropriation.

The Department does not deem it necessary to give you specific instructions in this respect, as your own information and experience in matters of ordnance and gunnery practice, will suggest to your mind the proper course to be pursued.

The cruise of the "Plymouth" will be first for the Azores; thence to Lisbon, in Portugal, and, running along the coast of France, touching at such ports as you may deem advisable, to Amsterdam, in Holland, which will be the extreme point of the cruise.

On your return, you may touch at Southampton or Bristol, in England, and the Bermuda Islands. You are authorized to visit the most important arsenals of the different countries at which you may touch.
CRUISE OF THE "PLYMOUTH," ETC. 193

It is not desirable that the "Plymouth" should be absent for a longer period than six months, at the expiration of which she will return to Washington.

The "Plymouth" left Washington, June 24, and put in to Norfolk to complete arrangements. When well out at sea the drill of crew commenced, and practice with the IX\textsuperscript{in} and XI\textsuperscript{in} was had day after day. Every means to excite emulation was used; premiums were given to the three most skilful in general management and to the three of the best shots. The use of the guns was also offered to volunteer crews, and one was at once made up of petty officers and seamen for the pivot XI\textsuperscript{in}.

With pleasant sailing, and without incident, the dark masses of Fayal lay before them by July 24, where some days were spent in a dull enough way for the men, as the authorities objected to their coming ashore on leave. Here the boats were manned, and exercised in howitzer practice, &c.

The obvious want of system and drill required continuous practice. After taking leave of the Azores they had target practice; two floats with their muslin screens were hoisted over into the sea, and the guns were let loose upon them. To give the best marksmen the promised chance to show themselves, each had his turn with five shells. Being at times bothered with the single targets, which, keeping head to wind, made it difficult to get at the face of them fairly, two were lashed together.

Then a new phase of the subject was tried, for the ship was to be handled under rapid way, and the men were not so well used to it. Thus bearing in view the object of the cruise, and with fresh breezes and a regu-
lar sea, they entered the Tagus, with the city of Lisbon full in view.

Aug. 13. — The "Groningen" coming into the harbor with the Prince of Orange on board, official visits had to be made, and also a Court presentation arranged for, by the American Minister. A few lines from Commander Dahlgren's journal of an evening reception at the palace may not be out of place.

. . . The Duke of Oporto chanced to be just at the door, and I was introduced. He is a good-looking lad of eighteen years, with fine fair complexion and very light hair, and not very tall. Speaks English well, but slowly, and chatted very easily on naval matters. The King was now within a few steps, coming along and talking to each in turn. He wore an undress uniform, frock coat buttoned up, with scales on the shoulders. He was not long in reaching my locality, and, after the Minister mentioned my name, began to converse on Ordnance.

His English is good; not quite so ready as the Duke's. Speaks rather slowly, and in a low tone, and kept his head close to me,—a habit necessary, perhaps, in a full room, where all are not to hear what may be said to a person. He is quite young; slender, but not thin; complexion light; wears no hair on the face, and that on the head cut short; nose inclined to be long; face plump; has a slight twitch towards left eye; manner is amiable, easy and proper. He chose to talk about Ordnance, and showed familiarity with the details. Of course, I answered so as to let him say all he wished without interruption, and he remained longer than with any one else; indeed, he talked the subject out. Presently his father, formerly the Regent, passed by to go out, and the King turned to take his leave, very gracefully taking his father's hand and kissing it. After a few words, the King Consort retraced his steps to me, and began to talk in a very easy way, making very complimentary remarks about my success in certain things. He then spoke affectionately of the King; said I would find him well-informed on all subjects. The King now resumed with me, and his father took leave, but in a minute afterwards two persons rushed close by
at full run, passing out by the large entrance. It was the King Consort chased by his son, the Duke of Oporto. Both are said to be full of fun, which hardly anything restrains. The King just raised his eye. It was now near midnight. The King shook hands with me and bowed. . . . The ladies were seated by themselves,—no music, no dancing.

A few days later: —

The Minister again conversed with me on a matter which he had introduced on Sunday evening, while we were awaiting the approach of the King. The latter had taken a great fancy to our boat howitzers, after seeing them in the "Merrimac." My book on the subject had been obtained through the Portuguese Minister in New York, and, from the drawings therein, an attempt was making to construct the iron field-carriage. Our Minister was desirous that I should present one of the "Plymouth's" to the King. He proposed to have the piece deposited with him, subject to the order of the Secretary of the Navy, and he pressed the matter warmly, but I could not see my way clearly, and so expressed myself.

Being ready for sea, on the 19th of August the ship stood out slowly, and passing out of the Tagus, the Coast of Portugal was lost to sight. Again the drill and practice at the guns was resumed. The evening of August 26th finds them in the English Channel.

The evening beautiful, and several vessels of different sizes in company, and sharing with us the head wind. The "Old Pilgrim" bore her part well in the competition. Just at sunset an evidence was offered of the great intensity of the reflective power of the lenses in St. Agnes light. It was, perhaps, a dozen miles off when the light seemed to shine in full splendor. The pilot said it was the reflex of rays from the sun. Then I took the telescope and examined. The presence of the fire from lighted lamp was so strongly exhibited, that I believed the old man was mistaken, but in a few minutes the luminary of day had descended, and the glow from the lighthouse was gone. The thing was almost incredible.
Passing on through the English Channel, the ship entered the waters of the German Sea, and September 2d anchored in the Texel Roads, off the Government Dockyard. The expectation was, to have taken the "Plymouth" to Amsterdam by way of the canal, but the idea was reluctantly abandoned, on account of the representations made by the sluice-master as to the time it might take. The next day Commander Dahlgren went up to Amsterdam to visit some of the ordnance establishments, accompanied by General Bormann,\(^1\) with whom he had had a professional correspondence during some years past. Permission was obtained from the War Department to visit the Belgian works at Liége, except the Pyrotechnic. Leave was also obtained to visit the camp and experimental practice at Brasschaet. He likewise visited the Musée d'Artillerie at Brussels.

In company with the director, Colonel Frederix, the celebrated foundry at Liége was inspected. A very heavy gun was being cast, and Commander Dahlgren says in his description:—

The examination of metal by the mechanical tests was always obtained, and in this respect they seemed here to be passing through the phase which has cost so much trouble in the United States, and had ended with the system being discredited by the United States Navy. Colonel F. was much surprised at my views on this subject, and more so at the few facts that I detailed for his information. . . . I told him we had gone through this experience in our Navy, and after much anxiety and expense, had, it was hoped, surmounted the difficulty.

The Polygon of Brasschaet, where all kinds of experiment is made, and the place selected for the training of the Belgian artillery, was carefully examined. By

\(^1\) The inventor of the Bormann fuse.
Sept. 11 they were well on the way, beating through the uneasy waters of the North Sea, and on the 16th the "Plymouth" headed round into the Channel for Southampton water. From thence by railroad to London, to call on Mr. Dallas, the American Minister, and obtain the necessary permits to visit the Dockyards. Upon receiving this leave, Commander Dahlgren went at once to Chatham, where he was much interested in the different classes of vessels then building at this yard.

The next day he was admitted to the Woolwich Arsenal, where the Inspector of Machinery, Mr. Anderson, showed him the various departments of this immense establishment, and where he was introduced to the members of the Select Committee on Ordnance, all of whom were very civil.

In his private notes on this institution, he remarks:—

The establishment is immense, but there is danger of concentration. Who can put unity of progress into such an immense concern? The danger exists of the execution overshadowing the design; the mechanical, the mind.

Where shall be the master minds? Accordingly, while the means are vast beyond conception, the variety and excellence of detail unequalled, the great points are almost untouched. . . .

Genius—mind. Where shall that come from, but from God, the mighty Creator over all, and of all. . . .

I left fully sure that we are ahead in all the main points. Our works have neither the extent nor the excellence of machinery, but both these can be bought.

The union of Land and Naval Ordnance is fatal to the Navy. How can landsmen know the troubles of ships, or knowing them, how shall they know the remedy? Good-by, Woolwich, I am easy.

On the following day went to the Woolwich Dockyard, where he saw many objects of interest.
On the 29th he took railroad for Portsmouth, and spent the day in viewing the large naval depot and its dependencies. Here he met with the most flattering attentions from all the officers, several of whom were very complimentary to his last book, “Shells and Shell Guns,” and he was told that some of his doctrines had been expressly submitted to practical tests on board the famous gunnery ship “Excellent,” and “had been entirely confirmed.”

On Oct. 2, being invited to witness the first trial trip of the “Diadem,” a new screw steamship, he went to Portsmouth for that purpose. Having now accomplished the visits authorized by the Department, Commander Dahlgren returned to Southampton and applied himself to the ship’s business and to preparations for sea. We here stop to extract from the journal a pleasing incident of British hospitality: —

It was now sunset, and, in looking for my boat, I was most unexpectedly beset by a deputation of the ex-Mayor and some citizens with the United States Consul, who let out a regular speech, in which I was urged not to do their hospitality the injustice to leave without partaking of it. The application was so urgent that I could not refuse, though to-morrow I had fixed for sailing.

Oct. 3. — So at ten, a party of officers accompanying, I was received at the landing by the Chaplain of the Corporation, and carriages. Soon after they were joined by the Mayor and ex-Mayor of the city, and they proceeded to Winchester to view the famous Cathedral. This occupied some hours, in the course of which the Mayor of Winchester joined the party, and we were conveyed to his mansion, where refreshments were offered. From this we went to the house of the ex-Mayor of Southampton, where a handsome dinner was laid for the guests. It was near midnight when I reached the ship.
Leaving the Southampton water, they were scarcely out in the English Channel before they were met with one of the most violent of the Channel gales. The ship was subjected to a severe trial, for they were exposed to the full fury of the storm, and at one time were indeed in great peril. They came out of this danger with tattered sails, — in fact, all but the entirely new sails had given way, and it had seemed as if they could not possibly withstand the storm. This boisterous weather detained the ship in the Channel for nine days, and occupied the crew in working ship to the full extent of their strength. On clearing the Channel, the bad weather continued, so that the ship was in a most uncomfortable condition, and it was not until Oct. 17 that the working of the battery was recommenced.

Fine weather succeeding, they had again, on the homeward-bound passage, an opportunity for drill and exercise at the guns. By Nov. 11 the ship was at the entrance of the Chesapeake Bay. Here we take from the journal a characteristic notice of the brave son who, a few years later, so freely gave his young life, with all its bright promise, for his country. It says:—

About half way from Mt. Vernon to Fort Washington a boat was seen coming along, which proved to contain no less a person than my son Ully. How he had grown; nearly as tall as myself, and but little more than fifteen. He looked well, and it was delightful to see the lad and hear from home. He had left the Navy Yard, pulled to Alexandria (six men in the boat), then got a tow from a schooner for twelve or fourteen miles.

Arriving at the Washington Navy Yard, "a Report of the Cruise of Ordnance Ship 'Plymouth'" was at once handed in to the Secretary. This report gives what we have avoided attempting in our narrative, *the professional*
account of the cruise, and the result of his ordnance observations. This report was appended to the Secretary's, and, with others, was sent into Congress Dec. 8. On the 10th, it was printed in full in the New York "Daily Tribune," and on the 11th in the semi-weekly, with the President's Message, &c. By Dec. 25 it was reprinted in full in the London "Times."

It enforces the principles of his system of armament, and proves that the XI\textsuperscript{th} can be used at sea.

The Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1857, makes the following mention of this cruise, which may be considered the official summary. He says:—

The Act of March 3, 1857, making appropriations for the Naval service, appropriated $49,000 "to enable the Secretary of the Navy to arm and man the Ordnance ship 'Plymouth,' with a view to the improvement of ordnance and gunnery practice."

She was accordingly put in commission, and, on the 7th July, sent to sea on a six months' cruise, under Commander Dahlgren. Her armament consisted of four IX\textsuperscript{th} shell guns, one XI\textsuperscript{th} shell pivot gun, two 24-pdr. and one 12-pdr. howitzers. She was ordered to cruise by the Azores to Lisbon, along the coast of France to Amsterdam, and returning, to touch at Southampton or Bristol and the Bermuda Islands. Commander Dahlgren, having completed the cruise, has returned to this port, and will continue the drill necessary to perfect the training of such seamen as have been found capable of receiving it.

The "Plymouth" encountered long-continued, boisterous weather on her return homeward, with some heavy gales, during which the heaviest of the cannon were secured perfectly with ordinary lashings, and were as well under control in a rough sea, when cast loose for practice, as could be desired. One hundred and twenty-one shells were fired at sea, during the cruise, from the XI\textsuperscript{th} pivot gun, and without experiencing any of the difficulties usually supposed to render such heavy ordnance nearly unavailable on ship-board.
The result of the operations of the "Plymouth" seem to dispel all remaining doubt whether the heavy cannon which she carried would be manageable, and not only to justify the previous adoption of such ordnance in the steam frigates recently built, but also to render it expedient to extend this plan of armament. I earnestly recommend a renewal of the appropriation, and the permanent employment of a ship on this duty.

During the winter of 1857–1858 the "Plymouth" remained off the Navy Yard, visited daily by numbers of ladies and gentlemen, Congressmen, &c., who admired the excellent condition of everything about the vessel.

The seamen by the close of the year were adepts, and could drill beautifully at the cannon and small arms. During the winter the practice continued, and little of note is recorded.

The cruise had been accomplished, and many points in question had become established facts, most of the objections to the heavy guns having been flimsy as cobwebs. Thus, after eleven years of labor, having begun at the beginning, and from the germ carried out the entire plan, until he had ended with triumphant proof on the high seas!

The journal records:

Jan. 8. — This day ten years since I began my career in the Ordnance, all alone and unassisted, then and for some time, . . . and now I am about to embark on the proper application of results on shipboard, where, though well received, they are not yet comprehended. The "Plymouth" will be ready before summer.

The "Wabash," returned from Aspinwall, had tried her guns when rolling muzzles to, the sea washing the gun-deck and wetting the charges. Found the 1X in. guns to be perfectly under control. So there is an end to another bugbear.
MEMOIR OF JOHN A. DAHLGREN.

But progress was ever Dahlgren's watchword, and even at this time his prescient ken looked to the results attained at the present day. Writing to Captain Blakely, R. A., in April, 1858, he says:—

How long may it be before a calibre of $XX^{in.}$ can be brought into a practical use at sea?

Evidently, he already foresaw that the principle he had established was capable of far greater adaptation and expansion than he dared at that moment to give it, in view of the prejudice then existing against heavy calibre.

Among his staunchest supporters at that time, as always, and ever his firm personal friend, was that most admirable man and officer, Commodore Joseph Smith, his old commander. In one of his letters, dated Feb. 27, 1858, he says:—

The Secretary ought to take a copy of your book for every commissioned officer in the Navy, besides supplying the Yard libraries and ships with a copy each. . . . I advise you to memorialize Congress at once for remuneration for the work of your brains in Ordnance improvements, and back it up with all the influence you can control. Go direct at the work, delays are dangerous. . . .

If the Secretary gives permission for you to devise and arrange the armament for the South American ship, it is all you want.¹ The compensation for the work of your ingenuity and talents is your own business, provided it does not interfere with your legitimate duty. . . . You stand on a high pinnacle, and you are always cautious to prevent vertigo from upsetting you. Whether you have arrived at the apex, or have still a loftier eminence to mount, is to be seen. Your career is onward. The reward will come sooner or later, therefore keep your weather-eye open. I can only reiterate my regard and steadfast friendship.

¹ Chili had asked for the guns.
In March, 1858, the Turkish Rear-Admiral, Mahomet Pacha, visited the "Plymouth," and was very anxious to see the big guns, asking many questions, and desiring a drawing of the XI<sup>th</sup>.

About the same time the Russian Captain S. asked for the guns to mount in the new frigate which he was superintending for his government. In May, 1858, his request was granted to put up another furnace in the Ordnance Gun Foundry.

But another terrible domestic affliction, in the loss of Commander Dahlgren's eldest daughter, Elizabeth, almost unfitted the bereaved father for exertion. This beloved child died of consumption in May, 1858. She was only seventeen, and was possessed of extraordinary beauty.

The latter part of May, 1858, Commander Dahlgren left with the "Plymouth," a volunteer for Cuba, where the British cruisers were troublesome, interfering with our commerce passing between Cuba and our coast. In a couple of months, however, that apprehension was at an end. But we anticipate somewhat. We quote some points of international import from the journal of May 29, 1858:

I had a conversation with the Secretary, who gave me specific directions to get ready. I asked some questions in regard to the views of the Government, which were clear enough as regards the high seas, but were very obscure as to resisting a search of merchant vessels in a neutral port.

Next morning stopped at the Capitol and saw Mr. Mallory, Chairman of Naval Affairs. He thought I ought not to hesitate about a neutral port; said the resolutions just offered by Mr. Mason, of the Foreign Affairs, were feeble and not what the country demanded; also showed me something stronger, which he intended to offer.
Leaving the Yard, May 29, 1858, Ulric again went with his father until clear of the "Anacostia," and then pulled back in the green boat, while the "Plymouth" was bound down the Potomac and Chesapeake Bay, and on her way to Norfolk, where she was floated in the dock for hasty equipment and repair, for there seemed to be concurrent feeling that work was ahead. By June 4 the ship was under all sail and out at sea. The crew was new, the time of enlistment of the old crew having expired, and practice and drill at the guns at once commenced, as these were the first lessons to the men. So it was, drill, drill, at guns big and little; they use Sharp's rifle and rifled musket, long and short,—and light infantry drill for all, and only one marine who understood the latter!

The "Plymouth" was on her way from Norfolk to Cuba, and the journal of the cruise is filled with the reminiscences of the past. It says:

It is now about thirty-three years since I travelled the route as an amateur sailor taking first lessons,—an orphan lad just from home, and rather slight for such a life,—yet have I outlived comrades whose robustness and vigor gave far more promise of endurance. Of eighty who entered the Navy at the same time as Midshipmen, but fifteen remain. ... The dead! the dead! how they gather around us! Our companions in the journey drop by the way like the leaves of the forest. This wonderful being,—it cannot cease here, it would be life to no end.

By June 22 the coast of Cuba was descried, which, after the dangerous nature of the navigation off the Bank, must always be a relief. The notes mention:

This N. W. current is a notorious fact with navigators, and yet those who write say not one word. Columbus experienced it on his first voyage going from San Salvador. The charts
note none, except one by Blunt, and he puts it just the other way, along the north edge of bank,—that is, S. E. Now the fact is, that coming this way from the United States, Easting should be made in full, so as to be able to steer a free course on striking the S. E. trades, which no doubt originate the current.

The 24th June anchored off Cardenas. Here communicating with the U. S. Consul, Commander Dahlgren was assured that not one of the American vessels then in port had been boarded by British cruisers, and there were many of them. In Cardenas there was no feeling among the American masters on the subject. So he determined to go off Havana and see the Commodore. On the 26th they stood out seaward, and next day made the Havana light, and stood in for it.

Yellow fever prevailing, the "Plymouth" was not taken in, but remained nearly at the entrance of the harbor. Commander Dahlgren went ashore, met the Consul, called on Captain General Concha, who assured him that he had given the most positive instructions to prevent the boarding of our vessels in Spanish waters, at any risk. There was not a vessel in port that had been boarded by English cruisers. It was thought that the trouble was over. We refer to the journal:—

June 29.—At early light a large ship was seen to the northward, some two miles off, which was presently made out to be the "Colorado," bearing the flag of Flag Officer McIntosh,—the first time I had seen the Rear-Admiral’s flag in an American ship, it having been ordered a month ago. Saluted with thirteen guns.

But no prescient eye looked into the future then, to point out to Dahlgren, how near he was to an Admiral’s commission himself!

For some days the "Plymouth" and "Colorado"
were cruising off the Havana, watching the "Styx" and other British vessels, and July 11, 1858, she had joined the "Wabash," "Constellation," "Saratoga," "Colorado," and "Macedonian," at Key West. Of the "Macedonian" Dahlgren writes:

I walked around the ship with much interest. It is the *alter idem*, the other self, of the first ship I sailed in, *just thirty-two years ago*,— a third of a century! That "Macedonian" was the veritable ship taken from the English. Too rotten for further service, she was then rebuilt, and instead of thirty long 18-pdrs., and eighteen 32-pdr. caronades, carries sixteen VIIIth guns, four long 32-pdrs., and two Xth Pivot Guns of my own model. The young boy-reefer of 1826 little dreamed that one day the gallant ship would bear his own thunder!

July 22 — Orders came from the Department that the ships were to be dispersed,— when to meet again? — and the "Saratoga" and "Plymouth" were to sail for San Juan, whence the "Plymouth" was to go to Vera Cruz and receive the U. S. Minister in Mexico, and take him to the United States to any port that he desired. The ships were soon under way, and August 7, after a succession of wearying calms, the Island of Nevassa was seen. Here some Americans held the little settlement, and were the only inhabitants. But they had been visited by two Haytien vessels of war, who restrained them from working the guano and sending it away, declaring that the Island belonged to Hayti. These vessels made their appearance frequently after that time, May 21 and 31, and maintained, as it were, a species of blockade, not suffering the party to receive or send away the least thing of any kind. Fortunately, they had a stock of water and provisions, or they would have been starved into an evacuation.
Commander Dahlgren was of opinion,

That the island having been by the terms of an Act of Congress, and the declaration of the President, announced as "appertaining to the United States," and that the "laws of the United States were extended over it as over a vessel at sea," that therefore the first step should be to publish this by formally hoisting the flag of the United States, and leaving a small detachment of men with an officer, and should the Haytien brig and schooner make their appearance, they were to be warned against trespassing, at the peril of seizure and transmission to the United States for trial as trespassers. Or they might be sent to Port-au-Prince in order to create an opportunity for communicating with the Haytien Government, and requesting the Emperor to desist from any aggressive measures, leaving the matter for reference to our Government.

But Captain Turner did not like the idea of weakening his force by leaving men, and preferred to go to Port-au-Prince to warn the Haytiens to desist. So this being the measure adopted, and Captain Turner having the command as senior, they set sail for Port-au-Prince, which they did not reach before Aug. 15.

Inasmuch as the Island of Hayti has occupied so conspicuous a place in the more recent politics of the United States, it may not be uninteresting to quote freely from the remarks of Commander Dahlgren concerning this island. He says of Port-au-Prince: —

The anchorage is excellent, with every nautical requirement; the two ships ride some three quarters of a mile from the landing, with verdant little islets near by. The mountains line the coast here, too, and at the base of the loftiest is the town, on a rise of very convenient slope. . . . The pest here is the yellow fever, and it is inevitable, even with every care. . . . In 1789, while the whites still held possession, immense quantities of sugar, coffee, and cotton were exported; now, some seventy years later, the few pounds of sugar which I need for my table are brought here from abroad. The dealers say they have no
native sugar. If this neglect of means, so luxuriantly supplied by nature, were compensated by any other good, it might be well, but the whole social condition is but a grade above barbarism. The people are represented as good-humored and inoffensive, having no ill-feeling save to labor, and the idea of that drives them to desperation. The Emperor is a cute old fellow, who keeps everything straight by a large army. But such troops! There is the usual negro love of pomp, and obtuseness to the most ridiculous forms of its display. Each soldier has a coat yearly, made somewhere abroad by contract. The style and fit may be imagined. Couple the view with almost any manner of head ornament, from a cocked hat to a smashed felt with a bandana under it, and you have the ensemble of the troops. . . . The few days here, I always found the nights and mornings cool, and but a few miles up in the mountains that look down on the anchorage, I am told that a blanket is needed in sleeping, and that all the fruits of the higher latitudes grow. The produce brought to market was evidence of the superior climate of Hayti; for notwithstanding the absence of any system of labor, you get easily, potatoes, mutton, peas, melons, fowls, eggs, &c., and cheaply; whereas they were not at all procurable in Havana, and the prices were enormous. I am somewhat surprised that the filibustering propensities of our countrymen have not selected this as a field of operations, rather than Cuba. The great discoverer, Columbus, never displayed more judgment and sagacity than in his pertinacious preference for this island.

Speaking of the navigation, he says:—

It will be seen that going and coming we took the longer passage by the north of Gonaïves, but this is the advice of all, as the southern and more direct way is troubled with calms, and requires more time. In fact, steam is pre-eminently the only motor for these seas. . . . This and the former experience shows that the best track is to hug the capes closely, and not to steer from Nevassa except from Tiburon. The currents experienced between Nevassa and San Juan induce me to think that the southerly current about Nevassa is but an offset of the
great current further south produced by the trades. Now as a strong current from north sets into the north opening of the passage, where do they meet and neutralize each other?

To the representations of Captain Turner an official dispatch was received, saying that

His stay was too short to admit of a reply to his communication, but that an answer should be promptly given through the U. S. Commercial Agent.

Returning to Nevassa, Aug. 23, they found that their compatriots had not been idle during the absence of the ships, as large heaps of reddish-brown guano were piled up at the top of the cliffs near the shore, ready to be shipped at an instant. The "Saratoga" having communicated the news ashore, the two vessels filled away and made all sail. At sunrise of the 28th the whole line of the Nicaragua coast was disclosed, showing some high mountains near the sea, as well as further inland. These sailing vessels had made the intervening distance of seven hundred miles from Nevassa in five days. A note is made of the observation that

The color of the water on these soundings is of a dark bottle green, (twenty-seven to thirty fathoms,) therein resembling what we see on our Atlantic board, where there is no coral formation, whilst along the Bahamas and the coasts of Cuba and Florida, where it is coral bottom, the water is blue on soundings until you come to one or two fathoms, where it becomes a most beautiful light green, or nearly white.

The description given of San Juan is not very flattering. We give some portions:

Greytown, as the English call San Juan, has a population of about 500 persons, of whom 100 are white. It is a collection of miserable shanties, raised on the even sod where the dense forest had been cleared away for the purpose.
MEMOIR OF JOHN A. DAHLGREN.

And, if suddenly lifted off by some hurricane, there would be no trace left, for the soil is nearly unbroken, and you tread the short soft grass instead of pavement. Close around are the primitive trees, extending densely in every direction along the shore, which is a very dark, loose formation, but little above the level, though very high eminences, and even mountains are near, and in some places advance nearly to the sea. The mode of life of the people was thus given by an old negro missionary. "In the morning some go out turtling, and come back to sell to those who don't turtle, then all lie about for the day, and in the evening go out fishing." In other words, they are in all respects below the aboriginal race that Columbus found here.

While in the harbor of San Juan the practice was continued with IX\textsuperscript{in}, and men landed on the beach for target firing and a variety of movements, but Commander Dahlgren was evidently not satisfied with the ordnance progress, for he writes: —

So far as regards ordnance purposes, the cruise has been null. Not a man at the guns who was there last cruise; indeed, but one seaman on board of that time, and he is now gunner. Not one of the Division officers either, nor one who is capable of properly doing the duty. I now make a last effort by organizing a special gun's crew, picked from the entire ship's company, which will be drilled by the Second Lieutenant. But if the Navy Department will not pursue a different course, there can be no result, and the service had better be dropped.

All being ready, they were once more clear of all limits, and rejoicing in the space of boundless ocean, on their way to Vera Cruz. The following remarks will find an echo in many a captain's heart: —

The night fine, sky clear and blue with myriads of stars. But it is weary work for the watchman on the tower, who must ever be prompt to answer his own anxious query, "What of the night?" That doomed man in a ship of war is the captain. All else may go through their stated rounds, and then give no
thought to the ship’s course or safety, but the captain must be all eyes, day and night; when there is doubt or danger, he knows neither rest nor sleep.

And this picture of discomfort must also be familiar: —

As we had now passed over the most remote chance of actual gun-service with Britisher, Cuffee, or Nicaraguans, I caused a part of the cross partition for the cabin to be restored, for there was but a screen between me and the gun-deck, so that I was exposed to every species of discomfort. If a sea came in forward, it rushed aft, and I have my clothes wetted when wanted to hasten on deck. The morning holy stoning brought sundry trespassers in the shape of marines and topmen, who, zealous in the cause of sand and stones, would carry the war behind my very screen. The most entire change of dress could only be ventured on at the risk of being caught flagrante delicto by the bull-headed orderly, fresh and furious with some official message. This morning the round of reports was varied by one of the Quartermasters, who, bobbing his hand to his head, stated that the sun was eclipsed! Terrible bother with the reckoning,—would not fit with the observations any way, with or without current, unless especially manufactured for the purpose! So I had to wriggle along from one observation to another as well as possible,—they by no means harmonious, like all other troubles, found I had to work my own way.

Perhaps, too, the following reflections may have their weight from so astute a disciplinarian: —

Sentences of summary court on four men; a very poor substitute for some efficient punishment—a cold-blooded proceeding which leaves, I fear, anything but right impressions with the men.

A prompt, even if a more severe, punishment, inflicted with some feeling, would be better in this respect, and in every way be more suitable to the service. Flogging I should shrink from, but what shall it be? But the form of process by which the punishments are administered are also subversive of the only power competent to administer the affairs of a ship of war—
the captain. This has already been touched seriously by other changes in the service, and now by the instrumentalities of the process, the power of punishment is transferred to classes of officers inferior to the captain, whilst the latter is alone responsible for the discipline, efficacy, and safety of all. The innovation may prove fatal, in connection with others, and yet not exhibit any sign until the hour of battle.

There is no evading the truth, that a ship of war is the most artificial creation of civilized man. It contemplates nothing that is agreeable, but the mere display. In all else, it is a sacrifice on the part of all,—a harsh, arbitrary amalgamation of every interest and feeling in one idea of the public service. And to do this, the captain must remain as he has been,—the tyrant over all, each of whom in turn tyrannizes over his subordinate. Try to make it otherwise, let women and children contribute their humanizing influences, let the rights of all be respected and be visible in the treatment of all, and then see what your man-of-war will be in the hour of danger. War is a curse, and its means of operation can hardly be blessed.

It is doubtful if ever captain of a man-of-war's-man spoke with more frankness, or with more truth. It has been said that John Dahlgren was of severe nature, yet no man was ever more in accord with defenceless nature. Here are a few sentences giving the undertone, as it were, of his gentle feeling: —

A variety of little land birds shot past the ship at times, and one or two would alight. A little tom-tit passed the whole of yesterday in the cabin, and I tried to have him fed, but he would not, and seemed more disposed to nap; at last, with his head under his wing, he quietly lay over on the deck, dead. Poor little wanderer — the travel had been too much for him.

Again: —

All day I have had the company of a little bird, hopping about in the cabin as freely as possible, even resting on my knee at times as I sat reading.
On Sept. 20 the "Plymouth" anchored off Vera Cruz, and the purser was sent ashore with a letter to the American Minister, Mr. Forsyth, in case he was not in Vera Cruz, and to arrange for the salute, &c.

The purser brought back word that Mr. Forsyth was in Mexico, awaiting the "Plymouth," and that, the town being besieged, it would be necessary to send a special courier with any communication. The courier was accordingly dispatched at once, as it was indispensable to the execution of the orders from the Government.

Commander Dahlgren says of Vera Cruz: —

I noticed with pleasure the regular streets and well-built dwellings; pavements excellent, but the grass was springing up, and the miserable condition of the few persons we met, spoke strongly of the desolate prospects of the place,—no life, no animation.

After an absence of six days, the courier returned with an answer from the Minister, to the effect that he was not ready to embark, but would be so about October 15.

So Commander Dahlgren determined to put to sea as soon as possible and visit Tampico, as a letter had been received from the United States Consul there, saying that our citizens were again disturbed in that locality.

Sept. 30.—Again out at sea, and with clear and beautiful weather. The journal says: —

Quite glad to have what has been a novelty for some ten days—a clear, bright sun, just to dry the ship and the crew, and every manner of trapping that so fills ships. Nothing is so disorganizing as continued wet weather on shipboard. All the daily routine that concerns exercise, and which sustain the artificial organism of a ship, are suspended; the men are unemployed, wet and uncomfortable; the ship is closed, reeking with foul atmosphere, and as forlorn as possible; the damage to equipment is considerable, and to sails most serious.
Arrived off Tampico, Commander Dahlgren, accompanied by the United States Consul, Mr. Chase, called at once upon General Garza, at his public quarters on the plaza. This functionary had levied a forced loan from foreign merchants, and had imprisoned one who refused compliance, until he paid. Commander Dahlgren says:—

To my remonstrance and demand for reparation he assented without reluctance, and expressed his regret, and said he had been forced to this step by necessity. When I insisted that the practice must be discontinued, he demurred, and would only say that necessity would compel him, and that he would also refer it to the supreme government—that of Juarez. I then read from the protest of Mr. Schultz, whose goods (to value of $12,000) had been seized, after paying duties once to his predecessor, on the ground that this predecessor, an opponent, had no right to receive. A form of process was being gone through, which he could, but would not, put aside. I protested against the invasion of right, and told him that the Government would never submit to it. . . .

If I had had the power, a summary demand should have been enforced instantly, but I was acting without instructions of any kind, and, of course, had to be careful, to avoid committing the Government.

I was by no means favorably prepossessed by Garza; his gray eye and black hair, with a willingness of expression, strike me unpleasantly. I endeavored to be firm and to the point without rudeness. Did not offer to shake hands, but could not avoid the presentation of his own. . . . Soon went to the Consul’s and wrote out my letter to General Garza, protesting, &c.

Returning, October 10, to Vera Cruz from Tampico, the package of the British Consul was delivered, and a courier sent to Mr. Forsyth, the American Minister, apprising him of the arrival of the “Plymouth.”

Commander Dahlgren then requested an interview
with President Juarez on the subject of General Garza's doings at Tampico. He says:—

Oct. 13. — After breakfast went ashore, and by 11 o'clock were at the President's residence. Our party consisted of the consul here, Mr. Allen, Purser Boggs, and an American merchant, who was to interpret.

There was a guard at the door, and the captain demurred to my sword. I told him it was part of my uniform; he might as well ask me to put off my coat; and, in fine, the sword went up with me, if I went at all. So he had to go up and ask leave, which being granted, up we posted.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ocampo, received us at the head of the stairs, and we were ushered into a sitting room, and soon Juarez came in. He is clearly Indian, and of good address; short, fat and composed. My business was soon presented, and was shortened by the conciliatory views of the President. He said that General Garza should be instructed by the first opportunity that American citizens were not to be subjected to the forced loan, and the President would attend to the affair of Mr. Schultz. In fact, he professed entire willingness to preserve the peace with the United States, so I had to be very pleasant. On leaving, I said I would write him on the subject, shook hands, made my bow, and walked out. The party, some of whom were much alarmed lest there might be a pitched fight, much approved of my course, and thought it would have its effect at this time, when Juarez himself had applied to the merchants for a loan.

Commander Dahlgren then returned to the ship and addressed a note to the President, Juarez, recapitulating the subjects of conversation of the day previous. To this note the journal says:—

I received from the Minister of Foreign Affairs an answer, dated Oct. 16. President Juarez directs him to say that no future exactions in the shape of "forced loans" shall be levied on United States citizens, and that those so obtained shall be restored by General Garza. Mr. Schultz' goods will be released
on his payment of a small fine; in fact, every disposition manifested to square up:

We desire to close this review of the action of Commander Dahlgren at this time, by quoting from our own "Biographical Sketch," written for and prefixed to his own posthumous work on "Maritime International Law," in which sketch the above-mentioned circumstances are briefly alluded to, and it is said that

The correspondence that ensued showed that he was well versed in questions of international law, and ready to insist on their just application.

The very able letters then written by him, and addressed to General de la Garza, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senior Ocampo, and to the President, Juarez, form of themselves a most interesting chapter on the subject of forced loans, illegal seizures, and similar exactions, when made upon foreign merchants. The excellence of his logic, backed by a firm determination to protect the invaded rights of American citizens, had the desired effect, and due apology and reparation were made. A letter from the U. S. Consul on this subject, addressed to Commander Dahlgren, says: — "You have done more for the commerce of this place than all the ships and squadrons belonging to the United States have done since I have had charge of this Consulate."

This letter lies before us as we write, dated "Tampico, Nov. 11, 1858," and signed, "Franklin Chase."

The Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, December, 1857, gives the official account of these transactions, and approves the action of Commander Dahlgren.

The American Minister, notwithstanding the presence of yellow fever in the harbor and the oncoming gales of winter, detained the ship of war, dancing attendance in one of the most exposed of anchorages for over a
month, and it was finally October 28 before he came on board.

Rather a stretch of a privilege, it would seem. Mr. Forsyth and his family were taken to Mobile Point, where they were transferred to a steamer that would take them up to Mobile, some twenty-seven miles distant. Nor had they escaped altogether the bad weather to be apprehended at that season. In reference to the navigation of the West Indies and the Gulf of Mexico, the journal remarks: —

There are certain well-defined peculiarities that would assist very greatly, if marked down for the use of the Navy. For instance, the dreaded Northerns on the Mexican shore are in effect the N. Westers of our coasts. At Vera Cruz the direction is N. N. W., varying a point either way. These winds sweep the Gulf from the United States shore, and in all cases like the N. Wester on our Atlantic board,—its first rush is instantaneous, shifting to N. N. W. with violence. . . . It would seem that the powerful set of the Gulf Stream is no exception to the general law which prevails in the waters of the West Indies and Gulf of Mexico in regard to the effect of wind on currents. . . . No fact is more important to navigators in these seas, than that the current is almost at once diverted by the wind, hence there is little use in beating against a trade; you must go round and start to windward. Gales are invariably preceded by a swell, sometimes twelve hours in advance, in the Gulf of Mexico. . . . I cannot help thinking that the theory of the Gulf Stream has been unnecessarily complicated; in a few words, the continued action of the trades forces a broad stream of current into the passages of the West India Islands, the set being increased in strength by the narrowness of the channels. Striking against the Peninsula of Yucatan, a portion is compelled to the southward, towards San Juan and the Isthmus. The mass of the water, however, passes between Cuba and Yucatan in great force, and spreads out into the basin of the Gulf. Some of it striking the western shore, naturally moves to the southwest, where it has no opposition,
but the chief part piling up in the Gulf has no outlet except between Cuba and Florida, and out through this passage it rushes, the force being accumulated, first, by the issue from the Mississippi and other rivers, and, secondly, by the indraught through the old Bahama channel of the original eastern current. Thus swelled to the utmost, the pent-up waters find the passage open to their egress between Florida and the Bahamas, and come forth in strength into the open ocean north of the trade region, and consequently with no permanent winds to quell them.

The high temperature in the cool northern waters is explained by the fact that, in a tropical sun where seldom less than 80° is found, the water is well boiled and so retained as far as Cuba, whence it passes at too rapid a rate to be cooled at once by the water of the more northern Atlantic. It may also be noted that the original current entering the northern passages is met by that which having come in through the eastern inlets, overcomes it. Thus between Cuba and Hayti the trade current enters strongly, and will be felt nearly to the inner part of the passage. Here, however, some of the water that entered between the Windward islands tries to escape, and hence a current around the southwest end of Hayti, which, of course, does not go far against the stronger current coming in from the ocean.

We have transcribed these remarks at some length, because they can scarcely be considered as mere theory, but are the result of careful and intelligent observation.

Nov. 18. — A telegraphic order from the Secretary of the Navy was received by Commander Dahlgren, thus: —

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16.

_Proceed with all dispatch with “Plymouth” to Washington._

ISAAC Toucey, Sec. Navy.

Upon receipt of this dispatch, the ship was provisioned for a two months' sail in all haste, and by the 20th was
homeward bound. However, her captain was not a little puzzled to understand the course of the Government. General Walker, the filibuster, had arrived at Mobile, and the town was full of his men. The Government had issued a strong proclamation, and just as the "Plymouth" left, the news came that there was in addition a special decision, and yet this man-of-war, being the only means on the spot, and ready to enforce these measures, was ordered off with dispatch!

Dec. 5.—The journal notes, in sadness:—

And so we approach home. What varied feelings and prospects among the two hundred living souls that the "Plymouth" carries! Dare I write my own? Alas, how desolate that home! How different from what it was for many long years.

Death has invaded the sanctuary of its peace, and thus closes another act of life's drama.
CHAPTER IX.

VARIOUS INVASIONS OF HIS INVENTIONS.—RESUMES CHARGE OF ORDNANCE AT WASHINGTON YARD. 1859-1861.

SCARCELY at home, and Foote writes:—

MY DEAR DAHLGREN,—I heartily congratulate you on winding up a little cruise, alike creditable to your diplomacy and firmness, as all your cruises are, to the practical demonstration of your theories in developing a new era in ordnance and gunnery.

The Hon. Isaac Toucey, the Secretary of the Navy, in his Annual Report, Dec. 6, 1858, says of the ordnance for this year:—

In the construction of a war vessel, everything connected with it has ultimate reference to a single point—the use of the gun, by which alone, as the means or instrument of power, important results are to be accomplished. To place it in the presence of the enemy, or beyond his reach, in the shortest possible time, and to use it with the greatest possible effect, is the great object to be sought for in the construction of a Navy, or the maintenance of its auxiliary establishments.

It is to obtain this object that the skill of the Departments of Ordnance, of Construction, and of Engineering, is taxed to the utmost. In the first place, we have aimed to select and adopt the arm which combines the greatest strength, range, accuracy and power.

In the Dahlgren gun we have found what we want, and it is believed there is no gun in any service that surpasses it in these qualities. In the use of it, by training a corps of skilful gunners, by constant instruction, and by universal practice at sea,
according to the requirements of the naval service, we have attained the greatest perfection in celerity of movement and accuracy of aim.

On reaching Washington, Commander Dahlgren, by order of the Secretary, resumed charge of the Ordnance Department in the Yard, while the "Plymouth" was sent to Annapolis for the school-ship. The first work was to place the pivot XI\textsuperscript{in} for the new screw gunboats and draught the carriages, a serious undertaking, assigned to him by the Chief of Bureau. While his powers of invention were being taxed to the uttermost, and as freely used as given, by the Government, his rights were invaded in a new shape. We give the first painful record just as we find it in his "private memoranda," which says: —

Meanwhile I find myself very shabbily treated in regard to my cannon, IX\textsuperscript{in} and XI\textsuperscript{in}. Rumors had reached me before that Mr. Alger, the founder, had been selling some of them abroad. Two were seen at Woolwich, but I found it difficult to have the proof.

Within a few days a report of officers who had visited the new Russian frigate at New York was published in the "Journal of Commerce," in which it is stated that two of my heaviest cannon were to be carried.

Other persons told me they had seen the two guns on the wharf.

So on Tuesday, March 15, I saw the Secretary, and stated what I heard, requesting the protection of the Department against the breach of faith, and indeed of the Burcâau order, as it was a great loss to me, who had not patented, relying on the Department. The Secretary was displeased at Alger, and said I should be protected. He directed a letter to be written, asking Mr. Alger if he had made and sold any guns of my model to others. Next day I filed my application for patent, hoping it was not too late. On Monday, 14th, I also had my rifle shell caveated. A worse feature in the matter is this. Last
year the Russian Captain Shestakoff, whom I knew quite well, came on board the “Plymouth,” and just as we were sitting down to the dinner table he said, “Captain, we must have your guns.” We had been conversing about the new frigate at New York, which he was superintending. I answered that I must refer him to the Secretary of Navy.

Some days after, the Secretary sent for me and said the Russian Minister had called to ask for my designs of cannon for the Russian frigate. After some conversation the Secretary said he would leave it to me to do as I pleased. Accordingly I signified to Captain S. that I would give my designs for guns and carriages, with personal supervision, for a certain sum. He answered that he must refer to his government. I replied that if the amount asked for had influenced the reference, I would do what was required and leave the amount to the Russian Government. Not long afterwards I went to sea, and heard no more of the matter until mentioned as above.

Of course I was much surprised, inasmuch as, under the circumstances, there seemed to be an evident propriety in avoiding any such course.

On April 4, 1859, Mr. Alger’s answer to inquiry of Department was sent me; a very diplomatic answer, too. He said he had sold some rejected cannon of my model, but those made for Russian frigate were not of that model. I saw the Secretary, and asked to have the difference ascertained, and sent up my request in writing.

On April 20, saw the Secretary, and gave him my letter, remarking on Alger’s breach of faith in selling patterns of my guns to foreign powers, and . . . asked that he should have no more contracts. The Secretary seemed perfectly willing to assent.

Such is the simple record of a very grave infringement, but if this violation of confidence led the magnanimous inventor to define and assure his rights by patent, it may be considered as a not unfortunate circumstance. I hold a copy of the letter alluded to, and addressed to the Secretary of the Navy, April 20,
1859, before me, and it is a clear statement, ending with an indignant remonstrance, in which he says: —

The breach of faith thus committed is an encroachment on the right of property to my grievous detriment, for, after the service of a life in my profession, this alone constitutes the entire dependence of my children if accident should deprive them of my assistance. It matters little how difficult it might be to preserve this, there is no justification in that for a breach of faith to the Government and the wrong done to me.

A letter from J. C. Rowan, U. S. N., of April 20, 1859, after alluding in forcible terms, on this occasion, to the conduct of the Russians and of the founder, adds: —

When the ship was built by Webb for the Russians and sent to the Amoor River, I visited her when ready for sea, and was surprised to find on the wharf a battery of your field howitzers. As well as I can recollect, "Ames" was on the guns.

I hope the time will come when officers in charge of Ordnance, "ashore and afloat," will be authorized to refuse these foreigners access to all our naval improvements.

The printed regulations at Woolwich, in England, for the use of the police, of which I have a copy, show that they understand better than we how to guard their inventions abroad, while the long list of rewards and honors conferred on their Ordnance inventors also shows that they understand the importance of developing Ordnance genius. In this very year of 1859, of which I am now writing the record of John Dahlgren's struggles, Mr. Armstrong was paid £20,000 for his patent, the announcement being made to parliament by Gen. Peel, the Secretary of War. He was knighted, and great Ordnance power put in his hands.

Yet at this time of 1879, a score of years later, no comparison can be instituted as to the relative impor-
tance of the Ordnance record of the two men. But while England made haste to recognize, the United States not only allowed John Dahlgren to die a poor man, but for ten years after his death withheld from his family that which in justice and right was theirs, setting aside all ideas of generosity, finally granting them a very in-commensurate recognition. What is the gain to the nation by such a niggardly policy? The inventive genius of the Navy still awaits the fostering care of the nation, and stands appalled at the past record of its stinted appreciation to its first great naval inventor, and as a result, while England goes ahead, we stand still — and wait.

So entirely had the first objections to the heavy guns ceased, that they were now accepted by the Navy generally, without question. An officer's letter, date Jan. 30, 1859, lies before me. It says: —

All the vessels speak well of their IXth guns, and they seem quite a favorite, and no one appears to allude to the lighter ones except as for ornament or saluting!

The furnaces, too, which Commander Dahlgren had designed, were doing their work well. We quote from another letter from an officer, who says: —

I congratulate you on having at last got the furnaces, although I think that as the Navy is to derive all the advantage from them, and you only have the extra trouble, I don't know whether congratulations are in place. I admire your perseverance and powers of work, and hope only that the reward will come some of these days, but, as it generally comes, slowly, under our Government.

These expressions of good-will from comrades must have been very grateful.

The question of Rifled Ordnance had for some time occupied Commander Dahlgren's thoughts, and in
March, 1859, Secretary Toucey gave his assent that a rifled cannon should be made, and Commander Dahlgren was requested to send in his design. This was done April 4, and April 9 a rifled 10½-pdr. was bored, turned and rifled; being the first gun ever rifled at the Ordnance Yard. And May 19th, a second 10½-pdr. rifled cannon was bored; it was longer than No. 1, and had a pitch of forty feet.

May 31, 1859, Captain F. Buchanan took command of the Yard.

On June 8 the casting of a heavy rifle cannon was made.

On June 25 permission was granted to put up two more furnaces in the foundry.

On July 14 a sad accident, causing loss of life, occurred by the bursting of a 64-pdr. at the battery. The Memoranda before us says: —

I have formerly brought to notice of the Bureau the defects of this model, without other success than a request from Commodore Morris to introduce one or two features of my own for four of the class about to be made, which I found impossible, and declined.

The coroner's inquest held in the afternoon of the same day, after a very searching examination of evidence, declared the event to be accidental.

Here the memoranda notes: —

July 20. — Worn out with the unremitting application to duty, and distressed by the consequences of the late accident, I asked for the first respite in eleven years, which being granted for one month, I repaired first to Bedford and afterwards to Berkeley Springs, where I dismissed all thoughts of business.

On his return to duty the subject of rifled cannon continued to engage his thoughts. Writing to Lynall
Thomas, Esq., of London, acknowledging receipt of his book on Rifled Ordnance at this time, he says:—

Early in this year I commenced experimental inquiry, contemplated some time previously, into the effect of pitch of spiral, using several pieces of the same calibre, &c., varying from five feet to forty feet in the turn.

Again, to compare the pitch proper for different calibres, a set of 40-pdrs. (cast-iron) are in preparation, one of which, as well as all the smaller pieces, has been in practice some time; the others will be ready shortly.

Two pieces of increasing pitch have also been tried, and by spring I hope to have at least one 80 or 100-pdr.

No one can deny what you affirm of the paucity of data in regard to rifle cannon, and the absolute need of supplying much of a most minute kind before a reasonable conclusion will be even in view. So far all my results are but preliminary. Compared with those made public by Sir W. Armstrong I get considerably greater range, about one half the accuracy, and equal, if not greater, penetration.

I am far from abandoning the idea of getting cast iron to withstand the strain of the heavy rifle cannon, having already attained sufficient results to encourage the hope, though very much short of anything like absolute proof. . . . The samples of rifle cannon I cast here myself, with some variation in form from the smooth bore. The trial gun, weighing 600 pounds and bored smooth, stood 1000 fires with 12-pdr. shot and 12½ pounds charge. The last, a rifled 40-pdr. (5700 pounds), has been fired to a moderate extent with projectiles varying from thirty-five to forty-two pounds, and four pounds charge,—the wear exhibiting very favorable indications.

By the way, you credit me at page 192 with the pistol-barrel experiment, which is the labor of some one else. Others have done the same, compelling me to several disclaimers—once in a London paper, once quite formally in the "National Intelligencer"—to the inquiry of some gentleman over his own signature, and on other occasions. Gibbon, author of the "Manual," also wrote to me, and his book contains his version of the experiment.
INVENTION OF RIFLED CANNON.

See also page 65 of "Ordnance Experiments," published by the U. S. War Department. Certainly, the idea is not mine, nor was I aware of the results for several years after my own models were in existence, and even subsequently to their being mounted in the U. S. ships.

I saw them first in the hands of Mr. Stevens, just before his death. He was engaged in building a war steamer for the United States, and called to converse with me on the nature of the armament he would have to encounter, and to ask me for the design of some ordnance suitable to his steamer. At all events, these results have reference to but one condition,—the effort of explosion upon different parts of the bore; whereas there are other strains that must be considered, and will have material effect where cast iron is concerned.

The construction of my models was intended to follow the law of these combined strains, and the guns now cast fulfil the original design exactly. They have never been modified by experiment.

We have thought it best to publish in this work this disclaimer, in case the subject referred to ever comes up again.

In a formal letter to the Bureau, of Aug. 27, 1859, he again repeats his opinion with regard to the use of cast iron. He says:—

The necessity for greater power of endurance in rifled cannon is manifest from the proceedings in other countries, where strenuous efforts are being made to obtain the desired strength by using other material, such as steel, wrought iron, &c. But, in view of the very superior character of our own cast iron, I am unable to concede its inability to furnish what may be required, provided the object be pursued perseveringly and properly.

In the summer of 1859 a board of army officers was convened at Fort Monroe, and expressed an opinion that "the era of smooth-bore artillery had passed away, and that the rifled cannon, from its superior accuracy
and greater range, would supply the place." And yet some memoranda of Commander Dahlgren, written after the results of the war were in part known, says:——

It may be that the time for Dahlgrens has gone by, and of all smooth bores, but it is not determined what shall replace them. The difference between the system of Paixhans and my own was simply that Paixhans' guns were strictly shell-guns, and were not designed for shot, nor for great penetration or accuracy at long ranges. They were, therefore, auxiliary to, or associates of, the shot-guns. This made a mixed armament, was objectionable as such, and never was adopted to any extent in France.

This was also the case in England, as the light Xth- and VIIIth-class gunboats.
tions in the division were the long 64-pdr. of the "Susquehanna" and some light 32-pdrs. in the gunboats.

As for the effect which shells may have on iron sides there will be no difference in opinion.

My own idea is, that as IX\textsuperscript{in} or XI\textsuperscript{in} guns are capable of throwing shot of 93 and 170 lbs. even iron sides may be shaken and dislocated. . . .

As to the effect of our shells on wooden sides, we shall oppose rifle cannon to rifle cannon; we do not think of doing otherwise. But we still feel sure that so long as smooth bores can or may be used, we can rely on the IX\textsuperscript{in} and XI\textsuperscript{in} to send shells and shot on their errand. What are the probabilities of results at ranges beyond the work of these guns? Decisive results are not to be obtained at such distances.

Sept. 19.—I again take up the Memoranda. Learn that Captain Ingraham will refuse my estimates for extension of foundry. The Secretary, to whom I spoke first, agreed to it.

Oct. 17.—A sudden order for ammunition for marines ordered by railroad to Harper's Ferry, to capture old Brown and his party, who had made a foray thither.

During the excitement produced by that raid, Commander Dahlgren was applied to, by a Virginia gentleman of standing, for information regarding the use to which his light-artillery system could be put in suppressing sudden riot. In the course of reply Commander Dahlgren says:—

The Navy Howitzers in the present state, and mode of drill, which is the simplest of its kind, can be manoeuvred and worked as rapidly as the fort artillery of an army, maintaining the most rapid rate of firing known to any system of artiller, whether foot or horse. . . .

No foundry, at home or abroad, can produce gun-metal superior to that of the Navy Howitzer, and I have yet to see any as good.

I am glad to see that any one of the Southern States is at last taking into consideration the question of a volunteer artillery.
A small body of resolute men with artillery could make good a defence in a building, or in the field entrenched, against an undisciplined mob, could clear mountain passes, and command a wide extent of country by means of posts.

Artillery has eminently the advantage of being almost inefficient if it should fall into the hands of an ignorant multitude.

The writer would here remark, that as at any time it may become a question how best to protect the country against lawless bands of men, some notes on the use of the Dahlgren howitzer may not be amiss, although evidently not written for publication, but rather hastily, as one who writes currente calamo. He says:

There is no system of light artillery more suitable for popular use, — citizen soldiery being situated much as are seamen.

The pieces are light, the carriage lighter by one half than the army; they can be handled by very few men, and drawn by no great force — no need of horses — and this dispenses with the most costly and troublesome item of light guns. These pieces are powerful and not costly.

They are, therefore, cheap, easily manageable, always convenient, and very powerful. . . . Yet I take the occasion to declare that nothing is further from my thoughts than to contribute in any way towards the repression of citizens. Every feeling of my heart is opposed to the application of military force to suppress even disorder. Let the civil authority do this work, and, if need be, call on the citizens. But never, never do I wish to witness the array of the army or navy drawn against our own people. God forbid! . . . All I desire is to impress on the popular mind the advantage of light artillery for their own defence.

May 19, 1859, Commander Dahlgren addressed a letter to the Chief of Bureau, Ingraham, on the final arrangements of the battery of the "Niagara." As this
ARMAMENT OF THE "NIAGARA." 231

was a matter in which he was very nearly concerned, I shall make some extracts from the press copy before me. He says:—

The Honorable Secretary of the Navy assigned the armament of the "Niagara" to me, for two reasons, because the plans of Mr. Steers in constructing the ship, and my own ideas of all spar-deck armaments, were equally in conflict with those commonly entertained in the Navy.

It happened unfortunately that the plan of Mr. Steers conflicted quite as much with my own, for it did not admit of a gun-deck battery.

All my efforts to obtain a fair trial of the plan of armament were unavailing, notwithstanding the fullest disposition on the part of Secretary Dobbins. The "Niagara" was too far advanced to pierce ports below, and the "opposition in regard to the other frigates was too strong." (I use the words of Secretary Dobbins.)

As a consequence, the plan is divided between the two classes of frigates; the "Merrimac" class having the gun-deck battery, and the "Niagara" the spar-deck battery; while to my inexpressible mortification it is fully developed in the new British screw frigate (!) built expressly to compete with our ships (as announced to Parliament by the First Lord of Admiralty), and just ready for sea. . . . I have no desire to obtrude my opinions upon the Bureau in regard to these matters, for argument and experience are in favor of my original propositions.

I only wish—now that the "Niagara" is about to be brought before the service as a regular cruiser, with a battery, which I would be held responsible for—to state what I am responsible for, and to ask respectfully that this may also be submitted to the Honorable Secretary of the Navy.

During the summer of 1859 the "Boat Armament" was adopted in the Prussian Service. About the same time Captain Farragut recommended VIII\textsuperscript{th} instead of IX\textsuperscript{th} in the "Brooklyn." The Captain did not foresee
the good use which he would, at no distant day, make of these very IXth. On the other hand, the Report of the Board on Yards was highly laudatory of the Ordnance Department at the Washington Yard. We give the following extract from Reports of the Board of Officers ordered to examine into the condition of the Navy-yards, and communicated by the Secretary of the Navy, in answer to a resolution of the House, dated Feb. 16, 1860. They say:—(36th Congress, first session. House of Representatives. Ex. Doc. No. 34.)

At the same time, the Board are of opinion that, so far as the character of our ordnance and the quality of its material is concerned, we are equal, if not superior, to any Navy afloat. For this superiority, if it does exist, we are in great measure indebted to the officer in charge of the Experimental Department in the Washington Yard.

Some of the officers in charge of the Bureau of Ordnance, have aided and encouraged this officer in every way, by giving him the largest latitude, which it would be well still to extend to him. He should be relieved from useless forms, the organization of his department left entirely to himself, and the experimental part of it detached from all connection with the Yard.

No one officer of the Navy has had more experience, or devoted more time to the subject of ordnance, ordnance equipments, and improvements in guns generally, than the present experimental officer; and as the subject is one of deep interest to him, and he could explain his own views better than could be done by the Board, they recommend that any ideas he may suggest for the improvement of his department be carried out, so far as it may be practicable.

F. H. GREGORY, Senior Officer.
G. J. VAN BRUNT, Captain.
C. H. POOR, Commander U. S. Navy.
JOHN R. TUCKER, Commander U. S. Navy.
DAVID D. PORTER, Lieutenant.
HOII. ISAAC TOUCEY, Secretary of the Navy.
Before closing the record of this year (1859) we turn once more to the "Private Memoranda," of which *the grave has broken the seal*, for to this nice adjustment and even balance must all human actions be subjected at last, before history can be made.

Commander Dahlgren was always annoyed that the gallant conduct of his dear friend Foote had never met with the proper official recognition. He speaks of this sarcastically in his Memoranda, thus: —

*Nov. 5.* — President of U. S., Mr. Buchanan, visited the Yard. Came too late (4.30 p.m.) to see much, but got through pleasantly. When I showed him a piece of granite from the Chinese forts, he observed on the "little that had been said of the action." I answered, "It was a very gallant affair." He replied, "It was not authorized."

Funny, if a Commander should write home for directions when his boat was fired into! Wonder if Mr. Ward was "authorized to go to Pekin in a tea-box well shut up."

*Nov. 14.* — Complained to Secretary of Navy that a compilation for Naval School used large portions from my works without acknowledgment, and had an interview with him on another subject. The Chief of Bureau had reported the proceedings of Board ready for printing. The Secretary wanted me confidentially to look over the papers, and note whether they had garbled my doings, particularly as regards exercise of cannon in Plymouth. So comes even-handed justice, etc. . . .

The Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1859, mentions the addition of twenty steam-vessels to the Navy, and says: —

These ships have steam-power as auxiliary to sails, and are armed with heavy IXth, Xth, and XIth Dahlgren shell-guns.

Dec. 24, the question of Commander Dahlgren's rank in the Yard, and of the separate organization of the ordnance, coming before the Secretary, —
On this question Commander Dahlgren addressed a paper to the Secretary, with regard to the advantage to be derived from a permanent separation of the Ordnance Department from the Yard. He says: —

It would give to this department that distinct organization in connection with the Bureau of Ordnance which its extent and interests have so long required.

The operations of the Ordnance Department of this Yard are peculiar to it, and include the founding of all light artillery for the Navy, the fabrication of boat and field carriages, fitting of the Shrapnel shells, etc. Therefore, besides supplies of various kinds for general purposes, such as fuses, primers, small-arm ammunition, and other laboratory stores, tests of samples from the iron ordnance of the Navy, and of powder for the service by the Ballistic Pendulum, &c.

The necessary authority for these purposes emanates from the Bureau of Ordnance, but it is transmitted to the Commandant of the Yard.

At first, when the present establishment was without other distinct existence than my own unassisted presence might signify, it was the practice of the Bureau to address me directly on such matters as related to my own functions, and this was heartily concurred in by the commandant, Commodore McCauley, who had little toleration for any but the most simple and direct mode of conducting affairs.

But after a period of more than four years, Commodore Morris succeeded to the Bureau.

By this time more than one form had crept in and established itself, which, in connection with the great increase of the work, began to encumber the conduct of the business when prompt action was required. To remedy this Commodore Morris had recourse to private notes or memoranda, by which his views and mine were communicated directly. They were the real agencies for the transmission of the most important arrangements, and were couched in the plainest language and the fewest words, without regard to the difference of rank in the writers. Many of them are on the files of the Bureau and of this office.
The continued increase in the work and in the number of persons employed, render it now absolutely necessary to simplify the administration thereof, and reduce the formula for transacting business,—connecting the nominal and real responsibility, and bringing them into direct communication with the sources whence the authority to act is derived.

I believe I may refer to the record of the Board on Yards, to confirm what I have advanced in regard to the affairs of this department; and to the personal experience of Captain Buchanan, the present Commandant of the Yard, while organizing the Naval Academy, for the advantage of avoiding all indirection in transmitting authority.

I desire to refrain from all personal allusions in stating the case, and have, therefore, confined my remarks on the business of the Yard to periods antecedent to the command of Captain Buchanan.

In conclusion, I earnestly invoke your favorable consideration of the subject, and hope that you will extend to this branch of the service the advantages of a separate organization which are enjoyed by the Naval Observatory and the Naval Academy, so that its future usefulness may not be impeded by needless forms, but may have their legitimate extension.

Inasmuch as these considerations have a permanent value, we have made the foregoing lengthy extract from the communication sent by Commander Dahlgren on this subject; and now close the record of 1859 from the private notes, which give an eloquent description of cannon-casting:

Saturday, Dec. 31, 1859.—The last day of the week, of the month, and of the year, and fittingly concluded with the casting of a second 40-pdr. It is now four o'clock, and I am waiting the full fusing of the metal in the furnaces, which are blazing and roaring with the intense heat. The light of the winter day is waning away, and night draws on prematurely under a cloudy sky, suggestive of some addition to the snow that already has whitened the landscape; the river is bound with ice from shore to shore.
A little after six it is quite dark, and the molten iron was let run, and in a few minutes it was embraced by the mould that was to give it form as a cannon; the ruddy light from it shed bright gleams over the frozen snow.

In March of 1860 Commander Dahlgren was called for four successive days before the Naval Committee of the House, they having before them the case of Mr. Hubbell, a Philadelphia patent-lawyer, who claimed the invention of the "flat-based mass" used in the Navy shells in connection with a metallic fuse. He asked for $50,000 damages. Commander Dahlgren was sent for by the Committee to attend, and furnish "such statements as the protection of the government may seem to require."

Mr. Hubbell had also claimed that the use of the mass opposite the fuse-hole, as practised in the IXth, Xth, and XIth shells, was an indirect infringement on the patents he had taken. The scope of Commander Dahlgren's elaborate argument went to show that, in his opinion, such prior use had been made of this invention as practically to deprive the patent of its force; that the IXth and other shells of the Navy were at that time made as they had been since 1809, and even at a time previous. He shows that:—

The fullest and most complete series of practical illustrations of the theory was made in 1835, by General Borman, and were published in Paris in 1836. The fact of rotation had been known a third of a century previously. Mr. Hubbell claimed the discovery to have been made by him in 1842.

And he says:—

Besides the foregoing claim, Mr. Hubbell alleges the invention of the metallic fuse stock, with the other arrangements of a fuse in use in the Navy.
The argument of Commander Dahlgren went to prove that this detail had always been attributed to others, and to invalidate the claim entirely. With the liberal spirit, however, which ever pervaded his actions, he says:

I do cheerfully concede, however, that if Mr. Hubbell has discovered any new uses of a theory well known, no matter how long since, and the United States has been benefited by said discovery, it would not become the government of a great and liberal people to deny him the full value of what has been received.

March 28 the Navy Pay Bill passed. It contained an amendment continuing the effect of the *proviso* of 1851, giving Commander Dahlgren the pay of next higher grade. This was carried by a vote of thirty to fifteen, all Democrats and two Republicans. Those voting against this recognition of service were all Republicans.

His ever sympathetic friend Foote at once writes him:

*March* 30, 1860. — I am rejoiced to see you so well treated by the Senate. It shows only a proper appreciation of your services.

Perhaps it may be pardoned here (on account of the *feminicity* of the writer), if we insert some descriptions of noted visitors who were received about this time at the Capitol of the Nation.

These social events were deemed of sufficient importance to find a place in the "Private Memoranda," from which we have so freely copied, and which, indeed, form the text, as it were, upon which this narrative of the life of John A. Dahlgren is framed. He says:

*Monday, May* 14. — The long-expected Japanese Embassy landed at the Yard. . . . Great ceremony was observed in re-
ceiving them, far better than which, was the immense crowd of beautiful women and distinguished citizens who thronged to witness the event. The Princes were by no means of a remarkable appearance, being of low stature and good, but plain, features. . . .

May 19.—Interview with the three Japanese Princes, at their instance. Explained a variety of breech-loading arms.

May 21.—Mr. Ledyard, from State department, called to say that the Prince de Joinville wished to look over the ordnance with me. In the evening called at the Prince’s quarters. . . . He is tall and very thin, a little deaf, and quite bald; speaks English, but with a foreign accent.

May 24, about 10 A.M.—The Prince came down and looked over the several workshops; finally he came to the Ordnance, where he spent most of his time, being much interested in all shown to him. He also stayed at the Battery, patiently enduring delay and the hot sun, not leaving until I concluded fully. He left about 1 P.M., and at 2:30 P.M. the Japanese Princes came, and were taken to see everything, firing and all.

In the evening, dining with the Secretary of State, at a dinner for the Prince, Commander Dahlgren says:

The Prince used each opportunity to renew the conversation with me on topics of Ordnance, the Navy, &c. He is well posted on all professional matters, is very curious about rifled cannon, and attentive in examining the draught of the French Emperor’s cannon,—the first time he had seen it. He did not deny the authorship of the articles in the “Revue de Deux Mondes,” which I mentioned as ascribed to him. Said the French navy was not a natural result, but a necessity, and was only kept in order by unceasing care.

About this time, at the request of the Secretary of State, Commander Dahlgren made out a list of some artillery matters for the Japanese, as presents from the Government, a battery of Howitzers being the chief article. These were sent soon after, and Dahlgren requested by letter that Commodore Wise (who was a son-in-law of
Edward Everett) should take passage in the "Niagara," and deliver the Howitzers in Japan. The "Niagara" left New York June 30, and Commander Wise in her.

The splendid government work of "Perry's Japan Expedition," when Commodore Perry was sent as United States Special Envoy, and Commander-in-Chief of Naval Forces in the East Indian Seas, has among its illustrations, by that clever artist Heine, a very pretty picture (lithographed by E. Brown, Jr.) of the "Debarkation of Dahlgren Boat Howitzers at Simoda, Japan, June 8, 1854."¹

Perhaps, indeed, there may be somewhat of fancy in Heine's sketch, for the pen-and-ink picture that we found in a letter of Commander Wise, who was sent in the "Niagara" to present these Howitzers at this time, is a very different affair. It is true that this recital is made in a friendly letter, and was not intended, when written, to reach either the diplomatic or the public eye. Wise says, Dec. 28, 1860:

On arriving at Yedo, Colonel Ripley and I had an interview with Harris, the Minister, who had already been apprised by the Department of State of the presents sent in the "Niagara," and what disposition was to be made of them. . . . Accordingly we had a grand interview with the Prime Minister, and a good deal of magpie talk generally, the upshot of which was, that they were glad to get the presents, but did not want to receive anybody with them! Some days elapsed, however, before they would name a day or place to receive them from me, in view of a formal transfer at some future time on the part of the Minister, and it was only when the ship threatened to run away with the Staff that they sent junks to receive them.

Then I was taken to a horrid hole, ten or twelve miles down the gulf, and landed on a great half-drained marsh, which I

¹ This lithograph will also be found in this Memoir.
saw was a proving ground,—and welcomed by the two chief ambassadors.

But fancy my feelings, my friend, when I saw all the beautiful ordnance, of which so much care was taken in the manufacture, pitched pell-mell into mud, dirt, and filth, and exposed in dilapidated sheds to sun and rain, and then the boxes knocked to pieces for an inspection of their contents. The whole thing was such an insult that I gave vent to my indignation in no measured terms.

But what vexed me yet more was to find, in a shed hard by, seventeen of your 12-pdr. howitzers boat and field carriages complete, and then to be told that they had one thousand more of the same sort. In fact, I counted forty-six pieces on one fort near the city.

Well, I stood this torture for good ten hours, and during this time I mounted the rifle-gun, and put a lot of their officers through the exercise, in their own language; and, I must say, in less than an hour they handled the piece like a top.

Towards evening they told me that it would be rather dangerous for me to remain longer, as there were bad people on the road back to Yedo, and, as they had received all the instruction they stood in need of, I had better be off. And so off I galloped,—and be damned to them,—with a revolver in my fist, to guard against accidents. . . .

Before I leave these Japan matters, I must tell you what I think will not surprise you, as it is on a piece with the conduct of your cannon-founders at ——. The Messrs —— sold to a large ship-chandler at Hong Kong all the rejected IXm, Xm, and XIm guns, together with those rejected batches of the army, which they had on hand, making about 200 tons, which they disposed of at three cents per pound! The entire lot is now at Macao.

The Chinese would n’t bite, though the price asked is only $140,000. Mr. —— then tried the Japanese, but I put a spoke in that wheel and stopped the negotiation. The owner was extremely anxious for me to strike hands in the matter! He has, he tells me, drawings of all the classes of guns and shells,
furnished by ——, and moreover eight 24-pdr. bronze Dahlgren howitzers!

This letter may be headed "History behind the scenes." Think of an officer and United States Envoy for the delivery of presents to a friendly Power, galloping off with revolver in his fist "to guard against accidents"!

What a commentary on the absurdity of arming against ourselves these semi-civilized countries!

To resume the journal:

Dined at the Bremen Minister's. He gave us some hock of 1624, owned by the city of Bremen, two hundred and thirty-six years old. It was served in little glasses about as large as a thimble, and was quite acid, and far less pleasant than hock of the present day on the table.

Saturday, a soirée at the Dutch Minister's, for the Japanese.¹

On Tuesday, a soirée at Mrs. Slidell's; next day, another at Mrs. Douglas's; and on Thursday I was asked to dine at the Prussian Minister's (the Baron Von Gerolt).

To resume the journal:

June 20. — Dined at Mr. Toombs's. He and the Vice-President, several other friends, and myself remained to chat. Breckenridge said, if he were nominated and elected, it was certain that, being only forty, he would have to make some mark, and would do so. They then reviewed old associations with Douglas,—both having warmly stood by him at Cincinnati in 1856. Now Douglas and they were in exact opposition.

How the nationality of politics vanishes in the expression of individual purposes and opinions!

Monday, July 2. — Touched the first month's pay under the

¹ The writer of these memoirs here recalls an amusing incident connected with this affair. She happened to be conversing with the Secretary of State, General Cass, when the Prince de Joinville arrived. General Cass, in introducing the three Japanese Ambassadors to the French Prince, said, "Your Royal Highness — The Japanese Trinity."
late act for increase to $4,200. It may be well to note that I have been thirty-four years in the Navy, and to this day I have not received one cent above that which was required to pay the expense of a very, very moderate living.

At 6 p.m. cast the heaviest gun which the four furnaces could produce; being the first time all four have been in blast.

*Sept. 14.* — Visited by ———, who represented that he had a complete set of draughts of Armstrong rifled cannon, which were obtained by him in England from ———, who, he said, not being properly paid, took this way of getting more.

He requested me to examine draughts, some ten or twenty in number, which I did, and felt satisfied of their having evidence of authenticity. He also showed a small wooden model of the gun and its field carriage, and a fuze. He told me that it had cost him $5,000 to get these. I told him frankly *that I was opposed to this mode of obtaining information, and never would use it*. I would refer him to the Bureau, and did so. Commodore Smith (acting) took him to the Secretary, who did not know what to do, and so the man went away.

We append a press copy of Commander Dahlgren’s letter written on this occasion. It is a model for the future action of officials of this Republic under similar circumstances.

(Confidential.)

**Ordinance Office, Navy Yard,**

**Washington, Sept. 14, 1860.**

**Commodore Smith, Acting Chief of**

Bureau Ordnance and Hydrography.

Sir,—The bearer of this, Mr. ———, has submitted to me certain propositions, which I have no power to entertain, and therefore refer him to the Navy Department. He has a number of draughts purporting to exhibit the exact dimensions of the Armstrong gun, shell and carriage, which he has obtained from certain parties who are engaged in the fabrication of this kind of artillery at Woolwich.

I am free to confess that I have never given any encourage—
ment to this mode of obtaining information, believing that there is ability in this country to meet any means of offence which another power may bring against us.

But as it is not my province to refuse, or to accept, it is my duty to refer the matter to competent authority.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

Jno. A. Dahlgren,
Commander.

It may not be pleasant to copy the full text of the following record in the "Memoranda," but it is due to a full understanding of the various difficulties that John Dahlgren had to meet and overcome. We give the record as we find it.

Monday, Sept. 24.—A white day in the history of ordnance. Captain — left the Bureau of Ordnance to take command of the "Richmond."

It would be difficult to find a man more unfit for a duty which he desired to perform fully and honestly. All progress was impossible, and this at a time when England and France were engaged in unprecedented efforts to improve their ordnance, particularly by introducing rifled cannon. I made a written request in 1856 to prosecute this question, and forwarded the draught of a rifled 100-pdr. The matter having then no seeming importance, Captain — would not listen to it. He did not even answer my letter, nor would he permit me to move in the matter until the surprising results of Armstrong were astonishing the public mind. Then he said I might try one or two pieces!

He made also a blunder of less importance in reducing the calibre of our naval musketry in the new arms.

He quickly came to a resolution, upon the most imperfect grounds, and was then most inflexible in adhering to it. His fear of expenditure was a real disease. Such another instance can hardly exist.

He was very quiet in his manner, and always gentlemanly, industrious, and of strict integrity. It will be difficult, how-
ever, to repair his blunder in rifled cannon. He is succeeded by Captain Magruder.

A few weeks later and Washington was occupied with the festivities given on the arrival of the Prince of Wales. We give this little sketch from the Memoranda, which says of H. R. H.: —

The expression of face was always quiet and hardly varied. At times in speaking it might have inclined to a disposition to be pleasant, but that was all which imparted the least change to the fixed gravity of the features. In fact, they were dull, never animated; nor was there anything to indicate intellect above the common order. Without being haughty, the Prince seemed to have the power of chilling any approach to cordiality. The Duke of Newcastle is a fine-looking man, of large make,—head and body,—with plenty of reddish hair and beard, looking the regular Saxon. He and the rest of the noblemen seemed clever men, without being superior to our own high officials.

Oct. 13. — A visit from Governor Floyd, Secretary of War, with General Johnson. They talked over guns and all kinds of things. He has a rifled breech-loading gun that he wishes me to try. I transmitted to him sketches of the big Rodman gun and of the XIth, with a letter to show identity of model, and my claim to the origin of the model.

Oct. 31. — Governor Floyd down again.

In the mean time the election of President Lincoln caused the threatened resistance of the South to take substantial form in South Carolina, and the excitement went on increasing steadily.

Dec. 7, the Memoranda notes: —

1 The truth of this became obvious six months later, when the rebellion broke out. Rifled cannon were loudly demanded; we had none. Were obliged to put into service the crudest experiments. They burst, killed our men, and but for the excellence of my IXth and XIth cannon, the evil might have been irremediable. — J. A. D., April, 1870.
Fine practice at 2,000 yards, of eleven shells. Nine hit direct in twenty square yards and one on ricochet, while the last passed over so close as to cut off the screen pole, twenty inches above the screen. Three others, — one hit direct, and two on ricochet. This decided the superiority of my rifled guns and shells over any other muzzle-loaders, and practically they are equal to the breech-loaders.

Dec. 12 the journal notes: —

I understand that Captain Dyer claimed the plan of fixing on trunnions eighteen months ago, which would be June, 1859. Now, the first of the kind was cast here, March 2, 1859, and the mould, patterns, &c., had to be prepared.

We note this especially, because in all inventions priority of claim is of the utmost importance.

In December, 1860, Commander Dahlgren made a "Report on Rifled Cannon and the Armament of Ships of War." This was transmitted by the Secretary of the Navy to the House of Representatives, and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs, and ordered to be printed. (36th Congress, 2d Session, Ex. Doc. No. 43.) It gave some of the results of trials made with two classes of rifled cannon, and finally says: —

I beg leave to close by saying that the conclusions here arrived at are not to be understood to favor so radical a change as the entire replacement of the present smooth-bored guns by rifled cannon of any kind. This is a question that will need careful experience before proceeding so far, particularly in regard to the probable distances proper for decisive firing. So far as accuracy is concerned, the IXth. and XIth. shells will compare well with rifled shells, at least to the distance of 1,300 yards.

If sea officers feel that this distance is likely to be exceeded, I could not venture to say how much further the accuracy of round shells is to be relied on. But in practising at 2,000 yards with rifled cannon, I have been forcibly impressed with the
exceedingly nice adjustment of every condition required in order to strike a target whose distance was known to a foot. And I am sure that in sea service no profitable end could be obtained by firing at the largest ship if distant 2,000 yards; occasional shot or shells might strike, but there could be no certainty thereof, and the practice could not be decisive.

The penetrating power is a different matter. The rifled projectile has it far beyond any round projectile ever used at sea; but for the same reason it passes through an object with far less shock, and in that respect is, therefore, inferior to the round projectile, as it most certainly is in ricochet. The suggestions which I now beg leave to submit to the Bureau may be summed thus:—

1st. Mount on every gun-deck armed with IX in. guns, four rifled cannon of VI in., throwing shot of 80 pounds, referred to in this report, and on every spar-deck two of like class.

2d. The rifled cannon of V in. (50-pdr.) may be mounted in batteries carrying guns of less than IX in. calibre.

3d. Every vessel entitled to have more than one boat howitzer, to have one rifled 12-pdr. of 800 pounds.

4th. Two more furnaces to be put up in the Ordnance foundry, so as to allow of the casting of the heaviest rifled cannon.

5th. An additional supply of iron, to enable the execution of these suggestions.

This report was soon succeeded by another on the "Armature of Ships of War with reference to their powers of resistance of rifled and other projectiles," which was also referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs, and ordered to be printed. (36th Congress, 2d Session, Ex. Doc. No. 25.)

Commander Dahlgren mentions in this report that in 1852 he affirmed to the Bureau "the possibility of guarding vessels against the dangerous action of heavy shells." He says:—
The means that I requested to complete the data necessary for the design of the armature not being furnished, and no notice being taken of any suggestions, the opportunity was lost to this country of initiating one of the most important inventions that has occurred in naval affairs, the idea of which was suggested by Paixhans in 1825.

The introduction of new and very powerful ordnance by the United States Navy in 1854 undoubtedly led foreign powers to the effort to obtain even more powerful pieces, and the rifled cannon are now about to share a place with the smooth bores, if they do not replace them entirely. It was natural that the defence should be desired to proceed pari passu with the offence, and metallic armature has been adopted.

He then repeats the propositions made in 1852, namely,—

1st. Use an iron ribbing externally, with such stowage of coal within as the ship permits; using also an interior arrangement of thin plates calculated to give a harmless direction to projectiles, that is, from vital parts.

2d. These cannot prevent the entrance of shot, but they can be made to nullify shells, either by direct fracture, if round, or by glancing them, if from rifled cannon.

3d. Such armature need not exceed in weight one half that of the present ship, and thus add some five hundred tons to the capacity for coal, thereby doubling that now carried.

If rifled projectiles are, however, introduced into the batteries of ships, this form of armature will no doubt be less effectual, and I therefore have now suggested the addition of interior plates, so that the projectiles which may reach them shall be diverted from the more vital parts, and the inner bulkheads of the bunkers can be made to serve this purpose.

If, however, the ribbing should be found to be useless against the rifled projectile, then I propose to substitute a system of smooth plates, corrugated or grooved, so as to take advantage of the glancing property of the rifled shot or shell.

Although his views were enforced as far as possible, yet Commander Dahlgren was incapable of any jealousy
of the progress made by others. He says in a letter to the editor of the "Scientific American," dated April 16, 1861:

There is full room for everybody in the settlement of the rifle cannon question, and all I desire is to see the Government in possession of the best method, whatever that may be, or from whomsoever it may come.

No good can come from partial views. The truth will in the end prevail.

It will be perceived by the extract given from the document on the armature of ships, that if the advice of Commander Dahlgren had been followed we should have commenced the construction of plated ships in 1852. Who can measure what a vast power in this direction might have been reached through successive experiment, and what fortunate results brought to bear upon the conflict at arms that so soon after took place?

In 1860 Captain Dahlgren proposed to print a book under the title of "Ships and Forts," a work under one cover and with two subjects,—one, the drill of heavy guns, recording some facts in relation to heavy ordnance; and the other portion to serve as an appendix, to record the gallant exploit of the attack on the Barrier forts by our Navy, that it might receive that measure of justice in history which was denied it at the time by the United States Government. These manuscript notes are endorsed:

_Nearly ready for the printer. Progress interrupted by the Rebellion._

It is with the writer a matter of consideration whether to publish these notes in their unfinished state, or to let their purpose and purport fail altogether in that silence which at present entombs them. Probably they will
yet see the light at no distant day, as the considerations they present cannot be without interest, at least to Navy men.

Commander Dahlgren writes to General Borman, the distinguished Belgian artillerist, Feb. 5, 1861, thanking him for a copy of his book on Shrapnel, and he adds: —

Also for the handsome manner in which you are pleased to speak of my labors, for your opinion must everywhere be recognized as the highest authority. Since I wrote you last, my time has been much occupied with attempts to solve the problem of rifled cannon, which I prefer to do by loading at the muzzle, believing that for the present it is of primary importance to habituate seamen to the least difficult system. Whether the common opinions of professional men will in the end incline to muzzle or breech-loading, is not easily to be conjectured.

There is no doubt that the greater precision is attainable by the breech-loader, but whether the advantage in this respect can be made to compensate for the disadvantages of complication in use and difficulty of manufacture, or will, indeed, be of practical importance, I am at this time unable to admit.

The heavy rifled cannon which I have designed prove to be capable of placing their shells within an area equivalent to a square of 17 feet at 2,000 yards, and \( \frac{2}{5} \) lbs. of the number in 12\( \frac{1}{2} \) feet square.

And so far as concerns practice at a ship in motion, I am sure that the most exact accuracy in flight would not produce military effect beyond 2,000 yards, and even for this distance the most favorable circumstances would be needed. I find my rifled 12-pdr. howitzer also very effective, so that we are prepared to introduce light and heavy rifled guns into our navy.

Speaking of the question of smooth and rifled cannon, he says: —

So little having been determined with regard to the preferable mode of armoring ships, there will necessarily exist, as
already observed, much difference of opinion and practice as to the ordnance that will be most serviceable.

This would be reduced to very narrow limits were it possible to decide intelligently upon the claims of smooth and rifled cannon. But the obviously unperfected condition of the latter interposes an obstacle to a fair consideration of its merits, which the ingenuity of very clever men has long been exerted upon without complete success.

1st. The rifle shot when moving correctly is the more accurate to first graze, though not materially so at moderate distances,—say 1,300 to 1,500 yards. Beyond a mile its advantage in this respect is very marked. But after encountering any object its deflections are of the most erratic description, and it generally tumbles over so as to nullify its force, and render its subsequent direction beyond conjecture. . . .

A glance at the forms which this arm has assumed in different countries shows the great variety of solutions that the problem is capable of, and may possibly indicate some difficulty in uniting all the qualities desired in one piece.

Speaking of his ordnance future, and his expectation to produce, at no distant day, a rifled gun of unquestioned power, he laments that the progress was entirely interrupted by the events of the war. He says in the same notes:—

The war found me getting along very well, but entirely unprepared to launch iron rifled cannon into service, and yet they were needed immediately.

And in this connection he adds:—

There is no royal road to science, and time with labor will be as much needed as they have been in all human undertakings.

The questions now pending are to obtain a gun which will pierce the armor of any ship, or an armor that will resist any shot. Both we cannot have.

In a letter written in 1863 he says:—
I have never made known the real principles of my cannon. Some day I will do so. They will be found curious and simple.

This written admission reminds us of a conversation in which we once asked Admiral Dahlgren, "What was the specific thought which led you to invent your cannon?" To which he replied: "I observed a law of nature, and making a mathematical application of it, made a gun which was an invention, and in no wise a result of experiment. But some day I will explain." This was a passing conversation made during a walk, and our woman's curiosity being at the moment quite satisfied, the subject was never again alluded to.

Our impression at the time was, that he intended to explain to us at a more opportune moment, and in as full a manner as we were capable of comprehending, that particular law which had led him to adopt a certain basis for mathematical computation, and create a scientific adaptation which must lead to unerring results.
CHAPTER X.


We have now traced the course of the invention of the Dahlgren ordnance and its acceptance into the Navy; but, with the exception of the light artillery, no battle test had as yet proved the heavy cannon. But this ultimate proof was soon given, in the rapid march of events, hurried on by the civil war which had now burst upon the country. The recital of the contest between the "Merrimac" and the "Monitor" is historical and well known, and yet we think that Admiral Dahlgren's notes upon this first battle test of his heavy guns may also have a place. He says:

March 8, 1862.—The defence has been gradually making slow way against ordnance; but the events of this day will definitely shape the future in such matters.

Our squadron had been quietly occupying Hampton Roads since the insurrection, without dispute or the prospect of it.

Meanwhile rumor from day to day reported that the frigate "Merrimac," which it was supposed we had destroyed on retiring from the Norfolk Navy Yard, was being cut down and plated with iron. Notwithstanding it had been recently said also that the project had failed because the plates applied were too heavy, still the work was believed to be in progress. We had also been preparing some iron-plated batteries, and the readiness of one of them probably precipitated the catastrophe.
About 1 p.m. of this day the "Merrimac" was seen coming down from Norfolk, and was signalled by the "Congress" and "Cumberland," lying at Newport News. The "Minnesota" was near Fort Monroe, and also the "Roanoke." Transports and a fleet of small craft were about.

Two light steamers, "Jamestown" and "Yorktown," coming down the James River, joined the "Merrimac," and the three steamed straight for the two ships at Newport News.

Being calm, and they only sailers, these ships could only abide the attack. Brushing the "Congress," the "Merrimac" went directly at the "Cumberland," and struck her twice. She began to sink. Then the "Merrimac" opened her battery on the "Congress," and soon compelled her surrender. The continued fire of the vessels was of no avail; their shot and shells poured from their guns and fell harmlessly on her. The "Merrimac" now turned her attention to the "Minnesota," which, having grounded in attempting to approach her, lay exposed to fair fire. The "Roanoke," having a broken shaft, could not move. The "Merrimac," however, as the day closed, did not pursue her opportunity further, but returned toward Norfolk. It was about this time that Mr. Fox, Assistant Secretary of Navy, who had come to examine in person if there was any reason to expect the "Merrimac," had full evidence of the fact.

The prospect was dismal enough, as darkness set in, and there seemed no help for the "Roanoke" or the "Minnesota." The day following, it was supposed, would witness their destruction and the dispersion of our naval force at Old Point, with the most fatal consequences to the garrison and the transports.

But there was a little speck on the waters no bigger than a man's hand that was to repel the great disaster and blast the new hopes of the Confederates just as its consummation seemed inevitable. The "Monitor," on her way from New York to the Potomac, heard the firing, and put into the Roads.

She was a new and untried experiment, so low in the water as to show to the eye only a small tower, in which were two of my XIth guns.
Sunday morning came, and the "Merrimac," in the pride of conscious strength, appeared on the scene, once more after her prey. One, two shots at the "Minnesota," aground and helpless, and out from the crowd of transports moved the newcomer, a mere speck, like a hat afloat on the surface of the water. Unnoticed she pursued her way towards the "Merrimac," and when not far off called her attention by one and then another shot. The "Merrimac," surprised by this challenge, seemed to pause in order to make sure of what the strange apparition was, and then turned on her. It was now about 8 o'clock, and the conflict between these strange combatants lasted till noon, when the "Merrimac" withdrew, none in our vessels being able to say whether injured or not. The "Monitor" was certainly uninjured. The distance between the vessels varied from twenty to two hundred or three hundred yards, and both vessels being constantly in motion, the "Merrimac" endeavoring to get a fair blow with her beak at her tormentor, which the latter constantly eluded by being pivoted more readily, and in turn made every effort to strike the screw of the "Merrimac."

The firing was incessant, and the loud taps from the armor certified to the shot having struck. The iron casing of the "Monitor" was scarred, but nothing more, and her commander was nearly blinded by the explosion of a shell at the slit just as he was looking through it. No other personal damage was done to any one in the "Monitor." Several thought that the "Merrimac" was pierced in three places by the XIIth shot of the "Monitor," but others thought not.

So the Confederates were balked of their long-looked-for triumph just as it seemed inevitable. If the "Merrimac" could have succeeded, she could have scathed every one of our naval positions, and had access to all our ports where the draught of water was sufficient.

As a biographer, we have now to revert, with reluctance indeed, and with a painful sense of the entirely inadequate manner in which we are at all qualified to present it, to a subject about which Admiral Dahlgren always felt greatly aggrieved.
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We allude to the similarity of model which, to the day of his death, he never ceased to claim, between the Rodman XVth gun and his XIth shell gun.

Had Admiral Dahlgren lived long enough to fulfil his own wishes in this regard, he would have brought this matter to a more practical issue than even the protests which he addressed from time to time to the War Department.

Our desire and aim is to present a clear record to his right of invention, and to preserve for him in history all that he claimed during life to be his due.

Of course, our entire inability to discuss, or present even, in our own language, any scientific exposition of an ordnance subject, must greatly mar the amplitude and absolute clearness of proof which Admiral Dahlgren could so readily have brought to bear on this subject.

One comfort exists in the fact, that, after all, to the non-professional reader must in great part the verdict of the future be left, and if we cannot present the proofs of the inventor with that entire precision which such proof demands, we can at least, by adhering closely to the fragmentary notes of the Admiral on this subject, not deviate from truth. The letters of Admiral Dahlgren to the War Department (press copies of which we have) on this matter, and some of the remarks of the inventor, must form the substance, then, of what can at this day be published, to uphold the claim of infringement of model. And in justice, this is due to the inventor.

The following protest was sent to the War Department, submitting claim to model:—
The Honorable John B. Floyd, Secretary of War.

I enclose herewith two sketches, which I respectfully submit to your consideration.

One is a photograph of the large cannon now under trial near Fortress Monroe, taken while in this city.

The other is an outline on tracing paper of the XI\textsuperscript{th} gun used in the Navy, and designed by me.

It will be seen by placing the latter on the photograph that the similarity of model is so close as to make the external form practically identical, except that the XI\textsuperscript{th} is longer by about a calibre.

The appendages at the breech for the purpose of elevation differ, but these ought to have no concern with the disposition of the metal that alone is to give the required capacity of endurance.

Part of the breech is necessarily merged in these additions, but the curve of the portions which are left to view coincide, and indicate what the nature of the remaining part would be if fully developed.

If the value of the model used in the XI\textsuperscript{th} and other calibres of inferior size had not been so clearly and indisputably established, I might have abstained from giving you the trouble of listening to the appeal I now make to you.

One instance will suffice. At Boston, when a number of cannon were cast (1857) by the same founder, from the same stock of iron, in the same furnaces, and in all respects treated alike. Some of these were Columbiads for the Army, of VIII\textsuperscript{th} bore for 65 lbs. shot; the remainder were IX\textsuperscript{th} guns for the Navy for 72 lbs. shells, of model similar to that of the XI\textsuperscript{th}. The eight Columbiads were fired with charges of 10 lbs. and shells of 51 lbs. One burst at the 176th fire, a second cracked at the 180th fire, and a third burst at the 40th fire. Two IX\textsuperscript{th} guns were tried. One of them was fired with 10 lbs. charges and shells of 72 lbs. It remained whole after 1,500 fires. Another IX\textsuperscript{th} gun endured 1,500 fires of the same kind, and was then burst by 22 proof charges, beginning with one shot of
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90 lbs., and so increasing to the last, which was 20 lbs. of powder and ten shot, weighing together 903 lbs.

It was believed that the quality of the powder might have had some influence, but the last Columbiad was fired with Dupont’s powder, similar to that used in the Navy, for service or for proof, and was taken from the stock in the Naval magazine, while another IX" at Bellona, proved also with the Dupont powder, was not burst by 1,000 fires.

A statement of the proofs at Boston occurs in the Artillerist’s Manual by Gibbou (p. 100), issued seemingly with the approval of the War Department.

The introductory paragraph runs thus: “As if to completely demonstrate that in the form lay the defect of the pieces, an incident occurred some time ago at Boston, when an opportunity was offered by comparing the two forms of the Army Columbiads and Navy shell guns, &c.”

Subsequently, the model of the Columbiad was changed, as Mr. Gibbon says, becoming more that of the model of the IX" and XI" guns (p. 70).

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

Your obdt. servant,

JOHN A. DAHLGREN,
Com’d’r. in charge of Ord. Dept. in Yard.

This letter, as will be seen, refers solely to the identity of model between the Dahlgren XI" gun and the XV" gun of Rodman.

A paper in reply to this communication was addressed by Captain Rodman, of the Ordnance Corps of the Army, to General Ripley, and was transmitted to Captain Dahlgren through the War Department. This communication was in turn replied to by Captain Dahlgren, in a letter addressed to the Secretary of War. We give some portions of the text.

The long interval elapsing shows the engrossing nature of the public duties which filled up Admiral Dahlgren’s time at this period, and with him all pri-
vate interests were made to yield to the public wel-
fare.

(Copy.)

ORDNANCE OFFICE, NAVY YARD,
WASHINGTON, March 21, 1863.

The Honorable EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

Sir,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a
paper by Captain Rodman, dated September, 1861, in reply to
my communication to the War Department, dated October 13,
1860, and addressed to the Ordnance Branch of the Navy
Department.

Captain Rodman's reply did not reach me before the 20th
November, 1861, and the continued occupation of my time since
then, by public duties, has prevented me from giving that atten-
tion to the subject which I desired.

A reference to my letter of October, 1860, will show that the
similarity which I claimed to exist substantially between my
model and that of Captain Rodman's XV\textsuperscript{in} gun was believed
to be exhibited by comparison of a photograph of the XV\textsuperscript{in} gun
with a sketch of the XI\textsuperscript{in} on like scale.

Captain Rodman denies the alleged resemblance, and is of
opinion that the distortion to which photographs are liable, and
the smallness of the scale of the one in particular, have misled
me (which he considerately speaks of as my misfortune). In
order to put this beyond doubt, he favors me with a draught of
his XV\textsuperscript{in} gun on a full scale, accompanied by another of my
XI\textsuperscript{in} gun on the same dimensions.

His paper also contains the dimensions of both pieces, ex-
pressed numerically to the second place of decimals.

It is from the data thus supplied by Captain Rodman that I
now propose to sustain the claims set forth in my letter of
October, 1860. The manner in which Captain Rodman has
contrasted the two guns is very well calculated to show that, if
two pieces of ordnance were to be made after the two designs,
throwing projectiles of equal diameters, the gun made after the
XV\textsuperscript{in} gun would be more bulky than that made after the XI\textsuperscript{in}.

Whereas the real question at issue between us, as stated
briefly but distinctly in my first letter, is whether the propor-
tions, distribution, and form of the metal were so nearly similar
in the two guns as to make their exterior form substantially identical.

And that this is the case, will appear, I believe, from another disposition of the facts which Captain Rodman himself puts at my disposal.

The drawing annexed\textsuperscript{1} represents two guns after the form of the $XV^\text{im}$ and the $XI^\text{im}$, having the diameter at the base ring of the latter (A) equal to that of the corresponding diameter of the $XV^\text{im}$.

From which it will appear that there is, 1st, absolute coincidence of four other diameters situated at as many distances along the lengths of the two guns, whilst the diameter of the Rodman gun at its muzzle again approaches so closely that of the $XI^\text{im}$ that if its lines were continued about $\frac{1}{4}$ calibres, there would be still another coincidence.

Expressed numerically, these coincidences will be (assuming the dimensions of the $XI^\text{im}$ gun)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distances</th>
<th>Radii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0. (A)</td>
<td>15.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.30</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55.35</td>
<td>12.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74.49</td>
<td>10.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119.79</td>
<td>8.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2d. The diameters between these coinciding diameters are alternately greater or less in one gun than in the other, but vary so little as not to cause the general form of the two guns to differ.

The precise form of the breech cannot be so well contrasted, because in both guns it is more or less concealed by the appendages needed for the elevating apparatus; but so far as it does appear, there is no essential divergence of the one from the other, though it is probable that, if fully defined, apart from the disc of the $XV^\text{im}$ one and the cascabel of the $XI^\text{im}$, the base of the former might be somewhat flatter than that of the latter.

The $XI^\text{im}$ is also proportionally longer than the $XV^\text{im}$, and has a slight swell at the muzzle.

\textsuperscript{1} See note on next page.
These, however, do not affect the resemblance which the form of the XV<sub>in</sub> has to that of the XI<sub>in</sub>.  

And with the coincidences of dimension and of general surface, just indicated, it may also be observed that when the piece referred to above as drawn after Rodman's XV<sub>in</sub> is not bored, but is divested of its extraneous appendages, such as trunnions, cascabel, &c., and extended to the length of the XI<sub>in</sub>, its weight (computed) is 17,900 lbs., whilst that of the XI<sub>in</sub>, similarly treated, is 18,130 lbs., the difference between them (amounting to $1\frac{1}{4}$ per cent) not being greater than occurs sometimes between cannon cast from the same pattern and at the same foundry.

If I have been correct in alleging these coincidences in proportion, surface, and mass, impartial persons will judge how far I was justified in the claim, asserted by my letter of October, 1860, "that the similarity of model in the Rodman XV<sub>in</sub> is so close to that of my XI<sub>in</sub> as to make the external form of the two practically identical."

So much for the resemblance which the model of the XV<sub>in</sub> bears to that of my XI<sub>in</sub>.

I now desire to call the attention of the Department to a passage in Captain Rodman's letter, which reads thus: "The model of the XV<sub>in</sub> differs much less from that of the Army model than it does from that of Commander Dahlgren, yet I am not aware that any one has ever claimed identity of model in these guns."

Annexed<sup>1</sup> are the outlines of the Rodman XV<sub>in</sub>, my XI<sub>in</sub>, and the Army model, reduced from the draughts transmitted by Captain Rodman to the scale of the unit-diameter at or about the base ring.

Departing from this point (A) the lines of the three guns are nearly identical at the most important diameters where the greatest strain occurs, embracing the region around the charge.

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<sup>1</sup> Diagram No. 2. We do not find these diagrams annexed. They were sent with the letter, of which this is a copy, to the War Department. But the chain of reasoning seems to us quite intelligible, without consulting the annexes. Those who are disposed to consult the original can, doubtless, find the letter on file — from its date — with the diagrams attached for explicit reference. — M. V. D.
IDENTITY OF MODEL USED BY RODMAN.

Thus they continue to B, where the XV\textsuperscript{m} and the Army model proceed in a parallel course at no material distance from each other, while the XI\textsuperscript{m}, diverging decidedly from both, is joined at C by the line of the Army model, which it crosses and subsequently unites with the XV\textsuperscript{m} at D. Crossing this also, it diverges to no material extent from the XV\textsuperscript{m}, and again unites with it at E.

The line of the Army model, having passed outside of both the others, runs nearly parallel with the XV\textsuperscript{m} for the whole length of the chase, but at a material distance from it, while the XI\textsuperscript{m}, after uniting with the XV\textsuperscript{m} at two points of the chase D and E, pursues a direction nearly mean to the lines of the Army model and the XV\textsuperscript{m}.

In the formation of the base of the breech so far as disclosed, the divergence of the Army model from the XV\textsuperscript{m} and XI\textsuperscript{m} is still more decided.

From this it would appear that the model of the XV\textsuperscript{m} gun does not differ less from that of the Army model than it does from mine — . . . .

And if this Army model is that of the gun described in Captain Rodman's book (p. 131, &c.) as having been "modelled in close conformity with his theory" and experiments, and if the model of the XI\textsuperscript{m} is so entirely dissimilar from that of the XV\textsuperscript{m}, what becomes of any similitude at all between the X\textsuperscript{m} of 1858 and the XV\textsuperscript{m}, both by Captain Rodman? There must be two theories, or else one admitting of very latitudinous results; and if to the extent exhibited by the X\textsuperscript{m} of 1858, and the XV\textsuperscript{m} of 1860, why, then the model of the XI\textsuperscript{m} cannot be excluded from the benefit of the theory, because it lies between the two, and is nearer to the XV\textsuperscript{m} than to the X\textsuperscript{m}.

So much for the relative resemblance between these guns.

Now, as regards the resemblance that might appear between that model of 1858 and my own models, it has not been quite so distant as to be altogether unobserved. Captain Rodman will find at page 70 of the "Artillerist's Manual" the following remark: "The form of the Columbiad, too, has changed, becoming more that of Dahlgren's gun, with little or no swell at the muzzle, and no chamber."

The author of the work is an officer of the U. S. Artillery,
and the manner in which he has executed his task is intrinsic evidence of its merit, apart from the official sanction which it has.

Since receiving Captain Rodman's letter of September, 1861, in reply to mine, I have had an opportunity of becoming acquainted with other guns designed by Captain Rodman,—an VIII\textsuperscript{m} and a X\textsuperscript{m}, intended, I believe, as substitutes for Columbiads of that calibre, and, it is to be supposed, as improvements; for, under the circumstances, change infers improvement.

Annexed\footnote{Diagram No. 3.} are the outlines of my XI\textsuperscript{m} and Captain Rodman's XV\textsuperscript{m} and VIII\textsuperscript{m} Columbiad, reduced to the unit of a principal diameter at the base on a scale of \(\frac{1}{4}\).

On examining these outlines, it will be seen that, starting from the unit-diameter at the base (A), where the three lines diverge, that of the XV\textsuperscript{m} is intermediate to the XI\textsuperscript{m} and the VIII\textsuperscript{m} until the two former unite soon after at B; thence to a point in advance of the charge (C), where all three, having approached gradually, again unite and continue nearly coincident for about half a calibre, when they separate, the line of the VIII\textsuperscript{m} running intermediate to the XI\textsuperscript{m} and the XV\textsuperscript{m}, and joining the XI\textsuperscript{m} at D.

From this point the XI\textsuperscript{m} becomes intermediate to the lines of the two Rodman guns, until it coincides with the XV\textsuperscript{m} nearly at the insertion of the chase (E). Thence the XV\textsuperscript{m} is intermediate to the VIII\textsuperscript{m} and the XI\textsuperscript{m}, joining the XI\textsuperscript{m} at F. The XI\textsuperscript{m} now passes between the VIII\textsuperscript{m} and XV\textsuperscript{m} and unites with the VIII\textsuperscript{m} (G). From this point along the chase the line of the VIII\textsuperscript{m} pursues a mean course between the XI\textsuperscript{m} and the XV\textsuperscript{m}, gradually approaching and uniting with the XI\textsuperscript{m} at the termination of the XV\textsuperscript{m} (H).

So far as the two models of Captain Rodman are concerned, the VIII\textsuperscript{m} separates from the XV\textsuperscript{m} after departing from the diameter at C, and never unites with it along the whole extent of the pieces; whereas the XI\textsuperscript{m} afterwards unites with one of the Rodman models (VIII\textsuperscript{m}) in three places (D, G, H), and with the other (XV\textsuperscript{m}) in two places (E, F).

I think it does appear, from an examination of the outlines...
of these three pieces, that the mode of construction adopted by Captain Rodman exhibits greater variations in the exterior of his gun than exists between my model and either of his. Hence the idea is inadmissible that his theory and conclusions require such precision in outline as to preclude resemblance unless there exists exact or perfect coincidence.

Nor do I see that Captain Rodman binds himself to any such rigorous law.

1st. After deducing certain proportions by a most elaborate process based upon some very minute experiments, Captain Rodman in the most summary manner disposes of the exterior of the whole chase of the XV\textsuperscript{m} gun by the addition of no inconsiderable amount of metal at that part, without the intervention even, or a reason in the shape of a coefficient, that most indulgent and flexible mathematical element.

2d. The breech is disposed of much after the same fashion, for after directing that it is to be “cylindrical from (maximum radius) R back to the curve of the breech,” it appears that it is not so in the XV\textsuperscript{m}, VIII\textsuperscript{m}, or X\textsuperscript{m}, the three guns designed by Captain Rodman, but only in the X\textsuperscript{m} of 1858.

3d. A like indefiniteness is observed in the dimension assigned in the “report” for thickness at the breech.

In one place (page 89) Captain Rodman states this should not be less than 1\$\frac{1}{2}\$ calibres.

In another place (page 131) a gun stated to be in close conformity with his theory, particularly at that part, is 1\$\frac{3}{4}\$ calibres thick.

And in a third place (page 154) nothing is obtained beyond 1\$\frac{1}{4}\$ calibres, and 1\$\frac{3}{4}\$ calibres would be safe as a rule.

It may readily be conceived that when a calibre may be a foot or more, any uncertainty (or latitude) to the extent of a fourth of this quantity is rather inconsistent with such precision of formula.

And without any intent at this time to discuss the experiments or formula of Captain Rodman, I cannot avoid objecting to the use of experiments specially made to fix the thickness at the breech,\textsuperscript{1} because those belonging to the regular series were

\textsuperscript{1} Page 153.
productive of other dimensions, which, if carried into practice, might have been, to say the least, singular!

4th. The individual results\(^1\) vary too much to permit of a mean suitable for a formula carried to such rigorous precision.

I cannot but believe that even this brief course of remark will show that the resemblance between my model and Captain Rodman's XV\(\text{m}^{\text{m}}\), as claimed in the letter of October, 1860, is sustained, which is the main purpose of the previous letter which I addressed to the War Department.

In addition to these letters sustaining his claim as to similarity of model, it is wished to add from the notes of Admiral Dahlgren some considerations which may be received as explanatory. He writes:

*May* 18, 1860.—Rodman's large gun, called the Floyd, is announced as completed and about to be forwarded to Fort Monroe. How far does the model of this piece conform to that of my own?

*Jan.* 31, 1859.—I happened accidentally into the Army Bureau of Ordnance, where Major Rodman was looking at a draught of the gun as proposed to be made. He asked my attention to it, and observed, "This is something of a cross." I answered, "It is the thing itself!" He then pointed out the differences, which, I observed, amounted to nothing. There also appeared a notice in the "Constitution" of the purposed design, which was described as a combination of the Columbiad and the Dahlgren.

1st. Now the model of the gun is essentially that of the Navy gun, except the chamber.

2d. That the model has been proved to be capable of giving the greatest endurance where that of the Columbiad failed, the metal being similar. When the Bureau accepted the IX\(\text{m}^{\text{m}}\) and XI\(\text{m}^{\text{m}}\) models, they did not accept the conditions with which those models were coupled, but ordered the guns to be cast in the usual way, and this was done against my repeated protests; repeated unavailingly until the bursting of a Columbiad gave

\(^1\) Page 153.
IDENTITY OF MODEL USED BY RODMAN. 265

sufficient force to my voice to assure due attention. When the extreme proofs which I had so persistently urged were at last acceded to, the results corroborated or sustained my protest.

3d. The Rodman method of casting has not been able to give any endurance with certainty to the model of the Columbiad.

4th. In changing the form of the Columbiad so as to approach my own, endurance was obtained. The first proposition, dimension and outline will prove.

The second was sustained by the proof at Boston, as stated in official reports, and quoted by Gibbon.

The trials at Pittsburgh prove the third statement.

Gibbon proves the fourth.

The gun having been submitted to proof, its endurance is shown to be due to model, while its want of endurance is due to other conditions, which neither the model nor the mode of casting can prevent.

When the hollow mode of casting was applied with the old model of Columbiad, as in 1849 and 1851, out of four guns, three were utterly worthless and failed to go beyond 250 rounds, but when the model and casting of the gun were made according to my judgment to follow my own model in its essential parts, then the hollow gun proved of extraordinary strength, and, stranger still, the solid gun also could not burst; so that the endurance in both modes of casting evidently depended on the model. Conclusive as this would seem to be, still I do not wish to be understood as denying that the method of cooling has its merits, but only that this is not of itself conclusive. The predominating idea with Captain Rodman in regard to the question at issue seems to be that it is to be treated as a matter of dimension, whereas the real question between us, as stated briefly but distinctly in my first letter, is whether the proportions, distribution, and form of this metal were so nearly similar in the two guns as to make the model of his gun practically identical to or with mine. Similarity of form, or model, has no connection whatever with size. . . .

Captain Rodman has proffered a test of comparative endurance between his gun and mine. I think it may be readily understood, that so long as I claim the model it could hardly
be expected that I would assent to a comparison until this was decided.

Still there are some means of arriving at an opinion. The Bureau authorized trials in 1849–1851, Captain Rodman having proposed to cast guns by cooling them. It will be observed that no attempt was then made at new model. Captain Rodman limited himself solely to the process of founding, and yet at that time my model was actually represented in iron. In July, 1856, the effort was renewed by casting two X\textsuperscript{th} Columbiads in pairs. As before, the solid gun was wretched, and the hollow one no better. . . . The models were again, as before, the old Columbiad. So that Captain Rodman offered no notice of this important fact, though by this time our new ships were showing my models in all their peculiarities.

In July, 1857, Captain Rodman entered upon his next experience. These guns gave better promise, and singularly coincident with this was the fact of a slight modification of the old model.

1st. So that it appears that so long as the old model was adhered to, three of four hollow guns were worthless.

2d. That the solid were also worthless, though more so in degree.

3d. That with the new model, both solid and hollow became of unequalled endurance.

4th. Whether the "slightly changed" should be classed as accidental, or due to the results of change, cannot be said, so that

1st. It will be seen that so long as Captain Rodman adhered closely to the old model he made no headway.

2d. A slight deviation gave good results.

3d. And the new model placed the gun, whether solid or hollow, beyond question. Captain Rodman himself says (p. 181): "It is believed to be mainly to the difference in model that the difference in endurance of these guns is to be attributed."

I have always considered the revised Columbiad as an imitation of the essential points of my own gun. . . . In 1857, after the comparative merits of the VIII\textsuperscript{th} Columbiad and the IX\textsuperscript{th} gun were unintentionally made so apparent, a board of officers, if I am informed correctly, was convened to revise the models
of the Columbiads, the result of which is seen in the removal of the most objectionable features of the Columbiad, and thereby approaching the form of my gun. Lieutenant Gibson says: "In 1860 the form of the Columbiad, too, has changed, becoming more that of the Dahlgren gun." To this officer was confided the instruction at West Point, and the work was circulated by authority.

In my book on "Shells and Shell Guns," it is stated that my aim was to produce the greatest power with the greatest endurance from a given mass of metal, and the manner in which that was effected is shown by the drawing of the gun. ... I should rather say, that my object was to have a strain proportionate at the different parts.

I have never published the processes by which I arrive at the model, though I have frequently explained it to some few.

In an official report, the object of the model was certainly made known to the Secretary of the Navy to be maximum power and maximum endurance with a given weight of metal.

When the Columbiads broke in 1857 and the IXm. guns did not, the world, if it thought fit to trouble itself about the matter, could readily judge of the merits of my model, both absolute and relative.

Captain Rodman cites certain instances of Columbiads and 42-pdrs. which varied very much in their endurance, and this is precisely the objection to, and the fault of, the model of the Columbiad. When the iron was originally good and properly treated, and all the circumstances were favorable, even the faults of the model could not deprive the result of its merit. But when any error in treatment, or unfavorable action from causes known or unknown, took place, then the defects of model were immediately apparent, and produced those excessive irregularities which finally led to the condemnation of the Columbiads.

Captain Rodman goes on to say that my own model cannot be relied on as a guarantee against bursting, and in evidence thereof cites the bursting of some IXm. guns at the Fort Pitt Foundry in 1855, and he also remarks "that the quality of the metal in these guns was certainly not bad, yet the guns were not good, &c." I believe it is generally conceded that certain
results are claimed to follow upon certain conditions, and if those conditions are not complied with and the result is not attained, it would be very illogical to make it a fault that the result was not obtained. Now it happens that the conditions which I deemed indispensable were violated in all their essential features, and that, notwithstanding my reiterated and earnest remonstrance.

The Chief of Bureau insisted on carrying out his views, and as a consequence the guns at Boston and Fort Pitt Foundry proved utterly worthless, as well as some guns at other foundries. It was not until a large number of guns had been completed that the Bureau would listen to my representations respecting the doubtfulness of these guns. When the extreme proof which I requested was finally applied, the consequences ensued which I had predicted or apprehended. At Fort Pitt several gave way at a low number of rounds, while at Boston the matter was even worse. I myself selected a gun as unable to stand ten fires, and it burst at the very first.

In this dilemma the Bureau consented to follow the conditions which I had prescribed. These conditions have since then been followed in the casting of nearly five hundred guns of IXth, Xth, and XIth, and not a gun has burst, though many have been tried from 1,000 to 1,700 service rounds. And one of the labelled guns, after enduring 1,500 fires, was only broken by twenty-two proof charges, gradually increasing until at the last fire the bore was filled by ten shots weighing 900 lbs. All of these statements will be corroborated to the letter by reference to the files of the Bureau of Ordnance.

In regard to the instances cited by Captain Rodman of want of endurance in the IXth gun, it will thus be seen that they were made in direct violation of my views and expressed wishes; that I alone suspected this defect and had it put to the test, when my anticipations were confirmed; and that since then, when my wishes have been followed, no IXth or XIth gun has burst, though a number of them have been fired 1,000 or 1,600 times. As to their comparative estimation, so far as the old Columbiad is concerned, the IXth and its comrade remain the standard of the Navy, and the Columbiad has been utterly discarded by the Army. So that no gun, it may be reasserted, of
my design, has failed to evince great power of resistance except the first, as already explained, which were made in neglect of, and in opposition to, my earnest representations. These, consequently, are not to be included in any fair estimate. . . . In view of the results which have been obtained for the Navy guns, I am unable to procure any advantage in following the method of casting and cooling prescribed by Captain Rodman. . . .

Captain Rodman’s method of casting and cooling will not guarantee against the inherent vice of model, as will be seen from the trials made in 1850 and 1851. . . .

Model is defined to be the particular form, shape, or construction of anything, and scale or size has nothing to do with the matter.

Two things may be of like form or model, and yet differ widely in size.

Absolute dimension, therefore, is aside from, or of, the question.

There may even be some difference in the proportions without materially affecting the general resemblance in form.

Thus the IX\textsuperscript{th} and XI\textsuperscript{th} have not precisely the same proportions, because the proportion of charge of the IX\textsuperscript{th} is greater than that of the XI\textsuperscript{th}, and yet it is obvious that there is identity of the general form. Of course, I never undertook to claim that the coincidence of every curve and dimension in exterior form of the XV\textsuperscript{th} gun coincides precisely with those of my models, but only to such an extent as to render them substantially identical.

It may be said that in presenting Admiral Dahlgren’s views, much of the above argument may seem like reiteration; yet we have thought it would render the proof clearer rather to reiterate an opinion than, by neglect, fail to present the truth in the clearest possible light.

The subject of rifle cannon now began to engross the public mind. As has been mentioned in the course of this narrative, Commander Dahlgren had submitted
a proposition to make rifled cannon to the Bureau of Ordnance in 1856, at which time he presented a draught "of a piece of rifled ordnance, designed to project heavy elongated shells." No action being taken by Captain Ingraham, Chief of Bureau, on June 2, 1859, Commander Dahlgren renewed the application for the manufacture of rifled cannon, but still no action was taken by the Bureau.

In 1860 Captain Magruder, being Chief of Bureau, authorized the trial, and five rifled iron cannon were made. The progress of the experiments was reported in detail on Jan. 11 by Commander Dahlgren, but the work was then suspended by verbal order of Chief of Bureau.

On Oct. 8, 1860, Commander Dahlgren asked attention to the progress made as reported in above paper, and he stated the objects in view, namely, —

1st. To produce rifled cannon of proper capacity, by loading at the muzzle.

2d. To determine a proper quality of iron for heavy pieces.

3d. Pitch of spiral for each calibre, length of gun, &c.

And he asked permission to proceed with this interesting subject, adding that no immediate expense would be necessary beyond mechanical labor, and he also requested leave to carry one or more pieces to extreme endurance.

The Bureau then authorized the casting of three more cannon of the calibre desired, and also the commencement of experiments as to pitch of spiral, weight, and endurance. And authority was also given to carry one rifled piece to extreme endurance.

Dec. 12, 1860, Commander Dahlgren made a report
of progress, which was referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs and ordered to be reprinted.

The report of Jan. 25, 1861, has already been noticed.

April 2, 1861, Commander Dahlgren suggested that in order to obtain facts in reference to the metal best adapted for rifle cannon, that the West Point and Richmond foundries be requested each to furnish a casting conforming to pattern, &c., the quality of iron to be left to the discretion of the founders. He sent sketch to Bureau for this competitive trial in April, 1861.

The movement of the Rebellion began in April, 1861, and in May, June, and July the work with rifle guns proceeded rapidly at the Washington Navy Yard.

June 10, 1861, the Bureau sent drawings of a rifle gun (VI\textsuperscript{in}) with trunnions to Mr. Parrott, as designed by Commander Dahlgren, with urgent request to put it in hand at once.

July 8, 1861, the views of Commander Dahlgren were required in reference to the rifle gun armament of the new class of gunboats, &c. In reply, he proposes that where only one pivot gun is carried, one half the vessels should carry a rifle and the other half smooth bore. If two pivot cannon are carried, one should be smooth and one rifled.

July 22, 1861, he transmitted sketch of chamber of VI\textsuperscript{in} gun (80-pdr.). The chamber was parabolic.

Aug. 10, he forwarded to Bureau draught of VIII\textfrac{3}{4}\textsuperscript{in.} and VI\textsuperscript{in.} guns (150 and 80-pdRs.).

Aug. 23, 1861, he reported the first 80-pdr. completed. It was put on board the "Underwriter."

Aug. 27, he transmitted a draught of a 30-pdr. rifled cannon of IV\textsuperscript{in} 4 bore.

Sept. 13, 1861, he requested that the rifled guns
should be proved before being rifled, the proof to be the same as IX\textsuperscript{th} shell guns.

Sept. 18, 1861, he stated that he recommended the 80-pdrs. to be cast without trunnions.

In Oct., 1861, he sent to Commissioner of Land Office a sketch of casting for a rifled gun.

Oct. 28, 1861, he transmitted a draught of block VI\textsuperscript{th}, and also of the finished piece, which were then to be considered as the standard for that calibre.

In Dec., 1861, he reiterated the recommendation of constant surveillance on the rifled cannon, and also recommended that the endurance of 150-pdr. rifle be tested before placing them in service.

And these recommendations not being sufficiently heeded, it is noted early in 1862 that the usual results of work done in such hot haste began to develop. The founders neglected to forward specimens for trial, and Commander Dahlgren called the attention of the Bureau to the fact, and mentioned that the density and tenacity of the metal was too low in the rifled gun castings, causing symptoms of weakness, so that serious casualty would be liable to occur.

Soon after this (Feb. 1, 1862) there was reason to believe that the castings from Pittsburgh were not absolutely cold blast. The Bureau was informed by Commander Dahlgren of the fact, and advised to withdraw the rifle guns so made, with the remark that “it remained to be decided how long the rifle guns suspected of a want of endurance could be safely kept in service.”

The Bureau then gave orders that no more castings should be sent.

Commander Dahlgren then experimented with different kinds of iron.
The result of this inspection was that he recommended the immediate disuse and withdrawal of 80-pdrs., Nos. 1 to 14, they being of the same kind of iron. Also 30-pdrs., Nos. 1 to 12, and he recommended for immediate precaution in founding guns,—

1st. The employment of good cold blast iron.

2d. A competent inspector, to make sure of this, and of the treatment in the air furnace.

The Bureau, March 29, 1862, "acknowledges receipt of results of practice with the service 50-pdr. Dahlgren, the captured VII½m Blakely, and Sawyer 12-pdr. rifles, and congratulates Commander Dahlgren upon the very decided evidence of the superior accuracy and regularity of range of the arm due to his own skill and invention."

In April, 1862, he again informs the Bureau that the difficulties which have been experienced with the 80-pdrs. and 150-pdrs. are entirely owing to low density and other disqualifying causes, and he again requests that blocks affording a more suitable density might be used.

In May, 1862, a wrought iron 50-pdr. of Dahlgren pattern was cast by Mr. Ames and sent to the Washington Yard for trial.

In June, 1862, he reported the trial of a 30-pdr. cast in the Yard by him, from iron obtained from Conowingo Furnace, Lancaster, Pa. It had endured 2,000 rounds with but one vent, and no indications of bursting.

June 3, 1862, the Bureau enclosed to Commander Dahlgren a Resolution of House of Representatives as to what rifle guns have been made at Washington Yard, &c., and asked for information.

July 8, 1862, he replied that the fabrication of rifled cannon might be said only to have begun in the Wash-
ington Yard with the insurrection then in progress; that the previous operations had been of the most limited character, and that previous to the secession of South Carolina were cast two large cannon of V\textsuperscript{in} bore, one of VI\textsuperscript{in}, and one of VII\textsuperscript{in}; that little had been done until after the attack on Sumter, when the work of armament had really commenced. He then gives desired numbers, namely, of iron rifled cannon cast in private establishments and finished in Yard, — forty-two 30-pdr.s., thirty-four 50-pdr.s., fourteen 80-pdr.s., and five 150-pdr.s.

The experiments then commenced were with the view to ascertain the kind of projectile necessary to destroy plates of metal, such as were likely to be used on armored ships, and XV\textsuperscript{in}. and XX\textsuperscript{in}. guns were ordered for Ericsson’s iron-clad turrets, fifty of the Dahlgren XV\textsuperscript{in}. being ordered April 4, 1862, at Fort Pitt Foundry. These “new Navy XV\textsuperscript{in}. cannon were draughted for use in the iron-clad turret vessels, and their length was therefore limited by the diameter of the turret.”

Among the Ordnance Memoranda we copy:

April 7, 1862. — Dahlgren to Bureau. Transmits draught of XV\textsuperscript{in}., restricted to dimensions of turrets. To be considered as an experiment on a large scale. Circumstances impose the necessity of proceeding without full experiment. Will adhere to the method practised in manufacturing the only XV\textsuperscript{in}. gun yet made, the founder to use same kind of iron, &c.

These instructions were transmitted to Knap & Co.

The Bureau to Secretary of Navy, May 13, 1862, says:

Draughts for XX\textsuperscript{in}. guns might be submitted in a few days, on the Dahlgren principle of construction, being the strongest yet known in the United States.
Ericsson being in haste for the new gun, the Bureau writes: —

July 12, 1862. — Navy XVth. guns for monitor class of vessels cannot be furnished in less than three weeks from date.

Drawings can be forwarded, or a model in wood can be constructed, or a XVth. Army gun can be applied for. Model of XVth. Army gun differs from Navy XVth. gun in position of trunnions, no preponderance, and ratchet for elevation, instead of a cascabel for screw.

The answer to this was given by Mr. Ericsson: —

Aug. 20, 1862. — Ericsson to Bureau. — Find it impracticable to apply Army XVth. gun to our turrets and gun carriages. Cannot complete turrets and pilot houses until we have the guns.

The work had not progressed rapidly, the Foundry experiencing a difficulty in the boring of vent. It was the 30th September before Ericsson received the guns.

We have now traced some of the history taken from private Memoranda, of the inception of trial of rifled cannon. It will appear that the first XVth. gun was, as already stated, the proof gun of its class.

It was fired, —

1st. Three times for reception from founder.

2d. Fifty times, and this continued until 622 rounds had been fired, "the bore and vent showing only the usual wear."

Such was the character of proof to which the gun was subjected. And having endured these trials so well, and "no sign of weakness having been manifested," it is not surprising that Admiral Dahlgren should have found it "difficult to understand why any change should have been made in the gun." Yet the

Acting Chief of Bureau, nevertheless, under the advice of the founder, ordered the chamber to be reamed out and the
chase to be reduced. Under this treatment, the gun endured 245 rounds more, and burst at the next.

The experiments made with this gun "related to its power of damaging iron plating by penetration or otherwise."

In allusion to the extraordinary change made upon his model in this instance, we find in some private notes some remarks of Admiral Dahlgren, who says: —

After boring, &c., the gun endured 246 fires. What was there in this so satisfactory and so decisive in favor of the change? It showed that they endured 246 fires — no more.

But why bore out No. 1? *Why not bore a fresh gun?* The real endurance of No. 1 was thus left in doubt!

On this illogical conclusion all the short XVth were altered, *and the new was contrived.* And what has been the result?

These guns — *hybrids,* they might have been well called — are complacently spoken of in the report of Bureau of Ordnance of 1863,— H. A. Wise, Chief of Bureau, — "as the ponderous and powerful XVth guns, *introduced by Assistant Secretary Fox,* as the special armament of the monitors and other turretted vessels."

But the patriotic and real inventor was by this time removed from the scene of his ordnance labors and trials, and serving his country in its extreme hour of peril afloat; and although he bitterly sighed in his heart (especially in reference to the Bureau Chief, whom he had loved as a friend), *Et tu Brute,* yet he was too sincere a lover of his country to pause for gnatsgings at such a moment. The Assistant Secretary, the would-be inventor of a bigger gun than the Dahlgren, was a worthy gentleman who was placed, fresh from the successful manufacture and sale of woollen cloth in New England, in a high sphere of official dignity at a critical moment in the country's history. He
possessed remarkable executive ability and energy; yet, when he and the Bureau Chief and others, et id, undertook to improve upon the inventive genius of the master ordnance mind of America, their Icarian flight met with the merited fate.

It was also afterwards found out that the founders had used warm blast iron, in violation of contract, and unknown to Admiral Dahlgren at the time; indeed, in positive disregard of his explicit and constantly repeated instructions, and also what Admiral Dahlgren speaks of in his notes as

The unaccountable mistake of the founders in running the metal low, its tensile strength being 21,000 to 27,000, when it should have been 30,000 to 34,000. Hence it was too soft to endure the enormous strain on the vent.

And he adds: —

There is no proper idea of the extent of this force in rifled cannon — and I can appreciate its effects — which alone seem to destroy cannon so rapidly, and far beyond any comparison with what occurs in smooth bore. In fact, it is the only issue which the explosive gases can have.

In some notes with regard to rifle cannon, under trial Feb., 1862, he says: —

I have reached some conclusions,—

1st. With a rear vent, stand 500 fires, as shown by even the present soft, No. 16, which still looks well. warm blast 80-pdrs. will

2d. This is the case with the parabolic chamber, which No. 16 had, but the ogre chamber is preferred. This will even bear a vent above.

3d. The 80-pdr. parabolic chamber with rear vent will endure 200 fires (No. 19), but the vent is excessively worn, though no sign of giving away.
4th. If the crack will not occur about the bouche, as in 80-pdr. No. 16, by 100 fires, there is no wear of a platinum bouche. Hence, even with this warm blast iron, of such low tenacity, such vents will insure endurance when the common vent soon destroyed a gun.

There remains, then, the cold blast iron of due tenacity, and the copper chamber, to give the rifle cannon all that is needed.

These changes should make the smooth bores impossible to burst.

Eighty-pdr. No. 17 discloses a new phase in the matter (Feb. 26). The chamber parabolic had been slightly oged to receive a copper bottom, in which was the small branch of the vent. The vent wore very little at 120 fires, and the copper resisted perfectly, but a very faint crack began to manifest itself in the chamber, above and below, outside of the copper bottom, extending nearly the length of the chamber, and looking dangerous. So it appears that the vent is not the sole producer of the initiate that splits the gun, but the absolute strain will do it.

... . . . . . . . . . . .

With regard to lining of chamber with copper or other soft metal, he says: —

March 24, 1862. — I contemplated this some years ago, and had a chamber of this kind prepared for IXth gun, which is now in the Ordnance Department. The books show that James Abbott was employed at this chamber, Sept. 18, 1854.

Early in 1862 rifle guns of various patterns burst. Among others are noted: —

A Sawyer gun, at Rip Raps.
A James gun, burst at Sag Harbor, 216 fires.
Semi-steel, by Wiard (50-pdr.), burst at tenth fire.
Semi-steel 3-inch, for field, by Wiard; burst under common proof.
A Parrott, at Munson's Hill.
A rifled army gun burst on "Carondelet" in action.
A Dahlgren 80-pdr. burst on board "Hetzel," in the attack
on Roanoke Island, Feb. 13.

A note says: —

I was unlucky; had just got ready to supersede the 80-pdr.
when the accident happened.

In the light of these events, how wise are the opin-
ions deprecating such undue haste even in the midst of
extreme peril, that is given in the following letter: —

Commandant's Office, Navy Yard,
Washington, March 19, 1862.

Captain A. A. Harwood, Chief of
Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography.

Sir,—I have received the copy of a letter from the Navy
Department to your Bureau in regard to the fabrication of XV m.
and XX m. guns for the iron-clad vessels of the Navy.

A subject so important cannot be perfected without much
reflection and extensive experiment.

But we lack almost the preliminary information indispensa-
ble to commence with. We do not know what size and kind of
projectiles are needed to pierce, dislocate, or dislodge iron
plates of different thicknesses placed perpendicularly or ob-
liquely to the blow; whether those of two hundred pounds, or
three hundred pounds, or greater, will perform the work or not
under the condition of actual combat, though there are some
significant facts which will answer as a starting-point. We
have also very little to guide us in the construction of pieces
with a bore of XV m. in diameter.

One piece of the kind has been made by Captain Rodman,
which has been very successful, having endured 504 rounds,
but no solid shot appears to have been fired from it; shells only
were used, and great care was taken to lessen the violence of
the charge in the gun by using powder of a peculiar description.
This fact is of great value, as it shows that such a gun can be
made of cast iron; but it still remains to be ascertained whether
this degree of endurance can be uniformly maintained. Several
guns have been cast hollow on the principle of Captain Rodman, and the majority of them were possessed of so little endurance as to be unfit for service until the model was changed, since which the guns so cast were good, and one of them, a $X^{\text{in}}$ gun, was not burst by 2,450 fires; but, curious to say, the same style of gun cast in pair with it endured just as well.

The Bureau is aware that I have claimed the model of the $XV^{\text{in}}$ gun as similar to my own. Captain Rodman thinks differently, but reflection has not changed my conviction. The $X^{\text{in}}$ guns above mentioned are also of like form, in my opinion.

The bursting of a gun is always sufficiently serious, but when so large, and in a turret, might render the vessel powerless. It becomes an imperative duty, therefore, to establish the uniformity of endurance which can be relied on in guns so large, before exposing great national interests to peril. Wherefore, to meet the requirements of the Navy Department, the fabrication of these guns should be conducted with great care, and extreme proof must also be resorted to in several cases, in order to determine the course of proceeding needed to insure a proper endurance.

To this end I propose,—

1st. To make the length of the gun to suit the dimension of the turret.

2d. To follow the general construction of the $XI^{\text{in}}$, and, as precautionary measures, to use the mode of casting practised with the present $XV^{\text{in}}$, and also to band the breech after the idea of Captain Blakely. Subsequent trial would indicate whether one of these would suffice, or all were indispensable; and thus, in the absence of accurate information, every device would be adopted to avoid disaster that skilful experts have deemed of importance, and if an accident should occur it would be consoling to know that no measures had been omitted to guard against it.

I confess myself, however, averse to this hasty mode of proceeding.

Using all dispatch, it would be impossible to fabricate the first $XV^{\text{in}}$ gun in less than seventy or eighty days, whilst the present urgent necessity must pass away in the third of that
time, and cannot arise again for a considerably larger period,—
having reference, of course, to foreign waters.

The plan I should prefer would be,—

1st. To place XIth guns in all the turrets until the heavier
ordnance were fully prepared.

2d. Construct proper targets to ascertain what size and kind
of projectile is needed to pierce, injure, or destroy plates of the
thickness in use, or likely to be used.

3d. Fabricate guns of the size thus indicated, whatever be the
calibre, using the form and process needed to give uniform and
proper endurance.

Conformably to this, I would request authority to put up
without delay plated targets for practice; the funds can properly
be taken from almost any head of ordnance appropriation, and
I will very shortly submit the draught of a XVth gun for fabrica-
cation, which may then be proceeded with at once.

The Bureau may rely upon it, that no undue haste will lead
us so quickly to the desired end as an intelligent plan properly
executed.

I have the honor to be,

Your obt. servant,

JNO. A. DAHLGREN, Commandant.

We have thought best to copy this letter entire, as
the instruction that historic record presents, is for the
future experience of nations. When John Dahlgren
had begged in vain, in time of peace, for a small
appropriation to enable him to solve these very questions
upon which so much now depended, the niggardly spirit
of the Ordnance Bureau and of the Congress of the
Nation saw only the present, and refused to look to the
future needs of the country. How nearly all this false
economy had proved fatal to the Nation in her swift-
coming hour of need, the "Child's History" of the civil
war, whenever written, can make plain to a future
generation.
CHAPTER XI.

CHIEF OF ORDNANCE.—DEFENCE OF SYSTEM.—ORDNANCE RÉSUMÉ. 1862-1865.

Some memoranda connected with the Dahlgren draught of the XVth gun, bearing date April 7, 1862, are before us, and we make some extracts. Commander Dahlgren says:

In the first place, we have hardly a single fact conclusive to the form or weight of ball that is needed to produce effect on iron-plated ships.

The English experiments are numerous, and extend over a series of years. But, until very lately, the projectile did not weigh over one hundred pounds. . . . In the United States the only facts at disposal are to be found in the operations of the Messrs. Stevens, and some practice which I made in 1852 on an iron vessel. But from none of these can I approximate the weight or form of the projectile that is likely to do the work required with any certainty, nor the velocity with which it is to be driven.

The difficulties of the thing are also enhanced by the peculiar conditions imposed by the use of a single turret, as in the monitor class.

A certain weight of projectile thrown in volleys from several guns might do all that was required, but a single turret seems to permit of the use of but one gun at a time. Hence the size of projectile must be enormously magnified, but to what extent no one knows. . . .

Supposing that a projectile as large as fifteen inches is needed, we have nothing but the preliminary knowledge required for the construction of its gun, and it is not yet established
whether such can be made so enduring as to be uniformly safe.

The importance of this condition cannot be overrated in the present case, because the consequences of bursting a XV\textsuperscript{in}. gun in the turret during action could hardly fail to be most disastrous and conclusive; and in making the XV\textsuperscript{in}. gun we are departing so far from our previous experience in the capacity of iron in so great a mass to resist the enormous strain which will be imposed on it.

We know that guns as large as the XI\textsuperscript{in}. can be made uniformly reliable, but the mass of a XV\textsuperscript{in}. gun is at least three times as great.

Only three guns larger than the XI\textsuperscript{in}. have ever been cast in this country. . . . One, a XII\textsuperscript{in}. gun, at Boston some ten years ago, which has been used very little, the XV\textsuperscript{in}. , and the rifled XII\textsuperscript{in}. by Captain Rodman; so that there is no certainty as to the uniform resistance of any description of metal when made into a gun so large, and exposed to such great shocks. The last accounts from England show that three Armstrong 100-pdrs. gave way under common proof in one day.

From these and similar notes can be measured in some degree the various perplexities that surrounded the rifled cannon question, amid the turmoil, too, of civil war.

We shall transfer to these pages another of Captain Dahlgren's letters, written about this time, for the sake of the lesson the past may be made to give to the future of the country.

It is a reply (as the letter will show) to inquiries made.

U. S. NAVY YARD, WASHINGTON, June 3, 1862.

Honorable JNO. P. HALE,
Chairman of Naval Committee U. S. Senate.

Sir,—Your inquiry as to "the present condition of the Naval Service of the country with respect to Heavy Ordnance" will be best answered by the following, which I render according to the best of my information: —
Recent well-known events must change entirely the system of naval attack and defence as practised to this time.

It is not yet certain that the existing heavy ordnance cannot be utilized in some degree, and I am now engaged in a course of practical investigation which will lead to some conclusion in this respect, as well as in others equally important.

There is by no means a sufficient supply even of this ordnance on hand, and the first gun is not yet made which is designed more particularly for the vessels building to use against iron-clad vessels.

The alarming deficiency of Heavy Ordnance for Naval purposes one year ago caused the greatest embarrassment, and had nearly been productive of disaster.

It became necessary to bring back into service a very large number of guns that had been laid aside as deficient in power, and to place them in the batteries of new vessels, merely because there was no other resort. The armament of the Western Flotilla was chiefly made up of pieces of this description, and I am of opinion that had it been possible to arm the flag vessel with XIth guns forward instead of those she carried, the fire of Fort Donelson would have been silenced utterly by Commodore Foote.

Several guns also burst in the flotilla. At certain times the scarcity of our supply compelled the use of guns that had already done full service. The “Pensacola” had to receive an XIth gun which was laid aside because it had been fired one thousand times, a measure which could be justified by nothing but the great and uniform endurance of this class of ordnance, and by urgent necessity. We are now endeavoring to meet the demands of the recent changes as well as circumstances will permit, but with any but a certain prospect of doing so in good season.

And should any other emergencies arise within the year besides that which now occupies us, it will be more difficult to meet it than any of previous occurrence. Briefly, the present stock of ordnance is insufficient, and the means, public and private, at command of the Navy Department are altogether unequal to its wants.

It is not easy to say what measures would always supply the
Navy with cannon, because its demand is not regular, but varies greatly; under ordinary circumstances being hardly sufficient to keep a single private foundry in profitable operation, and then, when an emergency like the present arises, all the foundries and machinery that can be made available are insufficient.

Still something may be done to remedy the difficulty.

The first embarrassment is the want of a proper standard whereby to regulate the operations of private establishments. Many of them have the ability and the desire to cast cannon, but are not acquainted with the exact requirements which this specially demands, and the Navy Department, having no officers whose regular province it is to become expert in the art, is unable to supply persons competent to direct the foundries, which have not previously practised the casting of very heavy guns.

This could be fully met, —

1st. By the extension of the government works so as to have their operations equal to about one fourth the current demand, leaving the remaining three fourths to private shops.

2d. By collecting a large stock of iron from different sections of the country, which has been ascertained by full trial to be fit for heavy ordnance.

3d. By a proper organization of the Ordnance Department of the Navy. That now existing would neutralize the abilities of the most skilful ordnance expert in this or any other country.

It is evident that there is no royal road to the art of making proper cannon. Even the genius of Armstrong, backed by the millions of the British Exchequer, has not been sufficient to satisfy his own people of its final success. And political favor in this, as in the case of the Lancaster gun and the huge Mallet mortar, has only conducted to insure greater notoriety for the failure.

The sole government foundry existing is in this yard, and comprises a capacity for running about 12,000 lbs. at one time. This proved equal to the fabrication of three fourths the bronze pieces needed for the Navy, and the occasional casting of an experimental iron cannon, too slow to attain results of any con-
sequence in good season. The moderate sum asked would have sufficed to compass this end, and no more.

I have the honor to be,

Very resp'y. your obt. servt.,

JNO. A. DAHLGREN.

As in the later years of his life no time was at his disposal to publish his views on ordnance matters, we now publish the following, among other opinions, expressed, perhaps, hastily at the time, but none the less the result of accurate and mature thought. March 12, 1863, he writes to Rear-Admiral Dupont, commanding U. S. Naval forces off South Atlantic coast:

Your request for my opinion in regard to the action of cored shot or shells on brick has been received, and should have had earlier attention if the many demands on my thought and time had allowed.

I should not hesitate to prefer the shell with the explosion of its charge to the more solid cored shot without it, because even if the shell does break, it must make some entrance into the brick, and the charge of the shell will then dislodge the contiguous parts which have been loosened by the shock of the blow.

Co-operating with this reason is a due regard for the capacity of the gun itself to sustain protracted firing. . . .

It is hardly possible to make much impression on earthworks. You may disable the guns by long firing, but the enemy will keep their men under cover, or at a distance, and unless there are troops to take advantage of the fire no positive gain will be had; the spade and shovel will make good by night the damage done by day. At such times grape and shrapnel from the XI\textsuperscript{m} will be very effective.

Cut the brick masonry with rifle projectiles, dislodge it with shot, and follow up with XV\textsuperscript{m} shells. Let there be no random firing, and place the iron-clads as near as possible, for the sake of their own fire, as well as to avoid vertical fire from the enemy, which they will not stand.
During the period when the Rifle Cannon question became one of absorbing interest, the rapid march of events demanded all the time, energy, and thought of Admiral Dahlgren, so that he was never, after the breaking out of the Rebellion, really allowed that calm deliberation which original or inventive thought demands. When the insurrection commenced, the command of the Yard devolved on him. From April 22, 1861, to July, 1862, he discharged two duties, being Commandant of the Yard and in charge of the Ordnance of the Yard, receiving the salary of the smaller office only. From July, 1862, to June 24, 1863, when he was called to the command of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, he was at one and the same time Chief of Ordnance and Captain in Charge of Ordnance, receiving the salary of the latter office only.

It is due as a part of the historic record of the unselfish and earnest service which the husband of the writer ever gave to his country, to mention this.

At this period his service was considered of such importance as Commandant of the Navy Yard at Washington, a position that his then inferior rank did not enable him by law to fill, that special legislation was had to meet his case, a compliment from his country which was extremely gratifying to him. This act was entitled:

An act to amend an act entitled, "An act supplementary to the act entitled an act providing for a naval peace establishment," and for other purposes, passed March 27, 1804.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, that the above entitled act be, and the same is hereby, amended by inserting after the word "Captain," where the same first occurs in said act, the words "or Commander," so that the President
shall be authorized to select the superintendents of the several
Navy Yards and heads of Bureaus from the captains or com-
manders of the Navy of the United States.
Approved August 2, 1861.

And in "A Report of the Navy Department, July 4,
1861," Gideon Welles, Secretary, says: —

In the Ordnance branch of the service there has been great
activity, and the works at the Navy Yard in this city have been
in constant operation, day and night, to meet, as far as was
possible, the extraordinary demands that have been made.
When the late Commandant of the Washington Yard, on the
22d of April, declined further connection with the Government
and was dismissed the service, it was believed the true interest
of the country would be promoted by placing the yard and
foundry in charge of the efficient and capable officer whose
reputation in connection with ordnance is national. If his rank
did not, according to usage, entitle him to the position, his
merit did. To obviate the difficulty and place that branch of
the service in proper working condition, I would recommend
that there be appointed an officer, to be known as the Director
of Ordnance, who shall, under the Department, have the imme-
diate supervision of the manufacture, description, and supply
of ordnance for the Navy in all its details.

Somewhat later in the same year, Dec. 2, 1861, the
Secretary of the Navy in his Annual Report pays the
following high tribute. He says: —

The emergency has put in requisition the energy and talent
attached to the Ordnance Bureau, which, under many embar-
rassments, has met the demand upon it; and if, at the com-
 mencement of our difficulties, the wants of the Government
could not, in all instances, be supplied with the rifled cannon
and Dahlgren heavy ordnance, that branch of the service is now
furnishing guns and munitions with a rapidity and of a descrip-
tion unsurpassed in any service. The occasion is such as to
stimulate into greater activity the inventive faculties and powers
of the distinguished Commandant of the Washington Yard,
OFFICIAL COMMENDATION OF GUNS.

whose services are as valuable to the country, and entitled to as high regard, as those of the most successful flag officer who commands a squadron.

The Dahlgren guns had, however, during this year proved their excellence of make, preceding all official commendation. We extract from the report of H. Paulding, commanding United States naval forces in the waters of Virginia, pro tem., to Hon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, April 23, 1861:—

The estimated number of ordnance of all calibres at this place (Gosport Navy Yard) is about three thousand, and of these some three hundred are of the latest patterns of Dahlgren guns, some of large calibre. They could not be removed, and there was no effectual means of rendering the Dahlgren guns wholly unserviceable. One hundred men worked for an hour with sledge-hammers, and such was the tenacity of the iron that they did not succeed in breaking a single trunnion.

And Captain Charles Wilkes, United States Navy (afterwards Rear-Admiral), in a communication addressed to Flag Officer Hiram Paulding, United States Navy, April 22, 1861, says:—

One hundred men were sent by Commander Pendergrast from the "Cumberland," to assist, divided into several gangs, to render the new guns unserviceable; but after some time spent therein, it was found that the metal of the guns was so superior as to resist all and the most powerful efforts to break off the trunnions.

They were spiked and rendered, as far as the time would permit, unserviceable.

Boynton's "History of the Navy," Vol. II. Chapter IV. page 36, says:—

In the mean time about one hundred men were sent to the Yard for the purpose of destroying the cannon, some of which
had been previously spiked, though in an imperfect manner. The intention was to break off the trunnions with heavy sledges. This was easily done with many of the old guns, but when they came to the new Dahlgren guns all their efforts were vain. Though they used sledges weighing eighteen pounds, they could not break a single trunnion. Such was the tenacity and superior character of the metal that it was found impossible to mutilate them by any means then available, and therefore these beautiful guns were left uninjured for the rebels. This fact shows what an improvement had been made by that scientific and accomplished officer, Admiral Dahlgren, not alone in the form of our cannon, but in the metal from which they were cast.

The enormous strain thus imposed at such a time, when the demand for ordnance was so much greater than could be met, and the terrible trials and duties of the later years of the war, doubtless laid the seeds of the disease which caused his death.

One of the documents from the Navy Department accompanying the annual message of the President to Congress, Dec. 1, 1862, was the report of Captain Dahlgren, Chief of Ordnance Bureau. As it is our aim rather to collate for publication private memoranda never before published, coming from the pen of John A. Dahlgren, we shall simply allude to this report, which was very full and elaborate, and explains not only the present condition, but also the probable future necessities of the ordnance of the Navy. It discusses the various problems of attack and defence involved in the construction of iron-clads or armored ships, and speaks of suitable ordnance to meet new modes of defence and of the claims of smooth and rifled cannon; of the coast defences, and urges the institution of a system of instruction in gunnery for our seamen, and that such course of instruction may be instituted as a part of the
system of the Navy, adding, "for battle is but the harvest of preparation." Memorable words!

The Annual Report of the Navy Department, of Dec. 1, 1862, says of Captain Dahlgren's ordnance service:

Whose ability in that capacity originally caused him to be detached from active duty afloat, and whose great services led him to be placed at the head of the Bureau of Ordnance, have elevated the standard of ordnance in the Navy.

During this year, and immediately after the battle of Port Royal, Admiral Dupont writes to Admiral Dahlgren:

But besides this, I am impelled by a feeling of duty to address you. The large ordnance of this squadron has sprung from your inventive genius, and thankful am I, for one, for those long years of study, scientific research, and deductions, which so materially aided in arming the American Navy as I believe no other navy is armed. . . . I only now wish you could have seen the practice from this ship during the engagement, not alone for its precision and destructive results, but for the rapidity with which such large guns could be loaded with their heavy shell.

I never get transporté, as the French term it, about such things, but I will repeat, to the day of my death, that the second assault of this ship upon the forts, for rapidity, continuity, and precision of fire, has never been surpassed in naval warfare.

Yours most truly,

S. F. Du Pont.

Early in 1863 these very flattering testimonials culminated, as it were, in the thanks of the nation,—the highest award that the heart of a patriot can know.

The ordnance service of Captain Dahlgren at that time received recognition by joint resolution tendering the thanks of Congress, in pursuance of the following recommendation of the President of the United States:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, that the thanks of Congress be, and they are hereby, given to the following officers of the United States Navy, upon the recommendation of the President of the United States, . . . viz.: Captain John A. Dahlgren, for distinguished service in the line of his profession, improvements in ordnance, and zealous and efficient labors in the ordnance branch of the service [the other officers receiving thanks for other than ordnance service at the same time were Commodore Charles Henry Davis, Captain Stephen C. Rowan, Commander David D. Porter, Rear-Admiral Silas H. Stringham]; and that a copy of this resolution be forwarded to each of the above officers by the President of the United States.

"Approved Feb. 7, 1863."

The report of the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, H. A. Wise, October, 1863 (Admiral Dahlgren being then in command of the S. A. B. Squadron), says of the Dahlgren guns:

Orders were given to the only foundries then prepared to do such work, to fabricate as rapidly as possible IXm., Xm., and XIm. guns. The necessity for prompt measures was greatly increased by the calamity at Norfolk and the occupation of the Navy Yard at Pensacola by the insurgents, whereby a large amount of ordnance stores and a considerable number of IXm. and XIm. guns, which then constituted the most effective pieces in the batteries of our ships, were lost to the Navy. . . .

It may be remarked that although the bronze howitzers were designed principally for boat service, in expeditions up rivers and bays, in covering the landing of troops, and incidentally, when placed upon their field carriages, to be used in operations on shore, at short distances from the point of disembarkation, the large number of light vessels added to the Navy for river work has led to their introduction more extensively as
deck pieces, both in pivot and broadside; and especially have the 24-pdrs., thus mounted, been found of very great utility in the operations of our Western flotillas.

GUN CARRIAGES.

These being essential to every gun, the figures which show the number of the latter are applicable to the former. . . . They may be divided into two classes, viz., pivot and broadside, for the heavy guns, and, for the bronze howitzers, into boat, field, and deck carriages. As designed and introduced into the service by Rear-Admiral Dahlgren, they have been found to answer its requirements in every respect, and the guns are easily handled in any weather in which they could be cast adrift with safety.

It may be cited, as an instance of the demand for the 24-pdr. howitzers for river work, that Rear-Admiral Porter, on assuming command of the Mississippi squadron, made a requisition upon the Bureau for nearly two hundred of these guns.

And the report of Chief of Bureau of Ordnance, H. A. Wise, November, 1864, says:—

In the system of bronze howitzers and rifles for boat service, and the decks of light vessels, no changes whatever have been made. Its intrinsic value is fully recognized, and whenever the accidents of service have called these guns into play, either in detached boat expeditions on our sea-coast, or on board the light-draught cruisers of our inland rivers, they have done excellent service. They have also been introduced as the special armament of many transports of the War Department.

COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES.

In general it may be stated that the IX\textsuperscript{in.} are used for broadside, the X\textsuperscript{in.}, and XI\textsuperscript{in.}, and the Parrott rifles in pivot, the XV\textsuperscript{in.} for the monitor turrets, and the bronze howitzers and rifles for boat and deck service in-shore.

A few of our ships continue to be armed with the 32-pdr. and VIII\textsuperscript{in.} gun of the old system, but these will probably give way to the modified guns of similar classes above alluded to.
CARRIAGES FOR BOAT AND FIELD HOWITZERS.

In general the plan may be considered perfect, and its excellence is admitted by other navies.

No changes have been made in the details of the carriages for boat and field howitzers, and it is very doubtful whether any modifications can be suggested which would give better results.

PROJECTILES.

With the rifled projectiles, however, it is hardly possible to exercise the same scrutiny as with the spherical, for these are, with the exception of a few made at the Ordnance Yard, on the plan of Rear-Admiral Dahlgren, the patented property of private citizens, from whom they are ordered.¹

Beside the Dahlgren rifle projectiles, just mentioned, and which are only used in the bronze rifles, those of Parrott, Hotchkiss, and Schenkl are furnished almost exclusively for iron guns. Other kinds have been tried, but hitherto with far less success than either of these just mentioned, and until something better is presented they must continue to serve the necessities of our rifled ordnance. . . .

WASHINGTON ORDNANCE YARD — (SAME REPORT).

Organized under many difficulties, and with exceeding labor and perseverance, by my predecessor, the distinguished officer at present in command of the South Atlantic Squadron, it has not only furnished the standards which govern the works at all the yards and foundries, but it has also proved the safeguard of the service against the nostrums and visionary improvements of would-be inventors and speculators. Its experimental batteries and records are the crucial test to which we submit every one of the great questions which command at any time the attention of artillerists at home and abroad; and the satisfactory manner in which they are solved is exemplified by the condition of our naval armaments. But especially is the service

¹ Admiral Dahlgren also held a patent for his plan of rifle projectile, issued August, 1861, to run seventeen years.
indebted to this depot for the high excellence of those indispensable details of ordnance embraced in the products of its laboratory, such as fuzes, primers, percussion-caps, fire-works, and small-arm ammunition, besides all the ammunition for boat and field howitzers.

REPORT OF BUREAU OF ORDNANCE, H. A. WISE, OCTOBER, 1865.

Annual Report to Navy Department, 1865: —

And, in illustration of the advantage of this latter condition of ricochet fire, as being peculiarly the property of the smooth-bore, I may refer to the published report of the army operating against Charleston, in which the commanding general bears testimony to the magnificent practice made by the iron-clad frigate "New Ironsides," with her IX in. guns, against Fort Wagner.

After quoting from the Army Report, he says: —

A ricochet fire of this kind is simply impossible from rifled guns, with elongated projectiles, whatever may be said of their superior power of penetration. . . .

Under head of "Composition of Batteries," the same report says: —

At present no change is contemplated in the distinctive features of our naval armaments, for there does not appear any good reason for departing from the established system of a mixed battery of broadside and pivot guns, the IX in. being the principal of the former, and the XI in. of the latter, wherever it can be carried; and in the lighter vessels the new VIII in. of 6,500 lbs., or 32-pdrs. of 4,500 lbs., with one or two 100-pdr. rifles in pivot.

In a letter from the Ordnance Chief of Bureau to Admiral Dahlgren, dated Feb. 11, 1864, he says: —

Nothing of iron which can float will resist the smashing power of the XI in. and XV in. guns, with thirty and sixty pounds of cannon powder.
During this year (1864) the remarkable sea-fight occurred between the "Kearsarge" and the "Alabama," which we prefer to allude to by some extracts from the Official Ordnance Report, which says: —

This contest was decided by the superiority of the XI\textsuperscript{m} Dahlgrens over the Blakely rifle and smooth-bore, in connection with the greater coolness and accuracy in aim of the gunners of the "Kearsarge."

Report of Captain Wise, Chief of Ordnance, November, 1864: —

The decisive power of the heavy gun in pivot is, however, most strikingly exemplified in the recent fight between the "Kearsarge" and "Alabama," although the distance at which the action was fought was fully within the scope of the broadside 32-pdrs. of either vessel, being only about 700 yards. The water also was smooth, and both ships moved steadily under steam in a continuous circle around a common centre. Every condition was, therefore, most favorable for the full exercise of the offensive power of each class and description of gun used; but it does not appear from the official reports or the published statement of the affair that much damage was inflicted on either vessel by the guns of broadside, the decisive work having been performed only by the pivot guns of the "Kearsarge." These were two XI\textsuperscript{m} guns mounted at either end of the ship. . . .

We gather from the official report of Captain Semmes, of the "Alabama," that the effect of the XI\textsuperscript{m} shells of the "Kearsarge" was most disastrous. . . .

There can be no question with regard to the superiority of the XI\textsuperscript{m} guns over the Blakely 120-pdr. and the 68-pdr. of the English pivot system, either in penetration, smashing effect of the shot, or explosive power of the shells. Hence, although the vessels were nearly equally matched as to tonnage, motive power, and number of men and guns, yet the preponderating influence of calibre, properly disposed in pivot, and coolly and deliberately handled by American seamen, was sufficient to settle the question briefly and most conclusively.
Out of the many notices by the press, we select the following:

[From the U. S. Army and Navy Journal, July 9, 1864.]

THE "KEARSARGE" AND THE "ALABAMA."

The remarkable action which has just taken place in the English Channel, off Cherbourg, is not only the first which has been fought between steam war vessels at sea, but also the first which has been fought on the broad ocean since the introduction of horizontal shell-firing, the recent Danish naval fight, perhaps, excepted. As such, it has an extraordinary significance. The relief of the country from the pestilent enemy of all its commerce, and the removal of the constant chagrin of its Navy, have been accomplished in this fight. But this is not all. It has given, to a partial extent, an illustration of the comparative merits of the two types of naval architecture and armament of England and America. Our Navy, with all its shortcomings, we take to be already the equal of any that floats, in the character of its ordnance. . . .

The armament of two hostile vessels is rarely found so well matched as in these, so far as comparison can be made with ordnance of different patterns. The elaborate counter-statements of a part of the English press on this subject evaporate at the test of simple fact. The "Kearsarge" had two XI\textsuperscript{m}. pivot-guns, upon whose efficiency the English dwell, and at whose muzzle the more candid lay the victory. Of this concession one need not be ashamed, when it is remembered that their offset in the "Alabama" was one 68-pdr., of a pattern which the English, after protracted experiments with Armstrong weapons, had asserted to be their crack gun, and not only so, but the best gun ever made. The "Alabama" also had one 100-pdr. rifled Blakely gun, of a similar pattern to that we are now finding it well to introduce in place of the forward XI\textsuperscript{m}. pivot gun. For broadsides, the "Kearsarge" mounted four 82-pdrs., in place of six of the same calibre on the "Alabama." In addition, the "Kearsarge" had one light 28-pdr. rifle on the forecastle. The "Kearsarge" carried one gun less than the "Alabama." . . .
It must be added that in this engagement, the theories of Admiral Dahlgren, to whose skill and untiring energy the present perfection of the ordnance of the American Navy is so much indebted, have been put to an interesting test. Without assigning more weight or scope to the results than they exhibit, it will be gratifying to the Admiral to observe how much of the merit of the victory is, perforce, awarded to him by the admissions and apologies of English commentators. The Dahlgren XI\textsuperscript{th} gun, with a plain spherical shell and a time fuze, and a charge of powder sufficient for this simple purpose, was able to force a shell through the side of the "Alabama," just far enough to permit it to explode within the vessel. That, according to Sir Howard Douglas, who as a naval authority in the present century has no superior, is the perfection of horizontal shell-firing.

The contest off Cherbourg shows to what brief compass of duration naval actions will be brought, when a single shell or two may decide the conflict. The shell which struck the steering apparatus of the "Alabama" decided her fate. This strange and fatal meeting will doubtless be of the deepest significance to the European marine world, as well as to our own. The day of Trafalgars, of Aboukir, and Copenhagen is gone by. Here, after a circling fight of sixty minutes, with an adversary from 900 to 1,200 yards distant, the terror of commerce and the pride of the British dock-yards struck, and in twenty minutes more the seas rolled over her.

The following evidence has interest, as emanating from the British press, and from the pen of an English gentleman who has studied the subject of which he writes. We give some extracts:

THE "ALABAMA" AND THE "KEARSARGE."\textsuperscript{1}

The importance of the engagement between the United States sloop-of-war "Kearsarge" and the Confederate privateer "Ala-

\textsuperscript{1} An Account of the Naval Engagement in the British Channel, on Sunday, June 19, 1864, from information furnished to the writer by the wounded and paroled prisoners of the Confederate privateer "Alabama," the officers of the United States sloop-of-war "Kearsarge," and citizens of Cherbourg. By \textsc{Frederick Milnes Edge}. \textsc{London: William Ridgway}. 1864.
bama” cannot be estimated by the size of the two vessels. The
collision off Cherbourg on Sunday, the 19th of June, was the
first decisive engagement between shipping propelled by steam,
and the first test of the merits of modern naval artillery. It was,
moreover, a contest for superiority between the ordnance of Europe
and America, whilst the result furnishes us with data wherefrom
to estimate the relative advantages of rifled and smooth-bore cannon
at short range. . . .

Ships of war, however, whatever may be their tonnage, are
nothing more than platforms for carrying artillery. The only
mode by which to judge of the strength of the two vessels is in
comparing their armaments; and herein we find the equality
of the antagonists as fully exemplified as in the respective pro-
portions of their hulls and steam power. The armaments of
the “Alabama” and “Kearsarge” were as follows:—

Armament of the Alabama.—One 7th Blakely rifle; one
VIIIth smooth-bore 68-pdr.; six 32-pdrs.

Armament of the Kearsarge.—Two XIth smooth-bore guns;
one 30-pdr. rifle; four 32-pdrs.

It will, therefore, be seen that the “Alabama” had the ad-
antage of the “Kearsarge,”—at all events in the number of
her guns,—while the weight of the latter’s broadside was only
some 20 per cent greater than her own. This disparity, how-
ever, was more than made up by the greater rapidity of the
“Alabama’s” firing, and, above all, by the superiority of her
artillerymen. The “Times” informs us that Captain Semmes
asserts “he owes his best men to the training they received on
board the ‘Excellent;’” and trained gunners must naturally be
superior to the volunteer gunners on board the “Kearsarge.”
Each vessel fought all her guns, with the exception, in either
case, of one 32-pdr. on the starboard side; but the struggle
was really decided by the two XIth Dahlgren smooth-bores of
the “Kearsarge” against the 7th Blakely rifle and the heavy
68-pdr. pivot of the “Alabama.”

Captain Winslow could not, however, believe that the enemy
had struck, as his own vessel had received so little damage, and
he could not regard his antagonist as much more injured than
himself; and it was only when a boat came off from the “Ala-
bama" that her true condition was known. The XI\textsuperscript{th} shell from the "Kearsarge," thrown with fifteen pounds of powder at seven hundred yards range, had gone clean through the starboard side of the privateer, bursting in the port side and tearing great gaps in her timber planking. This was plainly obvious when the "Alabama" settled by the stern, and raised the forepart of her hull high out of water.

CONCLUSION.

Such are the facts relating to the memorable action off Cherbourg on the 19th of June, 1864. The "Alabama" went down riddled through and through with shot; and, as she sank beneath the green waves of the channel, not a single cheer arose from the victors. The order was given, "Silence, boys!" and in perfect silence this terror of American commerce plunged to her last resting-place.

There is but one key to the victory. The two vessels were, as nearly as possible, equal in size, speed, armament, and crew, and the contest was decided by the superiority of the XI\textsuperscript{th} Dahlgren guns of the "Kearsarge," over the Blakely rifle and the vaunted 68-pdr. of the "Alabama," in conjunction with the greater coolness and surer aim of the former's crew. The "Kearsarge" was not, as represented, specially armed and manned for destroying her foe, but is, in every respect, similar to all the vessels of her class (third rate) in the United States Navy. Moreover, the large majority of her officers are from the merchant service.

The French at Cherbourg were by no means dilatory in recognizing the value of these Dahlgren guns. Officers of all grades, naval and military alike, crowded the vessel during her stay at their port; and they were all eyes for the massive pivots, and for nothing else. Guns, carriages, even rammers and sponges, were carefully measured; and, if the pieces can be made in France, many months will not elapse before their muzzles will be grinning through the port-holes of French ships-of-war.

We have no such gun in Europe as this XI\textsuperscript{th} Dahlgren.
THE BATTLE TEST OF SYSTEM.

This action was also a triumphant vindication of the *Dahlgren system of armament*, so long contended for in vain by the inventor. The Bureau Report mentions this in these words:—

The result of this action may, therefore, be taken as proving, beyond doubt, the wisdom of arming our ships with a mixed battery of pivot and broadside guns, taking due care to place on board of each ship the heaviest and most powerful guns that she can safely carry.

And this engagement remains, as yet, the one battle test that has arisen between the much-vaunted British systems of ordnance and the American, as invented by Dahlgren.

Boynton says (p. 566 "History of Navy") of this combat between the "Alabama" and "Kearsarge":—

The mortifying feature of the defeat was, that the American ship could tear in pieces and sink in an hour an English vessel of her own class, and that with trifling injury to herself. It was the English idea of guns and ships, matched against the American idea, and the former went to the bottom.

After the close of the war, in November, 1865, the Chief of Ordnance Bureau, H. A. Wise, says in his annual report:—

During the recent rebellion the cast-iron smooth-bore guns of the Navy endured all of the severe service to which they were subjected, and proved their excellence everywhere and under all conditions of actual war. Not a single gun of the Dahlgren system has burst prematurely, and none of the Xv\textsuperscript{th} guns, even when fired with their heaviest charges, have ever failed, except in the case of two or three which had their muzzles ruptured by the premature explosions of shells,—the body of the gun, even then, remaining uninjured. For the ordinary warfare of wooden ships against each other, or against forts, these smooth-bore guns are undoubtedly the best of their kind; while the practice at the test battery against armor
plating shows that even the XI\textsuperscript{th} at close quarters, is capable of piercing any thickness of iron or steel with which the sides of an ordinary cruiser, intended to keep the seas, could be covered with safety, and this without any danger of rupture from the use of increased charges, unless the gun has been very much weakened by previous service.

And in illustration of the advantage of this condition of ricochet fire, as being peculiarly the property of the smooth-bore, we may refer to the published report of the Army operations against Charleston, in which the Commanding General bears testimony to the magnificent practice made by the iron-clad frigate "New Ironsides" with her XI\textsuperscript{th} guns against Fort Wagner. He says:

... The "New Ironsides," with remarkable regularity and precision, kept an almost incessant stream of XI\textsuperscript{th} shells from her eight gun broadside, ricocheting over the water against the sloping parapet of Wagner, whence, deflected upwards with a low remaining velocity, they dropped vertically, exploding within or over the work, and rigorously searching every part of it except the subterranean shelters. A ricochet fire of this kind is simply impossible from rifled guns with elongated projectiles, whatever may be said of their superior powers of penetration.

COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES.

At present no change is contemplated in the distinctive features of our naval armaments, for there does not appear any good reason for departing from the established system of a mixed battery of broadside and pivot guns, the IX\textsuperscript{th} being the principal of the former, and the XI\textsuperscript{th} of the latter, wherever it can be carried. ... The days of the heavy line-of-battle ships, with their tiers upon tiers of guns, none of which were half so powerful as the ordinary broadside IX\textsuperscript{th}, are passed.

In this connection Note A to Ordnance Report of 1864 may be added: —
VINDICATION OF DAHLGREN ARMAMENT.

As a general summary of the results obtained in practice against iron targets, it may be stated that the XIth gun is capable of piercing four and a half (4½) inches of the best iron plating, backed by twenty (20) inches of solid oak; that the new Xth solid shot-gun will penetrate any iron-clad of which we have, at present, any information.

And in the target experiments the XXth gun has broken up and shattered plates exceeding in thickness anything hitherto proposed as defensive armor.

A weight of official indorsement has now been given such as few inventions have ever received, to which one of Admiral Dahlgren's dispatches is added, written towards the close of the war. This eloquent vindication of his system of armament was not written in a spirit of self-glorification, but was elicited by the sense of wrong inflicted by the Bureau of Ordnance; and that, too, at a time when he was so absorbed with the duties of an arduous command afloat, as to be unable to defend his interests in an effective manner. The Department having informed him of the proposed changes after the project was quite matured, he at once forwarded a protest, of which the entire text is given:

[Dispatch No. 576.]

FLAG STEAMER PHILADELPHIA,
PORT ROYAL HARBOR, S. C., NOV. 20, 1864.

To the Honorable GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.

I have received, but a few days since, a communication from the Bureau of Ordnance in relation to the casting of cannon of my design. The nature of the recommendations therein made by the Bureau to the Department seems to render it proper that I should address the Department directly.

The unceasing demands on my time and attention absolutely render it impossible for me to reply to this communication as I would wish, nor have I the documents at hand, if I had the leisure to use them. I am, therefore, obliged to content myself with the following incomplete expression of my views.
The IX\textsuperscript{th} and XI\textsuperscript{th} guns of my design have manifested all the endurance that has been required through a course of trial on the proving ground, and through a course of service which has seldom, if ever, been applied to any other cannon.

The endurance has never been approached previously by such heavy calibres, and it has also been uniform, which is absolutely indispensable to give value to any endurance, for it is the unexpected bursting of cannon that does the mischief.

In trials made to test the strength of the IX\textsuperscript{th} and XI\textsuperscript{th}, no gun has ever fallen short of 1,500 rounds when fired with the charges for which the cannon was intended, and I feel no doubt that if the firing had been continued with service charges, the guns tried would have gone to 2,000 or 2,500 rounds.

This was never done, because no probable exigency would ever have made such a demand on a single gun; extreme charges were therefore substituted. Some of the cannon that have been so tested were at the Washington Navy Yard, and unless removed are there still.

One of them, a IX\textsuperscript{th} gun, was fired 1,500 times with service charges, and still looks well; another was fired 1,500 times, and then with increasing charges, until at the twenty-second of such fires there were twenty pounds of powder and ninety pounds of shot in the gun when it gave way.

Many other cases of severe proof are recorded of the IX\textsuperscript{th} guns.

The first XI\textsuperscript{th} gun was fired more than 1,800 times with shell, and about 650 times with solid shot of 170 pounds; it burst at the 1,959th round fire. Other XI\textsuperscript{th} guns have been submitted to severe tests. One was used for practice against iron plates with solid shot, and charges increasing to thirty pounds, to the extent of 200 fires, and was in good order when I left it.

It is to be borne in mind that these guns were not intended to be fired with solid shot, and that previous to their advent 800 rounds were looked on as a fair standard for heavy guns, such as Columbiads.

In actual service the record of the IX\textsuperscript{th} and XI\textsuperscript{th} guns is unexceptionable.
They have constituted the armament of our principal ships of war for ten years.

They have been carried over the whole globe during more peaceable times in those superb ships "Wabash," "Minnesota," &c., and now that rebellion and disloyalty threaten the Union, they are identified with the greatest glories of the flag.

Admiral Stringham at Hatteras, Dupont at Port Royal, Farragut at New Orleans and Mobile, illustrated their power against forts and batteries, while the "Kearsarge" vindicated the principles of my system generally against the matured conclusions of British authorities.

Hundreds of these guns have been cast and carried by vessels second to none of their class; in no one instance has a single IX\textsuperscript{m} or XI\textsuperscript{m} cannon been burst on shipboard or a man hurt. One or two were split at the extreme end near the muzzle, but this could only have arisen from improper loading, and the guns were still capable of being used with effect and safety. No officer hesitates to place confidence in his IX\textsuperscript{m} or XI\textsuperscript{m} guns, and Admiral Farragut, when engaging the "Tennessee," shotted his IX\textsuperscript{m} shell guns with one third more powder than the usual charges, and he was not mistaken, at least in their endurance.

These guns were, in the strictest sense, shell guns. They were designed fifteen years ago, when wooden vessels only were to be the objects of fire, and it was this extensive application of the shell power that caused resort to iron plating to keep them out.

But so great was the strength which IX\textsuperscript{m} and XI\textsuperscript{m} guns proved to have, that no hesitation existed in loading them with shot and higher charges of powder for battering even iron plating, and the XI\textsuperscript{m} guns did good service to the country on more than one such occasion.

When the rebel ram "Merrimac" issued forth and inflicted such grievous damage at Hampton Roads, she was driven back by the "Monitor's" two XI\textsuperscript{m} guns, and never ventured on another trial.

There was a deal of wise discussion at the time about penetration and wrought-iron shot, &c.; but the simple and undis-
puted fact remained. The "Merrimac" was obliged to endure
the blockade of the "Monitor," and never dared to venture to
the conflict; her commander preferred to sink her, and did so.

At Mobile the few brief moments of opportunity were so
aptly used by the rapid fire of the XI\textsuperscript{th} guns of the "Chickasaw"
that the iron-clad "Tennessee" yielded to their blows, when
neither the tremendous shocks of the steamers nor the sluggish
fire of the XV\textsuperscript{th} gun had been able to accomplish the desired
result.

In the end they might have done so, but in battle, time is
just as essential to success as in other things. Here it is
notorious that the rapid and sustained fire of the XI\textsuperscript{th} cannon
of the "Ironsides" was more dreaded by the rebels than the
XV\textsuperscript{th} guns of the monitors, and while she remained here at-
tracted the chief efforts of the enemy to blow her up. If, then,
so many important and undisputed facts have established the
endurance of these guns, while their origin, use, and association
with events have imparted to them a reputation so entirely
naval, why propose any change in their manufacture!

They have faithfully withstood every ordeal, and are now
identified with the fame of the Navy in this great struggle of
the country to maintain its very existence.

What public interest demands it, if all that has been pro-
posed or required in the use of the guns has been accom-
plished?

Change of itself is not improvement, and it cannot, in this
instance, be made without additional expense to the Treasury.

One cent per pound is seemingly no great expenditure, but
in each gun itself it amounts to one, two, or even four hundred
dollars, and when cannon must be made by hundreds, the sum
becomes important. But the recommendation is not merely to
substitute hollow castings for solid, or to exercise a sound dis-
cretion at any time upon the subject, for the XV\textsuperscript{th} guns of the
Navy designed by myself are cast hollow, according to Major
Rodman's plan of casting; the proposition is to use no other
mode of casting but Major Rodman's, and to bind the Bureau
itself from using any other.

Why do this? Why voluntarily impose a restraint when
none is needed? Is there any apprehension that the asserted superiority of the hollow casting might suffer from competition?

No opinion is given in the documents of the Bureau from Mr. Chaffee, the manager of the Providence Works. I should have liked to know his opinion; and the letter of Seyert and McManus is by no means a testimonial to the merits of the hollow castings.

The paper of Mr. Parrott states many facts which are of interest, though they seem to have escaped the pencilled selection of some careful hand. I beg the particular attention of the Navy Department to one of these remarks. Mr. Parrott says: "I was particularly acquainted with the manufacture and trial of the Navy IXth and XIth Dahlgren guns, cast solid, and they had given more uniformly satisfactory results than the hollow cast Columbiads of old model, to which the experiments of Major Rodman were for a long time confined. It did not appear, from the foregoing and other trials, that the very great theoretical advantages which might be hoped for in the hollow castings were particularly realized. (See Rodman on metals for casting, &c., 1861, pp. 94, 96, for statements of these advantages.) But a further experiment was made after the model of the 10th Columbiad had been changed, by rounding off the angular breech, and giving increased thickness at the bottom of the bore. In this instance, both the solid and hollow cast guns endured well, reaching 4,250 rounds each, without bursting."

I think that what Mr. Parrott here states admits of neither question nor qualification. Please to note that the solid cast XIth gun, not with an especial care, but with no more than is usual in current manufacture of a large number, gave "more uniformly satisfactory results than the hollow cast Columbiads of old model, to which the experiments of Major Rodman were for a long time confined." Now note what Mr. Parrott says a little further on. "But a further experiment was made after the model of the 10th Columbiad had been changed, by rounding

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1 Cannon founders.
2 This "hand" doubtless wore the Ordnance Ring, which must have been formed in the "hollow cast" interest! — M. V. D.
off the angular breech, and giving increased thickness at the bottom of the bore. In this instance, both the solid and hollow cast guns endured well, reaching 4,250 rounds each, without bursting."

The plain and direct conclusions from these statements are,

1st. That when Major Rodman's mode of hollow casting was applied to the Army Columbiad of the old model, my solid cast XI\textsuperscript{m} guns gave more uniformly satisfactory results.

2d. And that when the model was changed there was obtained a very striking advantage to Major Rodman's hollow casting. It went to 4,250 rounds.

This would have been a stubborn fact to overcome by itself, but it does not stand by itself, for a gun of exactly the same improved model was cast from the same furnace, the same iron, and cast solid, as the XI\textsuperscript{m} guns are cast. That, too, endured just the same amount of firing as the hollow cast, nearly 4,250 rounds.

Well, from all this it follows, —

1st. That hollow casting would not save a bad model.

2d. That when the bad model was changed to a better, the solid cast gun endured just as much as the hollow.

Now, I desire that the Department may be fully aware of what is implied by this, — "rounding off the angular breech and giving increased thickness to the bottom of the bore!" And to do this, I would ask that three models may be made and placed before you, having the diameters at the base ring equal in all three models.

No. 1 shall be a 10\textsuperscript{m} Columbiad of the old pattern, that even Major Rodman's hollow castings would not save, and which he has abandoned.

No. 2 shall be a 10\textsuperscript{m} Columbiad of the pattern to which it was changed, and which is now used, having given so much endurance to the hollow and solid castings.

No. 3 shall be that of my XI\textsuperscript{m} gun.

Let the eye then decide how far the model of the XI\textsuperscript{m} gun departs from that of the old Columbiad, or any previous model, naval or military, and how marked the coincidence of the new Army 10\textsuperscript{m} and XV\textsuperscript{m} with the model of the XI\textsuperscript{m}, the latter
being rather longer; but in the disposition of the metal about the vital parts of the gun, how close the resemblance, the appendage for elevating being a plate in one gun and a cascabel in the other, but neither affecting the principle of construction that disposes the mass of metal about the bore. My guns are chambered and the Army guns are not, which has no connection with external model, but concerns the bore alone. The eye cannot be misled by any special argument, developed in lengthy technical formula, and symbols entirely incomprehensible, save to the initiated few. To it the relative diameters, at different parts, the character of the curves that unite them, the absence of projections and rings, produce forms as nearly identical as possible to vary at all.

The Department has already the statements of Mr. Parrott that the mode of hollow casting did not succeed with the old model, but that it succeeded with a new model; and I think it will appear from comparison of the models just suggested, that the model of the Army 10th, as well as the XVth made by Major Rodman, is identical with the model of my IXth and XIth guns.

This I submitted to the War Department some two years ago, and, so far, all I gained by a plain statement has been some long arguments by Major Rodman, in which he undertakes to show that the models are not alike; as if any statement could possibly negative the plain evidence of one’s sight. So that the change to the hollow casting did not succeed until a change of model was resorted to, and this was an adoption in effect of the XIth model.

It is now attempted, by the recommendation of the Bureau, to take from me even the claim to the hard labor of years. Such a wrong as this, I feel assured, will not be tolerated by the Department.

It has caused me the greatest astonishment, coming as it does from the Naval Bureau of Ordnance, to which I might have looked for at least fair play.

My absence and present duties might have pleaded for postponement at least, no necessity being shown for such urgent action; but if the recommendation must be made, why not have made it a few weeks earlier than it was made? I was
then in Washington, and might have said a word in my own behalf. Why defer, until some three weeks after I left, a proposition involving so much to myself, and then urge it upon the Department, leaving me afterwards in utter ignorance of what is going on, until the Department insists on knowing what I have to say? Nothing but the consideration of the Navy Department averted the decision; with a wise and sound discretion it refused to act hastily, and until I had been heard.

I cannot admit that we yet know all that is needed to a full decision as to the mode of casting. If hollow casting is better for any size of guns, why cool it with water? Will not the old mode of casting hollow, as practised for a century, answer? Who can speak of trials made with American material, such as are now used, and of American experience? Mr. Chaffee had the boldness to cast a XII\textsuperscript{th} gun solid, and it endured 172 firings; this was considered a failure.

When the largest of these hollow cast Columbiads gave way with, perhaps, no better endurance, was that considered a failure?

Mr. Chaffee had never cast so large a gun. He had never melted and cooled the iron he used in such great masses. If he reached the result he did at the first trial, what might be expected by further experience?

My own impression is that this result was, under the circumstances, highly favorable. In conclusion, I hope that I have been able to satisfy the Department that there is every propriety in my submitting an earnest protest against the recommendation of the Bureau of Ordnance.

1st. It is needless, because the IX\textsuperscript{th} and XI\textsuperscript{th} guns have done all that has been or should be required of them, without failing in any one instance.

2d. It is an additional expense to the Government, without any advantage.

3d. It is unjust to the hard and constant labor which I have given to the subject, and to the benefit which the Navy has derived from these labors.

4th. It is forbidden by professional regard for ordnance,— naval in its origin, naval in its use, and naval in its association with great results.
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I will only add my earnest request that the Department will give an order to the Bureau of Ordnance, that no change whatever shall be made in the model or details of my IXth and XIth guns, and that they shall continue to be cast and finished just as they have been,—that is, solid,—and that no change shall be made in the model or details of my new 130-pdr. (Xth) and XIIIth guns.

I believe it is supposed by some that considerable pecuniary advantage results to me from these guns. I have only to say that I never derived a cent from them, nor asked for it.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully,

Your obt. servant,

J. A. DAHLGREN,
Rear-Admiral Commanding
So. Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

Republics have their intrigues as well as monarchies and despotisms, or these "objections to casting IXth and XIth guns hollow" need never have been written.

Substantially the same argument was made, and has already been given in this ordnance narrative, on the occasion of defending the Dahlgren model against the Rodman and the Army infringements, and alluded to in the above dispatch.

Some notes written by Admiral Dahlgren, 1865, and headed "Memorandum," are before us. At the risk of some repetition we shall give them, because they contain in few words a sort of résumé of much that has already been given in an amplified form. He says:—

I was assigned to ordnance duty in 1847 (being then a lieutenant), and Commodore Warrington Chief of Bureau of Ordnance, in order to investigate and bring into use the Hale system of rockets. However, a reorganization of the naval ordnance had recently been entered on, and some one was needed to determine the ranges and other qualities of the new cannon. This was also put into my hands.
MEMOIR OF JOHN A. DAHLGREN.

This so-called new system was, in reality, only a copy of that just adopted in England. It realized the idea of which ordnance men had long been dreaming, one calibre for every gun in a navy, and so far it was well; but as that calibre was the 32-pdr., it failed to attain the promised benefits, and was even inferior to the armament which it superseded, because it sacrificed a higher calibre, the 42-pdr. This was a fatal defect, and, in addition, the principal gun of the system was so defective in model as to be dangerous in action.

These vices of the new system were quickly made evident in the practice which I carried on, in order to adjust the sights and other details. The guns lacked accuracy and power, and the heaviest gun, endurance.

On one occasion a long 32-pdr. burst and killed the gunner, and half of its breech passed hardly a foot from myself.

As soon as possible, I submitted these points to the Chief of Bureau, and proposed the remedy as follows: One calibre for all gun decks, and that calibre to be the heaviest gun that could be worked conveniently at sea.

Spar decks to be armed with pivot guns, size to be determined by the projectile, which was to be the heaviest manageable at sea.

The guns suggested to meet this view were to be the IX\textsuperscript{th}, of 9,000 pounds, for broadside, and the XI\textsuperscript{th}, of 16,000 pounds, for pivot.

These guns were to be shell guns, because such were most fatal to wooden ships; but they were to be so constructed as to combine the accuracy and range of the shot gun with the power of the shell gun, and they were also to be able to fire shot, if needed. All of these conditions I affirmed were met in the models which I proposed, and which were deduced, not from experiment, as has been supposed, but from such principles as I believed were correct. I drew and computed the models without assistance from any one, and furnished the draught for the founder.

And as first made, so have they remained.

Commodore Warrington had sufficient confidence in my reasoning to order a IX\textsuperscript{th} and an XI\textsuperscript{th} gun to be made, which was efficient in 1850 and 1851. The results met all that I
affirmed. Still, to change the whole ordnance of the Navy was a serious business, and met with opposition, not only active, but inactive, which is always the worst.

Of course, ships built to carry 32-pdrs. must undergo great alterations to carry IX\textsuperscript{th} and XI\textsuperscript{th} guns; and then, who ever heard of using pivot guns entirely on large ships' spar decks?

Sept. 1851, I was named as one of the officers who were to give their views on the defence of the coasts. In the paper submitted to the War Department and sent to Congress, my plan was briefly stated. (See House Reps. Ex. Doc. No. 5, 32d Congress, 1st session.) In 1852 the idea found a warm and intelligent defender in the Hon. Fred Stanton, then Chairman of the Naval Committee of the House, and he endeavored to obtain an appropriation for building a suitable frigate for the purpose. In a very able speech (Aug. 17, 1852) he entered at large on the subject, and made known my proposition.

The opposition, however, was too strong, and one of our oldest officers boasted to me of the influence he had used to defeat the measure.

The times wore round, however, when it was indispensable to give our Navy some fine large steam frigates, and in 1854 the "Merrimac" class was designed.

To mount 32-pdrs. in such vessels would have been a manifest absurdity, and so the Bureau consented to place my IX\textsuperscript{th} guns on the gun decks, but would not listen to the XI\textsuperscript{th} on the spar deck, even for chase; so I was obliged to draught a IX\textsuperscript{th} on like model and lighter, for the spar deck of these new screw frigates.

We did with the "Merrimac" as we are too apt to do with a good thing. Not content with being assured in the possession of such powerful ships, the "Merrimac" was paraded in England, where the lesson was taken with as little judgment.

There, as in France, the introduction of shell guns for entire batteries had been resisted for more than twenty years, because the Paixhans gun had neither range nor accuracy, and was therefore a mere auxiliary in the batteries of French and English ships, where one might see four or six among a crowd of 32-pdrs.

But here was an American ship armed entirely with shell
guns, and the brag was that they shot as true and as far as shot guns.

England dared not be behindhand. She followed quickly, and as a result we had the "Diadem," the "Galatea," the "Mersey," &c., so that when I visited England in 1859 I actually witnessed the trial trip of the first of this class, the "Diadem."

The objections to the XI\textsuperscript{ma} gun remaining insurmountable, in order to meet them I went to sea in the "Plymouth" (1857), on board which I had been permitted to place an XI\textsuperscript{ma} gun.

The result was fully successful.

The Bureau at once accepted that class of ordnance, so that the XI\textsuperscript{ma} gun soon found its way into our ships.

Not long after the batteries of the "Merrimac" frigates were amended by placing IX\textsuperscript{ma} guns on the spar decks, with an XI\textsuperscript{ma} at each end.

It was with such a battery that the "Wabash" entered into Port Royal, and its effect was such as to draw from Admiral Dupont a letter of acknowledgment to me.

In England, the necessity of an entire shell battery had been admitted, but the authorities seemed unable to get beyond the old models, 8\textsuperscript{ma} shell guns and 10\textsuperscript{ma} guns, with that great favorite, the 68-pdr., taking ground persistently against our IX\textsuperscript{ma} and XI\textsuperscript{ma}.

Critics were amused with their shape, calling them "soda-water bottles," and the First Lord of the Admiralty even descended to enlighten Parliament on the subject, learnedly pointing to the error of a theory that only valued low velocities, omitting the point of the joke entirely, which was that the shell was to penetrate with the lowest possible velocity.

These notions were adhered to until the "Kearsarge" met the "Alabama." The Union ship had two XI\textsuperscript{ma} guns on pivot. The "Alabama" carried that great favorite, the 68-pdr., and a heavy rifled 100-pdr. The consequence of a steady fight under steam was, that the English ship was sunk in too short a time to leave any doubt as to the cause.

More formidable rivals to my cannon, however, were brought forward. Rifled cannon of various material attracted public attention,—made of cast iron, banded, and of wrought iron,—
here and in England, loading at the muzzle and at the breech. They gave great promise, even to the entire supersedure of the IX\textsuperscript{th} and XI\textsuperscript{th} guns. The Armstrong, after many years of trial, and the expenditure of several millions, has lost its original shape, and vanished as a breech-loader.

So many of the banded rifle cannon burst during the war, particularly at Fort Fisher, that the heaviest calibres are being withdrawn from the Navy, and the weight of powder and of shot is being reduced in the few inferior calibres that are permitted. The wrought-iron gun that endured so much has not been repeated.

And so, after long service in peace and war, the IX\textsuperscript{th} and XI\textsuperscript{th} cannon, that first saw light some fifteen years since, remain the dependence of our naval power.

Having seen a great deal of experimental practice, and witnessed as much protracted firing in action with the enemy as fell to the lot of most officers, I am satisfied that naval smooth-bore ordnance will not be superseded by rifles. The latter have a decided superiority in one respect only,—the cutting through of masonry or brickwork; but when much rubbish is produced they lose that superiority. In all else the smooth-bore and its round projectile is better than the rifle gun and the conical shell.

As for distant firing, the heavy smooth-bores will do work, as far as fighting can be done, and beyond that it is useless to fire.

On one occasion I placed one vessel with an XI\textsuperscript{th} gun and another with an VIII\textsuperscript{th} rifle to pound a battery, which they could approach no nearer than 2,800 yards. The firing was plain to the whole squadron present, and even at that great range the XI\textsuperscript{th} dropped its shells as accurately as the rifle, and did better work, because its shells burst oftener. One commanding officer told me that it reversed all his preconceived notions, and I am sure he was not alone.

There is another phase of the general question. The use of entire batteries of shell guns indicated that the destruction of wooden vessels would be certain and speedy, and hence the origin of some devices to exclude the shell.

The swift destruction of the Turkish vessels at Sinope was
suggestive, and, with other events of the Crimean war, led to the defence in the iron-plated floating batteries, constructed in England and France in 1855. Three of the latter were finished in time to share in the attack of Kinburn, and were very effective in attack and defence. They were not accepted, however, to prove the feasibility of plating a sea-going ship of war, which problem was at length driven to solution by the full development of the shell power, and had its first practical development in 1857, when the French "Gloire" appeared on the ocean.

The English followed with their "Warrior," and now armored vessels constitute part of almost every navy. As such vessels were impenetrable by shells, a return was compelled to the use of shot, and guns were now demanded capable of power hitherto unknown. They appeared in every variety that genius or mere speculation could conceive,—of wrought iron and of cast iron, smooth or rifled, banded or in coils.

As the desired results were not to be attained except by labor, expense, and time, each navy was necessarily obliged to depend on its existing artillery. In our own service the IXm and XIIm were called upon for this duty, which it was hardly to be expected they could perform, as they were designed principally for shells, with the occasional use of shot and very moderate charges. It was found on trial, however, that heavy charges could be used with entire safety, even to the extent of doubling the weight of powder.

In this state of the question the Rebellion broke on the country, and the main defence of the Navy was unavoidably these IXm and XIIm guns. Nor was this reliance misplaced. At New Orleans, Vicksburg, and Mobile, Vice-Admiral Farragut vindicated the supremacy of the flag, and exhibited the power of these guns. So did Rear-Admiral Dupont at Port Royal, and Rear-Admiral Porter at Fort Fisher.

Meanwhile the rifle cannon was advancing rapidly in competition with the smooth-bore IXm and XIIm, and the tendency of many officers was clearly towards the new artillery,—indeed, it became a mania. Rifled guns were asked for at all hands, and it was difficult to meet the demand.

Some occasional ruptures on shipboard did not much abate
ORDNANCE RÉSUMÉ.

this passion, and the evident unreliability of the gun in the protracted cannonades at Morris Island passed almost unnoticed as adverse to the gun, while the splendid action of the "Ironsides" XI<sup>th</sup> battery seemed to have as little effect on the question.

Still, the opinions of officers were gradually taking shape in the right direction, as the rifle cannon failed to realize the great expectations which had been foretold of them. Meanwhile two important events reversed the hasty decisions which had been arrived at in favor of rifled ordnance.

The first of these was the action between the "Kearsarge" and the "Alabama," in which the XI<sup>th</sup> destroyed the enemy's vessel before the favorite 68-pdr. and the 100-pdr. rifle could do the "Kearsarge" mischief.

The consequence is very clearly stated in the reply of Mr. Parrott to the query of the Senate Committee (Jan. 18, 1865).

"Are they using rifled guns much in the Navy?"

"Not much, and especially now, since the action of the 'Kearsarge.'"

The second and deciding occurrence was the bursting of rifled cannon in the attacks on Fort Fisher, with no little loss of life. This disaster was as conclusive against the safety of the rifle guns as the action of the "Kearsarge" had been adverse to their comparative power.

The immediate result was the withdrawal of the 150-pdr. entirely from service, and the reduction of charge and projectile in the inferior calibre.

It also decided the action of the Bureau of Ordnance to rely on the smooth-bores for general use, and confine the rifles to special use.

And thus after the severe test of four years' war, the IX<sup>th</sup> and XI<sup>th</sup> guns remain with unimpeached character, and justly relied on by the whole Navy, having carried the flag of the Union triumphantly through some of the hardest fought battles that have ever occurred, while their competitors of greater pretensions have done most mischief to those who used them, and still others have not got away from the tests of the practice ground.
The bronze light artillery of the Navy is entirely of my design, and never has had a rival in our service.

These pieces I introduced in 1849. They have never failed to meet every reasonable wish, not only in boats, their legitimate place, but also ashore,—generally used in the hands of seamen, sometimes in purely naval affairs, at other times associated with the land forces, as in the operations of General Burnside in North Carolina and near the Coosawhatchie, South Carolina, where, in the fleet brigade of the South Atlantic Squadron, they were always in the right place.

The rifle guns of this description, 12-pdr. and 20-pdr., have always been much in request, and found safe and effective.

The full account of these pieces will be found in my system of "Boat Armament," and much that illustrates what I have here written of the heavy guns will be seen in my work "Shells and Shell Guns."

As regards foreign ordnance, the French have been exceedingly wary, and have yielded in the least degree to new fashions. When shell guns were initiated, they admitted but few in their batteries, and adhered to the 30-pdr.,—equal to our 32-pdr.

Their heaviest smooth-bore was the 50-pdr. When rifled cannon came forward they contented themselves with rifling the 30-pdr. and 50-pdr.

The English ran mad on the whole concern, and fooled themselves to the top of the bent.

Armstrong was their great authority.

He began in 1854, but was not ready for publicity until two or three years later. His system menaced the entire extinction of every other, and here, as abroad, the cold shoulder was given to all else. I absolutely refused to give ear to any plan of breech-loading cannon, believing it impracticable, and had the satisfaction of being refused therefor.

Time has done me justice. After spending fifteen to twenty millions of dollars and several precious years, the plan of loading at the breech is exploded and dismissed.

The Whitworth guns have never got much beyond the practice ground, and the English Government will none of Blakely.
The Admiralty will probably mount some of the new wrought rifle cannon in their heavy plated ships, but our heavy cast iron cannon (smooth-bores) may some day do for them what the XIth did for the 68-pdr. and the heavy rifle of the "Alabama."

Built-up cannon have yet to win and maintain their character, while the evidence against them and the rifle is too considerable to be easily surmounted.

These notes bear date Dec. 20, 1865.
Admiral Dahlgren died five years later, and did not change his opinions, we have reason to suppose, during those succeeding five years.
Numerous theories have had the test of experiment since then, doubtless, but no opportunity has arisen at sea for battle test, so that whatever claims new inventions may assert, it may still be said of them, as when Admiral Dahlgren penned these hastily written memoranda in 1865, that "they have yet to win and maintain their character."

Aside from all selfish inspiration, the writer would still urge a plea in behalf of the Dahlgrens, — guns that have won and maintained their character, — and this through all the various tests which these pages have dragged perchance a toilsome length along to make known.

Inasmuch as this ordnance narrative must take its place in the "Memoirs of John A. Dahlgren," being only a portion of a life so fully devoted to the service of the country in peace and in war, we shall not pause here to notice some incidents of the closing years of his ordnance career, but let these occurrences take their proper chronological order in the story of his entire life. We have, it is true, already reverted to various facts beyond the period in April, 1861, when the war record
properly begins, and which must form the subject of the concluding portion of this work.

It has been quite impossible to give the ordnance record as a unit, without some anachronisms, which, we trust, will be found to add to, and not to take away from, the clearness of this history.

In a recital of events so multiform as those which make up the varied public service of John Dahlgren, no more exact arrangement could well have been adopted.
THE REBELLION.
CHAPTER VI

THE UNION—COMMAND OF THE NAVY—PORTO RICO.

It was at Adjutant Hall that the plot was to be told to the general who related the history of the

United States being the same nation.

Dr. Samuel Adams, the President of the United States, related the need of the people in the country

who were the same. The present events of the other

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CHAPTER XII.

THE REBELLION.—COMMAND OF THE WASHINGTON YARD.
1860–1861.

Much of Admiral Dahlgren's life that remains to be told forms an integral portion of the History of the United States during the war of secession.

His personal career becomes so closely united with the public interests confided to him and the naval operations under his command, that it is impossible to note the incidents of the one without interweaving the events of the other. As yet, no history has been written of the operations of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, nor does it fall within the proper limits of biography to offer a fuller record than is now presented, in order to give a faithful account of the manner in which Admiral Dahlgren discharged the duties of the command intrusted to him during the civil war.

This remark applies in an equal degree to the various responsible positions in which he was placed, from the incipient stages to the final outbreak of the Rebellion, and after that on to the close of the war.

A succinct recapitulation of the situation of the country reminds us, that in 1860 a President of the United States was to be elected. There were three candidates. Those opposed to the Republicans divided
on two and lost. On the election being ascertained, South Carolina did not wait for the announcement by Congress in December, but seceded. The other Cotton States soon followed, at different times.

President Buchanan took no active measures, not even by proclamation, against the act. On the contrary, he submitted to a forcible resistance by South Carolina against the provisioning of Fort Sumter.

It must, however, be admitted that public sentiment at the North was unformed as to the precise measures to be adopted for preventing secession.

President Lincoln found things in this condition when he came into office,—Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri still adhering.

There were unpleasant symptoms adverse to his inauguration in Washington, and Buchanan had a small force of regulars placed in Washington to keep the peace, never exceeding 1,000 men.

Mr. Lincoln was neither hasty nor violent in his course. He seemed disposed to leave the question itself to further consideration, but decided that he would not abandon Forts Sumter and Pickens. It became necessary, therefore, to reinforce and provision them.

South Carolina had been openly preparing to reduce Sumter, and upon the attempt to provision it, began to fire upon the fort, which, April 13, 1861, had to surrender. This was the culminating point. Until now, the anti-Republicans had preserved their former position, and advocated the claims of the South. Even the Republicans had not agreed to pursue hostile measures. But when the news came of the assault on Sumter, all were united in their condemnation of the act, and there
was a hearty response to the proclamation of the President, calling for 75,000 men to retake the public property, so little disposition existed to force the seceders into the Union.

This measure determined the course of the other slaveholding states. Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee seceded; Kentucky and Missouri remained neutral; and Maryland was kept down by the Federal forces. For a while the fate of Maryland and Washington trembled in the balance; but the rapid gathering of the Northern volunteers prevented losses so fatal.

Both sides now prepared speedily for the contest. General Scott as Commander-in-Chief for the Union. After a short period of preparation the Union army was defeated at Bull Run. This unfortunate issue was succeeded by a still further preparation, and brought about the final decision to make good the Union by force of arms. This was also a period of doubt and apprehension as to the favorable result of the appeal.

The Union troops suffered several small reverses, and the first relief to the public mind was the capture of the forts at Hatteras in September. This was further encouraged by the handsome capture of Port Royal in November, and by a pretty stringent, if not a perfect, blockade.

During the period that the threatened resistance of the South was beginning to take substantial shape, the subject of our memoir was stationed at the Navy Yard in Washington, in command of the Ordnance Department of the Yard, actively engaged in making ordnance investigations and experiments.

At the same time we find by his private memoranda that he was carefully noting all the signs of the times, and making dispassionate observations upon men
and things around him. Some extracts from these Memoranda will doubtless become of curious interest in the future, as a picture of the social atmosphere of Washington during a crisis of supreme interest in the life of the nation. They will serve, as it were, to depict something of the calm exterior of the polished society routine, while, struggling beneath it, and co-existent with it, surges the hurried, busy, and often harassed official life. When we read of the fierce turmoil of public career, we overlook the fact that to outward seeming these very men have for the most part led the usual society life, which was in no wise controlled even by revolutions; so true is it that Fashion is the one tyrant that knows no control. And as it has been with other nations in other days, so was it with us during the terrible ordeal of civil war through which we passed. Never did a more striking contrast exist than during the winter of 1860–61, which opened warm and bright as May; the city socially gay, with its customary round of dinners and dances, and yet underneath all the ever-increasing darkening gloom of the near-approaching, inexorable war. We noticed in a former chapter some of the most interesting social events of this period.

We prefer to tell the story of 1861, as connected with the life of Admiral Dahlgren, in his own words, from memoranda carefully collected from letters, private journals, and notes, found among his papers. We transcribe first from the journal of Jan. 1, 1861, which says:

A memorable New Year's Day, for one of the stars has dropped from the Constitutional firmament, and the process of further dissolution is going on.

The public mind begins to be impressed by the nature of
the crisis, but by no means to the extent required to avert the evil.

In fact, the Federal Government proves to be a shadow in presence of State power, and there is apparent everywhere an utter want of loyalty to the National Union. The officers of Army and Navy united, with hardly an exception, in waiting on the President, and presented a numerous body of good-looking, reliable men, serious, and equal to their duty.

I remained chatting with Miss Lane for an hour, as the long files of people passed up and bowed to her.

Jan. 11. — Rumors in circulation that a mob will attempt to seize the Yard, to obtain arms to prevent the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln. In reply to a communication from the Commandant of the Yard on the subject, I state that the Yard is exposed in many places, most at the northwest, where there is only a slight board fence, and at low water the soil is bare to the next point of land.

I have nearly completed the withdrawal from the Yard magazine of the ammunition to the attic of the main building, where I have also the available cannon, viz., five smooth 12-pdrs. and three rifled, with 800 muskets and rifles.¹

¹ At this time, when all was gloomy uncertainty, Dahlgren wrote to a friend in Philadelphia: "The apprehension gains ground that this place is likely to be the scene of a row; indeed, the Government is making preparations against such a contingency, as you see from the papers. A number of ugly-looking customers are to be seen about the streets; no one knows whence they come or on what errand, but, like the stormy petrels, they are generally seen in advance of trouble.

"Not wishing to be concerned about personal matters at such a time, I desire to deposit a sum of money in Philadelphia, subject to my order, and to be had in specie, if necessary. But, above all, to be perfectly secure, as it is to provide bread for the family. Can you arrange this for me? The amount will be six hundred dollars."

The writer of these memoirs quotes this letter with the feeling that it is of itself a proud tribute to the integrity of one who had served his country so nobly, that, notwithstanding his inventions and long service, this "six hundred dollars" represented all that he would have left to his family had he perished at that time. Speaking of this period not long before his death to his wife, the writer, the Admiral said, that, being determined to blow up the shell-house, and perish in it, if need be, rather than deliver up the Yard to the rebels, he had sent to Philadelphia all the means he had for his family.
Jan. 22. — A letter from Foote in relation to his measures for defending the New York Yard. He reports that it might be seized.

Jan. 23. — The removal seems to have been completed. It was done secretly, by two trusty men (Boarman and Ludwig). Ludwig deserted on the 21st April; so much for those I relied on.

Jan. 25. — I urged the President to let the "Brooklyn" relieve Sumter.

Feb. 11. — The Union has lost the Cotton States. They have just confederated and elected Mr. Jeff. Davis President. The Peace Congress is here in session. I have been urging the building of more gun sloops and an iron-cased ship. But my earnest solicitations are of no avail. I meet the usual dilatory replies.¹

Feb. 20. — Saw Commodore Tatnall at the Bureau of Yards, and saw him sign his letter of resignation to the President.

Feb. 26. — The measures for defence of shell-house are complete. Doors and windows are barricaded, each door commanded by a 24-pdr., twelve 12-pdr. howitzers inside; rifles ready; fuel and water; calculated on seventy-five men.

Monday, March 4. — Witnessed the inauguration of President Lincoln, which went off quietly enough, in spite of ominous forebodings.

March 31. — Mr. Russell, the celebrated correspondent of the London "Times," visited me at my office, and remained two hours or more. He is very clever.

¹ Captain Dahlgren addressed the most earnest letters on this important subject to the Chairman of Naval Affairs in both Senate and House. In one letter he says: "In case an iron-plated ship is authorized, I ask that a clause shall be appended, directing ordnance trials to ascertain the nature of the armor to be used, the experiments in England or France not being conclusive, because they used 68-pdr. shot, their heaviest, whereas our heaviest weigh 170 pounds."

In another he writes: "I urged action on this subject in 1852, and, nothing having been done, I renewed my notice thereof in December last. The public interest requires that measures should be taken promptly in this respect. . . . The necessity now entailed for a heavy and prompt expenditure is to be considered as due to the postponement of the subject, instead of its gradual and steady advancement through the last few years."
Tuesday, April 2. — President Lincoln visited the Ordnance; he drove direct to the building and asked for me.

April 3. — Met the President at the marriage of Captain Buchanan’s daughter. He took my hand in both of his; spoke freely; conversed for half an hour; thought the St. Domingo rumor “a speck.”

April 4. — Telegram from Foote to send the howitzers to New York, and referred me to the President. I posted to the White House (6 P.M.). The President did not understand it. Said, “I know nothing about it.” Thought I had better see the Secretary of Navy. He did not know, either, but asked me to call early to-morrow.

Friday, April 5. — Went up. Commodore Stringham in. When he passed out he said, “You had better see the Secretary about those howitzers. I have explained it to him.”

I went in. The Secretary said five or six would do, and added, “I tell you, in confidence, that these are to go to Charleston in the ‘Powhatan.’” “When does she sail?” “Sunday morning.”

I then told the Secretary that an order to the Commandant of Yard was required. He did not understand why, but said, “Let the Chief Clerk write it.” I told Mr. Berrian. He asked me to sketch it, and he wrote it himself. Asked me to telegraph Foote, which I did on my way to the Navy Yard. I reached the Yard, showed Buchanan the order, and he endorsed it.

In my interview with the President he seemed ill at ease, and not self-possessed.

Friday, April 12. — Telegraph gives account of attack on Sumter.

April 13.— Telegraph reports surrender of Sumter.

Monday, April 15. — We have in print the President’s

1 This telegram was:

To Captain JOHN A. DAHLGREN, U. S. N.

Send ten boat howitzers and equipments immediately, by express, and let one hundred rounds of ammunition for each accompany them, if possible. Refer to the President.

A. H. FOOTE.

The light artillery here telegraphed for by Foote, was intended for the “Powhatan,” which was to relieve Sumter or Pickens.
proclamation, calling 75,000 men to recapture public property,—
forts, &c., in the seceded States. The North wheels at once
into line, and if there are any who are even suspected of think-
ing well of the South, they dare not even hint it. Those who
were opposed to Republican policy have now to sustain it.

_Thursday, April 18._—It has now leaked out that Virginia
seceded on Tuesday, secretly, in order to grab the public prop-
erty that is within her borders; and it is rumored that the
Norfolk Yard and Harper’s Ferry have been seized. Every one
believes, too, that a body of men are on the way to take Wash-
ington, and the alarm is intense. There are but 1,000 United
States troops here, and 1,200 to 1,600 District volunteers. No
troops have arrived from the North, though they have talked
prodigiously. In the evening the railroad brought 600 or 700
men in poor order.

This was the critical night, and _the_ chance for the South.

_April 19._—Sixth Massachusetts reached Baltimore at noon,
with ten Philadelphia companies. A contest ensued with the
mob. The Sixth Massachusetts passed through the city with
some loss, and the Philadelphia companies were also assailed,
but succeeded in returning to Philadelphia.

Baltimore this night in the hands of the secessionists. The
telegraph wires to the North were cut, and the railroad bridges
towards Philadelphia and Harrisburg burned.

_April 20._—In the evening, coming down Pennsylvania
Avenue, I halted at Four-and-a-half Street, among a crowd
gazing at the Sixth Massachusetts, which was on its way from
the Capitol to visit the President at the White House. It was
massed in solid columns. Presently the music struck up and
the regiment moved on. I waved my hat. _But one other_ was
raised in the dense crowd around me.

That evening received requisition for ammunition to Fort
Washington.

_Friday, May 3._—The first memoranda I have had time to
make since I took command of the Yard, which was on the 22d
April. I had no idea of the resignation of the Commandant
the day before, Sunday, when I dined with the Prussian Minis-
ter. About ten o’clock the son of the Secretary came into my
office and said his father desired me to take command, as there
was something wrong going on in the Yard. Soon after Captain Buchanan sent for me and showed his resignation, which he took up to the Department himself, and on his return wrote me a letter saying so, and requested me to take com-
mand. The Department detached him in the afternoon.

All day I was very busy arming and fitting the river steam-
boats that had been seized. In the evening, occupied till late in posting my little force for defence.

On Tuesday, Buchanan asked me to call up the men to take leave. This was done at the flag-staff. He made a few remarks, and formally resigned to me. The men remained perfectly silent. Thus every officer of the Yard had resigned, and I remained with Lieutenant Wainwright, of the Ordnance, who was, I think, sick at home.

I worked incessantly to get ready the steamers and to defend the Yard. Had about forty marines and three companies of District volunteers. These latter were not to be relied on; for when I sent for a guard to go down the river in one of the steamboats, the reply was that they had only enlisted to serve within the District.

I was able to report the "Mt. Vernon" ready for service in the course of the day, and received an acknowledgment from the Department, with directions to send her down the Potomac. . . . She went down about midnight.

April 23.—Navy Department wishes me to send a steamer to have landed "nine hundred barrels of cement designed for the defence of the public buildings." Commodore Paulding writes me that General Scott will send me some men, and asks me to send all the small arms I do not need to the capital for safe keeping.

Secretary Navy writes that, on my request, he has asked "the Secretary War for a battalion of reliable troops to be ordered to the Navy Yard for its protection immediately."

Working hard to get the steamboats ready. Rather anxious about the Yard. Only forty marines and three companies of District volunteers. The marine barracks stripped of its marines; sent on the Norfolk expedition.

The "Richmond Examiner" of this date has a furious article demanding the capture of Washington.
On Wednesday, April 24, the expedition got back from Norfolk, with Paulding. I retained the marines, so that with the volunteers I had 740 men in the Yard, and with the ship about 1,100 men.

On the 25th the Seventh regiment arrived and dispelled all fears of an assault.

On Saturday, April 27, the Seventy-first regiment marched into the Yard, so that it was rendered fully safe.

The sending of the force from Washington to Norfolk was a great risk, it so reduced that required here for defence.

The attention demanded by various matters is incessant; there is no respite.

I sleep and eat in rooms near the office, and have never five minutes unoccupied from early till late. . . .

There is also a telegraphic communication established with my office and the Departments, which works pretty well. The steamboats are astir the whole time. . . .

April 27. — The Seventy-first New York, Colonel Vosburgh, relieved the District volunteers in the Yard, and were, by special order, to report to me for instruction. The Seventy-first got into the Yard close on the notice that it was coming. Colonel Vosburgh called on me to report. It was with great satisfaction that I saw this fine body of men filling the main avenue. But quarters and food were to be provided, and tight work it was. To the officers I gave the Commandant's quarters.

May 3. — Major McDowell inspected and mustered into service the Seventy-first.

My note-book speaks of continued occupation, too much so to note passing events to this date, from the time I was thrown in command.

1 "The satisfaction" with which the arrival of the Seventy-first was hailed is not to be wondered at. It was fortunate in such a supreme crisis, when an immediate collision was so imminent, and hourly feared upon the Navy Yard first, as the point to be gained which would dominate all others, that the country had at this trying post an officer of the fidelity, ability, intrepidity, and commanding intelligence of John A. Dahlgren. After the war, the Admiral always reverted to this precise period as of transcending importance in the destiny of the nation.

Greeley says of it: "Washington had, for a week, been isolated from the North, while surrounded and threatened by malignant foes."
The Secretaries of War and of Navy often visit me, for the Yard is a point of importance. I have not yet got into the Commandant's house, but sleep and eat in the room opposite my office, in the large building down near the wharf, known generally as the Commandant's office. In this very room, fourteen years ago, I sat down, a lonely, unfriended Lieutenant, to face my future and all its difficulties. Now other and greater responsibilities environ me, and I fill the place deserted by others. . . .

Besides the Yard, I have to hold the bridge next above, so some howitzers and a guard are there. It is from this direction that the rebels of the eastern shore may come. This Yard is of great importance, not only because of its furnishing the Navy so largely with various stores, but also as a position in the general defences of the city.

The bridge near it would be easily reached and passed whenever an attack may be conducted by crossing from Alexandria, and from thence over the low heights opposite the Yard.

May 6. — Major Anderson called. It was 3 or 3½ P.M. when the messenger announced him. . . . He remained half an hour, and we chatted very cosily about Sumter, &c.

May 9. — The President came down to the Yard. . . . I am still kept fully at work, living, in fact, at the office, and exerting every effort.

May 12. — President came down unexpectedly about ten, and asked to go down the river. Had a pleasant jaunt until one, Mr. Seward and Mr. Weed only in company.

May 18. — While in the Ordnance Office the President came in with the Secretary of State, seemingly on ordnance matters.

The President was exercised about the communications by the Potomac, the quantity of arms, &c. I hinted deficiency of nitre and powder. . . .

Wrote a letter to Mr. Seward suggesting a plan for the erection of batteries on commanding points along the Potomac, and, in addition, the placing of vessels of some force at two or three intervals from the kettle bottoms to the Yard near suspected positions, with communications kept up by some fast and light steamers.
Thursday, May 23. — Was notified that tonight the movement was to be made upon Alexandria, and that I was to send the naval means that had been prepared. I gave no hint of the move to a living soul until the workmen left the Yard at sunset. Then all the gates were carefully closed, and sentries doubled, with orders for no one to go out or come in.

About nine o'clock the three large lighters were towed round to Long Bridge, and I embarked with three steamers to see after the embarkation of the First Zouaves from Giesboro' Point. It was two o'clock when I got there, the tide so low that the steamers could not get in, so the large supply of boats that I had, came into play. The moon shone out brightly, and after a short search I found the way to the encampment of the Zouaves. They were under arms, and Colonel Ellsworth was forming one of the companies. Very few words were needed, and we passed down to the beach with the men near us. As I glanced at the dark masses gathered together, and saw how much time was expended in getting one company on board, I felt there was a chance of failure, at least to be up to time. However, one of the steamers got in so close, that by linking boats together a bridge was made, and the men passed on board.

Friday, May 24. — About four o'clock the regiment, divided between the "Baltimore" and "Vernon," steamed down the river. I was in the "James Guy," to assist if a necessity arose. Colonel Ellsworth was with me, but finally concluded to go in the "Vernon," and I passed him in. The day broke fairly just as we got to the wharf at Alexandria. The Zouaves jumped ashore, and the rattle of musketry was heard. It seemed as if there was to be a fight, and the howitzer of my own steamer was got ready; but it proved to be only the alarm shots of the sentries and a return from the Zouaves. The whole regiment passed quietly ashore, and Alexandria was taken.

We did not know at the time that the column from the city, by the road, was near the town, though it was ascertained subsequently. Some five hundred or six hundred men escaped, but a troop of cavalry was surprised and taken.

After the Zouaves got ashore I went alongside the "Pawnee" to get some rest, but was soon awakened by word that Colonel
COMMAND OF THE WASHINGTON YARD.

Ellsworth had been killed by a man from whose house he had hauled down a Confederate flag. I went ashore and met a party of men carrying down the body. I received it in my steamer and returned to Washington, where I arrived about nine A.M. and had it escorted ashore, by detachments from the marines and the Seventy-first, to a suitable building, where it was laid out and encoffined.

In the afternoon the President drove down with his wife to visit the remains, he being a friend of the Colonel. Not being in readiness, he drove around the Yard, and asked me to join. During the drive he asked me about removing the body to the White House. I advised the President to consult his feelings entirely. He also spoke of the prisoners in my care, the Virginia troop, and exhibited much feeling; he found their capture a troublesome question. After seeing the body, he left. Before he arrived, there was quite a scene.

The lieutenant in command of the steamboat on board of which were the prisoners, assented to their wish to see the body. As soon as they landed it became known, and the men of the Seventy-first ran from every direction in the greatest excitement and with loud threats. I managed to restore order, and rebuked the officer smartly for his imprudence.

May 25.—The body of Colonel Ellsworth was transferred to the Executive Mansion.¹

June 1.—Offer the oath of allegiance to the workmen of the Navy Yard. Only three objected. I turned them out.

June 2.—President came down about evening with the Secretary of State.

June 4.—The Chief Clerk of War Department recommends a man to me, whom I find out to be a spy.

June 8.—Secretary of Navy sends Ames to me with note of introduction.

Sunday, June 9.—Events thicken so rapidly that I have no time to note them. . . . The troop of cavalry (thirty-five in number) taken with Alexandria, remained in my hands till the 6th, when I liberated them, by leave of the Navy Department,

¹ We have transcribed in detail these incidents relating to the death of Colonel Ellsworth, as he was one of the first, if not the first patriot of this war who lost his life in defending the flag.
and on the 8th I released the four who were taken in the skirmish at Fairfax, by leave from General Mansfield.

This release and the treatment here I claim for myself. They received the same food and care as the United States men in the same vessel, except they were not permitted to leave it, and they thanked me for it. . . . The President often comes to see the Yard, and treat me without reserve.

**June 17.**—Telegram from General Scott to send the Seventy-first from Alexandria. An attack suspected.

**June 18.**—Sent Captain Ellis, of Seventy-first, to seize some arms of insurgent cavalry of the eastern shore. The expedition left the Navy Yard about nine o'clock at night, and about eleven o'clock I had a telegram from General Scott asking if such were the case. This is of no importance, except to show that spies were kept to note what was done by United States officers.

The Seventy-first came back from Alexandria, and next day General Scott telegraphed again to send it down to Alexandria; attack still expected. To-day a case of slave-escaping. I received a note from General Mansfield, saying that in his opinion it would be right to deliver him. As that is not my business, I turned the case over to the civil authority.

**Friday, June 21.**—The main armies are in position about twenty-seven miles distant from each other,—one along the heights from Alexandria to Georgetown, the other at Manassas Junction; but there are bodies from each in advance, and their pickets are said to be nearly in sight, so that at any moment even accident may precipitate the collision. General Scott is exceedingly on the alert, with every precaution, and is now bringing here a regiment of regulars, among other troops, which seems to indicate the first brush to be near. To-day I had one of those mysterious premonitions that sometimes precede reality. It was pencilled on a leaf torn from a small blank-book, warning of a design on the city by surprise.

**June 22.**—The "Star" quotes from a letter written by Senator Mason to Mr. Faulkner (Minister to France), in which it is said that "measures had been taken to pass the ordinance of
secession on the 20th February, and the seizure of Washington on the 1st of March" last.

A letter from Ward on Wednesday and Monday.

_Sunday, June 23._—Letter from Captain Ward. Had been fired at with musketry from Matthias Point. Wanted two hundred soldiers to take the Point. I went to see the Secretary of Navy, and he suggested seeing General Scott; so we went to his quarters (private) on Pennsylvania Avenue. It was a hot day, and the General was up-stairs, but presently came down, leaning heavily on a cane and looking infirm. He read the letter of Ward, and ending, said suddenly, "A battalion! He shall have two!" Then, after a little pause, as if on second thought, said, "You had better see General Mansfield and arrange it with him."

Went to him with Colonel Cullum, General Scott's aid, and to the Navy Department. General Mansfield thought there might be a large force there, and hesitated. Cullum looked the same way. Finally, General Mansfield preferred a consultation.

_Monday, June 24._—At room of General Mansfield by ten o'clock. Major Barnard and Captain Woodbury there, also Palmer, of Topographical Engineers. Discussed the matter. All the soldiers adverse to the action. Might be a large force there, and involve a considerable operation. Decided to send Woodbury and Palmer to view the ground. So I started them off at three p.m. in a steamboat.

_Tuesday, June 25._—They returned at six p.m. Found no batteries on the Point, but four hundred or five hundred men, who scampered when the "Pawnee" threw shells at them. Do not favor the occupation. And there it ended.

_June 28._—I went up at seven o'clock to breakfast, and when I returned the Yard colors were at half-mast. I soon learned that the "Pawnee" was up, with Ward's dead body. He had landed some men last evening on Matthias Point, and nearly finished a slight breastwork, when the other side came down in force under cover of the woods, and gave such a destructive fire that the seamen had to make for their boats at once and get off.

Ward laid off a few hundred yards in the "Freeborn," and was covering his men as well as a single 32-pdr. would do it.
The captain of the gun being shot, Captain Ward jumped down off the light-deck and was sighting the cannon when a musket bullet struck him and went right through his body. He was caught by the sailor nearest, who at once fired the gun. Ward was carried to the quarter-deck, and lived about an hour. The last act was to order the cable slipped and the "Freeborn" to steam out and tow her companion, the schooner, away. . . . I had his body brought ashore under a strong escort, and placed in the little Gothic chapel. At four dined at the President's, though too sad to enjoy the occasion.

Saturday, June 29. — Had poor Ward carried to the depot. The Seventy-first regiment and a battalion of marines, with band and officers, attended. Captain Ringgold takes the body home.

Ward had written me on the day of the reconnaissance that he was much disgusted at the course pursued by the military. Said that the troops ought to be sent, "otherwise I shall have to try what I can do at a needless risk." So on the 27th he did try. His force was too small, and he was killed. A most needless throwing away of a brave officer's life. If the troops asked for had been sent, instead of the two engineers, Ward would have succeeded, for they landed without difficulty.

Sunday, June 30. — The President drives down about eleven a.m. with Secretary of State and Attorney-General. Asked into carriage and drive through the Yard. Then go on board "Pawnee."

July 12. — A telegram from General McDowell, making an appointment at Willard's to meet me this evening "on business of importance." I found it was to talk over the advance of the army contemplated. He is in command. Scott is too infirm. I proposed to land 10,000 men on the flank of the rebel position near Manassas, by steamers sent down the river. McDowell hesitated, and said he would think of it.

July 13. — Met again in the evening. McDowell said he liked the plan, but with volunteers it would be too doubtful. In the course of conversation the possibility of retreat was spoken of. He remarked it was impossible, as with volunteers it would become a rout.

Sunday, July 14. — During the last two weeks the force
here has been steadily increased by fresh regiments, so that
about eighty have arrived.

Gradually, too, the troops have been transferred to the oppo-
site shore, by the long bridge or by the Navy Yard steamers;
by the latter at least 12,000 men in last week or ten days.
There is a very gradual advance of our pickets in front also,
corresponding to the accession of our force on the south side.

Last Sunday the President came down with Mr. Seward and
stayed a couple of hours. We are approaching the explosion,
and before long the test of arms will be had.

The North and the South are at last face to face, with all
the armed strength each has been able to collect up to this
time. The armies are in good order, and their pickets are in
full view of each other. What is the question to be decided?
History and calmer hearts must answer. The first shock of
armies is inevitable, but the result is of more import to the
South than to the North. . . .

The foregoing was written in the morning, in entire uncon-
sciousness that the battle was actually going on at the time.
The information did not reach here till the afternoon.

The President drove into the Yard about six in the evening,
and as I rode with him told me that the armies were hotly
engaged and the other side getting the worst of it. About
seven p.m. Sunday I had a telegram from General Mansfield
asking me to send a vessel of war at once to Alexandria to
command the approaches. This looked badly. The Yard was
now as still as a church-yard; no one in it. I walked down to
the wharf where lay the venerable and miserable brig "Perry,"
all that I had of a vessel of war, just come up and snugly made
fast. I hailed Parrott and told him to get under way. Having
no steam, I sent a tug to tow, and the "Perry" got down.

An hour later, Fox 1 came down from the Navy Department,
and told me of the entire defeat of our army.

About ten o'clock the Secretary of the Navy (just awake
probably to the trouble) telegraphed me that I would do well
to have prepared all vessels that I could, to send to Alexandria
(all I had were there); also, that our men had made a stand
at Centreville.

1 Assistant Secretary of Navy.
At midnight the first man (of the Seventy-first) from the field reached the Yard.

*Monday, July 22.*—About daylight some of the wounded began to come in, and at ten o'clock the regiment arrived,—if one can so call a mere handful of jaded, miserable-looking men,—in all not over 150; but they marched in order and had the colonel and colors. Last Tuesday they went out in splendid style, 750 strong. They lost my two howitzers. Through the day the stragglers arrived in numbers. All accounts concur in reporting very bad management. The army was on the march twelve hours before battle, without food or rest, and the men engaged moved at a run for two miles; they were nearly exhausted at the outset.

Then there was very little plan of battle; or, such as there was, so transparent that the enemy saw through it at once.

The army diverged in three parts from a central point,—the left, of no great force, being designed as a diversion. The right divided, one part moving so as to cross the Bull Run and take the Confederates in flank; and here was the weight of the battle: our men stuck to it vigorously, and their left wing had to give ground until reinforced in the afternoon, by the corps arriving from Winchester, when our men perceiving they were beaten, our right wing soon became a routed rabble.

The other divisions came off in order, and the whole army fell back to the lines whence it marched on Tuesday.

The confusion in our right wing—some 15,000 men—is said to have been supreme and most disgraceful, the men accusing their officers, while, in fact it was the system. Volunteers are well enough to advance, but discipline only can make a retreat safe. Washington was soon filled with the crowd of soldiers from the beaten regiments, who infested every street and were very troublesome. The panic among the citizens was great, for they apprehended a pursuit and attack; which apprehension was so well grounded that only the inability of the Confederates prevented it.

In the morning (4 a.m.) I was asked by Major Ramsay, of the Arsenal, to send any cannon that could be spared, to the lines. The rain fell in torrents all day, rendering the condi-
tion of the fugitives distressing. They had lost my howitzers in the retreat.

Tuesday, July 23.—The Secretary of the Navy telegraphed me to be ready to send officers and men to Fort Ellsworth, as it might be attacked at night.

Wednesday, July 24.—I send three IXth guns and five howitzers to the lines, with 110 sailors and some marines.

Sunday, Aug. 4.—Order and confidence fully restored; General McClellan has taken command, and the effects were immediate on the discipline of the troops.

The naval battery is in fine order.

Congress has by law authorized the President to give yards to Commanders and the Bureaus also. This opens one half the duties of Captains to Commanders, and thus initiates an important progressive move, without any seeming previous intent, but originating entirely from reasons personal to myself. The Washington Yard is by law the only Yard which a Commander cannot command. It was desired to retain me, and in so doing I was made to carry two most important additions. By a law of March 27, 1804, the Washington Navy Yard was specially restricted to a "Captain"; intended really to make a place for Captain Tingeys, who retained it until his death in 1829. Captains succeeded in the course of service, but when the Commandant and officers abandoned the Yard, April 22, 1861, the command, by default, devolved on me, then only a Commander. After the crisis had passed and the Government was secured by the arrival of the army, some of the Captains asked for the Yard, on the ground that it was not legal for me to hold it; but the President answered: "The Yard shall not be taken from the Captain; he held it when no one else would, and now he shall keep it as long as he pleases." Finally, Congress enabled me to do so by amending the old law,—Aug. 2, 1861,—which I have always considered as the best compliment I ever received.

Saturday, Aug. 3.—Before Naval Committee on James's memorial, which was abusive of me. I refuted all its statements and denounced them as slanderous lies. He agreed to withdraw it; the Committee assented, and it was withdrawn.

Monday, Aug. 5, 1861.—A white day! The Secretary sent
for me and offered me the Bureau of Ordnance. I declined, and he asked me to consider. . . .

Prince Napoleon visited the Yard. The Secretary of State and his own suite accompanied him. I had the fullest opportunity to converse with him. He is dull, very like the pictures of his uncle, the Napoleon, but there ends the resemblance. In the evening I dined with him at the Secretary of State's. After dinner, in the parlor, he sat astride of a chair, his hands on the back, while the Secretary of State and several Foreign Ministers were standing near,—Mrs. Seward (son's wife) of the circle,—and he puffing at his cigar. He is rude and overbearing in his remarks.

Tuesday, Aug. 6.—I went to the Secretary, and positively declined the Bureau. He had given me to the last minute for consideration, as the Senate had but one and a half hour to sit. I recommended Harwood.

Thursday, Aug. 15.—There exists great uneasiness as to the movements of the Confederates. General McClellan is anxious lest they cross the Potomac into Maryland, which is disaffected, and advance on Washington.

I have seen two letters from him urging the Secretary of Navy to guard the river effectually.

This evening I am telegraphed from Navy Department that there is a large number of scows kept in the creek ready to cross. There has also been mutiny in two of our regiments. The President came down and gave me the first news, wishing me to have the prisoners kept in the Yard. They arrived at midnight, sixty-six in number. To-day the President came down about noon and conversed on the matter.

Sunday, Aug. 18.—All quiet below. Our flotilla off Acquia detects little change and no movement; still, our side is expectant of trouble, and General McClellan prepares for it. . . . I shall try to get some small craft down to Acquia tonight with coal and provisions for the flotilla, in case the Confederate batteries at Matthias and White House hem them in. If our troops were reliable we should let them cross.

1 After the Prince visited the work in the Yard, I offered him refreshments at my house (the Commandant's). His suite did not go to the table until he had left it.
COMMAND OF THE WASHINGTON YARD.

_Thursday, Sept. 12._ — Some ten days since, I sent over 400 sailors to occupy Fort Ellsworth, with Wainwright to command.

Last Saturday I was asked to General McClellan's to consult with other officers on a proposition to attack Matthias Point. I am occupied incessantly.

The Navy is a little in favor since the capture of the Hatteras Fort.

_Sunday, Sept. 15._ — I have just hurried away the "Flag," with men at work on her head, lest the river should be closed. . . .

The flotilla is also increasing. The "Pensacola" took her crew yesterday, though the engine is not ready.

I garrison Fort Ellsworth and the Naval Battery outside, with 600 sailors, and there is a growing disposition with General McClellan to have them in all the works. If we had anything but volunteers!

Last night Professor Way took his electro-mercury light down the river, and I had the President out in a steamboat to see it; the result was very satisfactory.

_Thursday, Sept. 26._ — The fast day proclaimed by the President,—the first day in which there has been a suspension of labor in this Yard since I took command.

The Prince de Joinville is here, with other French princes, so there are some dinners, &c.

At the dinner at Secretary of State, we had, besides de Joinville, the Count of Paris (heir to the French throne), and the Duke de Chartres, his brother. General McClellan was present.

Yesterday I dined at the President's, and the little Duke de Penthievre passed the whole morning with me looking at the works. He has been appointed a midy at our Naval School, while the Count of Paris and his brother are commissioned as Captains in the army on General McClellan's staff. This is to enable them to see the war. They are well informed, and are fond of "talking guns" with me.

_Saturday._ — Mr. Seward told me that the 10th of October was fixed for the grand movement.

_Sunday, Sept. 29._ — General Van Vliet, of McClellan's staff,
came to see about the transportation of some troops in the operation of to-morrow night.

_Friday, Oct. 4._ — General McClellan came in after sunset, having sent word previously by telegraph that he intended "making me an informal visit." . . . I was walking up the main avenue, and when just half-way encountered the General. . . . We made a brief round among the ordnance matters, and then adjourned to my quarters for tea. Though rather below the average size, General McClellan is of martial figure,—the countenance open, and not impressed with any one characteristic, but harmonizing much intelligence and manliness with perfect bonhomie. You recognize mind, and firmness, and a fine disposition, but no one of them too dominant. He is well educated, well bred; without the least assumption in manner, but winning in his address. In a few minutes he was using my last name. Conversing on various topics as they arose, either military or political, he was unreserved and at ease. He spoke of the men who had initiated the present status, and observed he was a Democrat. The probability of a predominance of the military element hereafter was hinted at.

_Thursday, Oct. 10._ — There are here altogether fifteen steamers, being the largest force ever assembled here. I sent down in one of the steamboats 200 seamen to man the "Rip Raps"; also four rifled 80-pdr.s., with a quantity of solid shot for the IXm. and Xm. guns, as a preparation for the "Merri-mac," which is said to have been plated.

_Sunday, Oct. 13._ — I sent two steamboats yesterday to Annapolis to assist in the embarkation, as the expedition for the southern coast is about to start.

So here we are again on the verge of a decision. Mighty hosts will soon be in collision to decide more than was decided on the 21st of July, though that was no small matter.

Now, as then, the Southern General seems resolute to offer no battle from his vantage-ground, but falls back at once from his advance to the lines of the Potomac.

If McDowell could have foreseen this, and not moved too rapidly for reinforcements from Harper's Ferry, or leisurely enough to intrench at Centreville, he might have forced back his opponent, or have held his own ground when pushed
back himself. We are all wise after the event; who is so before it?

Oct. 14.—Just closing dinner, and Captain Drayton at table, when General McClellan was announced with his quartermaster, General Van Vliet. The same friendly greeting passed as before, and in a few minutes we four were engaged in a quiet chat over cigars and champagne. Drayton did not remain long, and the conversation took an interesting character. The General, I soon found, has his annoyances as well as other people, for it seems that Scott insists on the direction, and McClellan resists. . . . He says Scott actually had an idea of preferring charges against him for the advance of the last few days! On one occasion at a general council the President read a paper, and observed he supposed that McClellan concurred, who answered he did not, but differed on every point. Scott then said he believed in McClellan's abilities, but after that would say nothing in the way of friendship. . . . He says Scott does not wish to fight, but considers delay the policy. McClellan thinks otherwise. He says, too, that he is never consulted in the movements of the other armies.

I could not but feel apprehensive when I found that on the eve of another trial the real leader was to be paralyzed in this way. . . .

One thing I noticed, that the General never became excited in speaking of these things, but was always in the best temper. I only hope that there will be influence somewhere to save him from this foolish embarrassment.

He is a hearty, clever gentleman, of the most moderate and proper ambition, and warm and kind in his feelings.

After he left I went to see the Secretary of Navy, who had telegraphed me. General McClellan also said that General Patterson had acted by orders of General Scott about the time of the battle of 21st, though General Scott had openly blamed Patterson.

Oct. 15.—Drayton had breakfasted with me. He had the "Pocahontas," one of those improvised war-vessels that arose on the necessity of the case, rather slow for a steamer. She had a heavy pivot gun, one of my own X in.

Several steamers were gathered at the Yard. McClellan's
great army lay in front of our lines about Alexandria, and the rebels right before them. The navigation of the river was still open, but we had word of batteries in preparation to close it, and with some solicitude were waiting developments.

The vessels were to go down to-day. Drayton and I chatted pleasantly over the breakfast, and when finished he rose to go aboard. I went to the front door; and as he was moving out of the garden gate I said jokingly, "Take care, Drayton, of those batteries." Drayton turned for a moment, with his pleasant smile. "I would make them show themselves if I had authority," he replied. "Very well," said I, "I will give you authority; have them out." So the brave gentleman went on. In the course of the day we received the news that, approaching the first suspected point, Drayton cast loose his X\textsuperscript{ma} and put in one shell after another, — aim cool, water smooth, distance right. Instantly some axemen leaped in front of the tall trees, and in a few moments they felled them to the ground, proving that they were but a mere screen for the batteries. The "Pocahontas" had now passed the batteries and ceased firing, as her gun ceased to bear, but the "Seminole," just behind, was fairly abreast. Rapidly came forth the sheets of flame, as one shot after another was poured into the "Seminole." Gillis, nowise daunted, promptly returned the compliment with shells from his XI\textsuperscript{ma} gun; but in a few minutes the "Seminole," too, had gotten out of fair range, and the firing ceased.

This was our first acquaintance with the river battery.

The "Pawnee" was preparing to leave about two P. M. with a battalion of marines on board, when Craven arrived in the "Yankee," and announced that the new batteries were at last opened (as has just been narrated). The "Pawnee" being so full of men, it seemed too much risk to pass this fire, so I detained the vessel for orders. The Secretary of the Navy came down at six P. M. with Craven and his chief clerk, Faxon. After some little chat it was decided to put the marines in a steamboat, which would thus pass nearly two miles from the batteries, while the "Pawnee" went down in the channel, as required by her draft.

They were to get to the place about four A.M., between moonset and sunrise. The "Vernon" did so, and was not
seen, but the "Pawnee" was late, and the eastern horizon was bright with the approaching sunrise, so the batteries plied her briskly, but only hit six times, and without damage. Thus the essay was successful, to my satisfaction, as I had held to the above plan.

Oct. 19. — Took the President to see the "Pensacola." He was accompanied by the Secretaries of State and Navy. Thence we went impromptu to Fort Washington, and got back after sunset.

Oct. 21. — General McClellan came to see me. We had dinner, and while conversing, the move at Leesburg was announced by telegram. We discussed the question of the river and other matters, and the General told me plainly his plan of campaign.

Oct. 23. — The Secretary directed me to say to Craven that a division of 8,000 men and 15 guns would guard the Maryland shore opposite the batteries of Ship Point. This was past eleven at night.

Oct. 24. — The Secretary sent for me, and we went to see General McClellan, who had not returned.

I again offered the counter battery, to check the rebel movements on the river. This battery to be made up of the "Pensacola's" 14 × IXm and one XIIn, with, from the Yard, 7—IXm, one of XIIn, three rifled 80-pdrs., seven XIn mortars, one 50-pdr. — in all, twenty-one of IXm, two of XIIn, three of 80 rifled, one of 50, and seven XIn mortars. Total, twenty-seven cannon and seven mortars actually available.

Late in the afternoon the Prince de Joinville came in. He was much engrossed with the crisis. He said that England was very unfriendly, and was ready to recognize the Confederacy, and that he had almost quarrelled with Lord Lyons, who said "they will do nothing," and that Europe was tired of waiting. The Prince said that the Emperor was so much concerned with European affairs that he would let England have her way anywhere else.

This introduced the pending intrigues said to be on hand to displace McClellan, which the Prince deplored. . . .

After a little talk on ordnance, he asked me to dine with him, which I had to decline.
My country! At such a crisis, the ancient republic met the troubles by a dictator. While writing these lines early in the evening, General McClellan telegraphed to know if I will be at home in an hour.

It was nearly nine o'clock when he arrived. McClellan got back in the afternoon from Leesburg, and was ill pleased with the blunders committed there. . . .

Oct. 29. — I took Secretary of Navy to visit Fort Ellsworth. Wainwright had it in fine order.

Oct. 31. — Spent the evening at the White House with Mrs. Lincoln. She always speaks with interest of public affairs. She said that while Mr. Lincoln's own party were far from united, the President was receiving the support even of Democrats. The Secretary of the Navy expressed the same sentiment to me a few days since,—that the Democratic portion was more hearty in support of the Administration than the Whig portion.

Friday, Nov. 1. — Prince de Joinville and his nephew, the Count of Paris, came down and spent some time with me, exhibiting great interest in our work. The Count was dressed in the United States uniform, as a Captain.

General Scott finally retires, and the President devolves the command of the army on McClellan. So he has his wish.

One evening, when I joked him on the Presidency, he said firmly that he did not want it. His ambition was to be Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

The trade by the river is closed, not so much by the batteries as by our own vessels, which will not allow craft to take the risk. As a consequence, the railroad is the sole communication, and may become blocked.

Nov. 14. — The papers have the full accounts of the successful entrance of the expedition into Port Royal. The fleet first attacked the forts and compelled their abandonment; then the troops landed.

In the evening accompanied Secretary Welles, Fox, and Porter to see General McClellan about troops for another expedition. While there the President and Secretary of State came in, and the President proposed a trip to the "Pensacola" next day.
Nov. 15.—The President came with Secretary of War, Navy, Attorney-General, and Senator Trumbull; soon after, the Secretary of State and Postmaster-General. We embarked and went aboard on the “Pensacola.”

The President said to the Secretary of Navy, “I will make a Captain of Dahlgren as soon as you say there is a place.” The Secretary of War followed, saying, “that if the President would transfer me to the Army Ordnance, he would put me at the head of it, and make me a Brigadier-General.” . . . This same day the Navy Department directs me to withdraw the seamen from Fort Ellsworth and send them to Foote, in the West. They had been in the works nearly four months, and obtained an excellent reputation. They were embarking at Alexandria just as we left the “Pensacola,” and cheered the President.

Nov. 16.—News came of the arrest of Mason and Slidell by the “San Jacinto.” They were on their way to Europe as envoys from the Southern States.

Nov. 17.—In the evening, dining with the Prince de Joinville, he expressed apprehension of the course England would take in the Mason and Slidell affair.

Nov. 19.—The Postmaster-General, Mr. Blair, said to me that the President had proposed in Cabinet to make me a Captain, and that the Secretary of the Navy backed down.

Nov. 20.—A grand review of 70,000 men.

Nov. 26.—Conveyed Mrs. Lincoln down the river in a steamer to see a review. We went so low down as to be within long range of the rebel batteries, which in no wise troubled Mrs. Lincoln.

Nov. 28.—Thanksgiving day. I dined at the President’s, and made one of a party of thirteen.

Nov. 29.—The French Admiral, Renaud, with the French Minister, visited the Navy Yard, and, under existing circumstances, more than usual pains were taken to be agreeable. In the evening I was at Mr. Seward’s dinner to the Admiral.

Yesterday, on leaving the Yard to go to the President’s, I met the Prince de Joinville coming on horseback to see me. . . . He was much interested that the French Admiral should be pleased, as he was to command the French fleet in our
waters, and already the awkwardness of two or three little gun-
boats in not assisting the wrecked French steamer had caused
unpleasant comment. He said that he knew them all, and had
interviews which were necessarily secret, from his own position
to the Emperor.

Nov. 30.—With General McClellan in the evening, by
appointment. I found him just finishing dinner with the
Prince and Count of Paris, who soon left when I entered, con-
jecturing business.

The General told me that he desired to have the calibre of
Army and Navy ordnance alike, because he had just summoned
a board of officers to reform the armaments of the forts. He
said that for several reasons he deemed it best that the Army
should adopt the Navy ordnance IX\textsuperscript{th} and XI\textsuperscript{th}, and asked me
if there were any objections. He asked me to join the board,
and offered to constitute it in any way I chose. . . . I left at
eight o'clock, and, returning later in the evening, found the
President, the Secretary of State, the Prince, and several others.
While sitting in the circle, the President again avowed his
willingness to promote me if the Department would find a
place for me. . . . After the President left we discussed the
various expeditions South, and the new idea of general cam-
pany was talked over.

Dec. 15.—The first news from England regarding the
seizure of Mason and Slidell. . . . The Message of the Presi-
dent was conservative, and is attacked by the extreme opinion;
and some impatience exists as to delay of movement by the
army on the Potomac.

On Thursday, Dec. 12, I went down to Mt. Vernon with
Secretaries of War and Treasury, and several ladies and gen-
tlemen in company. As the position of our forces here was by
no means assured, I considered it very hazardous for such im-
portant functionaries to go ashore. However, the whole party
went, except him of War, who quietly remained in the steam-
boat in mid-river. When we returned I dined with the Secre-
tary of Treasury.

News from England squally, though we have not heard fully
yet.

Dec. 18.—The President, Secretaries Seward and Stanton,
came to see the seamen drill. While they were in my parlor
by themselves, I never saw the President or Mr. Seward more
quiet or grave. The British affair seemed to weigh on them.

Dec. 19. — The Navy retiring bill has passed, shelving
officers after forty-five years on the register, or at sixty-two
years of age. Originally it was put at forty years. I got Hale
to extend it to forty-five. Then sixty years of age was added,
which I got Sedgwick to amend to sixty-two years.

Friday, Dec. 27. — I took the President on board the "Pens-
sacola," for her second trial trip. No one else was with us, so
we had a quiet time. The President looks grave and absorbed,
and a little the worse for his cares. It was late when we
reached the anchorage off Alexandria. Though the question
was frequently spoken of by me, the President was silent about
the British trouble.

Dec. 28. — Mason and Slidell are to be given up. There was
no alternative but war with England. The tenor of the paper
delivered by Lord Lyons was distinct to this purpose. Right
or wrong, they must be given up, for we could not wage war
with a single naval power of Europe without losing our naval
superiority over the South. . . . In the evening I was at the
soirée of the Dutch Minister. The British Minister was not
there, nor our own Secretary of State. The diplomatists were
all full-mouthed with the English view, which made me indig-
nant. May she again tread on their necks, as she has done
before now! The Prince de Joinville talked with me at length.
When we parted, the French Minister (who, of course, does
not speak with the Prince) took me aside, and said, "What
did the Prince say of it?" My answer certainly did not
inform him.

Dec. 31. — As this year ends the land is silent and sad under
the last humiliation, for it is not to be helped. So we have
taken another lesson in adversity.

The financial world is also troubled, for the banks have
suspended.

We have quoted continuously from the private mem-
oranda before us, not attempting to give any general
glimpses of the war that was devastating the country other than these graphic pen-pictures from Dahlgren's notes of his daily life. But as he was in constant and familiar intercourse with the President and his advisers, this journal may serve the valuable purpose, whenever the history of this momentous period shall be written, of assisting to give the real motives that prompted action. During the year of 1861 the adhesion of Kentucky to the Union, doubtless furnished in reality the basis of all subsequent Union successes. After Bull Run it was obviously needful that Scott should retire, as he was too infirm to leave his home, and McClellan, who alone had been successful in West Virginia, was made his successor. The effect was instant upon the discipline of the new army, and McClellan quietly continued to collect troops and to form an army. The Republicans by degrees opposed McClellan, and by the time that Congress met in December this feeling was formidable. McClellan was immovable in his plans, and the opposition was so active as to silence his friends one after the other. As the year ended, however, the army was deemed fit for an advance.

We will close our record of this year by giving a personal sketch by N. P. Willis in his own words, and published at this period.\(^1\) Willis says: —

We made a visit to Captain Dahlgren at his official quarters. The great inventor is too famous a person to escape the usual penalty of pre-eminence; and he will forgive me, therefore, if I tell the public what it wishes to know of his personnel. He is a light-complexioned man of perhaps forty years of age, slight and of medium height, pale and delicate featured. His

\(^1\) "Home Journal," June 29, 1861, and sent to Captain Dahlgren with compliments of N. P. Willis.
countenance is exceedingly thoughtful and modest, and expresses complete unconsciousness of being observed; while his eye is inevitably keen and his thin nostrils expand, as he talks, with a look of great enthusiasm. A practised physiognomist would at once pick him out for a man of distinguished abilities, though his destructive branch of science would hardly be guessed under a demeanor so quiet and amiable.
CHAPTER XIII.


We shall continue to quote from the private memoranda of Dahlgren for 1862 (as we have done heretofore), in place of giving a narrative in our own words, because his notes, written at the moment the events transpired, present the most graphic picture that could be given. They must always transcend in fidelity any impressions not at the time recorded.

New Year's Day, 1862, was clear and balmy as a warm autumn day. At 11½ the officers of the Navy bowed to the President and his lady. . . . On the whole, it was a solemn day, unmarked by joy or pleasure. Every one was in motion, but conversation was restrained and not at ease.

Jan. 2.—In the afternoon the President drove down with Fox to see the 150-pdr. fired. . . . I went with them to my house. For the first time I heard the President speak of the bare possibility of our being two nations,—as if alluding to a previous suggestion. He could not see how the two could exist so near to each other. He was evidently worried. . . . Said "No one seemed ready," with much feeling.

Jan. 13.—This afternoon the town is astonished to learn that Cameron has resigned from the War Department, and Stanton takes his place. Stanton was Attorney-General with Buchanan at the close of his administration.

This change must have great significance, and the appointment of Stanton, a Democrat and Cabinet Officer of the last
administration, a year since, indicates a corresponding tendency in the views of the President and his friends.

_**Feb. 8.**_—The public is disquieted with apprehension of British intervention. How stands the game? It is one year since five of the Cotton States seceded from us. The Northern States have an army of 600,000 men in the field. The Navy has been expanded so as to command the Southern seaboard. We hold a point on the coast of North Carolina, one in South Carolina, and one in Florida. In a word, we are just prepared to move, and only wait on the weather. The first weather that freezes the road hard, _ought_ to be the signal. Will it be?

The opportunity for decision seems brief, from two causes,—one financial, the other political. A debt of not less than five hundred millions has been incurred for this preparation, without the first step to provide for it; so the public credit has been used to its full extent, and we are threatened with want of funds.

The other difficulty is from abroad. England cautiously but surely progresses towards intervention. . . . Mason and Slidell are demanded by an ultimatum, and now we have threats of more direct interference, for which purpose she does not relax in preparation for war. . . . It is now evident that the pivot of affairs lay in the period beginning at the time when the attack of Sumter was decided, and the abandonment of Norfolk. The loss of Norfolk was almost fatal; could that have been held, the fate of Virginia might have been otherwise.

_The Department had one month to send there a suitable Commandant and officers, which was not done._ So the latter deserted and the former was helpless.

How much has it cost, only to ward off the consequences of this mistake! . . .

_**Feb. 5.**_—The Presidential Reception came off this evening, as appointed. The President and Mrs. Lincoln received in the East Room. The only distinction between this _soirée_ and the usual reception was, that the guests were selected by invitation and there was a supper. It so happened, I was the only Navy officer present. The officers of the Army, below the rank of General of Brigade, with one or two exceptions, were not there.

All the Foreign Ministers were present.
About midnight the President led the way to the supper-room, which was said to be the most superb thing of the kind that had been seen in Washington.\footnote{1} While the supper was going on, I fell in with General McClellan. He whispered to me that Fremont was in the room. This is the first occasion I have heard of Fremont's appearance in such places. The General admired my sword very much; for, being in full uniform, I wore that presented by the Seventy-first. I observed the niece of Mrs. McClellan with General Stone. Four days afterwards General Stone was arrested for treason and sent to Fort Lafayette.\footnote{2}

\textit{Feb. 8.} — The new gunboat, "Pinola," arrived to take her armament. The "Harriet Lane" is ready for service. I have changed and increased her battery to three of IX., one rifled 30, and one rifled 12-pdr.

\textit{Feb. 16.} — Since my last memoranda the Union has had a series of successes. On the 5th Foote attacked Fort Henry with his armored batteries and took it. The army was to have anticipated, but did not get up until half an hour after the flag was down. The armored boats bore no mean proof, and they suffered some damage. On the 15th and 16th Fort Donelson was taken. It contained 15,000 men. The armored boats engaged at short distance, and after 1 1/2 hours' firing they were so mauled as to haul off with severe loss. The troops finally carried the works. Bowling Green had just been evacuated; so that all the strategic points have been carried on the western line. . . . This frees Kentucky and lays Tennessee open; Price has also been obliged to evacuate Missouri. Burnside and Goldsborough attacked and took Roanoke Island.

The President, fully alive to the significant importance of these events, has proclaimed an amnesty for all political offences. He snaps his fingers at disloyalty.

\textit{Feb. 21.} — The Prince de Joinville sat for an hour with me

\footnote{1} The author remembers this supper as the most splendid probably ever served at the Presidential mansion, or, perhaps indeed, in Washington at any time.

\footnote{2} It now appears, from testimony before a committee, that the Secretary of War had ordered McClellan to arrest Stone on the 28th January, some nine days previous to this reception.
in the office, chatting about matters. He says that the Diplomatic Corps had Southern sympathies and believed in our failure; but, since the recent successes, the notions were becoming changed.

*Feb. 22.*—Congress resolved to have the "Farewell Address" of Washington read in the presence of the various Dignitaries of State. . . . The spectacle was the most imposing I ever witnessed. . . . The occasion lent all interest to the scene, for the country, after a term of doubt and despondency, was now awakened to better hopes by a series of victories that seemed to promise peace to the Union. There was all propriety observed throughout, and no sound was audible in the vast and elegant hall save the voice of the reader as he went through the Address.

The absence of one person was noticed among the diplomats, and that was Lord Lyons, the British Minister. Every one felt how well he might have waived the pretext of Prince Albert's death; for the general tone is evidently becoming more bitter on both sides.

The exclusion of the "Tuscarora" from British waters, after a detention really forcible, to permit the escape of the "Nashville," has given a sharp edge to expression here.

*Feb. 27.*—The Naval Committee of House considered the bill for grades in the Navy.

*March 4.*—The President has been in power just one year. What an eventful year! Few men have had so much to try them.

It is hardly to be denied that the prospects of the Union are better now than one year ago. . . . There is a remarkable stringency in the circulation of war news. The new Secretary of War seems to have muzzled the press at last in that respect.

*March 7.*—The President is out with his message to Congress, recommending a resolution that the United States will assist any State that desires to be rid of its slaves. This seems to have taken all by surprise, and is a dexterous hit just now, when the extreme party is contemplating a decisive blow at slavery. Being a mild measure, and optional with the Slave States, it will probably be adopted by moderate men as the
best under the circumstances. Like the amnesty after the first victory at Mill Springs, this move of the President's is calculated to do good. . . . The Navy Department has telegraphed to know what draught of water could be had up the Potomac, and to send a steamer to Fort Monroe, to bring the frigates "St. Lawrence," "Congress," and "Cumberland" into the Potomac immediately, and the Commander of the flotilla to report at the Department to-morrow.

So we again approach the great crisis of the drama.

It is the general impression, and I have it confirmed directly, that General McClellan is altogether averse to an attack on the Confederates in front at this time; but public opinion, or, rather, extreme men, have been urging it for a long time, and now have gone so far that a member of Congress said, "General McClellan must move the army or be removed himself." . . . The telegrams, however, to-night seem to announce the beginning.

March 8.—It is nine o'clock, and Wyman is coming up in the "Yankee," as directed. Fox goes to Old Point, to see what truth there may be in a rumor that the "Merrimac" is ready to come out. . . .

Sunday, March 9.—Bang comes the blow from a clear sky and on a beautiful warm Sunday.

Sitting in my office, about 10½ in the morning, when I should have been in church, the President was announced at the door. I went out. Senator Browning was with him. He had, as he said, "frightful news." The "Merrimac" had come out yest- erday, smashed the "Cumberland," and compelled the "Con- gress" to surrender, just where they lay off Newport News. The "Minnesota" was ashore in trying to attack her, and the "Roanoke," having a broken shaft, kept under the guns of Fort Monroe; so our naval force was reduced rather quickly. The President did not know whether we might not have a visit here, which would indeed cap the climax! I could give but little comfort; such a thing might be prevented, but not met. If the "Merrimac" entered the river, it must be blocked; that was about all which could be done at present. We talked as the carriage passed quickly along; the President was not at all stunned by the news, but was in his usual suggestive mood.
Senator Browning left, and I followed the President. Poor gentleman, how thin and wasted he is!

The Secretaries of State and War and Navy, General Meigs, Assistant Secretary of War Watson, and Private Secretary Nicolay were in his private room. It was instructive to see the effect on all. General McClellan was also present. There was a hasty and very promiscuous emission of opinions from every one, without much regard to rank, and some inter-talking which rather confused. Meigs looked desponding and was silent. McClellan was concerned about the troops at Newport News. Seward was composed. I suggested notice to be given to Port Royal to look out, and the “Wabash” to repair to Hampton Roads; also a steamer to observe the Potomac, and vessels loaded to be got ready for blocking the Potomac. The President directed McClellan, Meigs, and myself to arrange for the blocking, and the Secretary of War joined our party in the next room. This being arranged, I left in search of Secretary of Navy....

It was nearly two o’clock when the President’s carriage drove me to the Navy Yard.

One curious incident occurred. The information that had been received when I got into the Cabinet with the President, consisted of four or five telegrams, from which the story had to be patched up, only one thing being intelligible, that a great disaster had occurred. A reporter of the “Tribune” sent in a full and graphic account of the business, written out quite in detail. Think of a newspaper being better informed than the Government! I had hardly dined, when the Secretaries of War and State were announced, and, after a little chat, we started in a steamer to view the locality where the “Merrimac” might come. I pointed it out. The Secretaries were perfectly satisfied, and Stanton gave me the most ample authority for men and cannon. He also authorized me to lay hands on the river boats. About nine P.M. I was able to telegraph the President that all the measures were in progress and ready for use.

About ten P.M. the Secretary of Navy sent me a note saying that the “Monitor” and “Merrimac” had had a battle of four
hours this morning, when the "Merrimac" drew off about noon... So closes the day on the first view of these events.

March 10. — It was two o'clock in the morning when I was roused from my sleep by a telegram from Secretary of Navy that I would suspend further operations for blocking the channel.

At ten a.m. I went to the Department. The Secretary was evidently of the mind that there had been too much alarm yesterday. Meigs came in and was urgent as to preparation for blocking the channel. He thought the contest with the "Merrimac" showed her power. Fox had ordered all our vessels away as useless, but the "Monitor." The Secretary still did not see the need of the measure, but would not object. So we went to the President, and met Wise at the door, who had just arrived and brought up Worden, said to have been the only one hurt in the "Monitor." We ascended to the President's Cabinet, and found there the Secretaries of War, Treasury, &c. The aspect of affairs of course changed the tone of conversation, and Wise gave a very spirited account of the battle between the "iron-cased." Meigs and the Secretary of War still did not seem to be relieved in regard to preparation for stopping the channel in case the "Merrimac" should attempt it.

March 11. — It seems that poor Joe Smith was killed in command of the "Congress" by the bursting of a shell. A sad blow to his father, the Commodore.

The President came into the Yard, and I drove round with him.

March 12. — Secretary of State drove to my door. It is certain that our troops are at Manassas. While in the President's Cabinet, on Monday, I asked the Secretary of the Navy to let me take command of the "Monitor," as Worden was now entirely disabled. He objected, saying that I was of more use here, and it would not do to have me disabled. On Tuesday evening, being at his house, I urged the request again, but he objected as before.

I have urged the blocking of the Norfolk channel, and
handed the Secretary a paper written January 31, intended for the Department, in which I then urged the measure of the attack of Norfolk. On Monday I also mentioned the idea to the President.

There has been great omission in this matter. . . . Even now, when the "Merrimac" is in, no measures are taken to block the channel. . . .

*March* 16. — The President came down about eleven, with Secretaries of State and War. I was just writing an answer to the "Herald's" paragraph charging me with red tape, because I would not allow wrought-iron shot of 185 to be fired from XI\textsuperscript{th} guns of "Monitor" while attacking the "Merrimac." So I read it to the President, and all three exclaimed against my writing anything to be published, as too much attention would be drawn to whatever I wrote. . . . We then went down the river to look at the transports, which had come up to convey troops. The Secretary of War feared that their navigation was not cared for, and asked me to take it in charge, the President and he of State agreeing. So when we landed, Stanton drove with me to General McClellan, who assented. . . . Catesby Jones, who commanded the "Merrimac," says in his report that her prow was twisted, the muzzle of two guns shot off, and her armor considerably damaged,—not bad for one XI\textsuperscript{th} gun.

*March* 18. — Went in steamboat to Alexandria with Secretaries of War, State, and Fox, to see General McClellan. He came down to the wharf and spent an hour discussing plans. The Secretary of War had Burnside's report of taking of New- bern. McClellan, on reading it, said, "Can't you make him a Major-General?" The Secretary answered, "He is one." Fox said, "Then make him Lieutenant-General." Said he of War, "Oh, no, that is for you"—turning to McClellan—"when you take Richmond." The General said about 10,000 men had already gone down the river. . . .

There was some large talking about guns. 15\textsuperscript{th} were nothing; 20\textsuperscript{th} at least, and he of War suggested 30\textsuperscript{th}. *Go it!* The national team has run off, and stand clear! . . .

*March* 21. — Regular N. Easter. The President came down about three P.M. and asked me to go with him to Alexandria to see General McClellan, who came on board with
MEMOIR OF JOHN A. DAHLGREN.

General McDowell, and a confab ensued on the operations about York River. McDowell's corps is to begin there, and the question is, whether to spread out from Fort Monroe or to attack Yorktown in the vessels and land there. The President concluded we should meet at the White House this evening. So McDowell accompanied the President and myself to the Navy Yard, and at 8½ P. M. we assembled in the President's private cabinet,—the Secretaries of War and Navy, Fox, McDowell, and myself. McDowell wanted the ships to attack. I advocated doing so with "Minnesota," "Wabash," and "Niagara," which vessels could be got round by the time McDowell's corps were there, and the new iron-clad "Galena" would also be ready.

But the Secretary of the Navy was not so inclined, and Fox threw cold water by saying that General Barnard (of engineers) had gone down to confer with Goldsborough, and we must first hear from them.

The Secretaries of War and Navy are very offish, always; so we adjourned,—"another proof that Councils of War do not fight," which I whispered to McDowell as we left.

March 29. — The transports still crowd about Alexandria and drain off the troops to Fort Monroe. The President told me yesterday that 80,000 must have gone down. We were making a slight trip down the river, just to look at the great steamboats going off filled with troops; vessels, too, of all kinds, loaded for forage and artillery and horses. There is a prevailing feeling that the "Merrimac" must be ready for another swoop. Jeffers, who has the "Monitor," writes me that he is all ready.

Tuesday, April 1. — Went to Alexandria with the President and his brother-in-law, Mr. Edwards, to see General McClellan, who was to leave to-day for the army at Old Point. He was not at Alexandria, but General McDowell came on board our boat. Mr. Edwards told me that a brother of Mrs. Lincoln was actually in the Confederate army, and all her step-brothers and sisters were on that side.

April 2. — I went down to Mt. Vernon with the President, some members of his family, and others. I advised the President not to land, and remained in the boat with him. General
COMMAND OF THE WASHINGTON NAVY YARD. 363

McClellan went down yesterday. Troops still going. Must be nearly 100,000 men at Old Point.

April 5.—Great events are at the threshold. The army has begun to move from Fort Monroe,—more than 100,000 men, with McClellan at the head, thus changing the first view, for McDowell was to operate here with some 50,000 men. Now he is left behind, and the Chief goes in command, converting the subordinate into the main movement. So it is Richmond, now or never.

Again the “Merrimac” is supposed to be refitted, and her movements will be watched with much solicitude.

In the West the principal armies are about to fight a battle which will decide the fate of Memphis and much else....

On Tuesday Fox came down with Captain Ericsson to arrange for the new “monitor class.” We had a long talk. Captain Ericsson saw the compared draughts of Rodman and my XI". He observed “they were identical.”

April 6.—As not even a rumor was afloat about our “grand army,” I stopped in to see the President. ... The President said he had seen no way but to go ahead, and had so telegraphed McClellan. After an hour’s chat I left. It is not to be disguised that even McClellan’s friends are almost silent. The Secretary of War uses no ceremony in making slighting remarks, as he did this evening when he came in for a few minutes to tell the President that there was no change below.

April 9.—Events are hastening to a consummation. Mr. Seward, who came into my office yesterday, mentioned the surrender of Island No. 10, while Beauregard has been routed at Corinth,—and so Tennessee is cleared on the west.

Here in the east McClellan has moved on steadily, and was confronted with the Confederates at Yorktown, intrenched and in force. McDowell is at Warrenton Junction, closing on the troops in front who had fallen back from Manassas.

April 12.—Anniversary of the attack on Sumter, being the appeal of the South to the arbitrament of arms. In the afternoon the Secretary of State came down with a Whitworth shot in his pocket that had been sent to him, promising miracles upon iron plates. I saw no objection to buying one of his cannon, so I suppose Seward will do it.
April 18. — I am apprehensive. McClellan has the best troops of the Confederacy before him, strongly intrenched and barraging the way across the peninsula, some six or seven miles, the left resting on Yorktown,—a strong work,—the right on an inlet from the James River, and supported by the "Merrimac." The left is also sustained by Gloucester Point, some 1,200 yards distant.

At this time the capacity of the "Merrimac" is an actual menace to the supplies of 100,000 men enclosed in a small peninsula. A terrible disaster is within the contingencies. . . .

April 19. — Received word that the President was on board the "Miami" revenue cutter lying at the Yard, and wished me to go with him. Found Stanton, of War, and Chase, of Treasury, also Mr. Dudley Field, of New York, with the President. Took Ully along.¹ Weather bad, cold and rainy. Got to Acquia before dark, and sent ashore for senior officer, who could tell nothing when he came. Then some one picked up a "Herald" reporter, who knew everything, having come on with McDowell's advance upon Fredericksburg. So I sent ashore in quest of McDowell for the President.

Meanwhile we had a gay evening in the little cabin, and then went to bed. Five of us stowed away in a place like a box! The President in his usual way, and telling many a joke.²

So we slept till next morning, when McDowell arrived and told the story. But he has only two or three thousand men, and the balance — twenty-five or thirty thousand — rather scattered.

¹ His son; afterward Colonel Ulric Dahlgren.
² These "jokes," although often far from refined, were always told in the most quaint and original way, and also were intended to illustrate something, so that they were apposite.

Perhaps the following, told to the Admiral, has not found its way into print.

ONE OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S JOKES.

The school was very noisy, and one of the most uproarious had been called up by the teacher to be disciplined. "Hold out your hand!" A paw of the most surprising description was extended, more remarkable for its filthiness than anything else. The astonished schoolmaster gazed silently with suspended ferule at the uncleanly spectacle. "Now, if there were such another dirty thing in the room, I would let you off." "There it is," quoth the unmoved culprit, drawing the other hand from behind his back and presenting it to the petrified dominie.
I told McDowell that I had begged the President for ten
days to concentrate 100,000 men here in front and move
straight down to Richmond. As it was, the President was not
altogether certain that the capital was uncovered too much.
Banks has some twenty or twenty-five thousand men away on
our right; McDowell might muster 35,000, much scattered.
Together, the force might be something.

Secretary of War says McClellan has 150,000 men, which
must include Franklin's division, sent on to attack Gloucester
Point, if not also Wool's command.

Upon Secretary of War suggesting Fremont being brought
into the mass in front, the President said quickly, "But there
is the political trouble." "The law authorizes you to give com-
mand to any of like commission." The President replied, "If
I did that there would be an outcry, for McDowell is junior to
Fremont."

About eight on Sunday morning the revenue cutter was
started up the river, and by 2½ P.M. we reached the Navy
Yard.

During the whole time the rain had not ceased, and the
weather was nasty. In our chat around the little table of the
cabin, the events of one year ago were not forgotten.

The President said that when he received the nomination he
had forebodings as to the trouble which might ensue. This
passed away before a resolution to abide the consequences,
whatever they might be. . . . The party halted at my house,
took something to eat, and then parted for home. . . .

Last evening Mr. Secretary Chase observed to me, in speak-
ing of matters, that the President was at times indecisive
between McClellan, who was assumed to represent the Demo-
cratic wing, and Fremont, who stood for the Republicans. He
proposed that I should meet him next day at the President's, to
urge my idea of concentrating a large force under McDowell
and pushing for Richmond. But I thought better not.

April 24.—The French steamer "Gassendi" arrived, with
Mr. Mercier on board, from Richmond. This visit of the
French Minister to Secession has occasioned much speculation.
Friday evening I dined at the French Minister's with the
French Captain.
The President and Secretary of State visited the "Gassendi." Were received with all the honors paid to a sovereign. The French Admiral had arrived from New York. . . . In the evening dined at Mr. Seward's with the French Minister, Admiral, and Captain. . . . The French Minister told me that he saw Catesby Jones, who sent his respects and said "not to be caught napping at Washington." I told it to the President, as there might be a hint meant. . . . On Saturday Ully began his career as my assistant, of which he had the choice. He therefore gave up the study of law at Philadelphia to come here.

April 27.—In the afternoon rumor current that New Orleans had been taken. Dropped in on the President. He said, "There's the dispatch; read it." . . .

Monday, May 5.—McClellan's dispatch published. The Confederates would not abide the assault. . . . They fell back from Yorktown, which McClellan entered. . . . McClellan's strategy seems to be conclusive. He forced the Confederates to leave Manassas without a blow, and now to abandon Yorktown. But the battle impending. . . . The extreme Republicans are, however, persistent in their attacks on McClellan, as if nothing but a battle would content them. In reality, they would dismount McClellan, who will, however, be safe enough if he reaches Richmond, with battle or without.

May 7.—Telegram from McClellan. Yesterday he occupied Williamsburg.

May 8.—Dispatches from New Orleans, dated 25th. The bombardment of forts began 18th April, and on the 24th the squadron passed the forts.

May 13.—I was asked to accompany the Secretary of Navy, and left Navy Yard in steamer "Baltimore," at five p.m. Secretary of State, the Attorney-General, and others, ladies and gentlemen, on board. . . . Steered down the Potomac, entering York River about eight a.m. At 9½ passed Yorktown, and about noon reached West Point, at the head of York River. Continued to ascend the Pamunkey, a branch of the York, and got to a little place known as Cumberland, about 2½ p.m. Here we found a great crowd of vessels, with troops, stores, &c., and the army in full force. General McClellan, on hearing of our arrival, came on board, and there was a long talk. He felt sure
of a battle before getting to Richmond. The Prince de Joinville, with the Count of Paris and Duke de Chartes, in United States uniforms, as Aids, also came on board. The General would have us go ashore and see the troops at evening parade. . . . The men seemed in fine heart. . . .

May 15.—Got to Yorktown, and anchored at three o'clock in the morning. After breakfast it was voted not to land, but to proceed. So we steamed round to Fort Monroe and went up to Norfolk. . . . Went over to the Navy Yard. Crossed to Norfolk and looked through the town. The people kept their houses shut, and themselves inside. I am sorry for them, for I fear their town is ruined.

May 16.—Steamed to the Navy Yard, which we walked over; its destruction has been complete.

Left it, and stopped at Craney Island, which we found strongly fortified. . . . In coming away, we paused over the wreck of the "Merrimac," from which only a large timber showed itself above the full tide. . . .

May 17.—To-day the "Flag" (Goldsborough) was to clear out the forts on the James, which were supposed to be still occupied. Our vessels passed up and our boat followed. . . .

The day was beautiful, and we skirted the left-hand shore, which was closely noted for batteries. In half an hour could see the Confederate flag flying on a work well placed. . . . Found the work recently abandoned, guns spiked, &c. Hauled down the Confederate flag and left our own flying. . . . This arranged, it was agreed that we should go on up the river with one or two small steamers. The flag-officer going back, some time was lost in twaddle, so I got tired and pushed on. After a few miles, perceived a steamer coming down the river. . . . She reported an attack on Confederate works at a barrier about eight miles from Richmond. Our vessels had to haul off; the "Galena" much damaged. . . . Our party had been in most buoyant spirits; it was curious to see how they were quelled by a little reverse, and Mr. Seward began to remember reasons for returning. After much urgency, a reluctant consent was given to go as far as Jamestown. . . . With great care, and after grounding once or twice, got to Jamestown Island about eleven P.M., and anchored. . . .
May 18. — I was awakened from a sound sleep at four in the morning, by a knock at the door. It was Mr. Seward, in his gown. He wanted to move for Washington right off. There were State reasons for it. In vain I urged going a little higher, to see the vessels that had been in battle. So I up anchor. There was time, however, to pick up a load of negroes, who were invited on board by Mr. Seward himself. He also wished to carry away a lot of calves from the shore, but the boat got away without them. We reached Newport News in three hours, where he found time to land and visit General Mansfield; then also to wait at Fort Monroe, and then homeward.

May 19. — We got back to the Navy Yard. Mr. Seward was again in good spirits, and he now plainly gave as a reason for not going farther up the James, that he did not like to incur the risk of being captured. The Secretary of Navy says that he of State was much alarmed. Mr. Seward was much amused at the rats stealing the Attorney-General’s cravat and stocking, and joked Mr. Bates incessantly about it. One evening he wrote some verses on it, and illustrated with sketches.

May 21. — Dine at Mr. Hooper’s, — Chase, Sumner, and Stanton. The Secretaries also hit at the President in a satirical way; significant.

May 22. — I received a telegram from Secretary of War for a boat in the evening. So about nine came a carriage with Stanton and, to my surprise, the President, bound on a quiet trip to Acquia. He left so privately that Mrs. Lincoln alone knew of it. I told them there was nothing to eat in the steamboat. I had eatables, bedding, &c., tumbled in, and we left at ten p.m., after supper. The President read aloud to us from Halleck’s poems,¹ and then we went to impromptu beds.

¹ President Lincoln had real dramatic power as a reader, and recited poetic passages with pathos. The copy of Halleck from which the President read on this occasion, now belongs to us, and “Marco Bozzaris” is marked as the piece read aloud to Secretary Stanton and Admiral Dahlgren. What a mournful and prophetic suggestiveness there was in the selection! How truly may it now be said of Lincoln,

“For thou art Freedom’s now, and Fame’s;
One of the few, the immortal names,
That were not born to die.”
TRIP WITH THE PRESIDENT TO VISIT THE ARMY. 369

May 23.—We anchored at Acquia, and left when the car was ready. It was a common baggage-car, with camp-stools for the party. On reaching the Potomac Creek we found General McDowell there, who would have us look at the trestle bridge renewed across the creek. The President said suddenly, "Let us walk over." The creek follows the bed of a deep and wide ravine, so that the track passes through the air one hundred feet above the water, and for some distance. There was nothing but a single plank for us to walk on,—the President first, then the General, the Secretary of War, and myself. About half-way the Secretary said he was dizzy and feared he would fall. So he stopped, unable to proceed. I managed to step by him, and took his hand, thus leading him over, when in fact my own head was somewhat confused by the giddy height.

After an hour's ride we arrived in the vicinity of the camps, this side the Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg. ... We sat down to breakfast at McDowell's headquarters, and the generals of brigades began to drop in. McDowell has about 45,000 men. Shields just in from Valley of Shenandoah. ... It was arranged for the President first to view Patrick's division in advance of Fredericksburg. ... We looked at the division. Men in fine order and spirits. Went back and crossed the river to headquarters. We found the French Minister, with Admiral Julien de la Gravière, had arrived from Washington.

After a little interval we put out to review the division this side, the President and the Frenchmen riding; but the Secretary of War could not mount, from an old hurt of knee, so I remained in the ambulance with him.

The party was so numerous that it made a small corps, with its escort of cavalry.

The sun had come out in the morning, and was warm. We saw one division after another, all in fine order, the men cheering tremendously. Abe rode along the line with hat off, and I feared would be hurt by the sun. The ground occupied was very considerable, so that the whole afternoon was consumed, and in one lone ride I thought we travelled ten miles. So rough and uncomfortable was the road that the Secretary got mad, as we were separated from the rest of the party.
It was six o'clock when we got back to headquarters and sat down to a plain dinner. About nine o'clock we got into the cars to return.

Acquia was reached at ten o'clock. Mercier took the tug in which he came, and we steamed up and shoved off.

The President was in good spirits, and we sat down to supper. After that he read Halleck aloud, and we went to our beds. The Secretary, after getting in, called out to me and said that he did not think much of McDowell! It was three o'clock when we got to the Navy Yard.

May 24.—About five o'clock A.M. the President came in from his room half dressed, and sat down between the Secretary and myself. He was reminded of a joke, at which we laughed heartily. Then the President and Secretary left for home.

May 25.—A messenger with telegram from Department ordering cannon immediately to Harper's Ferry. Shields being withdrawn, the Confederates concentrated on Banks and drove him back speedily. . . . So Harper's Ferry was in danger. I met Stanton and volunteered. He said he would make me Chief of Artillery, if Navy Department would agree. I saw the Secretary of the Navy; he objected. I went over with him to see the President, whom we found in the War Department. At first he assented, but Fox also objected. They thought my presence here more important, and the thing dropped. . . . The President remarked yesterday that Shields was said to be crazy, which put him in mind that George III. had been told the same of one of his generals, viz., that he was mad. The king replied he wished he would bite his other generals. . . . One IXth and six howitzers with seamen went from here to defend Harper's Ferry. Ully went along.

May 26.—It is now known that Banks made good his retreat, and crossed the Potomac with trains, &c. . . . It would seem that Shields, Banks, and Fremont had each a corps in front. When Shields was withdrawn, the Confederates before him and those before Fremont united with that before Banks and pushed him home, Harper's Ferry being secured. Meanwhile orders were given for Fremont and McDowell to converge and endeavor to cut off the Confederate retreat. This was not
generally known, and the public mind was ill at ease. The President called out 50,000 more men.

May 29. — Uly came down for supplies for the guns, bringing some information as to the state of affairs, which was not very promising as to the resistance that could be made at Harper's Ferry.

I took him to the War Department, where the President was, and a number of others. Uly said what he had to say. . . . The Secretary of War made him Captain on the Staff, so that when we left the War Department Uly was a Captain, not having had the most remote idea of it when he entered.¹

May 30. — By eight A.M. Uly was on his way back to Harper's Ferry uniformed and equipped for his new place. . . . The Confederates have abandoned Corinth.

June 1. — The day has its usual budget of exciting news. . . . I went with the President to the War Department. . . . Our left at Richmond had been attacked in force by Confederates yesterday, and at nightfall the advantage was with them. To-day the attack had been continued, and at noon they had been repulsed in disorder. The President, after reciting our mishaps on the first day, said, "That was what I had to sleep on for the night."

It is now known that our moves to cut off the column that pushed Banks are taking effect, and Banks is advancing. At the War Department there seems to be a meeting in the evening of sundry generals and senators to canvass news with the President and Secretary of War. In an adjoining room is the corps of telegraphers. I observed that the editor of —— walked in and coolly sat down to read the latest telegrams. Public enough!

June 3. — The Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, with others, passed the evening with me at the Yard. It is now confirmed that the Confederates were fully repulsed at Richmond.

June 4. — Our operations in Virginia progress.

¹ The writer was told that both the President and the Secretary of War were impressed with the manner of young Dahlgren and the way he gave his information on this occasion. Nor were they mistaken, for in the near future this mere boy made for himself an imperishable name. — M. V. D.
**MEMOIR OF JOHN A. DAHLGREN.**

**June 8.**—News that Memphis is in our hands, and the Mississippi River open entirely.

**June 15.**—From some captured correspondence it now is known that the Confederates were informed of the uncovered condition towards Harper’s Ferry, and Jackson was ordered from Richmond to make a diversion, and thus interfere with reinforcements to McClellan. He did this May 23, and as soon as the Confederates were sure of its effect in countermanding McDowell, they attacked McClellan on the 31st and 1st. This steadiness saved all.

Jackson will now be cared for. McClellan reinforced and a reserve created at Annapolis, which should have been done six months ago.

**June 20.**—They are at work laying down some railroad in the city. Quite an era!

**June 25.**—McClellan has refused access to the Congressional parties by the railroad from the White House, so that when they reach there they cannot get to the Army. It is rumored that their action there has given him trouble. The correspondents touched up the parties going hence, so the Navy Department has forbidden me to let them use the steamboats of the Yard.

Yesterday Mr. F., a clerk, came to me to say that a person had been to him with a view of obtaining means to assail me, because I stood in the way of sundry schemes of invention. He said there was a secret organization which would raise a fund to the end of removing me, and would leave nothing undone that could damage me, especially through Congress. . . . This is a sample of the unscrupulous scoundrels that infest the government, whose sole aim is to rob the United States.

**June 27.**—General Pope ordered to the command of the forces in the Valley, including McDowell, Banks, and Fremont. The latter asked to be relieved, and General King took his division. Some measure was needed. The Generals did not absolutely quarrel, but they did not act together, and thus the Confederates worked at each separately.

**June 29.**—Jackson has moved rapidly from the Valley of the Shenandoah, and fallen on McClellan’s right wing, which
THE NEW GRADE BILL FOR NAVY.

resisted stubbornly. . . . McClellan drew his right wing across, withdrew stores of all kinds, gave up the communication by the Pamunkey, concentrated between the Chickahominy and James, establishing his communication directly by the James River, which is certainly a great advantage. . . . But what are our corps about in the Valley? They suffer Jackson to slip by them, beat Banks, and menace Harper's Ferry, four weeks since, and now he pounces on McClellan's right wing at Richmond. . . .

McClellan's demand for men has not been properly heeded. He wanted more when he started, and was sneered at, as asking for all. Then we have had no reserve, a great error. And now, when it is indispensable, we begin to collect at Annapolis and elsewhere. . . . It is clear that McClellan must have men. . . . Meanwhile we are menaced with mediation from England and France. . . .

July 2. — The Governors of States offer more men, and the President accepts 300,000. . . . The pressure of taxes, the drain of men, and loss of life must be expected to exercise their influences on our people.

Hale, the Chairman of Senate Navy Committee, dined with me on Tuesday (1st). He brought the new Grade Bill for Admirals' Pay, &c., and asked me to suggest amendments. He told me as a secret that Grimes, who had been opposed to it, had only come round in the last week, and that he was never very certain. The joke is, that Grimes told me that Hale was opposed to the bill, and if he (Grimes) went for it, Hale would go against it. So he had to seem adverse, so as to drive Hale right. It is very funny.

The bill came up. Hale and Grimes disagreed about the pay of Admirals, and the Senate re-committed the bill.

The care to suppress the news has only increased the apprehension of the public mind, and all sorts of rumors are flying around. . . . With all the care to be silent, it seems that the wife of one general tells what the wife of some other said of Buell's movement.

July 3. — The Confederates have followed our men closely, who have moved back in perfect order, frequently pushing from them the assault. The battle raged on Thursday, Friday, and
Saturday. On Monday it was recommenced with fresh fury. But McClellan could give no more ground,—the river was at his back, and the gunboats could be brought into play,—so he stood up to the work and the Confederates had to draw off. ... On Monday evening he telegraphed to the President that he "hoped to save the Army."

As matters stand, therefore, our Army has been driven from its position before Richmond, and is on the defensive against a superior force. ... Some reinforcements have reached McClellan, but probably not equal to his loss. ...

The work done by his army is tremendous. Yorktown, Williamsburg, Hanover Court House, Seven Pines, and Chickahominy have witnessed eight battles, which, with sickness, have probably cost 50,000 men from the line,—all in three months. He should have had 200,000 men, and yet so infatuated are some, that they insisted that the Confederates were for some time running away out of Richmond as fast as they could. I heard a Cabinet officer say this six weeks ago.

Well, the French Princes have left the Army and returned to Washington.

July 5.—About nine A. M. a telegram came from Secretary of War, marked "important." The President wanted me at the War Department. ... The President told me that he was anxious about keeping open James River; asked me if it could be done. I answered I would guarantee it, if he would send me there in command and would give me the means. He then asked me to see the Secretary, which I hastened to do. ... The President went in to see the Secretary and stayed a few minutes, when I went in. The Secretary at once objected to my proposition. He said I could not be spared; the Ordnance would not go on without me; my services were more important where I was. I answered that it was hard, and perhaps my last chance for a flag, &c. The Secretary said he would see Fox, who returned with him. He, too, said it was out of the question. It would change all the plans in Ordnance, and some one must take the Yard and Ordnance. I answered that I was willing to give up both for the command in James River. The Secretary finally would not consent, so I had to go back to the President, who thought it hard, but did not see how it could be avoided.
The President is much worried. I told him frankly that the Army would be lost if not quickly reinforced. He said he could not send away the troops from Washington. I referred to those scattered at Savannah, Charleston, and in North Carolina. He answered that they had been sent for. I saw Mrs. Lincoln for a few minutes in her carriage, going out to the Soldiers' Home. She said Mr. Lincoln frequently passed sleepless nights.

_Holy 6._— The Secretary asked me to-day if I would take the Bureau of Ordnance. I answered that I would leave that to the Department. . . . He then asked me what I thought of Foote for the Bureau of Detail. I urged it strongly.

It is now known that our Army is strong in its position on the James. It cannot resume the offensive without reinforcements, and they will not come rapidly. Meanwhile the ultras are furious at McClellan.

_Holy 10._— The President at my quarters. . . . He told me that the Army mustered 81,000 men, in fine condition and ready for a fight. He was in good spirits. In the evening went to see the Secretary of State. He was at whist. Asked me to go with him to-morrow to Congress.

_Holy 11._— At one p.m. I went to the State Department and found the Secretary at lunch. I joined him and rode with him to the Capitol, then into Senate. The Secretary of the Navy joined us. Mr. Seward said he wanted a law authorizing the President to issue letters of marque, in view of probable foreign trouble.

_Holy 14._— The President sent in my name to Congress recommending vote of thanks, in company with Davis, Lardner, Rowan, Porter, and Stringham. I hear that Grimes is opposed to it.

_Holy 16._— In the afternoon the House passed, nem. con., the vote of thanks to Davis, Lardner, Rowan, Porter, and myself. It went to the Senate, and was handed by Grimes over to the Navy Committee, there to remain for the present.

_Holy 17._— The last of the session. Hale consented to get the Committee discharged from the vote of thanks, and I did not hear of but one Senator opposed to it (Grimes), and he threatened to talk out the few hours left, if it were brought up.
In the morning Ully came in unexpectedly, just from Sigel's camp. . . . He looks hearty, and brown as a berry. Saturday he returned by railroad from Alexandria.

July 21. — One can appreciate that the temper of the North has undergone another change, and with its determination to persevere will forbear less than before. . . . To-day I received a commission as Chief of Bureau of Ordnance in the Navy Department, dated July 18, with power to retain the Department of Experiments and so much of the Yard as might be needed.¹

Thus being a Commander in the Navy, I have been Commandant of a Yard and Chief of Bureau, which no officer of that rank has done.² I have also declined the same Bureau a year ago, which no officer of the Navy has ever done.

July 23. — I entered on duty as Chief of Ordnance, and next day formally relinquished command of the Navy Yard to Captain Harwood, retaining, however, that of the Ordnance Department, which is thus separated from the Yard.

Some heavy responsibilities are before me, among them a number of iron-cased vessels needing heavy cannon, many as large as 15th, and not one made. There is no stock of nitre or sulphur, though there is sufficient powder for immediate use.

July 27. — Comparative quiet in the war; it is a phase of preparation. The United States is gathering its new levies of the 300,000, and new programme seems to be in hand. Halleck was gazetted on the 23d as Commander-in-Chief, the date going back to 11th, the day after the President returned from visit to McClellan. . . . In reviewing the campaign in Virginia from Bull Run to the reverses at Richmond, a period of nearly one year, it is noticeable of McClellan that he restored order to a broken army and confidence to the country. He collected and created an army of raw recruits into sufficient consistence to

¹ This commission was addressed to Dahlgren as a Commander. That of Captain was made afterwards, and ante-dated to 16th July.

² And Commander Dahlgren might well have added, that to have been the confidential and sought-for friend and adviser of the President in such a supreme crisis in the history of the nation, was an honor never before conferred on one of the rank he held at that time. We have seen in the "private memoranda" of the past year how constantly he had asked for active service and the opportunity of winning distinction in action, which was as constantly refused him, on the ground that his services were indispensable where he was.
conduct a daring operation of three months in the very heart of Virginia, overcoming a fortified line from river to river, pursuing a force superior to his own, forcing its rear-guard at Williamsburg, and finally placing himself in front of the Confederate capital, where he maintained himself for a month, until twice his force was collected by conscription in Richmond. Finally, when this force broke out in overpowering numbers upon him, he drew off to the only line of communication which was possible, and in a series of battles extending over seven days, sustained the direction prescribed, with no other loss than that of the wounded who could not move, and of stores almost excessive. It was in those battles that his care in forming the Army during eight months was precious. The discipline then acquired alone enabled him to push to Richmond and to save his outnumbered army.

It is now plain that his own earnest appeal for more men, from the first, was just and prophetic. Fifty thousand men landed at West Point immediately after the action at Williamsburg would have assured the capture of Richmond by June 1. Now it will require twice that number. We never had a reserve. Its formation should have been begun near Harper's Ferry in January.

Today I have a letter from Rodgers, in the “Galena.” He says the new ram is expected out from Richmond, and wants to know how heavily he can charge his guns. . . .

I must be off to Philadelphia to hurry up the “Ironsides.”

Tuesday. — Spent the morning on board the “Ironsides,” a clumsy attempt at an iron-clad. . . .

July 30. — Crossed early to Greenpoint to see the monitors that are building, then returned to New York and spent a couple of hours with Ericsson, discussing points with him and examining his plans. He is just the man to be very wrong or very right, when one or the other. . . .

In the evening I went to Trenton to look after a portion of “Ironsides” carriages being made there.

July 31. — Looked over gun carriages, and return to Washington. . . .

In New York and Philadelphia everything going on as if there were no war. Of course I did not expect to see man,
woman, and child with musket in hand, but there was not noticeable a single sign of the great struggle.

I urged Fox and the Secretary to cut down the "Niagara" for a ram, and fill in all the steam power she would hold; and also to cut down, iron plate, and turret all the large screw frigates.

Aug. 5, 1862.—Received my appointment as a Captain in the Navy, having been a Commander seven years.

Aug. 7.—Very hot. The President came down in the afternoon to look at some invention, which when he had seen, I took him on board a steamboat to sit down. A number of gentlemen, political friends, were in company; so as we sat in the cool breeze, the President, reverting to the topic of McClellan and Stanton, gave a sketch of the whole campaign of that army. He said its total had been 160,000, but it was only 91,000 now,—35,000 accounted for casualties, but 34,000 absent who should not be. He was adverse to the Peninsular campaign, but would have given McClellan all the men he asked for had he had them. He upheld McClellan and Stanton. On leaving the boat the President took me home in his carriage.

Aug. 13.—The battle of August 9 was hard fought and great loss, each side keeping its ground. . . . To-day our cavalry are in pursuit. . . .

Aug. 17.—The regiments begin to come in freely under the late call, and it reminds one of the scenes enacting a year ago after the defeat at Bull Run,—the troops arriving by trains through the day and then marching by to the sound of music.

The city railroad is now fully in operation from the Capitol to the Washington statue near Georgetown, and doing a good business.

When I came here in 1847 there were only one or two miserable stages on the avenue, taking a few weary people at a shilling. At that time the road of Pennsylvania Avenue from the Capitol to Navy Yard was cut up by ravines and without side pavement. In two or three years a line of omnibuses was established at six cents from Georgetown to Navy Yard. The road east of the Capitol has been filled in and completed, side pavement laid on one side, and lighted with gas. And now we have a railroad in lieu of omnibus.
Aug. 19. — The President sent for me about some new gunpowder. After the agent of the inventor left, the President began on Army matters. "Now," said he, "I am to have a sweat of five or six days. The Confederates will strive to gather on Pope before McClellan can get around, and his first corps is not in the Potomac yet." I observed "that Pope must not permit himself to be drawn into a pitched battle, but must fall back in season." The President said, "he was to do so." I replied that "it was a dangerous matter to withdraw McClellan, and we shall be lucky to escape the consequences." The President said, "that 12,000 new men had arrived." I said "that was a flea bite."

Aug. 27. — After a great mystery of several days, we have now the general fact that the Confederates did not move rapidly enough to concentrate before we did.¹

Aug. 28. — Pope began to fall back on the 21st, moving rapidly by columns on three different roads, and to-day reached Manassas, to find that Jackson had left it only three hours before.

Sept. 2. — Our Army is still receding to prevent being flanked. Unpleasant doubts agitate the public mind, which is also astonished to hear of McClellan again brought forward. ... It is a fact that McClellan is effectively in command, and yet within the week he has been denounced as a traitor by violent men. So high is passion and disappointment, that coward and traitor are current terms for any one. Oh, for our country! Who shall save it?

Sept. 5. — Public opinion is sadly disorganized — more so than the Army. . . .

Sept. 6. — It is officially announced that General Pope has been relieved of command of the Army of Virginia, and so ends his brief campaign of the East.

When McClellan was forced back on the James River in the first week of July — two months ago — the President perceived that a military head was needed near himself; that the pushing about of armies by himself one way and Stanton another would

¹ Of course these notes are to be taken as the impressions of the day, of which they make a graphic picture; but at times mistaken, as in this case.
not do. . . . So Halleck, of Western repute, was called in as Commander-in-Chief. . . . The three distinct commands in Virginia had been a great blunder. . . . So there must be but one army—that was right. Pope was assigned the great task. Meanwhile McClellan had been reduced to a humiliating condition. He had been taken from his own plan of campaign and laid on the shelf, and his army given to Pope, the thing being just covered by a nominal charge of the lines with a few new regiments. . . . Only one thing was certain. McClellan had had no part whatever in the business. On the contrary, he was in disgrace and his counsels disregarded. His army, indignant at the defeats which they had suffered through mismanagement, and fully confiding in McClellan, cried loudly for him. . . . In any point of view, there was no person to command but McClellan, and the Army hailed the order with joy.

_Friday, Sept. 19._—It is now known that Harper’s Ferry was first attacked on the 11th, and on the 15th Colonel Miles surrendered. On Wednesday a battle in force was fought along the Antietam near Sharpsburg, in which it is said we lost 10,000 men. . . . Several of our generals were wounded, and General Mansfield killed. He was a brave old man, and a good engineer. . . .

_Sept. 22._—The President renews the offer of pecuniary aid to loyal States who will free slaves, and declares free the slaves of all States who remain in rebellion after Jan. 1, 1863. The President says in his letter to Greeley, “that he will not interfere with slavery if not required to this end, but will interfere if it is necessary.” This, then, is equivalent to saying that slavery and the Union cannot exist together. . . . Going to the Navy Department, met Watson, Assistant Secretary of War. He said the Proclamation did not go far enough. In the morning met Wallack, the editor. He thought it went too far. The “Intelligencer” says, “Like other paper movements, it will do nothing.” This morning we know no more than that the rebel army has contrived to cross the river, and the strategy of new positions is not yet developed.

_Sept. 28._—General Sigel sent to me a letter for Governor of Pennsylvania, asking Ully to be made Major of Artillery, and
to be Chief of Artillery for him. Next day the President indorsed it, and I sent it to the Governor.

The armies still manoeuvring.

Oct. 3. — I applied by letter to the Navy Department for command of the forces that are to attack Sumter and the other Charleston forts. . . . Yesterday I went on board the "Monitor," which had just come here for repair. How a man of such cleverness as Ericsson should commit the error of exposing a flat surface to direct blow is curious. The solid iron beam is broken in two. This square box should have been a turret, too. Every Achilles, however, has his heel.

The situation! We have been one year and a half trying to put down the Rebellion, and the result is, that the two armies are facing each other across the Potomac, after varying fortunes. We have been pushed back nearly to the Ohio, and the loyal State of Kentucky is made a battle-field. We have a debt of a thousand millions, and not quite two months of weather fit for the field. Then comes December with cold and mud. Worse than all, the politicians are quarrelling with each other and making targets of the Generals. In this depressed state of affairs the Navy is preparing to revive public feeling by some well-put blows. . . .

By a singular coincidence my first XVth. gun is lying on the wharf near the "Monitor," being prepared for firing. . . .

Oct. 12. — Yesterday the first Navy XVth. gun was fired at the Ordnance Yard; thirty pounds of powder works well.

Looking over the "Monitor," I am persuaded from the appearance of the dints made by shot at the first battle and at Fort Darling, that she would not long stand battering with XIth. shot. A 10th. shot started the work inside, and four or five hits on the side have crushed the iron considerably.

Oct. 26. — Last Monday the "Passaic" XVth. was mounted. The one here has been fired 250 times; so the class will work.

The Secretary declined to let me go in a single vessel. Went to James River to visit "Ironsides," and to New York to see the "Passaic."

Very little done in the military way. McClellan and the Confederates occupy nearly the same positions as before, between Sharpsburg and Winchester.
Heintzelman and Sigel in front of Washington. Uly with
Sigel, who is busy harrying the Confederates with small
columns.

Nov. 9.—General McClellan relieved of the command of the
Army.

Nov. 10.—I received a telegram from General Sigel con-
gratulating me on Uly’s brilliant success and gallant behavior.

Nov. 11.—Telegram from Sigel’s Chief of Staff saying that
Uly had dashed into Fredericksburg and brought out a number
of prisoners.

Nov. 13.—I stopped in to see the President, just after
breakfast. The President had read the account of Uly’s raid
in the “Tribune,” and sent for Halleck to ask for his promo-
tion. Then we had the old defence about rules. The President
had every disposition to do the thing, but it was evident that
others overruled. As he said, “he was only the lead horse in
a team, and must not kick out of traces.” . . . Among other
remarks he said “he knew his Proclamation would not make a
single negro free beyond our military reach.”

Nov. 15.—The President drove to my office in the Yard,
Secretaries of State and Treasury along. They looked at guns,
iron plates, &c. I returned with the party.

Dec. 11.—Sigel, with the fourth grand division of the army,
is to move to-day from Fairfax to the front. . . . Before sun-
rise the attempt was made to pontoon the Rappahannock, but
the Confederate musketry drove our men away. Then our
guns open on the town from this bank of the river. Another
effort at the pontoons is checked, and our guns again open. So
go matters till late in the afternoon, when some companies
cross and dislodge the marksmen, which admits the completion
of the bridges.

Dec. 12.—Our army crossed early into Fredericksburg.

Dec. 15.—The President sent for me; had some chat.
Nothing from the Army. He said Halleck thought the Con-
federates would fight now. . . . I said they would give battle,
but could not say whether at the river or farther on. Our
flanks should be looked to.

Dec. 16.—Raw, rainy, and dismal, with the wind howling
from northwest, striving to get the mastery. And there are
150,000 of our men on a strip of land, hemmed in with annihi-
lating batteries in front and the Rappahannock behind. Ten
thousand of them just struck down. Wet and cold, with the
winter close at hand,—as near as those inexorable batteries.
This was written in the morning. In the evening it was known
that last night our army was glad to get back across the river
without being pursued. How terrible to think of so many
thousands losing life or limb on such stupid plans! So we can
raise larger armies than any other nation, and make generals
as fast as paper money. We can be so rich that a thousand
millions may be squandered and not be felt. But we cannot
make soldiers or leaders, because the whole system only makes
offices from $12 a month to $10,000 a year, but makes not
discipline nor military spirit. It is an army of postmasters or
other civil placemen with arms in their hands. The nation
only wants one man—a General!

Dec. 18.—The late disaster seems to have stunned people,
press, and Government.

A letter in the "Herald" speaks of Uly having ridden
twenty-five miles in two hours over bad roads, in order to bear
an order from General Burnside to Sigel. He was on hand in
the battle as Aid to Burnside, and when it was ceasing, late
in the afternoon, went with an order for Sigel to hurry up.
Reached Sigel about six p.m., then started back at ten, and got
to Burnside about five o’clock,—fifty miles in half a day.

Dec. 22.—The President sent for me about ten. Entering
his cabinet room, Forney, Secretary of Senate, was in conver-
sation with him, and saying that it would be well to publish
report of committee on fight at Frederick, as the people were
excited.

The President answered warmly, "that he did not like to
swear, but why will people be such damned fools?" Forney
remarked, going, "that he hoped the President would not let
Mr. Chase resign," and added, "nor Mr. Seward." The Presi-
dent paused and reddened, then said suddenly, "If one goes,
the other must; they must hunt in couples." So Forney made
his bow.

The President, much glad to drop such troublesome business,
and relaxing into his usual humor, sat down and said, "Well,
Captain, here's a letter about a new powder," which he read, and showed the sample. Said he had burned some, and there was too much residuum. "Now, I'll show you." So he got a small sheet of paper, placed on it some of the powder, ran to the fire, and with the tongs picked up a coal, which he blew, specs still on nose. It occurred to me how peaceful was his mind, so easily diverted from the great convulsion going on, and a nation menaced with disruption.

The President clapped the coal to the powder and away it went, he remarking, "There is too much left there." He handed me a small parcel of the powder to try, and, in noticing the late imbroglio, said "it was very well to talk of remodelling the Cabinet, but the caucus had thought more of their plans than of his benefit," and he had told them so. . . .

Meanwhile results were leaking out gradually. The "National Intelligencer" stated that the President had asked Seward to remain. And Wise was told that the British Legation was not going, as they were unpacking.

Some members of Congress were in during the morning and said it would be adjusted. In the evening I was at house of Secretary of Navy, and from thence went to Secretary of State. Blair, Postmaster General, came in, and we had a full exposition. Seward was apprised by Senator King of the Senatorial caucus and resigned instantly, before they could act. A committee waited on the President, who, after hearing the proposition, appointed a meeting for the next night, when he had the Cabinet present too. As a result, the President declined to accede, and the next day asked Seward and Chase (who had given up also) to resume. This was Saturday. On Sunday, Seward met Chase going to church, and they agreed to go back, and both sent notes to that effect, but in the course of the day Chase asked to consider further. Then on Monday he finally consented. The President probably did not know of this when I saw him on Monday.

Seward and Blair were in high spirits at the repulse of the caucus, and Blair referred to some points of former difference with Seward, viz., his support of Scott and introduction of Stanton into the Cabinet. . . .

The armies of the Union have had an unfortunate career.
The first was closed up with Bull Run, 1861. The second was used up between James River and Bull Run, 1862,—Halleck and Pope. The third has been stopped at Frederick,—Halleck and Burnside. What is left of the three makes up a formidable army. But who shall head it!

Dec. 28.—A strong Republican told me a few days since that the Emancipation Proclamation was issued rather hastily on the 22d September, under the belief that the Confederates had been crushed at Antietam on the 17th.

Dec. 29.—Our papers publish the Proclamation of Mr. Davis, dated December 23, directing General Butler to be hung if taken,¹ also recognizing the pending Emancipation measure, and directing all negroes in arms, as well as white officers acting with them, to be delivered to the respective States to be dealt with.

¹ The writer would ask,—Where would have been the injustice had Mr. Davis "been hung when taken"? Why not?
CHAPTER XIV.

PRIVATE JOURNAL FOR 1863.—VOTE OF THANKS OF CONGRESS, AND MADE REAR-ADMIRAL.—SUCCEEDS DUPONT IN COMMAND OF SOUTH ATLANTIC BLOCKADING SQUADRON.

Jan. 1.—We begin the new year in the midst of great events.

The Proclamation has been given forth, and our main army is quiet on the Rappahannock; but the forces in the West are in presence, and there will be desperate fighting.

The "Monitor" and "Passaic" have left Hampton Roads to operate on North Carolina coast.

Jan. 3.—The news that the "Monitor" foundered off Cape Hatteras.

Jan. 11.—So we have lost Galveston and the vessels the "Lane" and the "Westfield," and are beaten at Vicksburg. General Grant has fallen back to Memphis.

Jan. 15.—The President came into my room this morning about some new powder. The other morning, when I went in to see him, he was busy making notes from a map showing the black population of the South.

Jan. 29.—President sent for me. Some man in trouble about arms. President holding a breech-loader in his hand. That done, he asked about the iron-clads and Charleston.

Jan. 30.—Met Mercier, the French Minister, as I walked to the Bureau. He turned and walked with me. . . . He spoke of our affairs. Said the Emperor desired to have the Union. Mercier thought it impossible to renew it exactly, or now; but that peace, and a commercial union, would lay the foundation for reunity, perhaps, in ten years. . . .

"Russell's Diary" is just out. He relates all he sees and
hears, not omitting private conversations. I am brought out in
five or six places,—whenever he met me,—and what I say is
given without the least scruple.

Feb. 4.—Word from the President, about noon, to come
over. Governor Curtin, of Pennsylvania, had seen some won-
der in gunnery. Sat half an hour, and went back. At 12½,
coming down-stairs to go to the Navy Yard, I met the President,
bound for the Navy Department; he spoke aside to me, and
said he had come to the Navy Department to hear about some
rumors. Seward told him that the rams had issued from
Charleston and done much damage.

In the evening (six p. m.) I got the "New York Herald," and
there was the whole story, got from a Richmond paper of
Monday: Two little iron-clads stole out about four in the
morning, and in the darkness came on the unsuspecting vessels
which were nearest, sank one or two, and drove off the rest.
This was the in-shore division. The real effects of the opera-
tion are trifling.

Feb. 6.—I do not think the Republicans, or any one else,
know that Seward had been concerned in the French mission
to Richmond. The instincts of the Republicans had been ex-
cited by other symptoms. The publication of documents in
France show that Mercier went to Richmond last April at the
instance of Seward, who sent word that he would like to see
the Southern men in their seats in Congress, which it appears
the Confederate leaders would not listen to. . . . There is great
aversion to the Negro Soldier Bill. The other day, when I went
into the Cabinet room, Governor Hicks was saying to the Presi-
dent that the measure would be very hurtful to the cause. . . .
I observe that the President never tells a joke now.

I leave my house at 8 a.m. for the Navy Department, leave
the Bureau about 12½, stop at the house and take a mouthful
to eat, go to the Ordnance Yard, stay there till 4½ or 5 p.m.,
return home, find a mail there, open and read, dine at 6 p.m.;
and this has been my habit since I took the Bureau. The
pressure of private interests is enormous and rascally.

The "British Army and Navy Gazette" attacks my Report.
This is Russell's paper; he is abusive, though he did not scrup-
ule to be my guest when he was here.
Materials for history of the period are appearing. We have
the Prince de Joinville's Account of McClellan's Campaign,
Gurowski's Diary, the Diary of Russell, and the Record of
Courts-Martial on Porter, McDowell, &c.

I have a letter from the Prince de Joinville,—two sheets
full,—partly on iron-clads, partly on politics.

Feb. 12.—Mr. Seward reports to Congress that he never
authorized the French Minister to communicate with the Con-
federates.

The vote of thanks by Congress, which was passed by Senate,
went through the House on the 4th February, and was signed
by the President on Saturday, 7th February. Originally it was
to be Lardner, Davis, myself, Rowan, and Porter. The Senate
omitted Lardner because he had not commanded in chief in
action, and put in Stringham (Rear-Admiral on Retired List).
The effect is to keep us on the Active List ten additional
years,¹ and makes us eligible as Rear-Admirals.

Feb. 14.—Went to see the President about a report that the
iron-clads wanted ammunition at Charleston.

After I left he sent for me again. General Halleck and Fox
were there. President being shaved when we entered. He let
off a joke,—the first I have heard for a long while. Abe is
restless about Charleston.

Feb. 16.—President sent for me. Some inflammable humbug
had been poked at him; from it he went off easily to Charle-
ton matters. Du Pont and Fox differ as to plan of attack, and
he insists on Fox going down to Charleston to talk it over.
Stanton reading some papers.²

Feb. 19.—In the evening Foote sends me a note that I am
nominated an Admiral. My nomination received the favorable
action of the Senate Naval Committee, and was so reported to
the Senate. Davis likewise as Rear-Admiral; but I regretted
to hear that Rowan as Commander and Porter as Captain were
not acted on. I would have had them Admirals too.

Bitter attack in yesterday's "Tribune," flatly reversing what

¹ Admiral Dahlgren died July 12, 1870, at the age of sixty, and two
years before he could have received the benefit of this act of Congress in his
behalf. — M. V. D.
² Fox did not go; the idea was given up. — M. V. D.
was said December 3d about my Report. Came from one of the agents at Willard's.

**Friday, Feb. 27.** — To-night, about ten o'clock, I was confirmed by the Senate as Rear-Admiral, not thinking of it at the time. So I am at last an Admiral of the Republic. There are five above me, — Farragut, Goldsborough, Dupont, Foote, and Davis, leaving three vacancies.

**Feb. 28.** — At the Senate for a few minutes, then went into the President's to present the new Admiral and shake hands!

**Saturday, March 7.** — Saw the President last evening, who seemed nervous and uneasy.

**March 10.** — I omitted to mention that Congress had incorporated "a National Academy of Science," with fifty Corporators, of which I was one. This measure, from which should proceed a great institution, is due solely to Mr. Wilson, Senator of Massachusetts.

**March 11.** — I observe that the "Montauk" is again firing her XVm guns, which makes me very anxious, as they are on first trial and will not endure as other guns. It is the sin of the day, — this waste of cannon and ammunition. I have warned them, but with little success.

**Received my commission as Rear-Admiral, to take effect from the 7th February, being the date of my vote of thanks.** This makes me the sixth Admiral and Officer on the list.

**March 29.** — I went to the Department. Found the President in the Chief Clerk's room with the Secretary and Fox. He looks thin and badly, and is very nervous. Complained of everything. They were doing nothing at Vicksburg or Charleston. Dupont was asking for one iron-clad after another, as fast as they were built. He said the canal at Vicksburg was of no account, and wondered that a sensible man would do it. I tried my hand at consolation, without much avail. He thought the favorable state of public expectation would pass away before anything was done. Then levelled a couple of jokes at the doings of Vicksburg and Charleston. Poor gentleman!

**March 31.** — Great Union meeting at Capitol. The President and Cabinet attended. The Navy officers were in uniform, which was hardly necessary at the time. **Officers have no**
business with political meetings, but must support the Constitution and the law at the cost of life.

On Friday, April 8, I left Washington to visit our naval posts in the West; in the course of which I was at Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Louisville, Cairo, and St. Louis.

On the 10th, while at Cairo, came the tidings that Dupont had attacked Charleston on the 7th, and had not succeeded.

Being my first trip to the West, I was naturally much interested in what I saw. Arrived home April 20.

April 21.—I had a conversation with the Secretary about Charleston. He is not satisfied, and thinks Dupont gave up too soon. I reminded him that Dupont was a judicious and brave officer, and that the Captains of the iron-clads who were chosen officers concurred with Dupont. The Secretary was also not pleased with Porter’s results.

I had a conversation with Fox, whose ideas of Charleston were similar to those of the Secretary. He observed, “I wish you were down there.” I reminded him how earnestly I had endeavored to go there. He said it would not have done for me to be second, as Dupont and myself would have differed. If I am wanted there now, an order will soon take me there, as I am an applicant for sea service.

Next day the President came into Fox’s room while I was there, and sat some time, talking generally of matters. He said nothing of the Charleston business, in the way of opinion, but remarked that Dupont’s last letter showed an overreadiness to think that his (the President’s) letter censured him. Abe was in good humor, and at leaving said, “Well I will go home; I had no business here; but, as the lawyer said, I had none anywhere else.”

Sunday, April 26.—I had to spend most of the morning at the Bureau. The President came in and sat for some time, and talked over matters and read the last telegrams. He said that he had written a joint letter to the General and Admiral, giving discretion as to an attack on Charleston or Savannah, but did not suppose they would give up Charleston after a fight of forty minutes.

April 28.—The President came down in the afternoon, to learn about Ames, one of the hunters for a heavy ordnance
contract. It is unfortunate that the President will meddle in such matters. No adventure on the Treasury now stands on its merits. Projects for new cannon, new powder, and devices of all kinds are backed by the highest influences.

_May_ 6. — Captain Drayton came in about supper-time from New York, where he had brought the "Passaic" from Port Royal. He says it would be madness to go into Charleston again, and all the Captains who were in the action so agree fully. He thinks Dupont intended to renew the attack, but when the Captains of the iron-clads assembled in his ship and made their reports, he gave it up.

Drayton finds the authorities, particularly Fox, approbatory of Dupont's doings in the attack on Charleston, the unanimity of the officers tending to this.

_May_ 13. — This morning the Secretary opened with, "Well, what do you think of Charleston?" My answer not being despondent, he said, "Why do you wish to go there?" I said, "Not to displace Admiral Dupont or to promise to take the place, but to do the best if ordered." So we had a chat. I told him there were not vessels enough to do the work with certainty, and they might not be had till the autumn, when, if he wished, I would try. Meanwhile, let the work of preparation go on quietly. He seemed to like my views, and must think over them.

There seems to be no doubt of the death of the celebrated Stonewall Jackson. It will be a great loss to the South. He was a brave and pure man, with great abilities.

_May_ 17. — The President drove to my office at the Yard, and took me to town. He was full of joke, and we had some hearty laughs. Ulysses is still at the camp. I have not seen him these two months. Left for New York.

_May_ 20. — Met Assistant Secretary Fox, Captain Ericsson, Admiral Gregory, and visited the "Passaic."

On Thursday I left New York and went to Reading to see after cannon. Returned to Washington May 25.

_May_ 28. — Much chat in the Department among the initiated about Charleston. Too many seem to know of the project. Dupont is to be relieved, and three are spoken of in his place,—Gregory, Foote, and myself. There is evidently an idea of two
Commanders,—one for the fleet generally and one for the attack, intended, I think, to include Foote and myself. This is objectionable, as it renders collision of opinion possible, and hence dissension. So I told the Secretary. General Gillmore, too, is called on, and on the whole it does not look like unity of action.

Friday, May 29.—Fox came into the Bureau, and said the Secretary wished to know if I would volunteer to go as second to Foote in the attack on Charleston. I answered that I would promptly obey the order if given; that I wished to go, but would not volunteer as second, chiefly because two Admirals would only produce difficulty, and thus the seeds of dissension would be sown from the first. I was the next in rank, but one, to Foote, held a like commission, and was now a Chief of Bureau, like him. That I had my own opinions as to the mode of conducting the business, and would not yield them to any one. Foote could not be expected to subordinate himself to his second, and he would not do so.

Fox thought there would be discontent in the fleet if I relieved Dupont, but that should not be, as my position before promotion was senior to every officer in the fleet but Turner.

He talks, too, of an attack in two months. Can it be prepared? Foote is very anxious for it, and came down in the evening to talk of it.

June 2.—This morning, when with the Secretary on other business, he recurred to the Charleston matter by saying, "Well, you and Foote could not agree." I explained to him that he spoke of making the attack a separate operation from the blockade, but that when Fox came to me he said otherwise, and that two Admirals would in that way only clash. I mentioned this to Fox, and said I was even willing to go if the iron-clads were assigned me. Fox took up the idea quickly, and urged me to go in the most earnest manner, and said it would be desirable to go to New York to meet Foote there and ascertain if he would accede to the arrangement. It was now 10½ and the cars would leave at 11½. I managed to reach there in time, and by ten o'clock at night arrived in New York. The Navy Department had telegraphed to Foote at New Haven.

June 3.—Foote arrived and sent me word that he would be
at Van Nostrand's, the bookseller. There I found him about noon, in bad plight with a sick headache, and disclosed the purpose of my journey. While talking, General Gillmore came in. The renewed operation just now seems to have its origin in his confidence that he can occupy Morris Island, plant batteries and batter Sumter, the Navy to co-operate by a flank fire. He was anxious to be off as soon as possible. After he went, Foote and I resumed. Foote made no objection to my plan, viz., that the iron-clads should be in one division under my flag, and wrote to the Secretary. I was with him till he left at 5½, and next day I returned to Washington.

June 5.—As soon as the Secretary got to his office I went in and stated results, handing him the letter of Foote; telling him, however, that I was not sanguine of General Gillmore's success. The island was three and a half miles long, and 10,000 men was all our force.

The island being very narrow, the front of the attack and defence must correspond. The enemy would oppose the landing and retire gradually as each line of works was taken. These would be of sand, easily raised, and must in each case be assaulted after our cannon had cleared the way. Circumstances did not allow us to use an overpowering force, and the Confederates would be likely to have as many men as ourselves, and no doubt fewer and lighter guns. The flanking fire of the vessels must be uncertain, as they could get into no less range than 1,200 to 1,800 yards, and the island was fringed seaward by high sand-hills. We would have to work up some three miles in order to reach the proposed site of the battery, which, it so happened, was that of the enemy's main work, Fort Wagner. This seemed to me a small base for hope. The attack by water still alone feasible, if guns enough were taken in on the iron-clads; and this might possibly be with the "Lehigh" and "Sangamon" and the four or five others now building.

The Secretary said they could not be finished before October. Fox quite as eager for the new plan. The "Onondaga," "Lehigh," and "Sangamon" were all I could have in addition to those which Dupont had.

The attack will not be what it should be.
June 9.—Foote arrived here. Department anxious for him to sail at once, as the War Department may withdraw some troops from Charleston.

June 10.—The papers have it that I am to go with Foote, and thus the intention to attack again, is disclosed before I myself have received any positive direction on the subject.

June 14.—A letter from Ully. He gives an account of fight. He acted as Aid to General Pleasanton, and charged with the Pennsylvania Lancers, narrowly escaping. His horse shot in three places and fell.

June 16.—Hooker has fallen back nearly to the lines of Washington. . . . The President calls for 100,000 men.

Ully came from camp for an hour with message for the President. He is well, but well rid of flesh.

May 14.—I sent my resignation as a member of the Academy of National Sciences to Professor Bache, who had been elected President of the Academy. Next day he replied, requesting me not to insist, that I would be excused from service, &c.

But on the 18th May I wrote to him adhering to my determination.

June 18, 1863.—I have just narrated my appointment to the Southern Atlantic Fleet, to act as Commander of the ironclads with a special view to Charleston.

I had asked for a fast steamer to serve as flagship when not in action, and adapted to the ordinary business of the fleet. Some were noted to me, and I started for New York to make a selection, arriving at the International Hotel about eleven o'clock at night.

June 19.—Taking up the morning paper, I saw it stated that Admiral Foote was dangerously ill at the Astor House.

Little anticipating anything serious, I went there, and soon learned that his illness was considered fatal.

On entering the room, he expressed gladness at seeing me, and began to converse, but the oppression at the chest caused me to withdraw lest he might suffer from the exertion. In the afternoon I called again; he was still pleasant as ever, and more easy, so that I remained some time before I took leave.

June 20.—Called to see my friend. Alas! he was uncon-
DEATH OF ADMIRAL FOOTE.

sious, and had in reality taken his leave of earth, and I had to return to Washington. And thus parts the well-tried friendship of many years.

My journey was resumed with a sad heart, and late in the evening I arrived in Washington.

**Sunday, June 21.**—I went to the Navy Department and made known the events of my journey. The Secretary did not refer to the consequences of Foote's illness.

I went to church, and the service had not proceeded far, when a messenger from the Secretary summoned me.

He was at his house, and soon told me it had been decided that I should command the Charleston fleet, remarking that it seemed destined that no one else should do so.

I then saw Fox and we entered on the arrangements that would be needed.

**June 22.**—Busy in getting matters in order to leave. The Secretary still insists that I must not give up the Bureau, but must come back to it. I urge him to appoint a new Chief.

**June 24.**—I was at the Department about an hour, and saw the Secretary and Fox. I left at eleven, and got to New York by ten at night.

**June 25.**—I went to see Foote, and found him very low, and seemingly unconscious of all objects. When my name was said, he repeated it, adding, "Who will fight for Dahlgren?—Dahlgren's boys." Then he relapsed as before. I went to the Navy Yard. Not yet settled about a steamer for me. Got the orders to take command of the South Fleet.

**June 26.**—Foote very low, and at ten p.m. my good friend departed. The grave never closed on a better man. We had been bosom friends for twenty years, and one week since, when our last conversation took place, he expressed his high opinion of me, and added, "I would not say this now unless I believed it."

**June 27.**—The steamer "Dinsmore" being got ready. The Admiral's body was removed to his home in New Haven, but so quietly that no one knew it. So much for the fame of our best officer. New York goes on and makes money, heedless of all else. It is most sad that at this time the country loses one of her noblest and bravest naval commanders.
June 28. — The French Admiral called yesterday. He said he thought there were torpedoes near Sumter, and that fifteen monitors might take it if they fired faster. He said we fired once in eleven or twelve minutes from each turret.

June 30. — At eleven the steamer "Dinsmore" pushes off from the wharf, passes down the superb bay, and puts to sea. With me are Captain Rowan, to command the "Ironsides," Pickering, the "Housatonic," Spotts, the "South Carolina," Parker, the "Wabash," and Badger, ordnance officer.

July 4. — Tropical weather. At early light were off Port Royal. . . . Numerous vessels were at anchor, some few only looking like vessels of war.

We anchored about 7 1/2, and in half an hour the Fleet Captain came on board. He said Dupont was not up yet, and I deferred my call. Rodgers said that Dupont had not asked to be relieved, and was sore on the subject. I thought it was understood otherwise.

General Gillmore wished to act, and had called for assistance. Dupont had no specific instructions, but would assist. He preferred to await my arrival. A very loose state of things; no shape or connection.

After Rodgers got to the "Wabash" a note was sent me from Dupont, saying he was "rejoiced" at my coming, and would send for me at ten.

I wear the "Red," Dupont being senior. Could not salute, having no guns. So I went on board the "Wabash," a splendid screw frigate, and was received with salute and all other honors. Dupont was very pleasant. The cabins full of officers.

In the afternoon I went over to Hilton Head to see General Gillmore. He said that his project must now be tried, or it would be too late in a few days. So I had no alternative but to grant the aid asked.

I appointed next day to see him in the "Wabash."

July 5. — About one P.M. Gillmore came, and we put the matter in a more definite shape. I would send in five ironclads to clear the ground on Morris Island, and he would attempt an assault the night before. If it failed, then he would open the batteries. There is also to be a diversion by vessels and troops up the Stono.
RELIEVES ADMIRAL DUPONT.

The thing is rather complicated, and, to make it worse, I am new to the squadron and the locality, and my staff likewise. Besides, three of the turrets are being altered, and this work has to be stopped for the occasion.

In the evening I went to see the captive "Atlanta," and with Rodgers, who took her, must confess it looks like a premature surrender. I then went to the three monitors; they are getting ready.

July 6.—I went on board the "Wabash," and received the command from Admiral Dupont.

So ends the first act of the new play.

I learn that the crew of the "Ironsides" did not cheer Dupont when turned up for the purpose, on leaving after the fight of April 7. My Captain of Fleet (Taylor) tells me that the crew of his vessel ("Housatonic") did the same when he left. The press, and the moneyed influence of the monitor interest, have infused the poison into this portion of the Navy, which has rotted the public mind elsewhere. With us, law and order have hitherto prevailed; now they are to be relaxed.

A note from Gillmore thinks he will be ready.

July 7.—General Gillmore came on board to say he was not ready, and asked to postpone one day. Agreed on. He said a flag of truce had come out and peeped at our preparations. I sent orders to Rowan to receive no more for the present. I have ordered the frigate "Atlanta" to be fitted at once.

About 11 1/2 p.m. I was awakened to receive a dispatch from General Gillmore. All very well, and recapitulating the understanding, but urging strongly the entrance of the "Ironsides," as he, with some skillful seafaring men, found that she could pass at ordinary high tide. It is curious that the General should ask me to incur the risk on such grounds, when the pilots, who know the ground perfectly and will be on the spot, affirm they will not undertake it.

July 8.—I rose early; the sky very overcast and lowering. Wind W. S. W. I completed some arrangements; took Captain of Fleet and others in the "Dinamore," and left the anchorage at 8 1/4 a.m. I let my flag fly in the "Wabash," so as not to give notice of my departure. I have no concern now
but the weather, because the monitors drag in much sea or wind, their anchors being insufficient and their motive power lost by foul bottoms.

If the fire is heavy, the wooden vessels might not be able to give a tow. These are the chances, and if the operation were mine, or some time for preparation possible, they should have been much lessened. As it is, I must take the chance. . . .

It was six p.m. when I reached the "Ironsides" and went on board. Rowan, Green, and others do not think the wooden vessels should go in. I wonder if the many items of the plan will all work; and so wondering I went to bed and tried to sleep, but in vain, for the ship so groaned and shook as the sea tossed her about, that I could not.

July 9.—The sky looked so black yesterday that a storm might have come, but it did not. Before day the monitors were reported, and five o'clock (the hour of starting) had arrived when an A. D. C. came from General Gillmore asking for the postponement; one of the columns for boats was not ready.

Round about is the blockading force, strung rather sparsely; at anchor, too, which is not a good plan.

July 10.—Warm and oppressive. At four o'clock, being not quite light, I went on board the "Kaatskill" and hoisted my flag and led in over the bar, followed by the "Nahant," "Montauk," and "Weehawken." About ten minutes past five, our batteries began from Folly Island, and maintained an incessant fire from forty guns upon Morris Island, the shells cracking in quantities in the air, heavy banks of smoke encircling the view there. The Confederate batteries did not reply for ten minutes, and at the same moment the "Kaatskill" passed the outer buoy, about 5½ a.m. turning the inner buoy, which took us clear of the bar. At six passed the wreck of the "Keokuk," and anchored ten minutes afterwards.

At 6½ the first shell was fired from the "Kaatskill," and the other monitors followed, our fire being directed at the batteries and men on the sandy eminences who were replying to General Gillmore. This dislodged them, and their men could be seen running up the beach. Many shells from our batteries, going over the enemy, passed over us and ahead.

About eight o'clock the Folly Island batteries ceased, the
rattle of musketry was heard, and soon after our men came in sight of Morris Island, the enemy having given way, and were seen abandoning their batteries.

The South end of Morris Island is made up of sandy eminences for a mile, and on these was the defence.

Our men, still coming on, increased to two regiments and moved in column along the low beach; the iron-clads shelling the ground ahead of them.

It was nearly nine o'clock when they attained the South extreme of the sand-hills and came to the flat ground which constitutes the remainder of the island.

I then pushed on to come up with Fort Wagner. Morris Island is about 3½ miles long, and Fort Wagner three miles from the south end.

The water being shoal, the pilot could not go nearer than twelve hundred yards. About 9½ fired the first shot, followed by the other three monitors. The fort replied, and the whole scene became animated,—the troops moving up the beach, some detached buildings in flames (done purposely by the Confederates), and the cannonading between the fort and the iron-clads, Fort Sumter sending a shot at times.

The first three shot from "Wagner" hit the "Kaatskill" hard, and it was soon apparent that my flag was to have most attention.

At noon hauled out of fire, to give the men dinner, and about two went back to resume work.

Meanwhile the body of our troops halted about half a mile from Wagner.

At six P.M. ceased, and steamed the iron-clads down the channel, for the men were now weary and wellnigh exhausted. No one can form an idea of the atmosphere of these vessels.

The "Kaatskill" was hit sixty times, and her armor very much hurt. Turret, pilot-house, deck, smoke-stack, hit in many places. The sides of the pilot-house bulged through, and I just escaped the end of a bolt that was dislodged. The "Nahant" had six hits, the "Montauk" two, "Weehawken" none.

The "Kaatskill's" ensign-staff was shot away, and my flag cut by a fragment of shell.
I was a weary man that night, after my first battle.\footnote{An intercepted correspondence published in "New York Tribune," Jan. 16, 1864, mentions as a result of this day's work before Charleston, that Colonel Lamar, the Confederate agent, writes from London, July 28, that the attack on Charleston was discouraging,—only 4,000 men there. "That caused Lee to recross into Virginia, and he will have to reinforce Beauregard from his army; consequently, he will have to assume the defensive again."}

\textit{July 11.}—I was told about six that Gillmore tried Wagner by assault at daybreak, but was repulsed with loss. About nine I had a note from him by an Aid, in which he stated this, and asked that the iron-clads should go up and sweep the ground above Wagner, as he supposed it might be reinforced.

I went up in the "Kaatskill" with the other three, and peppered away at Wagner. Saw no troops, and came down about noon. This afternoon the "Wabash" and "Nantucket" appeared, according to orders which I sent. The one anchored outside, the "Nantucket" came in.

\textit{July 12.}—Hot. General Gillmore came on board, and we talked over some plans. He left without coming to a decision. He said that his leading column lost 108 men from 180; that two regiments in support did not follow, but halted.

I put four or five gunboats to stir up Wagner, at long range, with rifles.

I sent to Navy Department report of the 10th.

In the afternoon letter from Reynolds at Port Royal, stating that the iron-clad was about to attempt an attack at Wassaw. The "Conemaugh" had already left, and I ordered the "Nan-hant" to Wassaw.

\textit{July 13.}—Sent the "Canandaigua" to Wassaw, to look to matters there and see if they are going right. The "Ironside" was to come in the evening, but the wind freshened from S. W., and made so much sea that the pilot would not venture.

Troops quiet ashore. Gunboats practising at long range on Fort Wagner.

\textit{July 14.}—"Ironside" cannot cross this morning at high
tide, sea so rough on the bar. ... Captain Parker states that the seamen are not well enough drilled for assault, so I have only the 250 marines.

A letter in the afternoon from General Gillmore, fixing the 16th for attack. He says he will have eighteen rifle-guns at 1,000 to 1,600 yards, and twelve to fifteen mortars at 1,500 to 1,700 yards.

He wants the gunboats at short range.

July 15.—Sent out the Fleet Captain with steamers and pilots to get in the "Ironsides."

I sent "Powhatan" to bring up the "Patapsco" from Port Royal.

I went ashore and met General Seymour, who is nicely located in a very primitive manner amidst the sand; but the breeze was delightful. He said they could not open to-morrow.

I had a message from General Gillmore saying that a deserter informed that the gunboat fire was disabling twenty men a day, and he asked to have it renewed; so he finds himself mistaken.

At 5½ p. m. the "Ironsides" weighed anchor, crossed the bar in three quarters of an hour, and came to inside; she touched slightly once.

General Gillmore telegraphed after dark that he could not be ready before day after to-morrow.

I was all ready.

July 16.—General Gillmore telegraphed that the enemy had attacked in force and was repulsed.

About noon I had a report from Captain Balch, stating that he was attacked by a battery, and compelled to move his position. Had been hit forty-two times. One man killed and several hurt.

We are to attack to-morrow at sunrise, and are getting ready. Collected the marines, and sent them ashore to drill.

"Canandaigua" got back from Wassaw. All right there.

In the afternoon General Gillmore came off to arrange details of attack to-morrow. His batteries are nearly ready, but their metal is light,—rifle 20 and 30 pdr.s. I thought the General not too sanguine; and he added that he depended on my vessels.
The gunboats busy with long range at Fort Wagner.
About dark the "Patapsco" came in from Fort Royal, so I have five monitors here.

July 17.—It rained in torrents during the night. Very early General Gillmore made signal that he was not ready to attack. I sent a note that it was well not to delay, as we had all our force and the enemy would increase his every hour. I also signalled that we could see them strengthening. General Gillmore answered that he was getting ready as fast as he could.

July 18.—Not long after midnight a violent storm of rain and lightning came up. The water came down in a flood, and continued after daylight. The General signalled that he could not begin to fire, as his batteries were flooded. At 8½ he said he would be ready between 9 and 10. I sent signals to iron-clads to prepare for action, and ordered the gunboats to open fire. At 9½ General Gillmore telegraphed that his ammunition had been so wet that he could not open before noon, but would now begin to get his range. I sent word to iron-clads to postpone. The gunboats are firing very lively at Wagner, and the General telegraphed that they aid him very much. There are five at work.

About 10 o'clock the first shell from our mortar battery, to try range.

At 11½ I went on board the "Montauk," hoisted my flag, and led up the channel, followed by the turrets "Patapsco," "Nantucket," "Kaatskill," "Weehawken," and by the "Iron-sides."

About 12½ anchored abreast of Fort Wagner, and fired the first gun, which was succeeded by the fire of the other vessels. The guns of the fort were soon overpowered by the weight of metal, and did not respond with spirit.

The pilot would only take the "Montauk" to the edge of the channel, say 1,200 yards of the fort, and the "Iron-sides" could not get that near, for the tide was ebbing.

Meanwhile our gunboats were blazing away at long range and our shore batteries were going it rather deliberately. Such a cracking of shells and thunder of cannon and flying of sand and earth into the air!
About four the tide began to flow, when I had the "Montauk's" anchor weighed and closed in steadily until as near as 300 yards, when we anchored again. But the fort was quiet, and would not answer with a gun; indeed, under such a fire it was very unsafe for a man to come out of the bomb-proofs. The gunnery was very fine, the shells of the "Ironsides" going right over the "Montauk," so we had it all our own way.

About sunset an aid brought a note from General Gillmore, on half a blank leaf written in pencil, saying he had ordered an assault, and by the waning light we could see the masses coming along the beach; but the darkness shut them in ere they reached the fort. Presently came the flashes of light and the sharp rattle from musket and cannon. There could be no help from us, *for it was dark and we might kill friend as well as foe.* All we could do was to look on and await an issue not in our control.

The contest went on for an hour and a half, lapsed, and then died out. It was over, but who had won?

About ten o'clock, almost worn out with exertion for nineteen hours, I returned to my den in the "Dinsmore," and there learned that our men had been repulsed with severe loss, 600 or 700 men out of four regiments. The news came down the island and thence to the vessels there. The General evidently has not force enough.

*July 19.—Turned out early and went up the harbor to the "Ironsides," whence I sent the flag lieutenant and Surgeon Duvall under flag of truce to ask for our wounded or to send medical assistance. *Enemy declined both,* saying they would bury the dead and take care of the wounded. Mr. Preston says that many of both had not yet been removed, but were lying where they fell. . . .

So we passed a quiet Sunday, for it was impossible to fire while our wounded men were lying about.

I had not been long in my cot when alarm lights from outside said that the Confederate iron-clads were coming out;

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1 This needless loss of life may be attributed to General Gillmore's want of proper force, *and to the mistake he made* in postponing the assault until it became so dark that the Navy could not co-operate. — M. V. D.
then came some guns, and finally that a "runner" had been taken. It turned out in the morning that a vessel trying to get out was run ashore and burned. She had passed the outer vessels, but was headed by a shot from the "Kaatskill," that lay inside. This was the first of the real blockade; for the trade ceased at once when it was known that a monitor was so high up.

July 20. — An anxious day with me. News that Ully has been wounded.

At 11½ A. M. our batteries ashore opened; so did two monitors, which I sent for the purpose. But the " Ironsides," which was also ordered, did not join. The fort replied. Signal to leave off at noon. After dinner sent in " Kaatskill" and "Nantucket," with "Ironsides" and three gunboats. They peppered away till 4½, when I ordered them to haul off.

The "Ironsides" was hit fourteen times by 10 in. shot, but as the distance was 1,400 yards there was no damage to the armor. The "Montauk" was hit three times, the other monitors not at all.

July 21. — No fire from our shore batteries. Sent up two gunboats which did good work, but got no reply from Wagner.

I offered to General Gillmore to land a IX in. and some 24 howitzers. He said all the guns were mounted that could be used. I sent a monitor with tug and boats to observe the inner mouth of Swash channel.

July 22. — General Gillmore asks for two Whitworths, which I assent to if the men go with them.

Two monitors firing at Wagner in the forenoon and two in the afternoon were stopped at three by heavy rain.

My mind is with my poor boy. I do wish to know how it fares with him. Oh, that he may escape any permanent injury!

July 23. — General Gillmore writes that he will advance his batteries to-night, and asks me to cover them for a sortie, by a fire at daybreak; so our men rest to-day.

"Dai Ching" arrives from Washington,—one of the vessels built for China and purchased from Washington.

Captain Rowan writes that his position is unsafe. Curious! The "Ironsides" has been at her anchor in all weather outside in the open sea for a year, and yet here within the bar she is
unsafe, and may get ashore under the enemy's batteries, 2,400 yards distant!

July 24. — A beautiful, still morning when I left the vessel before daybreak and pulled for the "Weehawken." Up anchor, and before sunrise off Wagner with all the iron-clads. Opened fire, and soon stopped the feeble reply it made. I could see the new work of our troops through last night. Pounded away, scattering the sand till after ten, when a steamer was seen coming past Sumter with flag of truce. Ceased firing and responded with similar flag, for our wounded were on board, and there was to be an exchange. . . . I turned down channel to my vessel, for the exchange of wounded would occupy the day.

In the afternoon General Gillmore telegraphed that his operation had succeeded, and thanked me for the very efficient fire of the vessels. In the evening the enemy opened fire on the new work.

July 25. — Some little firing in the day. Troops busy with the new trenches. "Passaic" arrived in good season. . . .

When quite late General Gillmore wrote that he feared an attack at daylight, and asked for a covering of boat guns. I ordered a monitor with six armed boats to protect his approach.

July 26. — Arrival of some vessels. In the afternoon practice at long intervals between our batteries and the enemy. Landed two Whitworth 70-pdrs. and seamen under Captain Parker.

July 27. — No firing except an occasional shot from the shore batteries at each other.

July 28. — Had a large mail from U. S. One from Fox, recognizing our service here as a brilliant success.

Just while reading these letters came a telegraphed message from General Gillmore that a deserter brings information of a plan to attack the "Nahant."

I will not risk anything there (Wassaw), and so sent down the "Weehawken" and "Conemaugh."

July 29. — Shelled a little with "Ironsides" and two monitors with effect. General Gillmore thinks we broke in the "proof" at Wagner and did mischief at Battery Gregg.
Went ashore to see the General, and had a talk about prospects. He does not seem to think so much of Fort Wagner, but is looking to effects of rifle battery on Sumter.

_July_ 30. —Troops working at the batteries. Iron-clads shelling enemy.

My flag, Lieutenant Preston, went home in the supply-ship. A great loss to me, for he has a fine capacity for business and knew all about the squadron. Now I have a staff entirely inexperienced. No secretary, new clerks, and, sad to say, I begin to feel the effects of the climate.

_July_ 31. —Before daylight the batteries were active on both sides, then ceased. Very much pressed for vessels. There is a long list detained for defence at various points and for repair.

I went ashore to visit the sailors and marines sent to man our guns in the batteries. Then rode over to General Gillmore's tent.

_Aug._ 1. —Very little firing to-day, only from one gun-boat.

_Aug._ 2. —Several vessels arrived with the powder, cannon, shells, &c., I so much needed.

Steamers arrived with 3,000 troops from North Carolina.

_Aug._ 3. —Newspapers to the 29th. Long accounts North and South of the attack of the 18th, in which there is much bombast and twaddle.

So short of coal that I had to despatch a vessel to urge a supply.

Another steamer to-day with troops.

_Aug._ 4. —News from Ully. Poor child! he had to lose his foot to save his life. Sad loss. He receives every attention, from the President down, and has a Colonel's commission. I feared the result, and have been kept in extreme anxiety since I heard of his wound.

_Aug._ 6. —This morning the marines arrive — 265 — with what I have, 540, which I will form into a regiment.

_Aug._ 8. —Went ashore to see General Gillmore about our next operation. _He agreed with me that if I had had a regiment of marines, as now, to push ashore in rear of Wagner, as I wished, we would have taken it._
Aug. 9.—Increase of debility and disease alarming; many have to go home. The whole crew of "Marblehead" broken down.

Aug. 10.—Equatorial weather. Much of this will not leave many men. Enemy strengthening Sumter... Friday fixed to begin. Went ashore to stroll on the beach; splendid surf. Soldiers swimming. Marines just landed for drill. Then turned as far as the General's quarters. At tea, and afterwards talked over matters.

Aug. 11.—About two o'clock rapid firing by enemy. The General signals that they fire grape and canister. He fears an assault and asks me to open. The monitors ordered, and they begin accordingly. All alive ashore. The night still. Bugle and drum and orders heard very distinctly. The cannonading incessant. I went up in my barge alongside of the turrets. Daylight breaks. The Wagner firing repeatedly a few yards from my boat. No assault.

Aug. 12.—I saw General Gillmore in the evening and found him very sanguine. He wanted 500 pounds of powder from me.

Aug. 13.—Hot. The same breeze, but there is no elasticity in the air.

I am better to-day, but the worst of this place is that one only stops getting weaker. One does not get stronger. Day after day men and officers give way.

News from Bureau of Medicine against whiskey to the crews and turrets. The Department of course indorses. It is strange that persons who cannot know, will judge of people who must know. I wish the people at Washington would try a day's work in a monitor.

After dark General Gillmore telegraphs that he is too unwell to begin the fight to-morrow.

The Commander of Marines reports against risking his men in attacking works. Two of his officers had done the same in conversation before. I said it must come from the Senior in writing. Rather hurtful. What are marines for?

Aug. 15.—General Gillmore still unwell; also finds the quality of his powder various and uncertain. Asks me for some, and it is given of course. . . .

Nothing but the will has kept me up. . . . I went ashore to
see General Gillmore. Found him in bed; not weakened, however. He thought of Monday to begin. More troops arriving. The total additional must be 7,000.

_Aug. 17._—As agreed on, the shore batteries opened early in the morning, but deliberately. It was about six when the monitors began. I, leading in the “Weehawken,” anchored 1,000 yards from Wagner. The fort replied. When the tide rose I closed to 450 yards, and about 9½ the fort ceased. The other monitors blazed away,—the “Ironsides” and the gunboats at long range.

The “Kaatskill” had anchored just on port bow of “Weehawken,” her length inside, under Captain G. W. Rodgers, Fleet Captain. When the “Weehawken” was moving in I noticed that the “Kaatskill” was moving too, and remarked it to Captain Calhoun, supposing that Rodgers wished to get closer than I was. Then my attention was taken off, looking at the fort, until it was reported that the “Kaatskill” was going out of action. Then it was signalled that the Captain was disabled. As I went down, I heard he was killed. A shot striking the pilot-house drove off splinters of iron, killed him and the Paymaster, and wounded the Pilot and Quartermaster. When Wagner ceased, I passed to the “Passaic,” and steamed up to 2,000 yards of Sumter; “Patapsco” along. Opened on the fort, which replied feebly. Our rifle-shot hit. At noon hauled out of action.

All this time the shore batteries were doing work, slowly but surely.

The day passed over, and the results looked promising. I went to bed a weary man, but was waked about midnight by a telegram from General Gillmore, that a sortie was probable. Would the gunboats stop it?

_Aug. 18._—Sent up the “Ironsides” and two monitors at early light, to keep the enemy in check.

The new flagship arrived. I went on board in time to catch our first gale. Too rough to fire.

_Aug. 19._—General Gillmore says that the Whitworths are disabled. Will I replace them?

In the evening I went to “Passaic,” and steamed up to look at Sumter. Pretty well used up, but not breached.
Aug. 20.—I went into the creek to meet General Gillmore. Sumter begins to show under the continued fire. "Ironsides" hammering Wagner. . . . General Gillmore came on board. He is quite satisfied with the progress.

Aug. 21.—The success of operations has been mainly due to their being unexpected at this season. Morris Island is so low that only the prominent parts are not under water in strong gales. During the last northeaster, General Gillmore tells me that the men at work in the trenches stood eighteen inches in water, and had to wait for it to fall. Under ordinary circumstances very little digging shows water. The hills of the south end, Wagner, and one or two other spots alone are well above the sea. No doubt the Confederates thought we would wait for fine fall weather. . . . Sumter is now completely dilapidated at the gorge, and many shells have gone through the farther walls. So I decided to try a hand at completing the work, and assembled the Captains of iron-clads to explain my plan. Fixed it, however. At 10½ were to move. The hour came; I went to the "Weehawken;" she had not started anchor. . . . Simpson alone understood and acted rightly; hence the catastrophe.

Just as I was abreast of Gregg — all well — comes the scout, and says the "Passaic" is aground. So here is a nice mess. No one knows where. I took instant measures; but so much time had been lost by the time she was off — and I knew it — that there was too little of the night left. So I had to abandon the attempt.

Aug. 22.—General Gillmore asks me to keep down Wagner; it will disable his guns. I send in some iron-clads, which will do it. But this service will so exhaust the iron-clads as to unfit them for service to-night, so I cannot do it.

About eleven p.m. I went to the "Weehawken," and soon after all the turrets were moving up channel. It was a fine night, and too smooth, as the least sounds might be heard. The difficulty of managing a number of vessels like these was considerable, in a strong tide-way, under the fire of heavy forts and amidst considerable intricacy of navigation. So it was nearly three o'clock before we were all fairly in place, and I fired the first shot at Sumter. We were about 800 yards from
it, and its great walls could be seen looming up in the obscurity of the night.

The attack was a surprise, as several shots were fired before even a light was seen. Then came some half-dozen shots, very slowly. Meanwhile the monitors were firing rather slowly, except my own (the "Weehawken"), which fired thirty-three shots, "Nahant" one, the "Montauk" seven (one gun disabled), beside the "Passaic" and "Patapsco." It was an hour before Moultrie was fully aroused, and then opened a heavy fire. The blows were very severe, owing no doubt to decreased distance. For a while, fog arose, and we fired by direction of stars. Our shells were seen to hit and explode on the wall. The monitors manoeuvred rather much, and some did not seem to have a clear idea of the purpose.

Presently came daybreak; fog rather increased, and Moultrie firing fast. Finding Sumter pretty well used up, I concluded to haul off, for the men had been at work two days and two nights, and were exhausted. So the monitors were drawn off for a while. I missed the "Passaic" in the fog, and turned back. After a while saw her under high pressure. Learned that the "Patapsco" had got aground and then floated off.

So we all got back, excessively used up by two nights' vigil in this truly horrible climate. I met the "Ironsides" no great way from her berth, coming up as if she really meant to do something. . . . Rowan is terribly careful about that vessel.

 Aug. 24.—Came on to blow so hard from S. E. that the Captain of boat apprehended that the guards would be broken away by the sea, for the "Philadelphia" is a plain river-boat that used to run between Washington and Acquia. In the evening I went to see General Gillmore. Blowing very hard. I was concerned for the monitors. During the night it blew and rained intensely. This hinders my attempts at the obstructions.

 Aug. 25. — . . . Still the pilot said it was too rough, so I very reluctantly remained in the creek.

Wednesday, Aug. 26.—One of those debilitating days, such as I have seen nowhere else. I was so feeble that I could hardly rise from the chair and walk across the room. Got out of the creek at early light. Through the day preparing
to force the obstructions, and called the captains of iron-clads on board to explain. Rowan is a great drawback,—full of objections, and can suggest nothing else. Shows no interest, and is ready to cavil at anything. I have nothing from him. Well, we were to start at eight from the "Ironsides," but various delays made it nine. Then a strong tide retarded the progress of monitors, so that it was nearly eleven o'clock before the leading monitors had got past to Wagner. The weather, which had been threatening, now became very bad, blowing and raining violently. The pilot of the "Weehawken" (flag) declared that a southeaster was coming.

Mr. Porter came on board at two p. m. from the "Passaic," which was to grapple with the obstructions, saying he had been very near Sumter, and the flood-tide was setting in like a sluice. I sent word to Captain Simpson that as he had my pilot,—the only reliable one,—and himself had most experience, I should leave the question to him.

The flood-tide decided me; for it prevented all action after meeting the obstructions, and there would be loss of vessels in case of failure. The ebb-tide was essential. So about 2½ p. m. we turned back: raining incessantly, and as dismal a night as one would wish to see. The cooler atmosphere had braced me, so that I felt better.

Aug. 27.—Cloudy; wind N., and more acceptable. General Gillmore writes that he had advanced one hundred yards, and made eighty prisoners.

I feel better to-day, and propose to renew attempt to-night on passage of obstructions. I learn, at the last moment, that the only steam-tug which would answer has been sent outside the bar,—and thus

"Enterprises of great pith and moment

. . . their currents turn awry,

And lose the name of action,"

if I attend not to every detail. Thus things go.

Aug. 28.—My debility increases, so that to-day it is an exertion to sit in a chair. I feel like lying down. My head is light. I do not see well. How strange,—no pain, but so feeble, it seems like gliding away to death. How easy it seems! Why not, to one whose race is run?
(This, Thursday, evening, September 3, I endeavor to note down some chief events yet fresh in my memory.)

Tuesday, Sept. 1. — I concluded to feel the way about Sumter and the obstructions. Had the first any power? Were the latter not to be attempted?

In the morning I called the Captains of iron-clads together, weak as I was. . . . Stevens wanted to go straight at the obstructions with the "Ironsides" in open day, to run them down, and was sure Rowan would be willing, but he heard very different notions. Rowan had no taste for that. Finally we adjourned. Well, about ten I embarked in the "Weehawken" and proceeded up the channel, other monitors in company, and, after a couple of hours of slow steaming, got near enough to Sumter, to open fire, which replied by two shots only. Moultrie, however, blazed away in full style. Before full light had to haul off, as the flood-tide set in. The "Ironsides" came up, for a wonder, and fired.

We fired 240 shells, and got 70 hits, very hard, from Moultrie. One hit base of turret, and drove a splinter of iron from inside, which broke the leg of my chief of staff, Captain Badger. A fatality seems to attend my staff. Taylor went home sick, Rodgers killed, and Badger's leg broken by splinter. Coxswain of barge killed by a grenade.

We got to anchorage about seven A.M.

Sept. 2. — About one, General Gillmore came on board, to confer. I had to see him in bed. Settled to attack Wagner. I got up at two; just able to dress. Life seemed to be passing away. . . . I wished to renew the business of yesterday, but could not even be carried anywhere. I sent for Rowan, my second. He hesitated; said, "The night was dark; what use was it?" Asked for a written order, which I had drawn up, and finally withdrew. It was no business if a man's heart was not in it. I warned Fox it would be so.

Sept. 3. — Attack settled for 6th. I feel better to-day.

General Gillmore came on board to confer. He still inclines to surprise Gregg at night, if only to spike the guns. Ticklish operation. Of course, I agree. The reconnaissance had been very complete, the boats going quite to Sumter unperceived.
WAGNER AND GREGG EVACUATED.

Friday, Sept. 4.—The attempt to-night failed, owing to misunderstanding of my officer, ... so that the alarm was given.

Sept. 5.—Slow fire all day from shore batteries and “Ironsides” at Wagner. The attempt to be renewed on Gregg. General Gillmore sticks to that. Very doubtful. I send two howitzers to check communication north of Gregg.

I hear from General Gillmore that the Secretary of War has arrived at Port Royal, and has come to direct the whole movement on Charleston. He thinks we have enough when we get Morris Island and Sumter, and that it will not pay to go farther. There has been this difference of opinion from the first: Stanton and Halleck are opposed to any move on Charleston; Fox and Gillmore are strong for it. Fox carries it, but the slow progress gives Stanton the advantage.

Sept. 6.—Cannonading Wagner all day, so as to storm to-morrow. Wagner does not fire. General Gillmore comes on board in the afternoon, to agree on details. The trenches are pushed up to the ditch of Wagner.

Our fire has entirely stopped that of Wagner. Now the men go on working at the approaches unmolested in open day. Before now, a man could not show a finger. To-morrow, the assault, at nine o’clock.

Monday, Sept. 7.—Beautiful, smooth weather. Before day-light message from General Gillmore that the enemy has evacuated Wagner and Gregg, so the island is ours. I send a flag demanding surrender of Sumter. Answer: “Come and take it.” Sent “Weehawken” to pass close in between Cumming’s Point and Sumter, and in so doing she grounded badly.

I went up in the night to see what I could of the obstructions. Severe fire from Moultrie. I drew off, to give attention to “Weehawken.”

Sept. 8.—Engaged all day arranging to assault Sumter. General Gillmore, hearing it, tells me he has the same idea, and asked to put my men under his officers. I declined. Misunderstanding delays the move.

During the day a severe action between iron-clads and Sullivan’s Island, to cover the Weehawken, which floated about four p.m.
It is one o'clock before I can get off; and before I can reach the scene the fire of musketry from Sumter begins. Moultrie opens. The affair is of short duration, and my impression on a monitor, a quarter of a mile off, not favorable. Moultrie fired like a devil,—the shells breaking around me and screaming in chorus.

I came away without being able to see how the matter ended, and after a weary pull got on board the "Lodona."

No news yet, except that we had been repulsed, losing many prisoners; not many killed, and few wounded. Did not look like a vigorous assault. Some of the boat's crew jumped overboard at the first fire. I fell in with two boats at least a mile from Sumter.¹

*Sept. 13.* — Gillmore came on board.

*Sept. 17.* — Blowing and raining furiously from N.E. Can hear no news of what that assault really was. . . .

*Sept. 19.* — Since the evacuation of Morris Island it has been necessary to burnish up the monitors. The "Kaatskill" just back, after a month under repair. The "Patapsco" and "Weehawken" are at Port Royal, under repair. The "Passaic" goes to-day. The "Montauk," "Nahant," and "Leligh" will have to go; so I am tied hand and foot. Still I am having reconnaissance by night. I have been much prostrated, and not a doctor to say why.

Nothing could be more superb than the day. The heavy mass of cloud has broken up into smaller ones; the sun is out, tempering the sudden coolness, and the spires of Charleston are distinct in the distance. Sumter looks grimly, sometimes in shade, sometimes aglow with the sunbeams. I took a

¹ Other mem., for Sept. 8, says: "Daylight: 'Weehawken' still aground. Batteries opened heavily on her from Sullivan's Island. 8½ A.M., signal 'Ironclads, assist 'Weehawken.'" (Log.) Time of action not well noted. Stevens says (Arm. Vessels, p. 242), he anchored off Moultrie at 11 A.M., and 'Ironclads' signalled to cease at 1½ P.M. Rowan's report notes no time, but says he was engaged two hours and fifty-five minutes. The 'Weehawken' floated about 4 P.M. Boats for storming party assembled at 6 P.M., and started up towards Sumter at 10½ P.M. Three-quarters past midnight, flag-steamer moved up. 1½ A.M., the Admiral left her, just as the attack began."
pull in the barge, and skirted the shore of Wagner. Moultrie fired, and burst several shells quite near.

_Sunday, Sept. 20._ — Too much sea for the boat, so put for the creek. I met General Gillmore coming out to see me. He came on board and we talked over plans. Thought the batteries would be ready in a few days. Was going to Hilton Head.

_Sept. 23._ — Things quiet in preparation. . . . I am having the monitors repaired.

It was quite late when General Gillmore came on board. He has been made Major-General. We talked over matters. He says it is absurd to expect us to advance, when together, we would be weaker, out of position, than the enemy. He thinks it probable that I would lose half the vessels in forcing a way to Charleston, and considers the policy as questionable.

_Saturday, Sept. 26._ — A number of officers arrived yesterday from the North. My son Charley among them. . . .

The Confederates pound away incessantly day and night in order to retard Gillmore's new batteries on Cumming's Point, which they fear will shell Charleston. I am quiet enough, waiting for the monitors.

The General, too, is quiet, and has moved from Morris Island to the middle of Folly Island, which puts him three miles from me, and three times that distance from head of Morris Island, where the work is going on. Promotion is a sedative.

_Sunday, Sept. 27._ — The weather, befitting the Sabbath, is bright and beautiful. It is a day for retrospect. How hard to realize all the phases of life I have passed through! The school-boy, and home, dear home! the young man; the lover, husband, father; then left alone; and at last high public position. Altogether, this has been life.

And I can look back nearly half a century and see the little white-haired urchin with a world no greater than State House Square and some half-dozen squares near it, a happy child, only envious of the possession of a pair of little white bantams in his grandmother's yard.

Then comes the bigger boy, deep in Latin and history,—a hard student under his father's eye. The father a great tall
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A TORPEDO EXPLODED UNDER "IRONSIDES." 417

negro regiment coming along with music struck up "John Brown."

Who would have believed, three years since, that this would occur in sight of Charleston steeples and on South Carolina soil?

Oct. 5. — Trouble among the vessels. Heavy musketry firing. I got out into the channel during the night, and steamed to the "Ironsides," when I learned that a torpedo had been exploded under her.

Tuesday, Oct. 6. — Quite early a frightened wretch was brought to me, as taken out of the water after escaping from the torpedo. He gave a full statement. The vessel was about fifty feet, made like a cigar; five to six feet in diameter, with an engine which would drive her eight to ten knots. At the bow was a bar ten feet long, with a torpedo at the end holding 60 pounds of powder, with four nipples to act by percussion. There were four persons in the boat, and they stood on the bottom with their heads out of the hatch, which was made in the part out of water. They left Charleston at dusk, passed our vessels in the dark, then returned and attacked the "Ironsides." He could not tell whether the Captain or the pilot fired at and wounded the officer of the deck. The immense jet of water that came down put out the fire of the "David."

It seems to me that nothing could have been more successful as a first effort, and it will place the torpedo among certain offensive means. The Captain was also picked up. His name is Glassell, and he was formerly a Lieutenant in our Navy, and is now in that of the Confederates. I did not see him, as I could get nothing from him. What became of the other two and the boat no one could say; they may have perished or not.

Oct. 7. — I concluded to visit Port Royal, to see the Fleet engineer and superintendent of monitors, in order to have some fixtures for keeping off torpedoes from the monitors, as they might be fatal.

Oct. 8. — Fine weather. Got to Port Royal before day. . . . After some conversation went to see Captain Badger at Beaufort. It is beautifully situated, and with fine residences. Every inhabitant had left, and our troops occupied the houses, which showed no signs of ill usage. . . . About nine o'clock I was
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surprised by loud music quite near, and I found it was General Gillmore on a visit. He came with a number of staff and other officers. They sat and chatted in a very miscellaneous manner, the band going it strong all the while; then took leave after a while. The General does not seem to have any particular purpose in his eye, but is enjoying his new honors.

Sent dispatches from Port Royal advising the Department to block the Confederates with their own game and let loose on them quantities of torpedoes.

Oct. 10. — Returning, found things as I left them. . . . About sunset poor Howard died of the one little buck-shot which struck him from the torpedo. I had made him a Master the next day, but a higher power has given him a better promotion. It savors, to me, of murder.

Oct. 11. — The "Tribune" of the 7th spits its venom at me. It will never forgive my supposed interference with. . . . I am not pleased with General Gillmore's doings. In more than one instance he has asked how I would have some one thing represented in the papers. And I have also noted that the correspondent of "Herald" has frequently referred to what I have confidentially written to General Gillmore. This occurs in the "Herald" of the 7th, where he refers to the firing Sumter being at my request. Now this was in a confidential letter.

Oct. 13. — The Department writes, expressing "confidence in your judgment, firmness, and discretion, as well as in your skill and bravery."

Oct. 15. — Just as I was closing a letter to the Secretary, in answer to his, General Gillmore was announced. He came to confer about future operations, particularly with view to a slant at Johnson. I answered that I was always glad to cooperate with him, and would give all the assistance I could. We chatted pleasantly for half an hour; he took a cigar, and then left. The General seemed a little nervous about something.

Oct. 19. — General Gillmore came off to see me; dined, and stayed several hours. The continued attacks of the papers have made me very sore, and I frankly opened the matter. The General very good-naturedly disclaimed any idea of disagreement, or that there had been any but the best understanding
between us. He said it came from the reporters and the discontented officers. I also drew his attention to the difference between our letters and our conversation; the former were frequently at cross-purposes. The General laughed, and said, "Let us suppress the two last." So I handed him his letter, which he tore up.

So we discussed plans until it was dark, and the General said he would come again in the morning. He spoke of the assault, and said he lost 1,500 men, and that it ought not to have taken place.

Oct. 20. — General Gillmore was to come on board this morning and conclude our business, first taking breakfast.

We again talked over matters and wrote letters till noon, when we lunched, and the General went ashore. General Gillmore has nearly completed refortifying Morris Island, making three great points,—Gregg, Wagner, and a new work on the southern sand-hills. If the Confederates had made the last, we never would have got on the island, and the General admits it.

The "Ironsides" at work on fenders to keep off the torpedoes.

I sent down for Captains of "Nahant," "Montauk," and "Passaic."

Oct. 21. — The "Ironsides" has on her new fender,—a hawser stretched round her twenty feet distant, by means of projecting poles.

Oct. 22, 11 a.m. — I held a council of war in regard to entering the harbor of Charleston when the seven monitors were ready, which would be in the second week in November. There were eight Captains of iron-clads and two staff officers. The object was not to have advice for myself, but to comply with the request of the Secretary, who asked for the opinions of these officers. We began at eleven and finished at five. The four junior officers voted for attack with seven iron-clads. The six seniors were adverse. The intelligence was largely with the latter. One of the juniors seemed hardly to know what he was about. So my views were sustained. The majority were for waiting till the reinforcements arrived in December.
Oct. 24. — Monitors not ready yet, and no reinforcements. The worst of it is, that the public is kept in ignorance of my being unable to move, and I am abused because I do not move. At the same time the Government continues to express its full confidence in me.

Oct. 25. — Letter from Gillmore, asking if I would assist him to occupy Sumter. Rather singular, when the General was so much exercised because I asked him to do that very thing in order to enable me to go in! What does this change mean?

Oct. 26. — General Gillmore came aboard about two o’clock. Talked casually on any topic almost. Said he had no business in view; took a cigar, and was off in less than half an hour. He remarked that he began to try range on Sumter to-day. I answered that on hearing of it from the lookout, I had ordered two monitors with rifle cannon to assist.

Oct. 27. — Wagner and Gregg firing rapidly at Sumter. Have not made much impression yet, only increased the old damage a great deal. The heap of rubbish at the gorge looks invincible. The “Patapsco” and “Lehigh” seem to do better on the southeast face, for though they have but two rifle cannon, yet there the wall is perpendicular, and clear of débris which falls, and I imagined I could see the difference. It is not easy to overcome the immense mass of such a work. To-day musketry was fired from Sumter, and came into Battery Gregg without harm to any one.

Oct. 28. — About noon rowed out to the “Sonoma” and steamed up to look at Sumter. The shore batteries going briskly, and had been firing slowly all night. The two monitors (with rifle cannon) were in place at 2,000 yards, hammering away. The effect was now very plain. The ruins of the gorge showed no impression of the shore battering, but the southeast face was breached nearly half its length, and the army, noticing this, were now aiming that way, with the difference, that while ours struck it fair, their shot took it endwise. There is immense endurance in such a mass of masonry, and the ruins may serve as shelter to many men.

Oct. 29. — Went up the channel in a tug to look at Sumter, then changed to the “Kaatskill,” and went to about 2,000 yards
from Sumter. This was about noon, and the "Patapsco" and "Lehigh" were just taking their stations. The gorge remains as before. The southeast face is in like condition; that is, the wall is destroyed and the remains have crumbled into a slope nearly as high as was the wall. The northeast face shows some severe marks, but its general form remains. The shore batteries are pounding away steadily, and Gregg was at it all night. One can see what a battering such a work can endure.

Oct. 30.—I went up the channel in the "Sonoma." Got higher than usual, say up to Wagner buoy. The "Kaatskill" had joined the "Patapsco" and "Lehigh," and all three were firing at Sumter, which, by the way, is more cut up than yesterday, and I fancied the northeast wall had an inclination outward. The view was very fine, not clear or distinct, but picturesque. The smoke from the monitors would drift down with the wind across the fort.

Oct. 31.—Went up about noon in the gunboat "Ottawa" to examine progress on Sumter. An advance on yesterday; the southeast front much cut down; gorge as before; northeast face disfigured, but retains its form; northwest front looks to be breached; southwest front not visible. I was as far up as the Wagner buoy. The "Patapsco" and "Lehigh" firing very well; scarcely missing. The flag-pole (at S. W. angle) shot away twice, once by "Lehigh." A man got out on the wall and put it up.

Nov. 1.—I forgot to note that on the 27th General Gillmore sent me a note complaining that the correspondent of the "Baltimore American" was publishing matter giving information to the enemy. This is the sole member of the press in the squadron. So I sent for Mr. Fulton, showed him the note, and asked him to see the General, as requested. So he went ashore next day. I was not on board when he returned, but was told by Lieutenant Forrest that no case could be made out, and the General had to admit it; but he said that the real grievance was, that he had given some credit to the Navy on some occasion. If this is so, it is a very mean proceeding on the part of the General, who has a whole corps of correspondents about him, and lets them abuse me. . . .
Green came in from the "Canandaigua." He agreed entirely with me as to active operations inside.

I went down to see General Gillmore at his new headquarters on Folly Island. Found that he had intended to stop and see me, but the steamer was then out in the channel. Said he had been up to Gregg, but was doubtful about an assault; that it might cost men. Would like to know if the Government desired active operations inside. Was at a loss. Would I assist with the monitors? Admitted their work, particularly the XV\textsuperscript{th}, which he said were equal to a dozen of his. Finally it was agreed that he would come to see me in the morning, and we would decide. I think the General begins to see that the business is not done yet. He said he had worn out his guns.

Monday, Nov. 2.—Fine clear weather. . . . General Gillmore came alongside about ten o'clock, crossing to Morris Island. Said he was going to Wagner to look at Sumter. Would I go along? "Yes." Stopped for General Seymour. Wind rising and very strong.

Sumter looks ragged. Gregg firing. A gun occasionally from Wagner. Walked through it with the Generals. Bomb-proofs impregnable and very extensive. The work itself I did not think so strong. We should have carried it, particularly in the rear, which is what I had proposed. As we mounted the rampart some shells flew from Johnson. Gillmore careful to get to cover, squatting close to the gabion; Seymour and self either stood or sat. Left, and stopped in tent of Seymour, where we three discussed the question. Seymour was up and down against attacking the city or going farther. Gillmore was not so positive, but could not see what was to be gained. Could not muster more than ten thousand men, which would not hold the ground west of Johnson. I said I could go in with seven monitors when ready, which would be about the 15th November, or with eleven monitors about 10th of December. The former was a risk, the latter was not. Gillmore was doubtful about an assault; might be repulsed, and finally concluded to pound away for a day or two. The guns nearly used up. Was going to mount one or two smooth-bores at Gregg.

Nov. 3.—Went up to look at Sumter; it goes gradually. . . .
CONTINUES FIRING AT SUMTER.

See that the Department has published my letter, contradicting the rumors of disagreement with Gillmore, immediately on its reception.¹

Nov. 4.—Trying to fix Ericsson’s torpedo raft on a monitor. Needs smooth water for it. Received four new tugs from the North with flowery names,—“Larkspur,” “Carnation,” “Geranium,” and “Jonquille.”

Nov. 5.—Firing continues at Sumter from shore and monitors. The work is very much cut up. The only original feature left is the northeast face; the rest is a pile of rubbish. To-day they mounted a flag again, the first since it was cut away on 31st. Moultrie hardly fires a shot, nor Johnson.

Nov. 6.—Fired a torpedo at bow of “Patapsco”; held 600

¹ Special Dispatches to the Inquirer.

WASHINGTON, Oct. 23, 1863.

ADMIRAL DAHLGREN TO GENERAL GILLMORE.

Rear-Admiral Dahlgren, in a communication to the Navy Department, dated Oct. 20, says: As the Secretary of the Navy has alluded to the state of the relations between General Gillmore and myself, the following note from General Gillmore will satisfy the Department upon this subject, at least to its date, namely, the 23rd of September.

MORRIS ISLAND, Sept. 23, 1863.

ADMIRAL.—I am much chagrined at the reports in the newspapers about my tendering my resignation in consequence of a disagreement between you and myself, and that we did not co-operate cordially. It is not necessary for me to assure you that I am entirely ignorant of the slightest foundation for such reports, and had no idea that they existed until they appeared in the papers. They were, doubtless, started by some scribbling sensationist, in lieu of news. I will see that they are authoritatively contradicted.

(Signed) Sincerely yours,

Q. A. GILLMORE.

Rear-Admiral DAHLGREN, Light-House Inlet.

I have only to add that General Gillmore spent several hours in conference with me yesterday, as he did on the fifteenth, and as usual in the most friendly manner, and came on board this morning to converse on public business. We spoke on the subject, and the General assured me that he was not aware of any foundation for the current rumors, and, indeed, our concurrence on the public business between us, and our personal relations, make such rumors absurd.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN A. DAHLGREN,

Rear-Admiral Commanding S. A. B.
pounds of powder, immersed thirteen feet. I was standing on my steamer five hundred yards off, and would not have noticed the circumstance if I had not expected it. The sound and shock were less than that of the cannon a mile off. The column of water was by no means great, and even the raft was not hurt. In fact it was immersed too much, and proves that a very moderate mass of water will deaden the effect even of 600 pounds of powder.

*Nov. 7.*—Shore batteries firing very little at Sumter.

*Nov. 8.*—Captain Ammen returned in the "Arago" with a dispatch from Navy Department of Nov. 2, which touches on operations here, concluding with "Although delay is annoying, a failure would be more so. Success is the great and paramount consideration, and the Department will acquiesce in any reasonable delay to insure it."

*Nov. 9.—*Shore batteries firing very little. "Passaic" up yesterday from repairs at Port Royal. Sent down the "Kaatskill" to clean bottom.

*Nov. 10.*—Shore batteries fired mortars at Sumter by night and very little by day. "Montauk" fired twenty-five XIth in the afternoon.

*Nov. 11.*—General Gillmore telegraphed he would like to see me, and would come on board if I would come off the inlet. Started with "Philadelphia," but her steam got out of order. Went in a tug, steamed down to inlet, and went in with barge. I met the General as he was coming from General Seymour's headquarters on Morris Island. Having no place convenient, we walked the beach and conversed. He concurred with me as to the preference for waiting until the new monitors came down in December. A diversion was suggested meanwhile. Agreed that we should meet again on the subject, and also for his opinion as to my occupation of inner harbor, causing evacuation of Sullivan's and James Islands, as was supposed by Halleck, Cullum, and other generals in Washington.

*Nov. 12.*—Gregg shelling Sumter slowly.

*Nov. 18.*—"Nahant" arrived. "Patapsco" left for a new rifle gun, and to complete cleaning bottom. While finishing dinner, General Gillmore was announced. He concurs with my preference for awaiting the reinforcements. I indicated
the scope this would give, and also that I would menace their communications with Sullivan's Island, and if he would use the occasion we might occupy good ground. The General liked the proposition, and would think over it. Meanwhile the first step would be to divert public attention, and let it be thought that we had given up operations here. He would give the newspaper correspondence this set.

It was quite dark when the General left, so I had the "Philadelphia" steamed down off the inlet, and sent in my barge, with a light to guide his own boat. . . .

My birthday.

Nov. 16. — About one p. m. the General telegraphed that if I would come off the inlet, he would come on board to see me. . . . When alone, we talked over an attack on Savannah, which was agreed on to take place in a week or ten days.

Nov. 16. — Last night, about nine or ten, the Confederates very unexpectedly opened a rapid fire from their batteries on Sullivan's Island upon our works on Cumming's Point.

The General telegraphed me to prevent their landing in boats; so I sent orders accordingly to the monitors on picket. This morning at daylight the "Lehigh" was reported aground, and the Confederates pummelling her. So I signalled the iron-clads to go up and relieve the "Lehigh." I went up myself in the "Passaic," and finding the "Nahant" close in, passed to her in my barge.¹

The tide was rising, and the "Nahant" could approach so as to get a hawser aboard the "Lehigh."

The scene was of great interest. Three times the hawser parted; once shot away. The line carrying it was twice sent to the "Lehigh" by the surgeon, in a little boat, and once by two seamen. Every effort seemed vain, for the whole morning, under a perfect storm of shot and shell from cannons and mortars, under which the men worked well. At last I

¹ Cowley, in allusion to this and other acts, says of Admiral Dahlgren: "A more intrepid spirit never walked this earth in human form; his steadfast soul knew no such thing as fear; witness the sublime daring with which he pushed off in his barge, and pulled through a heavy sea and a tremendous fire of shells to the 'Passaic,' when that renowned little turtle-back got aground under Fort Moultrie." — Leaves from a Lawyer's Life Afloat and Ashore, p. 207.
ordered the "Nahant's" propeller to be started. The "Le-
high" backed, and the "Montauk" ahead of us. It was the
moment of high water, and, most fortunately, the "Lehigh"
yielded, and backed off. Even then the hawser began to give
way.

Seven men were wounded by pieces of mortar shells.

At one time I ordered the "Passaic" and "Montauk" to
reply to the batteries, which they did with effect, striking every
time and dismounting a gun. The scene was quite a change.
I noticed that the shore batteries, for whom we had got into
trouble, gave us no help.

Nov. 17. — Shore batteries firing very moderately at Sumter.

Nov. 18. — Captain Rowan came on board to report that, in
removing coal in bunkers of "Ironsides," it was discovered that
the injury from torpedo was very serious, and extended down
towards the keel.¹

As if troubles never come alone, Captain Bryson sent word

¹ We cannot refrain from giving a very thrilling incident that occurred
in connection with the divers' attempts to examine the condition of this
vessel. After the "Ironsides" had been struck by the torpedo, it became
important to know with certainty to what extent the hull had been affected
externally under the water. The divers were therefore directed to examine.
Their boat was brought alongside, and the diver descended. It was low
water, and the instant was seized when the tide ceased to ebb. The diver
went carefully over the part of the bottom at the damaged portion, and then
reaching the keel concluded to pass under it and look at the other side. He
had accomplished this, and was on the other side, when he perceived that
the ship was swinging to the newly flowing tide. He had found just space
between the bottom and the keel to pass under, and now saw that the vessel,
in swinging, would pass close to a shoal ridge of the sandy bottom, and even
grind into it. This must inevitably cut off the slender and delicate tube which
conveyed air to him, and also sever the lines by which, in case of accident,
he was to be drawn up. In the silence and solitude of those dark waters
there was no human hand to avert the fearful consequence. Fastened down
by his heavy weights it would be instant suffocation.

With all the speed that his encumbrances permitted he endeavored to
reach the keel and pass under it before too late. The ship was coming
round rapidly; he passed his head and body, but began to feel the pressure
of the keel against the soft ooze. With great effort he succeeded in dragging
his limbs and tubes clear, and the water became a little deeper; but one arm
was so painfully crushed that it was some days before it was in a condition
to use. — M. V. D.
that a hole had been discovered in the side of the "Lehigh," and she made nine inches per hour. When I went on board the water was rushing with much noise just below the overhang. . . . I directed Captain Bryson to have a careful eye to this leak, and steam for shoal water if any danger should arise.

Nov. 19. — Shore batteries firing very leisurely at Sumter, but not the monitors, as "Montauk" has XI\textsuperscript{in} disabled, and "Lehigh's" rifle is cracking.

Nov. 20. — Last night the Army undertook to feel the force in Sumter, and sent 200 men in boats for the purpose. At thirty yards a dog barked, and aroused the garrison, which fired, wounding two of our men. The rumor was, the night before, that an attack was to be made; and I ordered the monitors on picket to cover our men. At three in the morning I was aroused by a report that a musketry fire had opened from Sumter. A few shots were fired by the forts, and then there was quiet.

Nov. 22. — . . . "Lehigh" left for Port Royal, in tow of "Memphis." . . . Shore batteries firing lazily at Sumter with mortars, as usual, for a week past.

Nov. 24. — "Massachusetts" in sight at 8 a. m. To my surprise and pleasure, Ully\textsuperscript{1} came in her. Poor fellow! with but one leg. I wish I could have borne the loss for him. But a Colonel at twenty-one! . . .

Nov. 25. — . . . Had a note from General Gillmore; asked me if I desired to continue the present slow bombardment of Sumter. Said he had been unwell.

Nov. 27. — Formal leave of the marine battalion ordered North. Ully went with me. Stopped by the way at Gillmore's quarters. He had been sick. Seemed puzzled to know what to do. Went on to see the marines. Formal review. They were in fine order. . . .

Nov. 28. — As Captain Emmons has been detached by the Department, to return home, I have ordered Lieutenant-Commander Bradford to do duty as Fleet Captain temporarily.

Nov. 29. — Notice that the Navy Department appears to be in bad humor, and disposed to find fault.

\textsuperscript{1} Colonel Ulric Dahlgren.
Among other letters, one ran that the muster-roll of "Wabash" showed 1,093; and asks why was this, when the Department was in such a fluster to get men? I answer, "there were 443 men in the ship." Rather a blunder!

Then a party went ashore to look for water at Murrell's Inlet. Was intercepted by cavalry, and lost ten men. Whereupon the Department censures this as "straying," and also states that nineteen men were taken, which was the whole party; whereas only half of them were captured. Calls on me to issue a general order against "straying"! There is hardly any enterprise now, and this order will smother the little there is.

Then, in a communication about prisoners, I was so unlucky as to use the words "Confederate authorities," which provokes a burst of virtuous indignation from the Department. Good, that (!) from gentlemen who sit in cushioned chairs and blow the trumpet to me, who was the first perhaps to prepare to defend the Union by arms (January, 1861, fortified the shell-house in Navy Yard), who has exposed himself like the meanest man in the Fleet, whose flag is always nearest to the enemy,—one son nearly crushed in health at Vicksburg, and another maimed for life,—and all because Charleston is not taken for the want of adequate means!

Dec. 1.—There is no vessel here which can accommodate me and my staff, and can enter the channel, but this boat, which is a mere river steamboat, and won't stand the least sea; hence, when it becomes rough she has to be put into the creek, and can only get in and out at high water. I am sadly tram-melled.

Dec. 2.—Reynolds writes from Port Royal that he had succeeded in floating the "Kaatskill," but not the "Patapsco." Delay, delay. The battery at Gregg fires very slowly at Sumter from mortars. It is admitted now that the Rebels are snug in the ruins. Shot and shell will not drive them out.

General T. on board. He says they do not fire at Sullivan's Island,—no use,—but can silence them when I go in. They did not consider worth while to fire, and stop them pulling down the Moultrie House.

Dec. 3.—Loads of letters; must have had 200 or 300 in
the last three days; such a correspondence is killing; I cannot get time to look after active duties.

Dec. 4. — Captain Colhoun goes home sick. He is the last of the monitor Captains that I found in command.

Sunday, Dec. 6. — . . . The Signal Officer reported that the "Weehawken" had signal "for assistance" flying. In a few minutes the Fleet Captain came in and announced that she was sinking. Stepping on the guard, I saw she had keeled over, and as I looked she went down. Hardly five minutes elapsed between this and the report of asking "assistance." It was just 2.30 P. M.

Instantly boats were got out to save the crew. Those who are saved give a variety of statements; but all concur that no danger was thought of by any one more than ten minutes before the signal was made. How distressing that such an accident should happen now! There she lies, the top of the funnel just above water; the flag also floated above. Well, we must get her up in time to aid in the work.

Monday, Dec. 7. — The same blowing northeast weather, with a rough sea. Twenty-seven men and four officers missing from crew of "Weehawken." Their habitation has been converted into their grave. There are no new facts to unveil the mystery. We know the cause to be one of two,—either the water filled the anchor-well, the hawse-pipe let in more, did not run aft to the pumps, caused further depression of the head, more water settled and took her down,—or else leaks in hull, caused by starting of plates, let in the water. Ammen and Cornwell think the first. Simpson has sent me a written opinion that it is the latter. All are, or have been, in command of monitors. The "Fulton" should be here, and is not,—my only chance to get a dispatch to the U. S. quickly. I am short of vessels and tugs, and any accident makes it felt. At sunset the "Circassian" arrives, bound for the North. This is a chance.

Dec. 9. — "Sonoma" came up with divers from Port Royal. They agreed to work at "Weehawken" for $250 a day. Rather a heavy figure, but no choice.

Dec. 10. — The number of officers in the Fleet is represented as 825, of which only 222 are regular officers. Included in the
825 are 441 sea officers, viz., Captains, Commanders, Lieutenants, Lieuten-Commanders, Masters, Ensigns, Masters, and Masters'-Mates, of which only 68 are regular officers; the rest are volunteers from civil life, with a few from seamen. How is it possible to give military consistence and coherence to a command of seventy-eight vessels with so large a number of officers who are unpractised in the experience of vessels of war? So with the men. Very few are seamen, and a large proportion are light hands, with some negroes, — and even of these the vessels are rather short. Many are foreigners; so that a captain said one day, "When I get into a boat, it seems as if the English language had changed." . . .

The boat has been much thumped by the last blow, and tiller disabled. I learned also that through the whole of the gale our hawser was secured to the moorings by four parts of rope, which will give some idea of the way in which the New Navy goes on!

Dec. 11. — A regular northeaster; the usual amount of sea, making the steamboat labor much. The "Paul Jones" came in from Port Royal, and, to my astonishment, Ully on board. I felt sure he would not come here until the bad weather was over, for the boat has labored so much that it seemed as if she could not last through it. The divers cannot work, so I sent them back to Port Royal, satisfied that the hull of the "Weehawken" was entire.

Dec. 13. — Mail by "Arago." Navy Department says the monitors will not be ready before January 1, owing to the strikes. August to October, October to December, December to January; and yet the papers cry out, "Why not go ahead?" The Secretary confirms my action in case of rewards to "Lehigh."

Dec. 15. — . . . Just as the "Philadelphia" was leaving, off the inlet, General Gillmore was announced. He came off in his white barge. It was not eight o'clock, and I was about to sit down to breakfast. So the General sat down with Ully and me. He had a project for an attack on Savannah (the former one), and wished to consult me, as he wanted to write to War Department for instructions by the "Arago," which leaves today. I assented, as I always do to any advanced movement.
MONITORS DELAYED BY STRIKES.

I found, too, that the General told the War Department, in his letter, that he could not move with me in my entrance on Charleston unless he had 15,000 more men. He said he was afraid that they would not be sent, the War Department having never entertained an idea beyond the occupation of the exterior islands. I hoped the troops would be sent, as we could make a good thing; but I said, I will go in whether they are sent or not. The General said he was afraid of losing men, as General Butler had the North Carolina district, and wanted to get back some troops sent here from there. . . . Gillmore told me that the late gales had cut Morris Island through in two places, one just north of the sand-hills, the other south of Wagner.

We now started up the Stono, and made a quick run to Pawnee Landing; anchored a short while, and took a pilot for the narrow stream beyond. From sunset till midnight the boat was engaged in a curious navigation, turning and twisting in every direction, by kedges, in a streamlet so narrow that the boat would touch nearly both sides of the morass through which it ran, never going more than the vessel's length at a time. At last we emerged into the inlet and took our old berth, having circumnavigated Folly Island. I was struck with the exact accuracy of Major Bache's survey.

Dec. 15.—The "Kaatskill" arrived last night from Port Royal, and came over the bar this morning.

Dec. 17.—Just after breakfast, as I was preparing to go outside and look at the vessels, General Gillmore came on board. He had nothing particular to say, except to talk over what he had said on Tuesday,—in effect, did the Government want active operations against Charleston? If so, he wanted reinforcements. He was at a loss whether to move upon James Island or upon Sullivan's Island, by Bull's Bay. Then, the episode on Savannah,—which was to be so secret, and yet the enemy was actually preparing for it, as deserters state, whose accounts I got to-day from the "Unadilla." After the General left, various matters of business pressed on me, so that I could not get away until at last it blew so hard from southward that a violent sea arose and broke heavily on the bar, so that some of our boats were capsized and six
men drowned. My barge picked up fifteen out of eighteen saved.

Dec. 19.—Have received papers with President’s message and reports of Secretaries.

The Secretary of Navy says we have obtained all the substantial advantages off Charleston. Secretary of War says all has not been had which was expected. While he and Halleck write as if the Army had done all, without aid from the Navy.

Dec. 22.—Decided to send a small force to Murrell’s Inlet, to try the enemy there. Sent for Captain Green.

Dec. 24.—Captain Green wants Captain Ammen to go up and reconnoitre. The vessels to go are “Nipsic,” “Sanford,” “Geranium,” “Daffodil” (steamer), with Allen, and schooner “Mangham,” one hundred marines, and four howitzers,—a force very capable for the purpose.

Dec. 25.—No merry Christmas, for I am weary with waiting for the new monitors. A telegram came from shore, written by Captain Balch at Stono, saying that the enemy had opened fire on the “Marblehead” at six, which the latter returned with the “Pawnee” and “Williams,” and silenced the enemy. The “Marblehead” had three men killed and four wounded.

Written reports this morning of the attack on “Marblehead.” The Rebels got into position below the “Marblehead,” which was well up by the piles, and opened from a number of guns. The “Marblehead” dropped down to them and retorted. The “Pawnee” and schooner “Williams” moved into the Kiawah to enfilade. The Rebels stood it for an hour and then made off. The “Marblehead” was much cut up aloft; had three men killed and four wounded.

Dec. 27.—. . . The night set in with a light drizzle, wind S. E., and inconsiderable. I had gone out in the “South Carolina.” In crossing the straight bar, shipped some heavy breakers and half filled the boat. Steamed up near the “Ironsides.” Monitors all right. . . .

Dec. 28.—A villainous morning. Heavy squalls of rain, with a steady, strong wind from S. S. W. Could see the monitors at intervals, riding well enough at anchor. Towards
evening rain increased. Some blue sky. I walked up the beach to see some of the obstructions, which they were hauling out of the water. I saw seven bars of railroad iron (22 feet long each) linked together,—more in the water. Was told that thirty-three bars had been collected. The wooden floats were all removed.

*Dec. 29.* — Got from Port Royal the mail by "Arago." The Department merely requested me to hold a court of inquiry in case of "Weehawken." "Montauk" partially disabled; leaves me only three monitors here.

Green started this evening with expedition for Murrell's Inlet.

*Dec. 31.* — About eight. Wind S. W. by S., blowing with great violence and rain, and so continued till midnight.

Thus endeth the old year 1863,—one that has witnessed my highest advancement, but not my happiness, for I have been loaded with responsibilities that no one could hope to lead to a favorable issue; the best possible result of which would ruin the reputation of any man. And now what is there to look forward to?
CHAPTER XV.

PRIVATE JOURNAL, 1864.—OFF CHARLESTON.

What record shall this year bear for me? Wearing anxieties, with slander and base abuse, and silent assent in public by those who say in private, I "have their confidence," but who look on and read the miserable lies which corrode the good name of a whole life. Here I watch carefully for the safety and honor of the flag, while its enemies strive to do less harm than its pretended friends.

The people here have certainly not overrated the miseries of their winter weather, as this last month of December can testify.

Still, if the monitors were ready I might get a chance to try an entrance to Charleston. But those here are actually not repaired, and I am at a loss to know why.

Jan. 2. — Went in a tug to Stono to review the ground of late attack.

The works and guns captured show that the Army should look to it. Met "Marblehead" coming out, bound to Port Royal.

When leaving had a telegram from General Gillmore, saying he would come to see me. I went ashore and met him. We talked about a raid to Darien. . . . On the information given by a refugee, I agreed. In the course of conversation, he said he never could see his ability to do anything if I went into the harbor. Also, that he thought it a great risk to our positions for me to go in, and was willing to say so in writing. We parted; he for Port Royal, I for my flagship. Returning, found that Captain Green had got back from Murrell's Inlet.

The "Nipsic" burned a schooner loaded with turpentine.
Jan. 3. — Rumored by the contrabands from Murrell's Inlet that the Rebels hanged a black sailor of the "Perry's" boat immediately after her capture. On inquiry, Captain Green stated that one of the crew was a black, and from the North. No one saw the murder, or the body afterwards.

Jan. 7. — Rowan very uneasy about a new diving torpedo. Captain N—— returned home because duty did not suit rank!

Jan. 8. — Busy preparing the monitors....

Jan. 9. — At dark went up in "South Carolina," to be near in case of attack by torpedoes.

Jan. 10. — Came unexpectedly on Ully in a tug, bound up on a scout, and in such weather.¹

Jan. 11. — Ully was out on scout to-night with Captain Bunce.

Mr. Foss, correspondent of "Philadelphia Enquirer," sent in his card. Asked in. Never saw him before. Said he had met Mr. Dickman (Ensign), who replied to some request that he "was an enemy to us," explained by reference to the abuse of me in the papers. Mr. Foss called to say this was a mistake; neither he nor his paper had done so. Went on to converse, and to my expression of censure upon those who had done so, Mr. Foss said, "They did not suppose it was a harm, because all their letters had to be submitted to General Gillmore, who read them and struck out what he chose, and such matter was not thus prohibited." I answered that I would let General Gillmore know what he said; it must be a mistake.

Jan. 14. — Telegram from General Gillmore,— just up from San Augustine. Had received my letter. The report of his permitting defamatory correspondence on me to pass, he says, is "radically incorrect." Also says he will be up to see me on important business.

Jan. 15. — In the afternoon fogged up, and rained in the evening; wind S. W. Late when I got out of the inlet; could see no vessels; pulled up, came across two tugs; got aboard without being known; very comfortable was the party, when

¹ Colonel Ulric Dahlgren was recruiting his health, and on a visit to his father, soon after the amputation of a leg lost in the service. — M. V. D.
both should have been up the channel patrolling. I suspended
the Captain.¹

_Jan._ 16. — General Gillmore came aboard about eleven a.m.,
and entered on business. He said he was about to move head-
quarters to Hilton Head, and was letting the old soldiers go
home as convenient to return and enlist. Said he had answer
from War Department, and positively refused him reinforce-
ments. So he gave up all idea of doing anything here. He
asked me what I would do. I said I would go in unless other-
wise instructed. He asked, "What else?" I said, "Silence
Johnson, knock down Fort Ripley, shut up Pinckney, and
engage the city batteries, capture or drive back the iron-clads." He
thought I would lose some iron-clads.

We conversed at some length. I asked if I could repeat his
remarks to the Navy Department. He said yes; he could
do nothing if I went in, and he considered it hazardous for me
to go in. He said that when he was in Washington many
batteries had not been erected. I reminded him that a prisoner
from General Ripley's boat had said when he was taken, Sept. 4,
that 3,000 men had been fortifying west of Johnson, and that
the Rebels had foreseen the fall of Sumter when we began, and
had gone to work on their interior defences. The General said
yes. He also remarked that, constructively, he knew that
the War Department had not the least idea of doing anything
more towards Charleston.

The General then referred to the reporters. He said they
were guilty of constructive falsehood in affirming what they
did in relation to his knowing previously of their attacks on
me. He said he would be back in four days to see me.

_Jan._ 17. — The "Union League" send me their medal,
with a very handsome letter.

_Jan._ 21. — Mail came. . . . Among the letters was one from
the Secretary and one from Fox, both prodigiously flattering,
and asking for good character to the monitors. I also had a
letter from the President; a word for some inventor. A stir

¹ A military man, on reading this in the original writing of Admiral Dahl-
gren, has pencilled the remark, "I would have shot the Captain." Yet
some persons have said Admiral Dahlgren was severe. — M. V. D.
among the press this morning. The —— came on board, and Uly pitched into him straight while in the upper cabin. He winced and backed down.

*Friday, Jan. 22.* — A fresh mail and enormous quantity of business. The "Massachusetts" left at sundown, and my son Uly went in her to see about his own business. A brave boy, that, and none the worse for losing a foot; he rides as well as ever, and gets about in odd places surprisingly.¹

Ensign Dickman just from Port Royal. Says that it is all about that the General is going to attack Savannah, and a deserting officer at St. John's says he left because the Rebels, believing the same, were ordering every one to Savannah.

Poor Bradford asks to go home; wife in consumption; could not refuse him. Captain Boutelle tells me of doings in 1861, by which it seems that we have lost ground sadly on James Island, along the Stono. Then the "Pawnee" could go as high as the Wappoo Cut; now we are pushed down to Legareville. General Wright, too, had ground that is now intrenched by the rebels.

*Jan. 25.* — Busy on report of monitors for Secretary. Went on board the "Adams" to look at an old-time man-o'-war. How strangely it looks, and yet how familiar; how suggestive of the days when I was a boy and grew to be a man!

*Jan. 28.* — Captain Balch on board. He had heard it said that if Gillmore took Sumter I was to take Charleston; that there was a council in Washington. I told him I did not know General Gillmore in Washington, and had seen him once only. I first knew him in New York, but no word ever passed between us on business until at Port Royal. There had been no understanding with me.

*Jan. 29.* — At dark I went out to "South Carolina," — the grim old "Ironsides," with her revolving calcium light, and two tugs moving like satellites around her.

Gregg has resumed a deliberate fire of single shells at Sumter. It is high time.

¹ *March 14.* — The last time I ever saw my beloved boy. As my barge rowed away, I waved my hand to him repeatedly. Was there no instinct in this? — J. A. D.
Jan. 30.—I finished my paper on Monitors, of fifty-four pages, for the Secretary of the Navy.

Feb. 2.—When I came on (slept in "Carolina") about seven, the officer of deck said he believed a steamer had run in last night and was near Moultrie. Not a syllable had been said to me, and as I towed up to the "Lehigh" no sign of the sight moved one of the crowd. I ordered the "Lehigh" to open. About nine I came down and stopped at each monitor to order them up. I stopped at "Ironsides," and called Rowan into the boat, and asked him to look out while I went in. . . . I started back at eleven o'clock and found all the monitors at it,—average 2,500 yards. Also Wagner and Gregg. The stranger looked well peppered. She was white, very low and long. . . .

Feb. 3.—When I came on deck, early, I saw that the wind had so lowered the tide that the blockade runner was nearly high and dry. Not a gun going at her bare bottom. I ordered monitors to open. Very slow they were about it. Away they went, and by one P. M. a fire had broken out, which will settle her. The steamer was the "Presto," and was a total wreck.

Feb. 4.—Engaged in examining a party of eight deserters who arrived from Charleston last night. These are the first I have seen conversant with the torpedoes. Two large ones are down with 1,500 and 2,000 pounds of powder; one between Sumter and Moultrie, the other towards Johnson, in the channel. The remainder were fixed to float one and two fathoms from the surface. . . .

The most intelligent deserter is a ship-joiner, and had worked on the iron-clads. Two are plated, and the engine nearly ready for one.

The above embrace the three varieties of torpedoes to hold position beneath the surface of the water.

Feb. 5.—Notes from Gillmore by his Aid, Lieutenant-Colonel Smith. He declines the operation of Long Island, and writes for aid in an expedition to St. John's. He wants it right off, of
course, and gives me no time. I concluded to look into matters myself, so left in "South Carolina" about eight.

*Feb. 6.* — Off Port Royal at eight, but did not get in till noon. . . . Sent an order by General Turner, Chief of Staff to General Gillmore, to gunboats at St. John’s to assist. I ordered "Mahaska" and "Dai Ching" from Tybee.

*Feb. 7.* — I left at noon with "Carolina" and "Water Witch" for St. John’s. I have about 120 marines with me as stand-by.

*Feb. 8.* — Beautiful soft morning, with a dreamy haze over the landscape. The winter of the land of flowers. On deck at eight o’clock, and land in sight about the St. John’s, and many vessels there. The "Mahaska" going in, "Dai Ching" at anchor. Went in with the "Oleander." General Gillmore came alongside. He excused his short notice, and said he had orders from the President. When he left I went on board the "Mahaska." It was noon when I started up the river. The General astern. Passed St. John’s Bluff, and soon after the pilot put us aground, where we lay from two till six.

*Feb. 9.* — Up anchor early, and reached Jacksonville about eight or nine o’clock. Same gentle weather. I went ashore, and saw Gillmore just about to start. He said the Rebels had scuttled their steamer. Sent the "Ottawa" up to look after it. Strolled through the town with several of my staff. The people have all gone. Quiet as death. It has every evidence that trade and industry were about to build up a flourishing city. All over for the present.

In the afternoon the "Dai Ching" and the "Water Witch" came up and the "Ottawa" came down; later, the "Norwich." So there are five vessels of war here, and the "Oleander," — with nothing to do, I fear.

Gillmore has landed 5,000 men under Seymour, and the Rebels backed off at once.

*Feb. 10.* — Fine, pleasant weather. Seeing that the troops had advanced into the interior and the river seemed well secured, I concluded to send the "Dai Ching" away, as she was much strained by going ashore, and might not be able to use her pivot gun; and also to leave myself, and let Creighton remain with the "Mahaska," "Ottawa," and "Norwich."
wrote so to General Gillmore. About three p. m. he got back, and wrote that his men would have advanced fifty-five miles to-night; that the three gunboats would be ample, and his thanks for my prompt co-operation; also that he would go to Hilton Head on Saturday. In the evening he sent an aid to say he would like to have the steamboat sunk by the Rebels.

Feb. 13.—At five p. m. I left in the "Carolina."
Feb. 14.—Port Royal; got in about sunset.
Feb. 19.—The "Paul Jones," coming in, signals from Charleston.

The "Housatonic" had been sunk by the torpedo of a David, Feb. 17, on Wednesday evening before nine o'clock. She was at her usual station outside the Charleston bar; water smooth, wind light from N. and W. The officer of the deck saw some object moving, not far off; slipped the cable and started the engine; all in vain. The torpedo struck the bottom between main and mizzen masts, and the vessel sank right off, the whole not covering five minutes. There was twenty-eight feet of water at the place. Only two officers and three men are missing.

I intended to go straight, but the "Paul Jones" reported a N. E. gale outside which he could not make way against, and moreover could not be ready for midnight. Ordered the Captain to signal in the morning if he was ready. "Nipsic" was under repair, and my own vessel.

Feb. 20.—"Paul Jones" signal—not ready. Occupied with dispatches to stations south to be on guard, especially the monitor in Wassaw. This fate of the "Housatonic" troubles me very much. Torpedoes have been laughed at; but this disaster ends that. My steamer was to have been ready by eight, when twenty-four hours more were asked. So I went on board the "Paul Jones," and put out.

Feb. 21.—After an easy voyage the "Jones" reached the old anchorage in the Charleston Roads. Things looked as usual. Rowan came on board, then other captains, all looking rather despondent about torpedoes. In the afternoon I moved on board "John Adams," the old-fashioned sloop-of-war. How it calls up old memories!

Feb. 22.—Made a grand display of flags for the day. Only
the "Ironsides" could fire. In the afternoon the "Philadelphia" came from Port Royal; got her into the inlet and returned to her.

*Feb. 23.*—In the mail of yesterday was a document from the Navy Department, saying that the Secretary would "be glad to see you for a few days, provided you are of opinion that you can leave at this time without detriment to the public service," dated Feb. 15. I cannot perceive why this is not just as good a time as any.

*Feb. 24.*—In came the "Harvest Moon," a sea packet, new and just bought, side wheels, and very like the "Philadelphia," save that she could go to sea. I will go North in her. . . . I have news that our troops have been regularly trapped on the march inland from Jacksonville, and lost 1,200 men in battle, besides being beaten.

*Feb. 25.*—Moving from the "Philadelphia" to "Harvest Moon." I sent for Rowan; Rowan came. He asked "If they blew up a monitor, what he should do?" I answer, "Do not let them, and take care of the rest." —"Well, but shall I go outside?" —"Follow your judgment, and inform me immediately." We crossed the bar at eleven. . . . Got to Port Royal after sunset.

*Feb. 26.*—I went to see General Gillmore. Had a long talk. He said he only landed 3,000 men on the day we entered upon Morris Island. The most he had at any time was 10,000, but then thirty-seven per cent were sick and not fit for service. One day, on collecting all his force, he had 6,300 out of the 10,000. He also thought that Johnson was complete at the landing, but the batteries between it and Seceshville, Simpkins, Hascall, and Cheves, were put up after the landing. Said he gave up the steamer "Mary's," as I had the law of him. Spoke of the defeat in Florida, 700 killed, &c., and several hundred slightly wounded. He said Seymour had gone beyond his instructions. Said he had dismissed one correspondent of —— for lying, who in excuse said he had to do so, and now another had been guilty of slandering. . . . Showed me the drawings and model of Wagner and its approaches. Spoke of his idea of engineering across James Island. I told him I was called home for a few days by the Department. Said he would come to see me
this evening. Gillmore is an engineer, but no general. About
eight, Gillmore came off with Colonel Fuller, the new Quartermaster. He said I might repeat to the authorities what he said.

Feb. 27.—I observe by intercepted correspondence in
"Tribune," Jan. 16, that Colonel Lamar, the Confederate
agent, writes from London, July 28, that the attack on Charle-
ston was discouraging; only 4,000 men there. "That caused
Lee to recross into Virginia, and he will have to reinforce
Beauregard from his army; consequently he will have to
assume the defensive again."

It was 6½, and quite dark, when we turned short round the
outer buoy of Charleston Bar, crossed it, and, moving slowly,
anchored near the "Ironsides." Rowan came on board, and
was, of course, duly astonished to hear that I was going North
and he was to command. . . .

Feb. 28.—The vessel went along, averaging eight to eight
and a half knots.

Feb. 29.—Steamer skirting the shore at a good pace.

March 1.—At daylight close in with the land below the
Chesapeake. . . .

Thirty-eight years since I passed by Cape Henry light on
my first cruise as a midshipman,—a poor little friendless
orphan.

March 2.—A hard, cold northwester; how refreshing! I
feel a different man. There is vitality in a Northern atmo-
sphere. I could get no pilot. Got tired of the search and
played pilot myself in this most difficult river of one hundred
miles. Did famously. Never touched till near Alexandria,
where it is very narrow. Buoy in wrong place, and grounded
for a few minutes. How familiar every spot seemed, made
classic by the early events of the war,—the batteries from
Acquia to Freestone, Mt. Vernon, Alexandria, where I assisted
at the first step into Virginia and where Ellsworth was killed;
then the Navy Yard. Reached the Navy Yard at five p.m.;
dined, and went up to my house, where I found all well.

But Ully is away with General Kilpatrick, which I regret,
for his crippled leg is not well.1 I went to see the Secretary;

1 How little did I dream that my dear son was slain this very evening!—
J. A. D.
hearty welcome from him and his family. Then I went to see Fox; find my work much approved by Department.

_March 3._ — I went to see the President; not in. Went over to Department and visited the Bureaus, &c.; warm reception. Got home and found myself cited before Committee of Senate. Washington all alive with crowds making money on the war.

_Friday, March 4._ — Early had a card from the President, saying that Ully was missing. Kilpatrick safe at Fortress Monroe. I went up to see about it. Got the President to telegraph for more information. I forgot to note that last night I went to see the President at seven, by appointment. The Secretary of Interior there for a few minutes. He wanted Abe to do some small matter for a friend. Abe snappish about it. When alone, we talked over matters. I told some things, and pitched into newspapers and the report of Secretary of War. Abe puzzled. "Well, you never heard me complain." — "No, I never did." It was past ten when I left, and went over to see Seward. Pleasant chat; talked over matters. Near midnight when I left.

By the way, Fox is averse to any attack on Charleston unless successful. Defeat would hurt the Government, the Department, and me. He suggests letting Farragut have the new monitors for Mobile, and then I shall have them and all else to go into Charleston.

Today stopped in to see Secretary of War to ask about Ully.

When before the Committee at noon, they wanted to know as much as would write a book. I asked leave to put on paper. They assent. Asked about Florida. The President evidently concerned too, because last evening he referred to it with some point, and read letters to and from Gillmore about it.

In the afternoon the President sent an invitation to go to the theatre with him. I declined, being too much troubled about my son.

_Saturday, March 5._ — The postponement of action at Charleston indisposes me to go back there. So I took an opportunity to say to the Secretary that as it was proposed to defer action at Charleston in order to attack Mobile with the
new monitors, I preferred to be relieved in command at Charleston. I never saw a more astonished man. He said that he had not thought of anything of the kind, was perfectly satisfied with what I had done, and would rather I would remain.

Coming out, I told Fox the same thing. He was quite as much surprised, and said he was entirely satisfied with my course, and had always said so. The idea was new to him, and he would have to think over it a day or two; and observed that it would look as if the Department was dissatisfied with me. I said I did not now care what the press said, it had lied so much about me. So I left. In the morning the President sent me a few lines, that there were better news, and to come up. I did so. A deserter was in, who said that a Colonel with one leg had been taken.

_Sunday, March 6._—In the afternoon the Secretary of Navy called, and then the President and Secretary of War. Had a telegram from General Butler, saying that Uly was not a prisoner, but was at King and Queen's Court House, and he would send out and bring him in.

When the Secretary of Navy was going he said to me in the hall that he had been thinking of what I said yesterday, and could not assent. He wished me to remain in command.

_March 7._—No tidings to-day of Uly. Nothing from the President, who would, of course, send me word. Oh, how I wish this painful anxiety were at an end!

_March 8._—The President sends for me about ten A.M. I hasten up. Yesterday he had a telegram that my boy had been killed, but would not tell me, hoping for better news.

Merciful Father! Am I to lose my brave son? Not yet, not yet, I pray. Let me see him _once more._ I will hasten down so as to be nearer. The President says, "Go. I authorize it; ask no one; I will stand by you."

As soon as my steamer can be got ready (at 2½) I leave the Yard. Who shall tell my feelings? I beg Heaven his life is spared. Just as we pass Mt. Vernon I am reminded that some seven years ago, as I passed in the "Plymouth," he came down to meet me, having pulled all the way from the Navy Yard in a boat; not quite fifteen years old then, dear fellow!
How precious now are the two months he spent with me, and how I missed him when he went! My son, my son!

At noon, just passed the "Ella." Says he heard my son was at Fortress Monroe, alive! Oh, can it be true?

It was past ten when I reached Fortress Monroe, and sent ashore immediately to General Butler. The return brought me a package of Richmond papers, containing the sad tidings of poor Uly's death. . . . The exact facts are not known, only that he separated from the main body, was overtaken, and a conflict ensued. So ends a career too brilliant to last long. A Colonel at twenty-one!

And yet the scoundrels had no regard for the body of one so young and so brave. It was stripped, the finger cut off to get the ring, and every vile epithet bestowed by the Richmond press.—May an avenging God pursue them!

And yet how glorious, though he lost a leg at Gettysburg, and was not well enough to be on his horse!

Oh, that I may have the power to write his memoirs in characters that will never be forgotten!

March 10.—A day devoted to the memory of my gallant son. General Butler thinks that a special flag of truce would only exasperate the Rebel Government, but will ask for the body by the usual flag of truce. So terrified was Richmond that I have little hope, especially as the Richmond press affirm that nothing shall be known, even where his grave is, and they approve of the brutality offered to the inanimate body. General Butler suggested my asking for it, but it seemed better to go through the usual channel.

March 11.—The flag of truce boat, detained by the fog following on the S. E. blow of yesterday, reported to have gone up about five in the evening. General Butler sent me a copy of his letter to the Rebel Commissioner of Exchange. It was very delicately and well written. Dear Uly! I fear the brutes will refuse.

March 12.—Another day of solicitude.

General Kilpatrick came on board to see me. He commanded the late expedition, and spoke in unbounded terms of
my dear son, who seemed, as usual, to have been the very soul of the operation.

The General said it was basely false that his order contained anything of killing Davis or burning the city. The General had read it over with Uly more than once.

_March 13._—The bright, beautiful Sabbath. Another day of solemn suspense. My son, my son! When I left Washington it seemed as if dear Uly's death was the greatest possible affliction. Now, I hardly know if I can recover his body. How thoughts of him flit by me. The last evening he was with me I gave him my last memorandum in case I fell. Dear boy, he goes before me! Here, too, I have a whole life to contemplate, from the baby in the cradle to the distinguished Colonel falling in battle; and yet I am in the vigor of life. My son!

_Tuesday, March 15._—At four P.M. the truce boat came in sight, and in half an hour anchored off the fort. Does she bring my boy or not? The news came slowly enough. General Butler had gone out to ride. It was eight or nine in the evening before he wrote that he had no doubt the next truce boat would bring me dear Uly; and thought he could assure me that, at the farthest, this would be Monday.

So I wrote him a note saying I would go back to Washington, and would return to receive my son.

I also left my clerk to see that the remains were identified and proper means used to preserve them.

And so closes this little volume, with the death of my much loved, gallant boy. It commenced with the death of one of my best friends, Admiral Foote.

How busy is death,—oh, how busy indeed!

_March 16._—Returning to Washington from Fortress Monroe, where I had been to seek the remains of my beloved son Ulric, basely murdered in ambush, and held by the Rebels in Richmond.

The flag of truce did not bring them last night, but General Butler feels sure they will be sent by the next boat on Monday.

I awaited these news for six days, spending that time in my

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1 This journal was written in bound books.
flagship, entirely in retrospect of the life of my son—hunting out every little incident that was in memory for more than twenty-one years. Gallant fellow, how irreproachable the record! How brilliant the brief career!

I ascended this river with very different feelings, two weeks ago this very day. No thought of harm then to my precious son. Now I notice much to remind me of him.

He was with me once or twice on trips to Acquia with the President, &c. Then he was a mild civilian from a lawyer's office in Philadelphia. Then there stands Battery Dahlgren, where I sent heavy cannon to aid the lines after Bull Run, and where Ully played Aid to the Commander (Parker), being his first military service.

Now my brave boy sleeps in Richmond. The battle, where he has so often been foremost, will arouse him no more, nor give light to his eagle eye.

It was quite early on Thursday (March 17) when I landed at the Yard, and drove to the little home in Four-and-a-half Street.

On Monday morning, about eleven o'clock, I started from the Washington Yard, for Fortress Monroe, but had to come down in the ordnance steamer "Baltimore," as my own was under repair.

March 22. — Fortress Monroe. I arrived here last night in the "Baltimore."

March 23. — About one p.m. the truce boat arrived. The Commissioner (Mulford) sent me word that my son was not sent because the only person (an officer) who knows the exact locality of the interment was not in town, and had been sent for. So, with a heavy heart, I had to retrace my steps. Left about three p.m., and steamed away.

March 24. — Arrived (at Washington) early, and got home about eight o'clock.

March 25. — Though feeling very unfit for any business, I felt obliged to go to the Department, to see after that of the public.

The Department had sent for me to come here for a few days, and it was proper that affairs at Charleston should not
suffer. News that a new iron-clad ("Ashley") has been launched there (tenth).

I first saw Fox, and represented that I had been promised the new iron-clads for six months. Now they were ready, to send them elsewhere was not the best for things at Charleston, and unjust to me. Fox said that the coming campaign must influence their destination. Grant was now occupied in forming his plan, and if for Richmond and the James River, some iron-clads must be there, then I should have all they had; at all events, I had better wait here awhile and see what turned up. Then I went in to see the Secretary. He was in favor of waiting to see the plan of the Army. Did not consider the Rebel iron-clads much.

It is then understood that I am to remain and attend the general plan.

Fox thought the going in rather a desperate affair, and seemed doubtful if any result could be secured; ought to be sure of success.

I answered, that with such new data no one could be certain of success, but that a trial should be made. He said every one considered the project abandoned.

I told him that I had one disadvantage. Some of the Commanders were doubtful as to the judiciousness of going in,—probably Rowan, who certainly was adverse in the council to the "Ironsides" entering the harbor.

Tuesday, March 29.—About ten A.M. I left in the "Harvest Moon" for Fortress Monroe. . . . Got to the fort near dark, and sent a note to General Butler. He sent an Aid to say that the Rebel Commissioner Ould was in the fort on business, and suggested my seeing him. I declined, by note. Parley with those whose hands were red with the blood of my son,—and would kill his fair fame as they have his body! No, no. Upon the positive assurance that the remains should be sent by the next truce boat, I left immediately, and reached Washington after dark on Thursday.

I went up to see the Secretary of the Navy. He seemed to be of my way of thinking as to operations at Charleston. That is, with all the iron-clads to go in and try what was to be done. I told him that Wise had written to me about the Bureau. He
thought if I would withdraw, that he would be nominated. The Secretary did not think so. Asked me what I thought. I told him the construction, &c., of cannon should be separated from the administration of supplies, and I was willing to take the former.

To-day one of those mysterious messages. An officer of inferior grade called. Had met with some one from the "Peterhoff," who knew some one from Richmond, that told him some Union men had secretly disinterred my son, and transferred the remains to a metallic coffin, and intended to remove them from Richmond. I replied as before to similar hints, that I looked to the Rebel authorities for my son, and would not at this time admit any other course. This man . . . was a German, and it looks to me like a speculation. He gave an address in Baltimore. Other propositions have reached me, going to show that there is a constant communication with Richmond.

In the evening a gentleman, F——, called with something of the same kind, and seemed disappointed at my answer.

April 8.—I have two notes from the Department,—one official, asking if Dupont transferred an order of June 6, directing him to co-operate with Gillmore.

The other from Fox, marked private, and asking if I was not hurried off by the Department. It seems that General Cullum, the Engineer, denies that he was anxious to have the work begun. Of course I was hurried, and in such a way that made me suffer afterwards for the most ordinary conveniences.

April 11.—I concluded to go to Fort Monroe to receive my beloved son. Again a sad pilgrimage. . . . The remains had not been received. . . . The General is to telegraph me at once of the reception of the body.

April 14.—Did not reach home till noon. I found the "Baltimore American" of the morning contained extracts from the Dupont correspondence just sent to Congress by the Navy Department. Among them a letter from General Hunter of May 22, 1863, to the President, in which he proposes to do exactly what Gillmore has done, and says he cannot, because Dupont will not help him. . . . Fox tells me that Grant asked for two iron-clads in the James River, and the Department
would send "Onondaga" and "Tecumseh." That breaks in on Charleston.

April 17. — In the evening General Butler sent telegram from Fortress Monroe, saying that the truce boat had returned. "Mr. Ould assured Major Mulford that upon going to the grave of Colonel Dahlgren it was found empty, and that the most vigorous and persistent search fails to find it. That the authorities are making every exertion to find the body, which shall be restored if found. — B. F. Butler, Maj.-Gen. Com."

Fox said that Grant wanted naval aid in the James, which takes from me the new monitors. I told him that decided present operations against Charleston. I suggested a monitor without a turret to scout the harbor at night. He thought well of it. I warned him of the danger from torpedoes. We might lose a monitor. Talked of repairs to "Ironsides." I said withdrawal doubtful. He did not see her use now. I replied, "The naval effect." Then I saw the Secretary. I told him that I was still held by Committee on the War. He liked my paper on Cannon. I told him that I did not care for the Bureau, but did not wish to dissever my connection with the Ordnance; nor could I serve under an inferior in rank, and of less experience in ordnance. I thought I could retain the modelling, fabrication, &c.

April 22. — I gave a paper, proposing to occupy Long Island and attack Sullivan's Island. The Navy Department sent it over to the War Department.

April 24. — This evening Dr. Sunderland delivered a discourse, in the First Presbyterian Church, on my beloved son Ully. This large building was perfectly jammed by the crowd, who listened for two hours and ten minutes so quietly that a pin-drop might be heard. After it was finished, Mr. Morris, a Member from New York, expressed his wishes that the discourse should be printed and spread broadcast.

April 25. — The Secretary spoke to me about Rowan. I told him that he was a good officer and a brave man, but I was not sure that he agreed with me about going in to Charleston. The record of the Council of War stated his vote, and I thought that in case of such an attempt there should be entire accordance of views between the first and second.
April 26. — Orders received.

In the evening a countryman came, who said that my Ully's remains were on his farm. They had been removed privately by one or two persons. He says the body cannot be removed until our troops get that far.

April 28. — As I had fixed this day for departure, I went to say good-by at the Navy Department. The Secretary asked me to write privately as well as officially. I told him that he could not expect any results unless he sent me the monitors that were promised, and which it seems are now to be drawn off to assist Grant. Most of the troops are being taken away for the same purpose. I believe it is better to take Richmond first. I ended by taking leave of the President. He will not forget Ully. I told him also that "I had too little force; that he could only expect me to hold on." "O yes," he said, that "was all he expected."

At four P. M. the "Harvest Moon" left the wharf and made her way down the river.

May 2. — Anchored at Port Royal about noon. "Wabash" here, and one monitor, besides a few other vessels in repair. Returned to the old quarters in the "Philadelphia."

May 3. — General Hatch called, with General Gordon. The former succeeds Gillmore, who went out in the steamer that I passed coming in. Hatch says that Gillmore has taken off 20,000 men, and leaves him no more than enough to hold on. Hatch says he has no instructions; but Gillmore had, to act on the defensive. He left no copy; but Hatch says, as he saw them he must follow them. Gordon says that Gillmore never thought of more than taking Wagner and silencing Sumter.

May 4. — Went ashore to return visit of the Commanding General Hatch. Took Bradford along. Found General Gordon with Hatch. He is about to leave, to command in the St. John's. Gordon denounced Gillmore. . . . Said he had encouraged, and was pleased with, the war upon me, and used to speak gleefully of the newspaper attacks, and always had in view a scapegoat for the failure to take Charleston, which he knew was not possible. Here is patriotism, and honor, and honesty!
Much surprised at an application from Rowan to Navy Department to go home on account of his health.

**May 7.**—General Hatch came on board with General Schim-melfennig from Morris Island. The latter had a plan of the iron-clads going up the Wando River, where he would connect with 2,500 men. General Hatch did not indorse it, but thought I should know it. There was also a project to foray at Murrell's Inlet and Georgetown, which I agreed to. Could help very well if General H—— could spare the extra gunboats from the St. John's. He would see. If not, I would do the best I could.

**May 8.**—About eleven o'clock in the morning slipped out of Port Royal and steamed up to Charleston. Arrived about six p. m. "Ironsides" and six monitors all in place.

Commodore Rowan came on board. . . . Nothing could exceed the friendliness of the interview; it was entirely unreserved; and, among other things, he denounced Gillmore for his course towards me and the Navy in permitting the correspondence. . . .

I told him that the present seemed a good opportunity for trying the Rebels at some point, and asked him what he thought of an attempt on Sumter. He entirely approved; but shook his head at the idea of going up to the city,—might be done with the reinforcements,—would probably lose two or three, &c. He left, after a most cordial evening.

**May 9.**—Captain Cooper of "Sangamon" called. In reply to my question, he was not favorable to my going in or attacking. Said the batteries were very strong.

Captain Simpson, of the "Passaic," was favorable to attacking Sumter, and not much disinclined to attack on Mt. Pleasant.

Captain Harrison of the "Kaatskill" (only arrived from Port Royal this morning) was decided against proceeding up the harbor. Thought Sumter possible.

Captain Gibson of the "Lehigh" was not decided, but favorable to an attack on Sumter.

I was just on the point of convening the iron-clad Captains this evening instead of to-morrow morning. Had actually given the order, when I was handed a communication from Commodore Rowan, which proved to be letters from Dr. Duval,
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reporting, to Navy Department, Commodore Rowan and his executive officer Belknap, and other officers, as being parties to disparaging remarks on myself; which was producing serious consequences on the discipline of the squadron. Whereupon Rowan indorses them as false so far as concerns himself, and prefers charges against Duval. . . . As Belknap was not exonerated, I decided to begin with him as the senior offender.

May 10. — About eleven A. M. I convened the Captains of iron-clads, — Rowan, Cooper, Harrison, Simpson, Luce, Gibson, Davis, — and the “Nahant,” represented by L. C. Miller. The question was — attack on Sumter.

There was not a great deal of discussion. Luce and Bradford were strong for. Simpson decided for. Cooper, Harrison, and Davis strong against. Gibson mildly for. Miller quietly for. Commodore Rowan was for it, with much qualification.

I informed Rowan, before I began, that as Miller was too young for Commander, I should send for Green to take the “Nahant,” and vote. We adjourned to meet to-morrow, when Green would be here.

I expressed my astonishment to Rowan at the alleged state of things in his ship. He said he was astonished too, and that Belknap was as clear of it as he was. . . .

May 11. — I found myself obliged to send a Court of Inquiry to ascertain what Belknap had said.

May 12. — Lieutenant-Commander Fillebrown comes to report for command of “Passaic,” which relieves Simpson. So there is a change in the council.

In the afternoon I called the Captains together, — Commodore Rowan, Captain Green, Commanders Cooper and Harrison, Lieutenant-Commanders Simpson, Gibson, Luce, and Davis.

I announced that if we went in, Captain Green would command the “Nahant.” A full discussion now took place, in which Luce stated that he had changed his opinions since yesterday, when he was strong for an out-and-out attack to the extreme. Gibson changed too, and Rowan was strong against attack.

So when the question was put,—Is it advisable to attack Sumter, and reduce its power, offensive and defensive, with the
present force of seven monitors and the "Ironsides," having reference to all the questions involved? — the vote stood: —

No. Rowan, Green, Cooper, Harrison, Gibson, Luce, Davis, — seven.

Yes. Simpson, Bradford, — two.

May 14. — Report from Court of Inquiry, in case of some other officers on board the "Ironsides," charged with disrespectful language. Instead of facts, they favored me with an opinion. Sent it back. I examined a deserter who left Fort Johnson on Thursday night. Belongs to S. C. Regulars, 1st Reg. Co. K. Was in Battery Bee, Sept. 8, when the iron-clads attacked. Three monitors fired at Bee; did no harm; not a man or gun hurt ("Montauk"). Nearest of them, 300 yards. "Ironsides" and two monitors fired at Moultrie.

A shell 1 struck a pile of forty loaded shells, which exploded and killed twenty men and wounded eighteen; which, with four guns disabled out of eighteen, was all the damage there was in Moultrie that afternoon.

Yesterday I sent in two monitors to stop work in Sumter, and do mischief ("Nantucket" and "Sangamon"); to-day, the "Nantucket" and "Passaic." Moultrie was silent. A few shots from other batteries. Our batteries on Morris Island assisted. In the afternoon I pulled up in my barge to the "Nantucket." They did not fire at my flag.

May 16. — Court of Inquiry again at work on "Ironsides."

May 17. — Court of Inquiry finished. And, after swearing everybody, it seems that nobody ever spoke disrespectfully of me in the "Ironsides." Fortunate man!

To-day I sent an important document by the "Massachusetts," which left about two P. M. for Philadelphia.

I told the Department that a council of war decided against attacking even the remnant of Sumter. That Gillmore had taken North 20,000 men, leaving only 14,000, which were barely sufficient for the defensive; and General Hatcher intended to maintain the defensive. Finally, that the new monitors having been taken for James River, left me with nothing to do. So I asked to be relieved.

1 This must have been the shell from "Weehawken," which was thought to have blown up a magazine. — M. V. D.
May 18.—Arrived at Port Royal. About 10.30, May 19, started for Beaufort.

May 20.—Left Beaufort and steamed down to Port Royal. I left Port Royal and steamed round to Savannah River.

May 21.—Left Savannah River before sunrise, and steamed round to Wassaw.

May 22.—Reaching Port Royal about daylight, General Birney has a plan to cut the railroad at Ashepoo. I agreed to assist with gunboats, and detailed the “Hale” and “McDonough” with some marines.

May 25.—To-day I send the “Hale” and “McDonough” to aid General Birney to cut the railroad at Ashepoo. He takes 1,600 men in three steamers.

May 26.—The new military commander, General Foster, arrived. Sent an aid with my compliments.

May 27.—In the afternoon went ashore to see General Foster.

Early this morning the army transports came back from the Edisto minus one steamer. General Birney telegraphed me it was a failure. He knew nothing of the “Hale” and “McDonough.” In order to find out I sent a tug to communicate, which on coming in sight of them returned. They came in just before dark, much disgusted. They went up the South Edisto as agreed, and made the diversion requested; indeed, were so unexpected that they might have made an attack, and did actually fire on the battery at Millstown,—where is Governor Aiken’s plantation. Waiting to hear from General Birney, they at last saw a blaze in his direction, and, anticipating trouble, fell down to join him. Birney with his troops went up the Ashepoo, and reached his point safely. The “Boston,” with a regiment, got aground at night near a battery which opened at daylight, and so scared “de culled pussons” that they jumped overboard. The “Dai Ching” steamed up, opened fire, and hushed up the battery, then offered to get off the “Boston”; but Birney had enough, and ordered her to be fired, and destroyed the finest of the army steamers, with sixty horses. Our officers are much galled at the business.

May 28.—General Foster visited me in the afternoon.
May 30. — General Foster sent me dispatches from General Gordon at Jacksonville, giving account of his expedition up the river, which ended in the loss of the "Columbine." I sent down the "Hale."

May 31. — Had word yesterday from the "South Carolina" that she had scouted up as far as the Rebel ram at Savannah. My force in the river small and crippled, so I went round this morning early to see for myself. Survey steamer "Vixen" went along. Took the "Huron" with me, as she is to go home, disabled in boiler. The squadron is breaking down very fast, and the Department sends no reinforcements. On reaching the Savannah River gave the "Huron" her dispatches, and she left. The Captain said when he came on board that the men came aft and said that if the Admiral was going on an expedition they did not want to go. These men had been transferred from the "Wabash" for discharge, their time being out; the old crew sent elsewhere. A nice set of patriots! The crew of this ship "Wabash" has been troublesome from the first. When sent ashore last summer to the naval battery on Morris Island they complained that their time was out. . . .

Got to Port Royal about 5½ p.m.

June 1. — The "Ironsides" ordered home. Of the seven monitors left, two are here out of order, and the "Passaic" no better. The Rebels have four; wonder if they will come out and try their luck.

June 2. — Very early — say four o'clock — I moved up Beaufort River, along all its windings, and out into the Coosawhatchie into St. Helena Sound; began to see the "Dai Ching" and the lofty frame lookout on Otter Island. This is another sample of the beautiful interior navigation by which the large estuaries communicate. Nothing can exceed the beauty of the verdure, — luxuriant, massive, and rich in green. These passages are really large rivers, in some parts narrowing, but quite deep. It was nearly sunset when the "Philadelphia" passed Beaufort. Received from the Department its book versus Dupont. They have published all my letters, — some that should not have been made public, as it told the enemy too much. But they take good care not to publish their instructions to me; they will out some of these days, for inadvertently one of my letters is
given, which speaks of them. There is nothing either, of the Council of War; murder will out! 1

June 3.—As the "Ironsides" is ordered home, and will leave shortly, I have to look out for Charleston. I shall have left seven monitors, of which the "Montauk" is unserviceable for three months; the Fleet Engineer says it will take that long to put her in order. The "Nahant" will be ready next week. The "Passaic" needs scaling the tubes, which is an endless job; so I have no more than five monitors to count upon. The Rebels have four — one brand-new. So I concluded to call up the "Pawnee" from St. John's, and put her to some use off Charleston, putting on her four more IX's . . .

June 4.—About one p.m. came the astounding news that on Friday morning (June 3), before daylight, the Rebels had surprised the "Water Witch" at Ossabaw, and boarded her with eight boats; only one negro escaped. He made his way to the next station below (St. Catherine's), and informed the "Fernandina," which, being only a sailing vessel, got out to sea, and communicated with the "South Carolina," at Tybee. He telegraphed to me, and afterwards sent his boat with a dispatch. The "Winona" was luckily ready for sea, and by one o'clock was steaming out with a tug. I gave orders to retake the "Water Witch" if possible. The "Unadilla" followed, about four o'clock. The "Massachusetts" left, about six o'clock, for the North.

If the Department does not send me more vessels and men there will be more trouble. The present force is entirely inadequate, there being thirteen steamers absent for repair.

June 5.—The "Cimarron" having coaled, I sent her round to assist the other two and communicate with the monitor at Wassaw. I also sent a tug with a note to the monitor.

I find that the raid was limited to the "Water Witch," as I find to-day that all is right at the other stations. I felt most apprehensive that some attempt might be made on the monitor "Patapsco," at Wassaw, which would have nearly balanced forces. She is all right, however, and I determined to risk nothing there, so I sent the "Unadilla" with the "Wissahickon."

1 The Admiral was thus left unsupported, to bear the brunt of an excited public opinion. — M. V. D.
I sent orders to the "Pawnee" to come out St. John's and go to Charleston.

The "Cimarron" returns, and I send her back to draw out the vessels at St. Catherine's.

About one p.m. rounding the light boat, and across the bar. Five monitors are here,—the "Kaatskill" (Harrison), "Sangamon" (Cooper), "Passaic" (Fillebrown), "Nantucket" (Luce), and "Lehigh" (Gibson). The "Ironsides" was a large object in the view, and her absence is quickly noticed.

The Rebels have four iron-clads in the harbor,—"Chiciona," "Palmetto," "Charleston," and "Ashley." Will they come out?

The decrease of vessels is so great that we look quite few.

One of the Rebel steamers that supply and cruise between the forts grounded last night between Johnson and Sumter, on the bank that makes out there. At daylight Gregg opened fire, and seems to be picking her to pieces very rapidly. That will be a set-off for the "Columbine."

June 8.—Sent up the "Nipsic" to inquire after matters at Georgetown.

June 9. — I called the Captains of the five monitors, and gave instructions in case the Rebels should come out.

The stock of coal is so low as to be serious. I am much troubled about coal. Without some relief many of the steamers will be at a stand in a few days, and all of them not long after.

I hurried the "Queen" off last night with a dispatch on the subject to the Navy Department, and to-day, about ten, started the "Nipsic" to the Chesapeake, to telegraph, and pick up a schooner if possible. The Bureau is penny wise and pound foolish. No one could foretell the consequences.

June 12. — General Foster came up from Port Royal and came on board to discuss movements. I proposed to enter the inlets with 5,000 men, and seize a position to the rear of Sullivan's Island, first demonstrating at Stono. The General considered it too risky, so we talked over other notions; but the General was not inclined to anything very serious, and there it ended.
June 16.—General Schimmelfennig sent me a copy of a letter from General Ripley, saying that five of our generals and forty-five of our field officers had been ordered to be confined in Charleston, and that the place assigned for their residence was exposed to the fire of our guns. A nice business indeed, and just what might be expected from such scoundrels!

June 24.—Yesterday I sent my reply to the Senate Committee on the conduct of the war.

Saw Pendergast (of the "Water Witch"), who was wounded. Had three cuts on the head. The Rebel leader, Pelot, was shot dead by the Paymaster. The fight was hard, but brief.

June 25.—I sent a note to General Foster that I was ready for our move to Darien, and further operations as agreed upon.

The "Winona" came in from Charleston. She is to be of the party. Sent the "Pawnee" off at noon for Ossabaw.

General Foster wrote a note that he would soon be ready.

June 27.—In the evening General Foster came on board. The idea is to cut the railroad by way of Edisto or the Ashepoo, then make an onslaught south of Port Royal.

June 29.—In the evening the army transport arrived with five Rebel generals and forty-five field officers, who are to be held as hostages for the proper treatment of a like number of our officers, whom they threaten to put under fire in Charleston. I was asked to allow the steamer to be anchored under the guns of the "Wabash" for safe-keeping, which was allowed.

June 30.—I went ashore to see General Foster about the operation. He has 7,000 men in the business, and I am to lug, in what I can. The "Pawnee" not arrived yet, which interferes sadly. Her orders went by "Sonoma."

July 1.—A strong wind from S. The "Montauk" did not get out the creek this morning. Another drawback. The "Pawnee" came in about eight o'clock, and detailed orders issued. I had a long discussion with Boutelle, who does not like some of the army arrangements. About two p.m. I observed several transports with troops about the harbor. The "Pawnee" to move at two p.m., but did not. Ready by four,
and began to get under way. Soon signalled, "Engine disabled." The Captain came on board. I sent Fleet Engineer on board. Soon heard that she would not be ready all night. Terrible blow, being the main dependence to cover the troops in Edisto. The "Montauk" began to move out the creek at high water, and was out at six p.m. Had trouble here, too. Had to send Lieutenant-Commander Matthews in the "Sonoma," and no officer on board higher than an Acting Master, who had been but a few days in her. The "Passaic's" Captain would do, but he and his First Lieutenant were on the Court-Martial at Charleston. A nice state of affairs for a monitor just going into action! The "Winona" had not arrived to tow her up, and the Flag disabled and could not.

Just then the "Winona" was seen. The tug took her order and came back at two p.m. It was nearly dark when the "Winona" contrived to get the "Montauk" in tow. I sent Mackenzie in her from the "Winona," and two ensigns from the "Passaic,"—Williamson of the Flag in the "Winona"; and with this patched contrivance we pushed off. The Flag, the "Harvest Moon," and the "Montauk," in tow of "Winona." It fell entirely dark before we got far into the channel, and so, without any certain pilotage, the exit of a monitor was risked. Happily we got safely through the long channel of eight or ten miles, and in the open sea steered for Stono. The wind was fresh, and sea not too smooth. Going out, the lights of the transports glittered in green and red and white, and lit up the darkness.

In the middle of the day I wrote a note telling the General of my dispositions, but saying that it was by no means certain that the monitors could cross the Stono Bar. The General said he would move in the morning.

July 2. — It was late when I lay down last night, but I was awake at four, and learned that Stono was ahead six miles off. When I soon after rose, we were running along the land, and seaward, five or six miles off, were the "Montauk" and the "Winona," also the "Harvest Moon"; the "Dai Ching" further off.

About six we were off Stono, and could just see a tug or two
coming down. The pilot came off at seven, and, to my great
disgust, said the tide was falling. There were only eleven feet
on the bar, and rough. The monitor could not go in, nor any
gunboat. The "Dai Ching," which should have joined me at
once, at last came up. I ordered her to Edisto to assist there.
The "Wamsutta" coming down. The "Canandaigua," with
the "Leligh" and tugs.

At seven I went in with the Flag. Signalled "Wamsutta"
to Edisto.

The sound of artillery had been heard at daylight to the
right of Stono, and it was continued with vivacity.

The first symptoms of change seem to appear, as rumors
reach me that I am to be relieved of a duty that would have
been happiness to me had it not been for the share of public
abuse bestowed on me. This is the curse of the country, and
perverts the public feeling and strips it of the high and generous
semblance that should be extended to those who grasp great
interests. Instead of that, there is a passion for miserable
gossip and swift detraction that is amazing. No one seems
safe; and our public men are thus made to stand before the
world as a poor good-for-nothing set, the dross of the commu-
nity. Notwithstanding my disappointments, I found that the
General had fared even worse. A little before noon a tug hove
in sight to the southward, with a flag which I soon recognized
as the new one selected by the General. Well, the division for
the Edisto could not find the entrance, and had to wait till day-
light. Then, on trying to get in, they ran aground. Then there
were no boats, and there was a mess generally. Still it did not
disturb his equanimity. He wanted some boats, so I ordered
what there were at Charleston.

When I came in, the "McDonough" was above Legareville,
peppered away at the Battery Pringle. General S——'s Chief
of Staff, Major Wales, came on board at nine. His tug for
ornance stores had grounded, and he had no means of con-
veying ammunition to the front. "Would I lend him a tug?"
"Yes."

It was with much interest that I now awaited the move-
ments of the monitors. Could they cross the bar?

There lay the party to seaward: the "Winona" and the
“Montauk”; the “Acacia” coming down from Charleston with the “Lehigh”; the “Harvest Moon,” with my Fleet Captain. All very quiet, awaiting the tide. At last the tide came in, and at 4.20 the signal was made outside for leave to move, and the bright-colored flags streamed out gayly.

The “Winona” came round and made for the bar with the “Montauk,” then the “Harvest Moon” with the “Lehigh.” At 4.34 the “Montauk” was passing under my stern. Up went the flags, “Prepare for action!” The “Lehigh” came close after, with a like order. Deep in my heart was the memory of my brave boy. Oh that my cannon would rear a fitting monument for that martyr!

Away we go, I following in the “Philadelphia.” The “Montauk” wants coal, and halts. No matter. We pursue the winding river, pass the pretty village of Legareville, then through the opening across the river, and come to the “McDonald.” Pythian has much to tell; was only half a mile from the batteries; scared every one, and was not hit.

I leave the “Philadelphia” and get on board the “Montauk.” The day is going fast. We slowly steam up the river. The “Oleander” comes with the torpedo-raft. That consumes time. We get into it and proceed. It is now dark, and we are at the turn near Grimball’s. It is quite dark and late. The monitor steers badly. We reach the last turn and the batteries are above us. We see the lights. The channel becomes too narrow, and the “Montauk” grazes the bottom. The danger is imminent. If a mistake is made the purpose is defeated.

All is silent around; not a sound. So I leave the “Montauk” and repair to the “Philadelphia,”—a wearied man.

Friday, July 3.—The glorious Sabbath—but not of rest. I am up, not too early, but betimes, arranging for the day. As the tide flows it makes position bad for the monitors, turning stern towards the batteries, but soon begins to ebb. The “Montauk” comes up, and I go on board. The “Lehigh” a little lower than last night. Up we go, and about ten anchor above the bend and the “Lehigh.” All looking very quiet. Presently we begin. I should have said that at 8.20 the “Pawnee” surprised me by her arrival, and the “Winona.” It seems that
they got her straight, and she went to Edisto. General Foster found no opposition, and did not need her. She met the "Winona" going to Edisto, and brought her along.

Now we get into position.

The batteries are innocent-looking, and not very noticeable features in the landscape, but to a practised eye significant enough. Not a living creature to be seen. Close by is the low, swampy shore, and tall grass, with high clumps of forest here and there; to the right the skeleton frame of the Rebel lookout at Secessionville.

The notes of Signal Officer say:

9.50. Admiral went to "Montauk."
10.20. To "Lehigh." Signal for action.
10.45. "Montauk" fired first gun.
11.00. "Pawnee" — Anchor.
The Rebels made beautiful practice; their first shots would have hit in a window, and were a trifle too high. The "Lehigh" and "Pawnee" fired at Pringle, while the "Montauk" swept the ground in front of our troops,—it seems with the happiest effect. And so the time passed, of a very hot day, until one o'clock, when the tide beginning to flood must make the fire cease. Then I left, and the weary men went to dinner.

I stopped at the "Pawnee" and gave some directions. All was now quiet, and I got back to the "Philadelphia."

Dinner as soon as possible. Then an aid comes with a note from General S——. He had assaulted Simkins and lost 100 men. Bad. Our fire this morning stopped an assault on him by the Rebels in force. Came the grape and shell from the "Montauk," just on the masses in his front, and sent them right about. Good.

This evening I send up the mortar-schooner ("Racer"). There is also a wood on our left on St. John's, where if I can plant a gun it will be hard on them.

Before dark General Foster came in from North Edisto. Birney had failed completely. There was no opposition in Edisto, but when he turned off to Millstown some small batteries opened, and the negro troops flinched so that he would not trust them. Failure the second. Hatch is well, so far. At noon General S—— writes that he is at Bugbee's Bridge (which connects Wadclaw's Island with John's Island, say six miles from Legareville). General Foster likes my plan of a battery on John's Island, and thinks he will concentrate where we are. After dark we rowed in my barge to the monitors.

I had given orders in detail for an obstruction above, which had been well got up with Balsas, and for picket-boats, but they had not arrived.

Just as the General and myself pulled away from the monitors, the "Racer" began with the mortar. The first shell was beautiful, bursting twenty or thirty feet above the batteries. At slow intervals this was continued. One shell in particular well illustrated the rotary movement,—the plane of the circle it described must have been just in the plane of the trajectory;
so that the little star made by the burning fuze was half the
time in eclipse.

The torpedoes made by Maillefert have not worked well.
To-day I used a modification of my own. The officer rather
carelessly placed it, only half the length from my steamer.

At the word, away it went. The shock was tremendous, break-
ing all our loose glass. The diameter of the column of water
must have been 100 feet, but not very high. One thing was
evident: its circle of action was distinctly defined, and outside
of the column of water nothing is hurt.

July 4.—All the vessels gay in colors for the day. At
eight, as soon as the colors went up, the Rebel batteries opened
spitefully, their projectiles coming 5,000 yards, and falling near
vessels below,—Flag among them. I ordered the mortar to
open, which soon silenced them.

About ten the transports, with Birney’s column, came in,
and were landed to join Schimmelfennig.

The vessels fired moderately, too, but on the whole it was
very dull.

In the evening, about nine, I went up to look at the advance.
The pontoons stretched partly across, to obstruct torpedo-boats
and picket-boats. Looked promising.

General S—desired to resume fire, as it was very service-
able last night. So I set in motion the mortars “McDonough”
and “Lehigh.” About noon the “Lehigh” telegraphed that
Rebel troops were in view. Ordered to fire, joined by the
“McDonough” and “Racer” (mortar). 12.30, Aid from Gen-
eral S—to show the position of our troops. One P. M., four
or five transports ascending from below. . . About four P. M.
I went with Generals Foster and Hatch to reconnoitre the
ground. I landed near the dilapidated wharf, Paul Grimball’s
mansion, and found there an officer and picket. General
Hatch’s command were off a mile or two inward, but some
Rebel cavalry had dashed inside of them, and one of our men
was badly wounded in the skirmish. Our jaunt looked a little
risky. It would be a great haul to catch the Commanding
General and Admiral at once. But we mounted, and with a
Captain of Engineers proceeded. A short trot over an old
cotton-field brought us into a wood, which we traversed to the
northern end. We dismounted at Mr. Fripp's house, further on; and, while some ideas were being ventilated as to the mode of proceeding, I struck on through the wood towards the Stono. I presently found myself on the edge of the wood, and right opposite Pringle,—in full view, 1,700 or 1,800 yards off. I got down into the long grass, and carefully examined matters with a double glass. The work is regularly built, and close to the east margin of the Stono, of which I could just see a blue thread. Between me and it was an even stretch of high grass, over a morass, no doubt. There I sat in perfect quiet, surveying the scene. To the right of Pringle were other batteries. I thus passed half an hour, when General Foster, coming up, spied me. He then studied with my glass, and we retraced our steps after he was satisfied. We had been sheltered by a thin belt of trees of brush; to the rear of it was an open and splendid site for that battery of heavy guns which I was to put up, and in the rear the larger and more extensive belt of heavy timber. A finer position could not be imagined. We went back, and made our way to where our horses were tied. . . . It was a beautiful afternoon; a strong wind from N. refreshed the air, and the sun was just setting, whilst ever and anon came the boom of the navy heavy cannon. We got on our horses and rode back to Grimball's.

July 6, 1864. — One year ago—one eventful year—I took command of this squadron, as they call a fleet of eighty vessels.

July 7.—Calm, and the heat tremendous. General Hatch came on board. He thinks no serious operations here possible; thinks troops are of poor quality, except Colonel Davis's brigade of 1,300.

This morning the mortar schooner "Para" arrived, and was speedily taken into position to shell. . . . During the whole night the shelling was maintained from the vessels.

July 8.—Very debilitating weather.

About two P. M. a Captain (and very young) came on board. He said he was from General Saxton; that the Rebels had got a very heavy battery on his flank, and would drive him away if the Navy did not subdue their fire. . . . I ordered the "Lehigh" to move up so as to fire upon this new battery, if possible. . . .
About three P.M. General Foster came on board with General Hatch. A conversation ensued on the situation, from which it was apparent that the Rebels were too much for us, and which ended in General Hatch being directed to go ashore and take command, with the view of withdrawing our forces from John's Island to-morrow night. It was also agreed that the monitor should not move up until I heard from General Hatch. So both the Generals left, Hatch for one landing and Foster for another. It was now four P.M. Meanwhile a fire had begun in Legareville, which now bid fair to envelop the place. Of course nobody did it.

I am utterly disgusted. . . . After General Hatch left, General Foster told me that he had come back to withdraw the troops; he thought we could get no further. Towards evening, the General proposed to go up to the monitors and look at the batteries. We went to the "Lehigh." The Rebels fired from Pringle, and very close. One shell struck the water ten feet on the port bow; the next on starboard beam close to the torpedo guard, and two just in line, about a length astern. Our firing seemed just as good, as the dust would fly high every time.

The General remarked that he had done all he intended. We returned on board.

July 9. — Very close; calm. This morning, after daylight, the Rebels assaulted our position on the left, and after a stubborn contest were repulsed. They renewed it, and were repulsed easily. We heard the firing, but could not see the place. Now Pringle opens more sharply than usual, and is replied to by the vessels.

About ten I went ashore to Paul Grimball's house to see General Foster. I found him on the piazza, in conversation with General Hatch.

I had intended to propose a general move of the troops and vessels, but found the subject to be the withdrawal of the men. The loss this morning was more than 200. The impressions of the Generals were that the Rebels had 3,000 or 4,000 men at our front on John's Island.

So General Hatch left for the advance, and I, with General Foster, went aboard. During the night the necessary dispositions were made afloat to protect the retreat of the troops from
John's Island. . . . The Rebels threw their shells pretty freely
to-day. One burst over my barge in leaving Grimball's, a frag-
ment going to the right and one to the left abreast of us
and close by. One lodged in the "Pawnee," to which we
were near.

July 10. — Most debilitating. . . . The embarkation of the
troops proceeds, but very leisurely. At 7½ A.M. no very large
body of troops remained. A temporary wharf had been con-
structed near a mansion three quarters of a mile below Grim-
ball's. There was not a symptom of the presence of an enemy,
and their batteries silent. The embarkation continued the
whole morning. About eleven the General came on board, and
expressed himself well pleased with results. He said that the
officers and men considered it as a success, as it was the first
time they had repulsed the Rebels decidedly. . . . The General
asked if some of the vessels would stay behind and cover the
stragglers till to-morrow at daylight.

He went to Port Royal a little after noon, agreeing to meet
me at Charleston in a day or two.

By two P.M. every soldier was embarked save the few
wretched stragglers that may have dropped behind; and the
spot that had just teemed with life and with thousands of our
men was now almost deserted. This morning General Foster,
in speaking of the withdrawal from John's Island, expressed
his surprise that no attempt was made to follow the troops or
to trouble them. He said, "The fact is, I do not think they
were as strong as we supposed, and General Hatch thinks so,
too, I believe." The General also said that intercepted tele-
grams directed the Commander not to attack us, but to hold his
position, as our object was to flank Pringle and its line.

That is just what my battery would have done.

Well, every man of the whole force was leisurely embarked
without the first sign of a Rebel; nor did any appear until they
had been gone an hour, when a dozen troopers were spied, who
were quickly sent off by a few shots from the "Pawnee." . . .
I ordered the "Lehigh" down (at sunset) from the advance.
There we lay all night. The "Philadelphia," "Lehigh,"
"McDonough" (off landing), "Pawnee," and "Montauk"
strung in a line, close to the shore. It was expected that the
Rebels would bring down some light guns and annoy us all night. But I directed a very slow fire by single guns to be kept, and that would have stopped any such game.

July 11. — Calm as the sky, and hot! At six signal for "Under way and line ahead," and so we came down the river. . . . Late in the day the "Potomska" came in sight, and her Captain came on board. He brings news of the destruction of the "Alabama" by the U. S. Steamer "Kearsarge," after an hour's fight in the English Channel off Cherbourg, on Sunday, June 19.

There was as much equality as possible in a sea fight, the differences being those of opinion. Thus the "Kearsarge" had two of my XI"s, while the "Alabama" had a Blakely 100-pdr. rifle and a British 68-pdr. on pivots. The "Kearsarge" had four 32 of 42; the "Alabama" had 6×32 of 56"; the "Kearsarge" one of my 30-pdr. rifles. It was a regular naval fight, and most creditable to the United States vessel.

July 12. — I found at Port Royal the monitor "Tecumseh" and her satellites, "Augusta" and "Eutaw," bound for Mobile. This was to have been one of my fleet.

July 15, 1864. — The "Fulton" arrived, and, among other papers, brings me the photograph of the document alleged to have been found on dear Ully. A more shameless imposture I never beheld. The name is spelled "Dalhgren," instead of "Dahlgren," and the initial of the first name ("U") only is given. In no case whatever did he ever sign except as "Ulric Dahlgren." I have collected some 200 of his letters, and they are one and all so signed; nor did I ever know my son to sign otherwise. Nor is the handwriting his. I never saw a more audacious lie.

July 17. — Four refugees from Savannah. It seems we were balked at John's Island by Jackson's brigade on the way from Johnston's army, and just in time. This accounts for the increased force in our front.

July 20. — Oh, how hot! Our cannon have been pounding Sumter, but the effect is not very evident to a hasty glance.

I had a talk with General Foster on the Sumter business. He wants the monitors to lay off the channel fronts and pound them down; then throw in fifty men from each, while he
assaults on the other sides; that is, the monitors were to make a practicable breach in a night, or a day and a night,—which was all that the battering of months had been able to effect on the side nearest our batteries,—to say nothing of the fire of Johnson and Moultrie on the stormers!

The General looked discouraged when I expressed doubts of the feasibility, and said that General Halleck was opposed to it, but that he had hoped to do it. I replied, "Do not be discouraged; let the battering go on, and after a month's work we shall see what is possible." I offered to lend him XI\textsuperscript{m} cannon, as he said he had not guns.

\textit{July 21.}—I went up in the "Lehigh" with General Foster to look at Sumter. He said he had not before had such a good view of it. The northeast front still stands erect, and the work is nearly impregnable.

It was agreed that the powder raft should go up in the evening, under charge of the "Nahant." It was to be veered away when 1,000 yards from Sumter.

As in all combined operations, things did not work well.

At six I noticed that the powder was not in the raft, and sent an aid to see to it. And now the clouds that had been gathering came down in torrents, working in every direction, and with fierce lightning. The wind had been N. W. and S. W., and now came out at N. So it poured till bed-time, and I know not how much longer. Between the mistakes and the storm, the raft did not start.

\textit{July 22.}—Intending that the raft should go in, I sent a tug to tow one from the General's steamers; but he politely declined, and would start them from the shore.

Now the wind came in heavily from N. E., with heavy sea,—a little gale. I have the letter from the Department (July 15). They had received my request of May 14, asking for relief. They were embarrassed in changing commands, and say, "Your application to be detached relieves the Department of any difficulty that might have intervened in your case, and will be borne in mind in any new arrangement that may be ordered." From which I infer that the new arrangement has been made, and my successor has been booked. He will be welcome.
I have labored hard to serve the country. But the public will only be satisfied with victory; and they will find that is not to be had, under the conditions here.

The press is only the echo of the Army, and cares nothing for the Navy.

July 23. — The northeast weather continues, blowing fresh and rolling in a heavy sea, which distresses my old shingle-box very much, most by the heavy blows which the sea strikes under the guards, making the vessel quiver as if she would go to pieces.

Aug. 2. — During the day, General Foster notified me that an exchange was to be made of the fifty Union officers with the fifty Rebel officers.

Aug. 3. — I left Port Royal last night about ten, and after daylight reached Charleston in the “Harvest Moon.” After a while the “Cosmopolitan” came in with the Rebels, and the “Admiral” (supply ship from New Orleans) with Sickles. ... The exchange was made about our advanced picket station. When the steamer came down, with the band playing, I ordered all the vessels to cheer.

So the men were all drawn out, and first the “Pawnee” broke loose with a salute; then the vessels cheered, each as she passed. The flags flew from every mast-head. Then she swept round and came to the “Harvest Moon.” Such cheering for General Foster; then for Admiral Dahlgren; then over again. Generals and Colonels all in a crowd. Then they rushed aboard, and such shaking of hands! ... The released and all the others were very grateful for the naval reception.

Aug. 7. — Yesterday the Provost Guard landed at Bay Point, and seized some colored laborers in Navy employ. I wrote to the General, complaining that it was a gross outrage, and demanded the return of the men and the trial of the officer.

I am much embarrassed by wear and tear of steamers. Two monitors are here, disabled; two more at Charleston are little better; leaving only three there in any condition. I sent officer and marines to take care of Bay Point.
Aug. 9. — I have concluded to run along the southern coast, and look at things.

Aug. 10. — It was six o’clock when the “Harvest Moon” was steaming in for the rather pretty shores of the St. Mary’s.

Aug. 11. — After inspecting several vessels, I visited the “Saratoga,” Captain Colvoreses. A regular ship-of-war, well manned, in fine order. What a grateful sight after the odds and ends. . . . Oh, dear, for the old Navy, what could we not do? How suggestive! The last time I was in the “Saratoga” was in the West Indies, in 1858.

Soon after I was under way. I passed to Sapelo, where the “Sonoma” was. With little or no sail, it was a question of battery only. So there was firing, and I ordered distant practice with grape to illustrate its operation. It was fine at a mile, and I picked up a hint myself.

This over, there was just light to get over the bar, and then away for Port Royal.

Aug. 12. — Dear, ah! what a pile of rubbish, in the shape of letters. Very hard at work all day. General Foster replies about the Bay Point arrests. All deny giving orders. The General says he was not aware that there was an exclusive naval jurisdiction at Bay Point, and inquires “how it was obtained?”

I reply, “By Dupont, in 1862.”

Aug. 17. — General Foster answers my notes. He adheres to a joint jurisdiction at Bay Point.

Aug. 20. — A great bundle of letters from our prisoners in Charleston. One to me from the Rebel General Jones, in answer to mine asking that he should feed his prisoners properly, and offering to exchange them. His reply was rancorous in the extreme.

Aug. 22. — I went ashore to confer with General Schimmel-fennig about the XI\textsuperscript{th} battery. He will place one of 300, three of 200, one of 100 (rifled), two of 10\textsuperscript{th} (col.), twelve mortars of 10\textsuperscript{th}, two of 13\textsuperscript{th}. I will place four of XI\textsuperscript{th}. This is the most powerful battery that has been erected against Sumter. The General would have been ready now, but his force is too much reduced by transfers to the North. I am to man the
XI\textsuperscript{11} guns. . . . I notice in the "New York Herald" of the 19th all the news from here, just as if the writer had stood over Foster and myself as we wrote.

\textit{Aug. 23.} — News from Colvocoresses that he had made another descent, and captured thirty cavalry, burnt a bridge, destroyed salt-works, &c., &c.

I have received a letter from Dr. Whelan, sending a paper with some hair said to have been taken from beloved Ully's head, given to General C— by O——. I fear that man will disclose too much, and thus the spot will become known, and I shall lose my last chance to recover his body. Alas! In the evening I steamed out to sea for Port Royal.

\textit{Aug. 25.} — Trying to drive the work on the monitors. Hardly two of them in order. A steamer came in with 600 Rebel prisoners, to put under fire. Retaliation!

\textit{Aug. 26.} — The "Harvest Moon" arrives with prisoners captured by "Saratoga's" boats on the 16th, in a raid. . . . The S. C. Cavalry (prisoners) send me their letters for home. Very pitiful. I am sorry for them; but they are well treated.

\textit{Aug. 30.} — The General telegraphed in the evening that the Rebels had put up a new battery, and stopped the passage of Skull Creek. He wanted a gunboat, of course, instead of placing a battery months ago, as I suggested. I had no gunboat, and had to send a mortar schooner, which found no one there.

\textit{Sept. 7.} — The General has finally concluded, after a correspondence of one month, to give in on the naval jurisdiction at Bay Point.

\textit{Sept. 12.} — At ten I started in the "Harvest Moon" for Charleston. At five reached light ship, and soon after anchored inside.

Matthews reports that he has mounted four XI\textsuperscript{11}, and is ready to open, but that the Army has not completed parapet or magazines or traverses. . . .

\textit{Sept. 27.} — The XI\textsuperscript{11} guns ashore, and ready, but the Army has not finished the work.

\textit{Sept. 28.} — It was afternoon when the letters came. The chief one was from the Department, marked "Confidential." It was thus:—
Sept. 22. — Enclosed is a confidential order, which you will deliver to Rear-Admiral Farragut as soon as he arrives at Port Royal. Send the "Wabash" to Hampton Roads to arrive there between the 1st and 5th of October. None of your iron-clads will be withdrawn, and none sent from the North at present.

Very respectfully, &c.,
GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.

Rear-Admiral J. A. DAHLGREN, Com., &c.

With this was a blank white envelope, pencilled on both sides "Confidential." Opening this, was found an envelope directed to Farragut.

This was the first intimation that Farragut was to be here. What he was to do here is not said; but there are rumors that an expedition was bound to Wilmington with the "Ironsides" and other iron-clads... Well, it means that I am to do nothing. . . .

Oct. 6. — A poor wrecked man escaped from the cars bringing prisoners from Andersonville to Charleston. He was unable to stand long enough to tell his tale. What an outrage!

Oct. 8. — Two more of our soldiers escaped,—mere wrecks of men. One had been in prison a year. He says that Belle Isle was the worst of all.

Sunday, Oct. 9. — Had a quiet Sunday. We have got into the habit, and it seems to be understood, that I do not expect business on Sunday, if avoidable.

Oct. 11. — Captain Fox escaped from Charleston in Rebel uniform. He says that 15,000 to 25,000 men could take it in the rear, but that it is too strong in front.

Oct. 18. — So many steamers under repair, and they need it so often, that it threatens to make the blockade inefficient.

Oct. 21. — A document from Navy Department, marked "Confidential," saying that Farragut would stop here about the end of September, with a force to attack defences of Cape Fear River. I was to be under his orders (!) whilst he remained, and was to assist in creating the impression that Charleston was to be attacked. I was to give him four of my monitors and the "Canandaigua." The "Canonicus," "Mahopac," and "Saugus" were under orders for Charleston, and would reach
LETTER FROM THE NAVY DEPARTMENT.

by October to replace my four. Secrecy very important, and appearances to be against Charleston!\(^1\)

So here is the murder out.

Farragut was intended, early in September, to relieve Lee and attack Wilmington, N. C. But he meantime, before knowing, must have written home that he was sick. So about the 22d, hearing this, the Department sends the confidential letter to reach him here, and countermand. Porter must have been selected; for on the 28th he takes leave of the "Mississippi," in an address, and says he has been assigned another command.

The papers had it all right, but bungled about the time. Secrecy!!! A good joke. A feint upon Charleston, when the whole public on both sides said Wilmington!

Oct. 25. — The Department writes that the letter of Sept. 22, marked confidential, is revoked, and to be returned. "Admiral Farragut is not expected to come North at present."

Tuesday, Nov. 1. — The monitors all in place, and another wreck added to the ornaments of the channel. Said to be the "Flora." Battery ashore not ready yet. Bomb-proof not completed.

Nov. 6. — Crossed the bar, and about two P. M. reached Edisto River, where is the Stettin Channel, which is narrow but deep. . . . This river is viewed as an important road to

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\(^1\) We give verbatim a copy of the letter from the original, which we have in hand as we write:

(Confidential)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, Sept. 9, 1864.

Sir,—Rear-Admiral Farragut will be at Port Royal near the end of this month, with a force which will probably attack the defences of Cape Fear River. Place yourself under his orders whilst he remains, and assist in creating the impression that Charleston is to be attacked by a naval force. Have four monitors of the "Passaic" class ready to accompany Rear-Admiral Farragut, and give him the "Canandaigua" also. The "Canonicus," "Mahopac," and "Saugus," new monitors, are under orders for Charleston, and will reach you probably by or before the 1st instant, to relieve those withdrawn. It is very important that this contemplated operation should be kept secret, and have every appearance of being intended for Charleston.

Very respectfully,
GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.

Rear-Admiral JNO. A. DAHLGREN,
Comd'g. S. A. B. Squadron, off Charleston, S. C.
Charleston. Admiral Du Pont so reports of it; and in the Revolution Lord Howe passed up it with his forces and took Charleston.

_**Nov. 9. — Yesterday I made a visit of official inspection of the “St. Louis.”**_

Going over these relics of the past has always a great interest for me; it is revisiting the scenes of my boyhood. In just such a vessel as the “St. Louis” I spent my twentieth, twenty-first, and twenty-second years. The ship was the “Ontario,” in the Mediterranean. So every spot seemed familiar to me, and so different from all that has taken its place. There was the steerage, with a vision of that sanctuary, the wardroom, and the main hatch, with its stream anchor and the snug little store forward, where I studied French with the yeoman, a broken-down gentleman. I was young then. One day, as officer of the deck, I worked the “Ontario” round the Bay of Palma, where lay the mighty fleet of France, with 30,000 men on the way to Algiers. Then for the first time steam appeared in war. There were three little steamers about as big as our “Vixen” plying about, and thought such wonders. Now, a third of a century intervening, I command a fleet of steamers, with iron-clads, &c. And yet, I only feel older in what I remember.

_Sunday, Nov. 13, 1864. — My birthday. How many more shall I see?_¹ Well, if my resting-place is not marked, that of my birth is. The Philadelphia Exchange, at Walnut and Third, covers the spot; and the old school-house is yet standing, in Fourth, nearly opposite Library Street, but towards Chestnut. . . . The fleet of steamers with the sick and wounded go round to Tybee in succession, depositing their yet living freight, said to be 8,000 in number. These steamers are large and fine, among them those superb vessels, the “Atlantic” and “Baltic.”

_**Nov. 16. — Answering a famous document from Bureau, in which Wise proposes to Rodmanize my IXth and XIth.**_

_**Nov. 19. — Had a letter from Department enclosing a statement from some refugee that Fort McAllister was without troops. I sent the Fleet Captain to General Foster to look at**_

¹ Admiral Dahlgren died July 12, 1870.
it, and to say that if he would spare a battalion I would see what could be done. The General replied that the report was a mistake, and it was not worth while even to try it.

Nov. 22.—"Arago" left about noon. I sent a document of twenty-eight pages protesting against Wise's attack on the IX\textsuperscript{th} and XI\textsuperscript{th}.

Nov. 23.—My remembrance of last November (1863) is that of a serene and beautiful month, hardly disturbed by high winds. This year October seems to have been the quiet month, though there has been some fine weather in November. The general view is that during the summer there is usually much wind; this begins to lessen in August, and gradually to October. During October or November quiet, fine weather may be looked for, with the least wind of the year, and well suited to operations on the sea-coast.

Thursday, Nov. 24.—This day one year ago my own beloved son Uly came to me from home. I was at Charleston. He came in the "Massachusetts," with Captain West. I only knew of it on seeing him approaching in a boat. How well I remember! It was only when he got out of the boat and stood on his crutches at the gangway that I truly realized the maiming he had suffered. His leg was gone. I had been told of it in letter after letter; I knew of it perfectly, but never felt it before. The sharp pain went to my very heart, and it was only by a violent effort that I controlled my feelings so as not to pain him. It almost killed me; but I smiled pleasantly and welcomed him as the dearest thing on earth, little dreaming that even this affliction would be as nothing to the sad memories of the same day one year later. Now I am writing a note to the Young Men's Association, thanking them for their tribute to his memory. My son, my son! How much better that I had passed away in your stead! The most loved and cherished of all things to me, in all life, gone, and how sadly! . . . I have just received word by the "Harvest Moon" that his comrades, Colonel Lichfield, Major Cook, and Lieutenant Barty have not been received at Tybee. But this anniversary, so solemn to me, of my son's coming here, will not be unmarked. About three, a confidential note was received, asking if I would aid in a movement to assist Sherman. "Certainly I will." And
before I sleep the orders are issued to collect the light artillery and sailors and marines. The vessels, too, are assigned. My son, you are not forgotten!

Nov. 25. — The "Harvest Moon" went up at three A.M. for marines, and "Pontiac," Captain Preble, &c. About ten I have another letter from General Foster, who asks two to six gun-boats to cover, and six navy howitzers to assist, to be ready Monday evening. Start the "Bibb" off for "Mingoe" and men; send South for "Winona" and men; very busy with the detail. Last night I ordered an illumination for the public Thanksgiving, but really that the people were firm to their right, and Sherman coming like a thunderbolt, and retribution seemed nigh. It was a fitting remembrance for my son. The vessels and the naval buildings gleamed in light, and rockets shot into the air, while signal-lights showed their bright colors.

Nov. 26. — Very busy at Bay Point, organizing seamen and marines for landing. The "Pontiac" came in. In the afternoon I went ashore to see the men drill at howitzers. "Bibb" came down with Preble and some men. This was after dark. Then the "Harvest Moon" got back with some more men.

Nov. 27. — No Sabbath to-day for us. The naval detachment must move to-morrow night with the troops, and they are very raw. So we must drill on Sunday. The officers are clever and the men zealous; so we get on.

The battery will have six 12-pdrs., two of them rifled; the sailor skirmishers about 160, and the marines 180. It is very difficult to get the officers into the idea of light drill and open order. They will mass the men. "Wissahickon" and "Winona" come in. I was ashore morning and afternoon. Broad River is to be the scene of action.

Nov. 28. — I went ashore in the morning; got all parts together and had a grand drill. Gave them some notion of my idea. They scampered through bushes and over sand-hills with howitzers. In the afternoon all getting ready to embark. At sundown the gunboats "Pontiac" and "Mingoe" were brought to the wharf, and took in sailors, marines, and howitzers. In the evening I was busy with the orders for the vessels, and
with the Captains, so that by eleven o'clock I was a tired man, when I went on board the "Harvest Moon" to be ready for a start.

Then I departed from my invariable custom, and in doing so made a mistake. I said to the Fleet Captain, "Now I have arranged everything; we are to start by two o'clock, and I leave the execution to you, as I need a little sleep." . . . Fortunately, I said to the sentry, "Call me at four o'clock." My head was hardly on the pillow when sleep came. The next that I knew was, "It's four o'clock, sir." "Ask Captain B—— where we are." "He says, sir, the fog is so thick that he has not moved." . . . "Well, has the Army moved?" "I sent over, and the troops are afloat with the General." "Get under way, then." "We shall get ashore." "No matter; better that than not move." I looked out; there was a low fog hanging over the water, through which vessels might be glimpsed for two or three hundred yards; the stars clear above. As signals were uncertain and inexpedient, the "Harvest Moon" had to steam round and order each of the six steamers to get under way, so that daylight was relieving the horizon as the party was steering for Broad River, I ahead. It was a bitter reflection that the Army must be far ahead and the gunboats not ahead to cover. The fog had thickened so that the shores were just seen dimly. I ordered the "Pontiac" to lead (as she had our only pilot) with a little tug on each bow. So we went, rather slowly. Every now and then the little tugs would be seen shooting out across the track, when they found the shore too close. The sun rose bright, but could not dispel the fog, which was at times so thick that nothing could be seen. Still we went on. It might have been about eight when the pilot sent word that we were off the creek. "Go in," was the order; and we headed into a narrow, winding, but deep fork of the great river. We turned and we turned. At last the pilot announced that we were at the landing.

I had heard one or two loud "halloos" not ten minutes before, and supposed that they came from some of our soldiers. But there was not a soldier here, nor a steamer but my own, nor a sign of life; only a little hut under a tree for a picket, and the fire was still burning. This picket had been suddenly
astonished by the sight of several large steamers, seen like ghosts in the fog, and close upon him. He was at his breakfast, for the sweet potatoes were found on the fire, when he gave a yell and was off. There was not a sign of the troops. But soon a solitary transport was descried moving up. It had the new flag of the Brigadier-General,—broad pendant with one star,—and must be General Hatch, as it was blue, the senior color. As he passed I hailed. It was all right. So the howitzers and the men were put ashore in a twinkling. I landed on the ruins of a wharf. It was a beautiful spot; woodland and uncultivated fields, but silent as the grave. The sailors moved quickly, howitzers and men advancing to the front in skirmishing-order. I walked up the farm road with the foremost men, and it was hot as summer. The sun was in full play. Leaving the boys at a halt about a mile from the river, I went back. It was now about eleven o'clock. A few companies of colored troops were near the shore; not a sign of a move; some were building fires, as if for a meal. At noon, transports coming up rapidly. Three hours elapsed, and General Hatch not landed; I had waited to see him. I returned to my steamer. It was a stirring sight; the silent scene was suddenly all life, the river filled with war steamers and transports, the shores with soldiers and sailors. About two P.M. General Foster appeared. . . . At three a master's mate came from Captain Preble to say that he had advanced about four miles. But the Army having only as yet one company between him and the shore, I sent the master's mate to General Foster, who replied that General Hatch was hurrying the troops ashore.

It seems that the General had got befogged, and lost his way. . . . About four the General went down, and soon after I left, my share being accomplished. I got to Port Royal about eight, and returned to the "Philadelphia."

Wednesday, Nov. 30. — I was occupied till noon, when I left for Broad River. The sound of cannon had been heard during the morning. General Foster went up about ten o'clock. . . . It was four o'clock when I got into the creek. Captain Balch came on board and said all was going well. The troops were near Grahamville, and had some fighting with the Rebels, but
drove them. The Navy howitzers were doing well. . . . I returned about ten P.M.

Dec. 1. — I started at eleven A.M. for Broad River, and was grieved to hear that fighting had been going on yesterday very unfavorably to us. The Rebels had retired to a strong position on our road to Grahamville. General Hatch assaulted the work and was repulsed with heavy loss; he then fell back to a cross-road some three miles from the landing. Want of celerity seems to have been the chief cause.

We arrived at Boyd's Landing about eight or nine o'clock on Tuesday. By 1½ P.M. the Navy battalions were three or four miles in advance, and one company of the troops was between him and the landing, but the body did not push on till evening. The Rebel entrenchment had but few men, but they began to gather,—only militia. About noon regular troops left James Island, and did not arrive till seven P.M., about the time the Army began to advance. So that we lost ten hours in getting over the eight or ten miles which we should have made by noon and taken the battery easily.

During Tuesday night the troops moved slowly and lost their way twice, and halted. Wednesday the Rebels were met and driven back to their work,—which was no great affair, with three or four 12-pdrs., but so ensconced in woods as to be approached by the road going right to it. There was no flanking it, and the men were put right at it.

The Rebel guns did fearful execution, and after three efforts we had to give it up. General Hatch then fell back to a good position. The Navy battalions were on the right, while the fight was at the centre, so it suffered very little,—two men killed and six or seven wounded. I rode out about three P.M. to the front, had a chat with General Hatch, and then passed on to the Navy boys, who held the extreme left, well advanced. They were busy digging a breastwork, and looked rather fagged, but lively. . . .

Dec. 2. — General Foster sent a telegram from Hatch, saying that the Rebels were gathering on our front, and firing from two field-pieces, but it was not serious enough to answer. The General was going to reconnoitre. Wanted Balch and the tugs to go along.
I started at three p.m. to reconnoitre the Coosawhatchie. The tug grounded in the Broad River, and I went back in a boat. About seven p.m. I returned to Port Royal, in the "Philadelphia," to see about affairs.

**Dec. 3.**—About 10 1/2 A.M. went up Broad River. Foster ahead.

I sent the Fleet Captain to the General, to say that if he wished the batteries in the Coosawhatchie attacked I would send vessels, but it would be to no purpose if there were no troops to hold them. The General wished to have them attacked, and said I might have my brigade; and then he would not ask it officially. And Captain Bradford said he talked round and round, so that he did not know what he wanted. I told Balch to be ready.

**Dec. 4.**—Sent the "Pawnee" and "Sonoma" to Coosawhatchie with the launches. The General started off with some small steamers and a regiment for Whalebranch. About noon I started after them. I found the "Pawnee" and "Sonoma" very busy pounding a small battery not far up the Coosawhatchie. It fired a few shots, and was soon shut up. General Hatch was reconnoitring in force on the left; and the boats of the "Pontiac," which I had ordered up Boyd's Creek, peeped out of the marsh on the left.

**Dec. 5.**—Started with General Foster up Broad River. Stopped off the confluence of the Coosawhatchie and Tullifinney Rivers. The latter was reconnoitred, and I sent up for a few negroes that appeared on the shore. Meanwhile the steamers were pelting the little battery on the Coosa, as a feint.

It was midnight when I lay down, wearied with the many details for to-morrow's work, when we are to go in force, and hope to reach the railroad.

**Dec. 6.**—Soon after light the troops and steamers began to move from Boyd's Creek. We got to the Tullifinney about eight,—dead low water,—and it looked as if we were not to get in. General Potter, who was to command, came on board and said that General Foster doubted if it were not best to wait for the tide. But I said, "Go ahead off-hand." General Potter concurred in my reasons, and the water was soon covered
with boats filled with soldiers and sailors and guns. There
was no opposition. Our men got ashore and were soon lost in
the woods. In the evening I learned that several of my men
had been wounded. The "Pontiac" sent me half a dozen pris-
one, — all Georgians. One said he was at the battery we
fired at on the Coosawhatchie, and they had 600 men waiting
for us in ambush. So I was right; if the boats had landed I
should have lost heavily. After dark some heavy and continued
firing was heard, and some rockets were seen in a direction
north of Savannah. Hoping it might be Sherman, I had guns
fired and rockets thrown up.

Dec. 7. — The brigade of the fleet has lost about twenty
men here and at Boyd's Creek. I went ashore to the landing
(upper) to look at the wounded sailors. The Rebels trying to
force our position. We have cut the bridge (county road) on
the right, and can see and hear the cars.

Dec. 8. — The Rebels are quiet, and our lines certainly near
the railroad. Our casualties swell to twenty-three in all. I
sent a few sailors and marines to the front to supply vacancies.
Busy sending supplies of all kinds to the front.

General Foster went down last night, and got back late to-
day. I rode out to the advance. Our position was in a cleared
place, with woods all around, so that nothing was to be seen
beyond.

I observed that in selecting two guns to be left behind at
Boyd's Neck, the only two rifle howitzers were chosen, showing
the preference for the smooth-bore.

Dec. 9. — As I understood yesterday from the General, the
effort was to-day made to open the view to the railroad
through the dense wood in front of our position. Accordingly
five hundred men with axes started on the right, covered by the
fire of strong columns of skirmishers. The firing was sharp,
but not serious, while the axes were advancing; but as soon as
we began to retire (the work being done) the Rebels came
down like a house on fire. All that I could learn by night was,
that they had been repulsed, and that we had suffered consider-
ably, and among them our marines.

A deserter stated that Sherman was within fifteen miles
of Savannah, so I started down to Port Royal after dark. I
ordered the "Harvest Moon" to St. Simons, to hear, if possible, of Sherman at Brunswick. The "Dandelion" left this morning.

**Dec. 10.** — I ordered the "South Carolina" to St. Simons. Having disposed of all the business by four P. M., I once more turned up the river to know how we finally stood after the action of yesterday. I reached the mouth of the Tullifinney by eight o'clock, and dispatched an aid to the front, who got back by eleven P. M. Things were substantially as represented last evening, except the disaster to the marines. Our total casualty amounted to twenty, at least. We were well entrenched in position, and a lane had been cut to the railroad through the trees, ready for the rifle cannon.

**Dec. 11.** — At 9½, finding matters all secure, I turned down the river, and got to Port Royal by noon. . . . About ten at night an army tug brought a dispatch from the "Wissahickon," at Tybee, saying that heavy firing was heard up the river about Savannah. Sent word over to Foster.

**Dec. 12.** — While at breakfast General Foster came in his steamer astern of me and secured. His aid came on board. The General too lame, so I went on board. . . . In a few minutes an officer was announced, who was seeking for me with a dispatch from General Howard, the advance of Sherman's army. . . . The dispatch from General Howard was short, and written in pencil on a scrap of paper: —

**HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT ARMY OF TENNESSEE, NEAR SAVANNAH CANAL, GEORGIA, DEC. 9, 1864.**

To Commander of U. S. Naval Forces in vicinity of Savannah, Ga.

Sir,—We have met with perfect success thus far. Troops in fine spirits, and near by.

Respectfully,

O. O. HOWARD,

Major-General Commanding R. W. Army.

After a brief chat with General Foster about dispositions I left, and gave orders for collecting my steamers about the rivers near Savannah. I sent the monitor "Sangamon" to Savannah River, and about noon was able to leave myself, and reached there about four. The "Sangamon" had arrived, and after giv-

1 Sent dispatches by "Queen" to Fortress Monroe. — J. A. D.
ing directions about buoying the channel of the river, I left after dark for Ossabaw, and reached there about eleven P. M. The Flag is here with Captain Williamson,—and after giving directions, I left at midnight.

Dec. 13.—How embarrassed I am for want of vessels; not even tugs to keep communications. There are only two iron-clads available,—one at Wassaw, and one here.

I have entreated the Department over and over again, yet they have never answered me one word of reply, and now I am almost at a stand and unable to assist Sherman. Well, I will do the best I can.

Dec. 14.—At eight A. M. an officer came in a boat from “Passaic” with dispatch from Ossabaw.¹ I had communication by signal last night with Sherman; so I determined to go to Ossabaw by way of Wassaw, where I wished to have things right for stopping the Rebel iron-clads in case they made a dash. So I started by the inland passage. On getting into Wassaw Sound I saw General Foster’s steamer outside, which changed course and stood in on seeing me. The signal officer reported signals from General Foster that General Sherman was with him.

I anchored immediately, and in a few minutes the steamer came alongside and I jumped on board. I walked into the cabin and met General Sherman. The greeting was of course cordial. He had left his army to see me, and we were soon engaged in conversation, in which General Foster joined, and Mr. Browne of the Treasury. The cabin was filled with officers. . . .

¹ General Sherman’s letter to Admiral Dahlgren on this occasion was so characteristic, that we give it entire:—

U. S. S. “Dandelion,” in Ogeechee River,
Dec. 13, 10½ P. M.

Rear-Admial John A. Dahlgren:—

We carried McAllister by assault this five P. M. and I came down to this boat expecting to meet you. I want the army rations sent up Ogeechee to King’s Bridge, and will try and meet you before assaulting Savannah. I have possession of all roads and the river above the city, and Savannah is our game. I want ten 30-pdr. Parrotts and ammunition, good charts, and General Foster to simply prevent the escape of the garrison and inhabitants of Savannah from getting away. If occasion offers let the authorities know that my army is fat and happy and in fine order, having eaten all the turkeys, chickens, sweet potatoes, &c., of Georgia. We have lost only few, and have some 700 prisoners. All well.

W. T. Sherman, M. G.
It would be impossible to repeat even the substance of what passed, and yet every word was of profound interest. Sherman is of no reserve. He speaks out, and sympathizes with what is said. He told me that a division had just walked into McAllister,1 but that no ships could have taken it, so powerfully was it fortified toward the water.

Well, finally it was agreed that Sherman should go back with me, and General Foster would go to Hilton Head.

Then the General came with me, and I steamed out, first passing the "Pawnee," which I made cheer the General with a flag at each mast-head; a salute had been previously fired. He gazed curiously on the monitor. It was dark when we got to Ossabaw, and we dined. . . .

Dec. 15.—I went ashore with General Sherman to look over Fort McAllister. It is a truly formidable work, so crammed with bomb-proofs and traverses as to look as if the spaces were carved out of solid rock,—a very strong and complete work. The Rebel garrison were still there, cooking, &c., as if nothing had happened. Our soldiers looked worn and dirty.

They never seem to notice the presence of their officers; even Sherman passed with no more than a stare.

Having seen the fort, we went up the river and I landed with Sherman at the rice mills. Here we looked around and we parted. He took horse for his army, and I returned to my vessel.

The "Dandelion" very busy pulling up the piles driven across the river by the Rebels. There were two lines interlacing each other, and the most labored device of torpedoes I have yet seen. We pull them all up. Around the outer ditch of Fort McAllister they had buried 7th shells just below the surface, which exploded if trod upon. Several of our men were mangled and killed by them. General Sherman made a Rebel officer take his men and dig them up. I tried to go up the river, and was the first that passed through the piles.

Dec. 19.—In the course of the evening a small army tug was announced with word that General Sherman was in her, and in a minute he came on board, in order to confer about a push by Foster on the railroad from his positions at Boyd's Neck.

1 Dec. 13, at five P. M.
and Tullifinney, leaving me to make a demonstration. . . . Sherman concluded to send a division to assist Foster, and we finally concluded to go round to Port Royal. So my steamer started down the Vernon River.

Dec. 20.—Arrived at Port Royal before daylight, and telegraphed to General Foster that General Sherman was with me.

Wednesday, Dec. 21.—It was nearly four o'clock when the "Harvest Moon" put to sea, and found a considerable gale from S. W., with much sea. The pilot sent word at daylight that it would be too thick to see the buoy at Ossabaw and he would prefer to go into Tybee.

Into Tybee we went, and thence through the inland passage to Wassaw. Got three fourths of the way when the channel was so narrow and winding that the "Harvest Moon" stuck fast.

We could not wait, so I got into my barge with the General and his numerous staff, and pulled for Ossabaw Sound.

Before long we met an army tug with dispatches for the General. It was by telegram from headquarters, noon, stating, *that the troops were advancing; the city abandoned by the Rebel troops.* So the General eagerly pushed on for the Ogeechee in the tug, and my only resource was a pull in the barge for some miles up the Vernon against a heavy northwester.

It was about as much as the exhausted boats' crew could do to reach Beaulieu, when I signalled for a tug which soon ran down from the Battery, and about dark I landed at this well-known work. In the morning the "Sonoma" had heard of its abandonment and moved up with the "Winona." Found no one there, and took possession. It is a powerful work, of nine or ten guns, three of them 10th Columbiads. Rosedew also abandoned; mounting 3.10th Columbiads, one 18-pdr. rifle, 1.32 pdr. smooth, one 10th mortar.

I sat down by a blazing fire improvised in a dismantled house, and remained to give a few orders, then started down in the tug.

I had not got far when Captain Boutelle was announced with important dispatch from Sherman "at McAllister" 6½ P. M., enclosing telegram from General Howard, saying that Commodore Tatnall was on board the ram "Savannah," and in-
tended to run out by the Savannah River. Sherman seemed much concerned about it, so I ordered out the "Nantucket" in tow of the "Pawnee," though the gale was hard from N. W. The Captain was sick, so I sent Bradford to take the command, and sent the "Winona" also. It was midnight when I reached the "Harvest Moon," still hard and fast in the mud, and lay down in my clothes about three o'clock in the morning.

Dec. 22. — Soon after sunrise I had to take to my barge once more; the "Harvest Moon" still aground, and blocked up two tugs. The channel too narrow to turn round or pass her. It was cold and a N. W. gale, but I got to Wassaw very fairly, and stopped a few moments on board the "Passaic."

Had a hard, wet, and cold pull across Wassaw Sound, and up the passage. When two thirds of the way, luckily met the "Jonquille," got on board, reached Tybee before noon, and hoisted my flag in the "South Carolina." . . .

I went on board the "Wissahickon," signalled the "Winona," and went up the river with the two steamers and two tugs, and arrived near the obstructions at four P. M., and anchored.

Truly a formidable barrier, almost impassable, and irremovable save by great labor.

Dec. 23. — Hoisted flag in the "Pawnee," and went up the river and anchored near the obstructions. Then to the city in a small tug; got some hard thumps getting through the barriers. Wharves, forts, &c., lined with soldiers. Fort Jackson, a work of the old construction, brick facing, would not endure much; below it Fort Lee, a new and formidable earthwork of the late pattern.

I found an aid of General Sherman's on the wharf with an ambulance, and drove to his headquarters. Found these to be a splendid mansion, offered by the owner, a Mr. Green,—of course, as its best protection. After lunch I drove round the city. Soldiers everywhere hardy and equal to anything, but showing by their clothing the long march and campaign.

There was perfect order in the city, but the townspeople were moody and kept at home.

I said good-by to the General and got back to the "Pawnee."

Dec. 25. — Christmas once more! Work, work, though it is Christmas and Sunday. Have had a full note from Fox, in
which he explains that every squadron had been pinched to make up that of the North Atlantic.

_Dec. 26._ — The quantity and quality of the obstructions in the waters about Savannah are surprising. Savannah River itself may be pronounced impassable. They seem to be placed everywhere. . . . The principal line is at the head of Elba Island, across both channels. There are others nearer the city, and the network is right under the guns of Forts Jackson and Lee.

One consequence to the Rebels themselves was, that when they desired to rush out with their ram, the "Savannah," no effort could open the way, and they had to blow her up.

_Dec. 27._ — I went to the city about two o'clock to see General Sherman about future movements. His principal plan will be to draw well back from the sea-coast and pounce down from the interior, but he will not begin before New Year's. He is now having the city fortified.

We started out on foot, and rambled through the city, even to the outskirts. When just near the General's quarters, there was a great rush for me with dispatch from Charleston from Captain Scott (senior officer there), who hears that the Rebel iron-clads are to come out.

I returned at once, but it was dark.

_Dec. 28._ — Put to sea at eight P. M., blowing a gale from W.

_Dec. 29._ — By seven in the morning reached the bar and soon after anchored inside. Weather clear and cold.

The "Nantucket" makes the sixth monitor here, and by noon the "Passaic" arrived, making seven. . . .

I see no cause whatever for the alarm that was experienced, but it is just as well that I should make everything secure.

_Dec. 31._ — About dark, up anchor and away for a talk with General Sherman.

And so ends the old year, so full of sorrow for me. Alas! my gallant boy. You passed with me so happily the last anniversary of the parting year. Now, like this year, you are of the past, a bright dream. But your memory will live while I live, as green as my devoted love can make it.

1865 opens upon me in Port Royal on the way to Savannah.

_Jan. 1._ — It blew with great violence all night from W., and the "Harvest Moon" had an uneasy time. Arrived at
Port Royal about daylight, and the special message soon came, with news that Admiral Porter's Fleet Captain had arrived and gone on to Savannah to see General Sherman.

He left a paper stating that the fleet had silenced Fort Fisher (Wilmington), but the Army deemed it too strong, and would not assault, but had embarked and gone to Hampton Roads. Porter wanted Sherman to send up troops and take it. Captain Breeze got back about three P.M. Sherman had other plans, and would not break his army into detachments.
CHAPTER XVI.

PRIVATE JOURNAL TO CLOSE OF REBELLION.—OF THE COMMAND OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC BLOCKADING SQUADRON.
1865.

Jan. 2.—Went up to see General Sherman, and found there General Barnard, of the Engineers, just from General Grant. They were all agog about Porter's attempt on Fort Fisher. Both the Generals pitched into General Butler. Sherman said he ought to have lost a thousand men by assault before retiring. . . . While with the General, he explained the coming movement, and now I learn that his right wing will go to Beaufort by water, which is a new idea. Asked me if I would help. "Certainly." But I had only my flagship, "Harvest Moon," to lend. The General also wanted a gunboat up. I ordered the "Sonoma."

Jan. 3.—Parties are trying to clear portions of the obstructions. Very difficult to do anything with them.

I started at noon to look at St. Augustine's Creek. When we got to Thunderbolt found the "Harvest Moon" filled with troops and just starting for Beaufort. Not an army transport yet arrived. General Sherman here in the "Bibb," with General Barnard. . . .

I steamed back in the "Bibb"; she grounded in Savannah River. So I took the Generals in my barge to the "Philadelphia," whence they embarked in the "Daffodil" for the city.

Sherman hard on Butler; said he showed want of courage in not attacking Fisher.

Jan. 4.—The movement of the troops goes on from Thunderbolt to Beaufort. "Harvest Moon" carried 800. Corps of divers with a steamer at work on the obstructions. Have not made much impression, even on one crib.
Secured an unfinished torpedo boat, which had got down among the bushes of St. Augustine's Creek.

*Jan.* 6. — Some boats laboring to tear away some of the obstructions. They have accomplished one hundred feet in width, and that will serve for the present.

*Jan.* 7. — A letter from General Sherman touching operations.

*Jan.* 9. — The "Nevada," having Secretary of War on board, came in.

*Jan.* 12. — An officer came from Secretary of War to say that he, with the Generals, was dining on board the "Nevada." Would I join them? I did so, and found the Secretary, Generals Sherman, Meigs, Foster, Barnard, Colonel Townsend, &c., just finishing. I sat down. . . . Sherman was evidently not pleased with some of the plans.

*Jan.* 13. — Mail from the North, with private note from Secretary, who says they must take Wilmington; and then Porter is ordered to send me all he can spare, including ironclads. Went to the city to see General Sherman, and had a final understanding as to his plans. He will move from the coast on an interior line, destroying railroads. He does not intend to turn off for Charleston or Georgetown unless forced to do so by unforeseen circumstances. The General urged me not to commit my vessels to the fire of the Charleston batteries. It was late when I got aboard.

*Jan.* 15. — We reached Charleston before eight o'clock. After breakfast I summoned the monitor Captains and apprised them that we might be called on to co-operate in some move upon Charleston. The question was how and when. I observed that it might be done in three ways: —

1st. Attack Sullivan's Island.
2d. Pass in and attack Johnson.
3d. Run all the way up and attack the city. . . .

They were not inclined to go beyond the first step, — attack Sullivan's Island. After a full and unreserved discussion, I decided that the obstructions near Sumter should be examined by boats under the supervision of the Captains of monitors for each night.

While thus engaged, the "Britannia" arrived from Admiral
"PATAPSCO" DESTROYED BY A TORPEDO. 493

Porter with dispatches for General Sherman, and news that the troops were all ashore near Fort Fisher.

The Captain of the "Patapsco" announced the loss of the monitor by a torpedo. She was covering the boats while searching for obstructions and torpedoes, and when about 800 yards from Sumter was struck, and went down in thirty feet water, with not one full minute's notice. Sixty-two lost, and forty-three saved. The "Patapsco's" pipe just peeps above the water, and marks her place, 800 yards outside of Sumter.

Jan. 18. — Started for Port Royal. Had a long letter from General Sherman. He is adverse to my attacking batteries at Charleston.

Jan. 20. — The accounts of taking Fisher vary, but all agree that the assault was a great affair. Our soldiers fought desperately, and the resistance was stubborn.

Jan. 22. — I went over to Hilton Head to see General Foster about my notion of attacking Sullivan's Island. He seemed to think well of it, but would have to consult General Sherman, who would be here soon.

Jan. 23. — Telegram from General Foster that General Sherman had arrived. I went over to see him. The General continues to prefer his plan of a descent at Bull's Bay. He has left Savannah, and will move personally with his right wing.

Jan. 24. — Had a telegram about four P.M., and about seven the same day a letter from Sherman. I notice that he writes all these letters himself. He wants the gunboats to be active on the Rebel flanks; says the ground is drying after the late heavy rains, and he will move soon, menacing Charleston, but will not go there.

Jan. 27. — The "Dai Ching" has been cut up by a Rebel battery on the Combahee and destroyed. It took place yesterday. Captain Chaplin in command. He came in range, and was opened on about eight o'clock. Soon after she grounded, and that settled her fate. The battery was heavy, and she could not retire. After a defence of seven hours, he set fire to her and left her about three P.M., bringing off all his crew, except an officer and three or four men who were captured in a boat by the pickets on the bank.

Two mistakes. He did not drive in the pickets, and grounded
at high water. Had he avoided these mistakes the "Dai Ching" would have been safe, having had seven hours for exertion.

The "Pawnee" was sent for and got round. So now I must start and try to stop the "Wando" from getting into the Edisto. So much for co-operation. Sherman was to have Salkatchie about this time, certainly not later, and would have taken the battery in reverse. I got under way about nine, and took two tugs with me for messages.

Jan. 28. — Just at the mouth of the Edisto spied the "Pawnee" and "Wando" coming down St. Helena Sound.

Jan. 29. — In the afternoon I had a letter from General Sherman.

Feb. 3. — Great outcry against the Parrott rifles. The Captains object to receiving others in place of those burst. There are five or six cases of bursts and cracks.

Feb. 4. — Reached North Edisto about dark. Passed up to White Point; beautiful river. Found there the "Pawnee" and "Sonoma;" they had been busy shelling some light batteries ashore, and had landed some men, but not sufficient force to take the batteries. They had covered a thousand troops a few days since, who, on feeling the batteries, fell back promptly and embarked.

Feb. 5. — About eight left Edisto for Stono.

Feb. 6. — The "Arago" brings General Gillmore, who is to take the command in place of General Foster, whose wound (an old one) requires attention North. . . . I have an entire contempt for Gillmore because of his conduct last year,—harboring scribblers to lampoon me and denying their assertions to my face. . . .

So I concluded as the public interests must suffer where want of harmony would not insure perfect concord of action between ships afloat and armies ashore, that I would ask to be relieved.

Feb. 7. — Captain Boutelle came in on some of the Coast Survey business, which over, he referred to a ponderous tome that he held, all new, with its red cover, from the bookstore. It was Gillmore's book. I turned it over, by leaves at a time, glancing at the matter, and found my name flourishing very largely on the pages. So I read in one or two places, and found
the book to appear, from this short view of it, to be a vindication of himself, from something, at my expense.

To hold intercourse with this man was impossible; to permit the service to be exposed to the chance of suffering from this personal difficulty would not be right. So I briefly wrote to the Department stating his arrival to take command, and asking to be relieved. Self-interest would say, "Stay where you are," but a sense of what is due to the public interests says, "If there is aught that you know of to prevent your doing your whole duty, withdraw; do not let the interest of the country suffer." This is best. I shall lose some prize-money, too, but I will keep my self-respect, which is better. Is it not a heart-burning shame that a man who is educated, with high rank, and intrusted with grave responsibilities, should be incapable of pursuing the plain, straight path to duty, without permitting baser motives to mingle in his thoughts, and swerve head and hand from the true course? Gillmore was a Captain of Engineers with the rank of Volunteer Brigadier-General, an ephemeral, fleeting thing. Of course he would like to be Major-General, and this demanded some brilliant performance. This he, thought he could not achieve without having the entire credit. The Navy must not be allowed any share, and the howl that Charleston was not taken came like a shock. Did he fear that he would fail to be a Major-General, and find it necessary to place the failure upon me? He took Morris Island (by his own account); I did not even help. Now I must take Charleston!

Feb. 8. — Had heard nothing of the Army. Told Captain Stillwell to limit himself, feeling with scouts, crawling the gunboats up slowly, and not far, if at all.

Steamed up about ten; stopped at Beaufort to inquire for news of Sherman; got none. Went on and reached Port Royal about 7½ in the evening.

Feb. 9. — Ordered the "Wando" to go to Charleston, with orders for "Lehigh" to go to Stono. Orders for "Mahopac" and "Passaic" to be ready. Detailed "Shenandoah" and "Juniata" to tow them. Sent "Iris" to order "Pawnee" into Stono.

Feb. 10. — Before going, sent Fleet Captain to see General
Foster, and know if anything more was needed. He came back, and, to my surprise, said General Foster told him that the Stono must be over, and the troops must be going to Bull's Bay by this time. Also, that General Gillmore had taken command. How vexatious this slovenly mode of doing business!

If General Gillmore had left a note with Captain Reynolds, saying what he designed to do, it would have been easy enough; now I have turned the whole workshop upside down to get monitors ready, and then it is of no use.

The "Juniata" had got out, so I had to send after her and order in the "Passaic."

Sent a tug round to the Combahee, to order the two gun-boats to Bull's Bay, and went over to Hilton Head to say good-by to Foster. Quite a cordial good-by. He assured me of his respect, esteem, &c. I really feel sorry to part with him.

About nine o'clock, off North Edisto; I managed to find the entering buoy and picked the way in. Captain Preble said it was the first vessel that had come in by night since he had been here, and perhaps the first any way. Hafford (the best pilot here) always declines to go in at night.

I found the "Pawnee" below with the "St. Louis," ready, as ordered, to go out. Had been pounding some field batteries and shut them up, but were hit often.

Rebels very thin and weak; 1,000 men would scatter their outer lines here.

Feb. 11. — Under way early and steamed round into Stono; got in about eight A.M. Sent Fleet Captain to see the Commanding General, whoever he was.

Reported very active yesterday. The "Lehigh" got here about eight o'clock yesterday, and the troops, being pushed forward on Schimmelfennig's ground of last summer, drove out the Rebels from some rifle-pits, the "Lehigh," "Wissahickon," and a mortar-schooner covering them with a cannonade, while the "McDonough," round in Folly River with a mortar-schooner, blazed away at Seceshville. The whole affair was spirited, and the Rebels, hurrying up reinforcements, not knowing what was to come next. Steamed up the Stono to the
"Lehigh" in advance, and anchored about where our men embarked last summer on leaving. The Captains came on board, and we talked over matters, and then steamed down the Stono towards the landing.

Tug announced with a General's flag. Presently General Gillmore came over the side.

I told him I had only just received the formal notice of his taking command. Then he introduced the Bull's Bay demonstration. Afterwards I asked him to make a minute of what was desired, which he did, and then took leave.

As the landing was to take place to-morrow, I left Stono.

Meanwhile the "Pawnee," "Sonoma," "Ottawa," "Winona," had collected outside, and when I got out they followed. It was past three when I got off the bar, and the order of to-morrow was soon made known, but not by signal, as they read them. Then I went in to collect boats and boat-guns. The sun set. It was eight o'clock when I steamed out. All the outside vessels were gone. So off for Bull's Bay too.

There had been a signal for a vessel running out, which produced firing from inside.

_Feb. 12._—Off Bull's Bay, by 1½ a.m., among the gunboats. No troops here yet. They came along about five, and as soon as we could see I steamed in. I anchored inside about 7½, and General Potter came aboard about eight o'clock; then Captain Stanly and Captain Balch, the two Commanders of Division. I introduced them, and the General concluded it best to begin with a reconnaissance. So he started for one direction with Balch, and Captain Stanly, with the General's Engineer Officer, started another way. By ten o'clock these parties were aground some miles up the bay on the extensive flats. All depended on getting ashore quickly, before the Rebels could get to the spot. But the Army came without any guide, and no one knew where the troops were to land or how to get there, through the tangled navigation.

So I concluded to steam out and whip in more boats; very many were in and all afloat, ready for the work. Steaming out, I met an army tug coming in. An aid of General Gillmore's brought a cipher dispatch from General Sherman to General Gillmore, who could not read it, and sent it to me.
the Rebels at Charleston did not know of our coming in until noon of Sunday. . . . Sent "Pawnee" and "Winona" to South Edisto to co-operate with Hatch; had ordered "McDonough" there.

At sunset steamed out, and anchored off Stono about ten, pilot not liking to go in.

Friday, Feb. 17. — About ten a telegram from Morris Island that General Schimmelfennig had started for this place. He thinks an evacuation of Charleston indicated, and will move on Stono. He asks for more monitors. I send an order for "Nahant" with pilot by a tug. Scott replies that it is too rough.

About three I steamed up the Folly River and into the branch leading towards Seceshville, where our battery is on Cole's Island. The mortar-schooner, with General Schimmelfennig, is there. He seems confident of the Rebels' evacuating, and will feel them strongly to-night on James Island, and wants the vessels to cover his right flank by the Folly Branch and his left by the Stono.

Sent a dispatch overland to Scott, directing him to look out for the Rebel move and open the naval batteries on Morris Island; also to let the advance monitor feel Moultrie.

Feb. 18. — Sent the "Iris" up the Folly Branch to hear if there were news. Ten o'clock and no word. . . . An officer came from Johnson, saying that Schimmelfennig had got as far as Pringle, and that James Island was abandoned.

Steamed out of Stono and up to Charleston. By one P.M. reached the bar and passed in; everything looking as usual. Could not see our Flag, but the monitors looked higher up. . . . It was nearly two o'clock when I got up to Moultrie; the monitors crowding around the entrance, but that was all. Heard that two tugs were up, and some soldiers were in town. I had made up my mind to go in, torpedoes or not. The mate of a blockade runner volunteered, so I said; "Go on."

Gazed at the great batteries; how they stare from every direction! Presently we are off the city, so long looked at from the distance. Then the steamer enters Cooper River and anchors off some wharf. I step into my barge with a crowd of
captains,—Bradford, Scott, Barrett, Belknap, Weaver, and several others of the staff. We saunter along some streets to the arsenal, from thence turn down King Street to the boats and aboard.

It seems that the Rebels left Sullivan's Island about eight o'clock last night, except a small party of 150, left to reply to our heavy fire from Cumming's Point, which went off about two o'clock.

In the morning the unusual quiet attracted attention. Master Gifford, chief scout, first got ashore at Sumter, then on Sullivan's Island. He then pulled up to Mount Pleasant, where he received a surrender from the Mayor of Mount Pleasant, written in pencil on the back of a pocket map found in Sumter, and used for want of other materials.

Then Gifford pulled up to Castle Pinckney, where he was still first. But when he got to the city a few soldiers had just landed. Of course it was not long before the truth was known, that the Rebels had run off.

And thus was deserted, without firing one shot or the loss of one life, that "city by the sea" that the proud chivalry had sworn to burn before we should enter; that we should only walk on its ashes, and they would die for, &c., &c. All the better! The city was shut up,—doors and windows,—not a living thing to be seen within, and very few in the streets, those only negroes, Irish, or German laborers. Desolate, desolate, and well merited, because it was the hot-bed of the Rebellion, and for half a century has striven by word and deed to produce rebellion. The whirlwind came; blood and treasure flowed as if they were water. Our efforts were jeered at and taunted for four years. At last comes fate,—ignominy and disgrace.

Feb. 19.—Had a visit from a Dr. Mackay of Charleston, who claimed to be a Union man. He had attended, as a volunteer, poor Bradford, my marine officer, who was mortally wounded at Sumter, at the head of his men, and taken prisoner. When he died the doctor asked for the body. The surgeon answered, "Do as you choose; I do not care if you throw it in the streets." Dr. Mackay interred it in his own lot in the Magnolia Cemetery. When this became known an excitement
was raised which looked like trouble, so that it became necessary to remove the body. It was taken to the Potter's Field, where lay buried all the Union dead. I determined to have the desecration duly dealt with, and to restore the body to the finest site in the cemetery, with all honors. I wrote a note on the subject to General Schimmelfennig.

General Gillmore banging about with a band!

Feb. 21. — The new state of things makes great changes in stations of vessels.

Feb. 22. — Celebrated the day. Flags on all the vessels; salute at noon, and pyrotechnics in the evening; very handsome.

Note from Gillmore, who wishes to move on the Santee, and asks for gunboats, as he wishes to communicate with Sherman.

Feb. 23. — I received a dispatch from the Department cautioning against a Rebel ram just purchased in France. I ordered two monitors to Port Royal and one to Wassaw.

Feb. 24. — Not much going on. The number of troops about, ridiculously small,—forty to hold Sullivan's Island, and a corporal's guard in other larger works.

I went ashore for the second time, and walked around to see White Point Battery. It has four guns on the Cooper River front. One is an XI\textsuperscript{th} from the "Keokuk," two 10\textsuperscript{th} Columbiads, and one Blakely. The latter has been blown all to pieces before evacuating. It was mounted on an iron carriage; most complete.

On the Ashley River front are two guns,—one a 10\textsuperscript{th} Columbiad, the other a 7\textsuperscript{th} Brooks rifle. The works are very strong, with traverses, bomb-proofs, &c. Went to see General Schimmelfennig. He is at the citadel, and we concurred in some move upon Georgetown. Says he will send a regiment to assist the vessels.

Feb. 25. — General Schimmelfennig is about to send a detachment along the Cooper River, and asks for two gunboats. Ordered "Chenango" and "Sonoma"; and then he would send troops to aid at Georgetown, and to be under the Navy officer. Turns out to be only 300 men, and they black. I have 350 marines, and about 150 seamen, all ready there with orders to take
the fort. However, every little helps. Gave Stanly the command. He is to land in Santee and march twelve miles, which brings him on the rear of the work, the vessels to draw fire in the front. Stanly had started when a tug arrived from Georgetown. The Rebels evacuated yesterday, and the vessels are in possession.

The New York papers of 21st contain my announcement that Charleston is taken, and of the 22d with Gillmore's. Concluded to go up to Georgetown and look at things. Changed to the "Harvest Moon," and got out about eight o'clock.

Feb. 26. — About eight, off Georgetown. Had to wait for a pilot, and steamed in and passed on up the bay. It is a great bay or river from the entrance to Georgetown (11½ sea miles), where the Pedee, Waccamaw, Sampit, and other rivers flow in. About 8½ miles up is Battery White, a regular and very strong work, reported to mount fifteen guns, of which two are 10-in. Columbiads. This had often been represented as a small affair easily taken, and one deserter said he could take it with a boat's crew. It is doubtful whether a strong naval force could have taken it without an iron-clad and a land force in reserve. The various delays, waiting for pilot, distance, &c., made it noon before I reached the town and anchored in the Sampit close to the "Mingoe." Here the stream is very narrow. Georgetown is the third town of the State, Charleston and Columbia alone being larger. The town is held by four companies of marines.

Feb. 28. — I steamed down to the fort and went ashore to look at Battery White, a very formidable work, consisting of several detached batteries. The principal of these looks on the water, and is regularly and fully constructed, even with a ditch. Every gun has a high traverse, and the magazine is proof; mounting twelve cannon, of which two are 10-in. Columbiads and two are rifled 32-pdrs., all on good and new carriages of standard construction. The guns rake the channel from distant rifle range; water scant and channel intricate.

To the right of the main work are two one-gun batteries, commanding a beach below where an approach was practicable. All this corresponded with the accounts given to me, and I was prepared for it. But in the rear was an intrenched line, with
THE "HARVEST MOON" SUNK BY A TORPEDO. 503

high rampart and ditch extending 300 yards across the only practicable ground in the rear, and completely controlling the roads to the fort from the Santee and Georgetown; and between these places—as the dense wood had been cleared away so as to give no cover—a 24-pdr. was mounted near each extreme of this intrenchment. The magazine was proof.

This line might be a thousand yards from the water battery, and the space occupied by all was about 100 acres. This was dotted with the most superb live-oaks, and the soil was firm and dry. . . . The whole position was so strong that, if defended by the 500 men said to have been there, we should have found it a tough business even with the force I proposed in the fall. And it is doubtful if we could have forced the rear line. So much for the ridiculous talk of those who would take it with a gunboat and a boat's crew. I returned on board and spent a quiet evening in the "Harvest Moon," little dreaming it was to be the last.

Wednesday, March 1, 1865.—A dull-looking morning, with the usual leaden-colored N. E. sky.

A little after seven the "Harvest Moon" was under way to go down the harbor, and then for Charleston. I had dressed as usual, and just concluded. Simms had laid the table, and I was pacing about the cabin waiting for breakfast, occasionally taking a squint with the glass at objects along the shore. Suddenly, without warning, came a crashing sound, a heavy shock, the partition between the cabin and wardroom was shattered and driven in towards me, while all loose articles in the cabin flew in different directions. Then came the hurried tramp of men's feet, and a voice of some one in the water was heard shrieking, as if badly hurt. My first notion was that the boilers had burst; then the smell of burnt gunpowder suggested that the magazine had exploded.

I put on a pea coat and cap and sallied forth. Frightened men were struggling to lower the boats. I got by them with difficulty. They heard nothing; saw nothing. Passing from the gangway to the upper deck ladder, the open space was strewed with fragments of partitions. My foot went into some glass. The Fleet Captain was rushing down, and storming about. I ascended the ladder to get out on the upper deck to
have a full view of things. A torpedo had been struck by the poor old "Harvest Moon," and she was sinking. The water was coming in rapidly through a great gap in the bottom. The main deck had also been blown through. There was no help for it, so we prepared to leave the vessel. The tug that was following astern waited to be called alongside, and we transferred the baggage to her with much expedition; for in order to cross the bar in the only vessel at hand, the "Nipsic," full tide was needed, and we had not a moment to lose, if I was to get out that day on the way to Charleston.

And in this way I take leave of the "Harvest Moon"! How thickly events crowd on one!

March 2.—A memorable and most sad day in my home calendar. This day, one year since, my dearly beloved son fell by the hands of assassins, whose base work was fittingly concluded by the savage ferocity of the Rebel Government to his remains.

March 5.—The "Shenandoah," "Ticonderoga," "Mohican," "Monadnock," were ordered to Hampton Roads, the "Juniata" to Brazil, by the Department. Sent a note to Gillmore, drawing attention to remarks of correspondent of "New York Herald" of 22d, — and asking that it shall cease.

March 7.—The "Aries" brings a dispatch for two monitors to the James. Ordered them at once.

March 10.—Had a letter from Gillmore, in reply to mine about Sawyer. Says he sees nothing to justify his interference.

March 11.—Took a tug this afternoon and visited Fort Johnson, and Simpkins and Wampler and Glover; powerful battery.

Got on board, and heard that the "Jonquille" had nearly been blown up by a torpedo. This was in the Ashley, and she recovered four.

March 13.—In the afternoon I went to look at Sumter and Moultrie. I found that no account received gave me a proper idea of Sumter. The area is level and clear of rubbish of the walls. The ruins—that shapeless mass is limited to the walls. The material pulverized, and thrown down in slopes from the walls inside and outside on the faces towards our guns.
REMAINS OF BRADFORD RE-INTERRED. 505

But I could not discern that impregnability to assault which rendered it certain death to get inside, as was pretended. The galleries were loopholed so as to permit a musketry fire, but they could easily have been stuffed, while a shell down the chimney would have cleared the galleries.

From Sumter I went to Sullivan's Island, and wandered over its maze of heavy works.

At eleven the remains of Bradford of the Marines were transferred from the Potter's Field and restored to Magnolia Cemetery.

This officer was mortally wounded in the assault on Sumter, Sept. 8, 1863, and taken prisoner. After he died a friend interred the body in the Magnolia Cemetery, which is the Mount Auburn of Charleston. When it was known, the chivalry became so excited that a removal to the Potter's Field was necessary. No one would give room for the Union soldier. I saw some notice of this in a paper at the time.

The Commanding General, Hatch, was present, with officers of the Army and Navy; also Dr. Mackay's family. There was a detachment of United States infantry, seamen from the ships, and 100 marines. Service was performed in St. Paul's by Mr. Blake, the Chaplain of the squadron, who made a good discourse. Then the body was taken to Magnolia Cemetery and deposited in the finest site that could be selected.

It brought to memory the fate of my son. Here was I, doing for another what I could not do for him.

March 17.—In the afternoon I went to see the arsenal,—a very complete place of arms, exhibiting the means and manner of the best work.

In the afternoon the "Bibb" was nearly blown up by a torpedo, which went off under her bows, and luckily glanced from her sharp bow.

March 20.—A senatorial party arrived, with some sixty gentlemen and ladies. It was a touch of old friends and pretty faces, and sorry when the day was nearly ended to see them go.

That afternoon I got General Gillmore's second answer,—a mean-spirited, craven, white-feathered concern.

March 24.—Went round into the Ashley, and saw three
torpedo-boats, also one big fellow 150 feet long, to hold 250 bales of cotton,—machinery complete, and only wanting being put together.

March 25.—I went in tug along the Cooper, to look at torpedoes, and saw at one wharf some 80 of the cast-iron torpedoes for frames, and one frame in the dock complete; a quantity of galvanized wire, and a boiler torpedo ready for use. It was 12 ft. by 28 in. (3,000 lbs.) and about ready for use; also three cast-iron beds for it.

Higher up were three torpedo-boats, one new and nearly completed.

Divers were at work, trying to raise the sunken torpedo-boats that were in service.

Looked at the sunken wreck of the Rebel iron-clad, said to be the “Chicora.” Below her, a slight break on the surface of the water is said to mark the places of the “Charleston” and the “Palmetto State.”

March 26.—I went in tug, and visited the new Rebel iron-clad “Columbia.”

She had caught on a bank, as reported, coming out of dock, lodged, and broke her back. She is a remarkably fine, powerful vessel, mounting six guns, six-inch plating on casemate, with a new double engine,—a really formidable customer, and very strongly built, with great capacity as a ram. She would have stood a good fight with one of our iron-clads. She was injured about two weeks before the evacuation, had her guns in at the time. They were taken out, and some of her plating was stripped off.

Near the dry dock was the remnant of another iron-clad, just ready to be plated. She had been fired and well used up. It was strange that no effort was made to destroy the “Columbia.”

The last iron-clad had not been launched, and was on the ways at the Navy Yard. The Rebels fired on Saturday, at four in the morning. In the course of the day she quietly slipped off the ways and deposited her remains in the water, where they now are. This accounts for the whole six: three in service,—“Charleston,” “Chicora,” and “Palmetto;” “Columbia” just ready; one launched, and one ready to launch.
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I saw several torpedo-boats along the Cooper River. Went to see a new fort, nearly finished by the Rebels, to command the Wando.

March 27.—Got report of Committee on Heavy Ordnance, which is of much interest to me, as it exhibits the views of experts on my guns and those of others. The Navy backs my guns. The Army backs Rodman. Knap, Parrott, and Ames, — taking care of themselves. The committee got on Charleston. However, when Rodgers and Dupont were up, Rodgers backed me clean through, out and out. Dupont took his own part,—which is really mine also,—but did not mention me in that connection.

March 31.—The steamer "Iago" arrived with a party of ladies and gentlemen,—among them Fox. Had much conversation with him on various subjects.

I went over Gillmore's affair, and Fox spoke of it in my view of the matter, and suggested that I should make my report to the Department, and let it go in with the official report to Congress. He said that if I went to work right I would pull his book to pieces, as it was one-sided.

We talked of Rowan. He said that Rowan was not in good odor at the Department; that he had declined the command of the inner waters of North Carolina, the chief object of which was to destroy the Rebel ram. Rowan said it could not be done. They asked him to take the papers and read them, and think of it for two or three days. He did so, and adhered to his opinion that it could not be done.

He told me that General Terry and some other person, when at Washington last fall, had asked for Rowan to take my place, and was much astonished when told by Fox that Rowan had voted against going in. Rowan had said something about his opinion in favor of going in after Wilmington was taken.

As things come out, the proportions of that "Ironsides" and Gillmore coalition begin to show themselves! Gillmore, undermining in the papers, and then preparing his book; while Rowan was ready to take the vacancy! . . . Fox says that the Department intends to try the charges of Duval against Rowan.

April 2.—I mentioned some of the topics to Bradford. He
told me, for the first time, of some of his evidence. One was that Simpson came into his cabin and reported a tug running away from a torpedo. Rowan answered that the Admiral's order had demoralized the whole squadron about torpedoes.

Bradford says they badgered him till six o'clock in the evening, trying to upset his testimony. Pretty business for a second in command, and one that I have known as a friend for some thirty years, and have befriended when I could!


April 4. — Twenty-three years ago my beloved son Uly was born. I remember the day so well. The event occurred at the peaceful farm at Hartsville, and a bright, beautiful day it was. On that same day his great-grandmother, Mrs. Rowan, died, aged eighty-seven. My son, my son!

April 10. — General Schimmelfennig being about to take leave, sent me a hearty and noble letter, expressing his sense of the services of the Navy, and their value during operations.

April 11. — General Scammon came on board. He is in command of the Florida district. He is a pleasant gentleman, and spoke highly of the good will and aid given by the Navy in St. John's. He said that his motive in speaking of it was because much had been said of a contrary character. Thereupon I admitted that fact, and said it was due to the Commanding General Gillmore, who had not scrupled to cover the scribblings of correspondents near him, and had acted badly.

April 12. — The accounts of our entrance into Richmond on the 3d tell us that when President Lincoln arrived he received in Jeff Davis's house!

April 13. — The excitement everywhere ran very high as the news came in of the surrender of Lee and the Army of Virginia.

April 14. — The surrender of Lee must be noticed, and I
ordered the vessels to flag at eight o'clock and fire twenty-one guns. I went on board the "Iago," and we steamed down to Sumter, the steamers gathering in thickly. Fox and ladies and a crowd of naval officers were with me. The reception was tremendous, large detachments of marines and infantry on the wharf and in, on the wall and in the fort. It was one clatter of drums and "Present arms," and a throng of good-looking soldiers and sailors. Then many generals and ladies came. After a while all were seated. First prayer, then a patriotic song, then General Anderson ran up the old, stained, and torn flag, amid great cheering. Then Beecher's oration, and prayer, and we broke up. Then we steamed up to the city in the "Iago." The little squadron did the same, looking gayly with all their flags. The 14th April ended with the sunset salute.

April 18. — This evening one of the Rebel torpedo-boats that had been raised was actively steaming about the flagship.

April 19. — Surely these are days of great events. On the evening of the very day that we here celebrated the restoration of the Union flag to Sumter, the President was struck down by the hand of a murderer. Of course it is impossible to foresee the political consequences of this horrid crime.

I can say, from an intimate acquaintance with the President, that he was a man of rare sagacity, good genial temper, and desirable firmness; that he possessed qualities of the highest order as a ruler; indeed, we know of no man who was so well fitted to carry the country through her trial. I immediately ordered the flags of the squadron at half-mast, and fired twenty-one minute-guns from each. How impressive was the tribute in this harbor, where we are now peacefully anchored, near the city of Charleston, with ruined Sumter in the distance!

The same mail brought me notes from the Secretaries of War and Navy in relation to the remains of my beloved son, who was so basely assassinated.

April 20. — A letter from Badger, who is at Philadelphia. He says that I had much to contend with; my quick promotion and Dupont's popularity made me enemies. And he says, also, that Rowan told him that "nothing was to be gained by the iron-clads passing the obstructions into Rebellion Roads unless
to co-operate in a general attack of the Army either from James Island or in the rear of Sullivan's Island. That the substance of his statement was, that if the iron-clads went in they would have to come out again, unless the Army could act in force from the points named."

Badger goes on to say, "I was of the opinion for some time that Rowan was opposed to you, and had, perhaps, done you an injury; but I am convinced now that he never did so purposely."

Then he cautions me against ——; says he has made improper remarks of me, but being in presence of ladies, it would not be possible to handle him.

Now, this base fellow owes his promotion to me, and was the only volunteer lieutenant to whom I gave a letter. He is always so smooth and delighted to see me!

April 22. — The anniversary of the outbreak in Washington four years ago. When Buchanan and all the officers abandoned their posts at the Washington Navy Yard, leaving the Yard to me, I was directed to take command. How much has happened since! Battles have been fought and precious lives wasted! Shall we lose sight of the purpose of all this?

April 26. — I got the Department order for mourning for President, and although I had already gone through the form, I thought it best to comply literally, as such an event can hardly find too much expression. So the nine vessels present fired each one gun every half hour, colors half-mast. The effect was fine, as it made nine guns, intervals of one minute, every half hour of the day. About one I went up to see the Rebel iron-clad "Columbia" raised. She did actually float at five p. m., with four feet water in the hold.

April 27. — Got a dispatch in cipher from General Sherman. He says that Davis and his cabinet will try to escape from Florida to Cuba, so I made up a squadron of nine steamers to head him off.

May 1. — Sherman is at Hilton Head. Johnston has surrendered to him.

May 3. — About ten the "Russia" came in with General Sherman. I went on board. The General exploded instanter about Halleck's orders and Stanton's; most violent, too. He
asked if I had seen the "Herald" of 23d. I had, but not to read it properly. So after the General had let out, I tried to calm him and to induce him not to get involved with the President. For Halleck's cold blood would be more than a match for Sherman's fiery humor, and it was clear that his denunciation of them would be made to change the issue. It is, indeed, astonishing to see how entirely the current of newspaper opinion was made to set against Sherman, and his great service ignored. How deplorable are such differences! Sherman, when he let loose, said Halleck had not been under fire once; that he could whip him and the Army of the Potomac; and read me a letter which he had addressed to me and my fleet. I reminded him of the uselessness of such measures, and that even Jackson would not resist a civil court, but paid its fine.

I noticed when the General came to see me and reverted to the subject that he was quite calm, and thanked me for my advice. He stayed about an hour, and then steamed out for the North. . . . All the little dogs are loose on Sherman. How they bark! He is a great sinner against the mass of respectable mediocrities,—the fossils, and the smooth trimmers. How dare he or any one man march through one State after another, gathering up the Union armies and scattering the Rebels, dissipating their brags and gobbling up cities and States! How dare he do it! And that without a host of sycophants to warm in his blaze. They will never forgive him.

Sherman is, of course, in a magnificent passion, and that is just what they want.

May 7.—General Gillmore's Chief of Staff came with a communication about some steamer. In the course of conversation, he remarked, "That it was supposed the relations between General Gillmore and myself were not very earnest." I answered, "That was a mistake; so far as I was concerned, they were very earnest."

May 11.—The revenue cutter "Wayanda" came in with the Chief Justice and some friends. He is on a quiet tour of observation for the President, touching the existing state of things. I found my views to agree exactly with those of the Chief Justice. The game of the Secessionists now is, to get
back their civil government as quickly as possible, hoping in this way to retain all the slaves not actually freed by the "military necessity." Judge Chase thinks the States must be brought back, and that black suffrage is the only counterpoise for their schemes.

**May 17.** — Jeff Davis has been taken in South Georgia, by a party of cavalry, and brought to Hilton Head by the Army steamer "Clyde," which left soon for the North, conveyed by one of my vessels, the "Tuscarora." Retribution! The wretch who paid no regard to humanity, wandered like Cain with a price set on his head, and is now a prisoner.

**May 28.** — Quite early the "Cimarron," in the outer roads, announces the steamer "Iago" off the bar with the Secretary of Navy.

**May 31.** — The Secretary left; the steamer "Iago" steamed out to sea for the North. At the point of leaving, the Secretary stepped aside and asked when I wished to leave, and said I could do so when I desired. I suggested that direct orders would be better, so he said they should be sent as soon as he got to Washington. The Secretary spoke of Dupont, and said that the President became vexed with his delays, and spoke of him as a McClellan on the water. The Secretary also said that some one had asked him to order me into Charleston, but that he had refused, saying he did not wish it, and that I was acting as the Department approved.

Showed F—— my valedictory order. He said it was not enough on Gillmore, so I changed to a little more, which he liked.

**June 9.** — A day or two since I received Captain Parker's "Naval Howitzer Ashore," being a treatise on its management, illustrated with sixteen capital plates,—the whole very tastefully got up, and inscribed to me. It was forwarded with an affectionate note.

Chief Engineer King has also inscribed his book on the "Steam Engine" to me.

**June 6.** — I begin to find practically how much the business of the squadron has diminished, having sent away home forty vessels, lent Gordon three, and lost five.

I am now able to give a little attention to something else.
than the current business which till this time has filled every minute. I am arranging papers, &c., for my own departure.

Colonel B—r took tea. Said that when Morris Island was taken General Gillmore lay back and said, "Now the Navy is to do the rest; and that the Army was led away by this." . . . He said that on the 8th, when the iron-clads attacked Sullivan's Island, he supposed we could go in. I showed him that that time was my weakest, as the "Passaic" was disabled in action, the "Kaatskill" also disabled and absent, and the "Weehawken" disabled, leaving me four monitors and the "Ironsides."

June 8. — In Sherman's evidence before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, he says: "On the morning of May 3 we ran into Charleston Harbor, where I had the pleasure to meet Admiral Dahlgren, who had, in all my previous operations from Savannah northward, aided me with a constancy and manliness that commanded my entire respect and deep affection."

Well, it is some satisfaction to find one man, who is willing to acknowledge that you did your best for the public interest.

June 14. — The "Alhambra" brought a mail, and among the letters I have received the order of the Navy Department, dated June 9, "authorizing me to turn over the command to Acting Rear-Admiral Radford, or, if he does not arrive, to the next line officer, and to proceed North."

Mr. Redpath called. He is the Jupiter Tonans of the extreme anti-slavery type, and is also correspondent of the "Tribune." He was very desirous that I should come out in a speech or letter, and said there were to be changes in the Cabinet. He asked how I would like to be Secretary of the Navy. I replied, "Not at all" — that Mr. Welles was excellent, and the place would not suit me; that officers made poor politicians. Redpath said that Gillmore had been appointed by the "Tribune's" influence, but he had deceived them. He also said that my Georgetown terms, when it capitulated, were often spoken of North. So we parted.

Well, I have done my duty without fear or favor.

Saturday, June 17. — How hot it looks; the water like glass; not a breath of air, and only six in the morning. The whole heavens and all beneath, lighted up with the fervent sun.
Tropical indeed. Reynolds came up from Port Royal in the "Donegal," and came on board. Meanwhile all kinds of packing were going on.

There were but few vessels present, and the Captains came on board in a quiet and pleasant way to shake hands and say good-by, with good wishes. At last, all things being ready, I left the old "Philadelphia," rich with memories of the past, and none dearer to me than those of my dear son; for in that cabin we spent together the last days permitted us. He liked to sit in the green-cushioned chair of mine; back of him hung Darley's fine picture of his own exploit at Fredericksburg. There was the table, and just there he sat, a crutch resting on each side of the chair. He used to walk in the gangway, and I often caught sight of his noble head and the jaunty little military cap. How often his manly figure filled that doorway! Dear son, your memory will not die while I live!

About 3½ P. M. I established myself in the cabin of the "Pawnee." . . . The ship steamed out at four o'clock.

We passed Sumter, then Wagner, and all the familiar scenery of the last two years; and so ends a command of two years of one of the largest fleets ever assembled under American colors. There were at one time as many as ninety-six vessels.

June 21. — And now we are near the Anacostia,—the old ground. We pass Giesboro; and down with the anchor.

July 7.—At the Department the Secretary talks of the Bureau for me, or it is suggested that I go to Europe on an ordnance tour. He said we were all adrift about rifled ordnance; could not get wrought iron to stand, and thought we should know what they did in Europe; that it was very important. I suggested that I would like to finish my own experiments, and believed that I could complete my work. Rifled 80 and 150 pdrs.; 13th smooth and 130-pdr. smooth for 40 pounds of powder. Here the conversation was interrupted. Fox had told me that he had seen Beauregard's journal of operations at Charleston. The Engineer reported Wagner untenable on the 10th August. But Beauregard held on. It shows the fallacy of Gillmore's shooting over Wagner instead of at it.
July 11. — The President and Cabinet visited the "Pawnee" at my invitation. Saluted and manned yards, and afterwards I gave them a very handsome collation.

July 12. — Hauled down my flag under a salute of thirteen guns.

Thus ends a command of two years at sea. . . .
CHAPTER XVII.

A RECAPITULATION OF NAVAL COMMAND OFF CHARLESTON, FROM VARIOUS SOURCES.

The writer of this memoir has thought it best for the truth of history, to let Admiral Dahlgren—through his private journal written by his own hand, day by day—narrate for himself, unwittingly, as it were, the events of his personal life as connected with the civil war. The value of such material as this private journal contains, towards making up an accurate history of that portion of the war in which Admiral Dahlgren figured, cannot be overestimated.

Chief Justice Chase, on being told by the writer that such a journal had been kept, expressed his sense of its great value as material for history. And it is with the aim to give original sources that the journal is now published—as the reader has seen—verbatim. But inasmuch as, unfortunately, Admiral Dahlgren was not always supported as he had a right to expect, we prefer to add to this journal, so far as the War Record is involved, some proofs in explanation of its statements. The journal just given was of course written as a private record, for reference only, and must, when taken in this sense, be exempt from that taint of egotism which a similar record would of course have had, if published by consent of the author during his own life.

But that sacred seal of silence death has broken, and
the true and living pen-portrait, which the biographer seeks to draw, can thus best be given. During all the course of this history the writer has never used her own words where those of the Admiral could be found to tell the story. Nor has she yielded to the oft-recurring temptation to interweave her own ideas. She has rigidly adhered to the journal left by her husband. If, in doing so, names belonging to the history of the period have been freely mentioned, such use has been made with the painful consciousness that nothing less than such explicit statements could place the War Record of Admiral Dahlgren in its true light. He had indeed much more to fight against than the avowed enemies of the country whose autonomy he sought so bravely to uphold. Dark and selfish and ulterior aims would seem to have dictated measures that were continuously used to thwart or misrepresent the most praiseworthy actions, or, if possible, to throw a shadow over a patriotism as resplendent as ever existed.

Did Admiral Dahlgren err, knowing, as he did, the tangled mazes of ambiguous conduct against which at times he struggled almost in vain, that he firmly held silence, so far as his own course was concerned, before the country, and allowed himself to be misrepresented, rather than clearly and fully expose and denounce all this wrong?

He did err, and he did not err, in so doing. He did err, because his enemies did not deserve so much kindness at his hands; and it would in the end have been better for the country to have known the whole truth. He did not err by this most generous forbearance, because his motive was the purest patriotism. He was unwilling, at a moment when his beloved country needed the united aid of all her loyal sons, to add to
her perplexities by any exposure of personal griefs or grievances, however wearing. All honor to this brave, loyal, and steadfast soul, that could rise above the harassing trials of the moment, and know that he could trust to time, and that truth which the course of time elicits, to bring to light his real course. And he having died in this bright faith of reliance upon the future judgments of men, it becomes the inestimable privilege of his widow to act indeed as alter ego, and speak for him.

We now propose to give as succinct a narrative of some of the more important points, relating to operations off Charleston, as can be done to be at all intelligible; and in elucidation, if we may say so, of Admiral Dahlgren’s journal, as well as of the general events of his command.

When Admiral Dahlgren relieved Admiral Dupont off Charleston, there was a vague impression in the public mind that these two officers were in some way inimical to each other; and among the many friends of Dupont there were not a few inclined to criticise unkindly the course taken by his successor, simply owing to the fact that this distinguished officer was relieved of his command and a successor sent. Now the fact is, that in no way whatever, direct or indirect, was Admiral Dahlgren connected with the causes that led to the unfortunate disagreement of Dupont with the administration, which brought about the withdrawal of that officer. Nor was there the slightest feeling of ill will between these two excellent patriots towards each other. Admiral Dahlgren, on the contrary, always spoke with great interest of this man whom he had ever been happy to call his friend; and he lamented deeply the misfortune of the withdrawal of this accom-
plished officer from so important a command. Nor was Admiral Dahlgren at first designated to act alone, but he was to have held an appointment as Commander of the iron-clads, with a special view to Charleston, and in conjunction with Admiral Foote. The sudden illness and untimely death of Admiral Foote changed this plan, when about being consummated, and decided the Department to send Admiral Dahlgren to succeed Admiral Dupont in command of the Fleet. The journal of May 28 to June 28, 1863, gives the account, the substance of which we have just stated. Admiral Dahlgren was doubtless selected to succeed Admiral Dupont, because of his well-earned distinction as an artillerist, and also because he had confidence in the iron-clads and in their aggressive capacity.

Nov. 7, 1861, Admiral Dupont captured Port Royal, — a brilliant exploit, — which encouraged the country to hope for the capture of Charleston itself at no distant day. Accordingly, we find the Navy Department (May 13, 1862) informing Admiral Dupont that,

This Department has determined to capture Charleston as soon as Richmond falls, which will relieve the iron boats "Galena" and "Monitor." The War Department sends instructions to-day to General Hunter, with whom you will consult, and with whom you will co-operate fully, unless the move should be purely naval, when he will render you every assistance.

But nothing seems to have followed this first plan, except the unfortunate repulse on Secessionville, which ended Hunter's plan to reach Charleston by way of James Island.

Jan. 6, 1863, we have the second confidential instructions for the capture of Charleston, as follows: —

Sir,—The new "Ironsides," "Passaic," "Montauk," "Patapsco," and "Weehawken" (iron-clads) have been ordered to, and
are now on the way, to join your command, to enable you to enter the harbor of Charleston and demand the surrender of all its defences, or suffer the consequences of a refusal. General Hunter will be sent to Port Royal with about ten thousand men, to act as shall be deemed best, after consultation with yourself. The capture of this most important port, however, rests solely upon the success of the naval force; and it is committed to your hands to execute, with the confidence the Department reposes in your eminent ability and energy.

Dupont replies, January 24: —

The Department has been informed, through private letters to the Assistant Secretary, of the general character and extent of the defences of Charleston. I shall endeavor to execute its wishes with such force as it may deem necessary for this purpose. But the interests involved in the success or failure of this undertaking strike me as so momentous to the nation,—to put at my disposal every means in its power to insure success, especially by sending additional iron-clads to those mentioned. The Army is not ready even for the united co-operation it can give.

It is here evident that Admiral Dupont did not propose the measure, and scarcely concurred in it, as he required more force than the "Ironsides" and four monitors, and considered the aid the Army could give insufficient. The Department replies at once, Jan. 31, 1863: —

The Department does not desire to urge an attack upon Charleston with inadequate means; and if, after careful examination, you deem the number of iron-clads insufficient to render the capture of that port reasonably certain, it must be abandoned.

On the 18th February the Department wrote that the "Kaatskill" would be added, and on the 6th March promised the "Nantucket" and "Keokuk."
Thus the Department was proceeding to give Dupont all the force possible, still adhering to its wish for an attack. Meanwhile the Admiral was examining the qualities of the new vessels, the monitors.

The result of these tests draws forth from the Admiral the following opinion: —

My own previous impressions of these vessels, frequently expressed to Assistant Secretary Fox, have been confirmed, viz.: that whatever degree of impenetrability they might have, there was no corresponding quality of aggression or destructiveness as against forts.

The slowness of fire, giving full time for the gunners in the fort to take shelter in the bomb-proofs.

This experience also convinces me of another impression, firmly held and often expressed, that in all such operations, to secure success, troops are necessary.

After this, the Admiral notes several effects of action, and was seemingly not satisfied.

April 7, 1863, Dupont makes the memorable attack on Sumter, reports its failure, and his decision not to renew it.

The President's order of April 13 is important: "We still hope that by cordial and judicious co-operation you can take the batteries on Morris Island and Fort Sumter;" and, whether successful or not, he desires the demonstration to be kept up, for a very important object.

April 16, 1863, Admiral Dupont, in reply, says that as soon as "the serious injuries sustained by the monitors in the late attack are repaired, shall get them inside, according to last orders, — which will be attended with great risk, by reason of the gales and fire of Rebel batteries." He mentions that the ships cannot cover the landing nor protect the advance of the small army force
available; and advises that Charleston be menaced by the North Edisto, as James Island is fully occupied by the batteries of the enemy. He considers that "a renewal of the attack on Charleston would be attended with disastrous results," and asks to be relieved.

After this, quite a correspondence ensued with the Department, in which both parties seem to have lost their temper, being relieved by the episode of the capture of the "Atlanta" by the "Weehawken" on June 17, for which capture the Secretary thanks the Admiral. But the result of all was, that the Secretary was unwilling to give up further efforts on Charleston, and the Admiral continued to be opposed to a renewed attack; consequently he was relieved, as he had previously requested to be, and on July 6 Admiral Dahlgren took command. Of course we might elaborate this statement, and swell it into the dimensions of history. We are not writing history, however, but a biography of Admiral Dahlgren, and have only to deal with the historical events with which he was connected.

It was on the last day of June, 1863, that the steamer "Dinsmore" cast off from the New York wharf and steamed down the bay for the open sea.

The vessel flew the blue, square flag of a Rear-Admiral aloft, in token of her mission. She was one of the numerous steamers that the Government had been compelled to obtain from the mercantile marine, in order to assist the regular Navy to enforce a blockade that extended over hundreds of miles of coast; and which, under the circumstances, were indispensable auxiliaries to the national marine.

The "Dinsmore" had been specially chartered to convey Rear-Admiral Dahlgren to the South Atlantic
Squadron, and as yet had no battery. The haste with which the Admiral left, in accordance with the desire of the Department, was so great that he was only accompanied by one Staff Officer, Captain Badger, who was to act as Ordnance Officer. There were also on board a few other officers of rank who were to command some of the principal vessels of the squadron,—Captains Rowan (now Vice-Admiral Rowan), Pickering, Parker, and Spotts.

On her arrival at Port Royal, the "Dinsmore" anchored near the "Wabash," the flagship of Admiral Dupont; but as she had no guns no salute was fired. The "Wabash" belonged to a class which, when built, five years previous, was justly considered as the best among ships of war then extant.

But this fine ship, which had five years before been looked upon as the most powerful development of a ship of war, was now comparatively helpless in the presence of that curious nondescript, of puny dimensions, that floated near her. Admiral Dupont sent his barge to convey Admiral Dahlgren to his flagship. As the latter ascended the gangway, the spar-deck of this noble ship was crowded with silent, orderly, and neatly attired seamen. A full guard of marines were arranged on the quarter-deck, and opposite to them stood the officers of the ship; while the dark, heavy guns, and other warlike garniture, betokened a finished ship of war. The foremost figure of this striking pageant was the stately veteran Dupont. In the full pride of a personal presence seldom equalled in elegance or manliness, his majestic form towered above all near him, as he received with warmth and grace the new-comer sent to succeed him; while stretching far around the brave Dupont were the
heavy works which he had so recently gained for the country.

Here, on the very spot of his recent victory, he was about to resign his command to another. And in the midst of these glorious memories, as the drum rolled and the guard presented, the superb Dupont himself gave the welcome he so well knew how to give. And this welcome fell upon a heart as brave and loyal, as incapable of any littleness, as his own! It was almost, as it were, one of the last glimpses of the Old Navy as perfected since 1812,—fast disappearing under the needs of the times, the innovations of the day, and the fierce storms of civil war.

The ceremonious greeting over, the Admirals descended to the cabin, where a brief glance at the situation was taken.

Dupont stated that General Gillmore was asking for aid in a movement which the latter proposed, but that in view of the expected arrival of a successor he did not choose to involve the new-comer by his own action.

On July 6, Dupont left; and thus closed that chapter of operations before Charleston.

After having received from Admiral Dupont a general statement as to the affairs of the squadron, Admiral Dahlgren concluded, in view of the urgency that had been expressed by General Gillmore for naval assistance, that he would without loss of time visit him ashore, and learn precisely what he desired. Taking with him Lieutenant Preston, he crossed over to Hilton Head, and repaired to the General's headquarters.

Admiral Dahlgren had met General Gillmore only once before, on the 3d June, at New York, whither he had gone, at the instance of the Department, to
consult Admiral Foote. General Gillmore came in, having also an engagement with Foote, and during his stay Admiral Dahlgren conversed apart with General Strong, who accompanied Gillmore, and had no share in what passed between Gillmore and Foote.

Therefore Admiral Dahlgren really had no business conversation with Gillmore at that time, nor did he concur in any of the opinions he expressed; although General Gillmore, in a note next day to Assistant Secretary Fox, says that Admiral Dahlgren did concur with him.

During the interview of July 6, the details of a descent on Morris Island were arranged, which was to commence on the Wednesday following (July 8), but which was postponed, first to the 9th and then to the 10th, by request of General Gillmore, in order to allow the time asked for to perfect his arrangements.

In the absence of specific instructions, Admiral Dahlgren was obliged to assume the responsibility of action, and reporting accordingly to the Department, with the statement that he had no instructions, the Department sent him a copy of the order to Admiral Dupont, of June 6, directing him to "afford General Gillmore all the aid and assistance in his power in conducting operations." In some notes of Admiral Dahlgren he says:—

When we met to make arrangements for a joint operation, not a word was said of acting under any instructions upon a given plan agreed upon at Washington.

General Gillmore asked my co-operation to attack Morris Island, specifying certain details to which I assented.

On the 7th he addressed me a letter on the subject, in which he says: "I will recapitulate the arrangements for co-operating already agreed upon, as follows:—
"1st. I am to attack Morris Island on Thursday morning next, July 9," &c.

"3d. The Navy is to enter the channel abreast of Morris Island early in the morning, say about sunrise," &c.

The paper concludes thus: "My desire that there should be a perfect and cordial understanding between us in these combined operations," &c.

This was all of the plan that was made known to me by General Gillmore during the operation; nor was I aware that the "combined operation" was to cease until the 27th of September, when I asked him to assist me by opening fire on Sumter in order to drive out its garrison, when I found that my first request for co-operation was to be refused, although for sixty days I had faithfully rendered all that had been asked for. The answer amounted to an intimation that I must rely on my own resources, to accomplish ten times as much as General Gillmore had been able to effect with his own means and mine. It was evident to me, when I read the report of General Gillmore, that he had no authority for interpreting the intentions of the Department into an agreement to follow a certain plan marked out by himself.

On the contrary, the Department had understood him very differently from the programme afterwards announced. Under date of Oct. 9, 1863, the Department wrote me: "Previous to his departure to assume his present command, General Gillmore stated that, once in possession of Cumming's Point, he could thence reduce Forts Moultrie and Johnson.

"This opinion has probably undergone no change by what has since occurred," &c.

This was rather a better result than the so-called "demolition" of Sumter, and "the heavy artillery fire" from the Point and Wagner; for according to what the Department understood from General Gillmore, the former opened a fair way for the fleet, whilst what General Gillmore actually accomplished left the fleet to make its own way.

General Gillmore admits that he had not even written instructions from the War Department; and as to the originality of the undertaking, all that belonged to General Gillmore was left to the Navy for execution.
ATTACK ON MORRIS ISLAND, JULY 10, 1863

Recurring to the descent on Morris Island, Admiral Dahlgren reports to the Department (Dispatch No. 44), as follows:—

The naval part of the operation consisted: 1st. In assembling the iron-clads at the Charleston Bar, so as to cross at early daylight, on the day named; to cover the attack of the troops; to prevent the arrival of reinforcements during that attack; and to engage the Rebel batteries, particularly Fort Wagner. 2d. To furnish a convoy for the column that was to ascend the Stono, cover its landing, and shell James Island. 3d. To guard the depots of the Army at Hilton Head and at Seabrook, during the withdrawal of the troops concentrated on Folly Island.

I should here state that Mr. Ericsson had decided to increase the thicknesses of the pilot houses of all the monitors, and add heavy circles of metal to the bases of the turrets and pilot houses. The three at Port Royal were already in hand for this purpose, and some progress had been made. A part of my preparation consisted in putting a stop to the work, and having the vessels fitted temporarily for service.

This was effected in season, and before daylight of the 9th July the monitors were off the bar, ready to pass in at the first sign of movement by the United States batteries on Folly Island. The plan was, to open from the masked batteries on the north end of Folly Island, cross the bar with the monitors, and enfilade the Rebel position on the eminences of Morris Island, while the troops were to cross the narrow inlet which divides Morris Island from Folly Island, when the proper moment arrived.

The obscurity of night still rested on land and sea, when I went on board the "Kaatskill" (July 10), and not a symptom of preparation on shore was visible to us.

It was important that the monitors should not, by their appearance, give any intimation of what was meditated, by being seen on the bar, until the details were completed; so I waited the first fire of the batteries. This was not long coming, and I led, with my Flag, in the "Kaatskill," followed by Captains Fairfax, Downes, and Colhoun, in the "Montauk," "Nahant,"
and "Wciahawn." Steering for the wreck of the "Keokuk" and passing it, the monitors were laid in line about parallel to the land opposite the southern eminences of Morris Island, and poured in a steady fire among the Rebel garrison, who were there posted, making a feeble and ineffectual return to the storm of shot and shell that came upon their front and flank. I could see plainly the great confusion into which they were thrown by this sudden and overwhelming onslaught. It was a complete surprise, both as to time and to power developed.

The monitors were run in as close as the shoal water permitted, so that the shells from our own batteries on Folly Island passed close ahead of, and at times over, some of them.

About eight o'clock a body of men were seen coming over the low sand back of Morris Island; and while hesitating whether to treat them to some volleys of grape, the sight of the Union flag (the first planted on Morris Island by Lieutenant Robeson) told who they were. They composed the brigade which had been brought from the Folly River by the boats of the squadron, under Lieutenant Commander Bunce and Lieutenant Mackenzie.

I paused for a moment to observe the gradual accumulation of our men in masses, and their advancing movement; then pushing forward to accelerate, with our enfilading fire, the retreat of the Rebels.

The sight was now of great interest; our own troops could be seen taking possession of the sand-hills, where the enemy had rested the sole defence of this end of the island, while some battalions were moving along the beach.

The defeated Rebels were hurriedly making way along the low flat land north of their position, and some two or three detached dwellings were in flames, while the monitors skirting the shore maintained a steady fire on the retreat. Presently they reached Fort Wagner, and here we were advised that our advance was checked, at least for the day, though it was but nine o'clock. The discomfited Rebels were safe in the work, and our own men halted at a reasonable distance from it.

The monitor, with my Flag, was now anchored as near the beach as the depth of water permitted (1,200 yards), and the other monitor in line to the southward. A steady fire
was begun about 9.30, the fort replying briskly, and main-
tained through the day, except the dinner hour, until six in the
evening. Then I retired, and anchored lower down. Next
morning before six o'clock the Flag Lieutenant reported to
me that an assault had been made at daybreak by our troops,
and failed, and about nine o'clock I had a note in pencil from
the General, saying, "We attempted to carry Fort Wagner by
assault this morning, and reached the parapet, but the men re-
coiled, and fell back with slight loss."

It is known now that reinforcements had been hurried to
the island by the Rebels, and had entered the work about mid-
night.

I had no notice whatever of the General's intent, and could
therefore render no aid in time.

Here ended the first part of the enterprise against Morris
Island. It had been in all respects a surprise, and so complete
that the Rebels do not seem to have had any idea of it until the
day before, and it is not certain they were then aware of the
scale on which it was to be conducted.

Had a work like Wagner crowned the sand-hills of the south
end, we could not have established our position on the island;
even a surprise would probably have been out of the question.

But there were to be no more surprises; the undertaking
was to be completed only by hard work, patiently endured, in
the trenches, and by batteries ashore and afloat.

The General now decided to make a second assault in force,
and to cover it by some light batteries, established at distances
varying from 1,000 to 1,700 yards.

While the preparations for this design were going on, the
monitors were daily at work to occupy the attention of Wagner
and keep down its fire, the gunboats assisting at long range.
On the 18th July, all being ready, about noon I led up in the
"Montauk," followed by four monitors and the "Ironsides"
anchored at 1,200 yards, as near as the state of the tide would
permit, and opened fire; the gunboats firing at a greater dis-
tance, and the shore batteries also in action.

As the tide rose, the "Montauk" gradually closed in, until
at seven o'clock she was about 300 yards from Wagner, when I
ordered grape to be used.
Unable to endure the fire of the vessels, the guns of the fort were now silent, and not a man was to be seen.

About sunset a note in pencil from General Gillmore announced his intention to assault, but it was quite dark before the column reached the work.

The fire of the vessels was continued so long as it was safe for our men ashore, but ceased when the darkness made it impossible to distinguish friend from foe. The rattle of musketry soon made known the commencement of the assault, and continued with little intermission until 9.30, when it ceased. And then came the painful tidings of our defeat.

This was the end of the second part of the operation, and proved that the work was too strong and too pertinaciously defended to be taken by any off-hand blow. The slow and laborious operations by trench and cannon, only were capable of reducing it. And here I may remark that in this necessity is to be found a principal cause for the delay in reaching Charleston that subsequently ensued.

It was, no doubt, unavoidable, for it is to be presumed that no more troops could then be spared from the main armies. If there had been sufficient to make such an assault as would have overpowered all opposition, Wagner might have been carried at the first assault. Gregg would have yielded immediately; Sumter would soon have followed, as a matter of course, and the iron-clads, untouched by severe and heavy battering, would have been in condition to come quickly in contact with the then imperfect interior defences. The Rebel movements clearly indicate that they admitted the impracticability of defending Morris Island, and consequently Sumter, after our position on it was fully established and covered by the iron-clads. They only sought to hold the island long enough to replace Sumter by an interior position; hence every day of defence by Wagner was vital to that of Charleston. This policy was successful for two months (10th July to 7th September), and gave time to convert Fort Johnson from a forlorn old fort into a powerful earthwork, improved by the experience of Wagner. Moultrie received similar advantages, and most of the cannon of Sumter were divided between Johnson and Moultrie. Batteries were established along the south shore of
the channel from Johnson towards the city, and thus an interior
defence was completed, which, though it separated more widely
the salient and principal works of the defence, by substituting
Johnson for Sumter, yet rendered access to the upper harbor
far more difficult, because a more powerful fire was concen-
trated from additional batteries upon vessels attempting to
enter.

And thus it was that even after Morris Island was evacuated
and Sumter dismantled, the fleet must still pass the fire of
Moultrie and Bee, to find itself in presence of a formidable
earthwork supported by continuous batteries, and command-
ing obstructions more difficult than any between Sumter and
Moultrie.

The real nature of these obstructions was not suspected
until the winter freshets had broken away, and floated into our
hands a fair specimen of them, which certainly were far more
formidable than had been anticipated. . . . During the progress
of the engineers towards Wagner the iron-clads played an im-
portant part, using their guns whenever an opportunity offered,
as shown in the instances quoted. It may be readily conceiv-
that, all things being equal, it was just as easy for the Rebels
to have worked towards our position as it was for our troops to
work towards theirs.

But there was a serious difference in the fact that the cannon
of the iron-clads, and also of the gunboats, completely enfiladed
the entire width of the narrow island, and absolutely interdicted
any operation of the kind on the part of the Rebels.

In addition, whenever their fire was beating severely on our
own workmen, a request from the General always drew the fire
of the vessels, and I do not know that it failed to be effective
in an instance.

As a consequence, the Rebels were restricted to Wagner,
and were powerless to hinder the progress of the trenches, that
were at last carried into the very ditch of the work, and decided
its evacuation without assault.

The day before the contemplated assault I led in the iron-
clads in force, as agreed on, and battered the fort all day,
tearing it into a sand-heap. The next morning it was to have
been stormed, but the enemy had fled. They foresaw the inevitable result. *The vessels thus shared fully with the Army* in the operation that led to the abandonment of the works on Morris Island, and, besides what is already mentioned, prevented the access of reinforcements or their accumulation between Wagner and Gregg.

The boats of the squadron were also engaged on picket duty by night, along the seashore of Morris Island and the little stream in its inner harbor. . . .

In a communication made by Admiral Dahlgren to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, United States Senate, and forwarded to the Navy Department for transmission, June 23, 1864, he says, in explanation of the operations off Charleston, that

Previous to the 10th July, 1863, the blockade of the port was so imperfect that vessels entered and departed with so little risk that the export of cotton and import of supplies did not suffer any material interruption. I have been informed by persons who certainly had opportunities of knowing, that the storehouses of the city were never more full of cotton than then.

As a consequence, the Rebel Government and people depended chiefly on this trade for the great aid and comfort they received from foreign sympathies. Besides this, Morris Island was in the hands of the Rebels, and Fort Sumter continued to be a formidable fortress, which, in connection with Moultrie, completely barred entrance to Charleston Harbor.

Two attempts had been made to approach the city,—one by the Army, intended to operate across James Island, beginning at Secessionville; the other by the Navy, in a direct attack on Sumter about one year ago.

Both of these failed entirely, and Charleston seemed to defy every effort on our part to disturb the prosperity that she enjoyed, and which was far greater than had ever been known under the compact of the Union. This was quickly reversed by the combined operations under General Gillmore and myself,
which concluded in the capture of Morris Island, and the occupation of the roadstead, or main ship channel, leading into the harbor; while Sumter, though still sheltering a small Rebel garrison, was reduced from its great power as a first-class fortress to the condition of an outpost for Forts Johnson and Moultrie.

A perfect blockade was thus enforced, so that the illicit trade of the city was completely cut off, and the produce wrung from a degrading system of labor was compelled to find exit elsewhere.

The Admiral then gives the following brief account of the operations of the Army and Navy in this quarter:

Morris Island is a narrow outlying strip of sand-beach about three and a half miles (statute) long, and of irregular width, not exceeding three hundred or four hundred yards at the widest part, and in many places not half that.

This beach is completely insulated seaward by the main ship channel, and westward by an impassable morass, which extends landward some 3,500 yards, and is there terminated by the firm land of James Island.

It is intersected by small streams, and dotted with a few little spots of firm soil. The north end (Cumming's Point) forms the left angle of Charleston Harbor in entering.

From the ship channel the beach can be approached by the monitors to 1,200 yards at low water, and at high water to one third of that distance.

The site of Wagner is about three fourths of a mile from the north end, stretches entirely across the island, and a battery of heavy guns occupies the extreme northern end. From Wagner to the southward the beach runs evenly for a mile and a half, when there arises a succession of sand-hills, upon which the Rebels had placed cannon to command the approach from Folly Island, and the narrow inlet that separates it from Morris Island.

Nearly north from the north end of Morris Island the heavy masonry of Sumter rises out of the water at the distance of about 1,300 yards.
I took command of the naval forces on the 6th July at Port Royal; left there on the 8th; collected the scattered monitors, and on the 9th, before daylight, was off the bar of Charleston ready to cross. The General asked for a day's postponement, and on the 10th July, 1863, I began the attack on Morris Island.

The enemy were driven by the combined operation from their position on the south end into Fort Wagner, which I cannonaded with the monitors from nine A. M. till the evening. The next morning the General assaulted and was repulsed. Of this intention I was not informed previously, and therefore had no opportunity of assisting, until all was over.

Some light batteries were thrown up, and in a week afterward (18th July) an assault in force was made. The ironclads battered Wagner almost out of shape, and in the afternoon of that day the flag monitor "Montauk" lay only three hundred yards from the sea-face of the work; not a gun was fired from it; not a head was visible to my glass as I stood with other officers outside, watching the first symptom of renewed resistance. Our column came up, but it was too dark to discern objects from the vessels, and after a fierce and resolute effort the column fell back with a loss of 1,500 men. The assault could derive no aid from the fire of our guns, because it was impossible to distinguish our troops from the enemy.

This compelled a resort to the regular approaches, and after incessant labor, the Rebels were finally forced to evacuate on the 7th September. . . . An examination of a plan of the locality will show that it would have been impossible for the troops to have landed on the island, or to have continued operations there, without the active assistance of the Navy.

The presence alone of the vessels would not suffice. The action of their cannon was required to restrain the Rebels from

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1 This account, made in a communication to the Senate Committee, has been in substance previously narrated in the journal, and also in Dispatch 44, to the Navy Department; but we give extracts from this paper as it is, at the risk of tiresome repetition, because it includes some statements not before given, and also much additional explicit information. — M. V. D.
advancing by counter approaches upon our lines, or from landing in force at the north end of the island, and marching in superior numbers upon our men, and driving them off the island.

This is evident from the very configuration of the island, and is also assumed by General Hunter as the reason for his not proceeding against Morris Island, precisely as was done by General Gillmore and myself subsequently. The letter of General Hunter is addressed to the President, and a copy of it is appended,1 from which it will be perceived that he deemed the aid of the Navy absolutely indispensable to the reduction of Morris Island, and would not proceed without it.

The conviction, then, of General Hunter was, that he could do nothing at all on Morris Island without the aid of the Navy, even when the Rebels were comparatively unprepared to what they were when the attack was made by General Gillmore and myself. I will now cite the opinion of General Gillmore himself, who informed the authorities on the 20th June that he "could do nothing, as the Admiral2 had no instructions, and did not feel at liberty to put his vessels into action," &c.

The Committee will observe that the plan of General Hunter was virtually the same as that put into execution by General Gillmore.

The following will show how faithfully the aid of the vessels was rendered, being a brief exhibit of the occasions when they engaged the different Rebel works:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE.</th>
<th>OBJECT ENGAGED.</th>
<th>VESSELS ENGAGED.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 10.</td>
<td>Fort Wagner</td>
<td>Iron-clad Kaatskill.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Montauk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Nahant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Weehawken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 11.</td>
<td>Fort Wagner</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Kaatskill.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Montauk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Nahant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Weehawken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 18.</td>
<td>Fort Wagner (assault)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Montauk.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Ironsides.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Kaatskill.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 See Appendix A.  2 Admiral Dupont.  3 Flagship.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Object Engaged</th>
<th>Vessels Engaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 18</td>
<td>Fort Wagner (assault)</td>
<td>Iron-clad Nantucket.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Weehawken.¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Patapsco.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gunboat Paul Jones.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Ottawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Seneca.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Wissahickon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 20</td>
<td>Fort Wagner</td>
<td>Iron-clad Ironsides.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gunboat Ottawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 22</td>
<td>Fort Wagner</td>
<td>Iron-clad Weekawken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Ironsides.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Kaatskill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Montauk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Patapsco.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Nantucket.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 24</td>
<td>Fort Wagner, to cover advance of our Shore Batteries</td>
<td>Iron-clad Weehawken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Kaatskill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gunboat Ottawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iron-clad Ironsides.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Patapsco.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Passaic.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Ironsides.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Kaatskill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Patapsco.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 30</td>
<td>Fort Wagner</td>
<td>Gunboat Ottawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 31</td>
<td>Fort Wagner and Rebel Batteries on Morris Island</td>
<td>Gunboat Ottawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 1</td>
<td>Fort Wagner</td>
<td>Iron-clad Montauk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Patapsco.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Kaatskill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Weehawken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Passaic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Nahant.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Flagship.
# List of Vessels Engaged in Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Object Engaged</th>
<th>Vessels Engaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 1</td>
<td>Fort Wagner</td>
<td>Gunboat Marblehead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 2</td>
<td>Fort Wagner</td>
<td>&quot; Ottawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 4</td>
<td>Fort Wagner</td>
<td>&quot; Marblehead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 6</td>
<td>Fort Wagner</td>
<td>Iron-clad Montauk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 8</td>
<td>Fort Wagner</td>
<td>Gunboat Marblehead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 11</td>
<td>Fort Wagner and vicinity</td>
<td>&quot; Marblehead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 13</td>
<td>Fort Wagner and Rebel Batteries on Morris Island</td>
<td>&quot; Ottawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 14</td>
<td>Fort Wagner and Rebel Batteries on Morris Island</td>
<td>&quot; Mahaska.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 15</td>
<td>Fort Wagner</td>
<td>Gunboat Wissahickon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 17</td>
<td>Fort Wagner and other Rebel Batteries on Morris Island</td>
<td>&quot; Mahaska.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Batteries, which opened on Sumter</td>
<td>&quot; Ottawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Dai Ching.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Racer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Dan Smith.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mortar-boat Racer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Dan Smith.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iron-clad Weehawken. ¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Ironsides.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Montauk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Nahant.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Kaatskill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Passaic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Patapsco.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Gunboat Canandaigua.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Mahaska.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Ottawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Cimarron.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Wissahickon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Dai Ching.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Lodona.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Flagship.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OBJECT ENGAGED</th>
<th>VESSELS ENGAGED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 18</td>
<td>Fort Wagner, to prevent assault anticipated by General Gillmore</td>
<td>Iron-clad Ironsides.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Passaic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Weehawken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Gunboat Wissahickon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Mahaska.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Dai Ching.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Ottawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Lodona.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 19</td>
<td>Fort Wagner</td>
<td>Iron-clad Ironsides.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 20</td>
<td>Rebel Batteries on Morris Island</td>
<td>Ironsides.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Gunboat Mahaska.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Ottawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Dai Ching.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Lodona.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 21</td>
<td>Forts Sumter and Wagner</td>
<td>Iron-clad Ironsides.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Patapsco.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 22</td>
<td>Fort Wagner</td>
<td>Gunboat Mahaska.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Dai Ching.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Iron-clad Weehawken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 23</td>
<td>Fort Sumter (night attack)</td>
<td>Ironsides.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Montauk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Ironsides.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Weehawken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 31</td>
<td>Fort Moultrie</td>
<td>Montauk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Passaic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 31</td>
<td>Fort Moultrie</td>
<td>Patapsco.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Nahant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 1</td>
<td>Fort Sumter and obstructions in Channel (night attack)</td>
<td>Weehawken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Montauk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 2</td>
<td>Gregg and Fort Sumter</td>
<td>Patapsco.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 5</td>
<td>Between Sumter and Battery Gregg</td>
<td>Nahant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Lehigh.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Flagship.
LIST OF VESSELS ENGAGED IN ACTION.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OBJECT ENGAGED</th>
<th>VESSELS ENGAGED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Fort Wagner and Battery Gregg</td>
<td>Iron-clad Ironsides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 6</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Patapsco.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Lehigh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Nahant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Montauk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Weehawken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Passaic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 7</td>
<td>Forts Moultrie and Batteries on Sullivan's Island,</td>
<td>Iron-clad Ironsides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to cover the</td>
<td>&quot; Patapsco.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weehawken (ashore)</td>
<td>&quot; Lehigh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Nahant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Montauk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Weehawken, ashore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 8</td>
<td>Fort Moultrie and Batteries on Sullivan's Island,</td>
<td>Iron-clad Ironsides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to cover the</td>
<td>&quot; Patapsco.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weehawken (ashore)</td>
<td>&quot; Lehigh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Nahant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Montauk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Weehawken, ashore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Passaic, in a disabled condition.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following telegrams from General Gillmore will inform the Committee of the value that was attached to the power of the vessels:

TELEGAMS
FROM GENERAL GILLMORE.

July 30, 8 A.M. The enemy firing muskettry from Wagner, and interferes with my working. Can you not help me to subdue him?

Aug. 11, 2:35 A.M. Please open as soon as possible; the enemy's fire is very heavy.

Aug. 17. To save Sumter, the enemy may attempt a sortie in the morning. Can you get monitors in position as early as today?

1 Flagship.

REPLIES
FROM R.-ADML. DAHLGREN.

I have just ordered a monitor and a gunboat into action.

All right.

A detachment of iron-clads will be in position at daybreak.
TELEGRAMS
FROM GENERAL GILLMORE.

Aug. 17. The enemy are mounting a heavy gun on the sea-face of Wagner.

Aug. 19. If you could replace them (Whitworth guns) with 8-in. guns, and 300 or 400 rounds of ammunition for each gun, it would help us greatly.

Aug. 21. My approaches to Wagner are suspended, on account of the annoyance from the enemy's sharpshooters. Can you not stop it?

Aug. 21. The fire from Wagner is very galling.

Aug. 22. Wagner has opened a heavy fire on our works. Unless the Navy succeed in silencing them, there is great danger of their dismounting our guns.

Aug. 22. Colonel Turner telegraphs me from the front, that unless the Navy opens speedily, two of our guns will certainly be dismounted.

Aug. 23. Can you let me have some 100-pdr. Parrott shell? I am entirely out.

Aug. 27. Can I take another 8-in. gun and a 100-pdr. Parrott from your vessels?

It will be perceived that besides the assistance ordinarily given, it frequently happened that exigencies arose when the fire of the iron-clads was especially needed; and these at times were so pressing that the request was repeated before the iron-clads could get up their anchors and steam into position; and by referring to the previous minutes of occasions when they were in action, it will be seen that they never failed to render what was asked.

Besides this assistance from the heavy guns of the batteries, our men and boats with their light guns were often asked for, and always accomplished their work satisfactorily.

At the crossing of Lighthouse Inlet the column was conveyed in our boats under Lieutenant Commander Bunce and Lieutenant Mackenzie, and covered by the Navy howitzers.
A picket of launches was placed in the creek on the left flank of the works on Morris Island, and the boats of the vessels were also frequently stationed at night on the sea-shore of the island, to guard against the enterprise of the enemy. I also landed some rifle cannon with seamen, under Captain Parker, with which a battery was armed, and engaged with the other batteries in battering Sumter.

And yet efforts have been made to give the credit of the capture of Wagner, and all the subsequent results, entirely to the General commanding the troops, and to the engineering operations which he conducted on Morris Island. Every mail from this locality teemed with glowing accounts of what was achieved by the Army, while the co-operation of the Navy received little notice and no credit.

These partial notices finally took the form of direct attacks on myself; it was affirmed that I was at variance with General Gillmore, thereby doing injury to pending operations,—and this at the very time when those operations were proceeding most harmoniously and successfully. . . . I was utterly at a loss to comprehend the motive of these assaults for a long time, but have been somewhat enlightened on the subject lately. It is with great reluctance that I now permit myself to notice them, for I felt that in a cause so great, and when the suffering country demanded every exertion from her sons, it ill became them to yield to their private griefs. I came here prepared to give my best efforts to the flag I had served so long, and to make any sacrifice that was demanded of me; every moment of my time was given to the duties about me, and the smallest matter that could be useful was not too small for my personal attention.

I could not understand that actual witnesses of what was going on could so degrade themselves by the scandal of interpreting and underrating not only my own exertions but everything that was done by the Navy.

I have thus briefly, but I hope clearly, explained the nature and effect of the operations upon Morris Island, and the full
share which the Navy had in its occupation, as well as the reduction of Fort Sumter to a heap of ruins.

The Rebels had no alternative but to abandon Wagner and the smaller works north of it on the island, for if they had not, it would have undoubtedly been taken by assault on the 7th September, and the garrison would have been captured as well as the works. But they would not evacuate what was left of Sumter, and, as the sequel proved, with good reason. It was no longer what it had been,—a first-class work, with a powerful armament co-operating with Moultrie in forbidding passage to ships of war, and bearing with great effect on the interior anchorage; but it served as an outpost to Forts Johnson and Moultrie, and, with a small garrison, was capable of maintaining a fire of musketry and light artillery, which would prevent us from effectually removing the obstructions between Sumter and Moultrie, and interfere to a great degree with our scout-boats in traversing the lower harbor.

Moreover, there was every reason to apprehend that by some exertion they would convert the ruins into a better defence than the solid walls had been, and even succeed in establishing cannon on the fronts inaccessible to our batteries.

If, on the contrary, the Rebels were driven out, they would be deprived of these advantages, and we would have access to the lower harbor on terms nearly as good as they had.

Subsequent experience has shown that I did not overestimate the importance of mastering this spot; and, impressed with the advantages that seemed so plain to me, I decided to assault it while the confusion and depression caused by the loss of Morris Island were still in full force. I fully appreciated the difficulties that were to be expected in making the assault, but believed that the great advantages in view fully justified the undertaking. Great care was taken in organizing the column of attack; there were no better men at hand, and they were led by officers whose standing fully justified their selection.

A strong detachment of marines formed part of the column,—in all about 450 men,—while the force of the Rebel garrison was afterwards learned to be 250 to 300 men.

The Rebels evacuated Wagner on the night of the 6th—7th
of September, and the assault on Sumter was made an hour after midnight of the 8th–9th of September.

It failed, and the causes will never be understood, as few who participated could see far in the darkness of the night.

It seems that General Gillmore had intended to make the same attempt on the same night. Of this I knew nothing until late in the day, when I became acquainted with it on sending to borrow some of his boats. A proposal to co-operate was at once acceded to by me, but on account of the difficulty of communicating promptly and correctly by signal, I sent Lieutenant Preston ashore (the acting Fleet Captain), who returned, and reported that all was arranged satisfactorily. So we proceeded.

It was now past midnight. The Navy column pushed straight for the work with the greatest celerity, supposing that the military column would join them, and in the darkness never paused to see whether it did so or not, but went resolutely to its task.

After a brief conflict, the fire of the enemy was found to be too heavy, and our men fell back.

I learned afterwards that the Army boats had not been able to get out of the creek in time.

The Committee will perceive that the failure to co-operate was just such an occurrence as frequently mars combined operations.

I was so intent on our acting together, that while waiting for Lieutenant Preston I wrote an order recalling my boats in case he returned without being able to effect an arrangement. This order was of course not sent when Lieutenant Preston reported that the co-operation was satisfactorily adjusted; and I went myself up the channel, in order to insure personally the desired connection of my column with General Gillmore. The attack began, however, when I was within a few hundred yards of Sumter, and ended very quickly.

It should not escape notice that the intention of the General coincided exactly with my own plan, in time of attack, number of men, and belief in the practicability of the breach; so that if my judgment was at fault, General Gillmore shared the error. And I may venture to believe that our concurrent opinion was
more reliable at the time than that of other parties present or absent, who could not have had the same opportunities for opinion.

Of course, judgments formed after an event have facts to proceed upon which previously are wanting. I am by no means sure that a greater force would have improved the chances of success, while our losses would have been greater. Had the attempt succeeded, it would have materially changed the aspect of affairs in conducting future operations. As it was, I believe now, as I did then, that the possession of the remains of the work was all-important, and my only regret is that my attempt failed to obtain it. Sumter remained with the Rebels. General Gillmore opened the batteries from Wagner and Gregg as soon as he had completed them, late in October, and I also sent two monitors with rifles. Together, the walls of the fort were again battered until the gorge and sea-face were one heap of ruins. The monitors made excellent work, and cut through the nearest and furthest walls. No attempt was made to assault it by the Army, though a large force was sent one evening to feel the state of its defence. So that if my assault failed, nothing else has succeeded to this day, for the Rebel garrison still occupies Sumter.

I should have premised this account of the effort to capture Sumter, by saying that accident had also contributed to disappoint me in another respect. I had ordered the "Weehawken" (monitor) to take position in the only channel rearward of Sumter where she could float; in doing so, she grounded where the batteries of Moultrie had full sweep, and I not only lost her service in covering the assault, but was obliged to order up other iron-clads to prevent her being disabled, which brought on a severe conflict that bore with considerable severity on the vessels, and it was hoped at the time had caused at least equal inconvenience to the Rebels. The "Ironsides" hauled off with little ammunition left, and her associates were roughly handled. I learned afterwards from a deserter, who was in Battery Bee, that not a gun or man was hurt there, and the parapet was only pierced in a few places. Four guns of eighteen were dismounted in Moultrie, and the only serious casualty was produced by an XI\textsuperscript{th} shell from the "Weehawken," which landed
in a large pile of broken shells. By its explosion some twenty
men were killed and the same number wounded; so that for all
effective purposes our fire had not impaired these works.

I now proceed to explain why the operations have been de-
layed in reaching Charleston itself.

1st. The landing on Morris Island was a complete surprise;
and its result was to afford us foothold from which we could
gain possession of the entire island and the main ship channel,
besides reducing the great power of Sumter as a fortress. Had
there been sufficient force, we could have overpowered Wagner
by assault, and entered the harbor before the Rebels were able
to complete the interior defences or recover from their panic.
But there was supposed to be no greater land force than suf-
ficed to overcome Wagner by the slow process of engineering,
and the Rebels contrived to keep us out of possession for nearly
two months, during which time no exertion was spared to
extend and perfect the works that defended the interior
harbor.

The incessant battering to which the monitors had been ex-
posed while bearing their part in reducing Wagner and Sum-
ter, required considerable repair in order to fit them to endure
the fire of works far more formidable than Wagner; and the
scanty resources of the improvised workshops at Port Royal
did not permit this being effected with the promptness that
would have been very easy at New York, or other cities with
large establishments. Material had to be brought from a dis-
tance, and machinery and tools; and workmen could hardly
be obtained here in great numbers, when they were scarce at
the North at any prices.

Moreover, all the monitors could not have been removed
from Charleston and put under repair at the same time, be-
cause a certain number was absolutely indispensable at Charles-
ton to prevent the Rebel iron-clads from coming out.

The bottoms of the monitors had also become so foul that
their speed was reduced to three or four knots, a very material
consideration in battle. And besides the repair, there were
certain additional pieces to be put on to strengthen the con-
struction, which work I found in progress when I took the
command, and necessarily caused to be discontinued in order to commence operations.

2d. I was in expectation of additional monitors about the first of October; these were postponed from month to month by the failure of the contractors, and have never reached me to this date; for when they were finally completed, about the middle of April, they were needed in the James River, where they now are.

3d. It was not until late in October that Wagner and Gregg had been turned upon the Rebels and armed, so that their assisting fire was not available before that period.

It was, therefore, impossible to have moved with seven battered monitors upon the strong works which lined the approach to the city, without certain hazard to all that had been gained, and without any certainty of positive advantage. At the instance of the Navy Department I convened a council of the iron-clad Captains,—officers well experienced in the offensive power of their vessels and the defences of the Rebels. They were as follows:—

Commodores S. C. Rowan, commanding “Ironsides.”
Captain G. F. Emmons, Fleet Captain.
Commander Daniel Ammen, Special Staff duty, and formerly in command of the “Patapsco” (monitor) during attack on Sumter, April 7, 1863.
Commander F. H. Stevens, commanding “Patapsco.”
Commander A. Bryson, commanding “Lehigh.”
Commander E. R. Colhoun, commanding “Weehawken.”
Lieut.-Commander E. Simpson, commanding “Passaic.”
Lieut.-Commander J. L. Davis, commanding “Montauk.”
Lieut.-Commander J. Cilley, commanding “Knatskill.”
Lieut.-Commander J. J. Cornwell, commanding “Nahant.”

A full and unrestrained discussion took place, and the following propositions were voted on as follows:—

Would there be “extreme risk incurred without adequate results” by entering the harbor of Charleston with the seven monitors, the object being to penetrate to Charleston?

Ays, six; noes, four.
A COUNCIL OF THE IRON-CLAD CAPTAINS.

Should the "Ironsides" enter with the monitors?
Ays, four; noes, four; doubtful, two.

If the present force were not sufficient to enter the harbor, would it be advisable to co-operate with the Army in an attack on Sullivan's Island?
Ays, nine; noes, one.

Can Forts Moultrie and Johnson be reduced by the present force of iron-clads, unsupported by the Army?
Unanimously, no.

It will be understood, of course, that in thus speaking and deciding, the monitors were presupposed to be in good fighting order.

This, however, was not the case at the time, nor soon afterwards. My own opinions were not stated to the Council, and I took no further part in the deliberations than to state the question and regulate the order of business. In viewing the question of further operations, it was to be premised that the co-operation of the Army was at an end, and that whatever was to be done in attacking the interior defences was to be the work of the Navy alone. A view of the harbor showed what this was to be. On the right lay Sullivan's Island, with a continuous line of batteries from Bee, at the inner end, to Moultrie; somewhat further on, and to the left, Fort Johnson, a strong earthwork, with eight or nine 8\textsuperscript{th} and 10\textsuperscript{th} smooth and rifled cannon, supported seaward by Battery Simkins, and to the rear by Battery Cheves. Beyond Johnson some 1,500 yards was Wampler, with two 10\textsuperscript{th} guns, then Glover, and another earthwork, force not known. Nearly opposite Johnson was Fort Ripley, with two or three heavy guns.

These passed, we confront the city batteries. Ramsay, at the lower angle of the city, with seven heavy cannon; above it, on the Ashley, at Chisholm's Mills, is Battery Waring, with two heavy guns, and opposite, the battery defending the entrance to Wappoo.

Ascending the Cooper River on a wharf not far from White Point is the English 13\textsuperscript{th} (700 pdr.); at the foot of Lawrence Street another battery; and further on, lying somewhat back, is the Half Moon Battery. Castle Pinckney enters into the system, but has no material strength. Other batteries at Hab-
beell’s Point, Mt. Pleasant, &c., are on the right shore of the harbor, but would not be important in this connection, though their guns are heavy. There were also three iron-clads similar to the “Atlanta,” one of which, the “Charleston,” was new, and reported to be a better vessel. The torpedo defences cannot be accurately estimated, but the best information left no doubt that they were largely relied on by the Rebels as an important offensive element.

Under these circumstances, what could possibly result from the entrance of iron-clads alone? At the best, they could only drive the Rebels from the earthworks and silence their fire for the time, but they could not expect to destroy any one of the batteries. Day after day tons of shell had been expended on Wagner and Sumter and Moultrie; and yet cannon alone, whether in the vessels or in the trenches, had failed to give us possession of either. They were effective only to give the opportunity which the troops were to secure. If this was the case with Wagner, what must be expected at Johnson and its contiguous batteries, to which Wagner was insignificant? We know now that on the 8th of September the incessant fire of the “Ironsides” and five monitors for three hours had not hurt a man in Battery Bee, and only dismounted four guns of eighteen in Moultrie, some forty men being killed and wounded in the latter by a shell from the “Weehawken” plunging into a pile of loaded shells, inflicting more injury on the garrison than the direct fire of all the other vessels. This established fact, together with what was witnessed daily at Wagner, gave no encouragement that the seven monitors could produce any permanent effect on the interior batteries unless there were troops acting concurrently to take advantage of the effect produced by their guns; and upon this proposition the Council was unanimous. The iron-clads might steam in and make a promenade of the harbor, suffering much damage and inflicting little, and then retire.

But to remain in would only be a useless expenditure of valuable vessels which could not soon be replaced. Some thought that if the iron-clads could occupy a position near the city it would compel the Rebels to abandon their exterior defenses lying seaward. An inspection of the locality would show that
this could not possibly apply to James Island or Sullivan's Island; and if not to them, to what?

The truth is, that the entrance of the iron-clads could only make sure of the destruction of the city,—and not this without undue risk, if there were only monitors. The act itself could not be objected to by the Rebels, for it was understood to be their intent to destroy the place themselves rather than that we should occupy it. If so, it was quite as logical that we should destroy it rather than they should occupy it.

At all events, upon the proposition to enter and penetrate to the city, the vote in Council of War stood six to four; and with the majority all the senior officers voted, including my next in command, Commodore Rowan.

At one time General Gillmore agreed, if he could be reinforced, to co-operate against James Island; but he told me that additional troops were refused, and there it ended.

And thus the winter passed away, in close blockade, and in restoring the monitors to good fighting condition.

I was called to Washington upon the business of my command, and when I returned, found the seven monitors at disposal. It was the first time since taking command, in July, 1863, that all the iron-clads of the squadron were in good fighting order. It was reported that the Rebels had been active, improving the defences of Sumter, and mounting some heavy guns on the channel front.

It occurred to me as a fitting opportunity to bring into action the iron-clad squadron, and I submitted the question to a council of the iron-clad Captains, as follows:

Commodore S. C. Rowan, commanding "Ironsides."
Captain J. F. Green, to command the monitor "Nahant."
Commander J. H. Cooper, commanding "Sangamon."
Commander N. B. Harrison, commanding "Kaatskill."
Lieut.-Commander E. Simpson, commanding "Passaic."
Lieut.-Commander J. M. Bradford, Fleet Captain.
Lieut.-Commander William Gibson, commanding "Lehigh."
Lieut.-Commander S. B. Luce, commanding "Nantucket."
Lieut.-Commander J. L. Davis, commanding "Montauk."

After a full discussion, it was decided, by a vote of seven to two, that it was not advisable, with the present force of iron-
clads, viz., seven monitors and the "Ironsides," to attempt the reduction of the offensive and defensive powers of Sumter, as now existing,—having due regard to the general interests in this quarter intrusted to this squadron,—to the consequences that would ensue in the event of a serious disaster to the ironclads, and to the views of the Navy Department set forth in communications dated Oct. 9 and Nov. 2, 1863. Among the majority were the senior officers, Commodore Rowan, Captain Green, Commanders Cooper and Harrison.

The Committee will perceive, therefore, that in refraining from entering the harbor of Charleston, with a view to interior operations, with such force as I could command, I was supported by the opinions of the ablest naval officers about me.

At the same time, if the judgment of those who can give the order inclines to a different view, it is only necessary to give me that order, and it shall be obeyed to the fullest extent, for nothing will so well accord with my feelings. I have now laid before the Committee the principal points that present themselves to my mind at this time, not by any means as I would wish to do, but as well as the demands of the public service permit.

It may seem to the Committee that sufficient time has elapsed, since my statement was required, to have expressed myself to the fullest extent; but since that, the affliction of losing my gallant son, Colonel Ulric Dahlgren, and the never-ceasing cares of a command like this, have not allowed me that opportunity for correcting misapprehensions which I might have properly desired.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,

JNO. A. DAHLGREN,
Rear-Admiral Commanding Naval Forces off the Coasts of South Carolina and Georgia.
CHAPTER XVIII.

OFF CHARLESTON. — A LETTER OF ADMIRAL DAHLGREN TO THE NAVY DEPARTMENT.

Before closing the narrative of the combined operations off Charleston as connected with the command of General Gillmore, and in pursuance of our repeatedly expressed intention to let Admiral Dahlgren continuously speak for himself in the account of these movements, we shall now give to the public a letter which Admiral Dahlgren addressed to the Navy Department after the War of the Rebellion had closed, and which he had desired the Secretary of the Navy to publish in explanation of his course, and as a defence of the Navy in answer to malicious attacks made against it. But the Navy Department seems to have lacked at the time the moral courage to assume fearlessly the full responsibility of all its actions, which this publication must have involved, and the letter was read and returned to Admiral Dahlgren.

We hold the manuscript in our possession, thus indorsed by the Admiral: —

Withdrawn Nov. 8, 1865, the Department objecting to the introduction of Dupont and the opinions of officers, and to those parts where it is assumed, or seems to be so, that the Department did not send vessels enough.—J. A. D.

In other words, the Department was too inimical and revengeful in feeling to Dupont to be just, or to be
willing to have him relieved in any measure through any act of theirs, of any possible effect resulting from their continuous displeasure.

The opinions quoted of officers of experience did not always coincide with these views.

Moreover, Admiral Dahlgren had suffered in silence, during the course of his command, the utmost malice of his enemies, the libellous attacks of the press, instigated by the schemes and interests of others, with which his patriotic course often came in conflict; and he had, on account of the dire need of the nation in its hour of utmost peril, held his peace before the public. But now the time surely had come, the war ended, to vindicate himself and the action of the Navy under his command. So he thought, when this letter was written; and his widow, the writer, well remembers the bitterness of disappointment he expressed when his letter was withdrawn. He had all through his command off Charleston acted strictly under the views of the Department in desisting from making an assault with his iron-clads, and had borne the entire burden of reproach for what was often misunderstood before the public. The Department never once had the magnanimity to come forward and say: "We are responsible. This is our policy. We have sent our force of iron-clads, which were first promised to Dahlgren, to Farragut and then to Porter, and to aid in other movements where we thought they were more needed, and left just the force requisite before Charleston to carry out our own policy." But no; this course might have been unpopular for the administration, and it was safer to the last, so long as the enduring patriotism of Dahlgren would permit, to let him bear the entire onus. This endurance lasted with his life, and for a decade of years beyond that time have his
detractors been unanswered. Yet, a score of years is but a day for history, and now that men can begin, perhaps, to form a dispassionate judgment, the full record must appear.

"An honest tale speeds best, being plainly told."

We give the letter, hitherto suppressed and unpublished: —

WASHINGTON, Oct. 16, 1865.

The Hon. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy.

SIR,—My attention has been drawn to a report by General Gillmore, purporting to give an account of the operations on Morris Island, in 1863, which in its general tenor, as well as by particular statements, is calculated to produce very erroneous impressions in regard to the conduct of naval affairs about that time.

It was reasonable to suppose that under the circumstances he would have omitted no fact or information that was likely to be important to a fair conclusion; but on the contrary I find much left out, or so partially stated that it is impossible to judge correctly of the causes that unavoidably influenced the course of naval operations there.

My belief is, that if these causes had been fully and properly considered by General Gillmore, he never could have reached the conclusion which he has taken so much time to support by partial statements.

Or if he had stated all the facts of the case in connection with that conclusion, there would have been less necessity for this communication, as the fallacy of his views would have been accompanied by some correction.

It seems to be my duty, therefore, to supply the principal of these omissions, and to point out their effect on the questions which he has so gratuitously chosen to raise for the first time some eighteen months after the events referred to, under circumstances that should withhold from him all claim to courtesy of treatment. The propriety of sending our iron-clads into the harbor of Charleston at the time suggested by General Gillmore depended entirely on the state of the Rebel defences,
according to my most reliable information, the efficacy of the force that could be brought to bear on them, and the probability of accomplishing some useful purpose.

One of these conditions is explained very imperfectly by General Gillmore; the second is not even alluded to, though information was not wanting; while the impracticability of the undertaking would have been manifest from an inspection of the map, in connection with the foregoing.

It may be premised that no experiment was possible short of committing the force sent in to a decisive result; and if this were unfavorable, it would not be easy to estimate the extent or gravity of the disaster, not only to the iron-clads, but to the national interests in this quarter.

Success and safety were equivalent terms; and to attain either, it was indispensable that the vessels should be able to silence permanently the batteries, or else to pass beyond them and control the supplies of fuel and of ammunition which their consumption required, until the troops could render the assistance which General Gillmore promised.

If they failed to accomplish either, there were probabilities of great loss before they could be extricated from the harbor.

A review of the hostile defences as they appeared to us at the time, and of the iron-clad force then at my disposal, will furnish means for judging whether in the exercise of a sound discretion it would have been judicious to risk this only sea-going iron-clad squadron of the Union upon a movement that held out no prospect of an adequate result, when the course of operations was leading the combined forces to the acquisition of substantial advantages.

In naval as in military proceedings, the force and position of the enemy are seldom if ever known with perfect precision, but are to be approximated from what may be observed or collected from the accounts of deserters, scouts, and other sources. On the 23d of August, 1863, the commencement of the period alleged by General Gillmore to have been most suitable for a successful achievement by the vessels, the most persistent efforts by land and water had only impaired the enemy's defences to the extent of battering Sumter from one shape into another, and reducing the offensive power of its heavy artillery,
but had been unavailing to drive out its garrison, or prevent them from covering the obstructions at the entrance by means of light guns and musketry. These were, therefore, as formidable as ever, stretching across the channel in the shape of entanglements to foul the propellers, and torpedoes to break the bottoms of the monitors,—the heavy batteries of Sullivan’s Island defending them on one side; on the other, the light guns and musketry of Sumter, with perhaps a few heavy guns in the lower casemates.

Wagner still stood defiant, keeping back our troops from the complete possession of its end of Morris Island, and to all appearance quite as capable as ever of doing so.

The morale of the men a few days later is best described by General Gillmore. “The dark and gloomy days of the siege were now upon us. Our daily losses, although not heavy, were on the increase, while our progress became discouragingly slow and even fearfully uncertain.”

Opposite to Sumter were the powerful batteries of Sullivan’s Island, thus imperfectly represented by General Gillmore (sec. 5): “It [Fort Moultrie] is a brick work, mounting one tier of guns en barbette. Its armament in the autumn of 1860 consisted of sixteen 24-pdrs., fourteen 32-pdrs., ten 8\" Columbiads, five 8\" sea-coast howitzers, and seven field-pieces.” Sec. 10: “Additional guns were mounted on Fort Moultrie, and it was otherwise very materially strengthened.” The officers of the squadron, who by sight and actual test of battle were so familiar with these works, will hardly recognize in the above description the massive ramparts of sand behind which had disappeared the feeble old brickwork that would have crumbled away before the fire of our iron-clads, nor the heavy batteries of Bee and Beauregard that flanked Moultrie on either hand. Much less could they have conceived that the heavy shot, which told even on the iron-clads, came from works principally armed with 24-pdrs. and 32-pdrs.

The offensive power and capacity of these works had been well established in the actions with the iron-clads that occurred on the 23d and 31st August and 1st September, but more particularly on the 7th and 8th September, 1863, when the whole power of the “Ironsides” and five monitors was expended on
them without affecting any permanent injury, giving good
ground for the unanimous opinion of the council of officers
which a little later unanimously affirmed that neither Moultrie
nor Johnson was reducible by the iron-clads present, unless sup-
ported by the Army.

The position of the entanglement was well defined by the
buoys, which were almost always visible from the advanced
monitors stretching across the entrance. Their character was
variously reported by deserters. Some described them as boom
obstructions; others, that they were of rope. Subsequently,
there was reason to think that both were right, different kinds
having been used at different times.

The presence of torpedoes was also reported, and we had
had some experience of their use by the enemy prior to the
period in question. One had exploded on the side of the
“Montauk” during the attack by Captain Worden on the “Nash-
ville,” near Fort McAllister, February 28. The “Weehawken”
touched on one during the attack of April 7, 1863. The
“Pawnee” had been reached by some in the Stono that came
down the river. One destroyed her launch, another exploded
near the ship, two were picked up by the boats of a mortar-
schooner, and about the same time a boat was captured with a
platform for the torpedoes; this was in August.

General Gillmore also contributed to my stock of intelli-
gence. Thus, on August 4, is the following telegram, which
I do not find in the list that he published: “Admiral Dahl-
gren. My scout has just reported that the line of floating
buoys reaching from Sumter to Moultrie has disappeared since
yesterday. These buoys are supposed to have torpedoes at-
tached to them. He also reports that a large ship near the
city changed her position once or twice to-day and loosened
her canvas. She may be about to try the blockade, and the
obstacles may have been temporarily removed to give her fair
egress.” This disappearance does not seem to have been re-
ported by the pickets of the squadron; at all events, Ensign
Porter, who was specially employed in observation, telegraphed
me some days after, that “two steamers and three schooners
were at anchor in the centre of the channel, apparently at work
on the obstructions, or else sinking others.”
EFFICACY OF TORPEDOES USED.

Such intelligence did not often come in a recorded form, as given above, but still it is a fair sample of what did come frequently and irregularly by word. It was also in accord with the impressions of other naval officers who had served here. When Admiral Dupont moved upon Sumter in April, the progress of the iron-clads was barred by just such impediments. He says, in his report of the action: "At ten minutes past two the 'Weehawken,' the leading vessel, signalled obstructions in her vicinity, and soon after approached very close to them." Not being able to pass the obstructions, the "Weehawken" and successively the "Passaic," "Nahant," and others were obliged to turn.

The torpedoes that were used in connection with the entanglement at the entrance were presumed to be of the floating kind, some of which had been picked up in Stono and elsewhere. They were held a fathom or more beneath the surface, could not be seen, and were almost impossible at detection even when nothing interfered with the search; though liable to be swept away by the tide, they could yet be replaced in a few hours with great facility, even during the night. The locality of these obstacles was always closely watched by the Rebels, to prevent our disturbing them.²

The presumed efficacy of these torpedoes against the flat bottoms of the monitors was afterwards exemplified when the "Patapsco" struck one while covering an attempt to remove the obstructions. The monitor sank instantly, with more than half her crew. This torpedo was one of several that had been placed purposely, under the belief that some move was contemplated by the iron-clads.

Other experience has demonstrated that this was not an exceptional case, but that the effect of a torpedo might be relied on to a certain extent. The Navy has sustained many losses in this way, among them the following: —

¹ 1863.
² It was afterwards ascertained that men were constantly employed in the fabrication of torpedoes and in replacing them. Numbers were also kept ready to lay down wherever the vessels were expected. Sixty of them were found when we entered at different parts of the shore, and many had, no doubt, been destroyed. — J. A. D.
Beyond the entrance were placed other batteries, in case an attacking force should succeed in passing so far. My information of these was by no means so complete as that in regard to the works at the entrance; some of them being hidden from view by intervening objects, and others too distant to be seen as distinctly from the outer roads as could be wished.

The nearest of the interior works was Fort Johnson and its dependencies, of which General Gillmore gives the following insufficient description (p. 9, sec. 11): "Old Fort Johnson, on James Island, was rebuilt, and armed with a few heavy guns and mortars." Sec. 12: "Several batteries were also established on the shell beach, running in a southeasterly direction from Fort Johnson." As the old work was of brick, the ordinary inference would be that it was rebuilt of the same material, which was certainly not the case, for the new works were of earth, and of the most approved construction, stretching down to the water's edge as seen from the Roads, and not even on the site of the old work. A large bomb-proof was also visible; it was reported to be very strong, with heavy traverses. The accounts agreed that the work was armed heavily, but varied as to the number of guns.1

The narrow sandspit running out from these batteries showed several small batteries,—Haskell, Simkins, &c.,—the armaments of which were variously reported.

1 The report of the commanding officer shows that heavy guns were mounted as early as the attack in April, and during the assault of Sumter opened heavily, as I witnessed. — J. A. D.
Opposite Fort Johnson, and plainly in sight, a double row of piles ran across the middle ground, and inside of these was Fort Ripley, placed near the edge of the channel where the water was shoalest.

Two heavy guns were mounted on it. The chief merit of this work was that it crossed fire with Johnson and its dependencies.

The shore line from Fort Johnson towards the city was not in view from the Roads, being hidden by intervening objects. Our knowledge of the batteries located there was therefore limited to the intelligence received by deserters and others. Battery Glover, opposite White Point, was known to exist; but accounts varied so much as to the batteries which might be between Glover and Fort Johnson, that little more than the existence of some works there could be admitted.

In the city, the principal battery was at White Point, which, like Castle Garden at New York, terminates the tongue of land on which the city stands.

This might be seen from an advanced position in the Roads; but the distance and the vapory exhalations that often beset objects near the water interfered with any degree of precision. Its character and force, as well as those of other city batteries, were only to be gathered from the various accounts which came out to us.

Castle Pinckney, on the line of the Cooper River, was only of importance in connection with the other batteries in the harbor.

The impressions made on the mind of a British officer (Lieutenant-Colonel Freemantle) as he viewed the harbor from Fort Sumter on the 9th June, one month prior to the attack on Morris Island, are thus briefly given in his work published early in 1864: "In fact, both sides of the harbor for several miles appear to bristle with forts mounting heavy guns."

The interior channels were reported to be obstructed in many places by means of timber frames mounting torpedoes, or by other contrivances; the rows of piles were visible, and floating torpedoes were also stated to be in use, as well as some large boiler torpedoes sunk on the bottom.
MEMOIR OF JOHN A. DAHLGREN.

I am not aware that the accounts thus received were ever materially contradicted by subsequent accounts, or that from subsequent examination there was reason to believe them exaggerated.

In addition to the batteries, torpedoes, and obstructions, were three iron-clads, which could render substantial assistance under many contingencies of general action, and, being movable, could be placed in any position where their cannon would be useful, amounting in all to fourteen pieces, most of them rifled.

NUMBER AND CONDITION OF THE IRON-CLADS.

On the 23d August there were present off Charleston the "Ironsides" and five monitors. One monitor was at Wassaw blockading the Rebel ram "Savannah," and another monitor ("Kaatskill") was under repair at Port Royal, the top of her pilot-house having been fractured on the 17th August by a shot from Wagner, which killed Captain George Rodgers and another officer.

All of these monitors had been under steam for six or seven months, and their bottoms were so foul with incrustations of oysters, grass, &c., as to reduce their speed materially. Even in April, four months previous, their commanders stated that they were "scarcely able to go more than four knots, and some of them not even that." Consequently, as the foulness must have increased in four months, it is fairly to be inferred that in August their rate of going had been further diminished.

The experience of April 7 had indicated the necessity of further precautions against shot, such as increased thickness of the pilot-house, additions at the base of the turret to guard against damages that would hinder the turning of the turret, &c.; and when I took command the work had commenced on three monitors. To meet the urgent demands of General Gillmore for that assistance which he now announces he could have dispensed with, I put a stop to further proceedings, and three of the monitors went into action with incisions below the turret unprotected by the addition that was to cover them.
The iron-clads had been repeatedly engaged with the Rebel batteries (on sixteen occasions, from 10th July to 23d August), and were certainly not improved by the battering they received.

One of the five monitors present had the use of but one gun, the other being disabled by fractured trunnions; in another the rifle 8-inch was cracked, and liable to be entirely disabled; the total number of guns carried by all the iron-clads present was twenty-six, of which but twenty-four were serviceable, and the broadside power or number of cannon that could be brought to bear on one object was sixteen, being only two thirds of the number that was in action on the 7th April. Of this indispensable condition to any opinion, General Gillmore abstains from saying a word, although on the 21st August I had incidentally apprised him of the number present and the partial disability of one.

In considering the propriety of attacking land batteries with vessels, the line of the shore and the positions may enter largely into the question. Isolated or unsupported batteries on a regular beach, with no particular intricacies of navigation where vessels approach and withdraw at pleasure, may always be engaged without much risk, as the vessels can retire as soon as they sustain much injury; but in order to enter a harbor with a narrow entrance, where batteries are placed in succession and support each other along the whole extent, success is indispensable to safety.

In this respect few harbors possess as great advantage as that of Charleston. Vessels intending to enter must steer directly for Sullivan's Island, and are consequently enfiladed by its batteries from the moment they come within range.

Under this fire they advance quite close to the island, and then turn sharply to port for the passage between it and Sumter.

At the very focus of fire from all the contiguous batteries are the entanglements and torpedoes which are to embarrass and detain some of the vessels so as to compel them to do battle there, or, if they pass, to do so with a diminished and injured force.

1 1863.
To attempt to extricate them under such a fire would only end in failure.

Whichever vessels succeed in going on, now steer to port, pivoting on Sumter, and steer directly for Fort Johnson, receiving its fire directly ahead, while their sterns receive those of Sullivan's Island and Mt. Pleasant, and the two rifled guns about the western angle of Sumter (lower casemates) open abeam. On this course also lie the heavy boiler torpedoes, said to contain two or three thousand pounds of powder.

Still advancing, Fort Johnson and its dependent works are soon engaged at close range, while Ripley opens on the starboard bow, and the works westward of Johnson on the port bow. Ahead, the city batteries will soon begin, and Castle Pinckney.

Approaching the city, the fire of Ripley and Johnson is left astern, Glover on the port bow, White Point and the city batteries ahead, and Pinckney on the right hand.

Ashley River is not to be entered, because of the heavy timber frames across it mounting torpedoes; and the iron-clads have to turn up the Cooper River if they care to get beyond the fire that has pursued their entire course.

The Rebel iron-clads have probably remained near the city, and many recede before us into the Wando, using their guns as the opportunity offers.

The whole of this operation has to be executed along a winding channel lined on each side by shoals, which are easy enough to be avoided when marked by buoys, assisted by a free, open vision with the use of landmarks and the compass; but under the circumstances now considered, the buoys have been removed; compasses are not available in the iron-clads, the landsman cannot give the soundings, and the landmarks are only briefly and partially visible through the narrow slits in the pilot-houses.

These difficulties were more or less experienced on the 7th April, even in the comparatively open navigation outside the entrance.

The gallant and lamented Captain Drayton reports: "You (Admiral Dupont) probably observed in the 'Ironsides' the great difficulty of managing these vessels and keeping them
clear of each other and the bottom, with the limited power of vision which the holes in the pilot-house afford; and when to this is added the smoke, I consider it a piece of great good luck that none of us got ashore, or received injury from collision."

Captain Worden, well known for his combat with the Rebel ram "Merrimac," who commanded the monitor "Montauk" in the attack of 7th April, says: "I desire to say that I experienced serious embarrassment in managing my vessel in the narrow and uncertain channel with the limited means of observation afforded from the pilot-house, under the rapid and concentrated fire from the forts, the vessels of the fleet close around me, and neither compass nor buoys to guide me."

Captain Ammen, who commanded the monitor "Patapsco," says: "I think a want of vision one of the most serious defects of this class," &c.

It was into this embayed position, defended by successive batteries of heavy cannon, supporting each other so that no one could be attacked by vessels without receiving the fire of others and covering all available anchorage by the play of several of them, that General Gillmore now avers that he would have precipitated the small force of iron-clads, some of which would be in danger of detention from the main body by the obstructions or torpedoes, and all more or less liable to ground on some of the shoals that line the channel.

Plain common sense obviously enjoined that to obtain any result, the force which entered should be large enough to suffer probable diminution from these causes, and remain strong enough to engage the batteries with a fair chance of success.

I have already assumed that this would only be attained by silencing permanently the enemy's batteries, or by passing them with the certainty of receiving from outside whatever fuel and ammunition would be required by the daily consumption. First, Was there any probability, from past experience, that the six iron-clads could have so disabled any one of the earthworks in the harbor as to silence it permanently? Certainly no naval officer cognizant of such matters would reply affirmatively, and a glance at the practice here will put all doubt at rest.
Thus Fort Wagner was a sound work of no great extent, and constructed in the same fashion as the other earthworks about Charleston. In a naval point of view it was isolated, and unsupported by any fire that was important to an iron-clad. At the utmost but four of its guns bore on the water, and two of these were severe on plating. It was approachable at pleasure, and could be left with equal facility.

On the 10th July four monitors pounded it all day, continued the same next day, and on the 18th the "Ironsides" and five monitors battered it seemingly out of shape, while forty-one light pieces were at work from the land, some of which were light calibre.

A persistent assault in force by our troops immediately followed, which the enemy repulsed with loss.

By the 23d August, a period of forty-four days, the iron-clads and gunboats had cannonaded this work on twenty-five occasions, besides what was done by the land batteries; and yet it still stood defiant.

Fort Wagner was finally abandoned on the night of the 6th September, because the sap had been run into its ditch, and assault could not have failed.

In addition to the battering already described from land and ship batteries, was the following, as stated officially:

"Colonel Turner reports to General Gillmore that on the 5th September Wagner was opened on from the land batteries with one 10\textsuperscript{th} (300-pdr.) rifle; four 8\textsuperscript{th} (200-pdr.) rifles; nine 100-pdr. rifles; ten 30-pdr. rifles; ten 10\textsuperscript{th} mortars," &c. This fire was sustained all of that day and on the 6th.

On the 5th the iron-clads opened, and on the 6th kept up a steady fire from the "Ironsides" and monitors with six XV\textsuperscript{th}, or twenty heavy cannon in broadside.

General Gillmore thus describes the cannonade: "These final operations against Fort Wagner were actively inaugurated at the break of day on the morning of September 5. For forty-two consecutive hours the spectacle presented was of surpassing sublimity and grandeur. Seventeen siege and Coehorn mortars unceasingly dropped their shells into the work over the heads of our sappers and the guards of the advanced trenches. Thirteen of our heavy Parrott rifles, 100, 200, and 300-pdr.s,
pounded away at short though regular intervals at the southwest angle of the bomb-proof, while during the daytime the 'New Ironsides,' with remarkable regularity and precision, kept an almost incessant stream of X1\textsuperscript{st} shells from her eight-gun broadside."

The monitor fire does not seem to the General to be worth mention. It might reasonably be supposed that such a storm of fire would have levelled the work, destroyed its guns, and rendered it untenable by a living soul.

Its actual condition, however, is thus stated by Colonel Turner (p. 146): "Notwithstanding the heavy fire of this bombardment, together with all the fire Fort Wagner had been subject to since the commencement of our attack, from land and naval batteries, its defences were not materially injured. Our fire of rifle shells on the 5th and 6th inst., at the bomb-proof, did little or no damage."

General Seymour, who led the two assaults of the 11th and 18th July, says that "the effect of the firing, ashore as well as afloat," was practically "nothing in disturbing the defensive capacities of Wagner. . . . The symmetry of the work was somewhat disarranged,—nothing more," &c.

Nor did the armament of the work appear to be permanently injured more than its ramparts and traverses; in general, its guns were ready to recommence as soon as the vessels were.

General Gillmore is also pleased to observe that "it reflects no discredit on our Navy to say that Fort Wagner, with its garrison covered as it was by a secure bomb-proof, and with facilities for keeping its supplies of men, ammunition, and guns unimpaired, could never have been reduced by a naval force or any other means than those adopted, viz., by sapping up to the ditch of the work, and then assaulting or threatening an assault from the advanced trenches."

From the best intelligence that reached us, there was every reason to believe that the interior works presented similar construction, at least to naval attack, and were of greater extent in that respect than Wagner, and that their armaments were more numerous in heavy calibres, which was also fairly to be inferred; for if we found this mere outpost so well prepared to resist of itself our utmost efforts when comparatively surprised
at the first attack, would not the six weeks that elapsed be-
tween that event and the cannonade of Sumter be turned to
account in improving and strengthening the inner defences?¹
To conclude otherwise was to suppose a degree of imbecility
which had no warrant in the energy and completeness of the
Rebel defence of Wagner.

Assuming, then, as there was every propriety in doing, that
the principal works within were more formidable to naval
attack than Wagner, and no one of them less so except Ripley
and Pinckney, also that they support each other, it was evident
from the experience against Wagner that there was not the
remotest probability of silencing permanently any one of the
land batteries of the harbor by means of the iron-clad fire
alone. For it is out of the question that the Army would
then be able to give any support, either by its cannon or its
bayonets.

If, then, this squad of six vessels, which General Gillmore
prefers to call a fleet, could not disable or silence permanently
any of these batteries, it must either pass beyond their fire or
withdraw from the harbor; and these, under the circumstan-
ces, were the real conditions. To go above and out of reach of
the enemy’s guns required that the vessels should ascend the
Cooper River, or even into its tributary, the Wando; where, it
must be admitted, that if they were entirely out of reach of the
hostile batteries, they were equally so of supplies of fuel and
ammunition,—just when a steady replenishment of both was
indispensable to them.

To do this might have been to sacrifice the iron-clads, and as
it was clear that no good effect could have been produced on the
earthworks, the result of the trial so clearly to be anticipated
must have ended in the withdrawal of the vessels that could be
extricated from the situation.

In this connection may here be introduced the opinions of
naval officers upon the question generally of entering the harbor
in order to attack its defences.

In April, 1863, Rear-Admiral Dupont reported that he

¹ Under date of August 21 the Rebel General Ripley reports: “Our
works of preparation on the interior lines have steadily progressed.” —
J. A. D.
"crossed the bar" with the "Ironsides," seven monitors, and the iron-clad "Keokuk," "intending to proceed the same day to the attack of Fort Sumter, and thence to the city of Charleston." It was the next day before the design could be prosecuted. On approaching the entrance, indications of obstructions were unmistakable, signalled from the leading vessel, the "Weehawken."

The Admiral says: "Not being able to pass the obstructions, the 'Weehawken' and successively the 'Passaic,' 'Nahant,' and others, were obliged to turn," &c.

Commodore Rodgers, so justly distinguished afterwards for his capture of the Rebel ram "Atlanta," reports: "We approached very close to the obstructions extending from Fort Sumter to Fort Moultrie. . . . The appearance was so formidable that, upon deliberate judgment, I thought it right not to entangle the vessel in obstructions which I did not think we could have passed through, and in which we should have been caught."

Captain Worden states: "Some minutes later, the flood-tide having made, and setting the vessel close to some formidable-looking obstructions (which I deemed it highly important to avoid)," &c., as soon as "I could get my vessel under control, which it was quite difficult to do in avoiding the other vessels," &c.

Captain Ammen, a very experienced officer, then commanding the "Patapsco," says: "At that time, or before, I discovered several rows of buoys above us. . . . Endeavoring to turn, a ship's length short of the 'Montauk,' one found the headway of the vessel cease, and that she no longer obeyed the helm. Backing, we got off," &c.

In view of all the circumstances, as observed by himself and reported by his officers, Admiral Dupont arrived at the opinion (April 8) "that Charleston cannot be taken by a purely naval attack, and the Army could give him no co-operation. Had I succeeded in entering the harbor, I should have had 1,200 men and 32 guns," &c.

Subsequently, in a more detailed report, he says: "Any attempt to pass through the obstructions I have referred to would have entangled the vessels, and held them under the most
severe fire of heavy ordnance that has ever been delivered; and while it is barely possible that some vessels might have forced their way through, it would only have been to be again impeded by fresh and more formidable obstructions, and to encounter other powerful batteries with which the whole harbor of Charleston has been lined.

"I had hoped that the endurance of the iron-clads would have enabled them to have borne any weight of fire to which they might have been exposed; but when I found that so large a portion of them were wholly or one half disabled by less than an hour's engagement, before attempting to remove the obstructions or testing the power of the torpedoes, I was convinced that persistence in the attack would only result in the loss of the greater portion of the iron-clad fleet, and in leaving many of them inside the harbor, to fall into the hands of the enemy. The slowness of our fire, and our inability to occupy any battery we might silence,¹ or to prevent its being restored under cover of night, were difficulties of the gravest character; and until the outer forts should have been taken, the Army could not enter the harbor or afford any assistance."

Six of the monitor Captains also addressed a communication to the Department on the subject of the attack, in which they state: "And even supposing this point passed [Sumter and the obstructions], there still remained to go over more than three miles of water before reaching the city, part of which we could see was obstructed by piles, and all of which offered the utmost convenience for torpedoes, cables, and every other known means of stopping an advancing naval force, to say nothing of the guns."

The remaining Monitor Commander, Captain Worden, had already written thus: "After testing the weight of the enemy's fire, and observing the obstructions, I am led to believe that Charleston cannot be taken by the naval force now present."

These were the opinions which were then entertained by the best naval authorities. Between that date and the 22d August, Sumter had been battered into another shape, so that it could

¹ Admiral Dupont had not the subsequent experience, and only assumed that he could not occupy even if he were able to silence. — J. A. D.
not exert as severe a fire on the iron-clads as that which galled them on the 7th April, but it was still competent to shelter a garrison that could protect the obstructions from removal by boats or steam-tugs, and cover the parties sent by night to renew whatever had been carried away by the tide or cut by our scouts.

The Sullivan's Island batteries had in all probability been strengthened, and had received a portion of the guns from Sumter, which it is but reasonable to suppose had also been done with the interior works. Indeed, this is confirmed by subsequent information. General Ripley, in a report dated August 21, says: "The report given above contains the principal active operations of the defence and attack up to the evening of the 20th. During the time included in it our works of preparation on the interior lines have steadily progressed.

"The batteries and shelters on Sullivan's Island have advanced to completion, and the heavy guns and mortars which have been received and secured from Fort Sumter have been placed in position," &c.

Important change had also occurred in the capacity of the attack; the iron-clad force having been reduced by the monitors and the plated "Keokuk," while two of the remaining monitors were each disabled in a gun. The relative power of attack was certainly, therefore, not improved.

On the 22d of October, however, it was in a much more favorable condition. The batteries of Wagner and Cumming's Point were ready to contribute that "heavy artillery fire" which General Gillmore had promised to cover the operations of entering. Some of the monitors had received partial repair; there was one more present. On the other hand, it is presumable that the defence had not been idle and had improved the interior works. Still, on the whole, the attack had gained in the relative condition. At this date a council of officers was convened by order of the Navy Department, when the whole subject of attack was discussed with perfect freedom. Ten commanding officers were present,—of the "Ironsides," the seven monitors, the Captain of the Fleet, and Captain Ammen of my staff, who had much experience in monitors, and com-
manded the "Patapsco" on the 7th April. This council first
decided that there "would be extreme risk incurred without
adequate results by entering the harbor of Charleston with the
seven monitors, the object being to penetrate to Charleston."
Whether the "Ironsides" should go in with the monitors, the
vote was divided thus: Ays, four; nays, four; doubtful, two.
"If the present force be insufficient to enter the harbor, would it
be advisable to co-operate with the Army in an attack on Sulli-
van's Island?" Ays, nine; nays, one. "Can Forts Moultrie
and Johnson be reduced by the present force of iron-clads un-
supported by the Army?" Unanimously, no.

About four months later (Feb. 3, 1864), Commodore Rodg-
ers replied to an inquiry by a Committee of the Senate, as
follows: "Ordinarily and popularly, to take a place means to
take its defences. General Gillmore was forty-eight days
on Morris Island acting against Fort Wagner, with some ten or
twelve thousand men against a garrison of about 1,500 men
or less, assisted by the monitors and by artillery, which excited
the wonder of Europe. After forty-eight days he took the
place, not by his artillery nor by monitors, but by making mili-
tary approaches and threatening to cut off their means of
escape and take the place by assault; and when he took it, it
was not so greatly damaged as to be untenable. Now, if General
Gillmore on the same island, assisted by his artillery and the
whole force of the monitors, in forty-eight days, could not cap-
ture Fort Wagner alone by them, it is perfectly certain that the
monitors alone never can take the much stronger defences
which line James Island and Sullivan's Island. In going up to
Charleston, therefore, he would have to run by the defences,
and leave the harbor, so far as they constitute the command of
it, in the power of the enemy; and when he got up to the city
he could not spare a single man from his monitors, even if
they should consent to receive him; and if he burned the town
he would burn it over the heads of non-combatant women and
children, while the men who defend it are away in the forts. I
should be reluctant to burn a house over a woman's and child's
head because her husband defied me. Dahlgren, if he burns
Charleston, will be called a savage by all Europe, and after the
heat of combat is over, he will be called a savage by our own
people. But there are obstructions in the way which render it doubtful whether he can get there. And if he goes up under the guns of those fortifications, sticks upon the obstructions, and is finally driven off by any cause, leaving one or two of his monitors there within their power, they will get them off, repair them, and send them out to what part of the coast they please, and give a new character to the war. The wooden blockade will be mainly at an end, unlimited cotton going out and unlimited supplies coming in. I see no good to compensate for that risk, except it be in satisfying the national mind that retributive justice has been done against the city of Charleston, the nursery of the Rebellion. He might possibly go up there and burn the town, in which there are no combatants, and a place which, in a purely military point of view, as far as I know, possesses no value. To do that, he risks losing vessels upon the obstructions, and if they should be so lost, and fell into the enemy's hands, a new phase will be given to the war. In a word, I do not think the game is worth the candle. Whether these reasons operate with him, I do not know; they would with me."

Another consideration entered largely into the question of entering the harbor,—the condition and prospects of our land forces acting on Morris Island. What these were, I could only infer from such facts as reached me by observation or otherwise. I had witnessed the failure of two assaults; the slow progress of the approaches; received and met repeated and urgent demands from General Gillmore for the fire of the vessels to cover and even protect his positions; had heard the current rumors of sickness in the camp; and was informed by General Gillmore that he had "lost thirty-three per cent, in killed, wounded, missing, and sick," of the force he began with. General Gillmore had also written me on the 22d July: "I feel, as doubtless you do, that thorough co-operation between the Army and Navy is desirable, and that neither branch of the service can at the present moment advance alone. Each has already failed once in the attempt to do so."

Appearances did not lead me, therefore, to expect that the operations of the Army could proceed without the co-operation
of the Navy even in reducing Wagner, much less in advancing from the lodgment there; and I was without any positive information from General Gillmore further than what concerned the measures required to insure the possession of Morris Island.

In keeping with the state of affairs were the views of the Department, so far as they positively indicated the object in view, through the order of June 6.

Under these circumstances, to send the iron-clads into the harbor would have been equivalent to depriving the Army of a useful auxiliary, and placing these vessels where they could not assist the Army nor the Army assist them. It was a division of forces almost tantamount to a dispersion.

From what is now disclosed by the Report of General Gillmore, it would appear that my judgment in this respect was not wide of the mark.

On the 10th August he says in this document that (sec. 135), "it was a question of grave doubt whether we could push forward our trenches much farther, with the advantages to all appearance so entirely on the side of the enemy." On the same day he wrote General Halleck: "The Army here, so long as it remains greatly inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, must remain defensively upon these sea islands."

On the 27th August he says: "The dark and gloomy days of the siege were now upon us. Our daily losses, though not heavy, were on the increase. A feeling of despondency began to pervade the rank and file of the command," &c.

I have endeavored to include in the foregoing a statement of the best intelligence that I had of these defences of the harbor; of the natural advantages which the shore line gave for the distribution of these defences, so that the batteries could be variously combined on the main channel, and give full effect to the natural cul-de-sac; the condition and force of the iron-clads which were to attack; some account of our experience in battering earthworks, showing how partial and limited was the effect of cannon only; what could be learned of the torpedoes and entanglements that were to act on the iron-clads when under heavy fire; and, finally, the best naval opinions that bore
directly on these very questions, all concurring in the correctness of the course pursued under the circumstances.

Additional to these conditions were the position and prospects of our land forces on Morris Island, which seemed to require the utmost aid that the ships were capable of.

To all this General Gillmore chooses to oppose a contrary opinion, and singularly enough selects a period (23d August to 8th September) for the separation of our forces, which of all others was probably the last to be chosen, an error arising from his reliance on one single condition,—the alleged lack of preparation, on the part of the enemy, in entirely disregarding the fact that it was also the moment when of all others the condition and position of his force and of mine clearly forbade any such movement, being least able to use the opportunity, even if it offered, which was by no means certain.

He seems to forget also that he himself had assigned particular conditions as necessary for the entrance of the fleet, which were,—his possession of Fort Wagner and Cumming's Point, and a "heavy artillery fire" from these positions, together with the demolition of Fort Sumter. The troops also were to assist the operations of the iron-clads after they had passed into the Cooper River, and then was to culminate this ingenious strategy. The enemy would evacuate Sullivan's Island. Of course it is well known that we had not possession of Wagner, nor the Point, on the 23d August, nor for fifteen days afterwards, therefore there could be no assisting fire from our guns on those positions. Demolished Sumter still held its garrison, and continued to do so for nearly two years, so as to protect the obstructions against all our attempts; while the troops were yet unable to take Wagner, and might remain so for some time, were inferior in numbers to the enemy on the 10th August, and therefore were bound to remain defensively on the sea island. How, then, could they assist the iron-clads, which in diminished force had been able to entrap themselves in the Wando?

The success which was to be achieved is left to surmise, and may be considered to be an anticipation of what is indicated as the result of entering at a later period. Of this I will speak in that connection hereafter.
THE PROGRAMME.

This idea of having the iron-clads to enter during those ten or fifteen decisive days does not appear to have been the original plan of General Gillmore; it was an afterthought, new to me, certainly, until I saw it in the report some eighteen months subsequently.

There was another plan by General Gillmore, which was, to take charge of the future movement of the iron-clads, though at the time it was also unknown to me. It forms the staple of the argument that pervades the narrative more or less, and is therefore to be considered.

(Page 16). "First, To make a descent upon and obtain possession of the south end of Morris Island, known to be occupied by the enemy, and then being strongly fortified by him offensively and defensively.

"Second, To lay siege to and reduce Fort Wagner. With Fort Wagner, the work on Cumming's Point would also fall.

"Third, From the position thus secured to demolish Fort Sumter, and afterwards co-operate with the fleet. When it was ready, to move in by a heavy artillery fire.

"Fourth, The monitors and iron-clads to enter, remove the channel obstructions, run by the batteries on James and Sullivan's Island, and reach the city."

I shall be sustained by all the information in my possession when I say that no such plan ever was agreed upon, as stated by General Gillmore. The views of the Department, as signified by its order of the 6th June, looked solely to a combined operation by land and water,—nothing more,—and this had my entire concurrence; it was the most judicious course that could be pursued after events had shown the perils of attacks purely military or naval, and the military part of General Gillmore's plan had not even the merit of originality when he was called to Washington late in May. For General Hunter had stood on the brink of the passage to Morris Island six months previous, anxious to begin the very work that at a later day was begun, with the same number of troops and the batteries in hand, but which did not previously proceed because General Hunter could not receive the very assistance that General Gill-
more so freely received at a later day, and then some eighteen months later announced that he did not need. So far as General Gillmore chose to venture, the vessels did go, and thus all that was promised in the way of co-operation was given and was successful.

Admiral Dupont had written to the Navy Department, after the attack of 7th April, "that Charleston could not be taken by a purely naval attack."

And to this the order of the Department of the 6th June seemed a direct reply,—"General Gillmore has been ordered to take charge of the Department of the South, and you will please afford him all the aid and assistance in your power in conducting his operations."

On the 4th and 5th July, when I first conferred with General Gillmore upon the business in hand, not a word was uttered by him regarding any plan that had been agreed on elsewhere, nor was mention made of any subject save co-operation against Morris Island. That alone was the subject of arrangement. What passed may be shown by the following extracts of a letter of the 7th July from General Gillmore, in which he says: "I will recapitulate the arrangements for co-operating already agreed upon by us, as follows:—

"1st. I am to attack Morris Island on Thursday morning next," &c.

"3d. The Navy is to enter the channel abreast of Morris Island early in the morning, say about sunrise," &c.

He concludes thus: "My desire that there should be a perfect and cordial understanding between us in these combined operations," &c.

It will be seen that all this is perfectly in accord with the course of previous events, and with the sense of the Department's order of the 6th June.

I knew nothing whatever of any other arrangement from General Gillmore then, nor during the operations against Morris Island, nor did I imagine that the combined operation was to cease until the 27th September, when I asked General Gillmore to assist me by opening fire on Sumter in order to drive out its garrison. That, my first request for assistance, was substantially rejected, and though for sixty days I had
faithfully contributed all that had been asked of me in support of the Army, the answer was equivalent to an intimation that I must rely on my own resources to reduce Charleston and its interior defences, while General Gillmore, with all his force, assisted by all mine, had only been able to occupy Morris Island in two months, and *demolish* Sumter after his own fashion.

When I read the report of General Gillmore, it was plain to me, from the very terms employed, that the writer had no authority for interpreting the intentions of the Navy Department into an agreement to follow a certain plan marked out by himself. On the contrary, the Department understand very differently the prospects held out in case he could be assisted to the occupation of Morris Island.

On the 9th October the Department apprised me, in the course of a general communication, that "Previous to his departure to assume his present command, General Gillmore stated that once in possession of Cumming's Point, he could thence reduce Forts Moultrie and Johnson. . . . *This opinion has probably undergone no change by what has since occurred," &c.

Such a result would have indeed brought about quickly a triumphant consummation of the national desire. Once in possession of those points, the iron-clads would have entered, and the fall of the city would have followed inevitably. As it was, with those strongholds and Sumter left in possession of the Rebels, the fourth item of the programme is a perfect *non sequitur* to the preceding three; a great operation by a divided force, which, when united, had only taken an outpost in sixty days.

It is the climax of absurdity to suppose that a military commander would have been permitted to dispose of a naval force so essential to the welfare of the country, without even consulting the naval commander, and I have no hesitation in affirming that no officer actually responsible for the conduct of naval affairs could have bound himself to any such plan.

I look upon it as undeniable, also, that if the Department had ever accepted the plan of General Gillmore as embraced in the four propositions, so as to make it a condition that the fleet
should enter from the harbor of Charleston on the attainment of certain results by General Gillmore, I would have been so informed.

It is also fairly to be supposed that if General Gillmore himself had at the time considered such a plan to have been agreed upon, he would have referred to it in the conferences on the subject of our joint operations, particularly at the first interview; but it will be seen, from the written recapitulation by himself of what passed on the occasion, that nothing of the kind was mentioned.

We have nothing absolute, even from the War Department, as to its understanding of the matter, for General Gillmore admits that he had no written instructions.

Finally, it seems that General Gillmore held out to the Navy Department a grander promise of what would ensue, if he were assisted by the Navy to the possession of Morris Island, than was contained in the plan now announced in his report.

Had he been able to realize such results as the capture of Johnson and Moultrie, there would have been no need of an extended argument to demonstrate what the Navy should have done upon a basis ridiculously small in comparison, yet not even fully supplied in one respect, and very tardily in another.

For instance, Fort Sumter was to be demolished, its offensive power destroyed, in the words of General Gillmore. He writes thus (sec. 26): "I had entertained the opinion that Fort Sumter could be reached and reduced, or its offensive power entirely destroyed," &c. Sec. 29: "The principal question was to what extent the fall of Sumter, or the destruction of its offensive power," &c. Sec. 31: "That stronghold once demolished, or its offensive power practically destroyed," &c. Sec. 33: "It was therefore determined to attempt the destruction of Fort Sumter," &c. Sec. 37: "From the position thus secured [Wagner and Cumming's Point], to demolish Fort Sumter," &c.

There can be no misunderstanding of the terms thus used; their signification is plain and direct. Fort Sumter, so far as it could be put to any use whatever in retarding or influencing our operations, was to be obliterated.
Now, in fact, the result of the cannonading up to the 23d August from the batteries beyond Wagner, and of October and November, from Wagner and the Point, failed to do more than deprive one of the forts at the entrance, of its principal power to injure the armor of the iron-clads. The work still possessed the capacity to do its part in driving off such a force as could undertake to remove the obstructions, and unless these were removed it was nearly certain that some of the iron-clads would be stopped from entering.

General Gillmore had no right whatever to qualify his own conditions, and assume that his part was fulfilled, when it was so evident that such was not the case, if the alleged agreement had ever indeed been made.

It is plain that the plan which General Gillmore alleges was agreed to by the Navy Department never was so accepted; and I think that a consideration of the part which he now assigns to the Navy will show conclusively that no naval authority ever would have bound itself thereto.

The fourth proposition of General Gillmore's plan required the fleet to be placed in the Cooper or Wando River, but does not explain what consequence was expected to follow. This is stated at page 17, sec. 39: "It was presumed that as soon as the fleet should reach the city, the outer line of defences thus broken through would be abandoned by the enemy; for, the control of the Cooper and Wando Rivers by our gunboats, and the operation of the land forces which they could then aid and cover, would compel the evacuation of Sullivan's Island," &c.

I have already made it plain that the iron-clads would have been entirely incompetent to disable permanently a single battery in the harbor. And it is to be observed, moreover, that this is not contemplated by General Gillmore, for his fourth proposition only requires that the iron-clads were "to run by the batteries." So that when in the Cooper or Wando, all the hostile batteries which had been passed remained intact, and interposed between the land forces on Morris Island and the iron-clads above the city,—to say nothing of the superior forces of the Rebels.

In this situation our iron-clads were to aid and cover the operation of the land forces.
DISCUSSION OF THE REPORT OF GEN. GILLMORE. 579

How this is to be done General Gillmore does not explain; and it certainly does not appear from any ordinary examination of the premises.\(^1\)

There would be three miles of channel between the divisions of our forces, entirely controlled by the enemy's batteries.

If the vessels in the Wando were to cover the operations of the troops, the latter must contrive to get within fair grape range. They would not follow the iron-clads, and the iron-clads could not take them on board. The junction of the divisions must therefore be by land. This must take place by transferring the men from the outer island to James Island or to Sullivan's Island, or to the rear of it.

At any point of landing, however, General Gillmore would be met by the concentrated forces of the enemy, transferred with facility from one part of the harbor to another.

But General Gillmore has, in another place, put aside the idea of such operations. He says (sec. 28): "A land attack upon Charleston was not even discussed at any of the interviews to which I was invited, and was certainly never contemplated by me."

How these inconsistencies are to be reconciled is not very apparent.

It is very certain, however, from the experience that had been obtained, that the troops would not attack the Rebel position on James or Sullivan's Island without being covered by the Navy; and that was the condition to their operations as stated by General Gillmore. But how that was to be done, when the iron-clads had got into the Wando, leaving the troops on Morris Island, is not made known by the General. It is certainly incomprehensible by any recognized naval proceeding.

It is difficult to conceive of a project which, under the circumstances, would have been so inexcusable, particularly during those 'decisive days', when we had not Wagner, and did not know when we should get it. To run in the small force of iron-clads, incurring certain loss in the passage, and lodge them in the Wando, leaving the concentrated power of the enemy between the camp and the vessels, so that not a pound of

\(^1\) On the contrary, this singular strategy would have completely disabled either party from assisting the other. — J. A. D.
coal nor a round of ammunition could reach the latter, with no possibility of effecting any military result, and having to get out less easily than we got in, would have been sheer madness. With a sufficient force to secure the squadron against serious disaster, I would have gratified the popular yearning to see the Union fleet pass inside,—but not with the force which I had at the time.

If the propriety of going in or not had been evenly balanced, there still remained a good reason for postponement besides those already named,—that was, the expectation of reinforcements. The "Onondaga" and "Canonicus" were to be ready by the 1st October; and, with the "Sangamon," might then be expected, which would have given me nine monitors with one turret, one iron-clad with two turrets, and the "Ironsides," making a total of 38 guns, or 58 per cent greater power in armament than on the 23d August.

This was, in my opinion, the very least force that should have gone in without connection with the Army. The "Richmond" was also to be looked for; and, covered by so many iron-clads, her fine battery would have been very useful.

But with this force it would not have been most judicious to attack the general position only in front, where it was strongest, instead of assailing the flanks, which were more open. The movement in July, 1864, by the Stono, gave the enemy much more uneasiness, and menaced Charleston more seriously than any other previously; so much so, as to draw to that point nearly all the enemy's assailable force, when, by a skilful move, two regiments were sent against Johnson. The surprise was complete, and nearly placed us in possession of the fort.

When General Sherman moved upon Columbia, and wished to press the enemy at Charleston, he did not ask the fleet to enter the harbor, but that the land and sea forces should attack by way of Stono, and by the other flank at Bull's Bay.

Finally, when Morris Island was evacuated, the same process might have been applied to Sullivan's Island by landing on Long Island and flanking from seaward with the fleet.

The preceding has reference to the strictures which General Gillmore has very gratuitously chosen to announce, after a con-
sideration of the subject so deliberate as to appear some eighteen months after the events.

During this time a necessity arose for expressing an official opinion on the qualities of the monitors, in which I spoke of their service, and incidentally observed that the time required to reduce Wagner had given the enemy a better opportunity to improve the interior defences, and thus retarded operations against Charleston.

The purpose of this was to meet the misrepresentations that had been circulated in the newspapers as to the causes of the delay, and which were doing great injustice to the whole naval proceeding.

My observation seems to have given great offence to General Gillmore, and elicits a course of remark not less sophistical than those on which I have just commented.

It is obvious to the plainest mind that I never meant to say, and my words do not express the meaning, that Wagner would interfere with the passage of vessels in the Road, which intended to attack the city. A naval force strong enough for this purpose could not be detained by a work like Wagner.

The troops and vessels had commenced a combined operation designed to obtain possession of Morris Island, which was also to lead to the real demolition of Sumter; and subsequent operations were to pivot entirely on the results so obtained.

Wagner, which was in effect Morris Island, was not captured until the 7th September, and Sumter was never demolished, in the plain common sense of the term. One of the very conditions which General Gillmore had imposed on himself—that is, "a heavy co-operative artillery fire" from Wagner and Cummings' Point—was not actually in operation until the 26th of October.

Now I considered myself under arrangements with General Gillmore, partly written, partly implied, to assist him. On the 22d July, for instance, he wrote me: "I feel, as doubtless you do, that thorough co-operation between the Army and Navy is desirable; and that neither branch of the service can, at the present moment, advance, both having already failed once in the attempt."

As he was repeatedly calling on me for assistance, the united
force was thus unavoidably delayed by the resistance of Wagner, and that time was undoubtedly used by the enemy to improve their defences. It may be equally true that they had been so engaged before and after the period named.

That is the meaning, really, of the paragraph in my report to which General Gillmore alludes, and not the quibble which he has chosen to substitute.

In this note General Gillmore also asserts that "some time elapsed before any of its guns [Sumter's] were mounted by the enemy at other points in the harbor."

And yet, in a letter to me, dated August 23, he admits that "some of the guns from the gorge and the adjacent face, looking towards Cumming's Point, were doubtless removed to James and Sullivan's Islands, before the bombardment commenced or during its progress."

"Doubtless!" Certainly, because it was very plain, from the first, that the combined operation must lead to the occupation of Morris Island, and, therefore, to the disarmament of Sumter.

Its guns could, therefore, very little retard the fall of Wagner, and as they would be useful in other works, their removal was to be expected at an early date.

We know now that this was done, and was begun even before we landed on Morris Island, for it seems such an event was anticipated.

A British officer, who visited Sumter one month before the operation began on the 10th July, says: "The guns have been removed from the casemates on the eastern face."

And General Ripley reports officially, on the 21st August: "The heavy guns and mortars which have been received and secured from Fort Sumter have been placed in position," &c.

General Gillmore's admission to me by letter made at the time, and my own opinion, are therefore not only sustained by probabilities but by the facts, and present a flat denial to his assertion made in print so long subsequently.

There is another passage in this note which is worthy of observation. It runs thus: "Of the actual strength of those improvements we had no reliable information, as they were never tested or encountered by the iron-clads."
DISCUSSION OF THE REPORT OF GEN. GILLMORE. 583

The conclusion from such an unqualified remark is naturally that information in regard to an enemy’s position or defence is not to be relied on until obtained by actual trial.

The practice of General Gillmore seems to favor the idea that he may sometimes proceed upon such a notion; thus, in speaking of Fort Wagner, he says that (sec. 82) “The nature of its construction demanded and enticed an actual attempt upon the work, to make manifest its real and concealed elements of strength.”

Being so “enticed,” he did make the attempt,—not once, but twice,—the result of which was, that some 1,600 or 1,700 good Union soldiers fell on the ramparts and in the ditches of Wagner, among them such men as Shaw and Putnam and Strong.

Having thus satisfied himself of the “real and concealed elements of strength” in Wagner, General Gillmore coolly remarks that the result (sec. 101) “induced a modification of the plan of operations, or rather a change in the order previously determined upon.”

There must be a limit, however, even to this tentative mode of proceeding, for a man may try his head against a brick wall and be able to draw off so as to modify his operations afterwards; “but if he ventures into a steel trap, he may be unable to make any change in the order previously determined upon.”

I think the Department would hardly have held it justifiable in me to have sent the small force of iron-clads into Charleston harbor for the purpose of making sure of its “real and concealed elements of strength,” when it was evident that it could not be done without committing them to a decisive result which there was every reason to believe must terminate disastrously. All operations, military as well as naval, must not only have an advantage in view, but a reasonable prospect of acquiring it; and risk of loss is only justifiable when it may be compensated by the result, or when no other course is possible.

Still, if one will yield to the enticement which the nature of an undertaking calls for in order “to make manifest its real and concealed elements of strength;” or, in plain words, if you
will risk your means or the lives of your men in order to learn what the strength of a work is, let the execution embrace everything that is needed to economize life.

On the 10th of July our troops landed on Morris Island, under cover of a heavy fire from the land batteries and the monitors, and by nine in the morning had driven the Rebels into Wagner, being then, as General Gillmore states (sec. 73), in occupation of "three fourths of the island, and his skirmishers were within musket-range of Fort Wagner." At the same time four monitors lay off the work and began to cannonade it at good effective range.

The Report proceeds: "The heat being intense and the troops exhausted, offensive operations were suspended for the day."

Brigadier-General Seymour was ordered (sec. 74) "to carry Fort Wagner by assault at daybreak on the following morning. The attempt failed."

Evidently, if assault was to be made it should have proceeded forthwith on the spot. The enemy had just been driven in confusion from his positions; the "weakness of his defences," if not apparent, was certainly at its lowest point, while our power was at its maximum, morally as well as physically. To quote General Gillmore's words, "That was the time when success could have been most easily achieved," provided that an assault was to be tried.

It was not done, however, on that day because "the heat was intense and the troops exhausted,"—meaning, it is supposed, the men of the column that had landed, amounting to 2,500 or 3,000 men. But General Gillmore had some 11,000 men available, and it is but fair to suppose that they were in hand at the time. Less than 4,000 had been pushed up the Stono by way of demonstration only, leaving a probable balance of four or five thousand.

If, then, the demonstration could not have been made with half the force used (and that was worth considering), there were still troops sufficient to make the assault on the 10th, particularly if the landing force had been allowed a few hours for rest and food.

If any probability amounted almost to a certainty, it was
that the enemy would use all means to strengthen the work, especially with men. And so it proved. "In the evening Wagner was reinforced by Colonel Olmstead's command of Georgia troops."

Having lost this precious time, the assault was made next morning, without the first word that would have enabled me to flank the work with the monitors. It was quickly repulsed. And thus an effort which had its best chance of success if made a few hours after we landed, aided by the Navy fire, was repulsed next day by an enemy which had been reinforced; whilst our troops had not the assistance of the monitors that could have been had on the least notice.

So much for the tentative process which General Gillmore then advocated.

If it proves anything, it is certainly not favorable to the notion which it seems to convey, that the iron-clads should have been plunged into the harbor in order to obtain "reliable information" of the strength of the improvements.

Not content with undertaking to saddle the accomplishment of an impossibility on the Navy, the Report of General Gillmore most ungraciously denies to the service actually performed, that merit in the reduction of Morris Island which is so manifestly due to the squadron.

At page 180 (sec. 262) occurs the following: "While it would have been entirely practicable for us to have pushed forward our approaches to Fort Wagner without the co-operating fire of our gunboats," &c.

This depreciation of hard and faithful labor so qualifies the award that follows as to deprive it of all value.

A writer in the "Army and Navy Journal" has already exposed the fallacy of the assertion, by quoting from General Gillmore's own Report the repeated and urgent demands which he made, by signal, for the aid of the naval fire.

If more than these was needed to convict the statement of gross wrong and inconsistency with facts, it may be found in the reference already made to General Hunter's inability to begin and proceed without the very aid that General Gillmore received from me.
General Gillmore also contributes some evidence against himself.

Under date June 30, he writes: "My preparations are nearly completed, but I can do nothing until Admiral Dupont's successor arrives and gets ready to work."

To be sure, this is accompanied by the contradictory remark, "I believe we could get Morris Island without the assistance of the Navy," which involves another contradiction without disposing of that first noticed.

On the 7th July he wrote me on the importance of getting the "Ironsides" inside, adding that "it seems so important and in fact indispensable that the main ship channel abreast of Morris Island should be held against any attempt to dislodge us from that island, when once there, by the enemy's iron-clads from Charleston, that we should leave as little as possible to chance, or stress of weather.

"Navy officers agree, I believe, that the monitors cannot lay there in heavy weather, and that dependence upon them alone or upon wooden vessels would fail as in that contingency, whilst the 'Ironsides' would afford us perfect security."

In his Report he expressly states the necessity, "unless largely reinforced," of confining himself "to the narrow sea islands, where, on the one hand, they had the co-operation of the Navy against the iron-clad rams and gunboats of the enemy," &c.

An inspection of the map will show how completely a narrow island like Morris Island was commanded by a fire from the water; and as the iron-clads of the Rebels were close at hand in the harbor, it is very evident that if our iron-clads had not been present to flank the enemy's forces, the Rebel iron-clads would have been there to perform that office for General Gillmore, and to menace his communication. His own testimony given above is conclusive as to his solicitude for the aid of the Navy, not only to prevent the interference of the Rebel vessels, but to assist his own advance against their works.

His assertion in the Report, to the contrary, is not only invalidated by evidence furnished by himself, but, as he so freely
used the assistance of the Navy, it illy becomes him now to announce without occasion that he could have dispensed with such aid.

For service far less important General Sherman bestowed his hearty acknowledgments with that fulness and generosity that so truly mark the great and just mind.

I have no hesitation in asserting, to the contrary, that General Gillmore could not have landed on Morris Island, nor remained there, unless the squadron had been present to co-operate.

General Gillmore states (sec. 40) that, "other plans of joint operations, to be executed after the Navy should enter the inner harbor and reach the city, were subsequently from time to time discussed by Rear-Admiral Dahlgren and myself," &c.

I have only to say, that I have not the least remembrance of anything of the kind, and do not believe that such ever occurred.

In the foregoing the Department will find full refutation of the reflections which General Gillmore has so unwarrantably adopted with reference to measures purely naval against the interior defences of the harbor.

It appears even from his own statement that he did not intend to go any further than he did go; if so, on what ground does he presume to question the course pursued by the Naval Commander in a matter thus rendered purely naval?

I think it appears, from all reliable evidence, that the movement was to be combined; and it was so, until General Gillmore chose to say that he would go no further. There, then, his concern in the proceeding ceased, and it became a naval question entirely, whether the vessels should advance or not, to be considered and to be decided on naval grounds only.

If General Gillmore then entertained the same views of that plan that he now announces, he was singularly reticent in keeping it from my knowledge. It certainly was in my mind to enter the harbor if it were possible to do so; and no man in the whole squadron was more deeply solicitous in this respect than myself. Not, indeed, from any prompting on the part of
General Gillmore, or by reason of any agreement at the time between ourselves, or elsewhere, but only in following out the natural consequences of having been intrusted with certain means which were to be used against our enemy at my own discretion, unless otherwise instructed.

Accordingly, I did not await the final result of the cannonade on Sumter, which began on the 17th and ended on the 23d; but, in the hope of some result, on the 21st went up the entrance with all the monitors to verify personally the state of the defense. This was repeated on the 22d, and brought on a night action with Moultrie, Sumter firing also; again, on the nights of the 23d, 31st August, and 1st September, some heavy weather occurring at intervals; and one night the monitors were caught in a S. E. blow when well up to Sullivan's Island.

From what I could observe on these occasions, for I was on the spot, and from all that I could learn in other ways, I was satisfied that Sumter was not reduced, in the proper sense of the term,—its garrison was secure and effective in guarding the impediments or replacing them,—and that an attempt, with my small number of iron-clads, to force obstructions, must be disastrous to most of the vessels, without effecting any good.

I wrote to the Department: "A glance at the map will show that the entire advantages cannot yet be realized to ourselves, because we cannot occupy the fort."

The near approach of the catastrophe at Wagner naturally occupied most of my time.

On the 3d and 6th of September General Gillmore conferred with me, but the conversation was confined to Wagner, and not a word passed in relation to those decisive days, though we were amidst them; not a word of that entrance of the iron-clads that was to achieve success, nor of that plan.

Seeing that the attention of the Army was likely to be engrossed in securing possession of Morris Island, that Sumter was to remain in possession of the Rebels for the present, and that unless they were driven out the iron-clads could not well enter the harbor, I determined to risk an assault. When General Gillmore became aware of this, he informed me that he
DISCUSSION OF THE REPORT OF GEN. GILLMORE. 589

was about to do the same, on the same night. It was therefore arranged that the columns should co-operate, that of the squadron moving outside of Cumming's Point, and that of the Army from the inside. It was past midnight on the 8th September when a fine naval column of 450 picked men, well officered, pushed rapidly at the gorge and southeast face, landed, and ran up the débris of the gorge wall. The enemy opened a rapid and destructive fire from above, while Moultrie and Johnson flanked with a fire of shells our boats and uncovered men. Thus this attack on a fort which General Gillmore assumes he had demolished, necessarily failed.

So much did I desire the expected co-operation of the land column, that I went in person to the scene of action to secure the connection, but it came not. General Gillmore says his troops were detained by low tide "until after the naval attack had failed," which seems far from satisfactory in view of the fact that it was near midnight when Lieutenant Preston returned from General Gillmore with the assurance that the concerted action was understood and arranged.

General Gillmore adds that the arrangements "were intended simply to prevent accident or collision between" the parties. Each "was deemed in itself sufficiently strong for the object in view."

So far as the naval column was concerned, it was made as strong as my means permitted; if possible, I would have made it stronger.

When I learned that a column was to go from the shore, the connection seemed so important that while awaiting the return of Lieutenant Preston I wrote an order to anticipate the probability of failure in co-operation, to the effect that my own column should not move unless with that of the Army.

This order was not transmitted, because Preston returned and announced that all was right, and went up himself to join the assault.

The misfortune did not end with the failure to capture Sumter; while endeavoring to get a monitor in position rearward of Sumter, to cover the assault, it grounded, and, being exposed to the fire of Sullivan's Island, compelled me to engage those
batteries with all the iron-clads, which had the desired effect. But in the conflict one of the monitors became entirely disabled, which reduced the force correspondingly.

This is my recollection of what governed me in the course of the operations from the commencement until those decisive days had passed.

Nor can I trace any communication whatever from General Gillmore, either verbal or written, during that period, in relation to any of that plan so positively stated in his Report, nor of that episode in the shape of decisive days.

If General Gillmore had confined himself to a technical discussion of the combined operation against Morris Island, candidly stating all the facts and expressing his opinion on the naval proceeding, with some regard to his own imperfect knowledge of such matters, I should have preferred to follow his example, in case it had been necessary for me to object to any portions of his Report; but as he has, in my opinion, violated every rule of official propriety and personal courtesy, both in the time and in the tenor of his strictures, so as to do extreme injustice to myself and my command, I have only been careful, in replying, to adhere to the facts so far as I knew them.

It was certainly not known to me that General Gillmore entertained the opinions he now avows, and I never was more surprised than when the positive knowledge reached me, through the Report, some eighteen months after the events referred to. My belief was that General Gillmore perfectly concurred with me in the conduct of the joint operations, particularly in the necessity to which I felt it my painful duty to submit, in postponing to enter the harbor of Charleston until I was reinforced.

This belief was derived not only from what passed between us in personal intercourse, but from the prompt repudiation which General Gillmore bestowed on occasional reports indicative of disagreement in regard to operations.

For instance, when the current gossip of the newspapers went so far as to allege that we did not concur in regard to operations, and that General Gillmore would, therefore, retire
DISCUSSION OF THE REPORT OF GEN. GILLMORE.

from the command, he addressed me at once the following note, before I had time to say one word to him on the subject:—

MORRIS ISLAND, S. C., September 23.

ADMIRAL,—I am much chagrined at the reports in the newspapers about my tendering my resignation in consequence of a disagreement between you and myself, and that we did not co-operate cordially. It is not necessary for me to assure you that I am entirely ignorant of the slightest foundation for such reports, and had no idea that they existed until they appeared in the papers. They were doubtless started by some scribbling sensationalist in lieu of news. I will see that they are authoritatively contradicted.

Sincerely yours,

Q. A. GILLMORE.

To Rear-Admiral DAHLGREN.

It will be observed that this note bears date more than two weeks after the last of these days which General Gillmore now announces to have been the occasion when the fleet could have achieved success by entering the harbor. Is it possible that two statements so contradictory should both be true? If General Gillmore thought then, as he has since written, could he possibly have assured me that he was "entirely ignorant of the slightest foundation" for the report "that there was a disagreement between us, and that we did not co-operate cordially"? On the other hand, if he did not think so then, can he now avow that opinion? He not only disclaims the imputation, but he disclaims it in positive terms, and calls the author "a scribbling sensationalist"!

In January, 1864, a gentleman whom I had never seen before, informed me that he was a correspondent, and desired to relieve himself in my opinion of complicity in the current remarks which some of the correspondents indulged in to my disadvantage. He said that General Gillmore was privy to it. I lost no time in addressing a note of inquiry to General Gillmore, who denied the allegations entirely.

The note of the 23d September entirely discredits the conclusions of the Report, or else that note is not true. I am unable to see otherwise. Of course I could not but accept this disclaimer, coupled, as it was, with verbal assurances denun-
ciatory of the course pursued by the correspondents, and the harmony of personal intercourse was maintained to the last, until General Gillmore went North to take part in the campaign about Petersburg.

About a year later General Gillmore returned to the command in place of General Foster, and upon his return occurred a renewal of offensive remarks from the public correspondence of his department. These remarks had ceased entirely during the absence of General Gillmore. I addressed him a note on the subject, which was followed by others, because his reply was not satisfactory. My last note, 27th March, 1865, he did not reply to. The objectionable remarks in the papers ceased, but the impression produced on my mind was very unfavorable to General Gillmore, as will appear in the copies of the correspondence, which I annex.¹

Besides the omissions of which I have complained, which ignored facts important to a clear understanding of the naval operations off Charleston, I have to refer to that of a letter from me to General Gillmore, dated Aug. 22, 1863. In this letter is the following: "There are seven monitors: of these, one must guard the enemy's iron-clads at Wassaw, another is under repair at Port Royal; of the five here, one has a gun disabled, leaving only four fully available."

I have already adverted to the injury which was likely to arise from the omission of General Gillmore to state all the facts that were likely to influence the conduct of the naval operations, while he did not hesitate to pronounce opinions which the statement of these facts would at once have shown to be erroneous. In this case General Gillmore suppresses a letter containing information more essential than any other to a clear understanding of the reasons for not entering the harbor, while he gives his reply to that letter.

It was certainly to be expected that the "correspondence between Rear-Admiral Dahlgren and General Gillmore," annexed to the Report of the latter, would contain all that had passed between us, and not that some of it should be omitted, and particularly a letter that contained information which would have exhibited the insufficiency of General Gillmore's

¹ See Appendix B.
CONCLUSION OF LETTER TO NAVY DEPARTMENT. 593

deliberate opinion, as also the fallacy of his strictures. Comment is needless on the character of such a proceeding under the circumstances.

I am painfully sensible of the scandal to a great cause likely to arise from a controversy of this kind between officers who have been intrusted with the care of important national interests; but I entirely disclaim the responsibility of having given any reason for it, at any time, either in word or deed.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

JNO. A. DAHLGREN,

Rear-Admiral U. S. N.
CHAPTER XIX.

A RÉSUMÉ OF OPERATIONS OFF CHARLESTON.

The foregoing letter, which we have just given in full, is really a brief narrative of the share which the Navy took, as regards the various operations in connection with the command of General Gillmore. It will be seen that Admiral Dahlgren had been quite misled as to the real sentiments of the General, and that it was not until a year and a half later that the appearance of General Gillmore's book dispelled all illusion on the subject.

The news correspondents had indeed asserted and reasserted a difference of opinion between these two commanding officers as to the conduct of their joint operations; but, as has been stated, General Gillmore had explicitly denied such statements to Admiral Dahlgren, upon his inquiry as to their truth, and had promised that they should be authoritatively contradicted. It would be an injustice alike to the memory of Admiral Dahlgren and to the brave efforts of the Navy under his command, to withhold this paper.

In glancing over its several propositions, it will be seen that Admiral Dahlgren was fully conscious of the professional difficulties he had to meet, and gave his mind to their solution with a full resolve to do the best in his power, and leave the rest to higher influences.
Certainly nothing but an unjustifiable presumption could lead any officer to admit, even to himself, that he would surely accomplish what other able leaders had failed to do. At the same time, inasmuch as a land force by itself had not been able to succeed, and a naval force by itself had done no more, it was fairly within the limits of reasonable experiment to ascertain if a conjoint operation by land and water might not accomplish the purpose. And, indeed, it was incumbent to make the trial.

This trial was made; and so long as the two forces did co-operate they were successful. When they ceased to act together, the possibility of further advance terminated.

We have seen that Admiral Dahlgren received command on the 6th July, 1863, at Port Royal, and on the 10th, four days afterwards, led in his iron-clads to attack Morris Island, exhibiting, by this celerity of movement, the desire he felt to do the work before him. The land batteries on Folly Island were opened at the same time; and when the Rebels had been disordered by the united fire of the Army and the Navy, the troops were pushed across to Morris Island. The enemy did not await the shock, but gave way, and abandoned their works on the sand-hills of the southern end of the island.

The iron-clads followed their movement, and by 9½ o'clock the Admiral lay off Fort Wagner, to which the Rebels had fled, and opened fire on it, which he maintained till sunset, and was replied to steadily. General Gillmore did not pursue, but halted on the ground just left by the enemy, and made no further move towards Wagner. By this blunder General Gillmore lost the best opportunity that occurred for assault; for the
enemy was suffering all the discouragement and confusion consequent upon defeat, and could not readily be reinforced.

When, early next morning, an assault was ordered, fresh troops had just arrived and order had been restored, so that our men were promptly repulsed.

This repulse was the first notice received by the Admiral of what was contemplated; and thus it happened that our men were deprived of the cover the vessels would have given.

Later, when General Gillmore, on the 18th July, assisted by a heavy flank fire from the iron-clads, began a rapid and steady cannonade, he did not send forward his columns to assault until sunset, at a time when the on-coming darkness made it impossible for the vessels to distinguish friend from foe; so that our troops were a second time deprived of the invaluable aid of the Navy at this important juncture.

This assault, as might have been foreseen, ended in a repulse, and in the loss of 1,500 men.

Nothing now remained but to follow the course of a regular siege; by which, and the fire of the iron-clads, the Rebels were finally obliged to evacuate Fort Wagner and Morris Island.

Thus the omission of General Gillmore to follow up the first success immediately, cost us two assaults and great losses, together with heavy labors in the trenches and with batteries, and delayed the final result to fifty-eight days from landing. The iron-clads, of course, suffered proportionally in their efficiency, from such prolonged, arduous service.

As soon as Morris Island was evacuated by the enemy, the Admiral found himself estopped by their retention of Sumter.
It was no longer formidable to the iron-clads by the weight of fire which it could deliver upon them, but the light artillery and musketry of its garrison were fully able to prevent all attempts at removing the obstructions and torpedoes at the entrance, while right opposite were the heavy batteries of Sullivan's Island.

As the General was now giving all his efforts to the fortifying of Morris Island, seemingly with the view of driving the enemy entirely from Sumter, and as this must consume time, the Admiral saw that he had no alternative but to attempt to storm Sumter. He saw fully the slenderness of the chances, but conceived that, slender as they were, they justified the attempt.

As we have been told, this attempt, although made with all the care and preparation that circumstances permitted, failed. The column of attack was repulsed with a loss of one fourth its numbers. General Gillmore had promised to send a co-operating force from Morris Island to assist, but this force was not sent, and the brave-seamen never waited to see if it would come.

The essential condition upon which the Admiral could enter the harbor having thus been frustrated, it only remained for him to await the success of the operation ashore to clear Sumter of its garrison, or to proceed jointly with the military to act elsewhere.

Several contingencies might arise:—

1st. The army might cross directly to James Island from Morris Island, in which case the iron-clads would force the entrance at all risks.

2d. The troops could land on Long Island, and, aided by the iron-clads, attack Sullivan's Island, just as Morris Island was reduced from Folly Island.

3d. An attack might be made upon the flank defences of the city by way of Stono.
The General made no offer with regard to either of these modes, and seemed to be entirely occupied with establishing the works on Morris Island, as if only bent on completing the reduction of Sumter.

It soon became manifest that this was to be the limit of the military operations, and that if the Admiral desired to go further he must rely on his own means.

In other words, the joint operation was to cease here, although it might have been continued in any one of the modes already indicated, or in other modes, had such been suggested.

No one of the three indicated was practicable to the Navy alone, and it therefore behooved the Admiral to consider carefully the prospect that presented of entering the harbor with the vessels alone, and unaided by the Army.

The popular clamor encouraged any attempt and would have sustained it, precisely on the terms that it continued the cry of "On to Richmond," — that is, in case of success. This senseless want of discrimination the Admiral had already suffered from, in the failure to carry Sumter, for which the press censured him without stint, and without investigating the causes of disaster.

It has been fully explained that the entrance to Charleston harbor was defended by the batteries of Sullivan's Island, which were most formidable, as well as by obstructions and torpedoes, which could not be passed without unavoidable loss, or removed while protected by Sullivan's Island and what was left of Sumter; and that, after passing by these obstructions and forts, the heavy batteries of Johnson came first on James Island, while to the left and higher up were other batteries. Fort Ripley lay on the right, and above all were the city batteries.
The enemy had twice received notice of our intentions to attack Charleston: first, on the 7th, April; and if the unfavorable issue, to us, of that essay had perchance begotten security with the Rebels, the second notice, on the 10th July, followed, later, by the loss of Morris Island, must have dispelled that feeling; and if the result of the second attack had not been so flattering to the defence, it would have served also to point out how fully they might rely on their sand-works to make further defence. It was not, therefore, to be supposed that this precautionary measure would be neglected.

While Wagner detained the advance, Johnson was growing in extent and power, and other works beyond Johnson; and experience had shown that these forts could not be reduced or permanently damaged by the fire of such iron-clads as were at hand.

As the naval force which was expected to undertake the problem of entering the harbor would have clearly been unable to silence any one of the batteries inside, the only object would have been to pass them; and in case this had been effected, as many of the vessels as had escaped loss or detention at the entrance, or while navigating the winding channel from which the buoys had been removed, would necessarily have to go into Cooper River above the city. As we have seen, the effect of this movement would have been to divide the Union force in such manner that neither the troops nor the iron-clads would have been capable of assisting each other! Moreover, all daily supplies, including coal and ammunition, would have been intercepted.

The idea is absurd, and the Admiral, though bitterly disappointed, was obliged to wait until the Army would move, or until the arrival of more iron-clads should lessen the probability of severe loss or disaster. He
had, therefore, to content himself with such annoyance of the enemy as lay in his power, and repair his iron-clads as far as the limited workshops permitted.

When the Navy Department became aware of this state of things, its views on the subject were expressed at some length, and they were in accord with the course pursued. The request was, however, made by the Department to obtain the views of the iron-clad Captains on the situation. Admiral Dahlgren then held a council of war, and we have been told that after a very full discussion of all the points involved, the decision arrived at was adverse; namely, that to enter Charleston harbor in order to penetrate to the city, "extreme risk would be incurred without adequate results."

While upon the question as to whether it would be advisable to co-operate with the Army in an attack on Sullivan's Island, so to "advance gradually in reducing the defences and removing the obstructions of the port," all voted yes except one.

The ultimate proposition, "Can Moultrie and Johnson be reduced with the present force of iron-clads, unsupported by the Army," met with a unanimous "No." The Department received this decision, and at once replied on the 2d November. After reviewing some of the points, it concludes:—

If you do not consider that there are reasonable hopes of success with your present force, the "Onondaga," the "Canonicus," and the "Tecumseh" are promised us in six weeks, and with the "Sangamon," now at Hampton Roads, will be sent you. Although delay is annoying, a failure would be more so. Success is the great and permanent consideration, and the Department will acquiesce in any reasonable delay to insure it.

This was not the first mention of reinforcements. Soon after hearing of the failure of the second assault,
the Department told the Admiral that among other additions to his force, the "Richmond" had been ordered from Farragut's squadron to report to him. This ship would have been a powerful auxiliary in entering the harbor. The "Atlanta" also was to be used, when refitted; but the Department took her away, and the vessel that was to replace her did not arrive till December. Mr. Fox's letter of July 16 said that the "Passaic" would be sent, and the "Lehigh." This was the reply to the Admiral's request for more force in the beginning. But on the 1st of August he said that the "Onondaga" could not be ready for two months. On the 28th August Fox wrote that the "Lehigh" left on the 25th; the "Sangamon" would take the place of "Atlanta"; the "Onondaga" and "Canonicus" to be ready on the 10th October. But on the 9th October the Department wrote that the contractors were behind time; that the "Onondaga," "Tecumseh," and "Canonicus" ought to be ready in a month, but would not be in two months. When finished, they and the "Sangamon" would be sent, unless some change occurred in our foreign relations.

Then, Jan. 12, 1864, Fox writes that he has "been to New York looking at the iron-clads. I doubt if you get the 'Onondaga,' 'Tecumseh,' 'Canonicus,' and 'Manhattan' before the 1st of March."

Thus, the continued expectation of reinforcements, which never came, entered largely into a consideration of the situation from the first. And yet, had these reinforcements been sent, and the harbor entered by the fleet alone, even with a still greater force, this entrance could not have borne any good fruit, but would have been, rather, a wasteful expenditure of means.

The opinion expressed by General Gillmore, and probably inspired or supported at the office in Wash-
ington, that by pushing the iron-clads past the batteries, so as to take a position above them, the enemy would be led to evacuate, first, Sullivan's Island, and then James Island, is so plainly in conflict with sound principles as to excite wonder.

The entire force of both arms had been exercised for fifty-eight days against an advanced and comparatively unsupported work, and this, too, while our force, acting externally, was unmolested in flank and rear; communications freely open; facility to attack and draw off at pleasure; freedom to combine operations as desired each time existed. The Rebels, on the contrary, had no support save from the distant and desultory fire of Hascall and Cheves, on James Island, and for part of the time from a few guns on the gorge wall of Sumter.

This work, though strong, was still limited in that strength by its own scale, which was not large, and was always entirely swept on its sea flank by the cannon of the vessels. Its communications were so distant and precarious (being by water, and more or less under our fire), that men and provisions and ammunition were conveyed with trouble. Supporting batteries in the rear could not be established, by reason of the locality and the difficulty of transporting cannon. By this exemplar, it was almost a daily proven fact that the fire of the vessels could not reduce a single battery inside, unsupported by the bayonets and the cannon of the Army, and exposed to fire from many batteries, front, flank, and rear.

This was admitted by General Gillmore, because he says that they could not even reduce Wagner; while the Council of War, composed of officers who had full experience, said the same.

The batteries, then, would have remained intact, and
the iron-clads would, when in Cooper River, have been in position above them, while the troops remained on Morris Island. That such a measure could possibly lead to the evacuation of Sullivan's Island was an absurdity. Could the iron-clads have reached Charleston above the Rebel batteries, leaving the Rebels on James Island and Sullivan's Island, then should we have been besieged there, until our land force was sufficiently strong to have advanced against one island or the other. But to have divided our force by leaving the troops on Morris Island and sending the iron-clads into Cooper River would have been suicidal, and especially when General Gillmore asserted that he could do no more than keep the sea islands. So of course he could have rendered no help in such an emergency.

This division of force would only have been admissible, supposing that each part could have maintained itself in its position; and only advisable if, besides doing so, they each could have exerted due and cooperative effect from these different directions. Under the supposed circumstances, the iron-clads must have sustained loss in reaching position; must have expended fuel and ammunition daily and rapidly; could not have received supplies of either; would have expended all in a week or ten days, and must then come out, exposed to equal loss as when they entered. No greater folly could have been enacted!

Meanwhile, what would the troops on Morris Island have been doing? Would they attempt to operate against the enemy by landing on Sullivan's Island or James Island? When General Gillmore was at work on Morris Island, it will be remembered that he repeatedly called for help against the landing of the Rebels in boats. The idea that, uncovered by iron-clads (for
wooden vessels could not be put to such work) he could have sustained himself, is preposterous.

The aimless character of the plan which would have sent our few and battered iron-clads into the harbor of Charleston, unsupported by troops, was evident at the time. It was in violation of all military principle, on account of its division of force, its supposed effect on the enemy, the severe losses and probability of disaster it would involve. All this was manifest to the plainest judgment at the time.

Let us now see how matters appeared to the Navy Department. The reduced number and efficacy of the iron-clads, the inability of the Army to co-operate inside, the distant, if at all probable, reduction of Sumter, and the disastrous result of the undertaking, impressed the mind of the Admiral. In September he sent to the Navy Department official statements of the condition of the monitors which must await repairs, and that their number was not sufficient, and asked for more, and inquired if he was at liberty to risk what he had in hand. He also stated that seven monitors would be ready by the middle of October; that the defences had been improved by the enemy; and asked what would be the probable course of action when once in; stating that the attack with seven monitors would be uncertain in its issue. Also to be considered, what advantage would accrue from a reserve of five more; but that he was ready, after informing the Department of the probable results, "to take the chances of the attack."

October 2, he again informed the Department that the enemy was perfecting his defence, so that the attack ought not to be postponed later than the middle of the month, when only five monitors would be in good condition,—the "Kaatskill," "Weehawken," "Lehigh,"
"Montauk," and "Nahant"; and that he hoped for two or three more monitors. To these various communications the Department replied, October 9, "to the request for five more monitors," that the delay of the contractors to complete vessels embarrassed them; that they ought to have the "Onondaga," "Tecumseh," and "Canonicus" in a month, but would not get them in less than two months; and that, when finished, they and the "Sangamon" would be sent. That they could form no opinion as to the propriety of risking the monitors among the obstructions.

We quote from the letter of the Department: —

It is merely a point of honor whether you shall go in and take a position with your vessels in front of the city, with no co-operating army force to assist and sustain you. The Department is disinclined to have its only iron-clad squadron incur extreme risks when the substantial advantages have already been gained. Other operations of great importance on our southern coast are pending, and in case of a foreign war, which has sometimes seemed imminent, these vessels will be indispensable for immediate use.

Previous to his departure to assume his present command, General Gillmore stated that, once in possession of Cumming's Point, he could thence reduce Forts Moultrie and Johnson. This opinion probably has undergone no change by what has since occurred, &c.

The Department also expressed a wish to hear the "views and conclusions of the Commanders of the iron-clads, so far as it may be advisable to impart them," and concludes thus: —

While there is an intense feeling pervading the country in regard to the fate of Charleston, in which all of our loyal countrymen participate, the public impatience must not be permitted to hasten your movements into immature and inconsiderate action, against your own deliberate convictions, nor impel you to
hazard what may jeopard the best interests of the country without adequate results. . . . With confidence in your judgment, firmness, and discretion, as well as in your skill and bravery, the Department will continue to watch your proceedings, hastening as rapidly as possible the completion of the iron-clads, and in other respects furnishing you such assistance as it can render.

On the 22d October, soon after the receipt of this dispatch, a council was held, as already narrated, and the opinions of the officers forwarded forthwith to the Department by Captain Ammen, who was one of the council.

A few days later General Gillmore, having completed his batteries on Morris Island, opened heavily on Sumter, when the iron-clads were ordered up to assist.

The operation was watched with much interest by the Admiral, as its result was to decide whether he should be able to enter with his present force. A few days sufficed to assure him that it would fail, and that no prospect of proceeding alone would offer until the reinforcements should arrive. The bombardment, as we know, was continued for a month, with no useful effect.

Soon after, the winter weather set in, and finally the Department diverted the promised increase of monitors in other directions.

Later, in March and April of 1864, the Admiral was called by the Department to Washington, for conference on the situation off Charleston. On taking leave of the President, April 28, the Admiral told him that he "had too little force, and could only be expected to hold on." The President answered, "Oh, yes, that is all I expect."
May 3.—General Hatch was instructed to remain on the defensive.

It may be said that, up to the culminating period in January, 1865, when Sherman made his magnificent march north by the interior, this condition of things off Charleston remained practically unchanged. At that time Sherman writes to Admiral Dahlgren:

I would prefer you should run no risk at all. I think you will concur with me, that in anticipation of the movement of my army to the rear of the coast, it will be unwise to subject your ships to the heavy artillery of the enemy or his sunken torpedoes.

Of course, whatever could be done, was done during this long period of tentative operations, so that they cannot be marked as inactive.

We think we have now fully given the reasons why it was never found possible to attempt to enter the harbor, without risking in an unwarrantable manner the safety of the iron-clad force, and violating positive conditions enforced by the Navy Department. But there was constant, and at times daily, firing into Rebel works, and hard service that caused the monitors to deteriorate.

By June of 1864 the Rebels had four iron-clads in the harbor, and in this month the "Water Witch" was lost at Ossabaw, and the "Ironsides" left for the North.

In July the expedition to Stono, which we have already traced, was undertaken. The firm stand made on this occasion by the Rebels was, as afterwards found out, chiefly due to the accidental arrival of Jackson's brigade from Johnson's army, to recruit.

In August (23d to 26th) Captain Colvocoresses captured a Rebel meeting and some cavalry, by a sudden
raid on shore,—an amusing little episode amidst so much gloom.

By the middle of October, 1864, so many steamers were repairing as to make even the blockade inefficient; for amidst all discouragements a most rigorous blockade had been constantly enforced.

Late in November, 1864, an expedition was organized against the railroad from Charleston to Savannah, intended as a diversion to aid Sherman's approach to the sea; and in December took place the operations in Broad River, the Tullifinney, &c.,—notably of the Naval Brigade.

The Fleet Brigade, under Commander Preble, was in action Nov. 30, 1864, at Boyd's Neck, S. C., and some days later at Tullifinney Cross Roads, December 6th and 9th, and was daily under fire until December 28th.

This operation, which has been partially detailed in the journal, was especially noticeable as being the first time of the regular organization of sailors as a land force, although sailors have often been landed and done good service. But these actions exhibited more fully Admiral Dahlgren's own system of shore service; and the measure, even to the limited extent it was carried out, exemplified and made apparent the benefits to be derived from its proper introduction in the service.

The various demonstrations made in Stono, Bull's Bay, the Edisto, &c., in aid of Sherman's movement, have all been mentioned, up to the eventful day of Feb. 17, 1865, when the insolent city by the sea was abandoned and made desolate by her blatant defenders, who had burnt and sunk beneath her turbulent waters their own iron-clads,—a more bitter Nemesis than any the enemy could have inflicted!
LIST OF NAVAL BATTLES.

In closing this eventful chapter of Admiral Dahlgren's "Rebellion Record," we give the connected list of naval battles in which he was engaged during the continuance of the war, and extending through 1861, 1862, 1863, 1864, 1865, when the insurgents made their submission.

Admiral Dahlgren conducted in person the naval operations against Morris Island and Fort Sumter, beginning July 10, 1863, and ending September 6, and by signal or otherwise ordered all the different actions in that period. Of these he commanded personally in the following: —

1. July 10, 1863. He made a joint attack with the troops on the southern defences of Morris Island, which resulted in their capture. The "Kaatskill," flagship.

2. July 10. Immediately afterwards, on the same day, he made the first attack on Wagner, beginning at 9½ A.M., and continuing till 6 P.M. Flag in "Kaatskill." Army not co-operating.


4. July 18. Engaged Wagner with the iron-clads and gunboats, co-operating with the Army. Flag in "Montauk," and closed to 300 yards from the work. General Gillmore's assault repulsed with severe loss, — said to be 1,500 men.


10. Nov. 16. "Lehigh" was ashore under a very heavy fire from Sullivan's Island. Flag in "Nahant" endeavored to haul her off. "Montauk" and "Passaic" engaged the batteries.

11. July 2 to 10, 1864. The Admiral was in Stono, co-operating personally with General Foster against the flank defences of Charleston on James Island. On the 3d was under fire.

Nov. 29 to Dec. 12, 1864. He was in Broad River with gunboats and Fleet Brigade, co-operating with General Foster to assist the advance of General Sherman. This resulted in severe actions at Honey Hill and the Tullifinney. The gunboats covered the landing and the Fleet Brigade advanced with the troops; its howitzers and musketry were effective, and its loss was considerable. The Admiral remained with the vessels.

Dec. 1864. A junction was effected near Savannah with General Sherman coming from Atlanta. Co-operated with the General at Ossabaw and other contiguous points.

Jan. and Feb. 1865. Co-operated generally in aid of the movements of General Sherman on his march northward, through Georgia and South Carolina. In course of these operations the "Dai Ching" was grounded under fire of a Rebel battery while attempting to assist the right wing under General Howard. She was, after a gallant defence, abandoned and destroyed.

Admiral Dahlgren was present personally in the Stono and Bull's Bay, in joint operations to press the
flanks of the Charleston defences while General Sherman was acting in the rear at Columbia.

On Feb. 17 he was among the few who first entered Charleston.

And March 1, 1865, his flag steamer "Harvest Moon" was destroyed in Georgetown Bay by a torpedo.

The writer regrets that the restricted limits of biography do not permit her to include, as she would be glad to do, the various meritorious and gallant acts of officers and men attached to the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron under Admiral Dahlgren.

As most interesting in this connection, she appends to this chapter the General Orders Nos. 64 and 65 (third yearly series) of Admiral Dahlgren, upon taking leave of the fleet off Charleston in June, 1865.

These General Orders, being official acts, must carry the weight of History with them.

The complete narrative, including actors as well as actions of this command, belongs to the historian.

She also regrets that the pen which traces the War Record of Admiral Dahlgren is held by a woman's hand. Yet she finds consolation in the fact that her efforts have not alone been prompted by personal affection, but have, she trusts, above all, been dominated by patriotism.

We close this Record by giving the appreciative letter from the Secretary of the Navy to Rear-Admiral Dahlgren, when the Admiral, at the end of the war, was relieved of his command; proving, as it does, that he retained unimpaired to the last moment the confidence of the Government, and its approbation of his course.
NAVY DEPARTMENT, June 23, 1865.

Sir,—Your dispatch of the 21st instant, reporting your arrival at Washington in pursuance of the authority of the Department, has been received.

On the receipt hereof you will haul down your flag, and regard yourself as detached from the command of the South Atlantic Squadron, and waiting orders.

The termination of the Rebellion and the cessation of hostilities, which rendered necessary the reduction of the South Atlantic Squadron and its consolidation, involved your detachment.

In relieving you from a command which you have conducted with ability and energy for two years, the Department takes the occasion to express to you its appreciation of your services, and of the services of those who have been associated with you in the efficient blockade of the coast and harbors at a central and important position of the Union, and in the work of repossessing the forts, and restoring the authority and supremacy of the Government in the insurgent States.

Respectfully,

GIDEON WELLES,

Secretary of the Navy.

Rear-Admiral JOHN A. DAHLGREN, U. S. N.,
Washington, D. C.

ORDER NO. 64.
(Third yearly series.)

FLAG STEAMER "PHILADELPHIA,"
CHARLESTON HARBOR, S. C., June 16, 1865.

It is but due, before leaving, that I should signify in General Orders my appreciation of the officers of the Staff, whose ready assistance has so often contributed to lighten my labors.

First is Fleet Captain Joseph M. Bradford. Perhaps no one but a Commander-in-Chief can rightly understand the many and never-ceasing cares imposed by the proper discharge of the duties of this office, especially in war, and in a command so large as this has been; to say nothing of the abnegation of all opportunity of personal distinction which such a position
demands. I shall never think but with great pleasure and satisfaction of the excellent service which this gentleman has rendered, and the never-failing energy and ability with which he has discharged his many onerous duties.

The Fleet Engineer Danby has been for the last two years in charge of the Mechanical Steam Department at Bay Point, where his industry and thorough knowledge of his business has alone enabled me to keep in active operation so many steamers; the first time, perhaps, that this power has been submitted to such a test.

Fleet Surgeon Johnson, Fleet Paymaster Watmough, and Judge Advocate Cowley have always cheerfully contributed their services in their respective branches.

The junior members of the Staff, Lieutenant Commander Matthews, Lieutenant O’Kane, Acting Master Avery, and Ensign Dichman, have always been active and zealous; sometimes in service not strictly belonging to that of a Staff, such as service with the Fleet Brigade, &c. The flagship has been commanded satisfactorily by Volunteer Lieutenant Gillespie.

Fleet Pilot and Lieutenant Haffards has also deserved good mention for faithful service at all times. He has generally piloted the flagship in action with the Rebels.

Nor must I omit my thanks to Mr. Secretary Peterson, Mr. Cooper, and other members of the clerical department of the Staff.

Upon the depot at Port Royal and its dependencies, the store-ships, workshops at Station Creek, and storehouses at Bay Point, the vessels of the Squadron have relied for their repairs, supplies, and communication; a great responsibility, the successful conduct of which is entirely due to the intelligence and experience of Commander Reynolds, during the whole term of my command; and I shall always feel much indebted to this officer for the zeal and fine ability with which he has aided me. Under his direction and at the head of these respective branches, I must not omit Acting Chief Engineer Young and the Master Carpenter Davies.

I have been also much indebted to Captain Charles O. Boutelle, of the Coast Survey, for the valuable information received
from him, and frequently for the personal attention which he has given to the movements of vessels in difficult channels.

John A. Dahlgren,
Rear-Admiral Commanding
South Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

General Order No. 65.

U. S. Flag Steamer "Philadelphia,"
Charleston Harbor, S. C., June 17, 1865.

The Rebellion has been crushed, and the vast military and naval forces of the Union will now be made to conform to the peaceful condition of the country.

The number of this Squadron, which has amounted even to as many as ninety vessels, has been already much reduced, and the reduction will continue until but a few vessels remain.

The Navy Department has therefore been pleased to relieve me from the command.

In taking leave, I avail myself of the opportunity to express to the officers, seamen, and marines who have served in the Squadron, my earnest appreciation of the good service they have rendered.

During two years of arduous command of a Squadron, blockading nearly three hundred miles of coast, including twenty-one ports, and performing every variety of service, the personal of the Squadron, regular and volunteers, has most creditably discharged its duty.

It is impracticable in the limits of a General Order to do more than to point briefly to some of the principal events that have transpired during the two years of command.

The prominent purpose in view when I assumed charge in July, 1863, was to attack the defences of Charleston by a combined operation of the land and naval forces.

The effort had been previously made by each of the services singly, and, though gallantly maintained, had not succeeded; it was hoped that by a united effort something more might be effected.

And the result justified the expectation so long as the effort was united; but when the Commanding General of the Department did not deem it advisable to go further, it followed as a
consequence that the naval force was not of itself sufficient for the task.

Nor was even a trial possible that did not involve full comittal to a struggle, which, if unsuccessful, could not fail to be disastrous; this view was sustained by a Council of War.

During all these operations the officers and men of the iron-clads, gunboats, and mortar-boats bore their part, and contributed equally with the Army to the capture of Morris Island, though it is now asserted in a published account of this transaction, that the approaches by land could have been pushed forward without the co-operating fire of the gunboats.

You will be able to form a fitting opinion of such an assertion, made public so long after the event. The facts on record show that the Commanding General would not move on Morris Island without the aid of the Squadron; that his landing was covered by a heavy flanking fire on the Rebel position from the monitors, while the boat howitzers delivered an effective fire at short range in front; that all his operations which succeeded were aided by the Squadron, and failed when they were not so aided; that he frequently called for the fire of the Squadron to relieve his works from the instant disaster which the Rebel fire threatened; and that the Squadron gave its most vigorous aid to the last effort that expelled the Rebels from the island.

When I began to perceive that the enemy was not likely to be driven out of Sumter except by assault, and saw that the force which I had could not of itself go further unless he was driven out, I ordered the assault. It failed; but never was more gallantry displayed than in the attempt.

The necessity for occupying this post was fully justified by subsequent events.

During all this time the vessels of the Squadron were active in maintaining the blockade, and in furnishing men for boat duty, or for the service of some of the shore batteries; and when the active operations against the interior defences were concluded for the reasons already given, the picket duty and inner blockade devolved on the monitors, tug-boats, and launches.

Never was any service performed involving a more resolute
struggle against the cold and the storms of winter, the heavy sea and the unsleeping enterprise of a vigilant enemy.

The gallant men who lie beneath the blue water enshrined in the iron sepulchres of the "Weehawken" and "Patapsco," and still further to seaward in the "Housatonic," were the witnesses of what you suffered and achieved in the common cause; while the desolate wrecks that strewn the shores, and choke the channels of Sullivan's Island, make manifest that your labors were not in vain.

The blockade was perfectly close until a few very fast steamers of trifling draught were built in England, expressly for the purpose of evading it. But even they could not pass with entire impunity; for the scout boats and picket boats cruised close to the enemy's batteries, and seldom failed to open fire on the intruding steamers, frequently driving them back or forcing them on shore. In one instance they boarded the "Florie" as soon as she touched the reef, and, before there was time to back off, captured nearly the entire crew.

At other stations of the command, the duty of blockade was carried on quite as effectually, but diversified by many little expeditions which operated severely on the military resources of the enemy.

Stono was the scene of some smart actions. On Christmas day of 1863 the enemy assailed our vessels in position there, and were handsomely repulsed by the "Pawnee," "Marblehead," and "Williams," with the loss of some cannon.

In February, 1864, the Squadron furnished a strong detachment to assist in the expedition up the St. John's.

July, 1864, in connection with General Foster, a detachment of the Squadron advanced on the Rebel batteries and lines in the Stono, and produced no small alarm, as Charleston seemed to be in peril. Indeed, a well-conceived blow at Fort Johnson by General Schimmelfennig had nearly succeeded.

Late in 1864 General Sherman began that campaign which would of itself place him among the foremost military commanders of history, and to facilitate his communication with the ocean, a joint movement was made up Broad River by General Foster and a detachment of steamers from the
Squadron, menacing the enemy's own communications near Coosawhatchie.

The Fleet Brigade was organized from the officers, seamen, and marines of the Squadron, and did good service, participating in all the actions, which were often severe.

At Boyd's Creek and on the Tullifinney, the artillery and infantry of the brigade vied with the veteran troops, and drew the frank and appreciative recognition of the General.

At Boyd's Creek the sailors and marines were ashore first and deployed as skirmishers.

At Tullifinney the howitzers were rushed up to assist the advance, then heavily engaged with the enemy, and by a few decisive rounds threw them back.

When General Sherman resumed his line of march from Savannah to strike the blow that prostrated the Rebellion, some of the gunboats assisted in transferring his right wing to Beaufort, and subsequently the principal forces of the Squadron were brought into play with the troops of the Department, and shared in the attacks made at Stono and Bull's Bay, in order to menace Charleston, and rendered excellent service.

In an effort to remove the obstructions at Charleston so as to co-operate directly with General Sherman, then likely to incline towards the city, the "Patapsco" was struck by a torpedo and sank instantly, while the "Dai Ching," in endeavoring to assist the right under General Howard, grounded in the Combahee under a heavy battery, and after a gallant resistance of several hours, which reduced her nearly to a wreck, was fired by her commander.

The blow at the defences of Georgetown was struck by the Navy alone, and they were abandoned by the enemy on seeing the steamers crossing the bar with detachments of sailors and marines.

It was here, too, my flagship was struck by a torpedo and destroyed.

In all these operations, and in others which I cannot here enumerate, the personal of this Squadron has manifested all that could be asked of the Navy, and if brilliant victory was not possible, the general results were not less useful, directly to the great end.
MEMOIR OF JOHN A. DAHLGREN.

To mention names would be to give nearly the muster roll of the Squadron, and yet there are some whose memories we will always cherish, because that is all which their unselfish gallantry has left us,—Rodgers, Preston, Porter.

To all of you I now bear my testimony, and offer my thanks, with best wishes for your future.

JOHN A. DAHLGREN,
Rear-Admiral Commanding
South Atlantic Blockading Squadron.
CHAPTER XX.

IN COMMAND OF SOUTH PACIFIC SQUADRON.—CHIEF OF BUREAU OF ORDNANCE.—IN COMMAND OF WASHINGTON YARD.—CLOSING SCENES OF LIFE.

After the return of Admiral Dahlgren to Washington, and the close of his command of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, he was, some weeks later (Aug. 2, 1865), remarried.

His second wife, Mrs. Madeleine Vinton Goddard (the writer of these Memoirs), was the only surviving child of the Hon. S. F. Vinton of Ohio, and the widow of the Hon. Daniel Converse Goddard of Ohio.

Of her father, Mr. Vinton, who had been for nearly a quarter of a century a conspicuous member of Congress, we shall only pause to quote a few lines from a speech of the Hon. Alex. H. Stephens of Georgia, made in the House of Representatives, March 3, 1880, in which, alluding to Mr. Vinton, Mr. Stephens says:—

Samuel F. Vinton of Ohio, whose acquaintance with the rules, great prudence, and sound judgment, rendered him perhaps the most prominent leader on the Whig side.

The remainder of the summer of 1865 was spent on the Hudson, at Newburgh and West Point.

Early in November of this year, and after the return of the Admiral to Washington, the obsequies of Colonel Ulric Dahlgren took place.
We have already noted, in the course of the War Record, the unrighteous purpose of the Rebel authorities to consign this young hero to a nameless grave, and how signally their cruel intention was defeated. For Union men, in the heart of Richmond, had held close watch; and, taking these remains from where they had been secreted, had kept them for the sorrowing family and for the nation, until the capture of Richmond. Then one of the first acts of Secretary Stanton was to take them in charge for the United States.

They were received with every mark of sorrow and respect in Washington, where they first reposed in the Council Chamber of the city, and from thence were taken, with military and civic escort, to the Presbyterian Church where Ulric had attended as a boy. The President, the Cabinet, and an immense throng of citizens were present at the funeral ceremonies. The remains were then conveyed, with every military honor, through Baltimore, to Philadelphia, where they were laid, as was the martyred Lincoln, in the Hall of Independence; and from thence, with every demonstration of honor and respect, in their last resting-place. It was the "last of earth" for the mortal part of Ulric Dahlgren; but he has left an imperishable name as the typical boy-hero of the war. For the Union prisoners held at Richmond, and for their liberation from a captivity worse than death, he freely gave his young life with all its bright promise.

Admiral Dahlgren was now residing in Washington, and, while awaiting orders, was engaged in collecting the historic facts of the short but phenomenally brilliant career of his son Ulric. His labors in that direction produced the book entitled "Memoirs of Ulric Dahlgren,
by his father, Rear-Admiral Dahlgren." This work is written with an entire accuracy which must always give it the weight of history, regarding the life of Ulric Dahlgren and the facts grouped around that life. The book, however, was not published until after the death of Admiral Dahlgren, when it was edited, revised, and published by his widow.

During the interval of comparative relaxation from public duty that now, for the first time, was given the Admiral, he virtually permitted himself no rest. For, in addition to his work in writing this memoir, various occasions arose for occupation.

In November, 1865, he was a member of an important court-martial for the trial of Craven, of which he has left some interesting notes. In these notes he shows his kind and generous heart, which caused him to give the most lenient construction on the case before him.

January, 1866, opens with the duties of the Board of Admirals on promotion. The Board met January 23, — Farragut, Davis, Dahlgren, Porter. The order of Department limited action to officers of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron. The Admiral's journal of the 26th January says: —

We have nearly concluded.

I submitted the name of every officer in order who had served with me, and proposed some advancement for every man who had even been near fire.

The Board admitted twenty-three. Some which they refused I battled stoutly for,—the two especially, Preble and Stevens. . . . Of one, whom I had reason to believe had been my covert enemy, I spoke so often as to extort from Davis the remark, "that he hoped never to want so good a friend as I was."
In March the Admiral was a member of a Board on Coast Defences, composed of officers of Army and Navy.

In June he was President of the Board of Visitors to the Naval Academy.

In July he notes an application of some founders for permission to cast XIth guns of the Dahlgren model for the Peruvian Government, and says:

I declined at the time, being averse to dealing in money matters. The Assistant Secretary pressed me very strongly; said if I did not consent it would force the work out of the country; that I ought to make money if I could. But I held fast. Soon after, the Bureau of Ordnance sent me a paper showing that they were using my model in Sweden, with Rodman's hollow casting.

Last Friday, Alger of Boston wrote for leave to cast XIth guns. I wrote a letter, asking if the Department had any objections. To-day the Department writes it has not. So I notified Alger & Co. that I would assent.

This assent was the only instance, poor as Admiral Dahlgren was, in which his great inventions were of any pecuniary advantage to him; and the royalty on these few guns was but a small matter.

Sept. 15, 1866, he notes the birth of twin children, a son and daughter, named respectively Eric and Ulrica.

But the peaceful serenity of home life, so welcome to the Admiral, and so highly prized by the home circle, was soon to be cruelly disturbed.

We prefer to depict the tyranny of official will in the forcible words of the journal.

Sept. 29. — This morning's mail brought me an order, compressing much in six lines, requiring me to leave New York on
the 1st December, and relieve Pearson in command of the South Pacific Squadron.

It would not be easy to say how I received an order so unjust in its nature, so rude in its manner; and yet there is no appeal from the pleasure of one who is capable of so soon forgetting service rendered to the public cause. . . .

_Friday, Oct. 5._ — At Navy Department, in Bureau of Detail. The Secretary asked, “why my orders were not published?” The reply was, “that I had so requested, to prevent the news reaching my wife in her present feeble condition, as the effect now would be serious.” The Secretary objected. Said “the orders must be published!” . . .

That same day the journal mentions a conversation with the Secretary. He says: —

My orders were mentioned. I remarked that I had not expected to go to sea _before others whose turn it was._ There were three others. . . . I replied that I had been at the Washington Navy Yard, and was taken from it to go to the Bureau, against my expressed wishes. That I had seen but a year and three months there, and was entitled to the remainder of that service before going to sea. Now I am sent to sea, notwithstanding that rightful claim. . . .

_Oct. 6._ — The “Chronicle” has the following: “Ordered, September 28, Rear-Admiral John A. Dahlgren, to take passage from New York on the 1st of December next, to command the South Pacific Squadron.”

_Oct. 9._ — In spite of all my efforts, some one told my wife of having seen the orders in the papers, and the consequences are most serious. Her distress is excessive.

The last of this month the Admiral notes being well received in a journey he made to Ohio on business connected with the estate of his wife. He says: —

Surprised by a reception at Logan. At Chauncey, the country people fired a salute; but at Logan they had a band out, and great cheering. At Lancaster, crowd and band again.
About this time Headley published his sketch of Admiral Dahlgren among the various lives of his "Naval Commanders." Headley says: —

Dahlgren, by his inventive genius in the construction of ordnance, and his bold and original plan of arming vessels of war, has done more for the Navy of our country than probably any single man in it.

The journal of Oct. 30, 1866, says: —

Yesterday I mentioned to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy that I wished the permission of the Department to give passage in my flagship to my wife, so as to establish the family at some point on the South Pacific coast. The Regulation (202) did not forbid, only required the leave of the Department, and it had been customary to grant it, and never refused. Faxon said he would represent it to the Secretary. To-day he informed me that he had done so, and the Secretary declined. I replied, "Very well," and remarked on its consequences,—exposing my wife to land alone in a strange country, with little children, and to cost me about one thousand dollars merely to go out.

_How strange! I never asked the Government one cent for my guns, with which the Navy is armed, and yet I am refused a passage for my wife!_ Truly, when we see such things done, it seems out of place to say of such men that these "do constitute our American State."

Oct. 31. —Funeral of Mr. Seward's daughter. I was invited to attend as a pall-bearer.

_Nov. 8._ My wife has been making efforts to induce the Secretary to allow her passage with me. Among others, her father's friend and associate, Hon. Thomas Ewing, went to the Secretary.

The answer was, that passage would not be allowed in the flagship; but that if my wife would write to the Secretary, he desiring it, he might grant me the privilege of accompanying her in the mail steamer! The Secretary asked Mr. Ewing "if I had asked him to speak to him?" Mr. Ewing replied, "Not
A QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

*a word.* This was strictly true; nor was I aware of my wife's action in the matter.

_Saturday, Nov. 10._—Received a reply from the Department in regard to vessels of war passing a blockade. It is so singular that I note a copy:

_Navy Department,_
_Washington, Nov. 9, 1866._

_Sir,—Your letter, in relation to a question of International Law which you think may arise during your command of the South Pacific Squadron, has been duly considered._

_The Department is satisfied that a blockading belligerent has the undoubted right, after due notice, to prevent the ingress and egress of naval as well as merchant vessels,—to cut off all social as well as commercial intercourse._

_No such contingency is likely to arise in the South Pacific; but should it, forcible resistance will not be expected._

_Iron-clads, under present circumstances, are not needed in that quarter._

_I am respectfully, your obedient servant,_
_G. Welles, Secretary of the Navy._

_Rear-Admiral John A. Dahlgren, U. S. Navy,_
_Washington, D. C._

_The Department may be satisfied, on correct ground; but I can say that it is entirely at variance with the opinions of naval officers, as far as I know them, and certainly with the practice in three cases when I was present._

_In 1826 I arrived in Brazil, being a Mid. in the "Macedonian._

_Commander Elliott had, only a few months previously, forcibly resisted the intention of the Brazilian Commander to prevent his ascending the La Plata to Buenos Ayres, then blockaded by Brazil. The "Cyane" beat to quarters, and Elliott signified his intention to go up forcibly if needed._

_Afterwards, Commander Biddle desired to send up the "Boston." It was understood that a correspondence occurred between him and the Brazilian Admiral, who refused permission. Biddle insisted, and sent up the "Boston." Whether it was actually the fact, I do not know, as the correspondence was_
never published; but that certainly was the impression. I was a passenger in the "Boston."

In 1830 I was in the Mediterranean when Commander Biddle sent the "Ontario" to Africa to bring away the Consul. The French had a small blockading force. Contact was avoided, but the impression again prevailed that Biddle would not consent to be kept out.

This document of the Department shows again how the current opinions in the Navy are at variance with those of the Department, and that an officer dare not act without instructions. In the case of bombardment of Valparaiso, Rodgers would have followed the sentiment of the country. But the letter of Secretary Seward to General Kilpatrick utterly condemned any forcible interposition.

In this case, I am satisfied that the Department is wrong on first principles. Merchant vessels, by the nature of their business, give aid and supply, therefore are excluded. National vessels carry no supplies, and dare give no aid, therefore are not excluded.

On the coast of South Carolina I excluded the English and French vessels of war from Charleston, not on the ground of blockade, but because military and naval operations were being carried on inside the blockade, and no one was permitted to pass these lines. Mr. Welles has committed an indefensible error.

On being assigned to the command of the South Pacific Squadron, Admiral Dahlgren at once foresaw that he would be called upon to meet some perplexing questions, involving, indeed, points of international law.

One of the first of these difficulties likely to arise, was, to decide as to the measure of recognition which it would be proper to give the Admiral-in-Chief of the little Navy of Peru. Tucker, whom Peru had invested with this rank, had been formerly of the United States Navy, and had left the service and gone over to the Confederates during the war.
PERPLEXING POINTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 627

When, on May 29, 1865, the President, by proclamation, absolved the whole Southern people from all liabilities, certain classes of persons were specified as excepted. Among these was the class to which Tucker belonged. Therefore he stood liable to trial, and could not be relieved therefrom, save by pardon of the President. Nor could the act of Peru, making Tucker her officer, relieve him; for he could not, in his position, thus expatriate himself, and take a new allegiance. Hence, Admiral Dahlgren could only know Tucker as an ex-officer of the United States, liable to, and still owing the old allegiance. The Admiral therefore addressed a letter to the Department, asking for specific instructions as to how he was expected to regulate his conduct on this point.

He had every reason to be very particular, as he had of late received such ample proof of the petty persecuting spirit of the Department, in its brief hour of authority, towards him.

Having made these explanatory remarks, we shall again quote from the journal.

Nov. 15. — At Navy Department. I saw the Assistant Secretary, and observed that I had no reply yet to my letter about the Peruvian Admiral. Faxon said that nothing was decided; that Mr. Seward was weak in the backbone. Had seen the Peruvian Minister about it. The Cabinet was divided, but Mr. Seward had it in hand now. He added, that if I had no answer he would support me; that if I met Tucker I was to take no notice of him. I told him the Regulation of the Department, as to visits, would be violated, as well as the respect due to a foreign flag. He said, no matter; that the Department would sustain me, and then referred to case of Collins, &c.

Nov. 22. — To-day, closing up. Went to the Navy Department. Saw the Assistant Secretary. I referred to the letter
of the Department with respect to Tucker, which authorized me to disregard the Regulation that requires me to visit first. He asked if that would do. I said I would carry it out as far as it went. He added, "Take no notice of the cuss; I would put my heel on him." I said, "Put that on paper; the orders of the Department will be obeyed." He answered that it would not do, but I would be sustained. I said, "But why does not the Department say what it wants? If it is so careful, so will the officers be; if it shows backbone, so will they."

Then there was a pause, and I inquired about other details. He said, "The Secretary wishes to see you before you go," and he went into his room; came out and asked me to go in. I did so. I have not been there since the day I remonstrated about my orders. The old sinner looked very pleasantly, and held out his hand, as if he had not done me the greatest injury in his power. He then began about the Tucker business. . . . The Secretary called him "an unpardoned Rebel, who was liable to be hanged if he appeared at Fort Monroe, and he did not wish me or any officer to be disgraced by compulsion to render him civilities." He said there had been differences in the Cabinet. Stanton supported him; Seward opposed, but had since come round, rather. The Peruvian Minister (Bareda) had been spoken to. He admitted the employment of Tucker was a mistake. He said his rank was inferior to mine. The Secretary said that General Grant had been there about some communication by canal over the Isthmus, and he wished me, if parties came down on that errand, to assist. Being through, I rose: the Secretary ditto; offered his hand; wished me a pleasant passage and cruise; asked me to write officially and unofficially! he would be so pleased! So I bowed out. At one of the Bureaus was asked why I did not give passage to my family, and ask no leave. I pointed to the Regulation. I was asked, "Well, how do you read it?" Said I, "That I can give passage to any female but the wife of an officer."

Nov. 23. — Good-by to home, to wife, and the two babies. When shall we meet again, and how?

I passed the week busily in New York completing preparations. Had a long talk with Farragut, who called, and I
returned the visit next day. Evidently he is not consulted as much as he expects by the Department, and is nettled by it.

Saturday, Dec. 1, 1866.—About one o’clock the mail steamer "Ocean Queen" left the wharf and steamed down the harbor. Patty and Eva took leave the day before. Charley and Paul did so at the wharf. I never saw them looking better,—Charley hearty and hardy, with his now ample whiskers; Paul in his cadet uniform, striped as Sergeant-Major. Nice boys.

Wednesday, Dec. 12.—Panama. The "Powhatan" is here, and I received command, relieving Admiral Pearson,—in all respects a repetition of the ceremonial when I relieved Dupont at Port Royal, but how different from that grand spectacle!

Dec. 28.—The "Powhatan" was anchored in the Bay of Callao just one month after leaving home. Here I found the "Dacotah," "Waterée," and "Nyack"; only the "Tuscarora" wanting to complete the squadron. The Captains came on board. Of the three, two had been with me off the Southern Coast,—Thompson and Pendergrass.

After Admiral Dahlgren’s arrival at Callao he notes the customary official interchange of civilities all round, which culminated in the official presentation to Colonel Prado, who was then Dictator of Peru. Succeeding these official courtesies, he was occupied for some weeks squaring up all business bequeathed by his predecessor,—courts-martial, correspondence, &c., and sent the vessels in different directions. The apprehended question as to the acknowledgment of Tucker, even by the mere ceremony assigned to his rank in the Peruvian Navy, was almost at once presented. Although Admiral Dahlgren entertained no unkind feelings personally towards this officer, yet he felt compelled, on abstract principles of law, as applied to his case, to refuse all recognition. There was some diplomatic fencing, during which Admiral Dahlgren remained firm in his expressed intention, when his views were virtually admitted by
the Government of Peru, and Tucker accordingly resigned his position.

After a stay of over three months off Callao, a cruise was made in the "Powhatan," first to Pisco; then the Chincha Islands, so famous for their guano deposits, were visited. The Admiral also visited the estate of Mr. Elias, by invitation, where he was most hospitably received, and met a number of the neighboring proprietors, who had been invited to meet him. This is a very large estate, where sugar, cotton, and the vine were cultivated in different tracts, the vintage of the latter being a sherry, and some of it considered particularly fine, especially a choice liqueur called "Italia." Upon his return, the last of April, to Callao, the journal mentions receiving letters from the Department regarding the Tucker affair. It says:

Seward carries his point, and the President decides according to his view. So the Navy Department sends a copy of his letter, and directs me to restore No. 96. Seward's letter is highly complimentary to my sentiments, but says Tucker must be looked on as a Peruvian officer. A shameful and outrageous back-down! Needless, too, for Tucker backed out first! Mr. Seward has erred, as he always does where mere rules are inapplicable, and the decision must go beyond to the high sentiments of our nature. He admits that Tucker is a Rebel, liable to be punished as such, if found in the United States, but decides that Peru has a right to invest him with highest rank, and to require from me the honors belonging to such rank. That is, if in the United States, he might wear a halter; but in Peru he is to be received on a United States quarter-deck with a guard, with salutes from the cannon, while I, hat in hand, stand to receive him. To add to the absurdity, if next day I meet this man ashore, I am to decline all communication with him, as a Rebel. Can anything be more silly? To make the matter worse, all this was unnecessary; for when these instructions arrived all was settled, as Tucker had resigned.
The journal then says:—

_April 8, 1867._—Heard of grand row at the Navy Department. Dispatches missing! One of them important, from me. Finally it turned out that the Secretary had two baskets under his table, one for waste paper, the other for important papers. The messenger had been in the habit of using both in making fires! What a commentary on the conduct of public business! So they wrote me for duplicates.

_April 22, 1867._—Visit returned by Admiral Penhoat. He said he saw the fight of "Kearsarge" and "Alabama." He had been deputed to see them out of French waters. Complimented my guns. He said it was so difficult to preserve the neutrality. I told him, that was what we complained of,—putting Rebels on the same footing with a regular government!

About the first of May the Admiral made a cruise to Panama, to make arrangements for protection of American interests at that place, returning to Callao by the last of May.

The 24th June notes the arrival of his wife and infant children. It says:—

The New York steamer fell behind time, and so Madeleine found herself detained for two weeks at Panama. The pestilence menacing to be very rife, every attention was tendered by the railroad and other officials. A cottage was provided, but the prospect was gloomy, and the children fell dangerously ill. Just then the "Ossipee" came in, and Emmons considered the letter my wife had procured from the Secretary as his warrant. So he took the little family on board and brought them here,—a happy ending. I took them to Lima, and located at Morin's Hotel.

On the 10th of August the Admiral, having had needed repairs made on the "Powhatan," again put to sea. He had been in impaired health for some months, and says of himself in his journal:—
My own health having been much shaken by unremitting service in the Rebellion, and time not given to recruit afterwards, I have suffered very much from the climate here, and am now very feeble.

The little cruise now made was to Payta, once the great resort of whalers; from whence, by invitation of the United States Consul, a trip was made to the village of Huaca, on the River Chira. The journal says:

_Aug. 17._—Left Payta about half past five in the morning, and soon mounted up on the high table-land in rear of the town, which was perfectly level as far as the eye could reach, and its sand unvaried by a blade of grass. Above three hours and a half of steady travel on horseback brought us to the village. Nothing could have been finer than the cool breeze on the plain, but it was less refreshing when we descended from the plains to the valley of the river. The rest of the day and the two succeeding were passed at the house of the Consul. The valley is rich as possible in soil, and, being overflowed once a year by the river, produces almost anything. Cotton of all kinds grows luxuriantly. Tree cotton, Egyptian, and that of the United States. Indigo grows wild.

_Tuesday, Aug. 20._—Took leave. Mounted at 5 o'clock; returned over the plain, and reached Payta about 8½ o'clock; then on board. In all we saw, it was the invariable tale,—an indolent people who will not work, a soil as favored as any under the sun. After a pleasant passage of four days, anchored once more at Callao on the 24th August.

_Sep. 5._—It is now arranged that I shall leave on the 8th, immediately after the mail steamer from the United States arrives, so as to reach Valparaíso before my wife reaches there on the 21st, in the mail steamer. A great trial to me. This is indeed a shameful business,—my wife driven to the hospitality of the English flag, with two infants not a year old, while Captain Pennock is allowed to take his wife on board the "Franklin" to Europe, and the late papers announce that the family of the Secretary are using a United States steamer (the "Ascutney") for pleasure trips from Washington along the coast as far as Boston!
The British Admiral now in the Pacific has his wife and child always in his ship, and so had the Admiral who left, his wife with him. But the wife and children of an American Admiral are left to drift about unprotected.

_Sunday, Sept. 1._—I was a guest at the lunch given by the President. One hundred and fifty present.

The new Constitution was proclaimed on Friday, and Prado sworn in on Saturday as President.

_Sep. 21._—The Powhatan arrived in the port of Valparaiso. The mail steamer had got in about seven o’clock, and I soon learned that my family had landed, and were at the Hotel Colon.

The port is much crowded with vessels.

_Oct. 9._—Moved from the Hotel Colon to a house on the Cerro de la Concepcion, which I rented for the family.

We note from the journal of _Nov. 4_, an incident:—

Before the British “Chameleon” sailed, her Captain came on board and stated that some of his men had deserted. He was informed by the Captain of the Port that they were on board the “Powhatan.” The Lieutenant-Commander, in the absence of the Commodore, allowed the British Captain to see all the men shipped from the date of desertion. He did not make this known to me until afterwards, the Commodore having done the same himself once before; whereupon I issued an order, directing that in future English officers were to be informed, when making such applications, that I did not want deserters, and would send them ashore when known. They could furnish descriptive lists of deserters, to be used with other information; but no English officer was to be permitted to make a personal examination of the crew on board. We had no treaty with England in regard to deserters, owing to objections from England.

_Nov. 5._—The mail steamer from Callao arrived. The news from there is stirring. The revolution is showing itself in various parts,—at Truxillo; an outbreak at Puno; Prado marching with his forces on Arequipa.

Captain Brasher writes that the troops have been withdrawn from Callao, and the Prefect has authorized foreigners to defend themselves.
The Consul also writes that there is apprehension of riot and plunder, and asks for the presence of an American ship of war. . . . So I concluded to start myself.

Nov. 6.—The ship being ready, at six p.m. got under way, and put to sea.

Nov. 9.—Anchored in the snug little harbor of Caldera, a small town scattered over bare sand-hills, no trees, no vegetation,—a mere port for shipping copper from the interior.

Nov. 10.—Left Caldera, and November 13 anchored in port of Arica, and waited for mail steamer.

Nov. 17.—Anchored for the afternoon at Iquique. This port is formed by a slight indent of the coast and a little island. Like all the Peruvian harbors, very good, because there are no gales. Would not do, if there were. After sunset, up anchor, and steamed south, along the coast. About sunset of the 18th, entered Cobija. This is the only port of the State of Bolivia. It is a small collection of miserable habitations, placed on a little plain at the foot of the range of bare and desolate mountains that form the coast.

Nothing can be more utterly forlorn than the whole prospect. There is not a tree, bush, or blade of grass, green or brown, to be seen. Everything above water is one universal sand-color, except the flag of Bolivia that floats ashore. It is a mere landing-place for the trade to and from the interior. The anchorage is good enough. The Captain of the Port and the Commandant's aid came off, and I sent an officer ashore as usual to thank for the civility, offer to salute if returned, and to say that as I would leave early in the morning there would not be time to visit and receive the visit of the Governor. My aid came back to say that the salute would be returned as well as they could, and as I had not time to come ashore the Governor would come aboard. Very soon after, his boat was announced, and I was much astonished to see step on board a full-blown general, gold-laced from tip to toe, cocked hat included, epaulettes, &c. He was very gentlemanly, and spoke French easily; so we had a long chat.

It was impossible not to return the visit of such a personage, who waived all ceremony. So, half an hour later, I went ashore, not much laced, but with epaulettes, which I seldom
wear, and never on such occasions. Aid ditto. There was a
guard of half a dozen soldiers at his door to receive, his aid in
charge and the General at the head of the stairs en tenue, but
slightly relieved! . . . There were but two small field-pieces
to return the salute of twenty-one guns, and great were the
preparations to execute it. The cartridges were brought one
by one, and a dozen soldiers ran down at double quick; still it
was done with good will, and in good military style.

Tuesday, Nov. 19. — Reached Mexillones, or, as the orderly
reported it, "Macle Hony." The coast, as usual, a range of
arid, bare mountains. The bay is a semi-ellipse, open to the
north; the chief difficulty being the depth of water, so that
one has to enter very close to the shore. From this rises the
mountain, bare of even a blade of grass.

The presence of the guano company is indicated by a few
buildings, a wharf, a long shoot running a third of the way up
the steep mountain, and traces of roads. . . .

About two, I landed with Lieutenant McG——, the Chaplain,
and a Master, and, mounting, took the way up the mountain-
side. The soft rock had been cut away so as to form a fine
wide road, executed in the best engineering style. At the dis-
tance of three quarters of a mile this struck into the passes of
the mountain, gradually ascending and winding so as to avoid
too sharp a grade, until an hour's ride brought us to the beds
of guano that have been opened, say some 1,500 feet above the
sea. This guano is of a tawny color, and in consistence rather
firmer than chalk. It is in a compact body, and yields an even
surface to the pick and shovel. It lies like a covering of soft
earth on the mountain, perfectly even in texture and unmixed
with any other substance. Our guides then led the way by
mere bridle-paths higher up the mountain by zig-zag course
up its steep side until we reached 1,800 feet above the sea, and
only the point of the mountain looked over us 200 feet higher.
It was well that our horses were sure of foot and accustomed
to the crumbling surface which they trod. Even here shafts
were to be seen, sunk to twenty or thirty feet to examine the
soil. Everywhere the same light reddish deposit. The view
was superb,—over sea and plain and mountain range. Then
we turned to descend, and on the way stopped at the head of the
shoot, just where the road emerges from the mountain passes and winds down the side. This shoot is 720 feet long to the platform above the water. The guano is carried to it from above.

Nov. 23. — Reached the anchorage at Valparaiso.

Early in December the Admiral and wife went to Santiago, to visit the United States Minister, from thence to the celebrated hot baths of Cauquenes, and returned to Valparaiso, at the expiration of a week, after a very pleasant trip. Prado, having been unable to stem the revolution in Peru, sought asylum on the United States steamer "Nyack," Captain Pendergrast. He arrived at Valparaiso, January 20, in this ship. We give from the Admiral's journal a portion of his account of this event.

It was two P. M. when the "Nyack" anchored near the "Powhatan" and Captain Pendergrast came on board. He reported Prado on the "Nyack," and rendered a rapid statement of events connected therewith. I then went on board the "Nyack"; passed aft and met Prado coming out of the cabin. He first took my hand, then passed his arm around me, in the manner of his country with very near friends, expressing his great gratification at meeting me. We descended to the cabin, and there he renewed his thanks for all that had been done for him. When I offered a few words of consolation he showed entire firmness and unbroken spirit. He wore a plain black suit and straw hat, as, indeed, he usually did at Lima. But of all the numerous following that he had at that time, there was only his father-in-law, Ugartechi, and Colonel La Torré; the rest were paying court to the new powers.

Jan. 29, 1868. — It was nine o'clock last night when the "Powhatan" finally got out of the harbor of Valparaiso and steamed southward.

Jan. 28. — The sun was setting as we entered the noble Bay of Concepcion, and it was quite dark on anchoring off Talcahuano, at the bottom of the bay. Next day, at dark, left.

Jan. 30. — Anchored off Lota about eight A. M., — a little place
entirely of copper-making and coal-mines. I went ashore and visited the operations, which are large. The whole belongs to Mr. C——, who spends his great income in Paris.

Jan. 31. — About ten A. M. left, and steamed around into Coronel Bay.

Feb. 2. — About nine o'clock anchored in harbor of Valparaiso. It is very much cooler at Lota than Valparaiso.

The British Commodore took his wife and her child and sister to sea with him. When the French Admiral went to Juan Fernandez and Coquimbo he took the French Consul and his wife in the "Belliquese."

Feb. 12. — The second day of Chilian Independence (Charcabuco), celebrated by Chilians with salutes and flags.

March 10. — By sunset was on board.

March 11. — All night fresh gale from S. S. W.; going square before it with sail, only ship rolling like mad. So continued during this day. Put on low steam, but did not help. About two in the afternoon the high land about Coquimbo began to loom out through the thick air, and by five P. M. the ship was anchored in the placid water off Coquimbo,—the shores of the bay stretching around, and the town of Serena, with its white houses and steeples, somewhat relieving the dull aspect of a land where neither trees nor verdure was presented to the eye. It looks like business ashore, however, and the many tall furnace-stacks tell of the large smelting operations here. On March 16th got back to Valparaiso.

April 22, 1868. — My son, John Vinton, was born.

May 9. — Yellow fever raging in Lima. The authorities forbid official statements of mortality to be published. The ports along the coast are being inoculated by the mail steamers.

Saturday, May 23. — The Queen's birthday. No English ship but a storeship here. So the "Powhatan" took care of the day. Dressed with flags and fired national salute at noon, the British ensign at main.

May 27. — First norther of the season. The people always use the term "norther," whereas seamen only use it when it blows a gale. I am inclined to believe that the true location of this troublesome wind is between fifty and one hundred and fifty miles north of Valparaiso, and that it only extends to Val-
paraiso during the winter months, when it creates great sea, being the only exposed quarter. At other seasons it does not extend so far.

My wife has received a letter from the wife of the Attorney-General, saying that the Attorney-General had spoken to Secretary Welles about her returning on a Government ship, and that he replied that he "had no objection whatever to her doing so."

May 28. — Everything was now arranged for a move. Trunks aboard, and by eight o'clock in the evening the old "Powhatan" was steaming away from the anchorage.

July 2. — Reached the anchorage off Panama about eight A.M.

July 4. — Duly celebrated. Dressed with flags, and fired twenty-one guns at noon.

One of the confidential agents at Bogota to negotiate the recent purchase of the Colombian Government's reversion in the railroad (when so great a struggle was made by the English interest, under the auspices of Mosquera, to obtain the same object) tells me that a secret treaty is pending with Colombia, by which the United States Government seeks to cut a ship canal across the Isthmus. The route of the canal will necessarily be along the railroad, which, I am told, is the only practicable line.

Mr. N — says that I am the third outsider only to whom this has been made known; also that our Minister at Bogota is soon expected, with the authorization of the Colombian Congress.

July 7. — My little family left Aspinwall last evening in the mail steamer for New York.

July 9. — Shortly after noon the steamer arrived at Aspinwall, and Rear-Admiral Turner was in her. In the "Times" of 30th June I noticed my nomination to Bureau of Ordnance confirmed by the Senate.

Most to me, is the pleasure to Madeleine. She will be much relieved by the news on arriving at New York.

July 10. — Mail got over about eight A.M. Not a word from the Department about my being relieved of the command. A nice way to do business!

July 14. — At seven o'clock A.M. took leave. I dispensed
with all ceremonial, as Dr. M—— was too ill to endure the parting salute; still, most of the officers had assembled at the gangway to say good-by.

_**July 22.**_ — The steamer was at her wharf on the North River.

_**July 23.**_ — I reached West Point, and found my family all well.

_**July 24.**_ — A communication from the Navy Department in reply to my official document stating my arrival, saying that I was Chief of Bureau of Ordnance, and would begin the duties at my earliest convenience.

Salute of thirteen guns for me at the Point.

On August 3d I began work in the Bureau of Ordnance.

Many visits. The sun rises again, and the “clouds that lowered” are “in the deep bosom of the ocean buried.”

After briefly glancing over the many forms, I took up real business and went at the batteries of the huge vessels, not yet all finished. The Secretary left to go North. No scruple in using a Government vessel for himself and family.

_**Aug. 12.**_ — General Seymour called at Bureau. Speaking of Charleston matters, he said Wagner would have been taken by the assault of 18th July if Gillmore had not kept back the third brigade. Seymour was charged with the assault, and had divided his column into three brigades. The first went in, and, though suffering terribly, was not driven back. Seymour called for the second. Putnam replied, that he was ordered by Gillmore not to advance; but Seymour insisted, and Putnam came on. Seymour says his men virtually succeeded, for they got possession of parts of the work and held them. Then, had the third come on, he says Wagner would have been taken; but the Comdr. obeyed Gillmore and remained. Our men were therefore beaten back, but in not less than an hour.

_**Aug. 24.**_ — On my way to the Bureau I passed near to Mr. Stanton, and stopped to speak to him. He is astonishingly changed. No longer the sharp, bold, almost defiant bearing. He seemed feeble in his gait and speech; the eye lacked expression; the former man was gone, and the present appearance was decrepit.
Aug. 28.—Saw the Secretary about an officer to assist me in technical matters of the Bureau. I told him that so much work had been transferred to Ordnance from Bureau of Yards and Docks by the new arrangement, and so much formulae introduced since I was in the Ordnance, that I should have no time to attend to the real business of the Bureau, the great questions of the day, the ordnance affairs of squadrons, &c. . . .

Aug. 31.—Saw the Secretary about Ames's application to me for reconsideration of his claim. He said that the Bureau had decided and he had confirmed the decision, and the matter could not be reopened. He said that Ames and his friends had been opposed to my coming to the Bureau.

Admiral Smith spoke to me of the delay in Senate Committee in confirming me. He said that all the Committee, except Anthony, had been well inoculated by disappointed inventors with the notion that I was the inventor of a gun, and would exclude every other. The Admiral said he knew this by conversing with the members.

I went to the Secretary, told him what I had heard, and said that as there would soon be a vacancy in command of the Washington Yard, I would leave the Bureau if he would send me there. I was indignant at such unworthy treatment. The Secretary objected; said I was in the right place, and others were asking for the Yard.

I told him I would like then to leave the Bureau, anyhow. But he still refused. In the course of remark he said that when he came in he found the Navy ruled by a clique. That had been broken up, and now the same thing was being tried,— . . . at the head, and a Board of Survey the medium; that he was making a ring by the indorsement of certain officers; . . . that efforts had been made to underrate and exclude officers of the South Atlantic Squadron, &c.

I listened without saying anything more than that I had been absent, and knew little of these matters.

Sept. 17.—Porter comes in. We had a long chat. He pitched in generally. . . .

Sept. 23.—I spoke to the Secretary about making some shorter IX\textsuperscript{th} guns for steamers too narrow to take the usual
IXth. Told him that the question had been met by Wise, by making new 8th guns and 32-pdrs. which were shorter. The principle bad; being a great sacrifice. Should have been met by shortening the IXth. The Secretary argued that the vessels were overloaded with ordnance, and did not require such heavy cannon in peace.

I told him that heavy guns did not mean overloading, but only to put the whole weight in the heavy cannon; that it was melancholy to see some of the reductions.

Sept. 30. — Assistant Secretary came into my office with my estimates, and objected to items for guns, &c. Said that Congress had assailed the Secretary, and he would do nothing. I protested against such a course.

Dec. 22. — I have received a document from the Committee on Ordnance, asking me twelve questions about XVth. and heavy rifles. To answer it properly would need six months. They give me a month. The Secretary urged me to say I had not time; but I said I would try.

Feb. 11, 1869. — Send in my answer to queries of Ordnance Committee after seven weeks' incessant labor, all the clerks in the Bureau assisting to collate from the Record.

On the 15th the Committee make their report, of which the papers give a synopsis, to the effect that both my guns and Rodman's are condemned; that an ordnance committee is proposed, with high powers; that officers must not invent except for the interest of the Government; abolishes the Army Bureau of Ordnance, and consolidates Ordnance and Artillery, of which it is difficult to say which is the most mischievous or absurd. Ames, with his burst gun, is recommended for payment of $150,000, and Wiard for $120,000, the Government not having one gun from him, and the only one tried burst at first fire, for which he has been paid one half and gave receipt in full.1

1 We copy from the Admiral's journal this quiet notice of this most extraordinary report, which may go down in history as a perfect specimen of this kind of ordnance ring. The naval part of the war had been fought with the Dahlgrens, and with them brought to a triumphant conclusion, which this Committee now in piping times of peace "condemn," and advise the payment of large sums to disappointed claimants!!

Admiral Dahlgren could well afford to look on such proceedings with dignified contempt! — M. V. D.
March 4, 1869.—The city crowded to overflowing. By eleven o'clock I reached the Capitol with Madeleine and Romaine; the Admirals being invited to the floor of the Senate for the first time on such occasions, and tickets for the gallery for mine.

The Senate floor was open to those invited, and in we marched.—Supreme Judges, Representatives, Generals, and Admirals. Presently came Grant in plain black. Then out for the platform on the east front.

March 9.—About noon Mr. Borie, the new Secretary, received heads of Bureaus. So we assemble, and bow.

Some twenty minutes afterward the Secretary was announced as visiting the Bureaus, Porter with him; who, stepping aside, told me that Grant said he should run the machine as Borie's adviser.

March 10.—Porter busy getting documents for the Secretary to sign. I told him I would not remain in the Bureau. Reasons, the report of the Committee. He damned the Committee, and said we would whip them; that I must not think of leaving. I held on, however.

Porter showed me Borie's letter assigning him duty in the Department.

March 12.—I use every opportunity to put the Ordnance through some improvement. Breech-load muskets instead of the muzzle-—. Board of five officers; then a survey, by Board, of all the Ordnance material, with a view to sale.

March 13.—I have ready to-day my memorandum on condition of Ordnance.

March 30.—I told Porter when the Washington Yard was vacant I would like it; that I wished to vacate the Ordnance, being tired of the eternal abuse, and disgusted at the report of the Committee.

Admiral Smith displaced from the Bureau of Yards. He is now seventy-nine years old, and has worthily held the Bureau twenty-three years. He is vigorous, and probably more capable now, than any one else, to discharge the peculiar duties of this Bureau. He was the first Lieutenant of one of our leading ships on Lake Champlain in McDonough's battle, and he lost his favorite son in the "Congress" when sunk by the Rebel ram
“Merrimac.” The introduction of Ericsson’s monitor, which averted the serious consequences of the raid of the Rebel ram, was due to him. The removal of such a man is not creditable. I argued the matter without effect.

June 19. — Placed my family at summer quarters at Rye.

July 28. — Mr. Borie has resigned, and Mr. Robeson, of New Jersey, has been appointed Secretary of Navy in his place.

July 3. — To my great relief Paul stepped in, bag in hand, just from his regiment at Key West, bound to Fort Riley in Kansas, to join a light battery of his regiment. That anxiety is over, for he was in the midst of yellow fever.

July 12. — A day of mark.1 It is finally arranged that I am to have the Washington Yard. The Secretary was ushered into the Bureau. He came, he said, “to express his regret at my leaving the Department, but would let me do as I wished, notwithstanding.” Then he asked who ought to succeed me in the Bureau.

July 17. — Left Washington for Rye. . . . Lounged and loitered and drew in fresh air for a couple of weeks, and played with babies. How they grow in body and mind!

July 31. — Turned from the pleasant scene to mingle once more in the busy world.

Aug. 2. — At the Bureau. Saw Porter. He told me that my plan of a light armored-ship had been put in hand of Bureau of Construction; that he liked it, and so did Lenthall.

In the evening, presided at meeting of officers. The discussion on reorganization was animated.

I have received an official notice that I am to relieve Poor in command of Yard on the 10th.

Tuesday, Aug. 10. — Having shaken Bureau dust from my shoes, I donned uniform and rode to the Navy Yard. Inside the gate, Admiral Poor, with all the officers, full guard of marines, &c., received me. The Admiral then had a very nice collation at his quarters, to which all the officers were invited. I took command, under very different circumstances, of this

1 Strange remark. For one year later, on this very day, the Admiral died.

— M. V. D.
MEMOIR OF JOHN A. DAHLGREN.

Yard, April 22, 1861, when the Commandant and other officers abandoned it. Finally, having received the command, I returned to the city, Admiral Poor not being ready to leave the quarters.

And so matters went on until the time approached when my wife was to leave her summer retreat at Rye. I then left Washington to bring her and the children home.

We rented our own house to Mr. Le Strange, of the British Legation, for one year.

Sept. 17. — Reached Washington with my family.

Nov. 13, 1869. — I complete sixty years to-day. Grateful to say, in good health, and only the worse in point of time. All around me are also well.

Jan. 26, 1870. — Gave a reception to Prince Arthur, of England, at the Yard. About four hundred persons, embracing the most distinguished of Washington, were present.

For myself, I cared less for the Prince, than for what I could do to sustain the hospitality of the country, and gratify my friends.

March 16. — It would be difficult to conceive a more wild, wintry morning than this. A light snow whitens every object, and is driven with violence through the air by a strong N. W. gale that howls around the corners of the house, down the chimneys, and moans at every crevice of door and window. The atmosphere is thick with the storm. It is to be Romaine's wedding day.¹

As the day wore on the N. W. wind brought clear weather, and a little before two the invited guests began to arrive,—some sixty or seventy in number—the President, Chief Justice, the Cabinet, Foreign Ministers, and some friends. . . . Vinton² as best man and Miss Nettie Chase as bridesmaid. The ceremony at two o'clock.

March 30. — Dr. Draper sends me the third and final volume of his "History of the Civil War" in advance of the publication.

¹ Romaine Madeleine Goddard was the daughter of Mrs. Dahlgren. She was married to the Baron Von Overbeck of Austria.

² Lieutenant Vinton Goddard, U. S. A., now deceased, was the brother of the bride, and son of Mrs. Dahlgren.
IN COMMAND OF THE WASHINGTON YARD. 645

His 72d chapter (pp. 160–168) contains his view of the Charleston operations, and sustains my course there.

Dr. Boynton’s work (by authority of Secretary Welles) does the same, and Headley’s Biography. Hamersly’s “Records of Living Officers” makes note of the fact of my adherence to post when the officers of the Washington Navy Yard abandoned it.

April 22.—The Ohio Legislature visited the Yard by invitation, with their presiding and other officers, representing a sovereign State. The Legislature was saluted with twenty-one guns, a full guard, &c. After seeing the Yard, the whole party, about three hundred in number, were entertained by my wife, who is an Ohio lady, at the house.

Thursday, April 28.—About eleven o’clock Madeleine walked down to the office with a telegram saying that “Eva was very ill,” and asking me to “come on.”

So I left at 12.45 in the train for New York, where I arrived about ten o’clock at night. But owing to the distance, it was an hour later before I reached Madison Avenue, where Eva was.

I found my beloved child entirely unconscious. Three physicians were present. Dear Eva! About three o’clock Friday morning her innocent soul departed.

With this announcement of the death of his daughter Eva, at the residence of her aunt, in New York, the continuous record of Admiral Dahlgren’s own life closes.

His journal, commencing Oct. 18, 1825, just as he was entering upon his sixteenth year, has noted with an accuracy and perseverance of purpose, indicative of the character of the man himself, the entire course of a busy and eventful life. It closes only a little over two months previous to his death, in July, 1870, and presents an extraordinary picture of more than forty-four years of unremitting and earnest and high-minded endeavor,—a picture drawn day by day, unconsciously as it were, but with faithful exactitude. What lights and shadows
have been thrown upon and around this broad portrait-
ure of life's drama!

Admiral Dahlgren was an affectionate father, and he
felt very keenly the loss of his daughter Eva. But in
his pleasant home, and surrounded by the little family
to whom he was so tenderly attached, he had com-
menced to regain his usual cheerfulness, and appeared
to be in excellent health.

Early in July he visited Gettysburg, wishing to
inspect its historic ground. From thence he extended
his journey into the mountains of Pennsylvania, with
the view of selecting and purchasing a summer home.
He found a situation on the slope of a mountain, not
far distant from Chambersburg, which pleased him, and
had at once written to request information regarding its
purchase.

But the calm domestic happiness of life's glowing
sunset was not to be his. Providence otherwise or-
dained.

Having garnered in a rich harvest of good deeds,
and having attained a place in the world's renown, he
was now to be suddenly removed, in the full measure
of his great fame and usefulness.

During this last little journey into Pennsylvania, he
was so unfortunate as to be exposed to the violence of
a sudden rain-storm the morning of his return home.
The railroad ride had to be made in damp clothes, and
he contracted a cold which affected the chest. This
occurred in the early days of July, and after this acci-
dent he experienced an oppression on the chest, but
continued to transact official business as usual up to the
day preceding his death.

He then complained, for the first time, of severe pain
in the region of the heart, but declined to call in medical aid.

Mrs. Dahlgren, however, being greatly alarmed, sent for a physician, who did not look upon the situation as serious, but left a prescription in case of a recurrence of pain.

That last evening of his life was spent in his favorite room, — the "study," — where, seated in an arm-chair, and much relieved of the severe pain he had suffered, he conversed with his wife until eleven o'clock, when he was reminded that, being an invalid, he should seek repose.

Although during the evening, he betrayed no apprehension, yet it was remembered that the conversation must have had and expressed a much deeper meaning than was at the time made manifest. It was entirely in accord with his calm, Christian courage, to have known that he possibly stood in death's shadow, and yet, in outward bearing, have given no sign thereof. In the terrible light of the tragedy of the next day, it is now recalled that much that was said during that last evening on earth might most appropriately have been said, had the Admiral known of his swift-coming doom. This was doubtless owing to his superb fortitude, that determined him to quiet the apprehensions of his wife. He spoke continuously to her for some hours, in which he reviewed the course of their wedded life, mentioned by name each of their dear children, — calling the infant "blessed babe," — and assured his wife that her "companionship" had been "a blessing," and that she had "made him happy." He then dwelt upon his religious convictions, and said that "all his former prejudices against the Roman Catholic Church" were removed, "except concerning one point, . . . to which
his reason refused assent,—mentioning what that one point was. Finally, he spoke of the dream of his life,—his profession,—in which he had merged such a wealth of patriotism. His final expression regarding an officer's career was, "The officer should wear his uniform, as the judge his ermine, without a stain." What nobler sentiment could close his long and bright record,—one "without a stain!"

That night was made restless by continuous pain; or, as he himself said, "This dull, hard pain wears on."

Yet, that morning of July 12, 1870, he arose at his usual early hour of six o'clock, and his wife found him seated by an open window when she entered the "study" two hours later. She was at once disquieted by his peculiar pallor, and rang the bell to order breakfast to be brought to him, waiting to see that the simple meal his frugal taste preferred, was nicely presented. An egg, a crust of bread, and a glass of iced milk met his approval. As he took the goblet in hand, he said, with that ineffable elegance of diction he was wont to use, that "the clear ring of the ice was refreshing"; and quickly added, "Madeleine, I will take nothing more until you go to your breakfast, which you must require." In obedience to his request, his wife left the room, but was scarcely seated at the breakfast-table before she was recalled by a servant, who ran hurriedly to say, that "the Admiral had another attack of pain." She returned in quick haste, to find him extended upon a lounge, which he must have sought with the recurrence of pain. One swift glance told her that some awful change was passing; another, that this was death!

Summing up his life, it may be said, without excess of praise, that he was true in every relation of life. He
was a firm friend, a fond father, a faithful husband; but his chiepest loyalty — for it was held like supernal faith in a religion — was to his beloved country. *Patriotism* was with him not merely a virtue, it was the absorbing passion of his lofty soul. Formed in the heroic mould of the old Roman, he disdained all littleness. When the passions of the present shall be absorbed in the future, his ardent love of country will be the better understood and appreciated. Those who knew him best could best measure the magnanimity of his grand nature.

Looking over the record which filled the newspapers of the day, and the various resolutions of condolence to the bereaved family, as well as of respect to his memory, which were passed after his death, the judgment becomes perplexed in the attempt to make any selections of extracts from which to add to the pages of this Memoir. The materials presented are so abundant as to become bewildering; and so we have decided that, although all were appreciated, we shall quote from none.

*As yet,* the country which Admiral Dahlgren served with such consuming zeal, and which has reaped such *enduring benefits* as the result of his inventive genius and unstinted loyal service, has not erected to his memory, or to that of his hero son, any monumental semblance in marble or bronze, or made any adequate recognition of his merits. Still we shall ever cherish the hope — illusive though it may be — that Republics are grateful. Whatever else may betide, we do know, for a certain fact, that inscribed in the historic roll of fame will be the name he and his son made illustrious, — of Dahlgren!
APPENDIX.
APPENDIX.

A.

Copy of a Letter from Major-General Hunter to His Excellency the President of the United States.

DEAR SIR, — It is more than six weeks since the attack by the iron-clads upon Charleston, an attack in which, from the nature of the plans of Admiral Dupont, the Army had no active part.

On the day of that attack the troops under my command held Folly Island, up to Light-House Inlet. On the morning after the attack we were in complete readiness to cross Light-House Inlet to Morris Island, where, once established, the fall of Sumter would have been as certain as the demonstration of a problem in mathematics. Aided by a cross-fire by the Navy, the enemy would soon have been driven from Cumming's Point, and with powerful batteries of one and two hundred pounder rifled guns placed there, Fort Sumter would have been rendered untenable in two days' fire. Fort Pulaski was breached and taken from Goat's Point on Tybee Island, a precisely similar position, with 32-pdr. Parrott guns, 42-pdr. James guns, and a few 10-in. Columbiads, — the 13th mortars used in that bombardment having proved utterly valueless. I mention these things to show how certain would have been the fall of Sumter under the fire of the one and two hundred pounders rifled, now at my command.

On the afternoon after the iron-clad attack on Fort Sumter, the troops on Folly Island were not only ready to cross Light-House Inlet, but were almost in the act, the final reconnaissance having been made, the boats ready, and the men under arms for crossing, when they were recalled, as I hoped merely temporarily, by the announcement of Admiral Dupont that he had resolved to retire, and that consequently we could expect no assistance from the Navy.
Immediately the Admiral was waited upon by an officer of my staff, who represented the forwardness of our preparation for crossing, the evidently unprepared condition of the enemy to receive us, while any delay, now that our intentions were unmasked, would give the enemy time to erect upon the southern end of Morris Island commanding Light-House Inlet, those works and batteries which he had heretofore neglected.

To these considerations, earnestly and elaborately urged, the Admiral's answer was, that "he would not fire another shot."

A lodgment on Morris Island was thus made impossible for us, the enemy having powerful works on the island, more especially at the northern end, out of which we could not hope to drive him unless aided by a cross-fire from the Navy. I therefore determined to hold what we had got, until the Admiral should have had time to repair his vessels; and to this hour we hold every inch of ground, on Folly and Cole's and Seabrook Islands, that we held on the day of the expected crossing.

Since then I have exercised patience with the Admiral, and have pushed forward my work and batteries on Folly Island with unremitting diligence; the enemy meanwhile, thoroughly aroused to their danger, throwing up works that completely command Light House Inlet on the southern side of Morris Island, so that the crossing which could have been effected in a couple of hours, and with little sacrifice, six weeks ago, will now involve, whenever attempted, protracted operations and a very serious loss of life. And to what end should this sacrifice be made, without the co-operation of the Navy?

Even when established on the southern end of Morris Island, the northern end, with its powerful works, and commanded by the fire of Forts Sumter and Johnson, would still remain to be possessed. The sacrifice would be of no avail without the aid of the Navy; and I have been painfully but fully convinced that from the Navy no such aid is to be expected. I fear Admiral Du Pont distrusts the iron-clads so much that he has resolved to do nothing with them this summer, and therefore I most urgently beg of you to liberate me from these orders to co-operate with the Navy, which now tie me down to share the Admiral's inactivity.

Remaining in our present situation, we do not even detain one soldier of the enemy from service elsewhere. I am well satisfied that they have already sent away from Charleston and Savannah all the troops not absolutely needed to garrison the defences, and those will have to remain in the works whether an enemy be in sight or not. Liberate me from this order to co-operate with the Navy in an attack on
APPENDIX B.

Charleston, and I will immediately place a column of 10,000 of the best drilled soldiers in the country (as unquestionably are the troops of this Department) in the heart of Georgia, our landing and march being made through counties in which, as shown by the census, the slave population is seventy-five per cent of the inhabitants.

Nothing is truer, Sir, than that this Rebellion has left the Southern States a mere hollow shell. If we avoid their few strongholds, where they are prepared for and invite us to battle, we shall meet no opposition in a total devastation of their resources, thus compelling them to break up their large armies and garrisons at a few points, into scores of small fractions of armies, for the protection of every threatened and assailable point.

I will guarantee, with the troops now fruitlessly though laboriously occupying Folly and Seabrook Islands, and such other troops as can be spared from the remaining posts of the Department, to penetrate into Georgia, produce a practical dissolution of the slave system there, destroy all railroad communication along the eastern portion of the State, and lay waste all stores which can possibly be used for the sustenance of the Rebellion.

My troops are in splendid health and discipline, and in my judgment are more thoroughly in sympathy with the policy of the Government than any equal body of men in the service of the United States to-day. . . .

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

D. HUNTER,
Major-General Commanding.

B.

The Correspondence alluded to in the Letter of Rear-Admiral Dahlgren.

FLAG STEAMER "Harvest Moon."
Georgetown, S. C., Feb. 27, 1865.

Major-General Q. A. GILLMORE,
Commanding Department of the South.

GENERAL, — I transmit herewith a copy of the "Herald" of the 22d February, containing a letter from Mr. O. G. Sawyer, dated from Hilton Head, February 18.
A passage occurs in that letter which I have marked, and to which I desire to draw your attention.

It is in keeping with the aspersions and reflections upon me and my official course, formerly indulged in by certain correspondents from the same quarter, in which Mr. Sawyer participated, but which have ceased for nearly a year. These were so unjust personally, and so hurtful to the discipline of my command, that their renewal should not be permitted; and as this writer is within the military jurisdiction of your command, I have to request that he, as well as others who may be so inclined, will be required to refrain from making such remarks, or shall leave the Department.

I am, General, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

J. A. DAHLGREN,
Rear-Admiral Commanding S. A. B. Squadron.

(Copy.)

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH,
HILTON HEAD, S. C., March 1, 1865.

Rear-Admiral J. A. DAHLGREN,
Commanding South Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

ADMIRAL,—I have to acknowledge the receipt yesterday of your communication of the 27th ultimo, transmitting a portion of the "New York Herald" of the 22d ultimo, and calling my attention to the following extract from Mr. O. G. Sawyer's letter to that paper, dated Hilton Head, Feb. 18, 1865, viz.:—

"Considerable activity is manifested in the Squadron, but what will be accomplished none can tell. It is not likely a chance will be afforded to the Squadron to emulate the actions of Porter's and Farragut's brilliant organizations."

Your statement that Mr. Sawyer formerly participated with other correspondents from the same quarter in remarks unjust to yourself and hurtful to the discipline of your command, "but which have ceased for nearly a year," has its explanation perhaps in the circumstance,—reported to me by members of my staff,—that he has been absent from the Department during the greater portion of that time.

While I am unable (not being very sensitive myself to newspaper criticism) to see anything in the paragraph quoted which would seem to justify any interference on my part, I hold myself ready at all times to restrain the liberties of correspondents within proper limits: deem-
ing myself fortunate in thus having an opportunity to repay especial acts of gentlemanly courtesy of which I have been myself the recipient. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Q. A. GILLMORE,
Major-General Commanding.

(Copy.)

FLAGSHIP "PHILADELPHIA,"
CHARLESTON HARBOR, March 11, 1865.

Major-General Q. A. GILLMORE,
Commanding Department of the South, Headquarters, Hilton Head.

SIR,—I have received yours of the 1st March, in reply to mine of the 27th February.

You quote only a portion of the article to which I desired to call your attention. The whole of it reads thus:—

HILTON HEAD, Feb. 18, 1865.

. . . . . . . . . . . .

General Gillmore at Stono Inlet... General Gillmore proceeded to Stono Inlet this morning to take a look at the field. He is as active and energetic as ever. Here one day and no one knows where the next, keeping his eye on every piece on the board. His return to active service in the field is welcome by all who served under him in the Department of the South.

Considerable activity is manifested in the Squadron, but what will be accomplished none can tell. It is not likely a chance will be afforded to the Squadron to emulate the actions of Porter’s and Farragut’s brilliant organizations.

I admit that the portion which you omitted speaks of yourself exclusively, but prefer to preserve the connection just as made by the writer,—the inference being that your activity and energy were working their due effect, while no one could tell what would be accomplished by the Navy, and suggestive of further disparagement by contrasting a very small operation with brilliant exploits elsewhere.

What your sensibility to newspaper criticism may be I leave to yourself, but it is probable that it might be increased if that criticism emanated from a ship of this Squadron assailing and disparaging your military conduct so constantly when it spoke of you, that its effect was to shape public opinion into a false estimate of your motives and actions. Of course, I should not take the liberty of referring to your sensibility had you not spoken of it yourself.

The object of my communication to you, however, was not to speak
of your insensitivity to newspaper criticism, but to request that you
would not permit a writer whom you could control to continue the
course of criticism in which he had formerly indulged while you com-
manded here, because it was hurtful to the discipline of the Squadron,
and unjust to myself.

I did not ask you to punish him for what he had written, but only
not to tolerate its continuance.

You reply that "you see nothing in the passage quoted which would
seem to justify any interference on your part."

You thus indorse the propriety and applicability of those remarks,
not only in their separate sense, but in connection with previous commu-
nications of the same writer.

I feel constrained to say, therefore, of the remarks alluded to, that so
far as they detract from and depreciate myself or the naval operations,
they are false and hurtful to the discipline of the Squadron, and so far
as they form part of a system of puffing up and crying down, are dis-
graceful to the perpetrator, and to any who may seek to be benefited
thereby.

As it is in your power to prevent the continuance of such remarks,
and as you decline to do so on the ground that you see nothing in the
paragraph sent you to justify that interference, I feel that I have a
right to add, that whatever remarks of the above character may in
future emanate from writers whom you can restrain, you render your-
self responsible for, and cannot avoid sharing in, the demerit that may
attach to them.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,


(Copy.)

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH,
HILTON HEAD, S. C., March 19, 1865.

Rear-Admiral John A. Dahlowen,
Commanding S. A. B. Squadron, Charleston, S. C.

Admiral,—I have received your letter of the 7th inst. Although
it does not require a reply from me, I desire to renew the assurance con-
tained in my letter of the 6th instant, that "I hold myself ready at all
times to restrain the liberties of correspondents within proper limits,"
and to ask whether in its execution you are satisfied that you will receive
the protection and aid which you desire, as expressed in your letter of
February 27, or whether in addition thereto you wish me to describe
the means I intend to adopt, or to prescribe those means yourself. The
insinuations in which you have thought proper to indulge in the last part of your letter I am constrained to pass without notice.

It is but justice to the officers of my staff that I should say, in their behalf, that none of them knew anything of Mr. Sawyer's intention to write what he did, or knew what he had written until after its publication.

It seems needless to add that I never saw or heard of the article until the papers arrived from New York; indeed, I did not know that Mr. Sawyer continued to write to the "New York Herald," but supposed him to be exclusively engaged in editing a newspaper in Savannah.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Q. A. GILLMORE,
Major-General Commanding.

(Copy.)

FLAG STEAMER "PHILADELPHIA,"
CHARLESTON HARBOR, S. C., March 27, 1865.

Major-General Q. A. GILLMORE,
Commanding Department of the South, Headquarters, Hilton Head.

Sir,—In reply to the query contained in yours of the 19th inst., I have only to say that it is indifferent to me what means you use to suppress the remarks of a public correspondent under your control, which are equally at variance with truth so far as I am concerned, and derogatory to yourself in permitting them.

The estimation which attaches to these libels is derived entirely from the fact that the writer is known to be under your control, and therefore whatever he may write carries with it an acquiescence very little less than absolute approval.

The revival of such remarks just as you resume the command here has a significance not to be avoided, especially when it is remembered that this same writer, and some others, indulged in similar remarks during the term of your previous command, and that a correspondent affirmed your knowledge and countenance thereof.

When apprised of this you entirely denied the allegation, and I frankly accepted that denial, as the charge seemed to me incredible.

Since that, however, this allegation has received confirmation by an officer whose rank and character convey an assurance not to be disposed of by a mere denial.

In the present instance you say that you "never saw or heard of the article until the papers arrived from New York." Perhaps so; but when it was brought to your notice by me, what did you say then?
APPENDIX B.

That you saw "nothing in it to justify your interference," thus giving more color to the imputations formerly made than I was prepared to expect.

Now, I wish to be understood that I did see good reason for your interference, and when remarks of a similar description are made by a correspondent within your control, I shall address you on the subject precisely as if they were signed by yourself.

If this conveys to you the idea that I am seeking your protection, you will learn, probably, that it appears differently to others. My object is to protect myself.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. Dahloren,

Rear-Admiral Commanding S. A. B. Squadron.