ANDERSONVILLE,

A Critical Sketch

by

HERMAN A. BRAUN.

1892.

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MILWAUKEE.

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Object Lesson on Protection.
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PREFACE.

The conviction—based upon personal observations within the Confederate Military prisons during a period of eighteen months, and subsequent study—that the political situation in this country cannot be fully understood without a just appreciation of the prison horror and its causes, has prompted me to prepare this sketch, which I have reason to hope will be received with that consideration, to which an honest effort to serve the truth ought to be entitled.

Herman A. Braun.

Milwaukee, August, 1892.
INTRODUCTION.

On the tenth of November, 1865, a tragedy was enacted in Washington which at the time was looked upon by the people as a self evident demonstration of retributive justice. The victim was Captain Henry Wirz, the keeper of the Confederate military prison at Andersonville, who suffered the death penalty amid the execrations of the people of the Northern states, while upon no man, since, have been hurled anathemas with more bitterness than upon him. One of the narrators of the Andersonville horror, in summing up his malediction upon this unfortunate man, says:

"Over his ignominious grave will ever float the remembrance of his thousand crimes, to mark the resting place of a willing tool and murderer, while his memory will be handed down pre-eminent among the bad men of the world, but especially notorious as the Jailor of Andersonville."

In Mr. Elroy's book on "Southern Military Prisons" Wirz is described as follows:

"One morning a new officer came to superintend roll-call; he was an under-sized, fidgety man with an insignificant face and a mouth that protruded like a rabbit's; his little bright eyes, like those of a squirrel, or a rat, assisted in giving his countenance a look of kinship to the family of rodent animals, a genus which live by stealth and cunning, subsisting on what
they can steal away from stronger and braver creatures. He was dressed in a pair of gray trousers with the other part of his body covered with a calico garment like that worn by small boys, and buttoned to the pants at the waist. Upon his head was perched a little gray cap, and sticking in his belt and fastened to his wrist by a strap two or three feet long was one of those formidable looking but harmless English revolvers that have ten barrels around the outside and fire a musket ball from the center; he was stepping nervously about, and sputtering in broken English to one of his subordinates: "'By Gott vy you don't vetch tem tam Yankees close enough? Dey are schlapping rount und peating you every dimes.' He was guat-brained, cowardly and feeble, and was selected by the leaders of the confederacy because he would execute their hellish designs and was capable of adding a column of two figures, one of the qualifications required to take charge of prisoners, and one of the things they were very deficient in. A man who could add a column of figures! Now imagine if you please, such a man put in charge of 35,000 men! Being a fool, he could not help being an affliction to them, even with the best intentions; but he knew nothing. About the first thing I heard him say in a braggadocio way was, that he "was doing more for the confederacy than a corps of men at the front." I was convinced of the truth of the statement as soon as I took a look inside the stockade.

Even on such a late date as Nov. 8, 1890, a contributor to The Brooklyn Times writes of Wirz:

"Here I made my first acquaintance with Captain Wirz, and a more brutal coward I never saw. Kicking and cursing the sick who from inability to walk lay down on the ground outside the gate of the prison, with a revolver in his hands, he ran from one place to another, as we were being driven, like a flock of sheep,
within the gate, threatening, striking and cursing with the ferocity of a bulldog.

A contributor to The Milwaukee Sunday Telegraph, July 3, 1887, denies the possibility of an excuse, much less a justification, for Wirz in these words:

"There is too much evidence in the hands of the authorities at Washington, showing that a regular system of cruelty was ordered by the Richmond authorities for a Northern man to excuse Wirz or those who placed him at Andersonville."

Opposed to these opinions, is that expressed by a number of prisoners, myself among them, when placed in cars for their transfer from Andersonville to Charleston about Sept. 10, 1864. The division of prisoners designated for transfer while halting alongside of the train, was subdivided into squads of equal numbers, each squad being assigned to one car to afford the prisoners as much comfort during the trip as circumstances would permit. Never before had such attention been paid to them. Immediately after entering the cars, they were handed their rations consisting of corn bread and pork and as the food was in liberal quantity, the conversation soon had reference to the conduct of Wirz. In marching from the prison to the cars the men had seen him sitting in front of his tent in a position which indicated him to be in a reflecting mood. He had his right arm resting on the side of his chair, his head leaning on his hand, and was seemingly viewing the prisoners with sympathetic interest. The attention paid them on this occasion by providing room for everyone and the large allowance of rations was considered an indisputable evi-
idence of his good will toward the prisoners. Their experience in Andersonville compared with that in Danville and Richmond—for every man had been a prisoner since the days of Chickamauga—prompted them to recognize the fact of Wirz’s untiring efforts in behalf of the prisoners and to acknowledge his efficiency and consideration.

The conversation ended with the unanimous resolve, to proclaim these facts after their return home and to unite in an effort to secure generous recognition for Wirz. The men composing the squad were from the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Kentucky. That their views were shared by many other prisoners is shown by the fact that subsequently, at Charleston and in the prison at Florence, S. C., not a word condemnatory of that unfortunate man was said by anyone. In Florence, where the suffering was much greater than at Andersonville, owing to conditions which, in adjudging the causes of suffering at Andersonville will appear of great weight, it was freely admitted that the treatment at the hands of Wirz had been preferable to any other during their captivity. Like the Israelites, who sighed for the fleshpots of Egypt, many a prisoner who had given up the hope of ever returning to the North, comforted himself with the nearer memories of Andersonville, where his hunger had been appeased at least once a day.

The resolve to recommend Wirz to generous consideration, born of gratitude and entertained with that sincerity that comes from honest convictions, was for
nought. The passions of the time forbade even the attempt.

The civil war had been brought to a close; the joy of victory had been changed to mourning by the news of the assassination of Abraham Lincoln. Sectional prejudice and hatred, then in full sway, were further inflamed by the tales of horror, which the returned prisoners told in every home of the land. In describing the horrors experienced during their captivity there could have been no exaggeration. People can never realize the suffering endured by the prisoners during their confinement within the stockades; half clad, without shelter and deprived of everything which makes life worth living, they experienced the tortures of both heat and cold.

The magnitude of the horror is demonstrated by figures obtained from the reports at hand. The total number of prisoners, who died in the Confederate military prisons, is stated in one of the alleged official reports to be 36,491. Of this number, about one sixth died from wounds, leaving 30,000 who became victims of disease. This mortality is confined to a period of one year. The first death among the captives of the battle of Chickamauga (Sept. 19 and 20, 1863,) occurred at Danville, Va., in the middle of February, 1864. Hostilities continued during a period of four years and during that time 83,000 men were killed in battle or died from wounds, the average number of casualties, therefore, being about 9,000 less per annum than the mortality among prisoners resulting from diseases.
But to appreciate the fullness of the horror, one must also bear in mind the mortality among the Confederates confined in the Federal prisons. Secretary E. M. Stanton, in a report dated July 19, 1866, gives the total number of victims in those prisons at 26,436. The total loss of life among the prisoners held by both sides, is fixed officially at 62,837.

With regard to the mortality among the Union captives, confined in Confederate military prisons, Dr. Wm. Caldwell, president of the Northwestern Ohio Medical association, in a paper on the disabilities of soldiers, says.

"It is deemed pertinent to this enquiry to examine somewhat succinctly the conditions which contributed to the enormous tables of disease and mortality among the Union prisoners of war, which may lead us to a more just conception of the probable condition and health of the survivors; this is neither a partisan nor sentimental question, but one of pure science—of cause and effect; it was a question of food, shelter and environment. The ordinary amount of solid food per day required to sustain human life is about forty-two ounces: the average ration, however, of the armies of various countries, as well as civil and military prisons throughout civilization, is somewhat above this amount. In southern prisons it appears that the average ranged from six to sixteen ounces of solid food, and this under unnatural conditions, relative to shelter, clothing and sanitary surroundings. The average mortality in the hospitals of Dublin is less than five per cent., in the civil hospitals of France from five to nine per cent.; the average deaths in prisons of Massachusetts, Michigan, New York and Maryland was about two per cent.; the Union hospitals at Nashville received
during the year 1864, 68,000 sick and wounded, of whom only four per cent. died.

The official records of Andersonville prison show that 2,678 men died in September, 1861, or more than fifteen per cent.; in October, more than twenty-seven per cent. died; in August 3,000 men died, and on the twenty-third of that month one died on an average every eleven minutes. Of the inmates of Andersonville prison hospital seventy-five per cent. died. The entire number of officers, and soldiers, white and colored, killed in action during the War of the Rebellion was 42,238, and the total number of officers and soldiers who died of wounds received in action during the same time was 33,993. This, as against the 60,000 who died in prison or immediately after being released, shows a difference of but 18,221 more men killed in action and dying of wounds than died from confinement in southern prisons. Careful estimation shows that the average duration of life of the prisoners at Andersonville was ninety-five days. The men who were thus imprisoned and died so rapidly were in no way the feeblest class of the army; they had generally served from one to two years and were generally injured to all the hardships of the field. Only those having the strongest constitutions lived to return. It has been said that the soldier who died suffered less than he who survived—"That the red dew of one baptism is upon them all." Who among you are intimately acquainted with any of the survivors of these prisons will say that they are sound men—that they have not sustained permanent disability?"

Statistics compiled by a committee of the Union Prisoners of War National Memorial association show that 71,000 Union soldiers died in these prisons or soon after their release, while but 61,000 were killed in the battles fought during the four years of the war.
These figures, if correct, would show an excess of 55,750 over the average number of those killed in each of the four years of the civil war. History does not record another instance of such an awful loss of life outside of actual conflict and under like conditions. Major General H. W. Halleck, in his book "Elements of International Law and Laws of War" mentions the prison horror in the following words.

"Although the rules of international law, as well as the obligations of humanity, require the captor to either release his prisoners or to provide for their decent and proper support, there have been recent instances of treatment of such prisoners which would have disgraced the most barbarous ages. The cruelty of the Spaniards to the French prisoners confined at Cabrera, and of the rebel authorities to the United States soldiers confined at Richmond, Andersonville and other southern prison pens, furnish some of the darkest pages in modern history and are disgraceful to the perpetrators."

The words "release" and "provide" should be especially noted as well as the admission of the fact that the prison horror of the civil war is without an example in history. The suffering among the prisoners on the island of Cabrera extended over a period of three years and of 6,000 prisoners * half of that number survived. The average duration of life among them was six years; in Andersonville the average duration of life was ninety-five days. In the face of the magnitude of the horror, is it possible for one to conceive of such utter depravity of human nature that a person could be found willing to further hasten the

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* Robert Southey, History of Peninsular War.
work of death in the manner attributed to Captain Wirz?

And will the sober-minded at this day admit, that he would have been allowed to do such fiendish work even by the people with whom we were at war, after their soldiers in the field had spared the lives of the captives amid the carnage of the battle-field? Certainly not. The people of the Confederacy were alive to their responsibility in this case and the acts of Wirz, even if they resulted in the destruction of life, will appear entirely compatible with the highest aims of humanity—that of saving life.

And it is the denial of such aims and efforts and the condemnation of his acts as deeds of a fiend incarnate, behind which the secret of Andersonville and of the prison horror is hidden, that here is pointed out the problem which history must solve for the sake of humanity and above all for the sake of the cause of popular government.
ANDERSONVILLE,

AN

Object Lesson on Protection.

CHAPTER I.

CAPTAIN WIRZ.

Captain Henry Wirz assumed the control of the interior management of the Andersonville prison about the end of March, 1864. He was a native of Switzerland, the scion of a patrician family of Zurich, where his relatives held prominent positions. He came, it is reported, to the United States in 1849 and after a short stay in Louisville, Ky., settled in Louisiana, to practice medicine. When the war of secession began, he joined his neighbors in the defense of a cause which they believed to be just. For the fact of his active participation in the civil war he certainly deserves no special censure. He was a man of family and as he had probably learned to appreciate his neighbors he chose rather to follow their fortunes instead of deserting them at that time. In this respect he stands far above many of those who, while ever ready to de-
nounce him, failed to take part in active defense of the cause they pretended to believe to be just.

Captain Wirz had been wounded in the battle of Bull Run in 1861 and was afterwards employed in Richmond as a clerk. Ambrose Spencer, the author of an alleged authentic "Narrative of Andersonville" does not mention the fact of Wirz having been wounded, an omission not without importance since it is claimed that his selection for the position was on account of his "known cruelty." The same author states, that later on, Wirz was sent on a tour, to inspect the military prisons throughout the South. In the summer of 1863 he was sent to Europe to carry dispatches to the diplomatic and financial agents of the confederacy and returned in January, 1864.

In his capacity as superintendent of the prison, Captain Wirz was responsible to the commander of the military post, Brigadier General John H. Winder, a West Point graduate. Prescott Tracy, who was exchanged for the purpose of submitting to President Lincoln a memorial, setting forth the sufferings of the prisoners of Andersonville, speaks of the two men as follows: "As far as we saw General Winder and Captain Wirz, the former was kind and considerate in his manner, the latter harsh, though not without kind feelings." This statement was made in Washington Aug. 16, 1864, and it certainly coincides with the good opinion of Wirz expressed by prisoners on their leaving Andersonville. Fair minded men will admit that the direct control over 30,000 men required firmness which, in a case like this, might, of ne-
cessity, become sternness or even severity, according
to the obstacles he had to overcome for the purpose
of accomplishing the object at which he aimed. But firmness and even severity was essential for the
proper management of the prison, provided he, from
the standpoint of the humanitarian, took such interest
in the welfare of the prisoners as the emergencies of
the situation demanded.

The prisoners had to look upon him as an authority
competent to enforce obedience to his orders as well
as to afford protection against wrongs from any side.
The exercise of that power brought upon him the
odium of a brute and a fiend. An evident disadvantage
to him was his faulty pronunciation, due to physical
obstacles. His speech was intermixed with the
Alemanic gutturals, a peculiarity he had in common
with Dr. Stampfli, the president of the Alabama Claims
commission, and almost every other one of the illus-
trious men of Switzerland. But this had not been
considered a demerit until the ethnographic discovery
was made in the case of Wirz.

The straightforwardedness of the Swiss and a reso-
lute impulsiveness, characteristic to them, appear to
have had some weight in the estimation of the char-
acter of Wirz, on the part of the prisoners and it is
in this light that the term "harshness," as used by
Tracy, should be interpreted. This trait, however,
roused much of the animosity shown against him
and this is reasonably explained by the character of
the men in his charge, for they belonged mostly to
that class of people, which is very apt to allow judgment to be clouded by prejudices.

Wirz had evidently had some military experience before he entered the Confederate army. The "Sonderbunds war" in Switzerland had been fought but a few years before he left his old home in Europe and it is more than probable that his knowledge of international law may have prompted the Confederate authorities to select him for the responsible positions he held. That he chose the international code as his guide for the management of the prison there can be no doubt; and as an officer, acting under the authority of a belligerent power, he had to pursue a course in conformity with that law. This position is indirectly conceded as correct by the United States Supreme Court, which has held: "The war in the United States was accompanied by the general incidents of an international war."

The conditions arising from an outbreak of a civil war are further stated by Vattel, an authority on international law, as follows:

"Civil war breaks the bonds of society and of the government; it gives rise in a nation to two independent parties, who acknowledge no common judge. They are in the position of two nations who engage in disputes, and, not being able to reconcile them, have recourse to arms. The common laws of war are in civil wars to be observed on both sides."

That Wirz assumed his duties in a manner which attracted some attention is confirmed by Spencer, who says:

"His, Wirz's, assumption of duty was marked by a
radical change in the guarding, feeding and treatment of the prisoners under his charge.”

He adds that the change was for the worse, but this observation, if correct, marks the difference in the standpoints of the two men. Spencer, the civilian, was unable to appreciate the position of Wirz, the military officer, acting under the authority of international law, which, to Spencer, seems to have been a dark book.
CHAPTER II.

THE CAMP OF AN E R S O N V I L L E .

The tract of land which once constituted the Confederate military prison of Andersonville is located in Sumter county, Georgia, and is sixty-two miles south of Macon and nine miles north of Americus. The conditions of climate are described by Spencer as follows:

"The climate is mild, although subject to extremes of heat and cold, the temperature ranging, during the months of May, June, July, August and September to 88 degrees Fahrenheit in the shade, while with an external exposure, the thermometer in the same months, 110 degrees. The coldest weather of that region is during December and January, when the ordinary range is about 42 degrees, although the mercury has exhibited a minimum of 18 degrees, when ice of two inches in thickness has been made. Rain is not exceptional, for during the year of 1864 there were one hundred and eighty rainy days, during which there fell 54.205 inches, while there were ninety-four humid or moist days. By barometrical observations Andersonville is three hundred and twenty feet above tide water."

The area laid out for the prison comprised twenty-two acres, to which some more ground was added during the summer, the entire prison measuring 1,540
by 750 feet. A small stream of water divided the camp in two parts, inclining toward each other with a gradual slope ending in a swamp on each side, thus offering the best conditions for proper drainage. The ground was covered with heavy timber which was cut down, the trees being used as pickets, planted close together in a trench five feet deep, with the earth afterwards thrown around their bases. Two smaller surrounding stockades, one sixteen, the other twelve feet high were built later and were intended for offense and defense. The four angles were strengthened by earth works armed with cannon, which could sweep the entire inclosure.

The first attachment of prisoners arrived on Feb. 15, 1864. They came from Richmond. The first commander was Colonel A. W. Persons, a Georgian, of whom it is said, that he expended all the facilities in his power to mitigate the condition in which his prisoners were placed.

"But he did nothing more," says Spencer. "He could not provide lumber to erect shelter and protection for those under his charge, because he did not make such representations in time to headquarters of the deficiencies and necessities of the post as his station and duty required. He ought to have urged the erection of barracks, however rough, to shield his prisoners from the elements. He did what, in his experience, he conceived to be his duty—he carefully guarded and fed those committed to his care.'

This commander then, did what he merely conceived to be his duty which is noted in order to mark the
contrast between him and the man who knew what his duty was.

Captain Henry Wirz was assigned to the superintendency and management of the prison April 12, 1864, the appointing order requiring supplies for the maintenance of prisoners, to be issued only upon his requisition and under his orders.

Here is ground for the appointment of Wirz as keeper of the prison. The Confederates, perhaps, found themselves in the same predicament as did the federal government in regard to men versed in international law. The selection of a man, versed in international law, so far as it relates to the rights of the individual in war, was a matter of vital importance to the Confederacy. On that score it could not risk a violation of the laws of war owing to its peculiar position as the champion of human slavery. A strict observance of the laws of humanity was the most advantageous policy it could pursue toward its prisoners and at one period of the war it pointed to this with much ostentation as a safe-guard against hazardous complications.
CHAPTER III.

PERSONAL ACTS OF WIRZ.

The first mention of Wirz, as Mr. Spencer states, indicates the clearness of the man on questions of what he should not do. One of his "inventions" was the establishment of a line of demarcation, designating a neutral space between the stockade posts and the camp. It was known as the dead line, and the people have since been made to believe that it was a trap into which prisoners were inveigled to be slaughtered for the amusement of Wirz. This line was marked by posts, three feet high which were planted ten feet apart and thirty feet within and from the stockade, upon which was nailed a railing that extended around the enclosure.

Before the advent of Wirz, the prisoners had been permitted to stand against the posts and speak to outsiders through the apertures. Military reasons made such a practice questionable. The prisoners had been fast increasing in number and the means for intercourse with outsiders were in conflict with the right of safe keeping. This safety related not only to the power of the Confederates over the captives but to the personal safety of the prisoners as well. The sentinels stationed around the stockade were sol-
diers of the army of the enemy. Could it be left to their discretion when to use their arms to suppress disorder in the camp and was the conduct of the prisoners such as to exclude every possibility of the sentinels making use of their arms? The methods of war are cruel at best but that cruelty is not exerted only upon the foe; obedience to orders and rules is enforced upon friends as well and with the same means.

To isolate the prisoners was no hardship, since idle gossip would not have lessened their suffering. Ill-disposed men, outside and inside of the prison, were kept from plotting, a source of danger to everyone and one which any man of common wisdom would have removed by all means. The "dead line," hence, was nothing else than a way of keeping the prisoners out of danger. It was a restriction upon the sentinels who were apt to shoot at the prisoners and was also a method by which the responsibility for any violation of orders on their part could be established, a foresight for which Wirz deserves praise instead of condemnation. A. Spencer says:

"Notification was given the prisoners by Wirz himself that no one should pass beyond the barrier under pain of instantaneous death to him who should transgress. The sentinels upon the exterior platform were imperatively ordered, each time the relief was placed on duty, to be vigilant in detecting and shooting, without warning, the unlucky violator of this line of life and death."

Such instructions, the intelligent soldier knows, are the usual instructions given. The inmates of the prison, with but few exceptions perhaps, well knew, or
ought to have known, that the sentinel, who carries a
gun, will shoot whenever he is required to do so by
the order of his superiors. That many of the prison-
ers did not comprehend that the dead line was for
their own protection does not speak well for their con-
ception of military duties. But the extent to which
the imagination has been drawn upon to misrepresent
the objects of Wirz in the matter is shown by the
extracts clipped from publications on Andersonville.
One of the narratives says:

"Fifteen feet inside of the stockade there was a
light railing three feet high. This was called the dead
line, and to get an inch over this line was certain
death, and sometimes to even lay a hand on the rail
would be the means of getting a bullet through the
head, for the sentries were always on a sharp lookout
for a shot, as they had a furlough of sixty days for
killing, and thirty days for wounding, a man on the
dead line."

The reader will notice the importance given to the
privilege of putting a hand on the railing, for which
there was no necessity whatever, even if it were true
that a man had been shot on that account.

The assertion that the sentinels were rewarded for
shooting prisoners is mentioned in an article, pub-
lished in The Century Magazine, entitled "A Yankee
in Andersonville" and signed by T. H. Mann, M. D.
Dr. Mann says:

"The sentinels and guard at Andersonville were
'home guards' composed of boys from twelve to six-
ten years of age, and of old men unfit for active duty.
The older sentinels were not so rash or bitter in per-
forming their duties, but the boys would often em
brace the opportunity for maltreating us. It was a common rumor that a premium—a furlough of thirty days—was offered for every prisoner shot by a sentinel while upon his post and his positive orders were to shoot anyone who encroached upon the dead line. So well were the orders obeyed that hardly a day passed without some unlucky prisoner being shot at from a sentry box and I never saw or heard the slightest fault being found with any sentinel for his shooting.

As to the number of prisoners shot for violating the dead line, the findings of the court martial, before which Wirz was tried, show a much different state of things. The trial consumed seventy-three days and one hundred and seven persons who testified as witnesses had every opportunity to name such victims, in the specifications of the indictment only four of shooting of prisoners by sentinels (specifically eight, nine, ten and twelve) are mentioned, a fact that throws a cloud over the stories concerning the ineffectiveness of the sentinels. But even if these were true, do they not show the wisdom of building the least contact between the sentinels and prisoners, thus making the danger of a rupture or on as remote as possible?

The statement that a furlough was given to a sentinel shooting a Yankee prisoner seems to have the force of truth by repetition. If there had been desire on the part of the Confederate authorities to encourage their soldiers in the “sport” of shooting Yankees, the “dead line” was certainly a very effective bar, as thereby the opportunities for shooting
were lessened. The fact of compulsory service of all males between the ages of 16 and 60 argues against the probability of the garrison being reduced by furloughs. The furlough privilege is mentioned by a narrator as follows:

"Another rule was that any guard that shot a Yank, for or without cause, got a thirty-day furlough. So when one of those foul-mouthed, tobacco-begrimed blatherskites that stood guard on the stockades, wanted to go home, he made a shot, called for an officer, and started on his way rejoicing. I remember bathing in the creek one morning about 2 a. m., not near the dead line, when one of the guards fired into the squad, killing three men. I was informed by a guard after that that he received a ninety-day furlough for his excellent marksmanship—thirty days for each victim."

The reader will notice the narrator's estimation of the men whose statements serve as the foundation for his charge. The story of the master shot by one of "those blatherskites," by which three men were killed with one ball and in the dark of night, of which, it seems, no information was given to the court martial, indicates another misconception of the intentions of Wirz, so far as they concerned the welfare of the prisoners. There were good reasons for the vigilance of the sentinels at that spot. "With grim cunning," says Spencer, "he, Wirz, had placed the railing, that a portion of it crossed or intruded upon the little stream which entered from one side and furnished water for the prisoners. And this point was where the water was deeper and purer than at any other part of its course and necessarily more inviting to the thirsty palates.
that hankered for it. To reach this water the dead line must be obtruded on—to do this was death."

The malignity of the writer is nowhere so apparent as in the above. The water course, of which he speaks, entered the camp at a point about midway between the two gates on the west side of the stockade. The railing of the dead line crossed it where the current was swift and the water deeper than a few feet further downward, where the bed widened. There was no need of reaching beyond the dead line, the space between the railing and the bridge, from which the water was dipped, being ample. By reaching further and under the dead line the water was invariably roiled. This lower place was used as a bathing ground. The water there was shallow and the close proximity of a deeper stream may have tempted the men to encroach upon the spot reserved for furnishing the water supply. Do not the circumstances connected with the alleged shooting of the three men point strongly to a determination on the part of the commander of the camp to prevent the pollution of the creek by bathers, so that the vigilance of the sentinels was really exerted for the benefit of the prisoners?

One of the victims of the dead line was a soldier known as "Chickamanga," a prisoner who had lost a leg in the battle of Chickamanga. In Spencer's narrative, it is stated that he was a member of the Eighth Missouri infantry. The author formed the acquaintance of "Chickamanga" shortly before his death and during a conversation with him, he said that he be-
longed to an Illinois regiment. He seemed to be one of those men who never take life very seriously. He claimed to have been a minstrel and was apt to pass jokes when meeting acquaintances. He was disliked by the prisoners who suspected him of being a rebel spy, trying to detect attempts at escape. As a consequence he had no friends and no place to stay and being unable to clear himself of suspicion or to protect himself against bodily harm, he lost courage and finally sank into utter despair. As a last resort to escape the abuse of his fellow prisoners he sought relief by crossing the dead line when he was shot. In Spencer's report this episode is described as follows:

"On the 15th day of May (1864) a poor fellow, a member of the Eighth Missouri regiment, and who, in consequence of the want of sense, was nicknamed by his fellows "Mutton head" asked the sentinel to call Captain Wirz, for he had been so worried and badgered by his mates that he must seek some escape from them. Wirz came and "Chickamauga" proffered his request to go outside on parole. Wirz cursed him, and threatened to shoot him if he ever again bothered him with such a request. In a whining, supplicatory tone, the half-witted cripple reiterated his petition and told him that he would rather be shot "than stay there any longer—the men plagued him to death!" Turning to the sentinel on the platform, Wirz cried out: 'Shoot the one-legged Yankee devil!' The guard fired the ball shattering the man's head and in two minutes he died."

The shooting occurred in the afternoon and the incident was a subject for discussion among the prisoners for several days. My tent was perhaps 200 feet in a north-westerly direction from the point where
"Chickamauga" was shot and I saw the crowd standing about the scene before and after the shooting. The occurrence was described, then and there, by eye-witnesses as follows:

"Chickamauga" had crossed the dead line and was admonished of his danger by Wirz. On account of the man having been imposed upon by his fellow prisoners and in view of his helpless condition, Wirz compromised his own orders and had "Chickamauga" taken away from the forbidden ground. The man's determination to die was not shaken by this humane act and he crossed the dead line a second time. The guard did not fire then and Wirz once more interposed to save the man's life by ordering the prisoners to take him away. Wirz then left the scene, probably thinking that "Chickamauga" had become reconciled and would not repeat the attempt. Meanwhile the sentinel who had witnessed the episode, had been relieved.

"Chickamauga," still lingering around, however, repeated his attempt to meet his fate and a third time crossed the dead line. Though the sentinel begged him to leave the forbidden ground he insisted on being shot and the sentinel finally aimed and fired.

This version of the affair has been told by prisoners since their release and, in fact, I was never aware of any different one until Spencer's book came to hand with his story apparently made to suit its purpose. But even if the version based upon the testimony taken before the court martial be true, poor "Chickamauga's" fate certainly shows that brutality was not confined to the Confederates. This poor man, as has
been admitted, was hounded to death by his comrades, many of whom could not show honorable scars such as made "Chickamauga" a hero. Is the conduct of Wirz in this case denounced as brutal because he interfered in favor of a prisoner prosecuted by his mates on account of his infirmities, or for showing the man more kindness and consideration than did his own government which had forsaken him in order to save an unwilling man from performing military service? Was not Wirz really the last friend this poor man had on earth?

The indictment found against Wirz further charges him with having shot three men with his own revolver. The dates given are: May 13, June 13 and July 8. During my stay in Andersonville, no such occurrence was mentioned among the prisoners and as the proceedings of the trial were not published, the locality where the shooting is said to have been done cannot be learned. In conversing with survivors of Andersonville only one man was able, or pretended to be able, to state that he had witnessed such an affair. He said the shooting was done under the following circumstances: A number of prisoners, as was their custom for a time, had assembled at the gate north of the creek to await the arrival of new comers, and while crowding against the door some had been pushed beyond it. Wirz arrived in time to stop the crowd from pushing those in front further out. Ordering the foremost men to turn back, he drew his revolver to emphasize his command. One prisoner, instead of turning back, replied to him, saying that a guard
should be sent through the other door to drive back those who were pushing behind. Wirz, as commanding officer, had a right to enforce obedience without further parleying, but instead of firing, he sternly repeated his command. The soldier, evidently unaware of the danger in which he had placed himself by his disobedience, repeated his advice about sending a guard through the other door. He was ordered a third time to turn back and failing to do so he was shot. The shooting of that man may be deeply regretted, yet the interference of Wirz at that particular time, even though it resulted in the loss of a life, was a humane act, inasmuch as it resulted in the saving of the lives of innocent men. Had Wirz shown weakness at that particular moment and had he yielded before a crowd of prisoners who had shown their contempt for him by disobeying an order, emphasized by the cocking of a pistol, the men would certainly have pushed on further through the gate and made a leap for liberty. In that case the garrison would have been called upon to suppress the mutiny and hunt down the fugitives and a great many lives would have been sacrificed in order to force the prisoners to submit. The proportionate weakness of the garrison, the safety of which was in jeopardy, would have justified the severest measures. Happily, this was averted by the firmness and courage of Wirz, who, prompted by a high sense of duty, assumed a personal responsibility in order to save lives. The importance of this service is seen by a similar occurrence in the prison at Saulsbury, where, for want of discretion such as was dis-
played by Wirz, twelve men were killed and more than sixty wounded, as a result of a like attempt to make a break for liberty.

Wirz certainly regretted the occurrence and, richer in experience as to the guarding of the prisoners without using undue severity, he took steps to prevent a repetition of the affair by marking a line \* through the middle of the camp running from north to south. At the same time he issued an order, that prisoners in that part of the stockade where the doors were, should not crowd together when the doors were opened to admit new arrivals; the prisoners in the other half were not subjected to any restrictions. If murderously inclined as he is represented to have been, or void of that interest in the welfare of his prisoners, which humanity required of him, he would not have sought to provide for the safety of the prisoners in such a manner.

Specifications 5 and 6 of the indictment against Wirz relate to the charge of his having caused the death of two men by confining them in the stocks, an instrument so arranged as to hold the person undergoing punishment, by the feet. \‡ The date on which the death of one of the men is stated to have

\* Safety line.

\‡ The standing stocks, Davidson says, were formed of four upright posts, strongly connected together at the top and bottom, so as to make a nearly square frame. Upon the sides of this frame and near the top, were movable bars, in which holes were cut for the hands. Each of the bars could be separated into two parts, for receiving the arm, the notches fitting closely to the wrist, when the hand had been placed in position. Above these bars, and at right angles with them in the middle of the frame were two other bars, containing a notch for the neck, which could also be moved in a lateral and a perpendicular direction, the latter to enable them to be adjusted to the height of the culprit. At the bottom were two similar and parallel bars, with notches for the legs. In the lying down stocks the offender’s feet were fastened about twelve inches from the ground and he was left to lie down or sit up as pleased him best.
occurred was Aug. 30, 1864; the other date was Feb. 6, 1864. The latter is probably a misprint and should read Feb. 6, 1865, Wirz not having been in command of the prison before April, 1864. Another prisoner, it is charged, died July 25, 1864, while undergoing punishment in the so-called chain gang.

As to the victim of Aug. 30 it has since been asserted, that Wirz could not have been guilty of the deed because he was absent on sick furlough during that same month, a circumstance of great importance in fixing the general aspect of his case.

One explanation for punishing the prisoners in the manner above described, is found in the scarcity of men for performing guard duty. All accounts agree that the garrison was weak and that the men were kept constantly on duty. These modes of punishment were known to the prisoners within the stockade and to them they were not so shocking. They knew that some men deserved severe punishment.

The chain gang, according to Davidson, was used only in one instance. The "gang" at first contained twelve men, who were fastened together with short chains, twenty inches to two feet in length, which were attached to iron collars, riveted around their necks, each man being thus chained to the man on his right and left, the twelve forming a circle. To one leg of each a thirty-two pound ball was chained, while one sixty-four pounder was fastened to every four by the other leg. The crime for which these men were "put up" in this manner, was an attempted escape, some of them having broken from the hospital
and others having been recaptured once before. One of the gang, Davidson states, was sick with chronic dysentery, but the surgeons' clerks were forbidden to give him any medicine and he died under the torture.

The victim was probably one of a number of paroled prisoners who were employed in the cookhouse where they had to prepare food for the prisoners. They had been stealing meat intended for the prisoners and were thus summarily punished. Davidson, himself, was one of the paroled men whose relations to Wirz and to the Confederate authorities were entirely different from those prisoners confined within the stockade, a fact, which he does not seem to appreciate. These men had submitted to Confederate authority of their own free will and had, for the time being, dissolved their relations with the Federal authorities. The stealing of rations by those men, in the face of existing conditions, constituted a capital crime, and their punishment was appropriate and just. An explanation for the withholding of medical aid from one of them, is found in the scarcity of medicine.

How differently these occurrences were viewed, appears from a description of the chain gang by a prisoner, who was not under parole, but who had made an attempt to escape and was recaptured. He was a young man from Aurora, Ill., and a member of the Eighty-ninth Illinois infantry. He had passed through one of the gates in the disguise of a Confederate control sergeant and thus committed a punishable offense. When released from the chain gang, he rejoined his detachment within the stockade. The
punishment had not discouraged him and he expressed his determination to escape again in order to enjoy the "rich meals" furnished those in the chain gang. In his opinion, the carrying of the chains for a short period constituted neither a disgrace nor a hardship.

In a contribution to one of the Western papers, another prisoner says:

"In the summer of '64 a gang was near the star fort and were kept there in the hot sun until they all succumbed. We used to count them every morning to see how many had been relieved from their suffering; they kept going one by one until at last only one was left. I think he stood it two days after seeing the last one cut from the chain."

The writer, in his indignation, does not seem to ask himself the question, why those men were punished, nor what was their status under the law. They might have committed offenses which resulted in injury to the prisoners within the stockade and who would be willing to deny that the motive for punishing such offenders was a good one? In case they were paroled men no one had a right to object. A violation of the parole is a serious offense. Even the government of the violator cannot protect him against the consequences. Instances have been known, where persons charged with violations of the parole were required by the government to which they owed allegiance to purge themselves of the charge before being reinstated as officers. One example of this kind was General Ducrod of the French army, during the French-Russian war.
The case as to the question upon whom punishment was inflicted, was well stated by one Mr. Smith, a survivor of Andersonville, who made a lecturing tour through the northern cities under the auspices of the Young Men's Christian association. He said, that the confederates did not interfere with the men within the prison at all; hence they did not punish any without cause; i.e., they respected the rights of the individual in war.

There seems to have been no attempt made to identify the victims or to show the cause of their punishment or the motive on the part of Wirz in inflicting such punishment. Such inquiries were not made for fear of foiling the "ends of justice." Private Tracy, in a deposition sworn to at Washington, Aug. 16, 1864, which was published by authority of the United States Sanitary commission, says:

"It is a melancholy and mortifying fact, that some of our trials came from our men. At Belle Isle and Andersonville there were among us a gang of desperate men, ready to prey on their fellows. Not only thefts and robberies, but even murders were committed.

Josiah C. Brownell, in a narrative published in The Brooklyn Times, issue of Nov. 8, 1891, mentions such outrages in the following words:

"We were kept in constant fear by a lawless band of our own fellow-prisoners, who had joined themselves together to plunder and rob the rest and steal the rations of their sickly and weaker comrades; they called themselves raiders and were about 700 strong. They were the terror of us all—by day we feared to meet them, and night was made hideous by the cries"
of their victims; four men had been killed outright and many had been beaten badly by the human fiends."

J. F. King, a contributor to The Century Magazine, of November, 1890, speaks of the existing lawlessness in this way:

"It was in June that a small portion of the prisoners were transformed into beasts, and began to prey upon the others. They snatched and ate the rations of the weaker ones, and they grew strong. We called them "raiders," and they grew in numbers and boldness until murder was added to theft and no one was safe. They made raids within a few steps of where I lay, and cut and bruised some men in a horrible manner. The prisoners began to organize as regulars, and armed themselves with the sticks that had supported their little shelters. The raiders, anticipating trouble, also began to organize, and called themselves regulators. The law and order men began the arrest of the raider crowd, and they began the arrest of the others, and even of non-combatants, that they might turn attention from themselves. The stockade was pandemonium those few days. Hundreds of half-naked men here, and hundreds there, surged to and fro, with sticks and fists for weapons. No one can say what was done. The dense crowds hid the acts of individuals, but order was victorious. A court was organized; as is well known six of the raiders were found guilty of murder and were hanged. The others, with the innocent men that had been arrested in the turmoil, were all compelled to run the gauntlet, where fearful vengeance was visited upon the unfortunates."

Dr. T. H. Mann, another contributor to the same magazine, in its issue of August, 1890, says:

"An organized band of over two hundred members, selected from the most unprincipled and healthier
prisoners, bound together by oaths, and armed with short, heavy clubs, overran the prison-pen. They committed their depredations every night, and became a terror to us all. They finally grew so bold as to knock down and rob men during the day. They robbed me of a pair of shoes one night, taking them from under my head."

He had to do without shoes for four months in consequence.

Here is testimony which clearly shows the necessity of the stocks and the chain gang for other purposes than to satisfy the brutality of Wirz. Indeed by meting out punishment as charged may he not have earned the gratitude of the thousands of prisoners who were defenseless against the evil doers referred to?

The admissions of these prisoners, who from the tone of their narratives cannot deny prejudice on their part, make it evident that it was the duty of Wirz to inflict punishment. In the case of violations of the parole, he was free to act according to the laws of the Confederacy, and in case of impositions upon prisoners, not paroled, by the paroled men, he could not be too severe. It was the only way to fully protect them against those of the paroled men who abused their privileges to the injury of their comrades, who had preserved their fealty to the government.

And as to the matter of punishments, is it not a fact that there is no community with 30,000 active men without an institution for the punishment of offenders against peace and order? Does not almost every person undergoing sentence object to the justice meted out in his case? It was impossible for Wirz to erect
a house of correction for the brief period of the existence of Andersonville prison and what else could he do but to deprive offenders of the privilege of moving about.

He did not inflict this punishment with a view to causing pain, he only prevented the free movement of the culprits. "Tying up by the thumbs" was not practised by him upon men belonging to the enemy's forces, yet by the laws of Pennsylvania such punishment is allowed to be inflicted upon soldiers even in times of peace. Still Spencer, in his indignation, makes the pretense that Wirz was responsible for the outrages committed by paroled men and others upon their own comrades. Was he responsible for the moral depravity of some of the men with whom he had to deal? And is it not a remarkable spectacle for these men to appear as witnesses against the man who had exacted duties, which they had promised to fulfill, for the benefit of their own comrades? They had ingratiated themselves with the Confederates in order to escape the hardships of the prison and upon their return to the North their servility again prompted them to vie with each other in denouncing the man who had favored them. Upon such testimony the case stands. Were the judges unable to comprehend this feature of it?

In specification No. 2 of the indictment charges are made against Wirz as follows: "That he did jump upon, stamp, kick, bruise and otherwise injure with the heels of his boots a soldier of the army of the United States," etc. In this case it is not stated
whether the identification of Wirz as the man who committed the deed was complete. Several survivors have spoken to me since about the “kicking and stamping” of a prisoner. In one case, it was said to have occurred inside of the prison when a man was caught stealing a bag filled with meal from the wagon from which rations were distributed. Had the thief succeeded in securing the meal some of the prisoners would have been deprived of their daily food. The rebel attendant certainly showed more consideration for the unfortunate prisoners than the man who was caught stealing and whose punishment was deserved no matter in what way it was inflicted. Desperate cases require desperate means.

Another case of beating was related to me by a personal friend, also a survivor of Andersonville and Florence, in the following way: Wirz had come into the gate south of the creek to encourage the prisoners in the hope of an early exchange (he often took occasion to revive the sinking hopes of the men by communicating to them such information as would serve that purpose) when he was accosted by a ruffian with the words: “Shut up, you lying, Dutch s————.” The witness of the affair asserted that Wirz struck the man, a chastisement which one could expect under ordinary circumstances. Insulting remarks were sometimes made when Wirz passed a crowd of prisoners, but he did not resent them. It was charged that he was afraid to enter the prison, but another reason is given by Dr. Stevenson, a Confederate surgeon, who says that Wirz had gangrene in an old wound.
He, certainly, had no reason to avoid the prison for the reasonable men were aware of his efforts to ameliorate their condition. The latter episode was not mentioned at the trial; as to the former, the question seems to be one of misplaced sympathy. Should an innocent prisoner suffer by allowing his rations to be stolen? This case rather strongly indicates a disposition to shield the prisoners from harm.

Wirz earned the commendations of all well meaning men. Owing to the presence of lawless men, life within the prison became unbearable. J. T. King, in an article published in the November (1890) issue of The Century Magazine, mentions these men in the following words:

“There was a class of skulkers and gamblers brought into Andersonville from both the Eastern and Western armies, captured in the rear by the rebel raiders. Those from the Western army were brought into the prison with their ill-gotten gains upon their persons.”

“They had everything their own way for nearly three months” says Dr. T. H. Mann, another contributor to the same publication in July, 1890; “when it was discovered that several had been murdered by them. This knowledge stirred us up a good deal, and we soon sent out a petition to the authorities praying for some interference in our behalf. They granted our request at once, and sent in twenty or thirty of their best men, armed with revolvers, to assist us in hunting out the desperadoes.”

J. C. Brownell, in an article in The Brooklyn Times, also mentions the matter in the following words:
"At once a vigilance committee was formed who waited on Captain Wirz and asked for redress. He told the committee to bring every one of the rascals that we could catch to the prison gate."

Here is the corroborative testimony of three survivors, which shows the prompt action of this man on behalf of the prisoners oppressed by their fellows. Charged with gloating over the sufferings of the men, would he have interfered if he had been chosen for his cruelty, when cruelty was practiced by captives upon captives? He, it is admitted, had entire control over the prison and his interference, was prompted undoubtedly, by a wish to render relief.

"Wirz" says Spencer, "often asserted, during his supremacy, that he alone was responsible for the management of the prisoners, and if any blame attached to it he was willing to bear the brunt of it. He did bear the brunt, alas! but in a different way from that of which, in his assumed safety, he had boasted in a blasphemous mood.

Mr. Spencer continues: "His ghost and the spirit of his general have doubtless co-mingled ere now in other spheres; and it is not unfair to suppose that, if disembodied essences can feel the poignancy that tortures a mortal, repentant tears have been shed by the twain enough to wash from their souls the blood of more than ten thousand starving victims."

But the statements of the prisoners, as quoted, when contrasted with this officious malediction well illustrate the striking difference between truth and fiction.
The raiders had carried on their nefarious practices for some time when the first attempt to suppress them was made by "Big Pete," a Massachusetts artillery man of Herculean frame. He camped near the edge of the swamp on the north side and near the east line of the stockade, his tent being in full view of the men camping on the south side of the prison. One afternoon, perhaps two or three days before the arrest of the raiders, he caught one of the thieves in the act of stealing and held him for punishment, which consisted in shaving half of his head and "bucking and gagging." Curious about this proceeding, I went across to see "Big Pete" and the misdeeds of the man undergoing punishment were related by him in detail. It appeared that he had not been imposed upon himself but that he had interfered for the sake of his neighbors. His courage inspired the orderly prisoners to make an effort to rid the camp of the cut-throats who infested it. The support given him shows Wirz to have been actuated by the same motives as was "Big Pete" and there seems to have existed between the two men a mutual agreement regarding the methods to be used. Had Wirz desired to "do more than a dozen regiments at the front" he would have suppressed "Big Pete" in the latter's efforts to protect his comrades. But it appears plainly that his actions were in direct conflict with the theory upon which he was convicted, viz.: that his acts were in accord with "a conspiracy to destroy the lives of soldiers in the military service of the United States, then held as prisoners of war."
The narratives of Andersonville betray a disposition to deny Wirz the credit he deserves for his efforts to subdue the raiders. Mr. Brownell in The Brooklyn Times, Nov. 8, 1890, says:

"He, Wirz, told the committee to bring every one of the rascals that we could catch to the prison gate. In less than an hour our committee had caught one hundred of the most desperate of these thieves and cut-throats and delivered them to the guard at the gate."

About the further proceedings, Brownell says:

"Human nature at Andersonville was very much depraved, and poor, ragged and starving as we were, there were five hundred who armed themselves with clubs and took their places in line and as they stood waiting for the command that was to deliver their victims into their power, they looked more like hungry wolves than human beings. One by one, at the command of Wirz, the victims were driven by the rebel guards into the space between the two lines, and thick and heavy were the blows that were rained upon them, for those who held the clubs struck for many a lost dinner, of which these raiders had robbed them, and some for the memory of friends, and even brothers, who had been killed by their brutality.

But see, a bold and daring thief is about to take a run, and clubs are held by firmer hands, for he was the leader of the gang, and had been a bold, a desperate and daring man. A smile, or more properly a ghastly grin, played around the ugly mouth of Captain Wirz as he saw the anxiety of these revengeful men to have their victim; such a scene as this was just suited to his brutal nature.

The desperate thief took one look along the line, then started on a wild run. With savage desperation
he drew a knife that he had concealed about his person, and laying about him to the right and left like a madman, he wounded five men, two of them mortally. In a moment all was consternation and dismay. Wirz ordered every one of those who had just been released to be again brought to him. When this was done, he told us to appoint a judge and twelve jury-men, and examine the case of each one of them separately, and punish them just as the judge should decide. This we did, and after ten days spent in trying their cases, six were found guilty and sentenced to be hanged."

While here the day of the arrest is made the date of this occurrence, Dr. Mann states that it was the outcome of the trial. He says:

"Of the two hundred men who were thus tried there was probably a few entirely innocent of any crimes while nothing could be absolutely proved against one hundred and twenty of them; yet as their trial ended and they were set at liberty within the stockade, they were obliged to run the Indian "gauntlet"—a thousand or more emaciated human beings standing ready to administer a blow, a kick, or at least a curse and muttered execration, to those who in a measure had added to our sufferings, even though no act could be proved against them by the court."

Yet in the light of such statements, Wirz is still being held up as a brute and a disgrace to humanity?

The difference in the dates is not worthy alone of attention, when viewing this picture of horror enacted by the prisoners themselves, but there is an evident effort to connect Wirz with this demonstration of brutality made by "the better class of prisoners" who,
says Dr. Mann, had formed a league to protect their lives and property.

"This league, or 'police,' as they were called, was ever after kept up, and constituted itself into a complete government for the stockade within the dead-line. 'Big Pete,' always its chief, exercised absolute authority to punish all offenders against the public peace. He was judge, chief of police, and often he executed his own sentences."

The organization of this police had a wholesome effect upon the prisoners and similar bodies were organized subsequently in other prisons, notably at Florence, S. C. The police was supported by Wirz inasmuch as he allowed the men on duty extra rations, a fact never mentioned, although it clearly shows "how his heart stood," a qualification pointed out as a criterion in his case during the trial. "Big Pete" would not have been able to have maintained his authority but for the aid rendered him by Wirz. "Big Pete," says Dr. Mann, "had a kind heart and there was many a poor fellow who could speak of the acts of kindness received at his hands." Should not Wirz be given credit to some extent for enabling "Big Pete" to do acts of kindness?

"Wirz," says Dr. Mann, "informed our leading men within the prison that he dared not proceed against these men, either by court martial or by any civil law that could be had in that vicinity; but that he would allow us to organize a court, judge, and jury, and try our prisoners, as he called them, by a court of our own; and that he would render all the assistance in his power in guarding the prisoners for
us, and in furnishing proper facilities for executing the sentences that the court might impose."

This statement clearly shows Wirz to have recognized a limit to his power and affirms the admission of the lecturer, Mr. Smith, who, as previously stated, denied any interference of the Confederates in the internal affairs of the prison. In choosing this course Wirz recognized the necessity of affording protection to the prisoners outside of his prerogative as officer of a belligerent power, whose interests to preserve order within its walls were solely those of a humanitarian.

"This court," continues Dr. Mann, "was quickly organized. The judge to preside was selected by ballot, and the jury was drawn from a panel of a thousand. The prisoners had the privilege of pleading their own case, or of employing anyone within the stockade to plead for them. Two attorneys were selected, from a number of that profession among us, to proceed against the prisoners. The trial continued six or eight days. It was conducted as fairly and honorably as was possible under the circumstances; and forty or fifty of the two hundred were convicted of crime of some nature, and sentenced to punishment by the "cat-o'-nine-tails," * to be "bucked and gagged," to restore property where possible, or otherwise punished, as the nature of the case seemed to require. Six of the number were clearly found guilty of murder in the first degree, and sentenced to be hung within the stockade upon two days notice.

"Two days later a scaffold was hastily erected near the south gateway, within the stockade. The six condemned prisoners were delivered by Wirz to a posse of our own number, and amidst a breathless silence

* A mode of punishment not resorted to by Wirz.
which pervaded the thirty thousand who watched the ceremony five of the number were quietly swung into eternity. The sixth man, who weighed nearly two hundred pounds, broke his rope and escaped into the crowd, and was only captured after a long chase and after being knocked senseless with one of the executioner's clubs; then he was brought back to the scaffold, and made to join his five companions."

The narrator is somewhat in error here as to the details. The sixth man in the row of culprits, who stood with their faces toward the north, escaped from the guards before he had mounted the scaffold and his flight across the swamp delayed the execution. It was the rope around the neck of the first in the row that broke so that the man had to be raised upon the scaffold a second time. Dr. Mann is also inaccurate in regard to the date of the occurrence, for he states, that the rascality was not checked until Aug. 1, 1864. On the day of the arrest of the raiders, no rations were issued, although double rations were furnished the day following. A memorandum, kept by Thos. Walsh, a member of the Forty-seventh New York, which was offered in evidence during the trial of Wirz, mentions July 3 as the date when no rations were furnished. This date is certainly correct, for the executions took place July 11, 1864.

Mr. Spencer, in his efforts to misrepresent and falsify, mentions the close of the year as the time of the occurrence and charges that the murders committed by the raiders were the direct result of the methods of Wirz, who "had carefully marked the gradual development of these dangerous tendencies and was
at last satisfied that they had culminated into the
utter demoralization of the wretched subjects which
he controlled and he began, coward as he was, to fear
their sudden exhibition toward himself."

The truth is, however, that Wirz during the exciting
days that preceded the executions, freely mixed
with the prisoners and even when the culprits were
led to the gallows inside the prison, he accompanied
the escort of Confederates and formally surrendered
the culprits to the prisoners.

"It is a problem for the ethical philosopher to solve,"
says Spencer, who by the way speaks only of four
victims, "whether justice had been fairly meted out
in this instance—whether these four were more guilty
before heaven than he who had brought them by per-
sistent cruelty to the degradation which forced crime
upon them!"

The force of such reflections is destroyed, when we
know that one of the executed men, a marine, had
been in the prison but ten days before he was appre-
hended, tried and convicted. Just men will wonder
at such a bold perversion of the truth, but to dis-
pute the meritorious action of Wirz in this instance
is essential for keeping before the world that mythical
tyrant, for whom Wirz was selected as the bodily vic-
tim.

The effect of the executions is stated by Brownell
briefly, but truthfully, as follows:

"Previous to their execution no man’s life was safe,
but after their death all was peace and harmony and
all were on equal footing."

Prescott Tracy, as early in 1864, stated that "the
proceedings effected a marked change for the better."
The reign of terror began with the arrival of captives from the Eastern army but it was not of long duration. Wirz, upon noticing the efforts on the part of the prisoners to prevent acts of violence, unhesitatingly offered aid and complied with every wish of the men, although at the trial the hanging was given a serious aspect on the strength of a report by Dr. Jones, a Confederate physician, in which he says: "The Confederate authorities are said not to have interfered with these proceedings."

The executed men were all in the prime of life. It is possible, that some may have suffered innocently but there was no sympathy expressed for them at the time. Wirz viewed the execution from the sentry box on the southwest corner of the stockade and it may be that he had misgivings as to his ultimate fate. So far as he was concerned, the urgent necessity of suppressing lawlessness committed by prisoners upon other prisoners was admitted by everyone. The acts of the raiders were terrible, but Wirz, probably felt a hesitancy about interfering because the raiders, by their acts, had not come into collision with his own authority. In the case of the cooks, the case was different. The free movement allowed paroled men and their other advantages were tempting and it was whiskey especially which such men craved.

Colonel Chipman, the prosecutor of the court martial which condemned Wirz, as an excuse for such outrages said, that these men desired to better their condition, a plea which any common thief might advance in justification of his crimes. The character
of some of the paroled men, with whom Wirz had to deal, appears from the testimony of Dr. Jones, a Confederate physician. He testified that he heard a sick and wounded Federal prisoner accuse his nurse, a fellow prisoner of the United States army, of having stealthily, during his sleep, inoculated his injured arm with gangrene, that he might destroy his life, and fall heir to his clothing. This statement is apt to find believers among those who have some knowledge of the doings of the paroled men, who were generally men with money, who had purchased their privileges to escape the hardships of the prison and make their captivity profitable by taking advantage of the needs of their suffering comrades. The grave diggers for example, were paroled men. Some, says Dr. Mann, were waiters for the Confederate officers, etc. These men had of their own volition, acknowledged the authority of the Confederacy, and were therefore liable to be punished for offenses as were Confederate soldiers, for the status of the paroled men for the time being was the same. When the paroled prisoner escaped, the nature of his offense was about the same as when a Confederate deserted; both were subject to the same authority and to the same laws. It was just so when other offenses were committed by them. The position of non-interference would be the proper one for the United States in the case of paroled prisoners who had escaped and were recaptured. They were not punished for escaping but for violating the parole. There are other offenses that may have been committed and which may
have necessitated severe and summary punishment for the sole purpose of protecting the prisoners in the stockade against grievous wrongs. The circumstances justified exceptional severity. For stealing rations, in view of the dreadful results that had to be feared, no punishment was too severe. Even the doubtful charge of kicking a man loses its force, when the kicking was done for the sake of securing rations for another prisoner. This act is said to have been committed within the prison, yet Spencer asserts, that Wirz's visits to the stockade "were seldom made and then with extreme precautions for his own safety." Would he have kicked and stamped upon a prisoner when in fear of his own safety? Do not every one of his acts point toward a strong desire on his part to protect the prisoners against wrongs while they were not molested by him at all? As a Confederate officer, charged with the duty of guarding prisoners of war, humanity required him, for the sake of the prisoners, to prevent conflicts with the enemy's troops. Colonel Chipman, in his address to the court martial, quotes the following comments of a writer:

"Prisoners of war are indeed sometimes killed; but this is not otherwise justifiable than as it is made necessary either by themselves, or if they make use of force against those who have taken them."

The shooting of a prisoner, which has been mentioned before, seems to constitute such an emergency because of Wirz's obligation to prevent bloodshed. To sum up, there seems to be three causes for punish-
ment: Offenses committed by prisoners against their fellow prisoners.

Offenses committed by paroled prisoners against prisoners not paroled.

Offenses committed by paroled prisoners, which constitute a violation of the parole.

Punishments in the first two cases are not only justifiable but necessary for the protection of prisoners.

In the third case, the parole is a bar to any interference on the part of another government. Indeed the violation of the parole is considered by civilized nations as infamous. The question is: Did Wirz exceed these limits? It was not propounded at the trial.

Every circumstance points to the fact that he, like a hero, was firm in the performance of his duties as an officer selected to apply the tenets of humanity for the benefit of the prisoners in his charge. Though judging correctly in drawing his line of duty, he does not seem to have perceived his danger, so strikingly expressed by Halleck, when he points to the lack of knowledge of international law among the officers of the United States army.* Wirz only had to deal with the enlisted men and how many of them had ever heard of the international code, to which, alone, they were subject at the time? In their estimation all the precautions taken by Wirz for their protection were the hideous schemes of a demon; the Confederate

* "The experience of our officers, both volunteers and regulars, in the great civil war, which has just terminated, has proved, that this subject has been too much neglected, not only in our colleges but also in our two great national schools—the Military and Naval Academies." Preface to: "Elements of International Law," by H. W. Halleck,
soldiers were merely looked upon as offenders against the United States laws and hence they had no right to enforce orders. The great majority of the prisoners were unable to realize their true condition. They were not aware of the fact that an unconditional surrender makes the captors full masters over such prisoners even to the extent of destroying them "when they make use of force against those who have taken them, or by others who make use of force in their behalf, and render it impossible to keep them." These rights were conceded by the Union commanders who failed to attempt the rescue of prisoners for which General Winder, the commander of the post of Andersonville, had prepared himself by issuing order No. 73 commanding that the officer "in charge of the battery of the Florida artillery will upon receiving notice that the enemy has approached within seven miles of this post, open fire upon the stockade with grape-shot, without reference to the situation beyond these lines of defense."

In regard to the position of the United States government in the case of Wirz there can be no denial of the fact that the common conception of the prison horror was allowed to serve as the ground for proceeding against him and that the provisions of international law were lost sight of. Otherwise no paroled prisoner would have been permitted to testify against Wirz in the capacity of prisoner. Had such been excluded, there would have been no trial, for it is barely possible that any of the prisoners proper would have been able to criminate Wirz by his testi-
mony had he been inclined to do so. The intelligent men within the prison rendered a different verdict before leaving Andersonville.

There, too, is every reason to believe, that the charges were preferred by paroled prisoners in a spirit of revenge aroused by the persistency of Wirz in compelling them to perform their duties faithfully and well. The suspicion is even expressed that the paroled men were instrumental in bringing about the trial of Wirz so as to secure his punishment in retaliation for his part in the suppression of the raiders. But all the discrepancies and mistakes in the narratives of Andersonville can be explained by the insufficiency of the military training of many of the soldiers. While their tactical training may have been the best, they lacked that consciousness and sense of duty which makes the man in uniform a soldier. A well trained soldier would not blame a man for the performance of a duty even if restraint was put upon himself, neither would he assume a risk for a frivolous purpose and hold another responsible for the forfeiture. By drawing the proper lines in the Wirz case, where is the criminal liability? He had in view but two objects: To hold the prisoners and protect them against any danger on that score and to provide for their comfort as the means on hand permitted. All those who interfered were made to feel his power.
CHAPTER IV.

GENERAL MANAGEMENT OF THE PRISON.

The charges against Wirz growing out of the general management of the prison are equally manifold. As the commandant of the prison, it is charged that he, "fully clothed with authority, and in duty bound to treat, care and provide for prisoners * * * placed in his custody, according to the Law of War, did * * * confine a large number of such prisoners of war, to the number of thirty thousand, in unhealthy and unwholesome quarters, in a close and small area of ground, wholly inadequate to their wants and destructive to their health, which he well knew and intended."

The responsibility for the location of the camp does not rest with Wirz, according to the information given by Mr. A. Spencer, of whom the prosecutor speaks as "a gentleman of prominence in his state, residing near Andersonville during the war, and a frequent visitor to that place." He says in his book:

"Here, on the 27th day of November, 1863, W. S. Winder, a captain in the rebel army, who was selected for the purpose, came and located the grounds for a Confederate States Military Prison. The first suggestion for its establishment in Southwestern Georgia is due to Howell Cobb, at that time in command of the military district of Georgia and Florida. The accu-
mulation of prisoners of war at Richmond and Salisbury was so great as to cause serious inconvenience to the Confederate authorities, congregated as the prisoners were at and near the center of their military operations at one extremity of the Confederacy, exposed to recapture, and requiring the detail of a large force for their safe-keeping. The greatest disadvantage arising from the concentration of so many thousand prisoners at the seat of the Confederate government was the consumption of provisions destined for their army and the difficulty of transporting immense stores to that point, over single lines of roads with insufficient capacities. * * * These roads were liable to be broken, as they ultimately were, by the Union army and thus the means of provisioning their army, as well as the prisoners, be entirely cut off.

"An examination was made by W. S. Winder of other localities, among them a place near the town of Albany, in Dougherty county, where a bold and abundant spring was pointed out and examined by him. Magnolia Springs, twelve miles west of the town of Americus, was also recommended and finally rejected."

It nowhere appears that Wirz had any share in the selection of the spot. When he assumed command of the prison, there was ample room and the charge of crowding men into the stockade with criminal intent is untenable in the face of the fact that, as soon as it was needed, which was about the first of May, additional room was provided for by the removal of the hospital from within the prison and by the enlargement of the stockade.

H. M. Davidson, in his narrative, mentions the proceedings of Wirz in this matter in the following words:

"Some thirty men were selected for the purpose,
each of whom gave a verbal parole to make no attempt to escape while on this duty. The whole work was completed in two weeks.”

He then pictures some dreadful scenes at the opening of the new addition:

“More than ten thousand men passed through the narrow opening. The crowd was so great that the sick, falling down in the press, were trodden upon and killed; strong men became wedged in between the moving mass and the standing timbers and were crushed; men, carrying all their earthly goods, * * * were overthrown, trampled upon by the hurrying feet that could not turn aside, and left a shapeless, hideous mass of broken limbs, bathed in blood.”

This sanguinary picture, though in full accord with the findings of the court martial in the Wirz case, is a pure invention, without a word of truth in it, but the story has probably been read eagerly and accepted as proof of the villainy of Wirz, although he had provided an addition to the camp to escape the charge of “crowding the prison in satisfaction of his brutal instincts.”

Davidson, according to his own statement, was paroled May 26 to act as a surgeon’s clerk in the hospital and obtained his knowledge of things within the prison by “peeping through the door.” Willing to serve the Confederacy in order to escape the hardships of the prison, he fully sustained his “loyalty” by extravagancies in the other direction, especially by prompting the arrest of Wirz through Gen. Whipple’s chief of Gen. Thomas’ staff, on the strength of statements contained in his book, which are and must be
inventions on account of his absence from the prison and want of knowledge in every particular, outside of his experience in the hospital. His interference, however, shows the prominent part taken by men, paroled by the Confederates during their captivity, in aiding in the prosecution of the man who had benefitted them, although Davidson admits nevertheless, that when he was returned to Andersonville after an attempt to escape, he found that:

"A great change had taken place here, since our departure, nearly all the prisoners having been sent away. Those that remained had a much improved appearance, as if they had been better fed."

This admission, in connection with the charge of the crowding of the prison with intent to destroy lives, is of vital importance.

Colonel Chipman, the prosecutor of Wirz, in his attempt to prove the charge of conspiracy to murder the prisoners, referred to some correspondence between General Winder and the authorities in Richmond relative to the crowding of the prison. This correspondence must have been opened about July, for General Wilder, in a letter dated July 21, 1864, uses the following language:

"You speak in your indorsement of placing the prisoners properly. I do not exactly comprehend what is intended by it. I know of but one way to place them, and that is to put them into the stockade, and they have four or five square yards to the man."

This feature was dwelt upon at length by Colonel Chipman, who said:
"His government did not dare to speak more definitely, nor was it necessary to such a man as General Winder, occupying the position he did and with the letter of Robert Ould in his private desk written as early as March, 1863 — a private letter written by himself and indorsed by his own hand.

"The one way was the way given by his original instructions; it was the way understood by W. S. Winder when he said it was the intention to kill more Yankees at Andersonville than they did at the front; it was the way meant and well understood by General Winder when he said to Spencer that, for his own part, he would as lief the damned Yankees would die there as anywhere else; that upon the whole, he did not know that it was not better for them and which he afterward disclosed to Colonel Chandler in the remark: It is better to leave them in their present condition until their number has been sufficiently reduced by death to make the present arrangement suffice for their accommodation; it was the way well understood by the rebel government when, in the teeth of the protests of humane officers, and in the face of the official reports of the mortality of that place, they continued to forward prisoners, train-load after train-load, to an already overcrowded prison; it was the way dictated to the agent of that government, Robert Ould, and revealed by him in his letter to Winder, when he declares, speaking of exchanges, 'The arrangement I have made works largely in our favor; we get rid of a set of miserable wretches, and receive in return some of the best material I ever saw;' adding, 'This, of course, is between ourselves.'

"It was the way understood perfectly by General Howell Cobb when, in a speech at Andersonville, he printed with terrible significance to the grave-yard, remarking, "That is the way, I would care for them."
"It was the way well understood by the prisoner at the bar, who is shown to have uttered sentiments similar to those expressed by W. S. Winder on more than one hundred occasions; it was the way, and the only way, ever indicated by the chief of the rebel government and his secretary of war, else why did he, with this frightful picture before him, deliberately fold General Winder's letter, indorsing it: 'Noted — file. J. A. S.?'

"Let us advance another step in the evidence connecting the Richmond government with these atrocities. Colonel D. T. Chandler, of the rebel department, pursuant to an order of his chief of July 25, 1864, directing him to make an investigation at Andersonville and other places in the Confederacy, submitted a report dated: Andersonville, Aug. 5, 1864, and which reached the war department Aug. 17, 1864. This officer gives a graphic description of the sufferings of the prisoners of war, and in earnest terms beseeches his government that no more be sent forward to that place, and that immediate steps be taken to relieve the sufferings of the prisoners already there, making many practical suggestions for their comfort which he thought could be readily carried out. In a supplemental report, also dated Aug. 5, and which was received with the report first named, he says: 'My duty requires me respectfully to recommend a change in the officer in command of the post, Brigadier General John H. Winder, and the substitution in his place of some one who unites both energy and good judgment with some feelings of humanity and consideration for the welfare and comfort (so far as it is consistent with their safe keeping) of the vast number of unfortunates placed under his control—some one, at least, who does not advocate, deliberately and in cold blood, the propriety of leaving them in their present condition until their number has been sufficiently reduced by
death to make the present arrangements suffice for their accommodation, and who will not consider it a matter of self-laudation and boasting that he has never been inside the stockade — a place of horrors which it is difficult to describe, and which is a disgrace to civilization — the condition of which he might by the exercise of a little energy and judgment, even with the limited means at his command, have considerably improved."

"In his examination touching this report, Colonel Chandler says: 'I noticed that General Winder seemed very indifferent to the welfare of the prisoners, indisposed to do any thing or to do so much as I thought he ought to do to alleviate their sufferings. I remonstrated with him as well as I could, and he used that language which I reported to the department with reference to it — the language stated in the report when I spoke of the great mortality existing among the prisoners, and pointed out to him that the sickly season was coming on, and that it must necessarily increase unless something was done for their relief; the swamp, for instance, drained, proper food furnished and in better quantity and other sanitary suggestions which I made to him. He replied to me that 'it was better to see half of them die than to take care of the men.'"

"And to show that he can not be mistaken in what he avers, Colonel Chandler speaks of Major Hall, his assistant, having first reported to him similar language used by General Winder to him and remarks, 'I told Major Hall that I thought it incredible—that he must be mistaken; he told me no; that he had not only said it once but twice; and, as I have stated, he subsequently made use of this expression to me.'"

"Now let us see what the rebel government had to do with this report. As I before remarked, it reached Richmond on the 17th day of August, 1864. Immedi-
ately on its reception, as we learn from Captain G. M. Selph, of the rebel war department, it was carefully briefed, and extracts made and sent to the heads of the different bureaus, the comissary general and the quartermaster general; a report of Dr. White, an enclosure of Colonel Chandler’s report, being sent to the surgeon general. The entire report was then laid before the secretary of war, Mr. Seddon, and, there can not be the shadow of a doubt, was immediately, and fully, and seriously considered; nor can there be any doubt, that Mr. Davis and his war minister conferred together with regard to this subject.

“Captain Selph, speaking of a conversation between himself and Colonel Woods, a staff officer of Jefferson Davis, in regard to the prison at Andersonville, says: ‘During that conversation I obtained the impression that President Davis had some knowledge of it.’ ‘This,’ he says again, ‘was subsequent to the receipt of Colonel Chandler’s report.’ To the question, ‘Would a paper of this kind, on the subject of this magnitude, find its way to the president of the so-called Confederate States in the ordinary way of proceedings?’ he answered: ‘Yes, sir, I think it would.’

“It will not do to say that this report was buried among the multitude of papers that arrived daily in the war office, or that it lay upon Mr. Seddon’s table unnoticed. Mr. J. B. Jones, private secretary of Mr. Seddon, says that he remembers when the report was received, but only read the headings, enough to see the purport of it, and adds that he thinks it was sent for by the secretary of war.

“Mr. K. J. H. McKean, chief of the Bureau of War, says that he saw it lying on the secretary’s table. He also speaks of a conversation between himself and the assistant secretary of war, Judge Campbell, in which the report was spoken of, and in which Judge Campbell, speaking of the fearful mortality, remarked, ‘This
looks very bad.' Captain Selph also testifies that the report created general excitement in the department.

"But we are not left with this evidence alone. This report was not sent in like ordinary inspection reports, but special attention was drawn to it by three officials. On the day of its receipt it was submitted to the secretary of war, as the following indorsement proves beyond all doubt:

" 'Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, | 
 August 18, 1864. | 

" 'Respectfully submitted to the secretary of war. The condition of the prison at Andersonville is a reproach to us as a nation. The Engineer and Ordnance department were applied to, and authorized their issue, and I so telegraphed General Winder. Colonel Chandler's recommendations are coincided in.

(Signed)

By Order of General Cooper.

R. H. Chilton, A. A. and J. G.'

"The report passed through the hands of R. B. Wellford, a confidential clerk employed in the war department for his legal abilities, who also made a brief analysis strongly seconding Colonel Chilton, Mr. Wellford's analysis being again endorsed, and the whole laid before the secretary by J. A. Campbell, assistant secretary of war, with the following indorsement:

" 'These reports show a condition of things at Andersonville which calls very loudly for the interposition of the department, in order that a change be made.

(Signed)

J. A. Campbell, Asst. Sec. of War.'

"What more could have been needed, or what more done, to bring authoritatively and strongly before the proper authorities at Richmond the subject of the
Andersonville sufferings? Here were an intelligent inspecting officer of high rank, Colonel Chandler; the chief of the inspecting bureau, Colonel Chilton; the chief of the bureau of war, McKean; a confidential clerk, Mr. Wellford; and the assistant secretary of war, Judge Campbell, all pressing in the strongest terms the necessity of an immediate interposition by the department, and not hesitating to declare the prison at Andersonville "a reproach to them as a nation." These appeals might have moved hearts of stone; but, addressed as they were to these representatives of a government based upon wrong and injustice, that had its origin in a conspiracy to overthrow the best government on the face of the earth, however they may have moved the hearts of those representatives as individuals, they seem to have still felt it their duty to adhere to a purpose so cruelly and wickedly begun, and thus far so faithfully carried out; and they dared not, or would not abandon, even then, this atrocious conspiracy.

"McKean says he is not aware the report was ever acted upon. Captain Selph says the same; and we learn from the testimony that the report remained with the secretary, never having come back to the inspector general's department, where it properly belonged, till about the time Mr. Breckenridge succeeded Mr. Seddon, some time in 1865, when Colonel Chandler having returned and demanded that some action should be taken on the report, or he would resign, it was brought to light and laid before Mr. Breckenridge, who would have acted upon it, as Captain Selph thinks, but for the rapid change of affairs in the Confederacy and the dissolution of their government soon after."

In this epitome of alleged facts the prosecutor sought to put the weight of guilt upon Wirz by pre-
senting him as the willing tool of Jefferson Davis, the president of the Confederacy, although no mention is made of him in the indictment, because as the prosecutor says in a significant note to A. Spence:

"I was ordered to strike from the charges the names of certain high rebel functionaries, and I was severely rebuked by the press, North and South, for presuming to connect these personages with the cruelties at Andersonville. I say to you now that those names (Jefferson Davis, James A. Seddon, Howell Cobb) were placed in the indictment upon evidence in my possession at the time, and the finding of the court replacing them as conspirators is my vindication."

Colonel Chipman also says: "As I am informed, every effort to secure the publication of the record or the argument you (Spencer) now ask, either as a private enterprise or in any other way, has hitherto been unavailing. A copy of the argument was made a part of the annual report of the judge advocate general, and its publication, together with an abbreviation of the record, urgently recommended, yet it was omitted, through some influence, from the published report of that officer. In giving the world this history, you are performing a duty which the country has failed to discharge," * * *

Such were the sentiments of the prosecutor, who found consolation in the fact that some of the associates of Wirz had been pronounced authors of the wrongs perpetrated upon Union prisoners as well as the accused himself.

In presenting the alleged facts which culminate in the charge of willful murder by over crowding the prison, he quotes Robert Ould's comment on the arrangements of the exchange in order to demonstrate
Wirz's motive and, as corroborative evidence, an alleged remark of General Howell Cobb. But Ould's letter was dated March, 1863, and he speaks of the advantages of a special exchange without making any reference to the conditions at Andersonville, brought on subsequently by the suspension of the cartel for the exchange of prisoners. The suspension dates from July 3, 1863, when an order to that effect was issued over the signature of E. T. Townsend, A. A. G. and the Ould letter, therefore, is foreign to the issue. The Ould letter had no possible connection with Andersonville, and the remark, to which Colonel Chipman points with so much emphasis, had no meaning whatever except that General Cobb prided himself upon having made a "good bargain." For him to speak of the Federal prisoners as "a set of miserable wretches," should he have done so, is certainly as pardonable as the remark made by General Neal Dow, a Federal officer who, it is claimed, when sent to Richmond to distribute clothing among the prisoners, said to the Confederate officer in charge of the prison: "You have here the scrapings and rakings of Europe," or the words of The New York Times, of Jan. 6, 1865, when it speaks of the recruits for the Federal army as "wretched vagabonds, of depraved morals, decrepit in body, without courage, self respect or conscience. They are dirty, disorderly, thievish and incapable." Indeed the condemnatory utterances on the federal side appear even more pronounced than the remark objected to. The letter written by Mr. Ould to General Winder was published subsequently in The Wash-
ington Chronicle and is acknowledged by the writer to be correct. It reads:

**City Point.**

“Sir:—A flag of truce has arrived with 350 political prisoners General Barrow and several other prominent men amongst them.

I wish you to send me, at 4 o’clock Wednesday morning, all the military prisoners (except officers) and all the political prisoners you have. If you, in the cases of the political prisoners, have on hand proof enough to convict them of being spies, or of having committed other offenses which should subject them to punishment, so state opposite their names. Also state whether you think, under the circumstances, they should be released.”

As late as 1875 Mr. Ould wrote a commentary to this letter, which in effect is a repetition of what he had once stated in a communication to The National Intelligencer. In the commentary referred to, he says:

“That some three hundred and fifty political prisoners had arrived at City Point, and being anxious not to detain the Federal steamer, I wrote to General Winder to send all the political prisoners he had in his charge as well as soldiers; that it was as to these political prisoners that I wrote the last paragraph in the letter; that it so manifestly appeared from the contest; that every word in the paragraph was true, both as to the class received and those sent off; that not one Confederate soldier in service was received at that time; that scarcely any one of the three hundred and fifty had been in prison a month; that all of them had been recently arrested as sympathizers with the Confederate cause; that those sent off were

‡ Southern Historical Society Papers
miserable wretches indeed, mostly robbers and incendiaries from Western Virginia, who were Confederates when Confederates occupied their country, and Unionists when Federal troops held it * * *; that they were men without character or principal, who were ready to take an oath or engage in any work of plunder; that I then reiterated what I have before written: that they were—‘a set of miserable wretches;' that the Federal soldiers who had passed through my hands knew well, I hoped, that I would not have applied any such phrase to them and especially so, if the calamities of prison life had prostrated them; and that inasmuch as in my letter I had referred to an arrangement which I had made, I must have referred to the exchange of political prisoners which I had just negotiated, and not to the exchange of military prisoners which was negotiated by the cartel."

Colonel Chandler’s reports and statements were introduced in regard to the culmination of the proof of the guilt of Wirz and his co-conspirators. Colonel Chandler was ordered to make an inspection and in his report he speaks of the inside of the stockade as "a place of horror which it is difficult to describe and which is a disgrace to civilization." This very truthful statement seems to have been commented on by the southern press at the time; a paragraph from a paper, published either in Charleston or Columbia, S. C., which came into the hands of the prisoners during their stay in Charleston shows that the condition of the Union prisoners was characterized "as one of the horrors of the war."

"It is unnecessary to repeat the words of Colonel Chipman which show a laborious effort to prove some-
thing that was not so. One only has to note the date on which the report was submitted to the war department of the Confederacy, which was Aug. 17. He assumes to have traced it through all the official routine and places it in the hands of Mr. Breckenridge, who succeeded Mr. Seddon in February, 1865, and who is claimed to have taken action upon it after the object of the alleged conspiracy had been accomplished. But let us see how far this is from the truth.

The exhibit from the journal, "Andersonville Prison Records," shows the presence of prisoners in Andersonville during August to have been 31,693; in September their number was 8,218, a difference of more than 20,000 men. These figures here demonstrate the very opposite of what Colonel Chipman believed he had proved and utterly refute the charge against the Confederate government of having, knowingly and wickedly, allowed the prisoners to remain in their crowded condition "so their sufferings might be a means of reducing their number."

The indisputable facts are that the Confederate government, with commendable promptness, acted upon the report, for hardly two weeks had passed when the removal of prisoners to other places was begun and continued without interruption until the number had been reduced to 8,218.

But to better understand the case and to appreciate the purpose of such an apparent effort to mislead the public, the explanations given by ex-Confederates relating to their testimony before the court martial are of profound interest especially since they coincide
with the facts as shown by the record; and even should the record of the Confederates be questioned, they coincide with the statements made by narrators, such as J. T. King, who says:

"Towards the last of August we were sent to Charleston, and later to Florence, South Carolina."

Dr. T. H. Mann speaks of the middle of September as the date of removal, as does also Josiah C. Brownell. Davidson, who had probably the best information on that matter, says that the removal was begun Sept. 7.

That the alleged incriminating expressions in the Ould letter had no bearing on the charge of crowding the prison for murderous purposes is explained by the date of the letter, and all the facts connected with the management of the prison show a persistent effort to prevent overcrowding. The charge as presented by Colonel Chipman lacks, therefore, every foundation of fact and is the reverse of the truth. He wonders at the failure of the government to embody his argument in the official report or to publish the report of the Wirz trial. It is plain to be seen why this was not done.

But still more may be said to show the wantonness of the proceedings.

Mr. K. I. H. McKean, chief clerk of the Confederate War department and afterwards rector of the University of Virginia, in a letter to the secretary of the Southern Historical society, dated March 22, 1876, says:

"It (the report) had been sent through the usual
channels * * * and was brought into the war office by Colonel Chilton and placed in my hands, with the indorsement quoted by this writer, or something to that effect. Colonel Chilton [who after the war became most favorably known as the commercial editor of The Louisville Courier-Journal], explained to me that the report disclosed such a state of things at Andersonville, that he had brought it to me in order that it might receive prompt attention, instead of sending it through the usual routine channel. I read it immediately and was shocked at its contents. * * * I took the report to Judge Campbell, assistant secretary of war, and told him of the horrors it disclosed. He read it, and made on it an indorsement substantially the same as quoted, and carried it to Mr. Seddon, then secretary of war. * * *

The Confederate government did not only act promptly in removing the prisoners but also renewed its efforts to have the cartel for the exchange of prisoners restored, for as soon as Colonel Chandler, whose statements were challenged by General Winder so far as they incriminated him, had submitted his report, Mr. Seddon, as existing reports show, sent for Judge Ould and "instructed him to go down James river at once with his flag-of-truce boat, see General Mulford (the Federal commissioner) and inform him of the state of things there; that its causes, by reason of the blockade, were beyond our resources to prevent, but that we were unwilling that the breach of the cartel should entail such suffering; and to propose that the Federals might send as many medical officers to Andersonville and other prisons as they pleased, with such supplies, and funds, medicine, clothing, and whatever else would conduce to health and comfort,

*Southern Historical Society Papers.
with power to organize their own methods of distribution, and without other restriction than a personal parole of honor not to convey information prejudicial to us, on condition that we, too, should be allowed to relieve the sufferings of our men in Northern prisons by sending medical officers with like powers, who should take cotton (the only exchange we possessed) to buy supplies necessary for our people; that this was immediately communicated early in August, 1864, to General Mulford, who was informed of the state of things at Andersonville, * * * and when the answer came it was a simple refusal; * * * that immediately thereon Mr. Seddon directed Colonel Ould to return down the river, (James) see General Mulford and say that in three days from the time we were notified that transportation would be at hand to receive them, the Federals should have delivered them ten thousand from the sick at Andersonville, whether we were allowed any equivalent in exchange for them or not, as a mere measure of humanity; that this was promptly done, and General Mulford, the Federal commissioner, as I am informed would have stated that, so impressed was he with the enormous suffering, which it was the desire of our government to spare, that not content with an official letter through the usual channels, he went in person to Washington, into the office of Secretary Stanton, told him the whole story, and urged prompt action, but got no reply. Nor was a reply vouchsafed to this offer until the latter part of December, 1864. Meanwhile some fifteen thousand men had died."*

The statements of Judge Ould regarding the urgent desire on the part of the Confederates to relieve the suffering at Andersonville are thus verified by official statements to the effect that the Confederates sought

*Southern Historical Society Papers.*
to secure an exchange of prisoners not only through their agent but through a delegation of Union prisoners, who were paroled for the especial purpose of presenting a statement of their sufferings to President Lincoln. They were exchanged Aug. 16, 1864, and the statement, presented by them, was supported in addition by a memorial of imprisoned officers, dated Aug. — , 1864, but nothing came of it.

Davidson mentions the sending of prisoners to Washington in this way:

"Sometime in July, permission was obtained from the Confederate government, for a number of men to proceed North, for the purpose of carrying to our government, a statement of the situation in which we were placed, together with petitions for relief. These men were to be paroled on reaching a flag of truce point, provided a like number of rebel prisoners were also paroled by the United States authorities, otherwise they were to return immediately. A mild statement was drawn up, setting forth the fact that we were without shelter and clothing; that the long confinement we had endured and the suffering and disease incident to it, to which we were exposed, was fast reducing our number etc. . . . . The papers were forwarded, according to the permission granted, the men reached our lines successfully and were paroled. But no good resulted from this; for the statements were drawn in such a manner as to awaken no sympathy for us. . . . ."

At the time both documents were published by authority of the United States Sanitary commission* to serve as campaign literature. Their contents,

*) Narrative of Privations and Sufferings of United States Officers and Soldiers while Prisoners of War. Philadelphia, 1881.
therefore were generally known, yet the prosecutor of Wirz succeeded in upholding the charge of conspiracy against him in the face of the fact, that proof to the contrary had been placed before the people in semi-official form. One might excuse the prosecutor for the reason that, by mistake, he named one government while meaning the other, but for his object, which, it is sad to know, he obtained.

To the charge of crowding prisoners is added neglect to furnish tents, barracks or other shelter sufficient for protection against the inclemency of the winter and the dews and burning sun of the summer. The United States Sanitary commission, in the pamphlet already mentioned, commented on the inability of Wirz and his alleged co-conspirators to furnish tents or supply shelter of some other kind, in the following words:

"It has been said and has been the general impression, that the rebel government was itself embarrassed for want of supplies; that its own soldiers were naked and hungry and that even the prison guards shared the privations of the prisoners.

"It will be noticed that this excuse, urged strenuously by their friends and half accepted by every one disposed to be moderate and just, after all only accounts for a small portion of the conduct of the rebels to their captives . . . . . .

"How is it that, after three years of war during which every thing military had grown colossal and correspondingly complete, with them, as with us, that no extensive barracks, even of the cheapest and frailest kind, offering, at least, space to move in, and shelter from the weather, were not erected; but that
open encampments, or city warehouses too small for such occupation, continue in use to this day.”

This epistle was written, evidently, for the purpose of blinding people to the real condition of affairs. Strong efforts had been made by the Confederates to bring about an exchange. In this, they were actuated by the knowledge of their inability to properly provide for their prisoners. Their opportunities to provide shelter were limited and even behind this fact is hidden one of the great lessons of the war: that bravery in the field must have the support of mechanical skill at home.

The prisoners were not intentionally deprived of shelter. Had the Confederates been able to provide proper shelter, the blockade, which was mainly for the purpose of depriving them of the aid of industries, would then have been a failure. But it was not. Its efficiency is one of the reasons, why the charge of refusing to furnish proper quarters to Union prisoners is groundless if not frivolous. Experience has or ought to have demonstrated this to the satisfaction of every prisoner, capable of seeing things as they are.

Upon their arrival in Richmond, Va., the prisoners were quartered in large buildings. The writer, with others belonging to the same command, was assigned quarters on the lower floor of a structure called the Pemberton building. The windows on the east side were near enough to the sidewalk to allow passers by to view the room without difficulty and the inmates were allowed to step to the window but were not permitted to look out, except at night when they had
stealthily arranged a trade with the guards, a practice quite general at that time.

The United States Sanitary commission seems to have been imposed upon by some of its informants, for it indulged in denunciations like this:

"Why, when over-crowding a building with captives, did they make an imaginary boundary line, two or three feet inside the windows, to be observed under penalty of instant death? How is it that the guards were not only permitted, by this regulation, to amuse themselves with taking the lives of the prisoners upon certain given opportunities, but were negatively encouraged even to murder and assassination by the prison authorities?"

This dark picture is purely a product of the imagination. There was no imaginary line in the room in Richmond nor was there any such line in the factory building at Danville, Va., which served as quarters for the same prisoners from the middle of December, 1863, to the end of March, 1864. That three men were shot either at Richmond or Danville, Va., during my stay in those places is not true, so far as my knowledge goes; although Davidson, in his narrative, states that one man was shot at Danville in prison No. 5. He says on this point:

"In addition to this discomforts, we were compelled to avoid all approach to the windows by the recklessness of the guard outside the prison, who upon the slightest indication of a man at them, fired recklessly into the building. Our windows were riddled by the balls thus fired at us and the beams and timbers of the apartments filled with them."

It is strange indeed that the conduct of the guards
was so variable for they were men of the same command. Davidson's statement, that he was paroled Jan. 1, 1864, to act as a nurse in the hospital and that he was an inmate of prison No. 2, makes his version of the prison discipline very doubtful to say least. The commander of the prison, Major Moslit, had provided against all such occurrences by having the windows boarded and the guards on the street were barely able to see men standing at the windows.

The two floors in the building in Danville, called prison No. 1, were crowded during the winter but only after the commander had ordered the prisoners on the lower floor to seek room on one of the two upper floors which had been cleared to some extent by the removal of patients to the hospital. This arrangement was made after repeated attempts by some of the prisoners to break out, so that the rights of belligerents were asserted here in a way that caused some discomfort, for the privilege of going into the yard was restricted during the night to two men at a time. The crowded condition of the rooms, however, lessened the effects of the cold, although the prisons afforded shelter against wind, snow or rain.

The removal to Andersonville occurred at a time, when the confinement in buildings threatened to become injurious to the health of the men. Prison No. 1 at Danville was emptied of its unfortunate inmates about March 24, 1864. One week later they arrived at Andersonville, at a time when there were but six thousand men collected there. The shelter tents and remnants of garments were utilized for tents. Some
information in regard to the ability of Wirz to furnish
tents is derived from a description of the burning of a
tent factory at Jackson, Miss., May 14, 1863, which
is given in Grand's Memoirs (Vol. 1, pp. 507) as
follows:

"Sherman and I went together into a manufactory
which had not ceased work on account of the battle
nor for the entrance of Yankee troops. Our presence
did not seem to attract the attention of either the
manager or the operatives, most of whom were girls.
We looked on for a while to see the tentcloth which
they were making roll out of the looms, with "C. S.
A." woven in each bolt. There was an immense
amount of cotton, in bales, stacked outside. Finally
I told Sherman I thought they had done work enough.
The operatives were told they could leave and take
with them what cloth they could carry. In a few
minutes cotton and factory were in a blaze."

It appears that no other tent-cloth factory existed
in the Confederacy, and the Confederate soldiers had
to rely upon the supply on hand at that time until the
close of the war. This condition of things seems to
be verified by the "Evidence of Soldiers in the Rebel
Army Confined at United States Stations," as pub-
lished under the United States Sanitary Commission.
One William F. Ferguson, of the Eleventh Mississippi
infantry, says: "Had walled tents sometimes and
cabins sometimes when in winter quarters." This
statement was verified by nine other captives named
in the report. Cabins seem to have been substituted
for tents at every place where troops were stationed.
In Goldsborough and Wilmington, N. C., the prison-
ers from Florence and Raleigh occupied cabins built of the branches of young trees.

In his efforts to provide shelter for the prisoners, Wirz did much better than this. Early in the summer, the men were employed in the construction of barracks, which were erected along the northern line of the stockade. They had a nailed roof and were open on the south side. The plan of the prison, as published in The Century, shows that barracks were erected along the southern line within the stockade. These must have been built after the partial removal of prisoners to other points. Many of the captives, during the summer, preferred to stay in their tents, and their numbers having been reduced from 31,693 in August to 1,359 in November, it ought to be clear to all fair-minded persons that, under existing circumstances, ample provisions were made at Andersonville for the quartering of prisoners. The failure to erect more sheds can be explained by the untiring efforts made by the Confederates to have the prisoners released by exchange and the previous attempts of local authorities to have the prison discontinued by injunctive proceedings. This uncertainty, though fully explained to the court-martial, had no weight, because the fact of the removal of the prisoners was withheld during the trial.

The erection of sheds or even barracks seems to have been a matter of grave concern to the Confederates. The people of the North are not able to appreciate the conditions of the Southerners during the civil war. Building material had been supplied from
the North; there was not a single nail factory within the Confederacy; edged tools were not to be had, except when a cargo of such was brought by a blockade runner. The first factory south of the Ohio river was established in Louisville, Ky., about the year 1875, the lumber industry not being developed as in the Northern timber states. If the Confederates had had the material with which to erect barracks, would they have not provided better quarters for their own garrisons than they did? The utter lack of materials for the building of sheds was fully demonstrated at Florence, S. C., where about ten thousand prisoners were confined in the stockade from the beginning of October, 1864, to February, 1865. The men relied on their own ingenuity for protection against the winter storms, but the sick, for want of shelter, were exposed to rain and snow until a Wisconsin lumberman succeeded in erecting sheds, for which not a nail was used. The roofs were weighted with stones or heavy timbers, and the bunks or beds rested upon forked sticks, with one end driven into the ground. The sides were hung with tent-cloth, which, however, did not reach to the ground. These sheds offered protection from the copious rains that fall in that region during the winter, but not against the wind, and they most certainly marked the utter exhaustion of the Southern markets in the matter of building material. Wirz procured nails and had sheds built for the well men, although he had opposed the work of supplying quarters at a time when the sheds were needed the least and because the authorities then intended to remove the
prisoners. He was nevertheless found guilty, although his good will was amply proved by the beginning he had made. Was he expected to do the unnecessary or accomplish the impossible?

As to his further misdeeds, it is charged: "With such evil intent (Wirz) did take and cause to be taken from them their clothing, blankets, camp equipage and other property of which they were possessed at the time of being placed in his custody."

Mr. Spencer, in his narrative, mentions two instances when prisoners were searched. He gives March 10 as the date of one such occurrence, but Wirz having been appointed director of the prison April 12, he could not have been guilty of this proceeding. A second occurrence of this kind is related by Spencer as follows:

"The result of General Stoneman's efforts to penetrate into Georgia, his defeat and capture, his imprisonment at Macon, and his subsequent exchange, is matter of history, and belongs to another recital. But with his men, at least part of them, who composed his command, it is now the duty of the author to treat. Stoneman's advance had not only been anticipated, but it was thought to be provided against; and, strange as it may sound to military men, a hastily collected, badly armed, and worse drilled militia effected the capture. The news of unexpected success spread like the reports of fame of old and eager crowds for miles around rushed to the prison to witness the arrival of the captives. Four trains of cars successively, come loaded down with the men who were destined to play such a conspicuous part in the drama which was to be enacted at this place. Especial care
had been taken by the authorities to receive them, and the cars were stopped some distance above the usual halting place, while extra guards were stationed around the spot. As each train arrived, squads of ten men were taken into a detached building near by, where Wirz, R. B. Winder and W. S. Winder were assembled. There each man was searched by Duncan and Hummer, was stripped to his shirt, if he possessed one, his shoes were closely scrutinized and the soles examined, and the shoes themselves appropriated if they were found worthy; the linings of the waist-bands were inspected; of course, the pockets of the pantaloons were turned inside out and their contents appropriated. The proceeds derived from this search were turned over to Wirz for a temporary deposit, afterwards to be divided fairly."

This description of the incident appears to be truthful. I saw the men come into the prison, and the search to which they were subjected was indeed thorough. They had been captured as raiders and were subject to the retaliatory measures of the Confederacy, called forth by the action of the Federal government in the case of Morgan's raiders, who during July 1863 swept through the states of Indiana and Ohio and were captured or dispersed while attempting to cross the Ohio river and escape into West Virginia. Morgan and his men were denied the privileges of prisoners of war and treated as criminals. Morgan himself and his officers were confined in the penitentiary of Columbus, from which they afterwards made their escape. This act of the Federal government was for the evident purpose of reconciling the people of the districts through which the flying columns of Morgan
had passed. Hence Union soldiers, detached for the same hazardous service when captured, had to suffer by reason of the retaliatory policy of the enemy. The people looked upon the efforts of Morgan's command to "live on the country" as robbery, and the government upheld that view by its acts, though in utter conflict with the conditions under which, according to the decision of the United States, the war was to be conducted, i. e., that both of the belligerent parties were equals in rights. And to uphold that equality, acknowledged by the highest authority as essential, the belligerents "resort to retaliation for every clear infraction of the settled laws of war."

This position is sustained by Graham, an English authority, who, in his work on international law says:

"The assailed community can not be expected to refrain from using like weapons to those with which it is attacked."

Morgan, although a regularly commissioned officer of the Confederacy, was treated after his capture as a felon, and the Confederacy promptly resorted to retaliation for the protection of its soldiers. Whatever the Union prisoners suffered on that account ought to be charged to those influences that induced their government to give way to such unusual methods. The dispute about the renewal of the cartel for the exchange of prisoners had begun shortly before Morgan's capture and was not settled at the time of the Stoneman raid.

This view of the matter, so far as the Confederates are concerned, seems fully sustained by facts which
developed since the trial and the execution of Wirz. The records of the adjutant general's office include an account of moneys taken from prisoners by the Confederates and returned to the Federal government as is shown by a statement, certified to by Adjutant General Drum, which reads as follows:

"Prior to Jan. 25, 1866, General Mulford, agent for the exchange, had paid out of claim fund, on claims of prisoners under instructions of Generals Ord and Patrick, as follows: In coin, $174.91; United States treasury notes, $103.05; bank notes $67.00. On that day he transmitted to the war department $25,854.02, being cash received from the rebels, belonging to Federal prisoners and held subject to the claims of the parties."

Stoneman's raiders were searched at Andersonville, because that post was the nearest to which they could be taken. A detachment captured near Old Hundred in Virginia arrived at Andersonville in an equally deplorable condition. The return of the funds clearly shows the search to have been a retaliatory measure and a mere incident characteristic of the mode of warfare inaugurated at the time of the Morgan raid, Wirz, in this case, acted as the agent of a belligerent power, whose right to retaliate was fully recognized by authorities on international law. Therefore, he was not guilty of robbery, as was charged.
CHAPTER V.

THE FOOD QUESTION.

"And with the malice and evil intent (Wirz) did refuse to furnish or cause to be furnished food either of a quality or quantity sufficient to preserve health and sustain life."

"He starved in Andersonville!" These words have been accepted by the people as the true indication of the fate of thousands of prisoners who perished in southern stockades. As early as Aug. 9, 1865, The New York Daily News contained an article, over the signature of "M. S. H.," in which it is said:

"The mortality at Andersonville resulted, mainly, from the following causes: 1. Want of food; * * * By the want of proper food I mean the dietary scale was neither of the kind nor the quality to which most of the prisoners had been accustomed. Still it was the ordinary diet of the Confederate army, and they had nothing else to give us. Thousands of the prisoners had never eaten bread made of corn meal, or any preparation of it whatever, and with those its use commonly resulted in diarrhoea, which, aggravated by the excessive use of water, generally in a few days became chronic. Everyone knows the difficulty of treating this disease, even under the most favorable circumstances. At first the meal was issued uncooked and the prisoners allowed to go out of the stockade under guard, in squads to collect fuel. This privilege
was accorded with the understanding that an escape would not be attempted. In a short time however, Captain Wirz was compelled to withdraw the favor, for it was evident that no reliance could be placed in the promises of our men. But the cooks were our own men, liberated from the stockade for this special duty, on parole, and receiving therefore an extra ration and the liberty of the entire post, besides other privileges."

The writer here states, that he was a prisoner but a few months and hence confines himself to Andersonville alone. But ex-prisoners, who have had experience in other places, will admit that the statement could be made more favorable to Wirz, for it can truthfully be said that, as to quantity, the prisoners fared nowhere better than at Andersonville, excepting, perhaps at Charleston, (September and October, 1864) where rations improved in quality for the evident purpose of allowing the men to recuperate. But in order to get at the bottom facts it is necessary to go back to post bellum times, when the resources of the southern states were made the subject of a discussion raised by a book entitled: "The Impending Crisis of the South: How To Meet It," by Hinton Rowan Halper. The book, which at the time of publication, (1857) attracted the widest attention and which, later on became a powerful factor in politics, contains statistical information affording an insight into the condition of the Confederacy so far as its resources for food are concerned.

The statistics are confined to the northern states of California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Wisconsin, and to the southern states of Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.

Of these southern states only Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana and Texas were at the time in the indisputed possession of the Confederates; Virginia and Georgia were partly occupied by the Federal armies and Arkansas, Tennessee, Kentucky, Maryland and Delaware were entirely in their power, while Texas was too remote to be of material advantage to the Confederacy, so far as supplies were concerned. The statistics are of the year 1850 and the book was written to show the stagnancy of agricultural interests in the south. Hence the figures may be accepted as correct for the time of the war, especially since the disturbance in slave labor had rather a tendency to reduce the production.

The totals given below represent the production in the northern states, as named above, and the southern states within the Federal lines in 1861, viz: Missouri, Maryland, Kentucky, Delaware, Arkansas, against the remaining southern states under the jurisdiction of the Confederacy:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>North</th>
<th>South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>88,114,272 bu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Corn</td>
<td>112,574,340 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>68,905,805 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckwheat</td>
<td>8,721,874 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans and Peas</td>
<td>2,462,881 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garden products</td>
<td>$4,115,095 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animals, slaughtered</td>
<td>76,713,586</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Animals, slaughtered | 44,665,138

The figures fairly shown the overwhelming superiority of resources in the Northern states compared with those states which, in 1864, practically constituted the Confederacy. The proportions on their side were, however, made still more unfavorable, on account of the rapid settlement of Minnesota, Kansas and Nebraska during that period, while a part of the southern states embraced in the above table were non-productive. The difficulties the Confederacy experienced in properly feeding its prisoners became apparent at once, even if one is unwilling to consider the southerner's own confession of such inability.

In regard to the individual responsibility of Wirz for the suffering of the prisoners on account of their food, no facts can be produced to show him to have been otherwise than liberal and punctual in his dealings with them. The differences of opinion among the men themselves can be explained by the variety of their experiences. Those who had been detained at other places for some time previous felt thankful at receiving a largely increased quantity of meal and meat. At Richmond the prisoners were fed on wheat bread of good quality but insufficient quantity, a mouthful of fresh beef and soup with brown peas.
This ration was furnished but once a day; the same was the case in Danville, Va. According to statements of prisoners, contained in the "Narrative etc.", published under the auspices of the United States Sanitary commission, the fare of prisoners confined at Belle Island during June and July 1863 appears to have consisted of the quantity furnished at other places later on. William Foote, in an affidavit sworn to May 31, 1864, says:

"For the first two or three months at Belle Isle, the quality of rations was very good; hardly sufficient to sustain life in quantity. It was wheat bread, almost four inches square, not exceeding half an inch in thickness, a small portion of beef, call it two mouthfuls. We had this quantity of bread twice a day and a small tincupful of bean soup."

Alfred P. Jones, in an affidavit contained in the same publication, speaks of the rations furnished at Bell Isle as follows:

"At the time I was there in June and July, 1863, the food was very fair, but in small quantities, received one-fourth of a loaf in the morning of wheat bread, which was three inches by three and three fourths, by one and three fourths. We had this twice a day; about two small mouthfuls of meat. For supper we had beef, a pint of bean soup; don't remember finding any worms in it; there was no deficiency in water."

No one can deny that the matter of supplies greatly interfered with the proper feeding of prisoners. Supplies had to be transported a great distance and through disputed territory; the laboring force in many districts had become demoralized by the prospects of
freedom and consequently the production of cereals in the rebellious states must have become much less than during the years of peace, when home production of cereals was even then insufficient for the home demand.

The removal of the prisoners to points further south became a necessity. Danville, Va., was made a depot for prisoners and while there the food was changed twice. The men were given corn bread for a time and pork was substituted for beef. The effects of the change were harmful, being manifested by a rapid increase of bowel complaints which in many instances resulted fatally. Later on a kind of bread was furnished which seemed to be more nourishing than corn bread. It was well baked and palatable and while many of the men asserted that it was made of meal, ground from the seeds of the sorghum sugar cane, it had every peculiarity of bread made of wheat and rye flour. In quantity there was no improvement as compared with the rations furnished at Richmond.

Upon the arrival at Andersonville in March 1864 all of the prisoners from Danville were much surprised to find the rations of meal sufficient to prepare about double as much food as had been furnished either at Richmond or Danville; and that the quantity of meat was also much larger. Ex-prisoners not blinded by prejudice will admit the fact, that many men were even able to keep a supply on hand. While this was not solely due to the quantity furnished but more on account of the rations being furnished to sick and well men alike, yet it shows that the prisoners were not stinted by Wirz, who besides maintained a rigid dis-
cipline in order to give every man what he was entitled to. This condition of things became evident at the time of the removal of the prisoners to Charleston. The first detachments, that were transported east, had occupied ground in full view of my camping place and when the tents, or rather remnants of tents, were removed, a number of heaps of meal were exposed to view. Most of it had been kept too long to be fit for use.

The persistency with which many of the survivors of Andersonville cling to the charge of Wirz intentionally withholding food seems to be explainable only by their inability to view the situation otherwise than from the standpoint of enmity. They persist in attributing the shocking loss of life to the lack of food. Even Dr. T. H. Mann, in The Century (November 1890) in a rejoinder to criticisms on his article on Andersonville says:

"The Confederate army did suffer much from lack of rations, and no doubt at times from lack even of raw corn, but the cause was lack of transportation rather than of such supplies within the Confederacy. There was corn enough rotting in the fields un-gathered, and in the bins, within twenty miles of Andersonville to feed properly every prisoner in that stockade."

T. H. King, in The Century (November 1890) says of the rations:

"The ration for the earlier months consisted of about four ounces of meat and a section of corn bread four inches square by three inches thick."
J. C. Brownell, in The Brooklyn Times, also complains about the ration and says:

“Our food was very poor and of very small quantity—a pint of corn meal and about an ounce of meat was all that we had for a day, and very often we went over a day without anything.”

The dates when no rations were furnished were mentioned in Colonel Chipman’s argument; they were July 3, Sept. 12 and Sept. 18. I am acquainted with the circumstances connected with the withholding of the rations on the date first mentioned; when it was done to give extra support to the men engaged in ferreting out the raiders. Double rations were issued on the following day, and on Sept. 14 rations were also doubled on account of none having been furnished the day before. The withholding of rations on July 3 was for the purpose of promoting order for the good of the prisoners and not a piece of brutality on the part of Wirz. On the dates mentioned, the suffering and mortality had reached the climax, and hence they were due to other causes than a lack of food on these occasions.

The question of food in connection with the great mortality was made the subject of an investigation by the Confederate authorities as early as May 1861, even before the prisoners had experienced the worst. Dr. Eldridge, acting under the authority of Howell Cobb, governor of Georgia, reports:

“The bakery just being completed will be a means of furnishing better prepared food, particularly bread, the half cooked condition of which has doubtless contributed to the continuance of the bowel affections.”
The prisoners on the date of this report, numbered 11,000.

Dr. Jones, under date of Aug. 6, 1864, reports:

"Scurvy, diarrhoea, dysentery and hospital gangrene were the prevailing diseases. The long use of salt meat, often times imperfectly cured, as well as the almost total deprivation of vegetables and fruit, appeared to be the chief causes of the scurvy. I carefully examined the bakery and the bread furnished the prisoners, and found that they were supplied almost entirely with corn bread from which the husk had not been separated. This husk (shell of the grain) acted as an irritant to the alimentary canal, without adding any nutriment to the bread."

Dr. G. G. Roy in his testimony regarding the condition of the prisoners says:

"I attribute this condition to long confinement, want of the necessaries and comforts of life and all those causes that are calculated to produce that condition of the system where there is just vitality enough to permit one to live."

On the strength of these and other reports recommendations were made by the Confederates embracing the following measures:

1st.—The immediate removal from the prison of not less than 15,000 prisoners.

2nd.—The detail on parole of a sufficient number of prisoners to cultivate the necessary supply of vegetables; and, until this could be carried into practical operation, the appointment of agents along the different lines of railroad to purchase and forward a supply.

3d.—The immediate erection of barracks to shelter the prisoners.

4th.—The furnishing of a necessary quantity of
wood and having wells dug to supply the deficiency of water.

5th.—The dividing of the prisoners in squads; each squad to be placed under the charge of a sergeant, and furnished with a necessary quantity of soap, each sergeant to be held responsible for the personal cleanliness of his squad; the furnishing of prisoners with clothing at the expense of the Confederacy, and, if that government be unable to do so, to candidly admit its inability and call upon the Federal government to furnish them.

6th.—A daily inspection of the bake house and baking.

7th.—The covering over with sand from the hill sides the entire morass not less than six inches deep. The stream or water course to be boarded and the men confined to the use of sinks, the penalty for the disobedience of such orders to be made severe.

Though Colonel Chipman in his argument says: "I will not stop now to notice with what flippancy and recklessness the practical suggestions made by these surgeons were put aside and totally disregarded both by General Winder and Chief Surgeon White"—yet the facts are indisputable, that as stated before, the prisoners were removed; the erection of barracks was begun, wells were dug, as will be explained hereafter, and the morass was covered, the work being begun early in July, although the "American Encyclopedia" contrary to the facts and to show the diabolical temper of Wirz falsely attributes to him an order by which this improvement was prevented.

The lack of food is not mentioned in these recommendations and the views of the physicians seem to coincide with that expressed by "M. S. H." viz: that
the men did not suffer from want of sufficient, but from want of proper food, i. e., vegetables. Here are two views in opposition to that expressed by Dr. Mann, who claims that the supply of corn meal was insufficient. The truth is that it ought to have been less, and that other food ought to have been substituted therefor; hence the recommendation to detail prisoners to cultivate vegetables. There were no vegetables furnished the prisoners during the entire summer. On this subject, however, a diversity of opinion seems to exist among the survivors. One man testified before the United States Congressional committee as follows:

"We never had any difficulty in getting vegetables; we used to buy almost anything we wanted of the sergeant, who called the roll mornings and nights. His name was Smith, I think; he was Captain Wirz's chief sergeant. We were divided into messes, eight in each mess; my mess used to buy from two to four bushels of sweet potatoes a week, at the rate of fifteen dollars Confederate money per bushel. (They got twenty dollars of Confederate money for one dollar of greenbacks in those days). Turnips were bought at twenty dollars a bushel. We had to buy our own soap for washing our own persons and clothing; we bought meat, eggs and biscuit. There seemed to be an abundance of these things; they were in the market constantly. That sergeant used to come down with a wagon-load of potatoes at a time, bringing twenty or twenty-five bushels at a load every time."

Dr. Mann, in speaking of this phase of prison experience, says:

"There was a sutler located within the stockade, whose establishment contained a little flour, soda,
salt, cream of tartar, pepper, sweet potatoes, onions, etc. The whole contents of the store could have been swallowed, at any one time, by ten of our hungry men in an hour. He charged one dollar per pint for salt, one dollar per quart for flour, ten cents each for very small onions, forty cents per pound for sweet potatoes, four to ten dollars per pound for tobacco, and everything else in proportion. A lemon did occasionally find its way within our prison, but I never saw one sold. I saw a few very small Irish potatoes that sold for five cents each, and were advertised to be excellent for scurvy.

The statement made before the Congressional committee is remarkable for the exaggerations it contains, especially in view of the charge that prisoners were robbed. Dr. Mann, who seems to have had every opportunity to see the sutler's supplies, truthfully characterizes the situation when he says, that all the supplies on hand could have been eaten by ten men in an hour. My personal experience accords with Dr. Mann's statement. With a supply of crackers and meat, sent by friends from Louisville, Ky., to Danville, Va., about February, 1864, I received three dice, worth perhaps three pennies. One day in August, 1864, I was accosted in Andersonville by a man who offered me $20, in Federal money, for the dice, for which I had no use. The money was at once expended for the purchase of a dozen potatoes, which were of a size not saleable in the North, although the price was $10, in Federal money. They were the only potatoes I saw in Andersonville, the sutler's tent being on the other side of the camp. With the other $10 I bought one half of a blanket.
The testimony given before the Congressional committee was seemingly calculated it to mark the contrast between the alleged villainy of Wirz and his opportunities for properly feeding the prisoners, if he had been willing to do so. What wonder that one finds the theory of intentional cruelty by withholding food still being upheld. "The Nation", in its issue of Jan. 30, 1860, applies its frail logic for that purpose in an article entitled: "The Prisons of the Civil War," in which it is said that the great loss of life among the Confederates held as captives in the Northern prisons was due to their "deproved physical condition" which "on arriving at the North was the determining factor in their subsequent physical career." Thus at Hart's Island less than one hundred of a large detachment reached there "as well men or even in fair health." At Elmira "the Fort Fisher prisoners arrived in cold weather, very much depressed, poorly clad and great numbers were soon taken sick with pneumonia and diarrhoea, rapidly assuming a typhoid character." Elmira is supposed to have been the only Northern prison at which there was much conspicuous mortality from avoidable disease and here, as at the other depots the underlying cause was "the enfeebled condition of the men on arrival."

In the same article details are given as to the comparative mortality in Northern prisons and with respect to scurvy it is said:

"From scurvy there died 0.16 (sixteen hundredths of one man) per thousand mean strength of the Union ranks. There are no figures for the Confederates, but
there are frequent references of the existence of scurvy among them and the fact, that fifty-eight cases (with no death) occurred at Johnson's Island, where most of the prisoners were officers, and where the diet was exceptionally abundant and varied, shows that, open or latent, it was a constant menace to their army. At Elmira there died from it three per thousand mean strength, and at all the Northern prisons 4.3 per thousand, in all which is fair to infer, that the cause antedated capture. But at Andersonville, of the Unionists, almost exclusively well when made prisoners 102.8 per thousand mean strength, or more than a tenth of those held in the stockade, were there destroyed in that way alone."

Further on it is said: "It is certain that the men confined in the Salisbury prison bore the impress of semi-starvation on their arrival in New York, although in the meantime every effort at recuperation had been made by the United States authorities and the Sanitary Commission."

The above extracts, credited to an authoritative publication, show the existence of the same conditions among the Confederate soldiers in the field as among the Union captives held in Southern prisons. The same causes brought in the same results. The condition of the prisoners as compared with that of the Confederate soldiers was worse however on account of the hopelessness of the former to which must be added the effects of the climate, which the human body when deprived of its accustomed food, is unable to withstand for any length of time. The change in climate alone as one of the causes of mortality should have prompted those in power to pursue a more humane policy. In the great European wars, captives were mostly re-
moved to the latitude of their homes except in the case of the prisoners who were detained on the island of Cabrera, where the difference in climate was likewise one of the causes of mortality.

"Those people," continues The Nation, "should not have been made ill. The want of quinine, of opium, of calomel had nothing whatever to do with the suffering that insufficient, improper and uncooked food, contaminated water and want of shelter caused the victims of the stockade. That blankets and tents were military supplies, and therefore cut off from the Confederacy is no excuse for the exposure and crowding of these helpless wretches."

The sycophancy hidden in these lines becomes apparent from the information as to the causes of mortality among the captured Confederates which is given in the same article.

But even without regard to their efforts to effect an exchange the proposition to hold the Confederates responsible for the fate of the Union prisoners is untenable from the standpoint of international law the principle of which in the premises is summed up in Halleck's book as follows:

"Vattel places the duty of a state to provide for the support of its subjects while prisoners of war in the hands of an enemy upon the same grounds as its duty to provide for their ransom or release by exchange. Indeed a neglect or refusal to do so, would seem to be even more criminal then a neglect or refusal to provide for their exchange; for the exigencies of the war may make it the temporary policy of the state to decline an exchange, but nothing can excuse it in leaving its soldiers to suffer in an enemy's country, without any fault of their own."
This principle was admitted by the Federal government in as much that General Butler wrote an opinion on the exchange question "not diplomatically, but obtrusively and demonstratively, not for the purpose of furthering the exchange of prisoners, but for the purpose of preventing and stopping the exchange, and furnishing a ground on which we could fairly stand."

More light is shed upon the subject by Mr. Charles A. Dana, assistant secretary of war, in an editorial, published in the New York Sun, which is as follows:

"This letter (addressed to Mr. Lyons) shows clearly, we think, that the Confederate authorities and especially Mr. Davis, ought not to be held responsible for the terrible privations, sufferings and injuries which our men had to endure while they were kept in the Confederate military prisons. We were responsible ourselves for the continued detention of our captives in misery, starvation and sickness in the South. . . . Moreover there is no evidence whatever that it was practicable for the Confederate authorities to feed our prisoners any better than they were fed, or to give them better care and attention than they received. The food was insufficient; the care and attention were insufficient, no doubt; and yet the condition of our prisoners was not worse than that of the Confederate soldiers in the field, except in so far as the conditions of those in prison must of necessity be worse than that of men who are free and active outside."

This statement certainly touches the very foundation of the question, as to whether any act on the part of a Confederate officer or any number of them could have added to the suffering of the prisoners. It also shows the situation of the prisoners to have been desperate enough to justify the interference of Wirz in uphold-
ing discipline among the prisoners in order to lessen the suffering incident to their condition of captivity as insisted upon by those in power on the Federal side.

But every phase of the food question, as presented above, shows the utter groundlessness of the charge, preferred against Captain Wirz. Had he the power to prevent the prisoners from becoming victims of a policy designed by their own government?

In connection with the charge of furnishing insufficient food an effort was made to show, during the court martial, that Wirz refused and neglected to provide sufficiently for cooking in summer and for keeping the prisoners warm in winter. That so much stress is put upon his failure to furnish sufficient wood is indeed singular. The allowance of wood was about the same at Andersonville, Charleston and Florence, although the difference in the climate in the season caused extreme suffering at Florence, while for a great part of the year fires were not needed at Andersonville either for warmth or for cooking; indeed many of the men, after the opening of the cook house were not in need of wood at all. M. S. H., the correspondent of the New York Daily News, in his letter, dated Aug. 9, 1865, which has been heretofore mentioned, says:

"At first the meal was issued uncooked and the prisoners allowed to go out of the stockade under guard, in squads, to collect fuel. In a short time, however, Captain Wirz was compelled to withdraw the favor, for it was evident that no reliance could be placed in the promises of our men."

This correspondent here points to the same difficulty experienced in connection with other disciplinary
matters and this in addition to the lack of knowledge of soldierly duties among the prisoners was a great obstacle to other efforts for relieving their condition. My experience as to wood was not such as to justify me in joining in the complaint about the lack of a sufficient supply. During the time the meal and meat were furnished raw, I often went outside of the stockade to get wood. One or two Confederate soldiers escorted the squad of prisoners to the forest near the hospital where the men were allowed to hunt for the best pieces of wood they could find. The escort usually insisted upon being given a promise that none of the prisoners would make an attempt to escape. The Confederates' confidence increased upon better acquaintance with the prisoners who at last were limited only to time and not to distance for their return. The load, usually packed in by one man, was sufficient for the number constituting the mass. The meal was used for bread which was baked on a board held against the fire or coal; or for dumplings, cooked in water or for mush. The meat was fried at the same time. The cooking done in this manner was sufficient for all purposes, although complaints on this ground may be well founded in some cases, where dishonesty or misconduct of some one had interfered with the arrangements made. My observations were not such as to make the lack of wood the source of great inconvenience and harm as was made to appear at the time of the Wirz trial and since. The wood famine, if it was seriously felt, was of short duration and mostly due to misconception of rights on the part of the
prisoners. After the establishment of the cook house, there was no need of wood for cooked rations were furnished. The bread, generally, was well baked. Although it is often charged that it was but half baked. "But the cooks were our own men, liberated from the stockade for the special duty, on parole and receiving therefor an extra ration and the liberty of the entire post, besides other privileges— —" says M. S. H. To compel them to do their duty, Wirz had the stocks erected for the purpose of punishing negligent, refractory and dishonest cooks. Such punishments were construed into manifestations of a demoniacal spirit although his action in the case entirely fitted the situation, which was desperate for him as the man upon whom a great responsibility rested. Was not the insufficiency of clothing the real cause of the suffering and were not the prisoners a party to a contract by which another party had been bound to provide clothing?
CHAPTER VI.

MORTALITY AMONG PRISONERS.

The leading cause of mortality among the prisoners at Andersonville is given in the indictment as follows:

"And (Wirz) did compel the said prisoners to use unwholesome water, reeking with the filth and garbage of the prison and prison guard, and the offal and drainage of the cook house of said prison, whereby the prisoners became greatly reduced in their bodily strength, and emaciated and injured in their bodily health, their minds impaired and their intellects broken; and many of them, to wit, the number of ten thousand, whose names are unknown sickened and died by reason thereof, which he, the said Henry Wirz, then and there well knew and intended."

"Contaminated water" is also mentioned in an issue of The Nation as the leading cause of misery among the prisoners.

Colonel Chipman, in his address to the court martial, paid little attention to this feature, although the indictment states that the number of victims from this cause was ten thousand. The tenor of the specification, however, makes it appear plain, that the theory of intentional cruelty on the part of Captain Wirz was gained from a description of the camp, furnished by Private Tracy who was entrusted with
the mission of presenting the memorial of the prisoners to President Lincoln. He says, under oath:

"Through the grounds, and at nearly right angles with the longer sides, runs or rather creeps a stream through an artificial channel, varying from five to six feet in width, the water about ankle deep, and near the middle of the inclosure, spreading out into a swamp of about six acres, filled with refuse wood, stumps and debris of the camp. Before entering this inclosure the stream, or more properly sewer, passes through the camp of the guard, receiving from this source, and others farther up a large amount of the vilest material, even the contents of the sink. The water is of a dark color and an ordinary glass would collect a thick sediment. This was our only drinking and cooking water. It was our custom to filter it as best we could through our remnants of haversacks, shirts and blouses. Wells had been dug, but the water either proved so productive of diarrhœa or so limited in quantity that they were of no general use. The cook-house was situated on the stream just outside of the stockade and its refuse of decaying offal was thrown into the water, a greasy coating covering much of the surface. To these was added the daily large amount of base matter from the camp itself."

To enable my readers to appreciate the horror embodied in the above statements a plan of the prison (Plan A.) has been appended which is of especial interest in demonstrating the eagerness to substantiate charges of cruelty against Wirz at a time when it was of vital importance to the men in power, that the people should believe in them. Tracy speaks of the stream as a sewer and his plan, especially his marking of the current, seems to justify the term. It also gives evidence to his statements, that a large amount
of the vilest material, even the contents of the sink, was carried to the camp, that the water was of a dark color and that it was necessary to filter it.

In The Century magazine of July, 1890, another plan of Andersonville (Plan B.) was published. A comparison of this plan with Plan A. which was published in August, 1864, will show that Tracy’s description of the water supply of the prisoners was untruthful throughout. The creek marked out on the map did not creep through the camp; at the point of its entrance into the camp the current was swift and in its course through the grounds it was nowhere stagnant. The water supply came from seven springs about 3,000 feet distant from the inner stockade, forming two branches which united about 1,000 feet from the stockade line. In its course, the creek was fed from springs in the swamp on each side. The prisoners were confined to this water supply until about the beginning of June, when permission was given for the digging of wells, which furnished excellent water. It is unnecessary to seriously consider Tracy’s claim that the well water was productive of diarrhoea, as this disease was only a symptom of the advanced stage of scurvy, the development of which could not have been greatly hastened by the water. The statement, it is evident, was purposely made to uphold Tracy’s version of the cruelty theory in connection with his description of the water supply, although the truth is that the water from the wells was cool and palatable and the supply was ample. Wirz took a special interest in the digging of wells and
when a number were ready, he furnished the timber for walling them, although the prisoners preferred to put the wood to a different use. When this matter is sifted thoroughly it will be found that the assertion that the water was intentionally contaminated lacks every foundation of truth.

Dr. T. H. Mann gives the close proximity of the cook-house as a source of evil when he says:

"The cook-house, where all the bread was baked and meat boiled, stood upon this very brook, above and outside the stockade, so that all the greasy scum, refuse, and dirt from it came floating through the inclosure that we inhabited, upon the surface, or mixed with the water we were obliged to drink and use for washing. The camps of our guard were so located that all their sewerage came down through our inclosure."

The plan that accompanied this article does not substantiate this assertion because the cook-house, and especially the soup-house is shown to have been located at a sufficient distance to avoid the contamination of the water, unless those prisoners who were employed as cooks, disregarded every sanitary requirement with which they were familiar from experience in camps of the Union army, where sinks were provided for the reception of the offal. His statement that the drainage from the camps came down through the inclosure also appears improbable upon examination of the plan furnished by him. On the contrary, this plan, so far as the location of the camps can be seen, shows that the Confederates were disposed to avoid every possibility of contaminating the water,
which, even when the temperature during the summer is taken into consideration, was never a cause of misery.

A comparison of plan A with plan B will make it plain that the sworn statement of Tracy to the effect that the contents of the sink were mixed with the drinking water was a base invention. Anyone who soberly considers the matter will, in addition, be shocked by the ingratitude of Tracy, in whom Wirz had confided for the purpose of securing relief for the prisoners but who, instead, betrayed his benefactor as well as his unfortunate comrades to help a party, a faction or a class. He thus added disappointment to the already unbearable lot of the prisoners.

The false position of those who still persist in holding that the contamination of the water was a source of misery, is shown by the following quotations from Dr. Mann’s article. He says:

“No provision was made, until near the very close of our incarceration at Andersonville, towards carrying off the refuse and sewerage of our prison, and no sanitary regulations had been put in force. The filth that accumulated through those long summer months can neither be described nor imagined. Most of it collected in and about the three acres of swamp, and I have seen that three acres one animated mass of maggots from one to three feet deep, the whole swamp moving and rolling like the waves of the sea.”

In another place he says:

“A league had been formed by the better class of prisoners, several days before the executions, for the purpose of protecting our lives and scant property;
and it was by the aid of this league, headed by a character known as "Big Pete," that these raiders were brought to justice."

Here he omits however to state that the members of the league acted also as sanitary police and prevented the pollution of the camp and deems it of no importance to acknowledge the part Wirz took in the organization of that force, the members of which were supplied with extra rations as a reward for their services. Its existence therefore, depended upon Wirz' consent. The members of the league were aided in their work by the maggots, a sanitary police provided by Providence.

The accumulation of filth mentioned by Dr. Mann becomes doubtful when we are informed by Ambrose Spencer, "that during the year 1864 there were one hundred and eighty rainy days, during which there fell 51,205 inches, while there were ninety-four humid or moist days." During the month of June there were twenty-one rainy days, others say twenty-eight and the volume of water that fell during that time excludes every possibility of an accumulation of filth as pictured by Dr. Mann. But he further on, refutes his own statement, when he says:

"Sometime in August one of those sudden and terrible thunder-storms so common in hot countries occurred, and it so swelled the small brook running through the stockade that its outlet, hewn between a few of the timbers set in the bed of the brook, would not allow the immense volume of water to pass; consequently the stockade acted as a dam, so that the water rose within an hour nearly to the top of the timbers, completely flooding the four acres of swamp."
From the occurrence dates the impious myth of a "Providence Spring", of which Dr. T. H. Mann speaks as follows:

"At the time of the flood which caused the break in the stockade the lightning, which was almost incessant, seemed to strike in several places within the stockade, at one spot killing several of our number. It struck, or seemed to strike, at one place about fifty yards from my own shelter and just within the dead-line. I noticed that several were prostrated by the stroke, and I immediately walked over to the spot, with many others, to see what damage was done. I found an ugly looking rent in the ground, out of which was flowing a clear, copious stream of water between the dead-line and the stockade, perhaps three feet within the dead-line, on the east side of the inclosure and fifty or sixty yards above the spot where the brook entered.

The general belief among all the prisoners in that vicinity was that the spring was opened by the lightning, and the fact that it was so opened was not questioned till years afterwards. It looked as though the electric fluid had found vent at this place from the overcharged earth. Be that as it may, the spring gave us pure, sweet water, and in sufficient quantity, from this time out so long as the place was occupied as a prison; and I have been told that it was still a living spring twenty years afterwards. The prison authorities fixed a wooden trough to conduct the water over the dead-line within our reach — about the only act I ever knew them to perform spontaneously."

The medical reports of the prison do not mention any such victims from lightning; but as the spontaneous act of fixing a wooden trough does it not again prove the friendly disposition of Wirz who was anxious that the prisoners should have good water?
MORTALITY AMONG PRISONERS.

But to recur to the sanitary condition of the camp, Dr. Mann himself indirectly admits, that the cleaning of the swamp at the time was thorough, for the stockade gave way and the swift stream carried away the last trace of filth. This was shortly before the removal of prisoners was begun.

Here we have two statements by Dr. Mann and one by Mr. Spencer, which are in utter conflict with the charge that Wirz allowed filth to accumulate in furtherance of his alleged murderous designs. Their statements, on the contrary, show, that the accumulation of filth was an impossibility. The plan, as published in The Century Magazine, certainly shows the condition of the camp to have been favorable to perfect drainage. Even the testimony given before the court martial by Confederates regarding the smell from the camp ought not to be taken seriously. Nazareth Allen is credited in the report of the trial with saying: "The stench was very bad. I have smelt it when I was at our picket camps, about a mile in a straight line," an observation that can be made in every large city, even in those where the sanitary arrangements are most favorable.

But the topographical conditions of the camp and the surrounding territory, the freshness of the water, the protection by rifle pits and bastions of the basin of the brook from sewerage, the distance between the dipping spot and the sink, the absence of camps above the stockade and the abundance of well water within it, ought to be sufficient to show the groundlessness of the charge.
The above deductions are upheld in addition by the medical reports to which attention was called in an article published in The Virginia Medical Monthly for the purpose of correcting statements made in a paper read by Dr. John G. Johnston, of Brooklyn, Dec. 17, 1889, in which the great mortality at Andersonville is attributed to the contamination of water. From the article, which was reproduced in The Sanitarian in August, 1890, the following is quoted:

"We would refer Dr. Johnston to Part Third, Volume Third, "Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion," where he can procure official statements in regard to many matters upon which he appears to be profoundly ignorant. We would especially call his attention to page 35 of this volume, where he will find full statements of diseases affecting Union prisoners at Andersonville, Ga. The medical reports show that during the time this place was used as a prison there were 42,686 cases of injuries and disease. Of these, 16,772 were from diarrhœa and disentery, 7966 had malarial fever, while but 753 suffered from the various forms of continued fever. What does the logic of these figures portray? Either that the doctor is all wrong in the matter as to the drinking water and the typhoid germs, or that the prisoners were most felicitous in avoiding the graver germs and gulping down those of a less noxious nature."

The plan of Andersonville which was published over Tracy's signature in support of his sworn statements, evidently served as a basis for the allegations presented against Wirz by Colonel Chipman. But the plan was a forgery, and ought not the authors of such a fraud be scorned by humane and righteous people?
CHAPTER VII.

THE HOSPITAL OF THE PRISON.

"And so knowing," further reads the indictment, "and evilly intending, did refuse and neglect to provide proper lodgings, food or nourishment for the sick, and necessary medicine and medical attendance for the restoration of their health, and did knowingly, willfully, and maliciously, in furtherance of his evil designs, permit them to languish and die from want of care and proper treatment."

The hospital was first established within the stockade in the same corner near which it was afterwards located outside. While within the stockade, the patients had the use of new and good tents, perhaps sixteen or twenty altogether. It is presumed that additional tents were provided for use in the hospital camp outside. On two or three occasions, I had a chance to view the hospital camp from the walk to the dead house and the tents seemed to be in good condition. A friend, who had been admitted and whom I saw sitting on a bench near the entrance to the camp, assured me that the hospital was in as satisfactory a condition as circumstances permitted. This young man, the scion of a distinguished family of Cincinnati who had attended the Woodward highschool of that city and who, if he had lived, would have a-
chieved distinction, certainly gave a truthful statement. He had frequently taken part in discussions concerning the management of the prison and was especially esteemed for his sound judgment, moderation and impartiality. Hence his characterization of the hospital as satisfactory can safely be accepted as an indication of the general aspect of affairs within these grounds. The causes of suffering among the men confined there were the same as among the rest of the prisoners. To become an inmate of the hospital was merely accidental and depended upon the energy of the friends of the patient in bringing him within sight of the physicians; otherwise he was doomed to die on the spot where he had dropped down from exhaustion. According to the hospital register, 3727 men shared that fate, while 8735 died in the hospital, making a total of 12,462 men. According to another report the total number of deaths was 13,717, or nearly 800 men more than the losses of the English in the battles of Talavera, Albuera, Salamanca, Ligny, Quatrebras, Waterloo, New Orleans and the Crimean war.

A statistical table of deaths from diseases during the civil war, published in The Nation shows the average annual rates of death per 1000 of strength as follows:

- Northern prisons, ..................... 230.4
- Andersonville, ........................ 732.6
- Elmira, .................................. 441.1
- Confederate States Army, ........... 167.3
- United States Army, .................. 53.48

These figures contain an instructive lesson regarding
the practicability of the government's policy of non-exchange. Here we find that the mortality from disease among the captured Union soldiers was thirteen and a half times greater than among the Federal troops in the field; the mortality among the captured Confederates as compared with those in the field was only one and a half as much, although the mortality among the Confederates in the field was three times greater than the mortality among the Federal troops. Thus the mortality among the Confederate captives in the North was nearly four times as great as the mortality among the Federal soldiers in the field. Here we find an excessive mortality among the Confederate troops and among the captured Federals held in Southern prisons. How much the condition of captivity contributed to such a fearful loss of life will be difficult to determine, but the excessiveness of the mortality among the two classes, the Confederate soldiers in the field and the captured Federal soldiers, shows the existence of one fundamental cause which can reasonably be traced to the prisons in the South as the determining factor in the fate of their inmates. The grim reaper had full sevay without the aid of any mortal hand. This fundamental cause lay beyond the control of Wirz. In regard to the mortality among the sick at Andersonville The Nation says:

"It is a lame and useless equivocation for any one to say that this misery arose from the fact that medicines were made contraband. The want of quinine,
of opium, of calomel had nothing whatever to do with the suffering."

But the use of quinine, opium and calomel lessened the ravages of death among the Confederate captives who, like the captured Federals, suffered from want of food. The unfavorable condition of the Confederates is often adroitly used as an excuse for the mortality among the Confederate prisoners, but how can one explain the great difference between the mortality in Northern prisons and that in Andersonville, in the face of the admission that a “depraved physical condition” was the determining cause of mortality, when the physical condition of the captured Federals was not depraved until after they had lived under the same conditions as the Confederates who at the time of their capture were physically depraved. Now the abundance of medicines lessened the mortality in one case; was anything else needed but to withhold medicines in order to increase the mortality in the other? Was it necessary for Wirz to raise a hand in order to assist the destruction of life?

But the Confederates, or the contrary, made great efforts to relieve the sick. Davidson says:

"When the hospital was first established outside, only two surgeons were in attendance at the sick call, but before the summer was past, twelve additional ones with each a clerk, were required, so rapidly had disease increased among us. The principle diseases treated at the sick call were scurvy, diarrhoea, dysentery, pneumonia, ulcers from vaccination, fevers, gangrene, ophthalmia and erysipelas. The medicines consisted of quinine, mercurial preparations, cayenne,
chlorate of potassa, artificial and tartaric acids, gum camphor, salts, sulphur, oil and fly blister, a few decoctions of indigenous roots and barks and newly distilled whiskey, but for a great part of the time no medicines of any kind were in the dispensary. All our prepared medicines came from Macon; quinine and the more valuable drugs had labels of English manufacture, and had run the blockade at Charleston and Savannah. Bandages were so difficult to be obtained, that the same ones were washed and used again and again until used up.

Further details given by the same writer concerning the sick call show the medical service to have been thoroughly organized. Was organization needed for the destruction of lives?

Davidson in another place, says:

"When the surgeons and their clerks have taken their places within the sick call enclosure, the gate in their rear is closed, and the wicket in the great gate opened for the admission of the patients. My stand was situated near the wicket and one half the sick passed it on their way to their surgeon for examination. Each surgeon had charge of a certain number of detachments, the numbers designating which, were painted upon a board, and hung conspicuously over the clerk's stand; by means of this guide, any man could readily find the surgeon to whom he must apply to be examined. * * * * Three thousand men daily visited the surgeons for remedies, at this place, besides those to whom medicine was administered without a daily examination. On my own book, there were at one time nine hundred and forty-five names of sick men under treatment, by one surgeon; taking this as a basis, the fourteen clerks would have in charge 13,230 patients; and these were exclusive of the men who refused to report at sick call, and those
who were confined in the hospital, the latter numbering about two thousand men. At this time, it is believed that there were not five thousand well men among the thirty-two thousand confined in the stockade. Those who had been longest in the stockade and those who had come among us in a destitute condition were the earliest and greatest sufferers. * * * *

"The detachments were called in regular order. The surgeon upon whom I attended had charge of thirteen detachments; this would give him, if each division were full, 3,519 men, over whose health he was called upon to preside. * * * Each applicant was separately presented, his name, etc., entered by the clerk, the date of his examination and the diagnosis of his disease, and the formula or formulas applicable to his case, carefully noted, when he was turned back into the stockade to wait until 3 o'clock, before his medicine was served out to him. * * * "From 8 o'clock until 2, the work of examining the sick continued: * * * After the examination at the sick call, the clerks repaired to the dispensary, which was under control of Chief Surgeon R. H. White, to put up the prescriptions, made by the surgeons; this process required about an hour's time, and when it was completed, they returned to the sick call stand, with the remedies, to distribute them to those for whom they were prescribed. The medicines were issued both in powder and in liquid form, the former were enclosed in papers, but the latter—the dispensary furnishing no bottles—were poured into tin and wooden cups, or whatever else the invalid possessed. * * * *

"Much of the time the dispensary was without medicine, and very often only a few of the remedies prescribed were to be had there. * * * The number of men admitted to the hospital by each surgeon, never exceeded eight at one time, but the usual number was
three. On one occasion, however, soon after the enlargement of the hospital, Captain Wirz issued an order that all sick men, who were brought to the sick call upon blankets, should be admitted; acting under this order, (the surgeon whom I attended being absent,) I issued eighty tickets of admission—by far the largest number ever issued in one day. The captain was exceedingly angry with me for doing this, and cursed me roundly for it; but I pointed him to the order and continued about my business; none of the men were sent back into the stockade, but the order was speedily revoked. * * * * About 2,000 sick were constantly in the hospital.”

Here Wirz, the fiend incarnate, is described as being angry, although he really showed kindness to the prisoners by not sending any back to the prison. He revoked his order for the benefit of those of the sick who would have been deprived of the privileges of the hospital by impostors, thus evincing both judgment and humanity. It is fortunate indeed for the authors of this horror that the pen fails to convey the remotest idea of the suffering among the prisoners. Even during 1864 the Confederates never attempted to hide the horror, but spoke the plain truth so far as it could be done in words, which ought to raise a doubt as to their responsibility, even if we had not the assurance of Mr. Dana “that the Confederates were not responsible.” Was Wirz responsible? The statistics of The Nation contain the answer. Of the physically depraved Confederates in Northern prisons but 230.4 per 1,000 died; of the physically depraved Federals in Southern prisons, 732.0 per 1,000 men died, a difference of 402.2 per 1,000 mean strength—the ex-
tent of the suffering due to "the want of quinine, of opium, of calomel." Do not those figures demonstrate a shocking disregard of the duties of humanity on the part of others than Wirz and the Confederates? Who was it that withheld the medicine which was the cause of the difference in the mortality? Was not the policy of the party in power more cruel than the war itself?
CHAPTER VIII.
VACCINATION AND THE BLOODHOUNDS.

A most shocking charge against Wirz is that of having permitted the bodies of the dead to remain among the emaciated sick and languishing living, thereby increasing the mortality by one thousand. Josiah C. Brownell, in his article in The Brooklyn Times, sheds some light on this subject when he says:

"As soon as breath left the body it became a piece of merchandise, exchangeable for rations of food, or even for money. The dead man's nearest friend claimed the corpse, and was generally as proud of his property as a boy is of his first pantaloons. The secret of their value was this: We did not get half enough wood to cook our food, and we were allowed to carry the dead bodies of our comrades to the dead house outside of the prison; on our way back we could gather as much wood as we could carry, and this extra allowance would insure us well-cooked victuals for two weeks. But the great trouble was to keep the body from being stolen until the time came for carrying it outside, for we could only go out with the dead from 10 o'clock in the morning until 4 o'clock in the afternoon; and if a friend should happen to die in the night, ten chances to one but his poor tenement of clay would be stolen before daylight. To prevent this, many of the boys fastened a strong piece of cord to the corpse and tied the other end around their own
wrist, and then the body could not be removed without wakening them; but for all their watchfulness, many a hungry, half-starved man who went to sleep at night with bright visions of well-cooked food on the morrow has awakened in the morning to find that the friend who was so near and dear to him—dearer when dead than he was in life—had been removed forever from his sight and the profit of his removal gone to another."

The assertion that the privilege of getting wood was linked to the carrying out of dead bodies, if not important in connection with the charge of prisoners having been deprived of wood, is certainly erroneous for the reason that there was no wood to be had along the way to the dead house, which, at least until the erection of the second stockade line and after Brownell’s removal to Savannah, was located in the rear of the hospital office, as marked on Plan B. As the men were permitted to carry bodies to the dead house without escort, Mr. Brownell’s assertion that they were given the privilege of gathering wood as they returned must be doubted. But the privilege of carrying out the dead was of value because the man who performed such duty was entitled to the clothing left by the deceased. Mr. Brownell, however, robs the charge against Wirz of every vestige of truth, for he admits that the prisoners retained the dead bodies of their comrades for selfish purposes, which under the circumstances were excusable. The prisoners prevented Wirz from removing the dead, even if he had been willing to do so. Such occurrences, however, were not so frequent as is made to appear by the above ex-
tract. Many manifestations of true comradeship and brotherly devotion were witnessed at Andersonville, where the cynic was as much despised as anywhere else.

Among the victims of Wirz's alleged cruelty, Colonel Chipman counted two hundred and fifty who lost their lives in consequence of the use of impure vaccine matter. Vaccination was ordered in May, 1864, owing to the presence of small-pox patients in the hospital, which was then within the stockade. There was no compulsion, or at least no stringent measures were taken to find out who had or had not been vaccinated. There is no doubt but that some of those who were vaccinated suffered greatly, and many ugly sores could be seen. But the medical records of Andersonville show but four deaths from vaccination. Davidson says:

"The prisoners who had not recently been vaccinated were compelled, under severe penalties, to undergo this operation, the surgeons having been requested, it was said, by the United States government to do this as a preventive against small-pox. It seemed strange to us that here, where the instances of that disease were so extremely rare, such an order should be given; but the sequel showed the devilish cunning of the authorities at Andersonville. The virus used was impure, and if the inoculation with the poison failed of carrying off the patient, the wound would not heal under the influence of the heat, starvation and impure air, and invariably terminated in horrible-looking ulcers. I have said the virus was impure; I judge it to have been so from its effects, and not from a chemical analysis of it; but there were cases of in-
oculation which had been made in Danville, three months previous to our removal to Camp Sumter, that took the same form, as every case assumed after our incarceration there. The worst cases at Andersonville were caused by the vaccination, and the only inference that can be drawn from this fact is that our prisoners were deliberately poisoned by vaccination."

This extract is interesting for its temper, if not for the ignorance displayed therein. The fact that there were but four victims from vaccination seems to fully disprove the assertion that the virus was impure. Under the circumstances the number of deaths was certainly small, and shows the virus to have been at least of average quality. The four deaths demonstrate, if anything, the risk of vaccinating, and might furnish grounds for an assertion that vaccination is dangerous to health. But, while the vaccination of prisoners resulted in the loss of life, did the order requiring such vindication indicate a wicked and cruel purpose to destroy life, or did it show an earnest desire on the part of the Confederates to protect the prisoners against the ravages of the scourge, just as is now done in the cities of the North, though no one is in danger of contagion?

The use of dogs in the pursuit of escaped prisoners was undoubtedly looked upon at the time as an extremely brutal method of exercising the rights of belligerents toward captives. The presence of the dogs was known to every prisoner, as the animals were seen about the stockade quite often, and were evidently used for tracking men. Their howling could be heard
all over the prison. Ambrose Spencer gives a detailed account of the dogs. He says:

"The first pack was organized under the superintendence of Wesley W. Turner, a citizen of Sumter county, and numbered nine. During the month of May, however, the control of the hounds was transferred to Benjamin Harris, who managed them during the remainder of the time that they were required. The constitution of a pack of hounds is somewhat peculiar. It is requisite to assort them in such a way that every advantage may be taken of their different abilities and powers of endurance. Some are needed to trace the steps of the fugitive and point out the course he has taken; others are needed to take up the scent and keep it warm. After these come the catch dogs—the real bloodhounds, who, following at a more leisurely pace, keep within hearing of those who head the course, and when the quarry comes to bay or is 'treed,' are generally up in time to take the prey."

Dr. T. H. Mann quotes from a return alleged to have been made by Wirz in August, 1864, in which he says:

"Perhaps twenty-five more (prisoners) escaped during the month, but were taken up by the dogs before the daily return was made up, and for this reason they are not on the list of the escaped nor recaptured."

The extracts from the journal, "Andersonville Prison Records," as published in Spencer's book, show the total number of escaped prisoners to have been 328, the largest number being in September, when eighty-four escaped. Brownell, in his narrative, says that the hounds "made a circuit of the prison, outside of the picket," which statement, if founded upon personal
observation, would certainly affect the credibility of his reports of occurrences within the prison, as none of the prisoners inside of the pen had an opportunity of making such observations. But from his statement one can justly infer that the dogs were kept, not solely to pursue prisoners, but fugitive Confederate soldiers as well. The status of paroled prisoners, as explained before, was certainly the same as that of Confederate soldiers, and the line must again be drawn between men under parole and those who had not acknowledged the authority of the Confederates in such a manner, but had remained prisoners in the full sense of the term. Colonel Chipman computed the number of victims of the dogs at fifty, but even such a strongly prejudiced man as Ambrose Spencer is able to mention but one. Mr. Spencer's story of the case is as follows:

"Joseph P. Aschuff, of a Massachusetts regiment and a prisoner, succeeded in making his escape one day. He was one of those who had been permitted to go out under the charge of a guard to gather wood and when they reached the forest he suddenly jumped upon the soldier and his two companions disarmed and tied him. The three separated and made off in pursuit of their liberty.

After a description of the capture the story goes on:

"He was bound and led back to Wirz, who punished him with the stocks for thirty-six hours, exposed to the sun, bloody, wounded, sore as he was."

It is not necessary to give special weight to the denial made by Jefferson Davis in an article published in Belford's Magazine, in January, 1890, in which he said that there were no blood hounds at Andersonville,
but only some deer and fox hounds. The reader will be content with the following deductions from Mr. Spencer's statements so far as they relate to the Wirz case: In the first place, it is authoritatively stated that Wirz, during August, 1864, was absent on sick leave in Augusta, Ga., and had there been as many victims as Colonel Chipman states, someone besides Wirz was active in aiding the "rebellion against the United States, with the view to assisting in weakening and impairing the armies of the United States."

Aschuff was one of three men sent out to procure a supply of wood for their comrades, who needed it for cooking purposes, but he deceived his comrades in regard to his real intention and committed a grave offense, which might have resulted fatally for him on the spot. He seems to have been the only one pursued by the dogs at the time. He was afterwards kept in the stocks, but was it vengeance on the part of Wirz, that kept him there? If, as charged, the motive of the prison official was murder, he had here a chance to shoot a man in his tracks for cause, but he did not do it. His motive in punishing the man was to prevent a repetition of the offense on the part of others, for, with the means on hand, if the privilege of going outside the prison had been restricted, it would have been impossible for him to have had the prisoners supplied with wood. Could the charge of withholding wood from the prisoners be refuted in any better way? Did not the treatment of Aschuff who had committed a grave offense show a degree of moderation in strong contrast to the vindictiveness of the accusers and persecutors
of Wirz, even if the story as told by Spencer be true? The object of Aschaff's punishment was to maintain discipline for the benefit of the prisoners.

But shocking as the use of dogs in times of war may appear, the Confederates seem to have merely been pioneers in the matter, for since the civil war columns have been written about the training of dogs for war purposes in Europe, and will anyone claim that the dogs there do not tear trousers as well as here?
CHAPTER IX.

ANOTHER EVIDENCE OF GOOD WILL.

One charge against Wirz, of which Colonel Chipman seems to have had no knowledge, has been made by some of the survivors of the war. Early in May a letter box was placed near one of the gates to afford the prisoners an opportunity of communicating with Wirz by letter and although paper could scarcely be obtained within the prison, quite a lively correspondence seems to have been carried on. The letters, so the story goes, were taken to Wirz's house where they were read by one of his daughters, a young woman, who, it is said, afterwards burned them. This story is often made the foundation of an additional charge of cruelty, the question being asked, why the woman wanted to read the letters unless she hoped to learn thereby the plots of the prisoners within the stockade. Among the letters addressed to Wirz was one written by a soldier of the Fourth Ohio Cavalry regiment. His name, if I recollect right, was Weidmueller. He was a shoemaker by trade and in his letter he advised Wirz to have shoes made from the hides of the cattle killed for the use of the garrison. The writer outlined his plan of operations and stated that even primitive tools, such as a jack-knife, would answer; that he was also will-
ing to train other men in making pegs for soleing shoes. This letter was written in German. The writer lost his life at the time of the explosion of the steamer "Sultana" in the Mississippi river and his testimony as to the action of Wirz in the matter can not be offered, but facts are recorded which show more than anything else the constant care of Wirz for the welfare of the prisoners and his special exertions towards providing for them with such comforts as the means on hand and the circumstances permitted.

The sequel of the shoemaker's advice is given in a letter written by the Confederate general, J. D. Imboden, addressed to General D. H. Maury, wherein he says:

"The same man, (Captain Wirz) who was tried and hung as a murderer, warmly urged the establishment of a tannery and shoemakers' shop, informing me that there were many men among the prisoners skilled in these trades and that some of them knew the process of very rapidly converting hides into tolerably good leather. * * * I ordered this and a few weeks later many of the barefooted prisoners were supplied with rough, but comfortable shoes."

If this incident does not show the misapprehension under which many of the survivors of Andersonville are still laboring concerning the motives of Wirz, it certainly again proves the constant efforts this man made to relieve the prisoners. This conception of the actions of Wirz is upheld by R. H. Chilton, of the Confederate adjutant general's department, who, in a letter dated Sept. 28, 1875, speaks of CaptainWirz as "the only officer mentioned favorably in that report"
[Chandler’s, which was extensively quoted by Colonel Chipman] as doing all that a subordinate could do to improve the condition of the prisoners.” Does not this incident show the provident care of Wirz as well as the intelligence and conscientiousness of his daughter? Did she read the letters only out of curiosity?
CHAPTER X.

OTHER IMPORTANT FACTS.

Had Captain Wirz been disposed to give vent to "murderous instincts" he would not have been permitted to do so for the people would have prevented it. The records quoted at his trial show that the Confederate authorities instituted frequent inspections. As early as May, 1864, Major General Howell Cobb forwarded to Richmond a report * prepared by Surgeon E. J. Eldridge and dated May 21, in which he said:

"I found the prisoners, in my opinion, too much crowded for the promotion or for the continuance of their health.

There were numerous other medical as well as military reports, and whoever is acquainted with the facts in the case cannot but admit their candor and the earnestness with which the matter was treated. That this opinion prevailed among the prisoners in a large degree becomes evident from the words: "while allowing the Confederate government all due praise for the attention paid to the prisoners" as contained in a series of resolutions adopted by 6,000 prisoners, who had been confined at Andersonville and who were

* Southern Historical Society Papers.
afterwards detained at Savannah, the Federal commander at Saint Augustine having declined to receive them, though their release had been offered without an equivalent. These prisoners had been in charge of Wirz for months and adopted the resolutions to express themselves "not willing to suffer to further the ends of any party or clique." They did not recognize their sufferings as the outcome of a conspiracy of "certain high rebel functionaries" or of the "cruel instincts" of Wirz, for the facts as they knew them were incompatible with the theory of willful cruelty. Hence they pointed to a "party or clique" as the only obstacle in the way of their release. Indeed the causes of their sufferings were not of a personal nature. Jefferson Davis, in summing them up, gives these causes:

1. The exceptionally inhuman act of the North declaring medicines to be contraband, of which there is but one, if indeed there be one, other example in modern war.

2. The insufficient means of transportation and the more inadequate means of repairing railroads and machinery, so that, as the war continued the insufficiency became more embarrassing.

5. The food was different from that to which the prisoners had been accustomed, particularly in the use of corn meal instead of wheat flour."

On these propositions he comments as follows: "It was not starvation, as has been alleged, but acclimation, unsuitable diet, and despondency which were the potent agents of disease and death."

The assertions contained in the first and third para-
graphs are certainly based on indisputable facts, while Mr. Davis' comments on the true causes of diseases and death are incontrovertible.

On the fly-leaf of a bible a prisoner at Andersonville wrote:

"And though our suffering was known to the president and to congress, nothing was done for us. An impartial investigation will show beyond doubt that the prisoners were left to their fate. Not knowing what would become of them was the worst of all the suffering. Strong men died from despair; there was no hope; 'hope deferred maketh the heart sick.'"

Acclimation, unsuitable diet and despondency—does it not seem the climax of cruelty to doom men, removed by capture from the scenes of actual conflict, to destruction by such agencies, while hundreds of thousands were protected in their desire to escape the duty of serving their country and defending its integrity?
The acts of Wirz were certainly prompted by a sense of duty. That he realized the importance of his position appears from his expression that he was "willing to bear the brunt." His duties were twofold: to hold the prisoners in obedience to the orders of the Confederate government which acted by virtue of its belligerent rights and to provide for them as best he could in obedience to the laws of humanity. Any laxity in one or the other direction would have led to additional loss of life and to avert such a calamity, he was forced to assert his personal authority even at the risk of taking life. That he did not give way to sentimentality was the salvation of the many thousands of orderly men, who had sense enough to know, that their liberation depended upon their own government and who on account of this were willing to bear the sufferings imposed upon them. They knew that an act of violence on their part would imperil the thousands of their helpless comrades within the stockade. But it was not only this. Wirz was obliged to exert a strong pressure upon the men in the stockade in order to reach every man for the purpose of supplying him with food.
The mob spirit, which was directed toward capturing the supplies brought to the stockade by the Confederates for distribution among the prisoners and which was encouraged by thoughtless men who could not realize the injury thereby done to the unfortunate comrade who would miss his rations, demanded empirical treatment. One cannot help but mourn the fate of the men who were punished, but are not the others also entitled to a just consideration? Should Wirz have failed in the exercise of his authority in order to escape responsibility in view of the final victory of the Union cause, which must have appeared inevitable to him as well as it did to others, and so have allowed the prisoners to suffer and perish without tendering to them a helping hand? They needed protection against wrongs which were perpetrated by their own comrades, their alleged protectors among them not excepted, for even, Davidson says:

"A police or vigilance committee organized itself among the prisoners for the preservation of order in the camp. The purpose was good but there were lots of meanness perpetrated by these policemen that deserve the severest censure:

Had Wirz done one iota less than what he did, the loss of life at Andersonville would have been still more appalling and this age would have been deprived of the sole comforting fact in this episode which is, that there was at least one man who was fearless enough to do his duty and serve humanity by enforcing discipline which was the only practical way left open to him.
Desperate conditions require desperate means. It is so in times of peace, and could it have been otherwise at Andersonville in time of war?
CHAPTER XII.

SUSPENSION OF THE CARTEL.

The cartel for the exchange of prisoners was suspended by an order of the adjutant general, dated July 3, 1863. The suspension was due to the suspicion that "the sick and wounded in hospitals were released in order to avoid guarding and removing them. Such paroles are not regarded by the enemy and will not be respected by the United States." In regard to the right of a belligerent to interfere with such paroles, Vattel, an authority on international law, says "that subjects should have this mode of saving their lives or recovering their liberty."

In the discussion of the subject in later years, General Grant is generally quoted as the author of that policy because of the following letter:

"City Point, August 18, 1864.

"To General Butler,—I am satisfied with the chief object of your interview. Besides having the proper sanction, it meets with my entire approval. I have seen, from Southern papers, that a system of retaliation is going on in the South, which they keep from us and which we should stop in some way.

"On the subject of exchange, however, I differ with General Hitchcock. It is hard on our men held in Southern prisons not to exchange them, but it is humanity to those left in the ranks to light our bat-
tles. Every man released on parole or otherwise becomes an active soldier against us, either directly or indirectly. If we commence a system of exchange which liberates all prisoners taken, we will have to fight on until the whole South is exterminated. If we hold those caught, they amount to no more than dead men. At this particular time, to release all rebel prisoners North would insure Sherman's defeat and would compromise our safety here.

[Signed]  
"U. S. Grant,  
"Lieutenant-General."

In the editorial in The New York Sun, which has been referred to before, Mr. Dana says in regard to the connection of General Grant with the policy of non-exchange:

"The fact is unquestionable that while the Confederates desired to exchange prisoners, to send their men home and to get back their own, General Grant steadily and strenuously resisted such an exchange. While, in his opinion, the prisoners in our hands were well fed, and were in better condition than when they were captured, our prisoners in the South were ill-fed, and would be restored to us too much exhausted by famine and disease to form a fair set-off against the comparative vigorous men who would be given in exchange. 'It is hard on our men held in Southern prisons,' said Grant in an official communication, 'not to exchange them; but it is humane to those left in the ranks to fight our battles. If we commence a system of exchanges which liberates all prisoners taken, we will have to fight on until the whole South is exterminated. If we hold those caught, they count for no more than dead men.' 'I did not,' he said on another occasion, 'deem it justifiable or just to reinforce the enemy; and an immediate resumption of exchanges would have had the effect without any
corresponding benefit." This evidence," adds Mr. Dana, "must be taken as conclusive."

Just one year prior to this on July 4, 1863, General Grant paroled the garrison of Vicksburg, giving as ground that "many of them were tired of the war and would get home just as soon as they could. A large number of them had voluntarily come into our lines during the siege and requested to be sent North where they could get employment until the war was over and they could go to their homes." In another place, in giving the details of the patrolling of the prisoners, he says:

"Several hundred refused to sign their paroles, preferring to be sent to the North as prisoners to being sent back to fight again. Pemberton appealed to me in person to compel these men to sign these paroles but I declined. It also leaked out that many of the men who had signed their paroles, intended to desert and go to their homes as soon as they got out of our lines. * * * * Many deserted, and fewer of them were ever returned to the ranks to fight again than would have been the case had the surrender been unconditional and the prisoners sent to the James river to be paroled."

The extracts tend to show that General Grant had a changeable mind. He admits that there was no necessity for holding the prisoners as, "they would count for no more than dead men," because "many deserted and fewer of them ever returned to the ranks to fight again"; and that not every man released on parole or otherwise again became an active soldier and that on the contrary, the parole in the field, as prohibited by order of the war department
in Washington, had a strong tendency to weaken the enemy and thus remove the necessity or extermination; he furthermore admits that the system of exchange had been proved to be of advantage only to the North. On that point General Grant can be quoted further for he says in his "Memoirs:"

"Troops were necessary in the Northern states to prevent prisoners from the Southern army being released by outside force, armed and set at large to destroy by fire our Northern cities." *

Here lie plainly although indirectly, admits the contrary to what he stated as the reason for non-exchange in his letter, written at City Point, by referring to the presence of prisoners in the North as such a "menace" to the safety of Northern cities that to protect them it was necessary to have troops who would otherwise have formed a "fair set-off" to men given in exchange.

Here lies the inconsistency of the position taken by the authorities at Washington. General Grant undoubtedly had a right to object to an exchange of prisoners pending the campaign in Virginia, the conditions being such as to justify such an extreme measure, but was he right in objecting to the exchange of captives taken during previous campaigns in view of the fact that the "depraved physical condition" of the captured Confederates showed the absolute impossibility of such surviving captivity? Had he a right to designate them as victims in the face of the Confederates' protests?

The need of troops in the Northern states for the protection of cities against a possible outbreak of prisoners, is another important feature as it makes the object of the suspension of the cartel appear dubious, so far as it was for the purpose of maintaining military superiority in the field. There would have been troops available for that purpose but for the policy of non-exchange.

General Grant does not further express himself in his "Memoirs" regarding the prisoners or his connection with the policy of non-exchange for which, in his letters, he had advanced military reasons—reasons, which even Mr. Dana hesitated to pronounce valid. The claim of humanity becomes untenable in the face of the fact that this "humanity," according to General Halleck, resulted in cruelty unparalleled in history, but for which, as Mr. Dana says, neither "Jefferson Davis or any subordinate or associate of his" should be condemned.

"The condition of the Confederate soldiers in the field was not worse than that of the Union prisoners" says Mr. Dana. This is confirmed by The Nation, when it speaks of the "depraved physical condition" of the captured Confederates as the cause of the great mortality among them. Aside from the fact, that, in the light of these admissions, the Wirz trial was made a cruel farce, the policy of non-exchange is given a peculiar aspect indeed.

In the first place, the insufficiency of supplies in the Confederacy, as intimated by The Nation and admitted by Mr. Dana, was a leading factor in the collapse
of the rebellion. The forces in the field greatly lacked supplies and their power of resistance had been gradually lessened by exposure and hunger. While their numerical strength had by no means been reduced to the extent of making their cause entirely hopeless, yet a continuation of the struggle became impossible for want of supplies, but not for military reasons, an assertion which seems to be well sustained by the lesson of the "Seven Years War," when it was learned that superiority of the forces in the field was no guaranty of ultimate success, for a continuance of hostilities brought on exhaustion of the stronger power as well.

To further characterize the situation, it needs to be stated, that the quartermaster in Goldsborough, N. C., was able but once during five days to procure rations for the prisoners held in that place. General Joseph Johnson had at the time concentrated a Confederate force in that region and to this was due the inability to procure supplies for the prisoners and their escort as well.

But even if the prisoners were neglected intentionally, does it not appear clear to reasonable people, that the collapse of the rebellion would have been hastened in case the Confederates, instead of being obliged to furnish provisions for the prisoners had had to provide for an equal number of their own men who would have had the right to insist upon being furnished the same quantity of food as the other soldiers? If the policy of non-exchange recommended itself for military reasons, the observations noted in The Nation and the statement of Mr. Dana completely destroy
the correctness of that assumption, provided that the charge of withholding food from the prisoners is upheld at the same time. There is an irreconcilable conflict between the policy of the Federal government and the charge of willful cruelty manifested toward the prisoners by withholding food from them, for if the charge is well founded, then the policy of non-exchange had a tendency to prolong the war by enabling the Confederates to better economize their resources and so maintain themselves in the field in spite of their inferiority in numbers. General Grant speaks of this as the "crumbling process." "They could get no more recruits, while losing, at least, a regiment per day," he says. Here he again reiterates the observations he made after the surrender of Vicksburg although his plea of humanity in support of the policy of non-exchange loses every foundation of fact.

To summarize the statements of General Grant on this question, it would appear that he considered the exchange of prisoners as commendable for the reason that the experience of the captives tended to convince them of the hopelessness of their cause. Later on, he suited his views to the situation brought on by fatal mistakes of the Federal government which allowed no other remedy at the time. But when he speaks of the need of strong garrisons in Northern cities on account of the presence of Confederate prisoners, his statement permits of another explanation for the persistency with which the powers in Washington refused the offers of the Confederates for the renewal of the exchange. Was not the pres-
ence of the garrison for the purpose of securing in those states the dominance of the republican party at the presidential election in 1861? The holding of captives had evidently proved a disadvantage to the North because of the need of strong garrisons; the Confederacy, on account of the general levy of all males from 16 to 60 years of age, was not deprived of a solitary man, capable of performing services in the field. Hence arose the impracticability of the whole system irrespective of the considerations of humanity.
CHAPTER XIII.

THE BLOCKADE.

There is another feature to be noted. The Federal government blockaded the Confederate ports for the purpose of depriving them of the supplies needed for carrying on the war. The absence within the Confederacy of every industry for the production of war material made the blockade a potent factor in the suppression of the rebellion, but its effectiveness was put in doubt when the requirements for active warfare on the part of the Confederates were lessened by holding the Confederate prisoners. The purpose of the blockade was to deprive the Confederates of war material and of arms which they could not obtain except by importation, but by holding as captives their men able to bear arms, the needs of the South in regard to the equipment of its army, were lessened and the possibility of securing other needful supplies was increased proportionately so as to keep the army, though reduced in number, in better condition for maintaining the field.

These propositions assume especial importance in view of the obligations of a belligerent power toward its subjects while in captivity as stated by Vattel, for when it is assumed that the Federal government felt
it necessary to lessen the Confederacy's power of resistance by the non-exchange of prisoners, it is clearly shown that the government contributed to the suffering of the Union prisoners by the enforcement of the blockade. The charge of barbarous practices therefore, applies to the Federal side as well as to the Confederates. The government exerted the "pressure of misery" upon its own "subjects," an instance rarely known in the history of civilized nations. The commands of humanity were disregarded and barbarous methods were resorted to though clearly in conflict with the Union's best interests and regardless of the fact that the ostensible object of the war was the advancement of humanity. Hence the efforts to direct the attention of the people to the ball and divert it from the gunners.
CHAPTER XIV.

POSITION OF THE CONFEDERACY.

It can not be denied that the Confederates made ostentatious efforts to effect an exchange and that on their part, there was no hiding of the horrors experienced by the prisoners. The suffering among the men was, for a time, a subject of discussion in the Southern press. There was no denial of the fact that the condition of the prisoners "constituted one of the horrors of the war." This sentence touches the vital point, for the condition of the prisoners ought not to have constituted such a horror. To avert the responsibility of the horror being ascribed to them, the Confederates, in the first place, were most active in making known the suffering which the captives were enduring. Under the laws of nations, the captor is "bound to treat those who fall into his hands, with humanity. He cannot allow them to suffer or starve but must provide the necessaries of life, such as food, clothing, fuel." The plea of the Confederates for a resumption of the exchange of prisoners was prompted by their sense of humanity. Their inability to properly provide for their captives, on account of the lack of industries and the degraded agrarian conditions in the insurgent states, not to speak of the re-
suits of the blockade, should have given force and effect to their pleas in behalf of the prisoners as their condition made it appear the "moral duty" of the Federal government to yield its position. In the words of Halleck, it was bound "to provide for the release of such of its citizens and allies, as have fallen into the hands of the enemy. They have fallen" he quotes, "into this misfortune only by acting in its service and in the support of its cause." "This" says Vattel, "is a care which the state owes to those who exposed themselves in her defense."

The question of responsibility, therefore, became to the Confederates one of great importance and explains the urgency of their offers for an exchange. In this they even went so far as to waive their rights as belligerents by offering the release of their prisoners without an equivalent, depriving themselves of such rights to the extent of yielding the means for protecting their own soldiers held as captives in the Northern prisons as the only effectual method "of recalling an enemy from inhuman courses."

The Confederates had much to gain by a general knowledge of the facts. Engaged in war for the purpose of establishing a government, whose foundation was a system of servitude repulsive to most of the civilized nations, it was their object to show a high regard for the obligations of humanity, so far as they concerned the white man, the colored race on their side being excluded from actual participation in the conflict. Thus they hoped to retain the good will of nations friendly to them by demonstrating that the
hardest strain for the maintenance of the field was on the other side. Keeping within the bounds of humanity they even could hope for intervention on the part of England or France, or both of these powers.

That their hopes were not in vain, appears from a statement made in the press at the time of the death of Mr. Beverly Tucker, the diplomatic agent of the Confederacy, when he was credited with having been successful in his negotiations with England in so far, that that power had fixed a time for intervention. This statement is given the color of truth by the evidences of activity among the Confederates in Canada when, as a forerunner of intervention, diplomacy and secret agitation were used to outbalance other advantages of the Federals. By their efforts in favor of an exchange of prisoners, the Confederates, it seems, upheld a cause for foreign intervention, another essential ground being the increasing difficulties the North had in mustering in its recruits.

For the purpose of overcoming this crisis, General Butler wrote his letter on the exchange question * to furnish—"a ground on which we could stand." He was aided by the United States Sanitary commission directing the attention of the people to the prison horror as an incident of the war brought on by the savage disposition of the people of the South. General Butler's letter, however, is of additional importance for the fact, that even if the grounds, as presented by him, were valid, they had become void by the

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* Narrative of Privations and Sufferings of Prisoners, published by the U. S. Sanitary Commission, 1861.
voluntary action of the Confederates, who, in the case of captured colored soldiers, acknowledged the rights of the person in war as early as October, 1864. **

The race question, then was, as General Butler says, a mere pretense.

** A number of colored prisoners held in Charleston as criminals were brought to the camp at Florence, S. C., in October and recognized as prisoners of war.
CONCLUSIONS.

A discussion of the ethical features of the prison episode has never been attempted. In the North the prevalence of sectional feeling has discouraged such efforts and the stories of willful cruelty shown to the prisoners by the Confederates have become traditional, especially upon the strength of official recognition by the conviction of Captain Wirz. Then came Mr. James G. Blaine with his outburst of passionate denunciation on the floor of the United States senate in 1872, when he said that “neither the deeds of the Duke of Alva in the low countries, nor the massacre of Saint Bartholomew, nor the thumbscrews and engines of torture of the Spanish inquisition, begin to compare in atrocity with the hideous crimes of Andersonville.” This picture was painted in too glowing colors to satisfy the critical, who since seem to have become skeptical in regard to the measure of suffering endured by the prisoners. In regard to that, however, the assertions of Mr. Blaine were true.

So far then, the discussion of Andersonville has related to the conduct of the Southern people to the prisoners. But the general aspect of this episode offers a most important lesson to the
people, which has been hidden from them by sectional prejudice engendered by a disregard of all the essential features connected with the matter.

After the arguments on the slave question had been exhausted, a crisis was brought on by the election of Abraham Lincoln to the presidential chair. His election was looked upon as a vindication of free labor. The overwhelming anti-slavery sentiment in the North sustained the enthusiasm which was manifested when the Southern, afterwards the Confederate, states offered armed resistance to the Federal authority. History offers but few instances of such patriotic fervour as was shown by the people of the North, during the initial period of the civil war. At the first bidding an army was collected and organized equal to the mightiest host that ever assembled before. The first great battle fought on this continent, that of Shiloh, proved the prowess of the American volunteer. Undying faith in liberty and the perpetuity of the Union supported his courage and his achievements on the field of honor were the greater because his adversaries were of the same mettle. These soldiers had enlisted into the service of the United States without regard to conditions and solely in obedience to their patriotic sentiments. The prompt rally of the volunteers of 1861 was a glorious vindication of popular government; like the heroes of Valmy in 1792, they were imbued with their glorious mission, that of fighting the battles of mankind.

The offer of increased bounty in 1862, undoubtedly
depreciated the standard of the volunteers, a fact freely admitted by the soldiers at the time. Purely patriotic motives became mixed with mercenary considerations. This feature was embodied in the draft law, enacted in March, 1863, in response to the general service law enacted by the Confederate congress. The Federal law with its exemption clause and the increased offers of bounty by the Federal state and municipal authorities became the determining factor in the further conduct of the war. It aroused opposition in various sections of the country, for its provisions were in conflict with one of the fundamental principles of popular government—that of equality before the law. It discriminated between classes by affording an opportunity for the wealthy to escape the natural duty of taking part in the defense of their country. The lavish expenditure of money in the form of bounties and the inflation of the money circulation resulting therefrom enabled many to profit by the exemption clause, so that the physical resources of the government were rather curtailed than enlarged by the operations of the draft law. The bounty clubs, the members of which were pledged to secure for each other immunity from service, competed with the government in offering inducements to men willing to enlist, and by yielding to the demands it furnished additional means for those determined to fight by proxy.

On the other hand the passage of the Federal draft law was in conflict with the military experience of centuries. The country was engaged in a military
enterprise of the dimensions of a national war and was bound to adopt a system of defense best calculated to secure the prompt development of the physical resources of the country and bring to an end the abnormal conditions of war within the shortest time possible. In this it was bound to follow the example of the opposing party. General service must be accepted as the logical sequence of the volunteer system unless we admit that the citizen willing to take up arms in the defense of his country is an inferior being as compared with one unwilling to do so.

With the passage of the general service law, the Confederates fully recognized the progress of the times. Their system of defense was identical with the Prussian one, which is a legal recognition of the changes brought about by the French revolution and one which has since been imitated by all civilized nations. The Federal system of defense, with its bounty features, has been frequently compared with the system in vogue during the time of Wallenstein. If this was the case, then the teachings of the fathers of the republic were obviously disregarded by the recognition of classes and by the granting of legal preferences which were in conflict with the doctrine of political equality, the great achievement of the American revolution. Judging from the standpoint of history, the policy of the government was retrogressive, while that of the Confederates was progressive. Here then, we have a clear violation of the laws of competition. This should be plain to everyone. For example, who would attempt to conduct a business on the plan of 1640 and
attempt to compete with the patent processes of our day? The one undertaking such a thing could not escape the penalty.

The discrepancy in the law is very clearly pointed out in the following extract from the "History of Milwaukee:

"On July 28, the President made another call for 500,000 fresh troops, for one, two or three years' service. In view of the defects shown in the bill under which the previous drafts had been made, Congress had early in July passed a new conscription bill. Under its conditions there was no commutation. Volunteers were paid a bounty of $100 for one year, $200 for two years, and $300 for three years, all conscripts obliged to serve in person or by substitute.

Under the provisions of this bill the call was made for volunteers to enter any old regiment till Sept. 5, at which time a draft was ordered to supply the number still unfurnished at that date, and in addition 100 per cent. to cover any shortage that might occur from discharges, failing to report, and other causes. This draft, owing to the stringency of the existing law, awakened anew the work of recruiting, but it took a new form. There being no commutation, each able-bodied man liable to military duty was vigorously hunting for a substitute before the draft should be made. . . . . . . Nearly half of those who applied for examination previous to the draft were not entered on the enrollment list. Those less fortunate, who were enrolled, took immediate means, if possible, to avert or avoid the threatened calamity, by buying a substitute, if loyal and able to do so; by fleeing the country when cowardly or disloyal, if able; while the poor classes, unable to do either, waited in anxious suspense, bordering on despair, the terrible result.

It was to those of the poorer class a time of great
tribulation. The men were mostly heads of families dependent on them for daily support, out of which household the oldest boy had in many cases already been voluntarily spared. . . . . During the period between the call and the draft, while the enrollment was progressing, enlistments went on freely, most of the enlisting being substitutes bought by those enrolled. A brisk and profitable business was done by substitute brokers, and soldiers had as quotable a value as a horse during those periods, prices constantly advancing from the time of the call to the time of the draft. The opening prices, July 18, were: One-year men, $100; two-years men, $200; and three-years men, $300. At these opening prices the supply was not equal to the demand, and all were taken as fast as offered; as the time of the draft drew near and anxiety increased, prices advanced. The prices on the last day of examinations, Aug. 20, were: For one-year men, $200; two-years men, $100 to $150; and three-years men, $600 to $650. Subsequently as high as $800 was paid for a single substitute for three years. One business man paid $700 for his man, and subsequently ascertained, much to his disgust, that he was physically disqualified for the service, having lost a toe and being one-half inch below the stature prescribed in the regulations. The little merchant, who was loyal to the core, raved and swore roundly, not, as he said, ‘for the loss of the $700, but to think that them cussed bounty-brokers and bounty-jumpers have divided it up between them, when it might just as well have gone to the Soldiers’ Home.’

“The draft began Sept. 19 and continued through the month. The original quota of Milwaukee county was 4,087, which at the time it took place had been reduced to 3,275. So large a number were discharged on examination, or fled the country, that the reserve lists in many wards were exhausted, and supplemental
drafts were made in November. This did not fill the quota, and until another draft was made in December, and still another in January, from the delinquent wards above named, was the work complete. When the last supplemental draft was completed in the Third ward, which suffered most, all but thirty of the number enrolled had been drafted. The last three events of the year to quicken the pulse of the city were another call from the President for 300,000 troops, and an order for another draft on the fifteenth of the coming February, made on the 19th of December. . . . The enrollment was commenced and efforts were begun to raise volunteers as heretofore. The city at this time proposed to take the matter in hand in her corporate capacity. The question of levying a bounty tax was voted on by the people, Feb. 14, and decided affirmatively by a vote of 1,663 in favor of the proposition to 787 against it. Subsequently an application was filed in the circuit court by many leading citizens to restrain action in accordance with the people's vote, on grounds of illegality which it is here unnecessary to define, as the speedy close of the war put an end to the whole matter."

The reader should especially note the defects of the law, the ineffectual drafts during the last months of 1864 and the final exhaustion of the draft rolls which nearly necessitated the raising of a tax with which to meet the deficiency in men by increased offers of bounty.

The remedy applied for removing the defects of the law was an amendment requiring personal substitutes to be furnished by all conscripts unwilling to perform military service. From that time until the close of the war 125,000 personal substitutes were mustered into the service, a force strong enough to form a fair set-off to
any number of well-fed Confederates which the government was able to offer in exchange for "our famishing men." How many secured exemption under the law of 1863 is not known, but the workings of the law in assisting the exhaustion of the physical resources of the country were recognized by the passage of the amended law of 1864. The statement, that no further draft was practicable in February, 1865, further confirms the baneful effect of that law. While such strenuous efforts were made to secure exemptions for persons willing to profit by the misfortunes of the government, thousands of men were allowed to perish in the Confederate prisons in spite of the assertions of the Confederates that they were unable to properly provide for the prisoners' support. This was for the sole purpose of enabling the government to maintain its superiority in the field, the opportunity for maintaining such a superiority without an additional sacrifice of lives having been passed by the approval of the exemption clause in the draft law.

The financial aspect of the law was equally disastrous. Hundreds of thousands of men were released upon their payment of $300; subsequently $1,000 and even more was paid to men willing to enlist. In the light of these facts "the humanity to those left in ranks" becomes very significant. But General Grant, like General Butler, had to furnish ground for the government to stand on. It had missed the "categorical imperative" which the Confederates had recognized by passing a general service law and found
itself in a state of perplexity, for it had disregarded the fundamental maxims of war and was confronted by emergencies due to exhaustive campaigns and lack of recruits for filling up the depleted ranks. In leaving the prisoners to their fate, the laws of war were violated beyond a doubt, and because of this the condemnation of Captain Wirz becomes especially significant for the reason that the scaffold on which he died was intended to hide this fact.

In its dealings with the people, the party in power had recognized two classes and in its dealings with the classes it used different measures. It failed to enact compulsion in the case of the favored class, although every consideration of humanity and the experience of centuries should have prompted the government to use its constitutional power in calling into service every able-bodied man for the purpose of demonstrating to its opponents the hopelessness of further efforts on their part, thus terminating the war much earlier by removing every pretense for a continuation of hostilities. The discrimination of the law was also in conflict with the principle of political equality, for citizens were designated as victims for the sake of others seeking advantages foreign to the objects of the war. In doing so, the laws of civilization were plainly violated. The sacrifice of life in war is only justifiable for the purpose of overcoming armed resistance. The government therefore had no right to insist upon the suspension of the cartel for the exchange of prisoners in order to overcome the difficulties it had experienced on account of the in-
sufficiency of its civil legislation. Civil legislation must be suited to the demands of war, the laws of war being supreme.

This difference in the government's dealings with the people has become a fixed policy of the Republican party. The seed beds of that policy were Andersonville and other Confederate prisons. The state, in the case of the prisoners, contrary to the provisions of the international code, assumed the right to expose citizens enlisted in its service to unparalleled suffering and sacrificed their lives for the sake of other citizens who were unwilling to aid in the country's defense, a right not recognized or asserted even by the champions of slavery who only claimed the proceeds of the labor of the colored man, not his life.

This discrimination between the favored class and the rest of the people has been continued and enlarged by subsequent legislation. It begins with the payment of soldiers in depreciated currency, * against the passage of the gold redemption law, when, according to estimates, $1,700,000 were thrown into the laps of the favored class in addition to the privilege of exemption from taxation for the amount of their investment in bonds, to the usurious rate of interest exacted by means of the coin condition and the high premiums secured on their investments. Such preferential legislation has since been continued, until lately the McKinley law was enacted to prolong the period of war profits, although the costs of the war have been and are being paid by the people.

* Mr. S. F. Norton, author of "The Soldier and Bondholder" estimates the loss of each soldier of the three years class at $153.40 in gold.
From the time of its inception, the draft law has remained in force. The McKinley law is essentially a revival of the draft law. The latter as an expediency in war required the sacrifice of lives, while the former opens the pockets of the people for the purpose of sustaining the same legal inequality in times of peace. Its effects are not yet felt enough, but some one will have to pay the penalty. In a country, the fundamental principle of which is equality before the law, a continuous condition of inequality must lead to disturbances, such as the late strikes, and in the end to revolution. The legally created millionaires, but not the millionaires who became such by their genius, and the grave mounds near the stockades in the South, were the first symptoms of the fatal error, now termed Protection. Protection had its origin in a misconception of duties in war; it has been fastened upon this country by partisan considerations and that they might prevail, the true facts connected with the prison episode have been withheld. Is it a wonder that the lessons of the civil war have been so little appreciated?

The Confederates, on the other hand, though maintaining the racial discrimination, fully recognized their obligations towards those in the field. They "robbed the cradle and the grave" in obedience to the demands of civilization, which holds the life of one as dear as that of another. "War is the test for the standard of a nation" * says Dr. F. W. Barthold, "for it shows us in what estimation a man and his

* Geschichte der Kriegsverfassung and des Kriegswesens der Deutschen, by Dr. F. W. Barthold, Leipsie, 1864.
dearest goods (life) are being held.’’ By the undeserved denunciation of the Confederates because of the fate of the prisoners of war, people have been discouraged from making comparisons, but the difference in the results is obvious.

In the North “protection” brought on a social revolution by the enthronement of plutocracy; in the South communities were lifted from peace into war without disturbance of social conditions; the soldier was not subordinated to capital and the rights of the person were rigidly respected. In the North the disquietude resulting from “protection” tends to destroy the faith of the people in free institutions and the disciples of socialism are fast increasing. They, the Confederates, have demonstrated that popular government is fitted to respond to every demand of civilization. The North has been prevented from doing so by its class rule inaugurated during the war. Constitutional and international obligations have been disregarded as a matter of dire necessity, growing out from that disposition to “protect.” But is such protection (or unjust preferment) which is in conflict with the fundamental doctrines of government anything else than anarchy—anarchy resulting from bad laws? Anarchists are found among law makers as well. This fact has been recognized since the time of Sophokles. The prophecy of Teirisias,* that anarchy would prevail in the realm of King Keon was fulfilled; for anarchy of the law-maker brings on anarchy of the law breaker.

* Sophokles, Antigone.
Still Democracy champions the cause of equality before the law and those eternal principles of humanity and justice enunciated in the Declaration of Independence, which made this country the beacon light of hope for all nations striving for freedom and advancement. Are the people yet willing to yield their birthrights to greedy monopolists and assign to capital the blessings for which they are indebted to free institutions?

Such thoughts the memories of Andersonville suggest. While the captors were willing to and did share with their prisoners their last morsel, they, on the other hand, were sacrificed by their own party in obedience to the demands (disloyalty?) of a greedy plutocracy; the thousands of young men, buried at Andersonville would have died in vain unless people become aware of the cause of their fate and learn the lessons therefrom. If failing in this, the question is forced upon the world:

"With the advent of popular government is there noted a progress in civilization?"

THE END.
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